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THE  
CAMBRIDGE  
MODERN HISTORY

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## PREFACE TO THE FIRST EDITION

As we advance towards modern times, our task must needs become more difficult. The mass of material from which history has to be constructed grows constantly greater; and the sources have not yet been collated and coordinated so thoroughly as in earlier periods. The political struggles of the early nineteenth century still awake living passions and touch burning controversies of to-day. The scene is nearer to our eyes; proportion and perspective are in consequence more difficult to preserve. On the other hand, for this period, the authentic records are for the most part now accessible, though as yet imperfectly worked; for periods still later they will be closed to us, except in so far as a more liberal system may lead to the removal of unnecessary restrictions.

The unity of action and interests which characterises the history of Europe in the Napoleonic period still survives for some years after the Emperor's fall. For seven years the attempt was made to govern European relations, and the affairs of individual States, by common action concerted in European conclave. The epoch during which this unifying effort was maintained is surveyed in a separate chapter of this volume; for once, it is actually possible to treat the history of Europe as a single whole; and international relations group themselves as the affairs of an inchoate Confederation. But national aspirations soon shattered this ideal, the individualist policy of Great Britain largely contributing to the rupture. Thus in the later part of the period international relations must be studied in connexion with particular questions: more especially, with that of South America, with the Eastern Question, and with the problems presented by the various revolutions and by the unstable political equilibrium of the countries of southern Europe. The grouping of the Powers varies as each new question arises. Meanwhile the evolution of the modern State proceeds and can be studied best in the United Kingdom, where the most momentous problems were successfully and peacefully solved, and also, at different

stages, in France and Germany. In Russia alone among the Great Powers reaction seems more evident than progress; and the dreams of Alexander are found to have produced no tangible effect. This volume closes on the threshold of other and greater changes, whose effect on the European polity is not yet exhausted.

We have been fortunate in securing the cooperation of distinguished foreign scholars for chapters which deal with the affairs of France, Italy, Spain, Russia, and Poland. Economic changes and economic thought have received due attention; and place has been found for the great literary movements in England, France, and Germany. In some cases a retrospect has enabled us to do justice to developments which it was difficult to consider in conjunction with the tumultuous politics of the Revolutionary and Napoleonic eras.

Russian and Polish orthography have presented a difficult problem. The compromise between a phonetic and the native spelling which we have adopted is not and cannot be in all respects satisfactory; but the correct native spelling of Polish names would involve the use of an alphabet unknown to most of our readers; and a purely phonetic spelling would be too great a deviation from customary usage. In one case we have deliberately retained the familiar German transliteration. General Diebitsch might not have been recognised as Dybicz.

Our cordial thanks are due to all those who have cooperated with us in this portion also of our enterprise for the great pains which they have taken in contributing to its progress.

A. W. W.  
G. W. P.  
S. L.

CAMBRIDGE

April, 1907



## NOTE ON THE PRESENT EDITION

THE reprint now offered to the public comprises the complete text and index of each of the twelve volumes, together with Volume XIII, which contains the genealogical tables and general index. The bibliographies and the atlas volume are not included in this edition.

*Cambridge 1934*

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## CHAPTER I.

### THE CONGRESSES, 1815-22.

NAPOLEON, in his exile at St Helena, explained to the world, through his secretary Las Cases, the great ideal toward which all his efforts had been directed. He had aimed, he said, at concentrating the great European peoples, divided hitherto by a multiplicity of artificial boundaries, into homogeneous nations, out of which he would have formed a confederation bound together "by unity of codes, principles, opinions, feelings, and interests." At the head of this league, under the aegis of his Empire, he had dreamed of establishing a central assembly, modelled on the American Congress or the Amphictyonic assembly of Greece, to watch over the common weal of "the great European family." The dream had been dissipated by his ruin; but he prophesied that it would yet be realised, sooner or later, "by the force of circumstances." "The impulse has been given, and I do not think that, after my fall and the disappearance of my system, there will be any other great equilibrium possible in Europe than the concentration and confederation of the great peoples. The first sovereign who, in the midst of the first great struggle, shall embrace in good faith the cause of the peoples, will find himself at the head of all Europe, and will be able to accomplish whatever he wishes."

Whether, but for the chastening effect of his downfall, Napoleon would ever have proclaimed this ideal, or whether, had he done so, circumstances, which he acknowledged to have been even his master, would have enabled him to realise it, is a speculation more fascinating than profitable. The significant thing is that so keen an observer of the temper of the times should have given it to the world, on the morrow of the Congress of Vienna, as the apology for his career.

The treaties which were the outcome of the Congress were, in fact, a bitter disappointment to those who had looked for an authoritative recognition of those new-born forces of nationality to which, in the stress of the War of Liberation, the monarchs had appealed. They were scarcely less of a disappointment to those who had hoped from this unique constituent assembly of sovereign princes an international constitution which would have obviated for ever the need of the barbarous

appeal to arms. "Men had promised themselves," wrote Friedrich von Gentz, immediately after he had witnessed the signing of the Final Act, "an all-embracing reform of the political system of Europe, guarantees for peace; in one word, the return of the Golden Age. The Congress has resulted in nothing but restorations, which had already been effected by arms; agreements between the Great Powers, of little value for the future balance and preservation of the peace of Europe; quite arbitrary alterations in the possessions of the less important States; but in no act of a higher nature, no great measure for public order or for the universal good, which might compensate humanity for its long sufferings, or reassure it as to the future....The Protocol of the Congress bears the stamp rather of a temporary agreement than of work destined to last for centuries. But, to be just. The Treaty, such as it is, has the undeniable merit of having prepared the world for a more complete political structure. If ever the Powers should meet again to establish a political system by which wars of conquest would be rendered impossible and the rights of all guaranteed, the Congress of Vienna, as a preparatory assembly, will not have been without use. A number of vexatious details have been settled, and the ground has been made ready for building up a better social structure." It is with the attempt to complete the work left unfinished at Vienna, and to build up this "better social structure," that the history of Europe from 1815 to 1822 is mainly concerned.

The idea of a central constitution for Europe, though new life had been given to it by the common sufferings of the revolutionary epoch, was of course no new one. The Holy Roman Empire, so long as it carried on even a shadowy existence, had remained as the venerable symbol of this idea; and, at the close of the Congress of Vienna, Cardinal Consalvi, in the name of the Holy See, had entered a solemn protest against the failure of the Christian Powers to maintain the "centre of political unity." But the Empire had been too long closely associated with the interests of the German nation and the House of Habsburg to be treated, even by theorists, as the key-stone of an international confederation; and in all the "projects of perpetual peace" which had been published to the world during the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries, the Empire had been either ignored or assigned, at best, but a subordinate place. Of these schemes the *Projet de Traité pour rendre la paix perpétuelle*, published in 1713 by the Abbé de Saint-Pierre, deserves more particular notice as having formed the basis of all subsequent plans of the same kind. It aimed at making the Treaty of Utrecht the basis of an international system resembling that established afterwards among the German States by the Act of Confederation framed by the Congress of Vienna. A European League or "Christian Republic" was to be established, of which the members were to renounce the right of making war against one another and to submit their disputes to the arbitration

of a central assembly of the Allies, whose decision was to be enforced, if necessary, by a common armament. This idea was taken up and elaborated, from time to time, by thinkers of the most divergent schools.

Yet, but for the Revolution, all their projects might have remained mere speculations of theorists. It was the common peril of the revolutionary propaganda, however underrated and misunderstood, that first revealed to statesmen a political Europe, recognising common rights and common duties. The Concert of Europe was born in the circular letter of Count Kaunitz, dated July 17, 1791, in which, in the name of the Emperor Leopold, he impressed upon the Imperial ambassadors the duty of all the Powers to make common cause for the purpose of preserving "public peace, the tranquillity of States, the inviolability of possessions, and the faith of treaties," and pointed out, as Voltaire had done in his *Siecle de Louis XIV*, that the nations of Europe—united by ties of religion, institutions, and culture—formed but "a single family." Thirteen years later, when the moral had been enforced by the bitter results of the continuance of the traditional dissensions, the Emperor Alexander I of Russia took up the theme. In a despatch dated September 11, 1804, and addressed to Novosiltsoff, the Russian special envoy in England, he suggested for the consideration of Pitt a plan resembling in general outline that of the Abbé de Saint-Pierre. In the event of the triumph of the Coalition over Napoleon, the outcome of the war was to be, not merely "the liberation of France," but the universal triumph of "the rights of humanity." To this end it would be necessary, "after having attached the nations to their Governments by making these incapable of acting save in the greatest interests of their subjects, to fix the relations of the States among each other on more precise rules, such as it is to their interest to respect." A general treaty was to form the basis of the relations of the States forming "the European Confederation." "Why could one not submit to it," the Emperor asked, "the positive rights of nations, assure the privilege of neutrality, insert the obligation of never beginning war until all the resources which the mediation of a third party could offer have been exhausted, until the grievances have by this means been brought to light, and an effort to remove them has been made? On principles such as these one could proceed to a general pacification, and give birth to a league of which the stipulations would form, so to speak, a new code of the law of nations, while those who should try to infringe it would risk bringing upon themselves the forces of the new union."

This proposal had, of course, been stillborn. Ten years were to pass before the liberation of France prepared the way for new experiments in the confederation of humanity; and meanwhile the Tsar himself, dazzled by the genius of Napoleon, had bartered away at Tilsit his ideals of a united Europe for the vision of a world in which there should be room only for the Emperors of the East and the West. His

breach with Napoleon, the horrors of the Moscow campaign, and the comradeship of the wars of Liberation had reawakened the old ideal. And, to all appearance, the times were singularly propitious for its realisation. The close of the revolutionary era had left Europe exhausted and disillusioned. "The doctrine of extreme equality," which had issued in the despotism of one masterful will, might still—to quote Talleyrand—"have as apostles and partisans a few dreamers, building theories for an imaginary world"; the surface of society, here and there, might be agitated by the nationalist storm called up during the War of Liberation; but, in general, princes and peoples alike aspired only to some moderate system which should be a guarantee of peace and of orderly progress. The question which occupied the minds of theorists, as of men of affairs, was in what this system should consist. However opinion might differ as to the social changes wrought by the Revolution, there was little difference as to the principles on which they had been based. To Chateaubriand and de Maistre, the apostles of the new Ultramontanism, they were "satanic," as false and as fatal as those which had inspired the original revolt against authority and laid upon the world the curse of God. To Jeremy Bentham, the prophet of the new Liberalism, the "Declaration of the Rights of Man" was merely a "hodge-podge of confusion and absurdity," and its outcome, in so far as this had been disastrous, but the result of false premisses and defective logic.

These strangely contrasted appreciations may be taken as generally typical of the two schools of political thought which came into prominence at this period and were destined to play so conspicuous a part in the controversies of the nineteenth century. One aim was common to both; for alike they sought in a quaking world for some firm foothold of authority. The one found this in religion, and in the divine right of the established order; the other in inductive science, and the duty of men to build up, on the secure basis of observed facts, a social system which should conduce to "the greatest happiness of the greatest number."

For the moment it seemed as though the new "Utilitarianism" would vanquish the spirit of reaction in the councils of the world. Bentham, who had lectured mankind for half-a-century in vain, in his old age suddenly found himself a power. Liberalising monarchs in Europe and the young republics of the New World sought his advice. His works, in the French versions of Dumont, circulated by thousands, and his principles left their impress on a dozen experimental constitutions. Yet the cold syllogisms of the recluse who proclaimed a gospel of enlightened selfishness did not appeal to a generation accustomed to be swayed by violent and conflicting emotions. The scientific spirit, which in a subsequent age was to work so great a miracle of transformation in the material and intellectual world, was as yet in its faint beginnings. Stronger by far as yet was that romantic spirit which

represented the revolt of the human imagination against the iconoclasm of the Revolution, and which sought its inspiration in the idealised past.

Romanticism was the outcome rather of emotion than of thought. It appealed, indeed, to history, but to history so ill understood as to be itself romance. It sought to materialise in art, in literature, in religion, its ideal vision of a world long dead. It inspired the Gothic revival in architecture, the "Christian" school in painting, the Romantic school in literature, and in religion the Catholic revival. In politics its influence, less clearly defined, since it was the outcome of confused and nebulous ideals, was from the first charged with fateful contradictions. It conjured up the beautiful mirage of the Middle Ages, which transfigured the selfish cry for the retention or revival of feudal and ecclesiastical privilege; it breathed new life into the doctrine of the divine right of kings; but it also, in its reaction from the colourless cosmopolitanism of the Revolution, gave an imaginative stimulus to the new-born passion of nationality which was to prove, during the century, the revolutionary force most fatal to the established order of the world. The nationalist agitation indeed, though alarming to the authorities, was practically confined as yet to Germany, and in Germany to a section of the literary and professional classes. The world at large was content to accept the principle underlying the Treaties of Vienna, to the framers of which sovereignty was still territorial, the nation no more than the aggregate of souls owing allegiance to a single government. The doctrine of "Legitimacy," which the cynical statecraft of Talleyrand had devised as the best lever to raise the Bourbons once more to the throne, identified the rights of sovereignty and of private property by basing both on prescription. This doctrine was consecrated by the principle, loudly proclaimed by the apostles of the religious revival, of the eternal union between "the altar and the throne."

The religious reaction, which is one of the most remarkable phenomena of the period immediately following the Revolution, and one of the most momentous in its results, was mainly the outcome of a natural revulsion. To the devout imagination it was natural to see in the woes that had fallen upon Europe the divinely decreed consequences of the unbridled reign of reason. The fashionable philosophy of the eighteenth century had brought dogmatic Christianity into disrepute, and the old antagonisms, which had once sufficed to deluge Europe in blood, had all but vanished. But the sceptical spirit which, in both Catholic and Protestant pulpits, had tended to substitute ethical philosophy for dogmatic religion, rested on too slight a foundation to resist the force of deeply stirred religious emotion. Scientific criticism and the study of comparative religions which, later in the century, were to prove more serious foes to Christian orthodoxy, were as yet unknown; and it was easy for Chateaubriand, in his *Génie du Christianisme*, published in

1801 on the eve of the Concordat, to turn the laugh against the age when "the documents of human wisdom were arranged in alphabetical order in the *Encyclopédie*, that Babel of the sciences and reason," and to show that the worship of Jehovah was at least as respectable as that of Jove, and that the Virgin had occupied as great a place as Venus in the history of art.

More important than the eloquent, but shallow, volumes of Chateaubriand, was the celebrated work of Count Joseph de Maistre, *Du Pape*, which is dated 1817, though not published until 1819. It was written during a critical time in the history of the Church. The Papacy, after weathering the storms of the Reformation, had seemed on the verge of succumbing to the solvent forces of the new enlightenment. The frontier line between Catholicism and the world outside, sharply defined at Trent, had become blurred and indistinct; and the belief was widely expressed that on the death of Pius VII the Holy See would share the fate of the Holy Empire. In France, though Napoleon's Concordat had made an end of the constitutional Church, Gallicanism was still a militant force. In Germany, in spite of the abolition of the ecclesiastical States, the ideals of "Febronius" were still in the ascendant, aiming at a great national German Church, which should absorb at least the Lutherans, and owe at best but a shadowy allegiance to Rome; and the Prince Primate, Karl von Dalberg, had sent to the Congress of Vienna, to represent the interests of the German Church, Bishop von Wessenberg, who, as Vicar-General of Constance, had, on his own authority, reformed the services in his diocese in an avowed effort to meet the Protestants halfway. The Catholic princes of the Confederation were willing to follow any system which would most readily make the Church the instrument of their secular ambitions. The reply of Pope Pius VII to these movements was the issue on August 7, 1814, soon after his return to Rome, of the bull *Sollicitudo omnium ecclesiarum*, reconstituting the Order of Jesus. The *Du Pape* of de Maistre revealed the full significance of this act, an act which proclaimed the irreconcilable attitude to be taken up by the Papacy toward the Liberal movements of the century, which was defined in Pius IX's *Syllabus* of 1864, and culminated in 1870 in the dogma of papal infallibility. With a sincere and forcible style, with much display of erudition, and with admirable logic, the author of *The Pope* proffered once more for the acceptance of the world the medieval ideals of Gregory VII and Innocent III. The Revolution, he argued, was but the logical outcome of the principles of the Reformation. The rejection by half Christendom of the God-appointed central authority had loosened the ties of all authority; and the true cure for the present ills was the recognition of the Pope as in all causes, both temporal and spiritual, the supreme and inspired head of all Christian nations. In place of a committee of the Powers, de Maistre would have established the Holy See as the central court of appeal, and this, not only in

international questions, but in all serious disputes between sovereigns and subjects. The book created a deep impression. To Gentz, no shallow critic of men and things, it displayed "a political insight such as no Montesquieu ever had, with the eloquence of Burke, and an inspiration bordering at times on the loftiest poetry"; it was at once accepted as the text-book of the Ultramontane party.

On the morrow of the Revolution the cross currents of thought produced by it had not, of course, as yet united into any streams of public opinion capable of shaping the destinies of the world; nor, had there been such a defined force of opinion, could it have influenced directly the course of affairs. Europe had been liberated; but the sword was yet supreme, though it had been put into commission, and, for the one man of genius who had wielded it, had been substituted a committee of comparative mediocrities. "What is Europe?" Alexander of Russia had exclaimed, after Tilsit, to the ambassador of France, "what is Europe, if it is not you and I?" After Waterloo Europe consisted, in effect, of the four Great Powers constituting the Grand Alliance. Of these Powers three, Russia, Austria, and Prussia, were autocracies; the fourth, Great Britain, was represented by statesmen who, though hampered by their responsibility to Parliament, were less so than if Parliament had been truly representative of popular opinion. Under these conditions the character and the point of view of the few men in whose hands power was concentrated were for the moment of more importance than the great movements of thought which only became politically effective at a later period, and of which the tendencies were still either unsuspected or misunderstood.

Of all the members of the Alliance by far the most conspicuous, and, for the time, the most important, was the Emperor Alexander I of Russia. It is true that Great Britain, her long struggle with Napoleon crowned by the victory of Waterloo, still dominated the councils of Europe; but the transparent honesty of Lord Castlereagh's diplomacy at Vienna and afterwards had tended to discount the effects of her power. All the world knew that she wanted peace, the establishment of "a just equilibrium" in Europe, the abolition of the slave-trade; and that for these ends she was willing to make enormous sacrifices, and, whether on the Continent or in the colonies, to identify British with European interests. Austria too, though disinterestedness could hardly be predicated of her policy, was prepared for the moment to subordinate her peculiar ambitions. Exhausted and all but bankrupt, the Habsburg monarchy needed peace and time to recuperate; and to this end, during the negotiations leading up to the Treaty of Chaumont, Metternich had, as his faithful henchman Gentz bitterly complained, substituted "Europe" for "Austria" in his policy, had broken the dynastic ties which had bound the Habsburg monarchy to France, and risked the

revival of the Franco-Russian alliance which during the next few years was to be the nightmare of the chanceries. As for Prussia, she was still less than Austria in a position to take any leading part in the councils of the Alliance. Her soldiers might exact from France barbarous vengeance for barbarous wrongs; King Frederick William III, pious and narrow-minded, was bound to the Tsar by ties of gratitude as well as of personal affection, and, apart from all these considerations, was to be occupied for years to come in the task of trying to absorb into the life of the Prussian monarchy the heterogeneous populations assigned to it by the Treaty of Vienna. Thus Alexander found himself in the position of which he had long dreamed—the central figure of the Confederation of Europe, and arbiter of the world, by the grace of God, and the sanction of the unbroken might of Russia, thrust forward now, in consequence of the acquisition of Poland, into the heart of Europe.

Under these conditions the menace of Russia to the liberties of Europe seemed to men of affairs nearly as alarming as had been that of France. Apprehension was increased by the enigmatic character of the Emperor. Behind the handsome mask of his face, with the smiling lips and the eyes that never smiled, was hidden a nature moulded and transformed by the most contradictory influences. His childhood had been spent at the voluptuous Court of the Empress Catharine, his adolescence under the sombre tutelage of his father Paul, who had inspired him with his own love of military detail, his theoretical love of mankind, and his contempt for men. The Jacobin Frédéric César de La Harpe had been his tutor, and from him he had imbibed the doctrines of Rousseau; while his military governor, Marshal Soltikoff, had drilled him in the traditions of Russian autocracy. Lastly, to all this had been added, after he had mounted the throne over the body of his murdered father, a mystic melancholy liable at any moment to issue in extravagance of thought or action. With him the moment had come during the horrors of the campaign of 1812. At the burning of Moscow, he declared afterwards to Bishop Eylert, his own soul had been illuminated. During the campaign that followed he had sought to calm the unrest of his conscience by corresponding with the leaders of the evangelical revival on the Continent, and had searched for omens and supernatural guidance in texts and passages of Scripture. Finally, in the autumn of 1813 he had met at Basel the Baroness von Krüdener, a lady who had turned from a life of pleasure to the congenial task of converting princes, and who had the singular good fortune to make a spiritual conquest of the most powerful of them all. From this time a mystic pietism became the avowed motive of his public as of his private action. Madame von Krüdener and her colleague, the evangelist Empaytaz, were during the allied occupation of Paris the confidants of the Tsar's most secret thoughts, and the Imperial prayer-meetings the oracle on whose revelations hung the fate of the world.

With the memory of Tilsit still fresh in their minds, it is not surprising that men of the world like Metternich believed the Russian autocrat to be disguising "under the language of evangelical abnegation" vast and perilous schemes of ambition. The suspicion was increased by other and seemingly inconsistent tendencies of the Emperor, which yet seemed all to point to a like disquieting conclusion. Alexander had declared open war on the Revolution; but La Harpe was again at his elbow, and the catchwords of the gospel of humanity were still on his lips. The very proclamations, in which he had denounced Napoleon as the genius of evil, had denounced him in the name of "liberty" and "enlightenment." A monstrous intrigue was suspected between the autocrat of all the Russias and the Jacobinism of all Europe, its aim the substitution of an all-powerful Russia for an all-powerful France. At the Congress of Vienna Alexander's conduct had accentuated and given point to the distrust of an Imperial conscience which had suffered him to keep his hold on Poland in violation of his treaty obligations; and, though the Hundred Days had intervened since the secret alliance of January 3, 1815, between Austria, Great Britain, and France, the distrust of which it was the symbol remained.

The links that bound the Powers together, of which the first had been riveted at Teplitz, had been slow in forging; and more than once they had threatened to give way under the sledge-hammer blows of Napoleon's masterly defensive campaign. It was not until the breakdown of the conferences at Châtillon had proved the impossibility of coming to terms with the French Emperor, that the tactful diplomacy of Castlereagh succeeded in welding them together at Chaumont, in the treaty which gave to the Grand Alliance the form it was to retain until finally shattered by the revolutions of 1848. The Treaty of Paris of May 30, 1814, and that of Vienna of March 25, 1815, were essentially but renewals of that of Chaumont. All were directed primarily to the preservation of Europe from any further peril of French aggression. The triumph of the Coalition had proved the quality of the Concert of Europe; but, its object achieved, there was danger that it would resolve itself into its elements. When the Abbé de Saint-Pierre communicated his project to Fleury, the Cardinal told him that he had forgotten one essential article, namely, to send missionaries to touch the hearts of princes and convert them to his views. In 1815 the omission seemed to be supplied; for the councils of Europe were presided over by an Imperial evangelist whose mission, loudly proclaimed, was to substitute in all public relations the principles of the gospel of Christ for the evil traditions of Machiavellian statecraft. On September 26, 1815, the Emperor Alexander announced to the world, at a great review held on the plain of Vertus, the scheme of the Holy Alliance, already signed by himself and his brother sovereigns of Austria and Prussia. Henceforth princes were to regard each other as brothers and their peoples as their

children ; and all their acts were to be founded on the sacred principles of the Gospel of our Lord and Saviour Jesus Christ.

The Holy Alliance, by one of the strange ironies of history, came to be regarded as the symbol of all that was oppressive and reactionary. Yet there was nothing in its provisions, nor in the intentions of its creator, to warrant the sinister meanings read into it by a suspicious world. To Alexander himself it was calculated "to give a lofty satisfaction to Divine Providence" as an attempt to lift politics on to a higher plane ; and so little was it a hypocritical conspiracy against liberty, that in one of his "Jacobin" moods he urged on his reluctant brother autocrats that Liberal constitutions were the logical outcome of its doctrines. The manifesto was, in fact, of immediate practical importance only in so far as it tended to complicate the diplomatic relations of the Allies during the years that followed—owing to the Russian claim, persistently repeated, that it committed the Powers to Alexander's ideal of a "universal union," which they in fact repudiated. Of all the princes who signed the Holy Alliance probably only Alexander himself did so with conviction. To Metternich it was "a loud sounding nothing," to Castlereagh "a piece of sublime mysticism and nonsense." The British Government, divided between fear of offending the Allies and exposing itself to the shafts of the Opposition, found a loophole of escape in the constitutional objection to the Prince Regent signing any document without the counter-signature of a Minister. The powerful endorsement of the ruler of Great Britain was thus lacking to this new family compact of the European sovereigns ; and the Allies had to be content with a personal letter from the Regent, expressing his hearty approval of their sublime principles. With this, and two other notable exceptions, the document was signed by all the sovereigns, great and small, of Europe. The other exceptions were the Pope and the Sultan. Pius VII, busy with his preparations for a new crusade against Liberalism, would be no party to a compact devised by a heretic and a Liberal. The Sultan, for reasons sufficiently obvious, was never invited to sign ; but, in view of the fact that the integrity of the Ottoman Empire had found no place in the guarantees of the Vienna treaties, the omission of his name was held to be ominous of Alexander's intention to exclude Turkey from the sphere of the Concert, in order to retain its destinies in his own hands.

At the date of the promulgation of the Holy Alliance the fate of France had not yet been definitely settled ; and, in the councils of the Allies, while all were agreed that she must for ever be rendered incapable of again upsetting the balance of Europe, opinion was sharply divided as to the means for attaining this end. But counsels of moderation prevailed ; and in the settlement with France the principle was reaffirmed which had guided the policy of the Allies before the Hundred Days. France, defined by her "legitimate" frontiers, was to be

received back on equal terms into the comity of nations so soon as her internal stability should have been consolidated under her legitimate monarch and the constitutional system granted by him. The problem was how this "consolidation" was to be ensured. It was more difficult after than before the Hundred Days to dissociate the spirit of France from that of Napoleon; and deep-rooted distrust of the French people underlay all the counsels and combinations of the Powers for years to come. The first of the two treaties signed at Paris on November 20, 1815, settled the frontiers and the financial obligations of France, and fixed the conditions for the occupation of French territory by the Allied army. Moreover, for the purpose of watching over the restored monarchy, a committee of the Ministers of the Allied Powers was to be established at Paris, receiving daily reports from the King's Cabinet on the condition of the country, and free on any question of internal as well as of external policy to tender advice which would be backed by the irresistible sanction of the army of occupation. The second treaty, from which France was excluded, is known as the Treaty of Alliance of November 20, 1815, and was avowedly a renewal of the Treaty of Chaumont and of the Vienna Treaty of March 25, 1815; both of which had been directed specifically against France. By Article 6 of this Treaty it was agreed that "in order to consolidate the intimate tie which unites the four sovereigns for the happiness of the world, the High Contracting Powers have agreed to renew at fixed intervals, either under their own auspices, or by their respective ministers, meetings consecrated to great common objects and to the examination of such measures as at each one of these epochs shall be judged most salutary for the peace and prosperity of the nations and for the maintenance of the peace of Europe."

This article, which formed the basis of all the subsequent attempts to establish a "Confederation of Europe," was the outcome of negotiations which have a permanent interest, as revealing not only the essential differences of principle between the Powers, which rendered the great international experiment abortive, but also the fundamental problems involved in the attempt to realise an international ideal, which will remain insoluble so long as the nationalist spirit, the most characteristic development of the nineteenth century, survives. The original draft of the Treaty had been drawn up under the direction of the Emperor Alexander, and embodied his views. Its preamble stated baldly that "the object of the Powers" was "to establish royalty in France on a constitutional foundation and to preserve the happy union of the Powers for this result of common interest"; and the remaining articles proclaimed in every line the right of united Europe to watch over and regulate the internal affairs of France. Castlereagh at once saw the peril to national independence involved in this. He shared to the full the general belief in the reality of the danger of a renewed outburst of revolutionary

France and the view that "nothing could keep her down but the strong hand of European power"; but he objected to "too strong and undisguised an interference of the Allied sovereigns in the internal concerns of France," to their posing as "umpires in the constitutional struggles" of the country, and in short to any attitude not dictated by "the immediate security of their own dominions." In the counter-project which he submitted, and which was accepted as the basis of the Treaty, he "endeavoured to keep the internal affairs of France in the background, and to make the colour of the contingent interference (of the Alliance) as European as possible." The determining attitude of Great Britain towards the "sublime conception" of the Imperial visionary was thus from the first defined. The Concert of Europe had achieved great things, and might do so yet again, should a common peril once more call for common action. But the nature of such common peril, and the character of the common action, must be determined, not on any general principle which would lead to a minute regulation by the Great Powers of the affairs of the nations, but as each case arose on its own merits. Castlereagh himself, indeed, did not as yet realise the full import of his attitude. He looked upon the Alliance as a convenient arrangement which, by bringing the sovereigns and their Cabinets into touch, enabled business to be transacted far more rapidly, and with much less risk of friction, than through the ordinary diplomatic channels. It was not till 1818, at Aix-la-Chapelle, that he began to suspect the incompatibility of the "European System" with the liberties dear to Englishmen. At Troppau and Laibach the suspicion was confirmed; but it was only in 1822, on the eve of the Congress of Verona, that the long process of his disillusionment culminated in the determination to make that open breach with the system of which, by his untimely death, the credit fell to George Canning.

Whatever the ambitions or ideals of its individual members, the object of the Quadruple Alliance as a whole was the preservation of peace on the basis of existing treaty obligations. France being, not unnaturally, regarded as the main focus of unrest, was the primary object of its watchful solicitude; but the sixth article of the Treaty of November 20, 1815, covered equally the case of any danger arising in other quarters. There was, indeed, material enough for alarm, and this was by no means mainly supplied by the agitation of the revolutionary "sects." The Powers were as averse from violent reaction as from violent revolution; but, unhappily, in their desire to find a basis of principle for their action, they had exalted the doctrine of "legitimacy" to a height which made it difficult for them to control the reactionary follies of the sovereigns whom they had restored to power. They were under no illusion as to their character or their probable consequence. They watched with disgust and alarm the proceedings of Ferdinand VII in Spain. It was a little matter that he had violated

his oath to maintain the Constitution of 1812; for the Constitution was unworkable, and was not desired by the Spanish people. But Metternich cursed the wicked infatuation which reestablished the Inquisition, and set up what Gentz described as “a system of reaction and persecution only to be compared with the reign of terror in France under Robespierre.” It was not to the interests of monarchy that a king should “debase himself to become no more than the leading police agent and gaoler of his country.” Nor was it expedient that rulers by divine right should make themselves ridiculous as well as odious to their subjects. It was not with the approval of the Powers that the Papal Government abolished street lighting in Rome as a revolutionary innovation; that Victor Emanuel, restored to his capital of Turin, caused the botanical gardens planted by the French to be grubbed up, and forbade his subjects to use Napoleon’s great road over the Mont Cenis; or that the Elector of Hesse appended once more to the fresh-powdered heads of his exiguous army the pigtails of the old *régime*. All these things were recognised in the councils of the Alliance as symbolic of a state of things pregnant with future dangers. For the present, however, the attention of the four Powers was absorbed by the problem of France.

This problem was defined by Decazes in a single sentence: “to royalise France and to nationalise the monarchy.” The successful establishment of the Bourbon dynasty in the national life of France was the guarantee required by the Allied Powers before they would consent to leave the country to itself. The difficulties of the process were obvious to all. The Bourbons had been strangers to France for a quarter of a century, during which a generation of Frenchmen had grown up who had been taught to regard them as enemies; they had returned “in the baggage train” of a hostile army; and their authority was supported by foreign bayonets and controlled by foreign counsels. The violence of the “Court” party, headed by the Count of Artois, the heir to the throne, accentuated this situation. The nation which, after so many changes, cared little what form its government might assume, saw the social and material gains of the Revolution, which alone it valued, placed in jeopardy; and when, in September, 1815, Talleyrand, Minister of Foreign Affairs, and Fouché, the Minister of Police, who had been left in office partly as a guarantee against unreasoning reaction, were sacrificed to the clamour of the “ultra-Royalist” Chambers, and replaced by the Duc de Richelieu and the young police prefect Decazes, the task of “nationalising the monarchy” seemed well-nigh hopeless. “With his new servants,” wrote Castlereagh to Lord Liverpool, “there seems to be but one opinion, that if the Allied troops were withdrawn, his Majesty would not be on his throne a week.” Yet Richelieu realised from the first that the monarchy could never be firmly established until the foreign army had ceased to occupy French soil, and directed all his efforts to this end. The essential condition was that a Government

should be established so moderate and so stable as to serve as a guarantee to the Powers for the payment of the huge annual instalment of the indemnity. The attitude of the European Concert to France was determined by the measure of success which attended the efforts of the French Government to satisfy their conditions. The dissolution of the *Chambre introuvable*, which had defied both the Crown and the Powers, though regarded as a "bold experiment," had the approval of the Allies. The passing of the budget by the Chambers elected in November, 1816, under the altered suffrage, was rewarded by a reduction of the army of occupation by 30,000 men. Richelieu now bent all his efforts to obtaining the withdrawal of the rest. The burden of supporting the Allied troops weighed heavily upon the French people; their presence was a perpetual irritation, which latterly had grown to such a pitch that Wellington reported that, in the event of the occupation being prolonged, he must concentrate his army between the Scheldt and the Meuse, as the forces, extended in a thin line across the breadth of France, were no longer safe in case of a popular uprising. But it was realised that such a concentration would inevitably lead to the crisis he feared, and the troops might be destroyed piecemeal before they could combine. Under these circumstances, the Allies agreed without difficulty on the principle that the occupation of France should not extend beyond the third year, and that the question of evacuation should be the first task of the Conference of the Powers which it was arranged to hold in the autumn of 1818 at Aix-la-Chapelle.

The Congress, or to be more strictly correct, the Conference of Aix-la-Chapelle, of which the proceedings were to mark the highest point reached in the attempt of the Allied Powers to govern Europe in concert, met on October 1, 1818. The sovereigns of Russia, Austria, and Prussia were present in person; Great Britain was represented by Lord Castlereagh and the Duke of Wellington, the Austrian Government by Prince Metternich, the Russian by Capodistrias and Nesselrode, the Prussian by Prince Hardenberg and Count Bernstorff. The Duc de Richelieu, by grace of the Allies, was allowed to be present on behalf of France. The question of the evacuation of France was immediately raised, and on this point a happy unanimity prevailed. The question of the guarantee for the payment of the remainder of the indemnity had been the last barrier to an agreement, and this had been removed as the result of negotiations carried on, on behalf of the Allies, by the Duke of Wellington with the great financial houses of Hope of Amsterdam and Baring. This made it easy to arrive at a decision to which, by common consent, every counsel of expediency pointed. At the very first meeting of the Conference the principle of evacuation was agreed to; on October 9 the treaty was signed stipulating that by November 30 the soil of France should be free of foreign troops. On the question of the further consequences to follow from this decision there was

a more fateful disagreement. Richelieu claimed that the same reasoning which had led the Powers to withdraw their forces from France would warrant their admitting France on equal terms to the Grand Alliance. This was, however, far from representing the mind of the Allies. The policy of evacuation had been inspired by no trust in the improved temper of the French people. The Eastern Powers viewed with exaggerated alarm the supposed weakness of the Government in dealing with the Liberal revival in France, to which successive elections had borne witness. Alexander I, whose "Jacobinism" was already on the wane, declared that nine-tenths of the people of France were corrupted by bad principles or violent party sentiments, and that the rest were incapable of working a constitution; and he refused to hear of admitting France to an alliance which must be upheld for its original purpose—that of safeguarding Europe against the French revolutionary spirit. Metternich, also, objected that the admission of France would mean "an amalgam of the conservative principle with that of innovation, of the remedy with the very evil it was intended to cure, of stability with movement, of security with risk." Castlereagh, on the other hand, though he shared the pessimistic views of his colleagues on the future of monarchy in France, was less concerned with principles than with practical politics. He pointed out that, were France isolated, she would inevitably become the nucleus of a separate alliance, and the whole gain of the European Concert would be placed in jeopardy. At the same time he realised the paradox involved in the inclusion of France in an alliance which, as Great Britain had always insisted, was directed primarily against herself.

These debates opened up the whole broader question of the future form of the European Concert. On this the mind of the Emperor Alexander was quite clear. His first care, on arriving at Aix, had been to define his own attitude towards the Alliance. In interviews with Castlereagh, with Wellington, and with Metternich, he had indignantly repudiated the calumnious reports which for months past had circulated in the chanceries, that he was meditating a breach with the Allies and a separate understanding with the Bourbon States. Any such act, he reiterated, he should regard as a crime, and its perpetrator as a felon. As for his army, about which so much had been said, he maintained it, not for Russia, but for Europe. On the general question the views of the Tsar were presented in a long memorandum, drawn up by Pozzo di Borgo, which in effect revived and elaborated the scheme outlined in 1804 in the despatch to Novosiltsoff already quoted. The Quadruple Alliance, he argued, was but the "centre" of the "universal union," and, though "unalterable in principle," would, "by extending its sphere according to circumstances," become "the alliance of all the States." "The system of Europe" which was "the work of Providence, not of any Cabinet," was "a general association having

for *foundation* the compact of Vienna and the Treaty of Paris, for *conservative principle* the fraternal union of the Allied Powers, for *aim* the guarantee of all recognised rights." There was no need for new treaties, or new oaths, which would but be weakened by repetition. The Quadruple Alliance, consecrated by the Treaty of November 20, 1815, contained the principle of which the natural consequence was the general Alliance based on the Treaties of Vienna and of Paris. He proposed, therefore, that the Quadruple Alliance should be preserved as against France; and that a general Alliance should be made effective for the purpose of guaranteeing the territorial *status quo* and legitimate sovereignty. The establishment of this general Alliance was to be effected by a Declaration, to be issued at the close of the Congress and signed by all the signatory Powers of the Treaty of Vienna. The Governments, thus relieved from the fear of revolution, could offer to their subjects equal constitutions; and the liberties of the peoples, wisely regulated, would arise from the state of affairs once recognised and publicly avowed.

The Russian proposal was received in the Cabinets with very mixed feelings. Metternich allowed his fear of Russia for a moment to be obscured by his haunting fear of revolution, and, in spite of the mild Liberal aspirations which in the last paragraph of the memorandum showed the hand of Capodistrias, hailed the Tsar's scheme as embodying the potentiality of a mighty conservative force. In a memorandum of October 7 he elaborated his meaning. The essence of the Treaty of Chaumont was eternal, as based on a principle of morality essentially unchangeable. This "anti-revolutionary principle" had been directed specially against France, and this special application should remain. But there existed another agreement, that of the Holy Alliance, on which should be based a general Declaration to which France might be a party. The principle of a universal guarantee was even more eagerly advocated by the Prussian Government, which, while agreeing to the evacuation of France, was in an agony of apprehension as to the results of this "risky experiment" to its own exposed frontiers. The British Government, on the other hand, viewed with dismay these persistent efforts to revive an idea against which it had always protested. Feeling in England was running high against participation in a system which not only threatened the liberties of others, but might, in the language of the orators of the Opposition, in time present the spectacle of Cossacks encamped in Hyde Park to overawe the House of Commons. Moreover, as Castlereagh pointed out to the Tsar, the British Government had to deal "with a new Parliament and a new people, intensely bent on peace and economy." To initiate a fresh policy of "eventual exertion" would be to hazard the sanction already obtained from Parliament for their continental engagements. In the general instructions for Lord Castlereagh's guidance, preserved in a Cabinet memorandum of September 4, it had been clearly

laid down that the treaty between the Powers must rest "upon the sanction received in the address of both Houses of May, 1816"; that its provisions "hardly admitted of being reinforced"; and that any attempt to renew them "would lead to serious differences of opinion." As to the question of admitting Louis XVIII to the Alliance, the main objection to this had been removed by the evacuation of France.

Under these circumstances, the task of Castlereagh was a somewhat delicate one. The abstractions and sweeping generalities of the Russian memorandum were in direct conflict with his own common-sense opinion and with the instructions of his Government. Yet, in view of the apparent urgency of the need for maintaining the Alliance, it was necessary to humour the Tsar by approving his principles, while weaning him from their consequences. In the course of several interviews with Alexander, Castlereagh had convinced himself of the sincerity of the views, on which the Emperor dilated "with a religious rhapsody." He realised that in order to hold the Emperor's mind "within the principles that could be maintained in Parliament," it would be necessary to try "to present something that would at once keep within our line, and at the same time present the subject somewhat in the tone of his own ideas." The outcome was a memorandum, in reply to that of Russia, of which the opening sentences are a masterpiece of solemn irony. "The benign principles of the Alliance of the 26th of September, 1815," it ran, "may be considered as constituting the European system in matter of political conscience. It would, however, be derogatory to this solemn act of the sovereigns to mix its discussion with the ordinary diplomatic obligations which bind State to State, and which are to be looked for alone in the treaties which have been concluded in the accustomed form."

In this sentence the whole policy of the British Government, which ultimately determined the fate of the Concert, is contained. The soul of the Holy Alliance might be suffered to hover over the councils of Europe; but in those councils the treaties, and the treaties alone, were to be the determining factors. Nor were any special treaties to be held particularly sacred. Some bound the States collectively; others were peculiar to individual States. Those of Vienna and Paris even, which formed the "Great Charter" of the European territorial system, "contained no engagements beyond the immediate objects which were made matter of regulation in the treaties themselves"; and, though the Powers possessed the right, there was no obligation on them, collectively or individually, to resent their breach; since the territories regulated by them were the subject of "no special guarantee, to the exclusion of others which rest for their title on earlier treaties of equal authority." As for the universal Alliance for securing the peace and happiness of the world, this was a problem of "speculation and hope"; but it had never been, and probably never would be, put into practice. The

British Government protested absolutely against the principle of intervention in the internal affairs of other States; and, until some system could be devised for enforcing on all kings and nations an internal system of peace and justice, the consequence was inadmissible; "for nothing could be more injurious to the idea of government generally than the idea that their force was collectively to be prostituted to the support of established power, without any consideration of the extent to which it was abused." The beneficial effect of the mediation of the Powers was admitted; and this would be increased by adding France, which would give the Alliance more moral weight without making it too numerous "for efficient concert." To the proposed periodical meetings Great Britain would not agree, for they would symbolise to the world the very system which she repudiated; but she would willingly take part in any meetings called to deal with particular emergencies.

In face of this uncompromising attitude, the temporary support which the Tsar's idealistic scheme had obtained from the other Allies collapsed. The cooperation of Great Britain was too valuable an asset to be hazarded for an experiment of which the success was at best doubtful. The result was a compromise, embodied in two instruments signed on November 15, 1818. The first, in the form of a secret protocol, renewed the Quadruple Alliance for the purpose of watching over France and shielding her from revolutionary dangers, and was communicated in confidence to Richelieu. The second, a "declaration," to which France was invited to adhere, stated the intention of the five Powers to maintain the intimate union, strengthened by the ties of Christian brotherhood, contracted by the sovereigns; pronounced the object of this union to be the preservation of peace on the basis of respect for treaties; and stated, in conclusion, that no "partial reunions" should take place concerning the affairs of other States without their invitation, and, if desired, their presence.

Thus ended, in a colourless compromise, the most serious effort ever made "to provide the transparent soul of the Holy Alliance with a body." A last effort was indeed made, on the initiative of Prussia, after the main question had been settled, to establish an "intermediate system" for guaranteeing the territorial *status quo*. It was suggested that the Allied troops withdrawn from France should remain concentrated at Brussels, under the command of Wellington, as a sort of European police force to watch over the established order. The plan had the support of Alexander and of Metternich; but it broke upon the uncompromising opposition of Great Britain. Wellington himself pointed out the disastrous effect that any such action would have upon French public opinion; and the British Government vigorously resented the reopening of the question of universal guarantee after it had been settled once for all. The matter was then allowed to drop.

But though, at Aix, the vision of the universal union had melted

into air, the Congress marked the highest point reached in the dictatorship of the Concert of the Powers. The efforts made to extend its sphere of influence beyond the Atlantic in the matter of the Spanish colonies were defeated by the stubborn attitude of Spain and the opposition of Great Britain. But from all Europe appeals came up to this High Court of the Allied sovereigns. Denmark appealed to it; and Charles XIV of Sweden (Bernadotte), in spite of his protests, was forced by the Concert to fulfil the stipulations of the Treaty of Kiel. The German sovereigns appealed, on a host of questions left undetermined in the hurried discussions of the close of the Vienna Congress; notably on that of the Baden succession, discussed below, and disputes outstanding between Austria and Bavaria. The more complicated of these questions, though debated at Aix, were ultimately reserved for the decision of a ministerial conference to be held the following year at Frankfort for the final adjustment of matters left open at Vienna. The petition of the Elector of Hesse, however, to be allowed to exchange his now meaningless title for that of King, was refused, on the ground that it was inexpedient to cheapen the royal style; and the complaint of the mediatised Princes was responded to by an admonition of the Allied Powers to their sovereigns to treat them with greater consideration.

Of more general importance were the discussions on the two great questions of the Slave-trade and the Barbary pirates. On neither of these was any decision reached. The Slave-trade had been condemned in principle by the Congress of Vienna; and, as the outcome of endless *pourparlers*, nearly all the European States had given at least a formal assent to the British demand for its suppression. In practice, however, Great Britain alone showed any activity in carrying out the work; and the trade continued to flourish under the protection of national flags. The British Government now proposed a reciprocal right of search, to be carried out by war-vessels specially designated by the Powers for this purpose. But, in view of the overwhelming superiority of England at sea, this was taken as tantamount to a license to British cruisers to interrupt the commerce of all nations; and the Powers rejected it. A counter-proposal of the Emperor Alexander to establish an international board of control on the west coast of Africa, with an international fleet commissioned to suppress the trade, met with no better success. The same fate befell the Tsar's suggestion for the establishment of an international squadron in the Mediterranean directed against the Barbary pirates. The question was one which affected Great Britain less than the rest of Europe; for the pirates had a wholesome respect for vessels sailing under the Union Jack. Austria, which had been forced to the humiliation of placing its seaborne commerce under the protection of the Turkish ensign; Prussia, which had witnessed depredations inflicted by African sea-rovers on the Hanseatic trade within the North Sea; the Italian States, whose coasts were exposed to

their descents; Russia, under whose flag the armed trading vessels of the Greeks waged with them perennial war, would have welcomed a scheme which promised to end an intolerable evil. But the sea-power of Russia was a dangerous, because unknown, quantity; the activities of the Tsar's agents in Spain and Italy had excited suspicion of his ultimate aims; and Great Britain refused to be a party to a plan which would have involved the establishment of Russian war-ships in the Mediterranean. The breakdown of the negotiations on these two important questions revealed the fundamental weakness of the Concert, and indicates the causes of its ultimate collapse. After weeks of discussion, conducted in the most friendly spirit, it had been found possible to agree on an abstract formula which served to disguise awhile from the world the essential divergence of views within the Cabinets; a few questions of minor importance had been satisfactorily settled; but, whenever the interests of the several Powers were deeply engaged, it had been proved that no Government would or could subordinate the particular interest of its own country to the general interest of Europe.

The events of the year that followed the close of the Conference of Aix-la-Chapelle tended to increase the mutual suspicion and the divergence of views within the Alliance. Affairs in France were developing in a way which led the more timorous Powers to doubt the wisdom of their generosity towards her at the Congress. Alarmist reports of plots and revolutionary movements, supplied by agents whose pay depended upon their zeal, poured in upon Metternich from all sides. Decazes, in Metternich's view, was by his weak concessions to Liberalism bringing the monarchy to the verge of destruction. More alarming still were the "military preparations" being hurried on by Marshal Gouvion de Saint-Cyr, coupled as these were with the "seditious language" ascribed to the Marshal and to the Minister of Finance, Baron Louis. In February, 1819, Metternich openly expressed his belief to the British Minister at Vienna that a revolution was no longer to be avoided. Nor was he "disposed to take a more cheerful view of the state of things in Prussia." King Frederick William, by postponing over-long the convocation of the provincial Estates, had "played into the hands of the Jacobins"; army, bureaucracy, and people were honeycombed with disaffection; and Prussia had become the centre of revolutionary infection for all Germany. The condition of Italy seemed even more alarming. Early in 1819 Metternich accompanied the Emperor Francis on his first visit to his new Italian dominions; and willing agents supplied him in full measure with materials for confirming the bad impression he had gained from the sullen demeanour of the Italians towards their Imperial master. None knew better than he the secret of the evils of Austrian rule in Italy: the atrophy of the local organs of government, due to the necessity for sending every question, however minute, for settlement to Vienna. Lacking the courage to press for the alteration of this system, he chose to regard the discontent

of the Italians as the artificial work of foreign agents, and to picture the mass of the people as anxious to attain unity under the shelter of the Austrian eagle.

The cause of the extreme nervousness of the Austrian statesman at this time was not, however, so much fear of revolution, much as he dreaded it, as fear of Russia. To Russia Metternich ascribed the crisis in France, since Pozzo di Borgo alone was responsible for encouraging the madness of the King's Government. In Madrid, General Taticheff continued his intrigues; their object being to embroil Great Britain with Spain in the matter of the Spanish colonies, and to bring in the Russian Emperor as the *deus ex machina*. In Germany liberalising Princes looked to St Petersburg for inspiration and support. Finally, in Italy the indiscretions of Russian travellers, and even of Russian Ministers, were producing a state of things intolerable to the Austrian Government. Everywhere they openly proclaimed the sympathy of Russia with Liberal aspirations. Capodistrias himself "horrified" the Neapolitan Ministers by his language; and, most monstrous of all, César de La Harpe had presided openly at Bologna over a meeting of Carbonari.

Metternich made no secret of his distrust of the Tsar's motives and aims; and so early as February he had declared to Castlereagh, through Sir Robert Gordon, that he disapproved of disguising "the proved conviction of Russia's falsehood and intrigue"; since the danger of "a reaction formidable to Europe" could only be averted by the Powers "displaying a full knowledge of the Emperor's character and setting his faults at defiance." Russians, he argued, are easier led on the right path by blows than by flattery; and, happily, the Russian Emperor had "one preserving quality"—want of courage. This brave language was not, however, translated into action. Instead, it was decided that the Emperor Francis should himself write to his brother of Russia "with an air of the most confiding friendship," and remonstrate with him on the ruinous activities of his servants, continued in spite of Austria's protests and, seemingly, in spite of the admonitory circular issued as their result in February by the Tsar. The murder on March 23, 1819, of the well-known dramatist, Kotzebue, who was in Russian pay, was a terrible object-lesson in the consequences of the revolutionary heresy, and came opportunely to reinforce Metternich's argument; but it served also to deepen the enigma of the Emperor Alexander's attitude. "The different language of the different Russian agents is the puzzle," wrote Gordon to Lord Castlereagh on April 22; "in Germany Kotzebue is murdered, and Stourdza nearly so, for espousing the cause of unrestrained monarchy and obscurantism; while in Italy M. de La Harpe travels up and down holding a language of the purest democracy."

The fact was that Alexander's mind was wavering between his Liberal ideas and his dread of the possible results of their practical application.

Metternich, ever prompt to recognise and use the psychological moment, saw his opportunity, and returned to Germany, determined to take full advantage of Karl Sand's crime, to quell the unrest in the German States, and to win over the Russian Emperor to that policy of "stability" on which he held the security of Austria to depend. The outstanding territorial questions left unsettled at Vienna had been finally adjusted by the general Treaty of Frankfort, signed on behalf of the Four Powers on July 20, 1819. A few of the articles concerned matters outside Germany: the cession of the border fortresses of Marienbourg and Philippeville to the Netherlands, the limits of Savoy, the reversion of the Italian duchies. But the bulk of the Treaty was concerned with the settlement of the burning questions within the Confederation; between Austria and Bavaria, and Bavaria and Baden. The limits of the German sovereignties being thus finally fixed, the time was ripe for Metternich to carry out his policy of making the Confederation the great conservative barrier, whether against revolution or Russia. In the opinion of many contemporary statesmen this double end was secured by the "Carlsbad Decrees," confirmed by the Diet on September 20, 1819, and the Vienna Final Act of May 15, 1820. The conferences of Carlsbad and Vienna, which issued in these famous acts, were attended only by German Ministers, and belong essentially to the domestic history of Germany. But, as Metternich pointed out in his presidential address at Vienna, the German Confederation was an integral part of the States system of Europe as established at Vienna; and not only its rights as a federal body, but the rights of the individual sovereigns who composed it, depended on the guarantee of the treaties. Europe then had a special right of interference in the affairs of the Confederation; and it was a matter of importance for Austria that her German policy should be endorsed by the Powers.

But, again, there was a wide divergence of views within the concert. The terms of the Carlsbad Decrees (described in a later chapter) had made a most sinister impression; they were regarded as the first step taken by the "Holy Alliance" towards the systematic suppression throughout Europe of all liberty of thought and speech. Castlereagh saw the danger, and protested against the Decrees as an unjustifiable interference with the liberty of sovereign and independent States; while to Count Lieven, the Russian ambassador in London, he pointed out that it was not to the interest of the Governments to contract an alliance against the peoples. Of greater moment for the fate of Metternich's policy was the attitude of the Emperor Alexander. It was not to the interest of Russia to see established on her flank a strong and united Germany under the hegemony of Austria; and, in spite of his dread of revolution, Alexander's role of protector of the oppressed admirably suited his German policy. The lesser States, like Württemberg, fearing to be ground out of existence between the upper and the nether millstone of

Austria and Prussia, fled to him, not in vain, as a refuge in time of trouble. He ostentatiously refused, indeed, to intervene in the internal affairs of Germany; but he chose this moment to issue to the world a fresh manifesto of his principles, in every line of which the influence of that "coryphaeus of Liberalism," Capodistrias, was clearly traceable. The document is remarkable as illustrating the gradual change which was coming over the Tsar's mind. He still believed in liberty, but in liberty "limited by the principles of order." He still believed in free institutions, though not in such as are forced from feebleness, nor in contracts extorted by popular leaders from their sovereigns, nor in constitutions granted to tide over a crisis. England was still his model, English history, in his opinion, "the code of every statesman"; and he was at one with Great Britain in refusing to do anything to support a league of which the sole object was "the absurd pretensions of absolute power."

Another political crime soon came to Metternich's assistance. On February 13, 1820, the young Duke of Berry, the popular heir-presumptive to the throne of France, was murdered in the Paris Opera House. Upon the Emperor Alexander the effect of this tragedy was profound. He compared the crime of Louvel with that of Sand, and in doing so, as Metternich exultingly remarked, "could not better have eulogised the Carlsbad Decrees." The influence of Capodistrias was shaken; and the language of the Russian Cabinet turned suddenly from that of Liberal exaltation to the frightened advocacy of reactionary measures of precaution. The triumphant progress of the military revolt, which at the beginning of the year had broken out in Spain, accentuated the alarms produced by the condition of France.

Alexander was in a mood for vigorous measures. He suggested that a Conference should be summoned at Paris to discuss the general situation. He declared himself ready to send an army in the name of Europe to crush the revolution in Spain. He even proposed that the committee of Ministers of the Allied Powers should be reestablished at Paris to watch over the affairs of France. To the latter suggestion both Castlereagh and Metternich were vigorously opposed. Not only would it be a breach of the engagement taken with France at Aix; but it would excite the very ferments it was intended to allay. As to the Conference, Castlereagh reiterated the objection of the British Government to a meeting summoned with no well-defined object. The Alliance had been effective because its aims had been clear to all the world; let it beware of acting "on a very questionable principle of precautionary diplomacy, of covering itself with the mystery of a Conference, and above all of hazarding its great moral ascendancy by carrying its councils into all the labyrinths and quicksands of the internal politics of France." Metternich was equally opposed to a Conference, but for different reasons. Austria was but little touched

by the troubles beyond the Pyrenees; but European intervention, in the actual mood of the Tsar, would have meant the traversing of her dominions by a great Russian army—a far more immediate peril. Yet to refuse the Conference was for him not so easy a matter as for Castlereagh. He endeavoured to cover his defection from the sublime principles of the Alliance in a cloud of high-sounding phrases. The moral basis of the Alliance was unalterable and eternal. This being so, it was still effective for the cure of the ills of Europe, which were "moral." But the troubles of Spain were "material"; and for the Alliance to intervene would be but to augment them. Moreover, the meeting would have to be one of the *five*, not of the *four* Powers; and *would* the British Cabinet, and *could* the French Cabinet, combine with the three Courts which were more free in their actions and more independent in their choice of forms? After all, the four Powers, independently (*non réunis*), could do all that was needful by a firm attitude and a common language.

The despatches to the Austrian ambassadors in which Metternich developed these views at enormous length were penned in June. In July, 1820, a military revolt broke out in Naples, and King Ferdinand was forced to accept the Spanish Constitution of 1812. An event which so immediately threatened the stability of the Austrian system in Italy produced a significant change in Metternich's language. In one way the nearer crisis was not wholly unwelcome to him; for it gave him the opportunity of diverting attention from a question little interesting and very delicate, to one in which, if he played his part skilfully, Austria and not Russia would have the deciding voice. The affairs of Spain could await the settlement of those of Naples, since "General Quiroga would be beaten in the person of General Pepe." The right of Austria to interfere in the Neapolitan revolution was based on a clearer title than that of any, or all, of the Powers to intervene in the affairs of Spain. By the terms of the secret article of the Treaty of June 12, 1815, between Austria and Naples, the Neapolitan Government was bound not to introduce any constitutional changes other than those allowed in the Austrian dominions in Italy; and even the British Government admitted the principle that Austria had a right, under this treaty, to intervene if she had good reason to suppose that the events in Naples were a danger to herself. France and Prussia were equally amenable; but the attitude of Russia was a more doubtful quantity. The Neapolitan Liberals had proclaimed that they had "the moral support" of the Emperor Alexander; and, though Metternich affected not to doubt the personal goodwill of the Tsar, the conduct of his agents had, from the Austrian point of view, done only too much to justify the claim. It became then all important for him to destroy, once for all, the belief of the Italian Liberals that they should reckon on the powerful patronage of Russia. His main fear was as to the ulterior object which lay

behind this unnatural coquetting of Russia with the revolutionary spirit.

In a letter, dated August 8, he explained his views to Prince Esterhazy, for communication to the British Government. For years past, he said, the policy of the "pitiable creatures" who composed the Russian Cabinet had been directed against what they were pleased to term "the influence of Austria," thus confusing "the conservative principle" with "diplomatic intrigue." The Emperor Alexander, it is true, had changed his opinions; and perhaps the outbreak of a series of military revolts would lead him to abandon his policy of "abstract analysis" and substitute acts for words. An ostentatious agreement between the sovereigns of Austria and Russia would, at the moment, best have served Metternich's ends. Alexander chanced to be at Warsaw; and it was proposed that the two Emperors should meet. But Alexander showed little disposition to be a party to a separate understanding. He refused to forget the troubles of Spain in those of Italy; and the violent symptoms of revolutionary unrest in Europe awoke in him with redoubled ardour the dream of a European Union of Guarantee which had been dissipated at Aix. As for the Quadruple and Quintuple Alliances, Capodistrias, in conversation with Baron Lebzeltern, denied their continued existence, since they had been superseded by the Declaration of Aix, and declared that Russia would recognise nothing but "a general association." Nothing, in short, would satisfy the Tsar but a Conference after the model of that of 1818. On behalf of France, the Duc de Richelieu wrote urging the same course, on the ground that the troubles in Spain and Italy were precisely the contingencies contemplated in the agreements made at Aix. The unexpressed motive of the French Government was the desire to see France ranged once more in effective concert with the other great Powers.

Metternich, on the other hand, still made strenuous efforts to avoid a Conference at which he feared the dangerous Spanish Question would inevitably be raised, and attempted to devise a plan which should unite all the five Powers in support of his Italian policy without the necessity for their meeting in council. In a formal "Proposition," dated August 28, and addressed to the Courts, he outlined the policy which Austria proposed to pursue. In the matter of Naples, as all the Powers had admitted, Austria had a peculiar right to take action by reason both of her geographical position and of her treaty with the Neapolitan Government. She proposed therefore to concentrate in Italy a force sufficient to quell "the factions," to invite the Allies to unite themselves "morally" with her, and at the same time to make "frank overtures" to the Courts of Italy and Germany on the state of affairs and on the general attitude of Austria towards them. As for the Conference suggested by France and Russia, to Austria as to Prussia and Great Britain, this seemed "not entirely exempt from objections." A formal

Conference, such as that of Aix, would but waste precious time, and its moral effect would be imperilled by the fact that Great Britain "had not a free hand." Austria, therefore, suggested common action on more simple lines. Let the Allied Courts refuse to recognise the revolutionary Government of Naples, declare all its acts void, and support through their Ministers the measures for its coercion which Austria might adopt. The reply of Castlereagh to these propositions, dated September 16, was unequivocal. Great Britain would be no party to the suggested Concert, which amounted to a hostile league against Naples, and would make England a principal in the resulting war; whereas she would neither interfere forcibly in the internal concerns of Naples herself, nor encourage others to do so. She was prepared to stand aside and let Austria act, if Austria believed her safety to be menaced. The Conference of Ministers at Vienna would be useful, to receive the report of Austria and to see that nothing was done "incompatible with the present system of Europe."

This idea of the Conference as a sort of committee of control, to guard against any possible violation by Austria of the territorial treaties, was hardly likely to appeal to Metternich; and, in view of the attitude of the British Government, he conceived that the best course open to him would be to fall back upon the solemn Congress of the Allies suggested by France and Russia. After all, if England could be persuaded to send a representative, all might be well. On the immediate question at issue, Castlereagh had expressed his desire to leave the Austrian Government, so far as possible, unembarrassed in its decision, and was prepared to consider the question of a Conference so soon as Austria had clearly defined what she wanted. With the Neapolitan Liberals neither he, nor the British representatives in Italy, were the least in sympathy. In their view, the revolution in Naples was but a "wanton and unprovoked" imitation of that in Spain, for which there was no excuse in the conduct of the Government, and which was therefore infinitely more dangerous, as "calculated to destroy all confidence between Governments and their armed forces." Thus Metternich believed that, were the Conference once assembled, the Powers, in spite of their secret differences, would present to the world a united front, and show that in her Italian policy Austria had at least their "moral support."

Unfortunately for the prospective harmony of the Conference, the memorandum in which Metternich formulated his views as to the attitude it should adopt contained statements of principle utterly at variance with those on which British policy was based, and scarcely less distasteful to France. The interests of Austria in the affair of Naples, he argued, were identical with those of Europe at large; for all the Powers were equally concerned in the preservation of the treaties, and therefore equally threatened by revolutionary movements, and equally

interested in concerting measures for their suppression. The business of the Conference which it was proposed to hold at Troppau would, therefore, be to define by a general proposition the principles on which the Allies would intervene in Naples, and to proceed at once to their application. He proceeded to explain his own idea of what these principles should be. Revolution, he argued, might be either legitimate, when initiated from above, or illegitimate, when exacted from below. In the former case the intervention of foreign Powers could not be allowed. In the latter, the signatory Powers should contract never to recognise changes so effected, and should undertake to abolish such as had taken place in their own States. The reply of Castlereagh to this remarkable pronouncement was quite unequivocal and, incidentally, furnishes the key to British policy from Troppau to Verona. The British Government, he said, was prepared to fulfil all treaty obligations; but, if it were desired "to extend the Alliance so as to include all objects present and future, foreseen and unforeseen, it would change its character to such an extent and carry us so far, that we should see in it an additional motive for adhering to our course at the risk of seeing the Alliance move away from us, without our having quitted it."

This plain statement of the British point of view was made on the eve of the Conference, which met at Troppau on October 20, 1820; and the constitution of this august assembly emphasised the division within the Concert of which it was the first conspicuous expression. The Emperors Alexander and Francis were present in person; King Frederick William of Prussia was represented by the Crown Prince. The Cabinets of the Eastern Powers were represented by the Ministers responsible for their general policy: Austria by Metternich, Russia by Capodistrias, Prussia by Hardenberg. Great Britain, on the other hand, consistently with her determination to take no share in the active Concert of the Powers, sent no minister plenipotentiary, but was represented by Lord Stewart, the ambassador at Vienna. France too, though her policy was less clearly defined, had given no plenary powers to her representatives. The inferior status of the Ministers of the two constitutional Powers, therefore, tended from the first to exclude them from the inner councils of the sovereigns, whose intimacy the friendly and simple intercourse in the quiet little Silesian town was so well calculated to cement. Metternich, in fact, whose leaning towards England had been due mainly to his fear of the designs of Russia, soon discovered that it was no longer necessary for him to depend upon a Power so "hampered in its forms," that it could offer nothing but "positive dangers, or but slight active assistance." For the Emperor Alexander had arrived at Troppau a changed man, and Capodistrias seemed to have shared his conversion. To commit the Russian Emperor publicly to the Austrian "conservative system" became now Metternich's supreme aim; and he succeeded beyond his hopes. In a confidential talk over a cup of tea

he received the Tsar's confession and vows of amendment. "To-day," said the repentant autocrat, "I deplore all that I said and did between the years 1815 and 1818. I regret the time lost; we must study to retrieve it. You have correctly judged the condition of things. Tell me what you want and what you want of me, and I will do it."

Under these circumstances Metternich thought himself in a position to ignore the views of Great Britain and France. In a series of conferences to which the representatives of the two Western Powers were not admitted, on the excuse that they were empowered to "report" not to "decide," was drawn up the famous preliminary protocol signed on November 19 by the three Powers. "States which have undergone a change of government due to revolution," it ran, "the results of which threaten other States, *ipso facto* cease to be members of the European Alliance, and remain excluded from it until their situation gives guarantees for legal order and stability. If, owing to such alterations, immediate danger threatens other States, the Powers bind themselves, by peaceful means, or if need be by arms, to bring back the guilty State into the bosom of the Great Alliance."

The moral effect of the Troppau Protocol was, none the less, likely to be greatly weakened by the conspicuous disapproval of two of the five great Powers; and Metternich still hoped to remedy this defect. He pointed out that the Protocol only asserted a principle to which any constitutional State might assent, since it applied exclusively to internal affairs having an external effect, and did but guarantee legitimate power, as the Alliance guaranteed territorial possession, against *force*. He hoped for the "moral support" even of those Powers who could not sign, since his object was but to prove to the world "that the Emperor of Russia is not in favour of revolutions, and to bind him to the protection of States." To these advances France, anxious to remain on good terms with the Allies, replied by giving a general adhesion to the Protocol, but with several reservations which she placed on record. Castlereagh, on the other hand, was obdurate. In the long despatch of December 16, in which he instructed Lord Stewart to refuse his assent to the Protocol, he presented a masterly criticism of its provisions. He denied the claim that these grew logically out of Article 5 of the Treaty of November 20, 1815, which applied only to France, and bound the contracting Powers to no more than to deliberate together with a view to guarding against a common danger; certainly not to an immediate armed intervention whenever and wherever revolution might show itself. He pointed out that the Protocol would defeat its own ends by seeming to separate the sovereigns from their peoples and to base the security of thrones upon foreign aid. Moreover, if, as he supposed, its provisions were to be made reciprocal, "would the great Powers of Europe be prepared to admit the principle that their territories were to be thrown open to each other's approach upon cases of assumed necessity

or expediency, of which, not the party receiving aid, but the party administering it, was to be the judge?" The British Government at least protested against any attempt to consider such a principle as, under any conceivable circumstances, applicable to the British dominions; and it followed that it protested equally against any systematic application of it to the internal concerns of other States. Great Britain, in short, could be no party to a system which seemed "to lead to the creation of a species of general government in Europe, with a superintending Directory, destructive of all correct notions of internal sovereign authority," and could not "charge itself, as a member of the Alliance, with the moral responsibility of administering a general European police of this description."

Meanwhile the Conference at Troppau had adjourned without coming to any decision on the Italian Question beyond that of continuing the conferences at Laibach in January, and inviting the King of Naples to attend them. With this plan the British Government was in agreement; and Castlereagh duly noted that the invitation to the King, "as implying negotiation," had tended to calm the ferment in Naples. England, while willing to send a squadron to watch over the safety of the Neapolitan royal family, and "arrest disorder," would maintain a strict neutrality. From Vienna, meanwhile, Stewart reported that Castlereagh's despatch had created consternation in diplomatic circles, and that the reactionary Powers were showing signs of repenting their precipitancy in the matter of the Troppau Protocol. This attitude was, in fact, disingenuous, and was dictated by the fear that Great Britain might at the last moment refuse to send a representative to Laibach, and thus advertise the disunion of the Allies to all the world. It succeeded; but the outcome was hardly less unsatisfactory to the reactionary Powers than if it had failed.

From the point of view of Europe at large the most important outcome of the Conference of Laibach was the further widening of the rift within the Alliance, which at Verona was to develop into a permanent and open breach. The British Government was as little anxious as any other member of the Alliance to take any overt measure the result of which would be to weaken the Concert which it believed to be essential to the safety of Europe. But the attitude of the other Powers left it no choice. To Metternich and those who thought with him it seemed all important that the armed intervention of Austria should be backed by the apparent moral support of all the allied Powers; and to secure this every effort was made to force or to entrap the representative of Great Britain into agreeing to a formula which, in the eyes of the world, would have committed England to the principles of the other Allies.

In the midst of angry discussions, in the course of which it was even suggested that he should not be admitted to the conferences, Lord Stewart stood firm; and, when Capodistrias began to read to the assembled

Italian plenipotentiaries what was in effect a recapitulation of the principles of the Troppau Protocol, he interrupted with the remark that, if the Russian Minister thought it wise to proceed now to "a new development of their former sentiments," he would have to "insert upon the face of the proceedings" the exactly opposite views of the British Government. The attempt to revive the Troppau Protocol, indeed, which Alexander now declared to be essential to the safety of Europe, necessitated a formal protest; and, to the dismay of the reactionary Cabinets, Stewart insisted on adding a declaration to the Journals, making it clear that Great Britain was not at one with the Allied sovereigns in this matter. The bitterness created by this attitude, wrote Lord Stewart, was very evident; and the breach within the Alliance was scarcely less so. To the Declaration issued at the close of the Conference Great Britain had little objection to make; but in their circular despatches and instructions to their Ministers the three Powers had used a language which, as "a development of the Protocol," they knew could not but be highly displeasing to both France and Great Britain. In the Russian circular, Count Nesselrode declared that in assuming their attitude towards the troubles in Naples the Powers were acting in "the cause of Europe, of law, and of the treaties"; which implied that Great Britain, by holding aloof, had betrayed Europe and been false to her treaty obligations. Moreover, the Tsar's idea of a Universal Union, so often repudiated, reappeared undisguised and unashamed. "As an intimate union," he wrote, "has been established by solemn acts between all the European Powers, the Emperor offers to the Allies the aid of his arms, in case new overturns should threaten new dangers." It was in this spirit that 100,000 Russians had received the order to march when the news came of the revolt in Piedmont. "In short," wrote Stewart from Vienna on March 20, "there can be little doubt from the complexion of these instruments that a Triple Understanding has been created which binds the parties to carry forward their own views in spite of any difference of opinion which may exist between them and the two great constitutional Governments." It is clear that, but for the acute developments during the next few months of two questions which once more profoundly modified the relations of the Powers, the avowed split in the Alliance, which, after 1830, was to place the two Western Powers in more or less general opposition to the three autocratic monarchies, might have been anticipated by several years.

Of these questions by far the most immediately critical was that which, about this time, first became known as the Eastern Question. It emerged, with dramatic suddenness, during the Conference of Laibach, with the news, which reached the Emperor Alexander on March 19, of Ypsilanti's invasion of Moldavia, followed a month later by that of the national uprising of the Greeks in the Morea. Its developments, diplomatic and other, will be dealt with elsewhere. Here it will suffice to say

that it tended to draw closer together the two Powers, Austria and Great Britain, most interested in the preservation of the integrity of the Ottoman Empire; and that, for the moment, it braced up the loosening bonds of the Grand Alliance, as the most obvious instrument for preventing the isolated action of Russia. The second question, destined to have momentous consequences, was raised by the attitude of the ultra-Royalist Government of France toward the continued unrest in Spain; the immediate consequence of which was to draw the two constitutional Powers apart, bring France for a while into line with the policy of the autocratic Powers, and lead ultimately to the proclamation of England's breach with the Continent of Europe.

The unrest in Spain had never ceased to grow since the revolution in 1820; and in France, where the ultra-Royalists were now in power under the able leadership of Villèle, a clamour arose for intervention, to suppress a revolutionary licence which threatened to infect France herself, and to avenge the insults offered to a monarch of the House of Bourbon. In August, 1821, an epidemic of yellow fever in Spain gave the French Government an excuse for establishing on the border a corps of observation, on pretext of forming a sanitary cordon, and this was gradually increased, till it numbered a hundred thousand men; nor was it withdrawn when the peril of physical infection was past. The hotter heads of the Government, in fact, were not averse from the attempt to add lustre to the restored monarchy by a successful revival of the old policy of the Bourbon monarchy towards Spain. But Villèle himself saw the necessity for caution. For Great Britain the Treaty of Utrecht was by no means a dead letter; and the British Government, after pouring out the blood and treasure of the nation in driving Napoleon out of the Peninsula, was not prepared to allow its peaceful occupation by his successor. It held, moreover, a powerful weapon in reserve. The independence of the Spanish Colonies in America was already established *de facto*; and though British Ministers did not yet think the time ripe, they were prepared to recognise them as existing *de jure* rather than run the risk of any attempt of a European alliance to reconquer them, or of any of them passing under the flag of France. In face of this attitude of Great Britain, therefore, France shrank from isolated action, and before attempting to interfere in Spain decided to obtain, if possible, the sanction of the European Concert.

Before the dissolution of the Congress at Laibach, in the spring of 1821, it had been decided that it should meet again at Verona in the autumn of the following year. Metternich still had hopes of winning over Great Britain to his views. From his standpoint the condition of Europe was becoming every year more alarming; and the Tory Government, he well knew, had little sympathy with popular agitations, or with the attitude of the Liberals in the south-German Chambers, which in Baden had produced a legislative deadlock, and in Bavaria had driven

the King to petition the Powers for aid against the Constitution he had himself granted. Castlereagh, indeed, was as averse as ever from committing Great Britain to the policy of the continental Powers; but in the Eastern Question, now every day increasing in seriousness, he and Metternich stood on common ground which suggested the expediency of a closer understanding between them. In October, 1821, accordingly, during the visit of King George IV to Hanover, the two statesmen met in conference. A meeting apparently of so sinister an import for the future of liberty seemed to some, at the moment, of doubtful expediency; and Castlereagh thought it necessary to justify his action. "Had the question been of an ordinary character," he wrote to Gordon, "and involving the form of government under which any portion of Europe was to subsist (as that of Naples lately did), I should have felt as you have done about an interview with Prince Metternich, that it might lead to more noise and jealousy than was worth encountering... but the question of Turkey is of a totally different character, and one which in England we regard, not as a theoretical, but as a practical consideration of the greatest moment."

Alexander's idea of a "universal union" of guarantee proved now a convenient diplomatic weapon in the hands of those who desired to prevent his intervention in Turkey. In a confidential memorandum, dated Hanover, October 22, Metternich defined the Austrian policy as the maintenance of peace *on the basis of existing treaties*. He would press the Porte to yield on those points at issue on which Russia's treaty rights were clear; but he refused to consider the question of war. "There exists," he wrote, "an explicit engagement on the part of Russia that the Emperor will on no ground separate himself from the conservative principles of the Alliance. It is to this declaration that the Emperor of Austria has attached the moral guarantee which he has been invited by his august ally to accord to him." On October 28, Castlereagh, writing to Sir Charles Bagot at St Petersburg, pursued the same line of argument. He refused to answer the Tsar's question as to what Great Britain would do in the event of war and the overthrow of the Ottoman Power. Whatever his personal sympathy with the cause of the Greeks might be, the preservation of the peace of Europe was of paramount importance; and he could not reconcile it with his sense of duty "to embark on a scheme for new modelling the position of the Greek population at the hazard of all the destructive confusion and disunion which such an attempt would lead to, not only within Turkey, but in Europe. The nature of the Turkish power was fully understood, when the existing state of Europe, *including that of Turkey*, was placed under the provident care and anxious protection of the general Alliance." This bold claim to extend the objects of the Alliance so as to cover not only the Acts of Vienna, which all had signed, but all other existing territorial treaties, might have left the Tsar unconvinced, had

his personal inclinations coincided with those of his people. As it was, Metternich's diplomacy, backed by Castlereagh, triumphed ; the Russian Emperor sacrificed the prestige of Russia in the East to his dream of a federated Europe, and consented to send his representative to take counsel with the Allies at the preliminary conferences at Vienna in September, 1822. He himself would be present at those at Verona a month later. Castlereagh, now Marquis of Londonderry, was on the eve of setting out for the conferences when, on August 12, his tragic death placed the guidance of the foreign policy of England in other hands.

Though the masterful personality and more brilliant imagination of George Canning were sure, sooner or later, to give a new tone to the language of the British Cabinet in foreign affairs, his acceptance of the office opened to him, at last, by Castlereagh's death, made no breach in the continuity of the policy of the Government. In view of the urgency of the crisis in the East, the presence of a British plenipotentiary at Verona was considered essential. The Duke of Wellington was now selected as the British representative ; and his instructions were those which Lord Londonderry, with the approval of the King and the Cabinet, had drawn up for his own guidance.

The main subjects to be discussed were three : the Turkish Question, that of Spain and the Spanish Colonies, and the affairs of Italy. As to the last of these, Great Britain not having charged herself with any superintendence of a system in which she had merely acquiesced, the duty of the British Minister would only be to keep himself informed and to see that nothing was done "inconsistent with the European system and the treaties." As to the Greek Question, the instructions foreshadowed the later action of Canning. The successes of the Greeks and "the progress made by them toward the formation of a Government, together with the total paralysis of the Ottoman naval power in the Levant," pointed to the fact that, sooner or later, Great Britain would be forced to recognise the belligerent rights of a *de facto* Government in the Morea. As to any proposal for joint intervention, care must be taken not to commit Great Britain beyond the limits of good offices. Any engagement in the nature of a guarantee was altogether inadmissible.

On the Spanish Question, which was destined at the Congress to overshadow all others, the language of the instructions was quite unequivocal ; there was to be "a rigid abstinence from any interference in the internal affairs of that country." As to the Spanish Colonies, these would be recognised by other States, sooner or later, should the mother-country not reestablish her authority within a given time ; and it would be to the interest of Spain herself to "find the means of restoring an intercourse, when she cannot succeed in restoring a dominion." Meanwhile, the British plenipotentiary was to draw attention to the commerce between England and the revolted Colonies,

which it was impossible to interrupt. Great Britain had already recognised the *de facto* existence of the Spanish American Republics ; there was no immediate necessity for recognising their existence *de jure*, "so as to create a certain impediment to the assertion of the rights of the former occupant" ; but it was a question how long it would be possible to postpone such recognition as would be implied by the appointment of diplomatic agents. Great Britain would be glad to "obtain a concert" in this matter, but not such as to hamper her independence of action. Thus were the principles defined of that policy which culminated, two years later, in the recognition by Canning of the South American Republics.

The aloofness of Great Britain from the other Powers was from the first made evident. The Duke of Wellington, as Minister Plenipotentiary, was instructed not to go to Verona until the affairs of Italy had been settled there. His place, meanwhile, was to be taken by Lord Londonderry (Lord Stewart), Castlereagh's half-brother and successor in the title, who was to act in the same capacity as at Troppau and Laibach. Meanwhile, in a series of despatches to Wellington, Canning confirmed and elaborated the instructions of which he was the bearer. In the Turkish Question, as between Greeks and Turks, Great Britain could be no party to any intervention in the internal affairs of any nation ; as between Turks and Russians, she would insist on the observance of the treaties. In the matter of Spain, her objection to intervention had been confirmed by subsequent events, notably by the ill-concealed ambitions of the House of Braganza, which hoped to profit by a French invasion. As to the American Colonies, England could be no party to any declaration affirming the rights of Spain over them, so as to fetter the discretion of the British Government. Indeed, in his opinion, before the meeting of Parliament, "the course of events, the interests of commerce, and the state of navigation in the American seas," would oblige the Cabinet "to come to some understanding, more or less distinct, with some of those self-elected Governments."

Wellington, for his part, perceived while yet at Vienna that the Conferences at Verona would "turn almost entirely upon the affairs of Spain." Now that the influence of Capodistrias had been removed by his dismissal, Metternich, who had become, according to Wellington, the Russian Emperor's "principal adviser," found little difficulty in impressing his views upon the Tsar ; and the attitude of the Powers towards the Eastern Question had been settled, in the preliminary conferences at Vienna, in a sense agreeable to Austria. When, on October 20, the Conferences at Verona were opened, the first and only question raised was that of Spain, and, with the broader questions of principle involved in it, it occupied practically the whole period of the Congress.

The discussion was opened by three questions formally propounded by Montmorency in the name of the French Government : (1) Would the Allies withdraw their Ministers from Madrid in the event of

France being forced to do so? (2) In case of war, under what form and by what acts would the Powers give France their moral support, so as to give to her action all the force of the Alliance, and inspire a salutary fear in the revolutionaries of all countries? (3) What material aid would the Powers give, if asked by France to intervene, under restrictions which she would declare and they would recognise? The situation created by the French memorandum is luminously described by Wellington in a letter to Canning dated October 29. The fundamental difficulty lay in the false position in which France had placed herself by her action in Spain since 1820; the embarrassment of the Emperor Alexander with his army, which he desired to keep occupied; and the fact that the German Powers felt it necessary to humour him in order to prevent his attacking Turkey. The reply of Alexander to the French enquiries had been as prompt as disconcerting. Already at Vienna he had made it clear to Wellington that he was in favour of European intervention, and had expressed his surprise on learning that Villèle intended to keep the question "wholly French." He now proposed to march 150,000 Russians through Germany to Piedmont, where they would be in an excellent position for attacking Jacobinism either in Spain or in France. This was a solution which appealed to Metternich and Montmorency as little as to Wellington. The French Minister "told the Tsar in positive terms" that any movement of troops would be injurious to France; and the Austrian and British Ministers combined to persuade him of the perils which would attend any such demonstration. The unanimity of the other Powers, however, stopped with their opposition to the heroic measures of the Russian Emperor, and in spite of the efforts of the Allies to refrain from holding any language in which Great Britain could not go along with them, four days of "confidential communications" were sufficient to reveal a fundamental divergence of view between Great Britain and the continental Powers.

Wellington, who from the wealth of his personal experience pointed out to the French Minister the peculiar danger of an invasion of Spain, proposed that France should declare her intention of maintaining peace, and should invite the good offices of one of the Allies to explain this to the Spanish Government. The proposal broke down, because Great Britain, recognised as the only possible mediator, was too much interested in the questions at issue to be acceptable to France. Failing this, Metternich suggested that all the Powers should speak, so as to prove to Spain that France had their support; and Montmorency proposed that their common language should be based upon the Treaty of Aix-la-Chapelle. But Wellington had already made it clear that Great Britain would be no party to any common declaration or treaty whatsoever. Metternich, therefore, suggested that the Allies should "hold a common language, but in separate notes, though

uniform in their principles and their objects." This solution was adopted by the continental Powers; and Wellington, true to his instructions not to countenance any intervention in Spanish affairs, took no part in the conferences that followed. On October 30 the Powers handed in their formal replies to the French memorandum. Russia, Austria, and Prussia would act as France should in respect to their Ministers in Spain, and would give to France every countenance and assistance she might require, "the cause for such assistance, and the period, and the mode of giving it, being reserved to be specified in a treaty." Wellington, on the other hand, on behalf of Great Britain, replied that, "having no knowledge of the cause of dispute, and not being able to form a judgment upon a hypothetical case, he could give no answer to any of the questions."

Attempts were made so to adjust the form of the intervention of the Powers as to avoid an open breach with Great Britain. But the interests of Great Britain were, in fact, too immediately involved to make any compromise with the principle of non-intervention on the occasion possible; and when, on April 7, 1823, a French army of 95,000 men, under the Duke of Angoulême, crossed the Bidassoa, the experiment of a "Confederation of Europe," ruled by a council of the great Powers, was at an end.

This outcome revealed to all the world the essential weakness of the foundations on which the claim of the Alliance to govern Europe rested. The dictatorship of the Allies was, in fact, as much a usurpation as the Napoleonic Empire which they had overthrown; and it could survive only so long as their own interests did not come into violent conflict. This had been the argument of the Emperor Alexander in his persistent efforts to base his "universal union" on the broader foundation of the Holy Alliance; and his opinion had been backed by the attitude of the minor States. The King of Sweden had protested at Aix-la-Chapelle against the dictatorship of the great Powers; and after Verona, the King of Württemberg, in a circular note signed by Prince Wintzingerode and dated January 2, 1823, had renewed the protest against the attitude of the Powers which had "inherited the influence arrogated by Napoleon in Europe," and had claimed for all sovereign States a voice in international councils. The open defection of Great Britain shook to its foundations the international structure on which, according to Metternich, the safety of Europe still rested. It was not that the attitude of the British Government was based on any new principle, or that its language differed essentially from that which it had always held. It was rather that, in the mouth of Canning, the old phrases had become infused with a new spirit. Castlereagh had lamented the loosening of the international ties which, as he rightly believed, had done so much to secure the stability of the new order in Europe. To Canning they were but a drag on the free initiative of

Great Britain ; and he made no secret of his satisfaction at their breach. In a letter of January 3, 1823, to Sir Charles Bagot at St Petersburg, he wrote exultantly of "the issue of Verona, which has split the one and indivisible Alliance into three parts as distinct as the constitutions of England, France, and Muscovy." The three autocratic Courts might threaten the Spanish Government, should it prove refractory, with the resentment of collective Europe ; but the policy of the French, as of the British, Cabinet was now directed, not by European, but by national considerations. "So things are getting back to a wholesome state again. Every nation for itself, and God for us all. The time for Areopagus, and the like of that, is gone by." In vain Metternich tried to restore the broken harmony of the Concert. To Sir Henry Wellesley, the British ambassador at Vienna, he complained of the tone of speeches in Parliament, of the licence allowed to popular agitation in favour of revolutionary movements, and declared that Great Britain was in danger of losing her influence in the Alliance. In a letter to Wellesley of September 16, 1823, Canning replied in language too clear to be misunderstood. The policy of the British Government continued to be what it had consistently been throughout. There was no intention of breaking with the Alliance, so far as this confined itself to carrying out the intentions with which it had been originally formed, and which were defined by treaty. "England is under no obligation to interfere, or to assist in interfering, in the internal concerns of independent nations. The specific engagement to interfere in France is an exception so studiously particularised as to prove the rule. The rule I take to be, that our engagements have reference wholly to the state of territorial possession settled at the Peace ; to the state of affairs between nation and nation ; not (with the single exception above stated) to the affairs of any nation within itself. I thought the public declaration of my predecessor had set this question entirely at rest." As for the position of England in the Alliance—"What is the influence we have had in the counsels of the Alliance, and which Prince Metternich exhorts us to be so careful not to throw away ? We protested at Laibach ; we remonstrated at Verona. Our protest was treated as waste-paper ; our remonstrances mingled with the air. Our influence, if it is to be maintained abroad, must be secure in the sources of strength at home ; and the sources of that strength are in the sympathy between the people and the Government ; in the union of the public sentiment with the public counsels ; in the reciprocal confidence and cooperation of the House of Commons and the Crown."

It is not surprising that language, so well justified from the British point of view, but from the continental point of view so "insular," should have led Metternich to speak of Canning as "the malevolent meteor hurled by an angry Providence upon Europe." Even had Metternich been by temperament inclined to "trust the people,"

there existed in the heterogeneous empire for the government of which he was responsible, little possibility of any "union of the public sentiment with the public counsels"; and, whatever the limitations of his outlook and the errors of his policy, he was in a better position than Canning to realise the perils to European peace involved in the stirring up of the dormant forces of nationality. It is clear, indeed, that Canning himself at this time did not realise the full import of his language, nor contemplate the ultimate outcome of the attitude he assumed. He loudly championed the principle of nationality; but for him, as for Metternich, the boundaries of nations were the territorial divisions established at Vienna; and in deprecating the interference of the Alliance in the Ottoman Empire he could even speak of the right of "the Turkish nation" to manage its own affairs. "Our business," he wrote in the letter already quoted, "is to preserve the peace of the world, and therefore the independence of the several nations that compose it. In resisting the Revolution in all its stages we resisted the spirit of change, to be sure, but we resisted also the spirit of foreign domination." Yet it was upon "foreign domination" that the order of the greater part of Europe rested; and the same was true of the British Empire itself; while, during the century to come, the clash of national ideals and ambitions was to be the most fruitful cause of change and of war.

The two burning questions on which, during the interval between Verona and the July Revolution, the Powers split into opposing camps—the Spanish Colonies and the integrity of the Ottoman Empire—were outside the scope of the Alliance altogether; and the attempt to bring them into the sphere of its influence broke down on the opposition of the Powers whose interests were involved. The case of the Spanish Colonies was the most momentous in its results, though in a sense very remote from the issues which loomed largest in contemporary fears. To believers in the divine right of monarchy the establishment of a series of Republics in the New World portended the ruin of all order in Europe; to doctrinaire Liberals, like Bentham, it meant the triumph of enlightenment through the example given to the world of communities firmly based on the purest principles of reason. The philosopher seriously meditated transferring himself in his old age to Mexico, to share in the glorious work; the Duc de Richelieu had proposed, in order to prevent a worse thing, to set up a Bourbon prince as "King of Buenos Aires." After the easy triumph of the French arms in Spain, the Spanish Government, supported by France, suggested that the fate of the Spanish Colonies should be submitted to a Congress of the Powers. The proposal broke down on the opposition of Great Britain, determined, in Canning's phrase, that if France had Spain it should be "Spain without the Indies." In announcing to Parliament the recognition by the British Government of the South American Republics (1825), Canning

exclaimed, "We have called a new world into existence to redress the balance of the old." To an age enlightened by very nearly a century's experience of the working of Liberal institutions in the semi-barbarous South American States both the hopes and the fears excited by their establishment seem almost grotesque; and the event now recognised as most pregnant with momentous issues for the future was the sudden intervention of the United States of America. The reply of the great Republic of the West to the claim of the European Powers to regulate the affairs of all the world was the famous message of President Monroe to Congress, on December 2, 1823, which developed into the "Monroe doctrine" of "America for the Americans."

While the attitude of the United States effectually prevented the attempt to extend the dictatorship of the Alliance beyond the bounds of Europe, events in Europe itself were rapidly tending to complete the process of disruption which the protests of Great Britain had begun. The developments of the Eastern Question had already split the Powers into opposing camps, before the Revolutions of 1830 made the first breach in the "treaties." The independence of Greece was placed under the guarantee, not of the general Alliance, but of Russia, Great Britain, and France; and, though the independence of Belgium and the establishment of the Orleans dynasty in France were "brought within the treaties" by the Concert of all the great Powers, the result of the Revolution was in effect to split the Alliance in two. The seal was set on this division by the secret articles of the Convention of Berlin of October 15, 1833, between Russia, Austria, and Prussia, by which the principles of the Troppau Protocol were solemnly reaffirmed. Thenceforward the "Holy Alliance" was not even the semblance of a Universal Union, but frankly a league of the three monarchies of eastern Europe for the defence of autocracy against revolution. The last effective assertion of its principles was the intervention of the Emperor Nicholas I, in 1849, to crush the revolt in Hungary. The "Concert of Europe" still subsisted as an effective factor in international relations; but it was based upon the principle consistently asserted throughout by the British Government: the binding obligation of treaties, and the right of the Powers concerned to be called into counsel on any case arising which threatened their interests. It was reserved for another Emperor of Russia, Nicholas II, to revive, at the close of the nineteenth century, an ideal similar to that of the original Holy Alliance, in the attempt to establish an international system which should enable the world to rid itself of the ruinous burden imposed upon it by the armed rivalry of the nations.

## CHAPTER II.

### THE DOCTRINAIRES.

In March, 1815, France had submitted for the second time to the rule of Napoleon, although united Europe declared him an outlaw and prepared the final effort for his overthrow.

Menacing as were the dangers of France abroad, they did not prevent men who considered themselves called upon to act for their country from fixing their anxious attention on internal political problems. They claimed from the despot, who had ruled France absolutely for fourteen years, the grant of constitutional liberty. These men were Lafayette, Benjamin Constant, Sismondi, and a few others. They represented the very doctrines which Napoleon had constantly rejected. The *Idéologues*, as he used disdainfully to call them, represented, according to him, the chimeras of abstract politics inherited from the eighteenth century. He did not distinguish between the disciples of Montesquieu and the followers of Rousseau, but held them alike responsible for the anarchy, the terror, and finally for the dissolution of social order. "These twelve or fifteen metaphysicians," he said, "ought to be thrown into the water." In accordance with these sentiments, he silenced the last representatives of free speech in the consular assemblies.

Shortly before Marengo, a few years before Necker's death, the First Consul had an interview with him at Geneva. The former Minister of Louis XVI, who had witnessed the fall of the monarchy, propounded to Napoleon his favourite views. He insisted on the identity between morals and politics, and advised a republican and constitutional form of government. The impression he produced was one of mingled contempt and irritation. Necker's daughter, Madame de Staël, and the other members of his little group, had henceforth to suffer for the fatal mistake of daring to utilise, and at the same time to impose limitations on, the supreme power of Napoleon. During his reign these representatives of the principles of 1789 suffered exile and persecution. They were challenged by the powerful genius who felt himself strong enough to provide France, not only with the military glory and the institutions, but also with the ideas, which she required. Victory, while it lasted, stifled

opposition. But, after 1812 and the disasters which the astute mind of Talleyrand had seen so early as 1805 to be inevitable, official France claimed once more the right to criticise the ruler whom fortune had abandoned. Even then the effects of the system which Napoleon had based on the weakness of human nature, on its love of power, on its selfish aims, and on the worship of success, prevailed with those who condemned, not his errors, but his misfortune. And the hope of securing their position in the future induced the members of the Legislative Bodies of the Empire finally to submit without conditions to the Monarchy by the Grace of God, and to accept the Constitution as the free gift of the King. The *Idéologues* of Republican days alone hesitated.

Their ablest publicist, Benjamin Constant, a Swiss by origin, represented the individualistic theory in politics. Liberty was to him a personal right, even more than a social necessity. At the beginning of his career, under the Directory, his sympathies were for the Republic. Like Sieyès, he advocated the limitation of sovereignty by the artificial combination of separate powers within the State, directed alike against despotism and popular terrorism. In 1814 he had supported a scheme of constitutional monarchy for France, with Bernadotte at the helm, and Madame de Staël had favoured it.

The final sanction by Europe of the legitimist solution induced the men of this group, as it had induced Lafayette, an advanced Liberal, and Carnot, a Republican, to accept the monarchy of Louis XVIII. Benjamin Constant now called the Bourbons of the elder branch "*la famille incontestée*." The allegiance of these politicians was not, however, based upon the legitimist creed, but on the pact concluded between the dynasty and the nation by the promulgation of the Charter. This pact excluded the return of the *ancien régime*. The monarchy thereby accepted the centralised administrative organisation created by the Empire and the social organisation begotten by the Revolution and based on the principle of equality before the law. It further assumed that the hereditary right, which the nation had once more sanctioned, could alone reconcile old and new France and secure the peace of Europe. The first Restoration rested on the assumption that men of all parties would be summoned round the throne, a visible testimony to the unity of a free and pacified nation. Under these conditions men who did not believe in the Divine Right of Kings were induced, both by prudence and necessity, to accept the monarchy.

Such an attitude was regarded with suspicion by the monarch and was hateful to the ultra-Royalists. They were supported by the King's brother, Monsieur, and were chiefly recruited from the ranks of the *émigrés*. It was soon manifest that their influence was likely to prevail. In 1814 this became apparent more by the intentions which were revealed than by the measures which were actually passed. But one of

these measures, the reestablishment of the Censorship of the Press, first convinced Benjamin Constant that the Restoration would not last. When Carnot, one of the regicides, submitted a memorandum to the King, in which he made the Emigration responsible for the death of Louis XVI, he was met by an outburst of Royalist passion, which showed that men of his political past could not expect toleration. One of the King's Ministers, Ferrand, justified a proposal for indemnities to the *émigrés* by asserting that they alone had kept "the straight line," while the Royalists who had remained in France were tainted with revolutionary ideas. Napoleon asserted that he owed his triumphant return from Elba to this utterance of Ferrand. Napoleon was able to grant what the Restoration refused. He had never punished men, either for having held convictions which he himself did not share or for evil deeds which belonged to the past. On condition that henceforth they submitted to his will, he had welcomed Royalists and Republicans, Terrorists, Thermidorians, aristocrats, or democrats, good and bad alike. In 1815, after having been carried by a liberal and democratic current from Cannes to the Élysée, he acted on the same principle. The days of his absolute rule were gone. He convinced patriots of the type of Lafayette and Carnot of the necessity of repelling foreign invasion; he won over Benjamin Constant, who drafted the *Acte Additionnel* in a more liberal sense than the Charter.

But Napoleon did not succeed in gaining the support of the Constitutional Monarchs. The episode of the Hundred Days only confirmed them in the resolution to rescue the King from his reactionary surroundings and to convince him of the necessity of shaping the monarchy of the future not only according to the letter, but the spirit, of the Constitution. The foremost of the Royalists who recommended this course, Pierre-Paul Royer-Collard, was well known to the King. Born in 1763, the son of peasant proprietors, he had begun his career as a lawyer in Paris and had approved of the beginnings of the Revolution. The excesses which followed he condemned, and he foresaw their consequences. He escaped from the Terror and was elected, in 1797, together with Camille Jordan, the young and highly-gifted deputy for Lyons, as member of the Council of the Five Hundred. In this assembly both these men pleaded, with remarkable eloquence, for liberty of worship and the impartial administration of justice. Their efforts were in vain; and from that time Royer-Collard went back to the historic tradition of France, as expressed in the monarchical system. He became in the true sense of the word a Legitimist, on the assumption that the hereditary Monarchy represented a principle, not a party, and that it would be prepared to lead the new destinies of France. A trusted adviser of Louis XVIII, the Abbé de Montesquiou, secured Royer-Collard as the correspondent who kept the King informed about events in France. This correspondence came to an end in 1800, after Marengo, when the Royalist cause had become

hopeless. In his valedictory letter to the King he congratulated him on having refused to sacrifice his hereditary rights for pecuniary advantages and warned him once more against the follies and the intrigues of the Emigration. Royer-Collard then applied himself to philosophy. He taught, under the influence of Thomas Reid, a metaphysical doctrine directed chiefly against the prevailing materialism, in defence of free will and the claims of human reason. He was appointed a professor at the Sorbonne, where young men like Guizot and Charles de Rémusat became his pupils, and witnesses to the influence of his teaching in favour of liberty. It rested on religious convictions. While Guizot, a sincere Protestant, defended Christianity according to his creed, Royer-Collard remained faithful to the Jansenist traditions in which he had been educated. Their severe morality was congenial to his conscientious but haughty and unbending mind. He owed it to his Jansenist teachers, he said, that he had never sought his own interest in public life.

When the Abbé de Montesquiou became a Minister under the first Restoration, he gave Guizot a post, and, remembering the services Royer-Collard had rendered to his cause, entrusted him with the supervision of the Press. Both he and Guizot consented to limit its liberty so long as the Government was not firmly established. At the same time they resisted the policy of the Ultras. When Chateaubriand published his *Réflexions politiques*, which, although directed against men like Carnot, advocated the recognition of the new order and a peaceful understanding between the contending parties, Royer-Collard declared this policy to be the true foundation of the monarchical system. He failed in his endeavours to decentralise the existing organisation of public instruction, because his object, the creation of seventeen universities, met with the resolute opposition of the Vicomte de Bonald, an advocate of royal absolutism and of the supreme power of the Church in matters of education. Bonald was supported by the Abbé de Lamennais, a man not less rigid than Bonald himself and equal in mental and literary powers to Count Joseph de Maistre. These partisans of the extreme views in Church politics came to the front soon after the publication in Paris of de Maistre's *Principe générateur des Constitutions politiques* (1814). It contained the essence of doctrines which were made famous by the author's later works. They proclaimed with conspicuous talent the divine origin of sovereignty, and the solidarity of mankind as a living and continuous organism, resting on tradition, guided by the infallible authority of Catholic faith, of which the Pope is the interpreter. De Maistre, like Bonald, looked forward to a regeneration of religion, which, notwithstanding the efforts of his genius to meet the needs of his time, was but another expression for the theocracy of the Middle Ages. The ideas of de Maistre developed into a coherent system only after his death, 1821, when the treatise *Du Pape*, which he published first in an incomplete form, was followed by a fuller version, by the work on

*L'Église Gallicane*, and the *Soirées de Saint-Pétersbourg*; the intellectual father of modern Ultramontanism never knew the extent of his triumphs.

Lamennais introduced the doctrines of de Maistre into practical politics. He was the first Catholic leader who proclaimed, in the days of the Empire, that the destructive philosophy of the eighteenth century was doomed, and that the right of public instruction belonged exclusively to the clergy. In the ranks of the rising generation, both lay and clerical, he won supporters whom the Imperial police failed to discourage and who organised the religious associations which, under the restored Monarchy, acquired the doubtful political fame attached to the intrigues and the secret working of the "Congregation." Louis XVIII tried in vain to avoid the danger which was threatening to complicate political by religious fanaticism. So early as 1814, priests refused absolution to the owners of national property. Regulations as to the observance of the Sabbath and Church processions, still more the outbreak of popular hatred against Protestants in the south of France, foretold a religious reaction, which was arrested by the catastrophe of March, 1815. But it was well known in Paris that Louis XVIII, after his flight to Ghent, was surrounded by men who declared that his Liberal concessions were responsible for the downfall of the Monarchy.

Royer-Collard and his friends had experienced the intolerance of the Ultras, whose religious views they rejected even more decidedly than their political passions. They considered it their imperative duty to speak to the King; and they sent Guizot to Ghent. The object of his mission was to demand guarantees for a loyal acceptance of the Charter, the dismissal of Blacas, the reactionary royal favourite, and the recall of Talleyrand, who had succeeded at the Congress of Vienna in saving the prestige of his fallen sovereign. At Ghent Guizot had the support of surviving Constitutionalists of 1789, of Beugnot, who had drafted the Charter, of the staunch Royalist Lainé, of Baron Louis, the indispensable Minister of Finance in both Restorations, but was unable to overcome the opposing influences. Chateaubriand, who acted as Minister of the Interior, proved hostile to Guizot personally, but advocated the liberty of the Press. Monsieur and his followers remained of opinion that everything which was not mentioned in the Charter should remain as in the days of the *ancien régime*. The King was reserved, but gracious.

After Waterloo the Duke of Wellington, speaking in the name of England as the chief Power which effected the second Restoration, succeeded where the Constitutional Monarchs had failed. Talleyrand was recalled. In his proclamation from Cambrai the King was induced to confess that the Government of 1814 had committed errors which would be avoided in the future. He promised liberty of the Press, free elections, the abolition of the system of confiscations adopted by Napoleon, a hereditary peerage, and a homogeneous Ministry. At the same time Wellington's distrust of the chances of the new Government prompted

him to insist on Fouché being placed at the head of the Ministry of Police. The King reluctantly consented to this humiliating necessity; but he nominated as prefect of the Paris police a young official of the name of Decazes, whose zeal for the Royalist cause had deserved the sovereign's approval and who henceforth replaced Blacas in his affection.

The task which lay before French statesmen at the second Restoration was one of extreme difficulty. The Tsar Alexander, owing to the attitude of Talleyrand at the Congress of Vienna, had become hostile to France. He excluded Talleyrand, who was Minister of Foreign Affairs, from the negotiations with the Powers, which were in armed occupation of three-fourths of the soil of France and had become exacting in their demands. At home, the events of the Hundred Days had increased to relentless hatred and fanaticism the violence of the parties into which the country remained divided. The Royalists believed in a conspiracy against the Crown which called for vengeance. The foremost Liberals rejected the monarchy of Louis XVIII so late as the end of June; and after the proclamation of Cambrai Fouché saw his opportunity. He perfidiously encouraged Lafayette, Voyer d'Argenson, Pontécoulant, and Benjamin Constant, to carry proposals to Hagenau, the headquarters of the Allied sovereigns, who declined to receive them. The envoys had to submit to Lord Stewart's rudeness when they insisted on the right of France to choose her sovereign, and declared that neither Louis XVIII nor Napoleon II satisfied the wishes of the people. After their return to Paris, the Chambers, whose illusions they had fostered, were closed, at Fouché's order, by a Prussian officer. The rejection of legitimacy by these Liberals remained unforgotten, nor was it ever wholly abandoned by them and by other leaders of the future Left in the Royalist assemblies. Their opposition became more and more anti-dynastic, and they undoubtedly compromised themselves by conspiring against the throne.

On the other hand, the legitimate sovereign who ascended for the second time the throne of France, returned, not as the successor of Louis XIV, but as the heir of the Revolution. "The Government of the King," Ranke truly says, "had no other powers than those which the Revolution had bestowed"; and de Maistre did not hesitate to affirm that the rightful descendant of so many Kings had become the successor of Bonaparte. The supreme military command, the right to declare war, to conclude treaties, and to issue the ordinances and decrees for the sanction of laws voted by the Chambers, were prerogatives which had belonged to the Consular power. The Concordat remained in force; the declaration of Catholicism as the State religion remained a dead letter. The *Charte octroyée* left three political problems unsolved. The King had the power to choose his ministers; but the question was left undecided whether he was bound to select them from the ranks of the majority—whether his government was to be merely constitutional

or parliamentary; while it was settled that the Chambers were to meet every year, that the deputies were to be unpaid, and that a payment of 300 francs in direct taxation was to be the qualification of the electors, the mode of election was not fixed; finally, there was no Press law. These three questions predominated in the parliamentary debates of the second Restoration. France remained divided, not into two parties, but into two nations. The partisans of the *ancien régime* declared war to the knife on the children of the Revolution. The generation of the past was determined to recover what it had lost; the new generation affirmed its right to keep what it had won.

Between these contending elements stood the King. It soon became apparent that he was resolved to govern. But at the beginning of his reign, in 1815, he had no military force. It was only after the troops on the Loire had been disbanded (July 16, 1815) that it became possible to form one. In the meantime the White Terror broke out in the south. It was directed against Bonapartists, Revolutionists, and Protestants, and led to rapine and murder. Hundreds of men fell victims, among them General Ramel at Toulouse, Marshal Brune at Avignon; and the authorities were unable to protect the terrified people or to punish the criminals. While the Duke of Angoulême, not without the help of Austrian troops, put down disturbances which had been stimulated by clerical influence, and while the Allied troops kept order in the south and east, the general election was held (August 22). The King, in 1814, had retained the Imperial Chamber. Now, pending a new electoral law, he issued the provisional Ordinance of July 13, by which the Imperial system was continued for the election of the new Chamber; but the limit of age for electors was reduced, and the number of deputies increased to 402. The Prefects received instructions to use their influence at the elections in favour of moderation; the King appointed the presidents of electoral colleges without reference to party; the censorship introduced in 1814 for minor publications was abolished. The Government remained impartial; but the Royalist policy of retaliation triumphed so completely that the terrorised Bonapartists and Republicans only obtained a few representatives; and the Chamber was named by the King the *Chambre introuvable*, because it surpassed the most sanguine expectations of the Royalists themselves.

Fouché, frightened at the extent of the Royalist victory, laid two memoranda before the Council, pointing out that civil war would be the outcome of reaction. They were made public with his connivance, and Talleyrand made use of this breach of trust to get rid of a colleague who now could only do harm. He was himself determined to resign, but he counted on a return to office, a calculation never realised while the Restoration lasted. In the darkest hour of the Monarchy he had committed himself to the conviction that France was both Royalist and Constitutional. The first verdict of the country under the restored

dynasty put back the hand on the timepiece of history twenty-five years and indicated a reactionary France. This made a Talleyrand Ministry impossible. Foreign complications offered the pretext for his retirement. In response to the exacting terms of the Allies, Talleyrand declared proudly that Louis XVIII was the ally of the Powers, not their enemy : no right of conquest existed against the legitimate sovereign. Had not the Allies declared that the maintenance of the Treaty of Paris was the sole object of the recent war ? But on September 20 his Ministry was forced to resign.

The Tsar held out hopes of better conditions should the Duc de Richelieu become Prime Minister. When Richelieu hesitated, Alexander showed him the map drawn by Knesebeck, with the line depriving France of the circle of fortresses constructed by Vauban. Pozzo di Borgo, in agreement with the Tsar, then wrote the protest of the French Government against Russia's allies ; and Richelieu reluctantly accepted office. He had lived out of the country for twenty-four years, had rendered brilliant service to the Tsar as Governor of Odessa, and had steeled his resolution in the struggle with Napoleon. He was a man of lofty character and admirable disinterestedness. In his youth he had been influenced by the physiocratic school, but of modern France he knew little. He stood outside the circle of Monsieur, nor did he share the violent prejudices of his class, although he had fought in the ranks of the Emigration. Not so his colleagues, the incompetent Vaublanc, Minister of the Interior, the Duke of Feltre, and Du Bouchage, whose appointments were concessions to the Ultras. Richelieu's supporters were Barbé-Marbois, Keeper of the Seals, Corvetto, Minister of Finance, and Decazes, to whom Louis XVIII gave the Ministry of Police.

The Chamber met in October. It was chiefly composed of land-owners, officials, and middle-class Conservatives. Its leaders were La Bourdonnaye, a former *chouan* and a fanatic; Bonald, whose doctrine of a hierarchical constitution of society rested on the assumption of the alliance between Church and State ; the more sober-minded Corbière, a lawyer, who tried, like Villèle, to harmonise the demands of the Ultras with the necessities of practical politics. Neither the secret agent of Monsieur, Vitrolles, always employed and never trusted or rewarded, nor Chateaubriand, at once the most eloquent champion of Royalist passions and the advocate of constitutional right, played a conspicuous part in the House. Vitrolles intrigued ; Chateaubriand influenced the Government and public opinion by ruling the Press with masterly power. The mainstay of the Ultras was Monsieur, who, in the words of Richelieu, although heir to the throne, never ceased to be a party chief. The Constitutional Royalists were represented by Lainé, appointed President of the Chamber by the King, Royer-Collard, Councillor of State and head of the Education department, Sainte-Aulaire, Camille Jordan, and Count Hercule de Serre, who soon

came to the very front rank. He had fought under Condé; subsequently he became President of the High Court of Justice at Hamburg during the Empire, and now held a similar post at Colmar. Guizot, principal secretary in the Ministry of Justice, was excluded by his age from the Chamber. Pasquier, both as deputy and Minister, Barante, as a high official, represented the Imperial administrators, who accepted the Restoration. From the House of Peers, whose dignity had become hereditary in spite of the Royalists, twenty members were excluded for their action during the Hundred Days. The King replaced them by Napoleonic marshals and members of the revolutionary assemblies, as well as by Royalists.

The royal speech insisted on adherence to the Charter; the address of the deputies reminded the King of the necessity to punish. The presentation of three exceptional measures met this demand. The first gave the Government full powers to arrest and detain, without bringing them before the Courts, all offenders against the King, the royal House, and the safety of the State. The second punished with extreme severity those who menaced the King or public security. The third created tribunals—the *Cours prévôtales*—which, presided over by soldiers, could deal summarily with political offenders. Although the powers of these Courts were not made retrospective, the King's prerogative of mercy was practically abolished.

In the debate on these measures, Royer-Collard and de Serre came to the front. They recognised the necessity of exceptional laws, but urged milder punishments and more exact definitions of offences. They opposed a law, passed by the Chamber and rejected by the Peers, for the temporary suspension of the security of judicial tenure, by the abolition of which the Ultras calculated that places would be filled by their adherents. From that moment, Royer-Collard, Pasquier, and their friends took counsel together on the tactics to be adopted against the party stigmatised by Richelieu as the White Jacobins.

On November 20 Richelieu signed the second Peace of Paris "with a sorrow amounting to despair." He had to submit to the surveillance of France by the Powers, to be carried out by their ambassadors. While the responsibility for the settlement with Europe rested on Richelieu, he was compelled to introduce the amnesty law. In his proclamation from Cambrai the King had excluded from amnesty the traitors of the Hundred Days only. The ordinance of July 24 sent nineteen persons before Courts-martial, which began their work with the death-sentence on Labédoyère. The fate of thirty-eight others was to be decided by the Chamber. Richelieu, supported by Royer-Collard, Pasquier, and de Serre, now proposed that these thirty-eight persons should be banished, but that all those not mentioned on Fouche's lists should be pardoned. The Ultras asserted the right of the Chamber in legislative matters to override the King's prerogative of mercy. The execution of Marshal

Ney, the escape of Lavalette, for which Decazes and Barbé-Marbois were held responsible, increased the thirst for vengeance. The language of La Bourdonnaye recalled 1793. He, Chateaubriand, Villèle, and Corbière, called for "categories" which, contrary to the will of the King, threatened 1200 persons with exile and confiscation.

In the course of this debate Richelieu spoke memorable words: "I do not understand your passions, your relentless hatreds. I pass every day by the house which belonged to my ancestors. I see their property in other hands and I behold in museums the treasures which belonged to them. It is a sad sight; but it does not rouse in me feelings either of despair or revenge. You appear to me sometimes to be out of your minds, all of you who have remained in France." Neither he, nor Royer-Collard and de Serre, who spoke in a similar sense and in favour of the royal prerogative of mercy, succeeded in preventing the exclusion of the regicides from the amnesty. The Cabinet was divided. Three Ministers acted with Monsieur. The instructions of Decazes to interpret the laws of exception in a merciful sense were evaded. In the army, the navy, and the administration, the opponents of Royalism were dismissed.

On December 18, 1815, Vaublanc introduced an impossible electoral law. Its object was to place the whole electoral machinery in the hands of the Executive. It was not unfairly described as a proposal under which Ministers and Prefects chose the electors, and the electors the deputies. The provision of the Charter under which a fifth part of the Chamber had to be elected annually was retained; but the limit of age for candidates was reduced from 40 to 25 years. These last two proposals caused the Ultras to reject the measure. It was then that Villèle, deputy of Toulouse, ventured on a daring counter-proposal. He framed the only project of an electoral law which, during the Restoration, aimed at extending the right of suffrage to the people. This project advocated the reduction of the qualification for the franchise from 300 to 50 francs in direct taxation, thereby increasing the constituency from 100,000 to 2 millions, while insisting on a payment of 1000 francs in taxation as a qualification for the deputies, and maintaining the system of indirect election. Villèle appealed to the royal ordinance of 1815, which suggested modifications of the Charter; he proposed that general elections should be quinquennial and that deputies should be 40 years of age. By this proposal the Ultras intended to increase parliamentary power at the expense of the Crown and in opposition to a Government which they considered hostile to their interests. They claimed a Ministry chosen from the ranks of their majority, and to uphold this majority they counted upon the combined votes of the landed gentry and nobility and upon their influence with the rural population. Their real aim was to weaken the power of the Liberal middle classes and to secure the domination of their party. The Constitutional Royalists supported the Government. During the Ministry of Talleyrand, Royer-Collard, being

consulted, had recommended direct elections and a qualification of 300 francs paid in direct taxation. Now he declared in a memorable speech that in France the King ruled and not the Parliament, and that the cooperation of the Chamber was only required for legislation and supplies. On the day when the Chamber could make or unmake Ministers, a Republic would be established. The Chamber in his view was a part of the King's Government. De Serre characterised Villèle's project as an attack on the royal initiative, and insisted on the necessity of maintaining unimpaired the power of the Crown in a nation without an aristocracy and with shifting majorities. Democracy, he said, had ruined the country and was unwelcome to France.

Both Villèle's and Vaublanc's proposals were lost in the Peers; and Corvetto then introduced the budget. To meet the enormous deficit, he proposed the sale of forests which had formerly been for the most part ecclesiastical and communal property and which now belonged to the State. The Right rejected the proposal and the claims of creditors of the Hundred Days, although the King had allowed them. They suggested payment by exchequer bonds of 100 francs, quoted at 60, which amounted to a declaration of partial bankruptcy.

The Government having recommended an increased payment to the clergy, the Right demanded for the Church a fixed revenue of 42 millions, the charge of the civil registers, and restitution of its confiscated property. De Serre characterised these proposals as monstrous and unconstitutional, and dissociated the clergy from claims which could not be raised without questioning the rights of property in every European State. Royer-Collard reminded the House that the King was pledged. The majority would not be convinced. Corvetto had to withdraw his proposal and to defer definite arrangements with regard to the debt. The session was closed in April, 1816. Shortly afterwards Vaublanc was replaced by Lainé. This was a concession to the minority, whose leaders Richelieu henceforth consulted, and to the Powers, in whose name Wellington besought Louis XVIII to support the Ministry. The Allies feared that peace, the dynasty, and the solvency of France were at stake. The Tsar, Nesselrode, and Hardenberg advocated the dissolution of the Chamber. Richelieu felt this interference so humiliating that he declared he would rather be overthrown by Frenchmen than saved by foreigners.

Just then disturbances broke out at Lyons and Grenoble. Their importance was exaggerated by General Donnadieu and the local authorities; and they were repressed with needless severity. While the Ultras planned changes in the Charter and a Ministry of their own, the firm establishment of a moderate policy was the condition insisted on by the Powers, before reducing the army of occupation. Russia called attention to the infraction of the Charter by the votes on the budget and the amnesty law. Gradually, through reports from all parts of the country, through memoranda from Pasquier, Guizot, Decazes, the King

was brought to admit that "the monarchy must be nationalised, the nation royalised." Richelieu and Lainé gave way; and on September 5, 1816, an ordinance appeared, dissolving the Chamber. It maintained provisionally the existing electoral system; but it reduced the Chamber to 258 members. Decazes, who was the real author of this *coup d'état*, had made Barante and subsequently Royer-Collard his confidants. The latter embraced him, exclaiming that he deserved a statue. The majority of the nation rejoiced. The Ultras were taken entirely by surprise. Chateaubriand, in *La Monarchie selon la Charte*, prophesied a Jacobin assembly and called on the Royalists to support the King against his deceivers. Decazes suppressed the pamphlet and worked on the electors through the censorship of the Press, recommending the choice of Moderates, "no matter whether these accepted the Charter because of the King, or the King because of the Charter." Guizot vindicated for the King the right of dissolution, and clearly indicated that he and his friends only awaited security from reaction to complete the edifice of political liberty.

The elections for the new Chamber in October, 1816, gave the Ministers a majority of between forty and fifty. The independent Left won twelve seats. When Pasquier became Chancellor in January, 1817, he was replaced as President of the Chamber by de Serre. The Government confided the preparation of the electoral law to Royer-Collard, who recurred to his plan of 1815—a qualification of 300 francs for voters, the qualifications for deputies to be payment of 1000 francs in taxation and 40 years of age, direct suffrage by *scrutin de liste* in the chief town of each Department, royal nomination of the presidents of electoral bodies, and annual election of one-fifth of the Chamber in Departments chosen by ballot. These were essentially the provisions of Article XL of the Charter, which, however, had left open the question of indirect elections, and, consequently, the formation of a wider electorate. Under the new system there were hardly 100,000 electors; the centre of gravity was placed in the middle class in order to exclude the lower, "the instrument," according to Barante, "of intrigue and passion."

The Republican Left was as yet too small a group to defend the interests of democracy. This was done by the Royalists, who again called for an extended franchise, and complained of the condemnation of the country to political slavery. Their Liberalism provoked the sarcasm of Benjamin Constant, who, pardoned by the King for his conduct during the Hundred Days, supported the Government, advising it to rely on the assistance of all persons free from crime, and thereby to resist the party which, under the pretext of liberty, aimed at the recovery of privilege.

Richelieu did not disguise his personal preference for the scheme of Villèle; and Lainé, Minister of the Interior, although responsible for the new scheme, doubted whether 28,000,000 of people would be adequately

represented by an electorate of about 100,000. He entrusted to Guizot the defence of the ministerial plan in the press. Guizot did not conceal that he and his friends desired the ascendancy of the middle class, which, according to them, represented culture and individual independence in civil life and right in politics. De Serre took another standpoint. He approved of the exclusion of the masses; but he desired separate representation of the only great interests which survived the Revolution—landed property and urban industry, a proposal which found no support. Royer-Collard carried the Chamber with him when he asked them to trust electors, whose material independence was a pledge of political maturity, and who represented the aristocracies of birth, fortune, talent, and position. “Above the middle class,” he said, “is the longing for power; below it is ignorance, the habit of dependence, and, therefore, the incapacity of exercising the functions in question.” The opposition in the Peers gave way under the influence of the King; on February 5, 1817, the measure became law. Its main principles governed France for thirty years.

The Right, under pretence that the Charter would be violated, now refused to consent to the prolongation of exceptional laws. Royer-Collard, supported by his friends, defended them and the continuance of temporary press restrictions on the ground of necessity, and, in a masterly speech, proclaimed it as the faith of constitutional France that the King governed, spoke, and acted through his Ministers, so long as these obeyed the law. It was a revolutionary fiction which separated the King from his Government. At this stage of his career, Royer-Collard, in friendly relations with Decazes and Pasquier, accepted the designation of ministerialist. About this time his acquaintance with the Duc de Broglie began. They met at the death-bed of Madame de Staël, whose daughter the young Duke had married, and were not mutually attracted. But their opinions harmonised better than their personalities. Broglie had come out of the ranks of Imperial administrators with extreme Liberal opinions. They were modified by the doctrine of Madame de Staël, as expressed in the *Considérations*, and condensed in her famous saying, “that liberty, not despotism, was old,” and by the study of English and American writers. Nevertheless he scrupled to support a Ministry which he reproached with governing under the influence of foreigners.

It was during the session of 1817 that the appellation of “*Doctrinaires*” was applied to the little distinct group of Constitutional Royalists. The name was given to Royer-Collard, de Serre, Barante, Camille Jordan, Guizot, and, in a more limited sense, to Beugnot, Mounier, and Rémusat. Broglie, when he ceased to act with the Liberals, completed the half-dozen about whom Rémusat jestingly said in 1818, that the thinking faction “collected on a sofa, constituted themselves the majority.” Till then the group possessed no definite doctrine in common. According

to Barante, the struggle with the Ultras led to the gradual formulation of a governing principle for the interpretation of the Charter. The party, says Guizot, was formed spontaneously, without premeditation, to resist a pressing evil, not in the interest of a particular system or set of ideas. To support the Restoration, while combating reaction, was at first its whole policy. It gained in distinctness as time went on. Guizot writes that the French monarchy and the middle class, both alarmed at the pretensions of the old nobility, combined for mutual protection. The Doctrinaires sought in the power of the Crown a safeguard against the ambition of the Chamber, and cared little for the consequences derived from theories of representation; nay more, they rejected them in the name of monarchy. Royer-Collard, addressing his constituents in 1816, said: "The King is Legitimacy. Legitimacy is order and security. These can be maintained by moderation alone, a virtue derived by politics from ethics." Barante insists that Royer-Collard was essentially an opportunist.

The political action of the Doctrinaires was determined less by ideas than by personalities. They all developed under foreign influences; Royer-Collard under that of Scotch philosophy; de Serre, Camille Jordan, Broglie in Germany, either in exile or as Imperial officials; Guizot and Barante at Geneva, in an atmosphere of German philosophy and poetry. The Duchesse de Broglie represented in politics the principles of Madame de Staël; it was she who won over her husband, Guizot, and Barante to orthodox Christianity. The supremacy of ethics in politics was the aim of the Doctrinaires. "Morals are the serious part of politics," Rémusat wrote. "We must show the Ultras that their morals are as corrupt as superficial, their religion mere formalism. Theories are convictions. If they are repressed, nothing remains but personal interest, the right of the strongest." He described Chateaubriand's *Génie du Christianisme* as a mischievous book, because it did not interpret the Gospel as the source of political morality, liberty, and civilisation.

Hereditary monarchy was for Royer-Collard the symbol of reverence. Guizot understood French society as the outcome, not of 1789, but of centuries. He wanted to complete the Revolution by expelling errors, and vindicated for himself and his friends the privilege of associating politics with sound philosophy. Philosophy taught that neither legitimate monarchy nor popular freedom can be improvised. He admitted that legitimacy begins with usurpation, liberty in anarchy. But he placed his hopes for the future in adhesion to the historical past, and, in the words of de Serre, wished "to bring customs and law into harmony with constitutional government." This line of thought, starting from historical development and placing moral considerations above party, had always something repellent for the French mind. The Doctrinaires did not conciliate it by their uncompromising, authoritative tone. They

influenced opinion ; a time came when they controlled it; but they never became popular, nor strong enough to form a governing party.

Divergences of opinion might be perceived among them so early as 1817. Barante went with Decazes. Guizot and Broglie showed predilections for English institutions, which Royer-Collard in reality never shared. Guizot was too overbearing for him; and his saying that he would not be a figure on Guizot's chessboard is of an early date. His cutting remark, when asked whether he had called Guizot an austere intriguer, "I never said austere," belongs to a later time. Rémusat, with Pasquier and Molé, complained that the Doctrinaires were not business men and had no efficient organ in the Press. Lainé and Pasquier objected to their intellectual haughtiness; Richelieu distrusted them. The Royalists spoke of them as Jacobins, and called them insufferable pedants. Later they were courted by the Left.

During the summer of 1817, after the close of the session, the Government was embarrassed by scarcity, lawlessness, and disturbances in Lyons, where General Canuel imitated Donnadiet. The *Cours prévôtale*s pronounced 28 capital sentences and others of transportation and imprisonment. It was only when Marshal Marmont was sent that order was restored. The election of a fifth of the deputies in September, 1817, left the majority unchanged. The Government, however, with difficulty prevented the return of Lafayette, Benjamin Constant, and Manuel for Paris. Before meeting the Chamber, Richelieu reluctantly replaced his colleagues Du Bouchage and the Duke of Feltre by Molé and Gouvion Saint-Cyr. The royal speech announced a wide amnesty and the abolition of the *Cours prévôtale*s. Numerous Press prosecutions and the consequent excitement of public opinion caused the Government to ask for three years' prolongation of the censorship, for the trial of minor Press offences by the ordinary Courts and of incitements to crime before a jury.

The Ultras and Liberals now combined in an opposition which would have failed without the support of the Doctrinaires, who demanded a jury for all Press offences. Camille Jordan, although a ministerialist and Councillor of State, accused the Government of violating the Charter and of flattering without satisfying extreme opinions. Royer-Collard declared that liberty of the Press without freedom to criticise the Government was unthinkable ; of all arbitrary powers those dealing with the Press should be the last entrusted to the executive. Lainé reminded him that he had not always thought so. An attempt by Richelieu through Villèle and Corbière to come to an understanding with the Right failed. Broglie went with the Doctrinaires, except that he rejected the censorship entirely, although he afterwards admitted its necessity while foreign armies stood in France. The proposed extension of trial by jury was dropped, but the censorship was only retained for a

year. Pasquier and Barante held that the distrust between Ministers and the Doctrinaires originated in this debate.

Royer-Collard, as President of the Council of Education, had to maintain the university system against the combined attacks of Lamennais, the Liberals, and his own chief, Lainé, who, obstinate as himself, shared Richelieu's aversion from him. The King spoke of the Doctrinaires as traitors who glorified the Revolution at the expense of the *ancien régime*, but supported Decazes, when accused by Chateaubriand and Fiévée of complicity with the Left. The censorship upon newspapers was evaded by both parties; they attacked the Government in leaflets. Benjamin Constant made the *Minerve*, a non-periodical print, the most powerful organ of the Left, and sought to win over the middle class by insisting on property as the basis of political rights.

In December, 1817, Gouvion Saint-Cyr produced a plan for the reorganisation of the army on a footing of 240,000. Louis XVIII had abolished the hated conscription; but voluntary enlistment proved insufficient to maintain an effective force. The Ministry retained the voluntary system, but introduced also recruiting by ballot and seven years' service. In compensation for this unpopular measure promotion by seniority up to the rank of colonel was made the rule for two-thirds of the officers, and the promotion of non-commissioned officers was also permitted. The King gave his consent to this limitation of prerogative. The formation of a reserve of veterans recalled to the colours for a number of years the disbanded men of the Imperial army.

This system, based on equality, created, according to Camille Jordan, an army of soldiers and citizens. It reconciled the veterans of the Empire and limited the possibility of giving commissions to *émigrés* and nobles. On these grounds it was an abomination to the Right, who, as in the Press debate, appealed to the Charter in support of prerogative. Monsieur besought the King to dismiss the Ministry; Chateaubriand and Villele protested against the democratic measure, which prepared an instrument for despotism. The Government leaned on the Left and on the Doctrinaires. Guizot composed the speech which won for Gouvion Saint-Cyr the greatest triumph of the session. Royer-Collard, like his friends, defended the measure, but supported by de Serre, Beugnot and Camille Jordan, he demanded an annual vote for the army, as Parliament had no right to bind its successors. "It would be useless for the Chamber to sit," he said, "if without and apart from it an army exists which could slip from its hands and be as uncontrollable as the Civil List." This proposal was rejected. Although the Government was victorious, Decazes alone in the Cabinet entirely agreed with Gouvion Saint-Cyr. Richelieu, who had long wished to retire, and Lainé, regretted the breach with the Right in proportion as their antipathy to the Doctrinaires increased.

The fate of the third Government proposal was sealed before debate.

Since 1814, as shown in a later chapter, negotiations had gone on between France and Rome for the abrogation of the Concordat of 1801. Not one of the negotiators thought the assent of the Chamber necessary for the proposed agreement. The omission had to be remedied; and a bill was drafted by Pasquier, in consultation with Royer-Collard and Camille Jordan, and with the assistance of Portalis, which guarded the jurisdiction of the State, reaffirmed the legality of the sales of Church property, and reserved for the Government control over the publication of papal bulls, briefs, and decrees. When it became clear that the ministerial scheme would be rejected by both Liberals and Doctrinaires, the Government put aside indefinitely the report of the commission; and after fruitless negotiations with the Curia the Concordat of 1801 remained in force.

Before the end of the session of 1818, by the intervention of the Tsar through Pozzo di Borgo and with the final consent of Wellington, it became possible to regulate the responsibilities of France towards her foreign creditors and the Powers. The claims of the foreign creditors were considerably reduced and met by an issue of *rentes sur l'État*; while a further issue of *rentes* was authorised to cover the war indemnity. An annual budget became possible now that special budgets were gradually abolished. The debt was consolidated, the State creditors were secured, and the ground was thus prepared for that honourable and economical method of administration which is the chief glory of the Restoration Government.

But in 1818, as before, nothing but surrender would conciliate the Ultras. Villèle was of opinion that a Republic was at hand if a Royalist policy were not adopted by the King. Monsieur tried to force upon him a Government of the extreme Right, by representing to the Powers, in a secret note drawn by Vitrolles, that such a course could alone save the dynasty and the country. Louis XVIII, incensed at a Royalist military conspiracy, replied by striking the name of Vitrolles from the roll of Privy Councillors and by depriving Monsieur of the command of the National Guard (September, 1818).

At the Congress of Aix-la-Chapelle Richelieu, through his personal influence, finally liberated France from the army of occupation. There the news reached him that the annual partial elections had nearly doubled the numbers of the Left (October, 1818). It increased to 45 deputies. Lafayette and Manuel were returned, the latter for Vendée. Richelieu gave his diplomatic colleagues tranquillising assurances, on which he did not himself rely, and promised to withhold his intended resignation, but returned to Paris with the conviction that the electoral law must be modified or even sacrificed and the Right conciliated. "We have defeated the Right wing," he wrote; "let us now fall on the Left, which is much more dangerous, seeing that it has its reserves behind it." Decazes, who was held responsible for the results of the

election, admitted that the law required modifications, but remained of opinion that the Government must lean upon the Centre. This group, however, having split just then into a right and a left Centre, was no longer able to secure a compact majority. During the election Camille Jordan had issued a proclamation which was considered as the manifesto of the Doctrinaires. It rejected any understanding with the Royalists, and was interpreted as a declaration of war against the Cabinet.

The Chambers met in the middle of December. The last speech from the throne had deprecated excessive zeal and declared the King's system to mean peace and union between the two nations into which France was unhappily divided. Now Louis XVIII spoke of principles which, under the guise of freedom, led through anarchy to despotism—words which were considered by Royer-Collard and Camille Jordan as an affront to new France. In the Peers the Royalist majority filled the committees with their nominees; in the Chamber of Deputies the Doctrinaires did the same, although de Serre, whose new rules for the Chamber were rejected, was replaced as President by Ravez, a friend of Lainé. In opposition to Decazes, Richelieu and Lainé advised an alliance with the Right, and proposed that all elections should be suspended for five years. Richelieu then approached Villèle and Corbière, suggesting the retirement of Gouvion Saint-Cyr and Decazes and the reform of the electoral law. When nothing came of this advance and all hope was over of a Ministry representing the Right Centre and the Right, Richelieu resigned (December 21, 1818). He advised the King to send for Decazes, who, only at the express desire of Louis XVIII, consented to accept the Home Office in a Ministry without Richelieu. On his recommendation, General Dessolets, a man in the King's confidence, became President of the Council; de Serre was made Minister of Justice, Baron Louis of Finance; Portal, an excellent administrator, of Marine; Gouvion Saint-Cyr remained at the War Office. The Ministry of Police was suppressed by Decazes as inconsistent with free government, and the Prefecture of police was restored.

The Cabinet was homogeneous and sincerely Liberal; the Doctrinaires promised de Serre their support. The programme of the King still held the field: "Let us hold out our hands to the Right and to the Left; and let us say, those not against us are with us." De Serre wrote that the safety of the Crown and the country lay in the development of free institutions, Liberally interpreted. He hoped to sever the Royalist Opposition from the Ultras, and at the same time to win over men like Broglie. The latter still considered the electoral law the masterpiece of the Doctrinaires, and the abandonment of it as synonymous with capitulation to reaction. At a later time he thought otherwise and acknowledged that it was a capital fault to sacrifice the Richelieu Ministry for that enactment. Richelieu's fears, he said, were not groundless; the electoral law of 1817, right in principle, was revolutionary in its working

and could not be maintained. This was proved in 1819, when the Ministry formed to defend it had to give it up. Richelieu was overthrown at the moment when his foreign policy triumphed ; and the Right Centre was driven slowly but inevitably into the arms of the Right.

The Doctrinaires now joined the Left Centre in defence of the Ministry. The Left, although favourable in principle to a Cabinet in which four Ministers were more advanced Liberals than Decazes, became exacting in their claims ; while the exasperated Ultras were so churlish in the debate on a grant to Richelieu, that, though a comparatively poor man, he handed the money over to the hospitals of Bordeaux.

On February 20, 1819, Barthélemy, the former Director, proposed "that the Peers should humbly request the King to sanction a measure tending to modify the organisation of electoral bodies." This proposal obtained a large majority. In the Lower Chamber Laffitte moved an address to the Crown in favour of the existing law. De Serre replied that the address was useless, because the Ministry were resolved to propose no change. The hostility of the Peers was shown by their refusal, without debate, to sanction a harmless proposal, accepted by the deputies, for altering the commencement of the financial year from January to July. A dissolution was considered ; but it was decided to create sixty Peers (March 6, 1819), among them Mounier and Barante. About thirty of the new Peers were former dignitaries of the Empire. Thus, as on September 5, 1816, a *coup d'état* of the King stopped the reaction. Monsieur talked about the beginning of the end and the doom of his House.

When the proposal of Barthélemy came to be discussed in the Lower Chamber, Royer-Collard declared that any attack on the system of direct election threatened the middle classes, which embodied modern interests and upheld the existing order. The passionate eloquence of de Serre excited the enthusiasm of the Left. He replied to a charge of Villèle as to ministerial pressure on the magistracy by a denunciation of the White Terror and the intimidation of the juries by the fanatics of the South. Barthélemy's proposal was rejected by a large majority ; and, on March 22, 1819, de Serre introduced the three great measures which established the liberty of the Press.

These laws were claimed by Broglie as the work of the Doctrinaires and the realisation of their principles and promises. He drew them with the help of Guizot and agreed as to their bases with Royer-Collard and Barante. All offences of the Press were to be dealt with under the ordinary law. The first measure defined crimes and offences and classified them under four heads : offences against the person of the King ; incitement to crime ; offences against public morality ; libel. The second measure fixed the tribunals ; all offences, with the exception of libel, were to be tried before a jury. The third measure related specially to newspapers. Preliminary authorisation and censorship were done

away with. This was an enormous step in the direction of liberty. But the Left were not satisfied, while the Right, although committed in the previous session to liberty of the Press, now denounced these measures as a breach of the Constitution. But the Government had at its command the greatest oratorical talents of modern France. When the clauses relating to public morality were alternately criticised by the Right as atheistical and by Benjamin Constant as amounting to State protection of religion, Royer-Collard and de Serre triumphantly vindicated liberty of conscience and morality as the shield of religion. "What is man," said de Serre, "that feeble and passionate being, that he should offer to the Almighty the help of his arm? Does he pretend to usurp His strength or to offer the aid of his own weakness?...The vanity of this presumption has often been shown. The centuries that are gone teach in bloody characters its terrible results."

The tone he took raised the level of the whole debate, which remains one of the most remarkable in parliamentary history. In reply to Lainé, who had joined the Right Centre, de Serre made use of the phrase, never forgotten by his enemies, that, in the French assemblies, the majorities were sound. "What, even in the Convention?" exclaimed La Bourdonnaye. "Yes," retorted de Serre, "even in the Convention. That majority debated with daggers at their throats." The Bills were carried by large majorities in full Chambers. On May 1, 1819, the Press became free. Chateaubriand made the *Débats* the organ of the Royalist middle class. The Doctrinaires were represented by the *Courrier*, to which Villemain, Rémusat, and Salvandy contributed. But their appeal to impartial justice left them isolated.

The Left organised petitions in favour of amnesty for the exiles of 1815. De Serre looked on this agitation as a revolutionary cabal, to force from the King the pardon of all exiles, including the members of the Bonaparte family and the regicides. He reminded the Chamber of the history of the breach between the Revolution and the monarchy, of the treachery of the Hundred Days, of the covenant of the monarchy with liberty, of the magnanimity of the King, of the vote of the Chamber of 1815, which demanded the punishment of treason; and he concluded with the famous sentence that, except in special cases and by the clemency of the King, "the regicides could never be pardoned." The united applause of the Right and the Centres, with which this remarkable speech was received, convinced the Left that they had nothing to hope from de Serre, who stood by the monarchy as firmly as he upheld his Liberal convictions. Royer-Collard replied as distinctly to Benjamin Constant that the attempt to wring an amnesty from the King would be considered an outrage in the case of a private individual. How much more so when the outrage was directed both against natural feelings and the royal majesty, which was identical with the dignity of the nation! Decazes held similar language, and the petitions were rejected.

The military law served as a pretext for renewed attacks on the Ministry by Villèle, Chateaubriand, and La Bourdonnaye on the Right, by Manuel and Benjamin Constant on the Left. The session closed with every presage of future conflict. The belligerent attitude assumed by the clergy in the Royalist cause, and the aggressive demonstrations against all who did not adopt their opinions, were met by the Liberals with equal violence. In the early summer of 1819 disturbances occurred among the students in Paris, in favour of a censured professor, which led to the closing of the law school. Royer-Collard declared that he would put down with the utmost vigour any attempt to introduce political strife into the schools. But, when Decazes agreed to an arrangement under which the Christian Brothers could obtain, for members of their confraternity, examined by themselves, diplomas from the University, enabling them to teach, Royer-Collard retired from the direction of the Education Department, as he considered that an encroachment had been made on the privileges of the University. His resignation seemed to indicate the separation of the Doctrinaires from the disunited Cabinet. The Liberals congratulated Royer-Collard; the Royalists ironically asked how the Ministry was to get on without the support of the half-dozen men to whom they owed so many victories?

With the cry, "Rather support a Jacobin than a ministerialist," the Right went in 1819 to the annual partial election. With their assistance, Grégoire, formerly "constitutional" Bishop of Blois, was elected for the Isère. He had been the very first man to propose, in 1792, the abolition of royalty and the prosecution of Louis XVI. Though personally respectable, he was a wrong-headed and fanatical partisan, who had compared Marie-Antoinette to Jezebel and Kings to monsters, whose deaths in all cases should be an occasion for rejoicing. Besides Grégoire, 28 members of the Left were returned, among them General Foy, while only five Ultras secured seats. Louis XVIII wrote to Decazes, to whom he was becoming daily more attached: "It is a consolation for me to think that one day history, which, in the long run, flatters nobody, will say to whom we are indebted for such an election." He alluded to Monsieur, who was embittered beyond measure by the decline of his influence. Benjamin Constant, afraid of reaction, warned his party of the danger of overthrowing a Ministry on whose merits he insisted, while Camille Jordan deplored the apparently irreparable breach of the Ministry with the Left. The elections in France coincided with revolutionary movements in Spain, Italy, and Germany.

Under the double pressure of home and foreign influence, three Ministers, Decazes, de Serre, and Portal, hesitated no longer to change the electoral law. De Serre went back to his former idea of the representation of property by classes, and, with the help of Broglie, he completed, by the end of October, 1819, a comprehensive measure

of parliamentary reform by which he endeavoured to introduce an element of stability in the electoral system by favouring landed property. There was to be a Chamber of hereditary Peers, with an endowment of 3,500,000 francs. The Chamber of Deputies was to be composed of 456 members, of 30 years of age and upwards, paying in direct taxes 600 francs, and elected for seven years by a complicated electoral system under which the wealthier classes had a double vote.

At the time when Broglie joined in this scheme he was already separated from his friends of the Left. In 1817 he had founded with them the *Société des Amis de la Presse*, which soon became the meeting-place of Republicans and Bonapartists. Decazes dissolved this society in 1819; Broglie, driven by Benjamin Constant to explain his position, said that the society had always been illegal and that there was nothing for it but submission. He knew that his own step-father d'Argenson, Manuel, and Lafayette, were allied with conspirators and pretenders, and thought it his duty to terminate his political connexion with them. Meanwhile Decazes, when he realised that the consent of Dessolets, Gouvier Saint-Cyr, and Baron Louis was not to be obtained for a reform of the electoral law, tried through Villèle and Corbière to come to an understanding with Richelieu, who was then travelling in Holland. He sent him (November, 1819) a confidential agent bearing a note from the King and a letter from himself, explaining the situation and enclosing a draft, by Barante, of the proposed legislative measures. At the same time Decazes approached Royer-Collard, to induce him to join the Ministry. Royer-Collard also was alarmed by the election of Grégoire, but met every proposal to deal with the situation by remarking that no legislative enactment could save the monarchy: the evil came from men, not from things; to perish was also a solution. But Decazes was so anxious for his assistance that he offered him the Presidency of the Council and his own resignation, whereupon de Serre remarked that self-sacrifice consisted in standing by the colours and not in flying from them. Royer-Collard himself was of opinion that no Prime Minister was possible but Richelieu, and insinuated that he might then take the Education Department himself. His interview with Decazes took place on November 15. The next day de Serre offered the War Office to Broglie. The latter replied that he could give no assistance and only do harm; that he had no influence with the Ultras; and that his vindication of liberty would be looked upon as a relapse into error. When he broke with the Left he changed, not his opinions, but his party. Nobody would believe in his disinterestedness, if he accepted office. On the day on which Broglie declined, Richelieu's answer arrived. He wrote to the King that he, speaking in the presence of God, did not deem himself capable of undertaking the task; but he promised his general support.

De Serre then unfolded his whole scheme to Royer-Collard, who neither

favoured nor opposed it; he still thought it possible to overcome the objection of Richelieu to take office. So late as November 17 de Serre wrote to Decazes that he still hoped "to make the Pope"; i.e. to persuade Royer-Collard to form a ministry. On that very day, after de Serre had produced his plan to the Cabinet, Dessolets, Gouvion Saint-Cyr, and Louis resigned. Royer-Collard refused at the last moment to join the Government. De Serre gave up the intended increase of the Ministry, but succeeded in obtaining the appointment of Roy, Latour-Maubourg, and Pasquier, on whom the King specially insisted, as Ministers of Finance, War, and Foreign Affairs respectively. De Serre having declined the Presidency of the Council, that position was given to Decazes.

Royer-Collard expressed his disapproval and disappointment in a letter to de Serre, who replied that the constitution of the Ministry was the result of the refusal of Royer-Collard himself to take office. Louis XVIII wrote to Decazes that the delight of the Comte d'Artois and the Duchess of Angoulême made him fear he had been guilty of folly. The attempt to rally the Left Centre round the standard of de Serre had failed. The Cabinet, reconstructed in a Royalist sense, without conciliating the Royalists, was now dependent on the Right Centre. Villèle declined to make any concessions to it. Chateaubriand, in the name of the Ultras, stated, as the conditions for their support of electoral reform, reorganisation of the National Guard, municipal reform, alteration of the system of promotion in the army, reduction of taxation, reestablishment of the religious Orders, and compensation for the victims of the Revolution.

The speech from the throne insisted on the necessity of amendments in the Charter in order to save the country from the disquietude caused by annual elections. Eight days later the Right moved to annul the election of Grégoire. The Ministers would have been willing to exclude him on a point of form. The Left, who had tried to make him resign, would have accepted this solution. But Lainé, representing on this occasion the Right as well as the Right Centre, in a memorable speech insisted on the exclusion on grounds of personal unworthiness; only the extreme Left voted against expulsion. During the debate on a Government motion for a vote on account, pending the introduction of the estimates, the Ultras were so violent that Villèle became alarmed and persuaded his friends to vote with the Government against the Left and a few Ultras. Two great speeches by Pasquier and Decazes accentuated the difference between the Government and the Left, which organised petitions in favour of the existing electoral system. A fatal blow was now given to the Ministry by the physical breakdown of de Serre, who, in January, 1820, was obliged to go to Nice to recruit his shattered health.

Before he left, he reluctantly consented to a modification of his electoral plan. The scheme finally put forward was that of de Serre,

with amendments by Richelieu, Pasquier, and Lainé. Colleges of the *arrondissements* were to select colleges of the Departments out of the most highly taxed landowners; septennial general elections and the reduction of the age qualification were dropped; but the annual election of one-fifth of the deputies was to be suspended for five years. The measure, accepted by the King, was to be introduced on February 14. On the evening of February 13, 1820, the Duke of Berry was stabbed at the door of the Opera House by Louvel. Overcome by grief, Decazes, who had hurried to the scene, scarcely perceived that the wife of the dying Prince turned away from him in horror. On the next day his impeachment, "as an accessory to the murder," was proposed. Chateaubriand wrote, "The hand that struck the blow is not the most guilty." The whole Right, in fact, held Decazes responsible for the catastrophe. On February 15 the Government asked for exceptional laws in restraint of liberty, and the reintroduction of the censorship for five years, and at the same time introduced their measure of electoral reform.

The Left Centre were not consulted. Royer-Collard, Camille Jordan, and Beugnot made it a condition, before consenting to the temporary measures of security, that the existing system of election should be maintained. In the Upper House, Doctrinaires and Royalists rejected the proposal to restore the censorship. Every attempt at conciliation made by Decazes was fruitless. "We have all been killed with the Duke," he wrote to de Serre. With the consent of the King he went to Richelieu on February 18, to whom, at the request of Decazes, Monsieur promised the support of himself and his friends, saying, "I will be the first of your soldiers."

Without confidence in this assurance Richelieu threw himself into the breach. The King's powers of resistance were broken by the tears and supplications of his family. He dismissed the favourite, who was made Ambassador in London and a Duke. Thus disappeared from the parliamentary stage a man, who to exceptional ability and great personal charm united a clear apprehension of the requirements of the modern State. Decazes in 1820 was only forty years old; but, although he lived to an advanced age he never recovered political power. Though he cannot be numbered among great and creative statesmen, he was an excellent administrator, energetic, hard-working, and of a conciliatory disposition. His greatest achievement, the Ordinance of September, 1816, which finally led to his fall, secured years of peaceful development to the Government of the elder branch of the Bourbons.

After his return to power, Richelieu placed the moderate Royalist Siméon at the Home Office and Mounier at the head of the police; Portalis replaced de Serre *ad interim*; Pasquier, who remained at the Foreign Office, brilliantly vindicated the ministerial policy in the Chamber. The Doctrinaires continued in the Council of State. De Serre charged them with having, by their conduct, brought about the

sacrifice of Decazes to the Ultras. De Serre's friends were of a similar opinion; in their letters to him they termed Royer-Collard the greatest master of destruction. Decazes recommended that Broglie should be secured to the Ministry as the least Doctrinaire of the Doctrinaires, now that de Serre no longer belonged to them. Broglie described the situation as desperate, and the King's rule as at an end. "Richelieu," wrote Royer-Collard, "is the last bulwark"; all opposition was dangerous and he would have nothing to say to it, but he would never agree to the electoral proposals of the Government as they stood; and, in the debates on the exceptional laws, the hostility of the Doctrinaires became clear. Royer-Collard compared these measures to money raised at usurious interest, which ruins the creditor; the nullification of the representative system by the reintroduction of privilege would prove deadly; the royal standard, which was hoisted on September 5, 1816, was sinking in the hands of incompetent leaders.

The Left, encouraged by the success of the Revolution in Spain, and animated by the fiery eloquence of General Foy, who acted as mediator between them and the Doctrinaires, attacked the Government with ever increasing violence. The Right reluctantly provided a feeble and precarious majority. Guizot wrote to de Serre that the monarchical and Liberal reform which he intended was doomed; he ought to resign and clear himself of responsibility, as he no longer had power. Royer-Collard held similar language: "I dreamt of an alliance between order and liberty, between Legitimacy and the Revolution....I am now awake." But de Serre had taken his stand. He thought there were signs that both groups of the Right would come to an understanding for the defence of monarchy. Should that come to pass he would gladly see them in power. Till then the only course was to fight on. The notion of deserting his post seemed to him cowardly. Since March there was absolutely no prospect of carrying de Serre's project, either as proposed by Decazes or in its original shape. On April 17 the Government, in agreement with Villèle, Corbière, and Lainé, introduced a third scheme, according to which two different classes of electoral colleges were to be created in each Department; those of the *arrondissements*, with a franchise of 300 francs, were to elect as many candidates as the Department had deputies; that of the Department, consisting of the most highly taxed fifth of the voters, was to elect the deputies from these lists.

The recognition of property, defined by Benjamin Constant no less than by the Doctrinaires themselves "as the natural, necessary inequality, on which the exercise of political rights reposed," had been the root-idea of the electoral law of 1817. The project of 1820, which introduced the dual vote, transferred political preponderance from the middle class to landed property, which, in spite of all upheavals and changes, to about half of its original extent remained in or had returned into the hands of the old nobility. The Left saw in the new proposals an injury

to the industrial as opposed to the landed interest, and a preparatory step towards the reintroduction of privilege. They attacked the withdrawal of the project of Decazes as illegal, with the support of Royer-Collard.

The Ultras considered the measure inadequate and the expression of the mind of the Centre. In another speech, on May 17, Royer-Collard characterised liberty and legitimacy as inseparable ideas, and equality as the corner-stone of French liberty. He repudiated, as before, the doctrine that the sovereign people represented persons and individual wills, not society, its rights and interests. Constitutional theory should make no distinction between owners of large and small properties. Property as such was the moral guarantee of civil capacity. "All the interests and rights of the community are represented by the Lower Chamber. Equality of electors and of votes and direct election are inseparable. Election by majority is alone valid. The representation of minorities is a fraud, a violation of the Charter, a *coup d'état* against equality and the representative system; it is the Counter-revolution." Pasquier retorted on the 18th that equality, the fundamental principle of the Charter, was already set at nought, 27,900,000 souls being disfranchised as against about 80,000 voters. He charged Royer-Collard with confounding civil rights, which were equal for all, and political rights, which were not.

The strongest pressure was brought upon de Serre, who returned at this time to Paris, by Broglie, Guizot, and Royer-Collard not to sacrifice himself "to the mutilated Bill and the wretched Ministry." "We have imperishable recollections in common. We have revealed our souls to each other," wrote Royer-Collard. For a whole week, in silence, de Serre listened to orators who accused one another of conspiring with the Left against monarchy, and with the Right in the interest of the Counter-revolution. The excitement was tremendous, in the gallery, at the doors of the House, throughout the country, in the army itself, which Laffitte, Lafayette, and d'Argenson were attempting to corrupt, while Vitrolles intrigued for Monsieur. On May 27 Lafayette spoke. He contended that the obligations of the Charter were reciprocal; the tricolour was insulted by the *émigrés*, the conquests of the Revolution threatened. It would not be well to drive the young generation to the defence of the sacred symbols of truth and justice. De Serre rose. He now began, in the words of Broglie, his Homeric struggle against the Left, which attacked him with fury, against the Right, which branded him as a traitor, against his former allies now incensed against him; he stood alone amongst colleagues, all of whom had sought his assistance and yet were divided by his presence. The hand of death was upon him; nevertheless he fought with a cool courage and mental activity never surpassed. Lafayette, he said, had alluded to the Revolution. "Have not those times," he continued, "left to the honourable

member sorrowful experiences and profitable recollections? He must have felt, more than once, with death in his heart and the blush of shame on his cheek, that when once the masses are roused, it is not only impossible to arrest them in a career of crime, but that one may be often forced to follow them, perhaps sometimes to lead."

Royer-Collard again repudiated any connexion with the doctrine of the sovereign people, and, after insisting once more on his views about direct election and equality of votes, admitted the necessity of modifications in the Act of 1817. In order to avoid the proposed two different systems of election and the double vote, Camille Jordan moved an amendment to create as many electoral colleges as the Department had deputies. This idea was now approved by the Left Centre and the Left, although the Left knew very well that the division of electors by *arrondissements* would raise up local influences against the revolutionary propaganda. The Chamber consented, by a majority of one, to consider this amendment. If this were accepted by the Government, they must renounce alliance with the whole Royalist party and break up their majority, while Camille Jordan could only offer the steady support of his friends, who were a minority in the Opposition. De Serre moved its rejection; describing the measure of Decazes, which was in reality his own, as that which would stem the tide of revolution in France and elsewhere by means of a powerful, generously interpreted representative system. Neither the Right nor his disconcerted colleagues dared to repudiate de Serre. The amendment of Camille Jordan was lost by ten votes. On June 3 the first clause of the electoral law, regulating the electoral colleges, was carried by five. On that morning Royer-Collard and Guizot let de Serre know that five-sixths of the Left were willing to vote for the clause, on condition of immediate dissolution, the election of the present 258 members by colleges of the *arrondissement*, and that of 172 additional members by colleges of the Department, but on a reduced franchise which would render impossible a predominant representation of reactionary interests.

Immediately after the vote the demonstrations in favour of the deputies of the Left, which had gone on daily since May 16, assumed the character of revolt. The Ministry placed the troops under the command of Marshal Macdonald. Officers of the Guard in plain clothes and returned republican exiles, among them an agent of Lafayette, took part in these riots. On June 6 Camille Jordan proposed that the Chamber be adjourned till the safety of the national representation, threatened by the Royalists, was secured. De Serre denied the existence of danger, but charged the Left with endeavouring to obtain, by incitement to disorder, what they could not get by parliamentary methods. Manuel replied that justice could not be expected from de Serre: the Ministry was no longer able to save the country. The Keeper of the Seals did

not waver for an instant. He held his ground against Benjamin Constant, Casimir Périer, and Laffitte.

Louvel's execution made this a critical time, but the Government mastered disorder. Guizot acknowledges that this was done firmly and moderately, without violating freedom of debate. While the Government were concerned about the maintenance of order, two deputies of the Left Centre, Courvoisier and Boin, gave notice of two further amendments. That of Courvoisier rejected the double vote. The amendment of Boin, which was considered privately by de Serre, Villèle, and Corbière, was substantially the proposal which Royer-Collard and Guizot made to de Serre on June 3. But it fixed the franchise for the departmental colleges at a qualification of 1000 francs, equal to that of the deputies. It further gave to the members of these colleges the double vote. This amendment was carried, on June 9, by 185 against 66 votes of the Left and the extreme Royalists. In the Peers the law once more underwent severe criticism from Liberals and Doctrinaires, especially from Barante and Broglie. They regretted the omission of provisions for general elections and the reduction of the age qualification. They however admitted that the gains outweighed the losses and that de Serre's project of 1819 was revived in essentials. With the assistance of the moderate Royalists the Ministry were victorious. A fortnight after the measure became law, Lainé offered Villèle in the name of Richelieu a seat in the Cabinet. Villèle declined for the present, pending the elections, in order to keep himself free from the appearance of having sought a position for himself.

During the debate on the budget the Left abstained from voting, on the ground that the Charter had been violated; and all legal opposition was at an end. Two only of their newspapers had escaped censure. General Foy and Laffitte were now dismissed from their posts. The Right, however, remained dissatisfied, so long as members of the definite Opposition were alone touched. The adversaries they most feared were those who had once fought side by side with them in the interests of the monarchy. The memoirs of Pasquier prove that Monsieur, Villèle, and Corbière insisted, as the price of their alliance with the Richelieu Ministry, on a complete breach with the Doctrinaires. The aversion felt for them by Richelieu and Pasquier was not lessened by the manner in which Royer-Collard, Camille Jordan, and Guizot, although Councillors of State, worked against the Ministers during the debate on the budget. Guizot, although not a deputy, had made himself conspicuous in the lobby and elsewhere by encouraging resistance. De Serre characterised Camille Jordan's tone as an appeal to revolution. His position was more difficult as regards Royer-Collard, with whom, as with Barante and Broglie, he had remained on terms of intimate friendship. The attachment of Royer-Collard to the dynasty was beyond suspicion; in critical moments he had, more than once, stood by de Serre. But

feelings of comradeship, the recollection of so many battles fought in common, failed after the refusal of Royer-Collard to take office and to secure for the Government the solid support of a majority in the Centre.

On July 17, a few days before the close of the session, the Keeper of the Seals dismissed Guizot, Camille Jordan, and Royer-Collard from the Council of State, "on the ground of violent and continued opposition to the measures of the Government against the enemies of the monarchy." Royer-Collard and Guizot declined honours and pecuniary compensations. Barante soon after resigned his newly-acquired diplomatic position and, with Broglie, went into Opposition. "We are about to undertake a difficult task," said de Serre to Barante in a last conversation; "we intend to govern by reasonable methods while leaning on the Right." The task turned out more difficult than he thought. After the reenactment of the temporary laws of exception the chiefs of the Left formed a committee to assist those who might be attacked, which soon was organised as a secret, anti-dynastic society in touch with similar associations, such as the *Charbonnerie*, the *Chevaliers de la Liberté*, etc. A far-reaching military plot, which was primarily organised to revolutionise Paris and then to bring about a change of dynasty, and was to break out on August 19, had been discovered by the Government in good time. The guilty were brought before a tribunal of the Peers, which did not pass judgment till July, 1821. In consequence, however, of the spirit in the army, the Peers and the Government were afraid to proceed against several deputies strongly suspected of having knowledge of this conspiracy and of being privy to the riots of June, 1820. Hence d'Argenson, Manuel, Foy, Corcelles, and above all Lafayette, escaped trial. The mildness of the sentences on those convicted was attributed by both parties to the weakness of the Administration. It was in reality largely due to the influence of Broglie, who, in his memoirs, takes the credit for it.

When, on September 29, 1820, a posthumous heir, the Duke of Bordeaux, was born to the bereaved dynasty, Richelieu and de Serre, pressed by the Royalists and against the advice of Pasquier, decided in favour of partial instead of general elections. Guizot, in a widely-read pamphlet, called upon the King to place himself at the head of the Revolution in order to overthrow the Counter-revolution. The advice came too late. A royal proclamation was issued calling on the electors to choose tried Royalist candidates. An overwhelming Royalist majority was returned, recalling the days of the *Chambre introuvable*. This majority was not satisfied when Richelieu, in order not to separate from colleagues, appointed Villèle and Lainé Ministers without portfolios, Lauriston head of the Household, Corbière to the Ministry of Education, Chateaubriand ambassador at Berlin, Ravez President of the Chamber, and favoured Royalist claims in the services. He hoped to conjure

away difficulties by legislation directed mainly towards the development of material interests. In the meantime he had to meet foreign complications.

The policy of observation, which, in opposition to the Emperor Alexander but in agreement with the other Powers, had been adopted by France as regards the military revolution in Spain and the restoration of the constitution of Cadiz, was no longer possible in presence of an identical movement in Naples. Richelieu, who at Aix-la-Chapelle had led France to adhere to the Quadruple Alliance, which was based on the maintenance of the treaties, proposed a conference, but tried in vain, by mediation between King Ferdinand and his Neapolitan subjects, to prevent Austrian intervention. The Congress met at Troppau. In spite of the protests of England, of reservations of the French plenipotentiaries concerning limitations of the right of intervention and the arbitrary action of the other three Powers, the French representative at Laibach nevertheless signed the protocol sanctioning the action of Austria against Naples.

The attitude of the Ministry at Troppau and at Laibach gave dissatisfaction to both the extreme parties at home. The feeling was so bitter that, when the light sentences passed on the conspirators of August 19 were interpreted by the Left as a tacit avowal that proofs against them were wanting, de Serre retorted by accusing the entire Left of being accessory to conspiracy. But it was in vain that the Ministry endeavoured to meet the wishes of the Right. The Ultras would not be conciliated, and refused to vote the censorship for longer than three months after the opening of the next session. Nevertheless de Serre advised Richelieu to reconstruct his Cabinet in a Royalist sense. This advice was based on the supposition that the influence of the moderate Royalists would preponderate in a future combination, in the event of the demise of the Crown, which the King's ill-health showed could not be far distant. He had slipped from the hands of Richelieu into those of Madame de Cayla; Monsieur now felt himself strong enough to require that the compensation for the *émigrés*, which Richelieu for financial reasons wished to defer, should be introduced during the next session.

At the partial elections of October, 1821, the Right again increased their majority by more than 50 votes, of which 20 belonged to the Ultras, while the Ministry obtained only 20 votes for their own group, the Right Centre. De Serre tried in vain to prevent the return of Royer-Collard, who during the last session had repeatedly opposed measures advocated by his former friend. The Ministry now only existed in consequence of the divisions in the ranks of their Royalist opponents. The Ultras resolved to overthrow it by an alliance with the Left against the censorship. The address to the King, drawn up by the Ultras, was a declaration of war against the Government. It expressed the hope, which

was in reality an insult, that the foreign policy would be so conducted as not to lower the honour of the nation and the dignity of the Crown ; it charged the Ministry with having brought about an agricultural crisis by their dilatory action in not prohibiting the importation of corn ; and it called for measures to fulfil the promises of the Charter. This last paragraph indicated the policy which ensured the support of the Left. The Ultras now approached Royer-Collard, who repaid de Serre for opposing his election by carrying the Left Centre over to the coalition and thus ensuring the defeat of the Government. The King, deeply offended by the address, returned a haughty answer. A dissolution might still save the situation. Five Ministers, headed by Pasquier, urged this course, and offered to resign if their advice were not accepted. In these circumstances Richelieu would have had to reconstruct his Ministry with Villèle, Corbière, and other members of the Right; but the attitude of the Chamber shut out all possibility of an understanding with the Ultras. Mindful of the pledge given by Monsieur when the Ministry was formed, Richelieu resolved to claim his mediation. He went to the Prince, explained the factious conduct of the Ultras, and asked for the fulfilment of his solemn promise. Monsieur evaded the question, and pressed for a Ministry under Villèle. Richelieu turned away in indignation, exclaimed to Pasquier, "He has broken his plighted word—the word of a gentleman," and reported to the King the substance of the interview. "What can you expect?" said Louis XVIII in answer, "he conspired against Louis XVI, he conspired against me, he will end by conspiring against himself." But the King also, broken in health and spirits, was now ready to accept Villèle.

Richelieu and his colleagues resigned on December 12, 1821 ; and the Government of the Right Centre became a thing of the past. It had succeeded, in spite of the most unscrupulous opposition, in disarming revolution, reorganising the army, regulating the finances, reviving credit, and laying solid foundations for constitutional government. The integrity of its administration, the rare gifts and high moral standard of its leaders, the eloquent genius, the fine character and governing power of de Serre, the patriotic self-devotion of Richelieu, above all the serious endeavour to apply to politics an elevated ideal of morality, deserved a better fate than the ungrateful desertion of those whose passions they condemned and whose true interests they served.

## CHAPTER III.

### REACTION AND REVOLUTION IN FRANCE.

THE more ardent of the Royalists who had gone into exile, either voluntarily or by compulsion, together with the royal House, had hoped after its restoration in 1814-5 to share in its triumph and its power, and to inflict upon Revolutionary France a signal revenge. Within one year, 1815-6, their excesses, often bloodthirsty, against the men and institutions of the preceding *régime* had brought them into discredit. Louis XVIII and his Ministers Decazes and Richelieu had cut themselves off from these infatuated and uncompromising allies, in fear lest the anger which they had aroused in the nation should recoil upon the monarchy. For four years, till 1820, the country was governed without their aid or in their despite. But in their turn the Liberals, who had in this crisis become the principal support of the monarchy, seemed to be turning traitors to it, and to be leading back the country, after the evacuation of France by the Allies in 1818, to the adventurous policy of the Empire and the crimes of the Terror, when by degrees they opened their ranks to Bonapartists or to regicide Republicans such as the Abbé Grégoire. The assassination of the Duke of Berry, which was laid to their charge, became in 1820 for the Royalists gathered around the Comte d'Artois the occasion of a return of unexpected good fortune. Louis XVIII, Richelieu, and de Serre made appeal to their devotion; and the nation itself, through fear of conspiracies and of revolution, gave them, by the elections of November 13, 1820, a fresh lease of credit. It is true, however, that these elections were the result of an electoral law passed on June 12, 1820, with the purpose of suppressing the secrecy of the ballot, and of correcting the possible errors of electors, by taking from them the choice of one-half the deputies, and entrusting it to the twelve thousand most heavily taxed landowners in France.

Victorious for all these reasons, what use were the Royalists likely this time to make of their victory in 1821? Their programme had always been a design of revenge upon the Revolution, and an attempt at reconstituting the *ancien régime*.

To carry out this programme, they counted chiefly upon proceeding by a restoration of the rights and doctrines of the Ultramontane Catholic Church. Their hopes and the basis of their calculations rested on the concealment of their ambitions and intrigues by a moral alliance between altar and throne, by a campaign against atheism and immorality, by a disinterested zeal for the welfare of souls and of society at large. Their chief instrument was the "Congregation" of the Rue du Bac, which since 1814, under the direction of a Jesuit, Père Ronsin, had gathered together laymen and priests, the nobility, the Royalist magistracy, and the young blood of the schools. The "priest-party," as it was afterwards called, even more Royalist than religious, organised branches in the provinces, conducted countless missions at home, or retreats with magnificent ceremonial like those of the Abbé Forbin Janson on Mont Valérien. It seemed to be conducting a crusade in a land of pagans. Declamatory journalists, editors of such organs as the *Drapeau Blanc*, the *Bibliothèque Catholique*, eloquent and dogmatic polemists, Lamennais, who between 1817 and 1820 brought out his *Essay on Indifference in Matters of Religion*, and Joseph de Maistre, author of *Du Pape*, did not hesitate to claim for the Roman Church the control of France, won back from the Revolution.

From the beginning of 1821 a majority in the Chamber urged the King to strengthen "the authority of religion in the hearts of the people, and to purify existing morals by a system of Christian and monarchical education." This majority now formulated its programme—a religious monarchy founded upon a strict alliance of politics and religion, and upon the spiritualisation of society. Thus, under the pretext of reforming morality in France, they intended to remake their country according to their liking, to replace the prefectoral administration of the Empire by the old *généralités*, to restore to the Church its authority in civil matters, to break down the revolutionary legislation on the question of marriage and of succession, and finally, to restore to the aristocracy, when replaced in the possession of the property forfeited at the time of their emigration, their influence at Court and their authority in the provinces.

At that time the Royalist party was already beginning to listen to the counsels of one of the most illustrious of its members, Chateaubriand, who by his speeches and through the medium of the Press had from 1818 to 1820 been preparing the way for his victory. This brilliant writer hoped to induce the French, in love with glory no less than with equality, to accept the programme of his friends by offering them opportunities in Europe, and a policy of action and of revenge. It was the time when the people of Naples and of Piedmont were rising against their rulers, who persisted in refusing them liberty and reform. With a view to establishing his power in the Italian Peninsula, Metternich was endeavouring to obtain from Europe authority to interfere at Naples against

the democratic party. Acting as envoy of Louis XVIII in Prussia, since November 30, 1820, Chateaubriand, at Berlin, had been demanding on behalf of France an analogous mission in Italy. "The white cockade will be established when it has once more faced the foe. A bold measure of high policy, which flatters the self-esteem of the French, will by that means alone ensure great popularity."

Such were the broad lines, the elements of the scheme by which in 1821 the French aristocracy—restored to power by force of circumstances, confirmed in that power by legislation touching the Press, and by the elections, which were favourable to their aims—hoped to satisfy their desires of revenge and to assert the claims of privilege against the new society.

Louis XVIII and his Ministers, in this period of trouble and unrest, had seemed to participate in the plot, the King by dismissing Decazes; the Duc de Richelieu, the First Minister, by making room in the Ministry for two leaders of the extremist party, Villèle and Corbière. "I prefer," Richelieu had written after the experience of 1818, "Royalist fanaticism to Jacobinism." However, as his ally de Serre, a brilliant orator and adroit minister, remarked, "While governing with the help of the Right, Richelieu yet wished to govern *with moderation*." He reckoned on some measure of patience in the Royalists, and believed that by pacifying them he could give them satisfaction.

In order to satisfy their religious zeal, he placed one of their own men, Corbière, at the head of the Council of the University (December 21, 1820). He approved the Ordinance of February 27, 1821, which gave the President almost absolute power over the teaching staff, and surrendered the control of instruction to the Bishops, giving them permission to inspect the Colleges and to employ State subsidies for the benefit of religious Houses. Professors of too Liberal views, such as Tissot and Cousin, were shut out from the College of France and the Sorbonne, while at the same time an *abbé* was summoned to the directorate of the most important Academy, that of Paris.

Besides authority over the schools, the Church was destined shortly to derive other benefits from the law of May, 1821. The Ministry had recognised the fact that there were not enough Bishops in France, and that the clergy lacked the resources necessary for their own use and the maintenance of their places of worship. They accordingly proposed to create twelve new bishoprics. It became necessary to make still further concessions to the party of the Congregation, which had already been encouraged by these promises, and to declare that the King would shortly proceed to the creation of eighteen additional sees. In the course of the discussion upon this law, the Ministry were forced to break with the most eminent of the Liberal monarchists, Royer-Collard and Camille Jordan, who accused them of compromising the monarchy and the Church to serve party ends. And yet they did not succeed in

satisfying the more ardent Royalists—Delalot, Donnadieu, Castalbajac—who were eager to proclaim the superiority of religious authority over that of the Chambers, and the right of the Crown under the old order to regulate without consulting the nation the relations between Church and State. Richelieu had hoped to create a ministry of “reconciliation and of pardon”—vain hope, in face of a party over-excited by victory and eager to obtain from it all possible results, in face too of the just alarm of the nation and the Liberal deputies aroused by the reassertion of these claims.

When a year had passed a crisis brought about by foreign affairs modified the situation. Europe, in 1821, was disturbed more than ever by the revolt of the Spaniards against their King, Ferdinand VII, and by the struggles of the Greeks against the Sultan. The French nation was in a state of irritation at the inaction of the Government. The Liberals demanded that succour should be given to the Greeks, the Royalists that support should be afforded to the Legitimist cause in Spain, and all were at any rate agreed in demanding some manifestation of French power abroad. It was not the fault of Richelieu's Ministry that no such manifestation took place. In spite of the joint representations of the Secretary of State and of the Minister of Foreign Affairs, Pasquier and Rayneval, the leader of the Cabinet inclined to action in the East and on the Rhine, in concert with the Tsar, Alexander I. But at the last moment, alarmed by the attitude of England and the other European Powers, Alexander drew back; the French people held the Ministry responsible; deputies from the extreme Right and the extreme Left alike united in their reproaches of Richelieu and their efforts against him. They accused him in the address to the Crown of “having purchased peace by sacrifices incompatible with the honour of the nation and the dignity of the throne” (November 26, 1821). After a violent speech complaining of treachery, he resigned office; and on December 12 Louis XVIII appointed Villèle and Corbière as his successors. Richelieu was not long to survive this undeserved check. He died the following year.

Still it might seem as if the retirement of the monarchists of the Right would simplify the situation. Did it not give victory above all to the Royalists of the Left, the extremists, leaders of the “priest-party,” as it was called? Were they not thenceforth in a position to realise their hopes and their programme in its entirety? While Matthieu de Montmorency was appointed to the charge of Foreign Affairs and Chateaubriand to the Embassy in London, the Duke of Belluno, a Marshal of the Empire, was made Minister of War, on the understanding that he was to prepare and carry out in the immediate future a foreign enterprise intended to achieve glorious results, “offered to the nation in exchange for privileges restored.” The hour seemed propitious; and the necessary elements united for a restoration

of the old order, to be effected by the aid of the refurbished glories of the Revolution and of the Empire.

However, the chief of this Cabinet, the Comte de Villèle, who for six years was destined to govern, first in the name of Louis XVIII and then in that of Charles X, was not one of those leaders who follow their troops. A practical and dexterous man of affairs, he had a firm grasp of realities; unlike the Royalists who had placed him in power, he had not lost the recollection of the defeat which his party had experienced in 1816 as a result of their misuse of victory. His dreams were of a progress more sure, if less dazzling, to be slowly realised without alarming the nation. He desired, in common with the Royalists, the restoration of the old order; but his policy was to effect it little by little, rather than at a rush. "To know where it is best to go, without ever taking a wrong turning, to make a step towards the goal on every possible occasion, never to get into a position from which it is necessary to retreat—such," he said, "is the need of the moment."

On the other hand, Villèle counted less upon the glory of a foreign policy, active and consequently costly, to confirm and strengthen the restoration of the *ancien régime*, than upon the results of a good internal administration, by means of which the monarchy might succeed in restoring to a conquered France sound finances and prosperity in succession to defeat. Thus, for seven years, France was to submit to the programme of the extremists, the Royalists, and the clergy of the *ancien régime*; but it was carried into execution by Villèle, by means of an adroit system which often aroused the anger of these impatient Royalists, but which lulled the nation into a sense of well-being.

The Chief Minister had the merit of keeping constantly in mind the fact that his friends owed their power to the forces of reaction and alarm, aroused in the country by the dagger of an assassin who had mortally wounded a member of the royal family. To keep this fear awake, in order to establish his authority, was his first care. In this he succeeded. The Liberals, finding themselves compelled to prudence, organised themselves into secret societies; and the Republicans, imitating the Neapolitans, actually formed in 1821 the *Charbonnerie française*, which avowedly aimed at giving back "to the French nation the free exercise of the right to choose its sovereign." In order to give battle to the *ancien régime* and its Bourbon protectors, they recruited their soldiers and captains without hesitation from among the officers, commissioned and non-commissioned, of the old Imperial army. Villèle showed particular skill in the discovery, exaggeration, and signal punishment of these conspiracies. For a long period he destroyed any sympathy which the Liberals might still retain throughout the country. With a magistracy obedient to its orders, the Ministry devoted itself assiduously to representing isolated movements, no sooner known than crushed, as

forming part of a permanent conspiracy organised by the Liberals, not only against the monarchy, but against society itself.

Some young men belonging to the military school of Saumur were arrested in December, 1821, for having planned a rising in favour of Napoleon II, a rising which had never even gone so far as a single overt act. At Belfort and Neubreisach the King's lieutenant arrested officers and ex-officers on mere suspicion. At Marseilles two old soldiers, Vallé and Sicard, were discovered carrying papers which revealed plans of conspiracy. There was a singular coincidence, to say the least, between the coming into power of the new Ministry and the sudden discovery of these conspirators.

Three months afterwards a general not in active service, named Berton, after having endeavoured to enrol superior officers from the Breton regiments, started with a handful of men to attempt the surprise of Saumur (February 23 and 24) and then of Thouars. This enterprise had hardly been more than a disorderly skirmish, at the end of which Berton, who was fortunate enough at first to escape, fell into a trap set by the police (June, 1822). At the beginning of March the people in Paris, excited by the Catholic missions at the Church *des Petits Pères* and the law-students of the Latin Quarter, made a demonstration, but offered no effective resistance to the police force. About the same time the colonel of a regiment garrisoned at La Rochelle, a former *émigré*, arrested four non-commissioned officers on suspicion of desiring to enrol their men in the secret societies. Finally, at the moment when sentence was to be passed at Colmar on the Belfort rebels, another officer on the retired list, Caron, a colonel of dragoons, made a last attempt to raise regiments in the east (June to July, 1822).

Sentences of death, pronounced in emulation of each other by the civil magistrates and the Courts-martial, fell pitilessly throughout the year upon those who were associated with these political plots. The four sergeants of La Rochelle were executed at Paris on September 21; Caron at Strassburg, September 1; Berton and two of his accomplices at Poitiers, October 6 and 7; Vallé, at Toulon, had ascended the scaffold on June 10. It seemed that the Ministers were eager to multiply these trials and executions. Since certain deputies of the Liberal Opposition, Lafayette among others, and d'Argenson, had openly associated themselves with these enterprises, which otherwise were devoid of danger, this supplied a fair pretext for exhibiting them publicly as criminals. The indictment which the King's Procurator, Marchangy, formulated, in order to obtain the condemnation of the four sergeants of La Rochelle, left no doubt as to the intentions of the Government. Its chief aim was to terrorise the French people "by this vast conspiracy against social order, against the families of citizens, which threatened to plunge them once more into all the horrors of anarchy." While keeping up the appearance of saving society, Villelè gained forthwith the power

to govern it in accordance with the wishes of his friends. The threat of anarchy, exploited by the judges in his service, allowed him to organise a despotism.

On January 2, 1822, Peyronnet, the Keeper of the Seals, brought before the Chamber of Deputies the draft of a Press Law which would place the direction of public opinion in the hands of those in authority. No newspaper was to appear for the future without royal sanction. Every sheet was to be laid upon the table of the King's Procurator, who was to have the right to examine "tendencies," and to suspend or even to suppress dangerous publications. At the same time Villèle revived another proposal prepared by his predecessors, dealing with journalistic misdemeanours: the trials of these cases were transferred from the juries to the magistrates of the royal Courts, who could receive orders from Government. The first article of the law was expressly designed to punish with great severity, imprisonment for five years or heavy fines, all writings and illustrations "which outraged or turned into ridicule the religion of the State, or which excited hatred or contempt of any class." It became clear that this legislation aimed at arming the Crown against the Press with extraordinary powers in favour of the aristocracy and the Church: it was the weapon prepared for the war which the Ministers wished to declare against the secular and levelling spirit of the society established by the Revolution.

On March 13, 1822, this twofold law was passed in its entirety by a majority of fifty. Public opinion, already terrified into submission to the Royalist designs, became thus for the future dependent on the mercy of the Crown, its Ministers, and the ministers of the Church. In vain, during discussions which frequently became very violent, the champions of liberty, Benjamin Constant and Royer-Collard, protested in magnificent speeches "against this Parliamentary Jacobinism, this arbitrary legislation which recalled the principles of the revolutionary tribunals." To avert this reproach Villèle had taken his precautions better than had the authors of the White Terror. He had had the wit to preserve at least the outward forms of legality. The laws which he passed were oppressive; but they were laws for which he had prepared public opinion, and gained the support of Parliament.

By a further step this Parliament, thanks to fresh elections, became in May, 1822, still more favourable to his designs. The Administration had skilfully handled the electors, who were less numerous than hitherto; it had nominated as presidents of the electoral colleges avowed and zealous monarchists, and called upon Government officials to support the Government candidates. Of 86 deputies, 54 were elected whose programme was clearly favourable to the Ministry. A revenue law which Villèle had proclaimed in the month of January, imposing heavy duties upon imported goods—a law which pleased the landowners and large

manufacturers, who found it "quite reasonable to see the majority of the citizens of a State sacrificed to a minority of individuals"—had not been without its share in the popularity and success of the Ministry. The two Chambers passed it with enthusiasm (July, 1822).

The opportunity was a good one for finishing the task of the subjection of the schools to the Church, which had been begun in 1821. The President of the Council of the University, who was already endowed with great powers, became once more, as in the time of the Empire, a Grand Master (by a decree of June 5, 1822), invested with absolute police rights over the teaching-staff and the curriculum of the schools; and when a Bishop, Frayssinous, was summoned to this office, the pretensions of the clerical party were further strengthened. In his first circular, the new Grand Master demanded that the entire youth of France should before all else be educated "on religious and monarchical principles," and that no teacher should continue in his appointment who did not accept this decree of the Church. Shortly afterwards Guizot, a Protestant, and Cousin, a philosopher, were compelled to relinquish their professorial chairs at the Sorbonne. The School of Medicine was closed in November, 1822, and only reopened after the exclusion of Jussieu and Vauquelin, the lecturers who had held heretical opinions. It was the turn next of the *École Normale*, whose pupils were dispersed through the provinces. And yet the extremists considered Frayssinous timid and irresolute!

What the priest-party would have liked was the entire overthrow of the University. Schools that were wholly ecclesiastical were being multiplied, and were kept up by subsidies granted by the communes and Departments. The Grand Master himself encouraged this development. The smaller seminaries—those in which, with the complicity of the Bishops, the Jesuits were giving their lessons free—drew away pupils from the secular schools and from the University. It seemed as if the friends of the monarchy, in order to bring about the restoration of the *ancien régime*, were not afraid of returning to the Middle Ages.

The country, glad of a dearly-bought and firmly-established peace after the long wars of the Revolution and the Empire, while deprived of the counsels of a free Press, and of all electoral rights, allowed Villèle and his party to dispose of power and opinions, and to break down the Opposition whose sole refuge was in the Chamber of Peers. At the end of the year 1822, after one year of government, the Cabinet was able to point out to its friends with pride the task accomplished with such rapidity and, above all, with such discretion. "The security of the citizens and the action of the laws were completely established; the finances were on a fair way to prosperity; the charges on the taxpayers were diminishing; and the treasury was becoming rich." Without friction and with the consent of a satisfied people, Villèle was capturing the public conscience and turning it towards the old order and the Church.

These successes emboldened the more ardent Royalists, "a mere handful," as the Minister said, but active, bold, and stirring. They listened eagerly to Chateaubriand, who from London had long been preaching to them a policy of war that might add to the solid rather than dazzling progress made by their party the prestige of military glory. "The idea of restoring to our arms their former strength and splendour constantly dominated me," wrote, speaking of this time, the author of *Mémoires d'outre tombe*. An opportunity presented itself. The King of Spain, Ferdinand VII, threatened with the loss of his kingdom in addition to that of his colonies, by the advice of Russia implored the aid of Louis XVIII. In the councils of the King the extremists intrigued to bring about intervention beyond the Pyrenees on behalf of absolute rule. In obedience to their demands Montmorency proposed to Louis XVIII to send out to the extremists in Spain money, ammunition, and arms. Villèle gained time by agreeing that France should join a Congress which was to be held in Italy for the settlement of these matters in favour of the King of Spain, who was still further involved in difficulties by the revolt of July 7, 1822, in Madrid.

"This Congress," said Chateaubriand, "is our secret and our hope." He disputed with his own chief, Montmorency, the honour of representing France there. The point at issue was which of the two should cause war to be decided upon at the Congress, so as to earn for himself the honour of having conferred a great benefit upon the monarchy and upon the country. Villèle forced Montmorency's hand, appointed Chateaubriand as envoy to Verona, and obtained for himself the presidency of the Council in order that by means of the rivalry of the two opponents and this new authority he might preserve his mastery over foreign politics. Satisfied with the present state of affairs, and disturbed by the projects which were being hatched abroad, he feared for the future of his schemes if France were involved in foreign war. Until the month of December, 1822, he prevented Montmorency, who disobeyed him nevertheless, from arranging with Austria and Russia for the intervention of the French by sending their army beyond the Pyrenees. Louis XVIII even granted, on December 25, Villèle's request for the dismissal of Montmorency. Did the Minister think to find a more complaisant colleague in Chateaubriand, the successor whom he nominated three days later? What is certain is that the nomination of the great writer to a position, from which he hoped to dictate laws to all Europe, almost coincided with Louis XVIII's declaration of war against the rebels in Spain (January 28, 1823).

Chateaubriand, though ever a poet in his dreams of glory, seemed to triumph over the methodical and prudent politician who had given him a place in his "little ministry." Almost immediately the nation was able to hail the awakening of the army and of French influence,

to acclaim the victories of the generals of the Empire, Belluno, Reggio, Molitor, Moncey, who under the leadership of a Prince of the Blood recaptured Madrid from the revolution, and who at the Trocadero, near Cadiz, completed in six months the defeat of the Spanish Liberals. The return of the Duke of Angoulême and his army on December 2, 1823, was the signal for a series of banquets and illuminations, in short, of a *fête nationale*. At Paris men forgot that this army had been the instrument of a campaign against a people's liberty. Their only thought was of joy at the successful effort which had restored to France "all her military glory and diplomatic influence." By this questionable achievement, the Restoration found itself more firmly established than by the more genuine services rendered by the monarchy, which had been engaged since 1815 in the work of reparation, liquidation of losses, and adjustment of the balance-sheet after the wars of the Empire. "The glory and prosperity of my country," proudly wrote Chateaubriand, "date from my inclusion in the Ministry."

But Villèle, who gained by these successes, kept a watch on the warlike action of his colleague in order to restrain it within bounds. He was aware that in the department of Foreign Affairs negotiations were on foot with Russia to engage the unoccupied Army of Spain in other struggles for national victories. In his interviews at Court Chateaubriand, when commenting upon the successes in Spain, hinted to the King the question of the Rhine frontier. He sowed the seeds for a new harvest of glory and of war. On June 6, 1824, Villèle demanded of the King his dismissal and obtained it. The motive skilfully alleged for his removal was not the fear of a war which would have caused the monarchy and the Ministry to lose all the benefit of the recent victories. The King reproached Chateaubriand with his opposition to the financial measures of the Cabinet, of which he was a member. In reality he was sacrificing him to the pacific policy of the President of the Council. Villèle, as a practical man, thoroughly understood how to reap the rewards of an enterprise abroad, which he had been unable to prevent but which he was determined to keep within bounds, and of the popularity which it brought the Bourbons, which he considered to be now sufficient; he understood also how to obtain at home fresh victories discreetly won for the benefit of his own party. His programme had never been that of the impatient Royalists; it was not his aim to offer a further bribe of glory to France in order to reestablish at a blow the whole of the old order, the absolute power of the Crown, the privileges of the nobility, the domination of the Church, "to lead the nation," as Chateaubriand's phrase runs, "to reality by the way of dreams." In vain did the leaders of the extreme Right, La Bourdonnaye, Delalot, Vaublanc, General Donnadieu, and the journalists of their party—writers for the *Drapeau Blanc* and *La Quotidienne*—reproach him with his temporisation as if it were betrayal. It was by winding paths,

without noise or outward show, that the Minister of Louis XVIII and the Church continued the restoration of the *ancien régime*.

In order to proceed in legal form, his first concern was to strengthen his majority in the two Chambers. He adroitly quoted the example of a free country like England which nevertheless was obedient to its constitution, when he laid before the King in 1823 the measures he had chosen. The Chamber of Peers, in opposition to this progressive reaction, had been since 1820 the asylum and refuge of Liberalism. Composed for the greater part of men attached to the modern system and hostile to all forms of despotism, such men as Count Molé, the Duc de Broglie, the Baron de Barante, and their friends, it had opposed the legislation against the Press and the intervention against the people in Spain. In December, 1823, after having enrolled in this body the generals who had conquered in Spain, Villèle advised Louis XVIII to nominate 27 peers, chosen from among his most faithful friends. The opposition in the Upper Chamber seemed broken.

At the same moment Villèle procured the dissolution of the Chamber of Deputies by a royal ordinance. He had never indeed lacked a majority, but he believed that the moment had come to make certain of it for a longer period. By urging the fact that the British Parliament was appointed for seven years, Villèle hoped in a moment of national enthusiasm to prevail upon a still more obsequious Chamber to suppress the article in the Constitution relating to the annual displacement of deputies by fifties. The elections were fixed for February 25 and March 6, 1824. The Minister did not omit to influence them in his favour by the choice of presidents of the electoral colleges, by the action of his subordinates, and by the revision of the electoral lists. The result proved better than his hopes. Among 434 members elected the Liberals numbered only 17 representatives, who were lost in the midst of this Royalist Convention. In the month of April, 1824, Villèle brought forward a proposal before the two Chambers, in which they were asked to modify Article 37 in the Charter, and to declare that thenceforward the new Chamber would sit for seven years. Under the specious pretext of importing into France the constitutional customs of England, he easily obtained from a docile and satisfied majority the vote which assured him a long continuance of power.

The great difference between France and England, which Villèle did not mention, was that under his Government there no longer existed either public opinion, or a free Press, or free elections. The journals of the Left, such as *Le Pilote* and *Le Courrier*, succumbed under incessant prosecutions. A Royalist association was formed to buy up bodily the Liberal press, which was ruined by the fines inflicted. The Government set its money and authority at the disposal of a party. The Chamber, elected for seven years, in a country reduced to silence by threats or bribery, was no longer anything but an instrument of despotism, all the

more dangerous because it sat for a longer period. Villèle had reckoned well; and when this Septennial Act had been passed, the demands he made upon this *Chambre retrouvée* were for services rather than for votes.

The work upon which he was then engaged with the help of the body of deputies was the grand liquidation of claims which the Royalists had looked for ever since their return from exile. When he returned with them, Louis XVIII had refused them the hope of regaining the possessions they had lost during the Revolution. He had proclaimed "all rights of property inviolable and sacred." He had thus given an absolute guarantee that the holders of national possessions should retain their lands. Nevertheless the Royalists asked whether the restored monarchy had no duties towards those dispossessed owners, those faithful adherents who had sacrificed their fortunes in defending its cause. Louis XVIII and his counsellors could not ignore these counter-claims, but they were bound by their promise. They first attempted to indemnify the former *émigrés* by reserving for them the best places and offices at Court, in the army, and in the Ministry. Thus they gained some years' respite. But the progress which the Royalist party had made since 1821 reawakened their grievances and increased their demands. How were they to be satisfied without disturbing the nation?

Villèle, that "*grand aideur d'affaires*," as Chateaubriand called him, evolved in 1824 the necessary expedient. Thanks to the peace, which the expedition to Spain so speedily concluded had not seriously interrupted, the finances of the State were in a prosperous condition. The French Government stock at 5 per cent. had risen steadily since the great disasters at the end of the Empire. It touched par on February 15; it rose to 105 in the month of March. This movement was partly attributable to a general rise which took place all over Europe. But it was also the proof and result of the relief in French finances brought about by the industry of the nation and the good administration of the Ministers of Louis XVIII. The occasion was a good one for reducing the interest on the National Debt. This debt stood at 2,800,000,000 francs, which at the rate of 5 per cent. required an annual payment of 140,000,000 francs. By reducing the rate to 4 per cent. an annual saving to the Treasury would be effected of 28,000,000, without reckoning the advantage to the State, when liquidating its debt, of no longer being obliged to buy its stock above par.

The Minister did not hesitate. On April 5 he proposed to the Chambers to lower the rate of interest to 3 per cent. He offered to holders of stock 3 per cent. bonds at 75 francs instead of 100 francs, which was the equivalent of converting 5 per cent. to 4 per cent. He made play with "the fruits produced by the wisdom of the King and the good fortune of France," the marvellous effect "of an operation which would attest the general prosperity and put an end to the disastrous discrepancy between the interest on capital invested in stock and the

interest yielded by capital employed in agriculture, commerce, or manufacture." "If you wish to give fresh life to these three pillars of prosperity, direct towards them the flow of wealth," he urged. Public economy, profits for the nation at large and for general industry—were these not enough to justify this conversion at the expense of holders of stock?

The only point which Villèle failed to mention, in obedience to his tactics of prudent compromise and partial concealment in the measures he brought forward, was the employment of these 28 millions, set free by public economies. If he had applied them to the development of the public wealth, nothing could have been better. But he kept them back for a particular application, which was the final end and essential object of his financial enterprise. It was reported and known that Villèle was arranging with foreign financiers for a new French loan, the interest upon which was to be paid by the anticipated economy. The loan was for 1,000,000,000 francs; and its purpose was the indemnification of the *émigrés*. In the discussion which took place in the Chambers, the Liberals, above all Casimir Périer, denounced the iniquity of this operation, which robbed the holders of stock in order to satisfy one special class of the nation, a minority of privileged individuals, who had been punished in time past for having conspired with foreign Powers to recover their own privileges. However, the majority which the elections of 1824 had provided for the Government approved the proposed action, and passed the law on May 4, 1824.

The Chamber of Peers threw it out on June 3. This Chamber was ruled by old public officers of the Empire, men of the Revolution, such as Count Roy, Mollien, Pasquier, and Talleyrand, who were irreconcilably hostile to the *émigrés*. Their opposition, enfeebled as it was by the nomination of new Peers, to which the Minister had recently persuaded the King, would have been insufficient, if Chateaubriand, who was jealous of Villèle, and dissatisfied with the foreign policy which the Minister forced upon him, had not wrecked the proposed measure by using his influence in the Royalist circles of the higher Chamber. He paid for this intrigue by the loss of his post on June 6. But this was the beginning of a war to the death between him and the Ministry which he had attempted to overthrow, and which dismissed him for his obstinacy and infidelity.

Thus the campaign whose success Villèle considered certain met with more obstacles than he had imagined among obstructionists of his own party. Before many days had passed, he was to undergo a fresh experience of the same kind. In working for the aristocracy he did not forget the Church; but his intention was to make use of the same crooked paths to serve her. Modern France, the France of the Revolution, was still hostile to the religious Orders that had been dispersed at the end of the eighteenth century, above all to the Jesuits who had been expelled

by the monarchy itself. This Villèle knew. He judged it more prudent not to mention to the people the reestablishment of the monasteries, but to leave their members scattered in a secular society to gain the mastery over the seminaries, the University, the education of the young, and even over the administration, so as slowly to extend their control over public opinion and government.

But he thought that the hour had come for working on behalf of the religious bodies who were not suspected by the people on the same grounds. On April 8, 1824, a royal ordinance confirmed the privileges of the Brothers of *la Doctrine chrétienne*, granted in 1819, and, by exacting of all teachers total submission to the Bishops, prepared for them a kind of monopoly of primary education. Some time afterwards, on June 12, the Ministry requested the Chambers to resign their right in favour of the Crown and to authorise it once for all to grant permission for the establishment of convents when it seemed advisable. The nuns, who were for the most part devoted to works of charity or to education, did not awaken in France the same distrust as the monks. Villèle hoped that in their favour the monarchy might be granted uncontrolled authority to foster the development of their work and wealth, and that a precedent might be thus created for hereafter depriving the law and the Chambers of the direction of religious bodies in general. This was the beginning of a period in which the Roman Church, chiefly with the help of the French Catholics, was to reestablish throughout the world her troops, which had been scattered in the preceding century by unbelief and revolution. It was of the highest importance that she should find in France a monarchy and Ministers capable of assisting her without being obliged to render accounts to the French nation, faithful to her laws and unfettered by those of the State.

The Chamber of Peers, which was obstinately Liberal in sentiment, though strongly monarchical, saw through the schemes of Villèle and baffled his calculations. "If we decide to-day," said Baron Pasquier, "that religious bodies of women can be established by simple royal ordinances, the force of circumstances will drive us to make the same decision for the religious bodies of men. The sanction of law is necessary." A majority of the Peers adopted his opinion. The Ministry had gained nothing by their adroitness. In spite of all their precautions against alarming the country, and their selection of docile Chambers, their plans on behalf of the Church and the aristocracy came for the time to a full stop. Yet, to a certain extent, these difficulties must have enlightened those of the Royalists who reproached Villèle with his temporising policy, and who waxed angry over his hesitations. This repulse proved his wisdom. He had failed; but defeat, in the conditions under which he made war, while making sure of retreat, left him with the hope of revenge. Time was working for him.

In point of fact, the reign of Louis XVIII was drawing to an end.

The health of the old King, who was broken by gout and long since incapable of walking, became rapidly worse during the summer of 1824. He yet made an effort to appear in public on August 25, his saint's day, and to continue till September 12 his royal functions. But then his strength gave way and fever supervened. After three days of acute sufferings and of repeated crises, Louis XVIII died on September 15. The accession of Charles X, the Comte d'Artois, who had always looked with more favour than his brother upon the hopes and aims of the more uncompromising Royalists, was to furnish Villèle with a new point of support. Though the new reign, in accordance with custom, began by measures of concession, yet the promotion of the three Bishops of Bourges, Amiens, and Évreux to the House of Peers, and the enforced retirement of the whole body of general officers of the old army, left no doubt as to the intentions of Charles X. His sovereignty claimed to be a government by divine right, supporting and supported by the Church in an attempt to wean men's minds from the recollection of the Revolution and the Empire.

A rumour spread immediately that the President of the Council, taking up his plans afresh with a confidence that nothing could shake, had collected in the Departments detailed reports as to the amount, nature, and value of the properties confiscated in accordance with the laws of the Revolution. This time he boldly resolved to couple a scheme for the indemnification of the *émigrés* with the plan for the conversion of stock which he had preluded by measures of economy in the administration of finances. Charles X came himself on December 22 to declare in the Chambers the intentions of his Ministers. "The King my brother," he said, "found great consolation in preparing the way for closing the last wounds left by the Revolution. The moment has come for executing the wise plans which he had conceived. The state of our finances will permit us to accomplish this great act of justice and of policy without increasing the taxes or injuring the public credit." On January 3, 1825, Martignac, a former secretary of Sieyès, who had become a Councillor of State as a reward for his Royalist principles (1822), and Director-General of Registration, read in the Chambers the statement of grounds for the project on behalf of the *émigrés*.

With Charles X on their side, the obstinate and confident Ministry no longer hesitated to serve the aristocrats who had striven against the Revolution with the aid of foreign help. The *émigrés* were victims who came to claim back their own; and it was incumbent on the Ministry to give them their due. "It is important," said Villèle, "that by one memorable and universally useful example we should teach the lesson that great injustices should receive in course of time signal reparation." By this language it was easy to measure the sense of security that had grown up in the Cabinet in the course of one year. The emigration

was not sufficiently remote for the French to have forgotten the fact that these nobles had conspired at Versailles against the nation for the maintenance of their privileges, and that they went away without compulsion, and at the dictates of levity or fashion, to form fresh conspiracies upon the threatened frontier. Modern France could not help being moved by the words of an orator of the Right, who seemed to define the tendency of his party and of the Ministry. “The country is founded upon religion—its altars were thrown down. The country is founded upon the King and those who surround him—and he had disappeared in the storm.”

Villèle, it is true, alleged other arguments, drawn, as his custom was, from policy rather than justice. He represented his design as a measure of reconciliation and amnesty; and it was on this ground that later it succeeded in winning approval. Would not the holders of the confiscated estates be still more firmly guaranteed than by the Charter against all claims of the former proprietors, when the *émigrés* should have received a just and satisfactory indemnity? “Security for present holders, satisfaction for the *émigrés*”—this would bring about forgiveness and reconciliation around the restored throne, at the hands of a King faithful to his promises of pardon and to the cause of his best servants.

In spite of the skill of this reasoning, one hard fact nevertheless struck public opinion and remained firm afterwards in men’s memories—the sum total of the indemnity, 1,000,000,000 francs, which was the valuation based upon the revenues produced by the estates confiscated in 1790. “There could be no question of restoring such a capital sum to the dispossessed families.” That was admitted by the authors of the measure themselves. Still less was it possible to despoil the holders of these estates by an act of expropriation which would have roused the whole of France. But, if 30,000,000 of interest were added to the National Debt in favour of the *émigrés*, securing to them the interest instead of the capital, this would not even augment the burden of the debt. For these 30 millions nearly balanced the economy which the State proposed to make on the same day by the conversion of stock. Clever as the operation was, was it possible for the Ministry permanently to conceal the fact that they were taking from the stockholders 28,000,000, a sum which nearly corresponded to a capital of 1,000,000,000, in order to make it over to their friends, the aristocratic party, those courtiers who had already been enriched by all the favours of Royalty ever since 1815? In principle and in fact, this double law, intended for the profit of the nobles, was a blow, almost a defiance, aimed at the whole nation. General Foy and Benjamin Constant opposed it in eloquent speeches, and, even in the Chamber of Peers, the opposition of Broglie and Chateaubriand was no less active. Nevertheless it passed the two Assemblies in the middle of April, 1825, by a majority of nearly one hundred.

The decisive success of the Ministry encouraged the Crown to make larger day by day the place which seemed reserved for, and due to, the Church in a society which was being little by little won over to a régime of privilege and of divine right.

In his last days Louis XVIII had created a Ministry of Ecclesiastical Affairs, and had entrusted it to the head of the University, Bishop de Frayssinous, in order to lay stress on the high place that Catholicism was to hold in the State, which had determined to hand over all the schools to the Church. Charles X followed in his steps. On January 4, 1825, he allowed the Church to reintroduce in the Chamber of Peers the Bill touching the religious bodies of women which had been thrown out the previous year. The Assemblies were once more invited to rob themselves, in favour of the monarchy and its Ministers, of all right of control over the development of the religious bodies and of their property. Hurling a new defiance at the Revolution, the Bishop dared to say, "I am far from being the enemy of perpetual vows. Liberty has been for many of the nuns a torture." If he did not demand their immediate reestablishment, it was not through principle but policy, and because Villèle was unwilling "that he should expose himself to be broken by the resistance of the laity." They lulled France to sleep in order to get her into their power, and they were successful. In the Chamber of Deputies the law was passed at a single sitting, and almost without opposition. The Chamber of Peers itself gave way.

Another law came up for consideration almost at the same moment, intended to perfect the system of stifling public expression of opinions. The Liberals, in spite of the threats that overhung their journals, attempted once more to put the nation on its guard against the progress made by the priest-party. To prohibit discussion on religious matters, Villèle and his colleagues evolved the "law of sacrilege," which was passed on April 15, 1825. It was not apparently directed against the Liberals, but against malefactors whom the Ministry wished to visit with special penalties, even with death, for crimes, thefts, and profanations committed in churches. In point of fact, it was never carried into execution. The true object of the proposer of the measure was to establish by this first attempt a class of religious offences and corresponding exceptional penalties. "To-morrow," wrote Broglie, who, with Barante, Pasquier, and Molé, opposed this unsuccessful attempt, "you will be asked to pierce with a red-hot iron the tongue which has committed blasphemy, to close the pulpits where error makes herself heard, to violate openly the great principle of the liberty of forms of worship."

This "to-morrow" was actually inaugurated in the month of May, 1825, by a significant manifestation. In his first speech Charles X had announced his intention of reestablishing the custom of consecration, of prostrating himself "at the steps of the altar where Clovis received the sacred unction." On April 26 he requested the Chambers to send

deputies to Reims to take part on May 29 in this ceremony, to which all the great personages of State and foreign monarchs were bidden. The holy vessel was rediscovered, though it had been publicly destroyed during the Revolution ; and on May 16 the *Moniteur* announced to the nation this precious find. A commission of architects and other functionaries was installed at Reims to give to the preparations all the traditional splendour. When the day arrived, the Bishops of France handed over to Charles X the sword of Charlemagne, with the hope "that he would protect and defend the churches, repair disorders, preserve what had been re-established," and, in short, strengthen the restoration of throne and altar. Monarchy by divine right, supported by the nobility and clergy, once more took possession of France, and from that day Charles X believed himself charged with a sacred mission to guard, in direct communion with God, the welfare of his subjects and the honour of the throne.

But from that day also the country began to awake to the perception of this domination of the clergy. The Royalist poets, Lamartine, Victor Hugo, Soumet, and Baour-Lormian celebrated the consecration. Béranger mocked at this "consecration of Charles the Simple," and his popular song made more enemies for the monarchy than the official poetry made friends. The Liberal press, the *Constitutionnel*, the *Courrier Français*, reopened a violent campaign against the enterprises of a clergy "under Jesuit orders."

The editors of these journals were arraigned before the tribunals but acquitted by the magistrates, who were themselves uneasy at the ultramontane doctrines professed by the French clergy. Finally, when the great Liberal orator, General Foy, died suddenly in the month of November, 1825, an immense crowd thronged to his funeral ceremony. A subscription set on foot immediately afterwards to raise a monument to him produced in six months nearly 1,000,000 francs. By uniting their cause with that of the ultramontane Church party, the Bourbons issued a challenge to the nation and put a dangerous weapon into the hands of the champions of Liberal ideas. This new form taken by the Opposition ought to have warned the Ministers. It was not without reason that Casimir Périer said in the Chamber : "We are only seven in this house, but we have the nation behind us." Villèle however did not pause ; and with his colleagues he brought forward at the beginning of 1826 a proposed law of successions, which modified the rules of equal division of the inheritance among children prescribed by the Civil Code. This project gave to the eldest son a right over that part of the inheritance which was outside the portion left in equal parts to the children, and which the Code put at the disposal of the father under the title of *quotité disponible*. As on the other hand, by the permission of entails for the future, it became possible to tie up this wealth in perpetuity, the nation saw in this legislation a step towards the re-establishment, by the custom of the right of the eldest, of the estates

of the nobility of the *ancien régime*. In vain did the Minister plead that it was to the general advantage to prevent the breaking up of patrimonies, and to maintain in the country on behalf of agriculture a great landed aristocracy. He did not disarm all those who began to recognise and to dread the return of the old order, under the legal forms and with the modifications devised by Villèle. It was the Chamber of Peers, composed of men of the Revolution and the Empire, which offered the most determined opposition (March, 1826).

The Opposition unmistakably gathered force in the course of this year, when it heard from the lips of the Minister of Religion himself of the authorisation secretly granted to the Jesuits to return to the Church of France, and to teach in the seminaries of the State (August, 1826). It seemed that for the future the Church, and with it the State, were to be at the mercy of those parties who had resolved to efface the last traces of the Revolution. Villèle, roused by this opposition, departed from his policy of prudence. He had recourse to measures of severity and made a Press Law which was called in mockery "the law of justice and love."

This law, which was brought forward by the Ministry on December 29, 1826, as a simple "police law" with regard to the Press, which was described as "having reached a pitch of utterly unbridled licence," was in reality a bold return to the customs of the old monarchy, which had been sovereign arbiter in France on all printed matter. Orders were to be given to the printers of journals, who were thenceforward to be held responsible, and to the proprietors, to submit five days before publication all writings which emanated from their presses, in order that the Government might examine them and permit the circulation of those alone which had been stamped with the government mark. Severe penalties and the right given to the magistrates to take official proceedings in the case of anything which might seem of defamatory character threatened the future freedom of thought and pen in France. It was no longer merely newspapers, but pamphlets of all sorts and books in general, which the Crown intended to subject to its decrees. "It would be the same thing," said Casimir Périer, a deputy moreover of moderate Liberal views, "to propose a law for the suppression of printing in France for the good of Belgium." "It is a law of barbarism," added Chateaubriand. It was not only in the Chamber and the Opposition but in the French Academy and in the country at large that emotion showed itself. The Ministry believed they would defeat opposition by measures of severity which deprived of their offices writers such as Villemain and Michaud (January 17, 1827). And at first they seemed to succeed: the eloquence of Benjamin Constant was insufficient to win over a majority in the Chamber, which was composed of friends or dependents of Villèle. But the Chamber of Peers gave the Liberals a complete revenge, and on April 17 forced Peyronnet, the Keeper of the Seals, to withdraw the law for fear of its rejection.

This check should have given Villèle a final warning. The withdrawal of the law provoked an outburst of joy in Paris; illuminations and fireworks blazed forth that very evening in many parts of the town. Ten days later, when Charles X held a review of the *Garde Nationale* at the Tuileries, in the ranks of several legions there arose cries of "Down with the Ministers, down with the Jesuits!" After a Gallican Royalist, Montlosier, had denounced to the country by books and petitions the progress of the priest-party and the religious bodies, all the Liberalism in France, alarmed at and convinced of the existence of a conspiracy between the Ministers and the Jesuits, proclaimed itself prepared to defend freedom of thought and the New Order.

Villèle, driven by opposition and the counsels of his party further and further from the paths of prudence and discretion, imagined that he would gain the victory this time by drastic and authoritative action. The *Garde Nationale* was forthwith disbanded (April 29). Then, two days after the Chambers had risen (June 24, 1827), a royal ordinance, countersigned by Villèle, Corbière, and Peyronnet, re-established the censorship over all journals and periodical writings. And the censors, who were appointed by the Minister of the Interior, received instructions to show themselves inexorable towards all Liberal or Opposition journals. Public opinion had no longer any medium of expression. It could only make itself felt on extraordinary occasions such as the funeral of the Republican Deputy, Manuel, whose hearse was drawn to Père Lachaise by the youth of the Liberal party amid the applause of the Parisian mob (April 24, 1827). Despotism at that time seemed to have gained victory and acceptance. The people in the provinces, and the army engaged in manœuvres at St Omer, acclaimed Charles X, who was making a triumphal progress in the north which had been arranged by his Ministers. The prosperity of industrial enterprise and of public finance which was being strengthened in various ways, and particularly by the exhibition of products of industry held at the Louvre on August 1, 1827, justified Villèle in his own eyes and those of the King for having maintained order at the expense of liberty. He boasted, and for the time being it seemed credible, that in this reactionary campaign he would have the last word, and that the *ancien régime*, thanks to his skill and perseverance, would be decisively restored.

Its defeat, however, was near at hand. It was brought about by those Royalists whom, to all appearances, its policy ought to have bound closely to it. Since the enforced resignation of Chateaubriand, Villèle had definitely alienated and had been unable to win back a group of extremists, *pointus* as he called them, obstructionists who fought him and his policy without intermission. This irreconcilable and dangerous opposition was founded without doubt upon wounded or dissatisfied ambitions; it was to be explained in part upon the ground of posts refused, and of jealousies aroused against men who had been too long

and too exclusively in possession of royal favours. But other and loftier motives cooperated. Chateaubriand and his friends, more violent partisans of the throne and the Church than Villèle, reproached him with not seeking by means of a policy of glorious activity abroad to secure a more rapid triumph for the anti-Revolution movement. They demanded, like the Liberals, liberty of the Press, in order to fight him and to win over national opinion. They professed, like the Liberals, ardent sympathy for Greece, who for the past five years had been struggling for her independence, under the eyes of Europe, at first hostile, then indifferent. Their incessant attacks shook the Ministry of Villèle more than the opposition of the Liberals, who owed to them their rare successes in the elections. When in the month of November it became known that at Navarino the French Admiral, Rigny, striking a blow for French glory, had prevailed upon the English and Russian Admirals to destroy the fleet of the Pasha of Egypt, which had been put at the disposal of the Sultan to use against the Greeks, all Villèle's enemies, Royalist and Liberal alike, united in raising a cry of victory against the Ministry. It seemed that it was chiefly the policy of the Ministry which the cannon of Navarino had overthrown (1827).

Villèle still believed himself strong enough to eliminate from his majority these contumacious and troublesome Royalists. He threw over the Chamber which in 1824 he had established for a term of seven years, and sent it back for reelection on November 5, 1827. At the same time he nominated to the Higher Chamber 76 new Peers, in order to create for himself there a more docile majority. The elections gave the victory to his opponents. In spite of the law of the double vote and the raising of the qualifications necessary for a voter, many Liberals, upheld by an awakening of public opinion and supported by the Royalists in the electoral colleges, by the manufacturing industry, the financiers, and the merchants, were enabled after seven years of exclusion to regain possession of the Chamber of Deputies. On December 5, 1827, Villèle sent in his resignation.

He retired, the victim of a singular coalition which rendered the King's task of choosing a successor highly difficult. His conquerors were such Liberals as Lafayette, Chauvelin, Étienne, Bignon, Keratry, the two Dupins, Mauguin, Alexandre de Laborde, Odier, and Lefèvre, men who were almost republicans. On the other hand, there were also the extremists whom Villèle had most persistently combatted, Hyde de Neuville, Bertin de Vaux, editor of the *Débats*, Ravez, La Bourdonnaye, and Delalot. From such representatives of the two extreme parties united in Opposition, though absolutely different in aims and principles, no lasting Ministry could be formed. There was no other Government possible than one analogous to that which had just been overthrown, alien alike to the party of ultra-Royalists and to that of the Liberals properly so called.

Charles X entrusted the task and responsibility of governing to the Vicomte de Martignac (January 4, 1828). In choosing him the King gave satisfaction to the Liberals, who were happy, in the first place, at seeing the direction of ecclesiastical affairs separated from that of public instruction, which was under the directorship of Vatimesnil. In the second place they received a guarantee when the presidency of the Courts of justice was taken from Peyronnet and restored to a Liberal Peer of France, Count Portalis. Moreover, the presence of Hyde de Neuville, a friend of Chateaubriand, at the head of naval affairs, and of Count de La Ferronays, ambassador to Russia and friend of the Tsar, at the head of foreign affairs, seemed to the Royalists to be a pledge of glorious action abroad. In reality Martignac, the chief man in this new combination, bore more resemblance to Villèle than to the majority of the Chamber elected in opposition to the ex-Minister.

Their origins were similar; as advocate at Bordeaux, or Mayor of Toulouse, both had been in 1815 in the South determined champions of Legitimism. Afterwards, when in 1821 the Royalist party, composed of the former *émigrés* and extremists, came back into power, and Villèle was called to be its leader, Martignac was conspicuous in the front rows of the majority. He was created Vicomte by Court favour, which recognised in him an active and eloquent coadjutor of the measures prepared by Villèle. This man, whom, by contrast with his former chief, men were now regarding almost as a Liberal, had counselled the Chamber to severe measures against the Press in 1822, had encouraged and aided Louis XVIII in his struggle against the Spanish Revolution in 1823. It was he too who had brought forward in the Chamber the law of 1824 for a septennial Parliament, and so furnished Villèle with this instrument of power and reaction. Soon, in 1825, the King summoned him to his counsels as a reward for his services, and commissioned him with the task of pleading before the Chamber the cause of the *émigrés*, and of supporting the proposed measure which was to restore to them 1,000,000,000 francs by way of indemnity. And in 1827, in the debate upon the Press, we find him once more giving his support to legislation of a kind "to prevent crimes by severity and fear." There was nothing in his past to cause men to anticipate a new change of front in policy. When the principal actor had been hissed off the stage by the public, the same play went on with an understudy.

In order to win acceptance, the new chief had the skill, it is true, to revive the earlier and more successful tactics of Villèle, to abandon measures that were openly reactionary, and to reassure the nation by timely concessions. He had all the necessary qualifications. As a parliamentary orator he was full of charm; he was a tactful and pleasant politician, who seemed chosen to soothe by his eloquence the alarm of parties and the country at large, to disarm hostility by his graciousness, and to bring about the necessary reconciliations.

Royer-Collard, the respected leader of the Liberal Royalists, was summoned immediately to the Presidency of the Chamber. The *doctrinaire* professors, his pupils or his friends, who had been persecuted for four years, Guizot, Villemain, and Cousin, were allowed to return to their posts, "with tranquillity in their breasts and liberty for thought." The restoration of authority to these eminent representatives of the Liberal party, the withdrawal of royal favour from the Prefects and the chief of police, Franchet, who had been plotting for clerical domination, and from Frayssinous, who was suspected of having handed over ecclesiastical affairs to the Jesuits, and the suppression of the "*cabinet noir*"—all this seemed to foreshadow a new system. Charles X resigned himself with regret. "Martignac," he said, "is meeting the Revolution half-way with his cowardice."

It was not, however, either cowardice or total change of method on the part of the Minister, who was reduced to depend for existence upon his concessions and his skill in steering between two parties. It was merely the necessary recoil. We find him, moreover, promising to the deputies greater honesty in the elections by the law upon the revision of the electoral lists; but at the same time he declared that he would nevertheless retain for the Government "such authority as they deemed indispensable for the conduct of the elections." The annual revision of the lists of voters would no longer be left to the arbitrary decision of the Prefects, but be subject to appeal either to the tribunals or to the Council of State (March 20—July 10, 1828). Before long Martignac brought forward a law concerning the Press (April 14, 1828), which stands as the exact measure of his Liberal intentions. He suppressed the censorship of newspapers which he had himself been instrumental in establishing in 1822, to which he had set his approval a second time in 1827, and for whose abolition the parties of the Left and the extreme Right were clamouring. He swept away "preliminary authorisation" and "offences of tendency." But he did not restore to the juries the trials of press cases, and he gave to the ordinary tribunals, which were always under the thumb of the Government, a severe code, the right of suspension for three months, and of imposing heavy fines the payment of which was secured by the preliminary deposit of an exorbitant sum. "This is a new Bastille," remarked some of the Liberals, "with liberty for its pass-word."

This verdict was not far from the truth. The task which Martignac was attempting was the maintenance of monarchical authority, strengthened by the fact that it was willing to rid itself betimes of the men and institutions most disliked by a sensitive and uneasy public opinion. The reproach of tacking made against him is unjust. He merely threw overboard such ballast as was necessary. This also was the motive which impelled him to publish on June 17 two royal ordinances countersigned by the Minister of Religious Worship and the

Minister of Ecclesiastical Affairs. The one, directed against the Jesuits, forbade the giving of instruction by any religious body not authorised by the State, and reported to the University eight Colleges suspected of giving clandestine instruction. The other attacked the smaller seminaries, which since the Empire, in spite of the monopoly of the University, had been allowed to attract students under the pretext of preparing candidates for the priesthood. This ordinance compelled their pupils to wear ecclesiastical costume, and limited the numbers of the children in their schools to 20,000, all told, for the whole of France. In short, it restricted them to their proper aims and duties. If the University had been at that time an institution hostile to the Church, as was alleged by the priest-party, the measures of Martignac's Cabinet, which announced the intention of reserving to it the entire education of the middle classes in France, would doubtless have been vigorous acts of secularist policy. But the State system of education which these ordinances strengthened was based upon principles which were essentially religious and Catholic, and many clerical professors were on the staff of teachers.

These laws were doubtless instruments useful to the monarchy, but it was a monarchy which was still the eldest daughter of the Holy See, and they contained no real Liberal principles, still less principles of the Revolution. Above all, they were not weapons directed against the Church. Judging by the applause they aroused among the Liberals, and the indignation evinced by the opposite camp, it might have been thought that they were. However, Martignac had acted with the full authority of Charles X.; and those secret counsellors of the King who were most devoted to the "Congregation," Bishop de Frayssinous, Father Ronsin, and the deputy Ravez, had themselves pronounced these concessions to opinion to be opportune.

The hostile section, however, of the extreme Right, who had thought that by overthrowing Villele they would clear their own path to power and bring about the triumph of their ambitions, were aggrieved that, apart from some concessions of detail, they had received nothing but a set-back. The Bishops protested against the ordinances of June. An "association for the defence of the Catholic religion" was organised, with Bonald and Dambray as its chiefs. Lamennais, the eloquent champion of Ultramontanism, was incensed at the "progress of the Revolution," and wished the Church of Rome to break publicly with a monarchy handed over by its Ministers to the Jacobins. The Royalist journals, the *Quotidienne* and the *Gazette de France*, declared war upon the Cabinet which had had the audacity to give counsels of prudence to their party. To Martignac's temporising policy they opposed a method which had brought failure to the Royalists in 1816, and had been condemned by Villele in 1821—the establishment by force of a kind of royal dictatorship, an act of defiance to the nation. "Those who give

the King such advice are mad," Martignac wrote at the end of 1828. "Your Majesty's Ministers are firmly convinced that the course they propose is the only way to restore power and dignity to the monarchy."

Deserted and thwarted by the more violent Royalists, the Ministry, on the other hand, were unable with this programme to give assurance or satisfaction to the Liberals. They had an instinctive feeling that Martignac was not working for the cause of liberty. They never accorded him more than a "conditional confidence." Victorious beyond their hopes in the elections of 1827, they were stronger in the Chamber than they had been for seven years. They were supported by a new generation, by the publicists of the *Globe*, Thiers, Mignet, Dubois, Jouffroy, Rémusat, Duvergier de Hauranne, and were determined that once for all the Crown should cease its secret or open attempts to restore the *ancien régime*, or to make war upon the new and lay society. They demanded of the Liberal Minister as the price of their actual support a formal declaration of his adhesion to the revolutionary principles of 1789; but they found that Martignac was in no hurry to give it to them. In this frame of mind they awaited the end of the year 1828 for a decisive turn in affairs which was to be brought about by the law of elections.

The deputies of the Left could not be under any real misapprehension as to the causes of the unhoped-for success they had won in the elections of 1827. When Villèle sent the Chambers back to the country, in the conditions under which the suffrage was exercised—the double vote and official control—the Minister, with his long career of success behind him, had thought himself certain of the result. His anticipations were falsified, because in many of the Departments, including Paris, the Opposition of the extreme Right held out support to candidates from the Left. Thus the Liberal Opposition was at the mercy of those allies whose desires were the exact contrary of their own. They were eager to escape from so onerous and precarious an alliance, and to consolidate a victory thus won by a surprise attack. Thus they waited for Martignac to bring forward a new electoral law which would, by increasing the number of electors, give them a firm foothold in the country.

Martignac, at the beginning of 1829, did not bring forward the law they wished. With his wonted skill, deeming it as he did a primary necessity to gain time, he brought before the Chambers two proposals touching communal and departmental administration (February 9, 1829). He offered freer and more widely representative elections, but only in the councils of the Communes, Cantons, and Departments. He refused to extend them to the central Assembly. His purpose was sufficiently clear. "Are you not," he said, "concerned on behalf of this crowd of educated, industrious, and energetic men whom public life admonishes and arouses, who are impelled

towards public affairs by their social position; the consciousness of their own ability, and the force of example? What means have you of satisfying their natural and legitimate impatience? Open for them a new career at their doors. They are ambitious to win men's suffrages in their honour. Give them the means to satisfy this noble ambition at home, and draw round them a circle of honour within which there is profit and glory to be won by remaining." Men might really have thought that they had returned to the *ancien régime* and the days of Turgot. To a nation which had known the *Constituante* and the Convention, and which was being constantly reminded by Thiers and Mignet and the other Liberals of the glorious memories of the great national assemblies, Martignac vouchsafed the concession of provincial assemblies. He admitted that he was seeking "to divide the current of men's minds in order to make its actions less forceful and less impetuous."

Thus on April 8, 1829, the party of the Left declared open war against him by throwing out his measure, or rather by forcing him to withdraw it. The Royalists of the extreme Right, "irritated by these concessions to democracy," had taken part in the struggle with equal violence. What was not sufficiently Liberal for the one side was too much so for the other. From that time the Ministers, who had just lost by the defection of the Left the sole majority by whose aid they could resist the influences of the Court and the demands of the extremists, and who were reduced to making Liberal protestations at the *tribune*, while defending reactionary measures imposed upon them by the secret counsellors of the King, were, in spite of their skill, really powerless to fulfil their mission. Their weakness became obvious in the summer of 1829, in the course of the discussion of the Budget. Without a party in the Chamber, without credit at Court, without support in public opinion, Martignac had failed in this fifteen months' attempt, which indeed was foredoomed from the beginning.

In point of fact, the period from April 8 to August 9, 1829, witnessed the second victory of this strange coalition, formed in the last days of Villèle's Ministry, a coalition composed of extreme parties who could not govern in union. Under Martignac, the system of prudent reaction and prudent temporisation, which had for so long been practised by Villèle, showed clearly that it had had its day.

Charles X thus found himself forced in 1829 to make a choice, decisive for the future of his monarchy, between the two parties whose ephemeral coalition had ruined the policy followed by his Ministers ever since 1821. Like Louis XVIII in 1816, he was compelled to declare himself on the side of the no-compromise Royalist party, who were impatient to complete without half-measures or diplomacy the restoration of the old order, of privilege, and of the ultramontane Church, or on the side of men who, like Rémusat, had for their

programme "to defend the Revolution and continue it without the revolutionary spirit." The crisis had not changed after thirteen years; it was the same at the end as at the beginning. The solution, however, was more difficult for Charles X than it had been for his brother.

Charles had neither the subtlety of mind nor the sceptical prudence of Louis XVIII. Fickle and volatile from youth, Charles was, by the habits of his riper age, passed amid the flatteries of the ultra-Royalists who surrounded him, by his conviction that Providence would guide him by mysterious ways towards the accomplishment of the divine mission with which he believed himself charged, by his lack of reflexion and his obstinacy, ill fitted to make the necessary concessions. Moreover, those which he would have to make to the Liberals, if he separated himself from the ultra-Royalists, would thenceforth be greater than those which would have been sufficient for his brother. Defeated and occupied by the enemy, tired of revolutions and of war, France in 1815 hungered less for liberty than for repose. Since then new generations had arisen with the design and the desire to take up once more by teaching and action the national task which France seemed to have abandoned through fatigue. Against the royal will of the Bourbons, restored by means of foreign aid, which had seemed to be the foundation of the Charter they had granted, these younger Liberals put forward the rights of the nation, in their eyes the only true foundation of that Charter. More and more, Liberalism invoked principles irreconcilable with the ideas that the restored Bourbons, especially Charles X and his friends, held concerning the rights of the Crown. "There is no way of dealing with these people," said the King to Martignac on April 9, 1829. "It is time to call halt." On August 9 he entrusted Prince de Polignac, his ambassador in London and his favourite, with the task of forming a Ministry. The period of halting was past. This was a declaration of war, not an act of negotiation.

The *Journal des Débats*, a Royalist paper of moderate principles, dealt with the King's decision on August 15 in an article which was subsequently made the ground of a prosecution. In alluding to the three Ministers—Polignac, an émigré and accomplice of Georges in his conspiracies with foreign Powers, Bourmont, a hero of the wars in the Vendée, who deserted in the face of the enemy after the Hundred Days, La Bourdonnaye, who took part in the White Terror—the writer said: "Coblenz, Waterloo, 1815—those are the three principles, the three personages of the Ministry. Squeeze and wring this Ministry, and you will get nothing from it but humiliations, misfortunes, and dangers." While at Paris the whole of the Liberal press raised a cry of defiance against the Crown, at Lyons the people acclaimed Lafayette as the republican and national hero. Companies were formed in Britanny and elsewhere for the defence of the Charter by the refusal to pay taxes.

Though he had decided to attempt the restoration of the *ancien*

*régime* by some drastic act of authority, Polignac, the trusted champion of the *émigrés*, nevertheless at first felt some hesitation. He proclaimed his intention "to reorganise society, to give back to the clergy their weight in state affairs, to create a powerful aristocracy, and to surround it with privileges," but he took no action. Was this the fault of his colleague, La Bourdonnaye, Minister of the Interior, who, after having for ten years clamoured for war to the death against the Revolution, showed himself as incapable of undertaking as of conceiving a plan of action, and retired on November 17? The lack of decision seems in fact to be due to Polignac also. "He has made up his mind," said an opponent, "but he does not know exactly to what." The serious thing was that, having the temperament of a mystic and a touching confidence in Providence, he looked to heaven rather than to his own resources for the necessary help, and even for the signal. Foreign Ministers, Lord Stuart de Rothesay, and Villèle himself, watched him march slowly towards a battle without any plan but with smiling serenity and the confidence of a somnambulist.

On March 2, 1830, he convened the Chambers. He laid before them a programme of external policy, which circumstances offered him, and which he thought would be decisive for the success of his plans. At first he had thought that events in the East, the victories gained by the Russians over the Turks, would permit to France a glorious intervention in European politics, and to Charles X an act of vigorous self-assertion at home. He had formed a plan in concert with the Cabinet at St Petersburg,—a general rearrangement of Europe, beginning with Turkey and ending with the Rhine; but the Peace of Adrianople, which was rapidly arranged for Nicholas I by the mediation of Prussia, had upset his arrangements (November, 1829). Failing a war upon the Rhine, Polignac meditated an enterprise in Algiers, where the Bey had since 1827 refused to make any reparation to the King of France, who had been insulted in the person of his ambassador. He "made preparations for it with a prodigality of resources and a superabundance of precautions which betrayed that a greater interest was at stake than the national honour or the advantage of conquest." He wished to increase his power abroad in order to be able to strike a strong blow at home.

"If this Algerian enterprise," wrote Talleyrand, "is an expedient to facilitate government at home, it is a great mistake." The Chamber which Polignac hoped to bend to his designs was forewarned and unwilling to follow him. The future belonged to the moderate Royalists, friends or disciples of Royer-Collard, who were equally afraid of the dictatorship which the party of the extreme Right and the Cabinet were endeavouring to establish, and of the revolution for which the journals of the Left, the *National*, the *Globe*, the Republicans, and the Bonapartists, were now praying. "We must strike hard and soon," Royer-Collard insisted to his friends. Their hope was that Parliament, between

a monarchy ready for a *coup d'état* to establish its rights and the nation forced to act vigorously in defence of its own, might still perhaps be able to prevent the conflict by a firm attitude. On these grounds an address was drawn up, voted by 221 Liberal deputies, and presented to the King on March 18, 1830. It was an address of reproach to the Crown for its resistance to the people's wishes by its choice of a non-representative Government instead of one chosen in consultation with them; and at the same time it was a declaration of the deputies' principles.

Charles X took the address as a defiance of the Crown. To set up his standard, as he said, he authorised his Ministers first to prorogue, and afterwards to dissolve, this rebellious Chamber, and ordered Peyronnet, a man of battle, to take all suitable measures for the elections (May 16, 1830). Perhaps he was still reckoning on the moral effect of the expedition which was shortly to be undertaken in Algiers. He was certainly persuaded that he would escape the lot of his brother Louis XVIII by forestalling with energetic action a factious Opposition.

But, contrary to his hopes, the majority of the nation took sides with the deputies who were sent back to them. Their reelection was the watchword given in the month of July. The election was completed on July 19, and 53 new members were added by the will of the electors to the Opposition of 221, who had in the month of March resolutely demanded the dismissal of the Polignac Ministry. That Ministry had now in the Parliament only 100 supporters, determined but powerless. This counter-stroke exasperated the King and those around him. He was incensed, like a King of the old order, that the nation could have and express a will different from his own. Force still remained to him, and he used it. Under the pretext that the Charter by virtue of Article 14 left to the Crown the right of providing for the safety of the State by ordinances issued at his own discretion, Charles X resolved upon a special act of authority supported by this legal form. On July 25 he published three ordinances, one to dissolve this Chamber, which had been regularly elected, before it had met, the second to establish a new electoral law which would permit the monarchy to reduce to submission or to remove from the lists obstinate electors, the third to crush the Opposition press.

On July 26, 1830, the printers and journalists, eager to proclaim the sovereignty of the people against that of the Bourbons, summoned the people of Paris to armed insurrection. At the same time they invited the Chamber of Deputies, the authorised representatives of the nation, to defend their rights and those of the people. To the Ministers who, believing themselves sure of Paris, while attempting an extraordinary act of authority, had left the Government with insufficient forces, and to the King himself, who was on the point of departing for a hunting expedition at Rambouillet, this popular insurrection came as an entire surprise. To the citizen classes and many of the deputies, who were defenders of the law, but constantly mindful of the recollections of

the Terror, the sight of the people of Paris under arms brought alarm and dismay. However, by July 28 the people had succeeded in gaining the mastery over the royal troops in the Hôtel de Ville ; the next day (July 29) the insurgents, led by former officers and young men from the schools, forced the Duke of Ragusa to evacuate the Louvre, the Tuileries, and before long Paris itself. After having attempted vainly negotiations with the Court at Saint-Cloud, which, now that it was too late, threw over Polignac and the ordinances, the deputies and Peers were fain to rally to the victorious Revolution and to proclaim the downfall of the Bourbons. It was on behalf of the Charter that the people had risen. By the popular victory the Charter ceased to be an act of royal favour conceded to obedient subjects. It became a national Constitution, a sovereign guarantee of the rights of the people.

Legitimism had finally succumbed, ruined by the faults and excesses of its partisans. As for a return to the old order—religious, social, or political—France would have none of it. The obstinacy of the Royalists, who had attempted this enterprise at first by cunning methods, and afterwards boldly, had inflicted a double injury upon the Crown. In the first place, its fall resulted. But, worse still, it caused men to forget all the services which the restored monarchy had rendered to France since 1815—the rapid evacuation of a territory occupied by foreign armies, the liquidation of the cost of a long war, financial prosperity favourable to the development of industry and commerce. In short, peace with honour.

Nothing was fated to survive of this short-lived *régime* but the lasting glory of the literary and artistic achievement which testified to a real renaissance of the French genius. The honour belongs especially to Chateaubriand, whose influence and example were more potent in his writings than his political life. Though Madame de Staël, after having by her powerful imagination exercised a considerable influence upon the opinions of her day, and after having welcomed at Coppet the beginning of the reign of Romanticism, died in 1817, the author of *Le Génie du Christianisme* and of *Les Martyrs* lived on in undiminished glory, to be the guide of successive generations of writers in the new paths which both these authors in their different ways had opened, by breaking the narrow mould of classical form. The representation of nature, the expression of the deepest emotions of the soul, and the discovery of the beautiful, instead of being a convention and tradition, became the living sources of a lyrical stream which fertilised all at once the French genius.

This period saw the rise of a constellation of poets formed in the school of Chateaubriand or of foreign lyrical writers, Schiller, Byron, Manzoni. The *Méditations* of Lamartine, who, after a peaceful and happy youth, became a poet at thirty years of age owing to a short-lived passion, served in 1820 as the signal, the firstfruits of that harvest which was to prove so abundant. While Lamartine, in his

*Nouvelles Méditations* (1823), renewed his confessions of sorrow, soothed his griefs by turning them to song, and sought for consolation in a hymn of faith, *Les Harmonies* (1830), Victor Hugo, son of a general of the Empire, still a classicist and a Royalist, celebrated the monarchy in his *Odes* (1822), in which at twenty years of age he showed the force of his talents. Alfred de Vigny, an officer out of love with military glory, and almost with humanity itself, at twenty-six years old, began with his *Poèmes* (1822), followed up in 1826 by the *Poèmes antiques et modernes*, the sober and eloquent work of a solitary life consecrated to thought informed by beauty and force of expression, to the mission of a poet in human society. The greatest names of the lyrical cycle of the nineteenth century in France henceforth command the attention of the public.

Around them groups soon began to form, either at the Abbé aux Bois, in the company of Chateaubriand, Ballanche, Ampère, and their friend Madame Récamier, or at the Arsenal, where dwelt Charles Nodier, who brought back from his travels the inspiration of English and German Romanticism (1823). In these circles talents were discovered and encouraged. Sainte-Beuve appears, who drew his inspiration from the French poets of the sixteenth century before the Classical period, and made his first trial of romantic poetry with *Joseph Delorme* and the *Consolations* (1829-30); the two brothers Émile and Antony Deschamps came forward with their writings in the *Muse Française* in 1823. In this society which Stendhal (H. Beyle) frequented, publishing in 1822 his *Racine et Shakespeare*, Victor Hugo was growing up, contributing to the new literature his *Ballades* in 1826 and his *Orientales* in 1829. And towards the end of this period, in 1830, French poetry counted two recruits whose names were to increase in glory, Alfred de Musset with his *Contes d'Espagne et d'Italie*, and Théophile Gautier with his *Premières Poésies* (1830).

Apart from this lyrical awakening, the renaissance, of which Romanticism with its fervours and its fruitful throes seems to have been the dominant characteristic, made itself felt in every department of art. In the theatre the drama of the new school was inaugurated with the *Cromwell* of Hugo (1827), the prologue of which was a defiance of all rules and ancient traditions, and set the author in the front ranks of his companions in the strife. *Hernani* (February 25, 1830) was the great battle of Romanticism, following on *Cromwell*, the declaration of war. It had been preceded by skirmishes of some importance. The early works of Mérimée, the plays *Clara Gazul* (1825) and *Jacquerie* (1828), already gave examples of dramas akin in form to the classical conventions, clothed in familiar and picturesque forms drawn from actual life or from history. In 1829 Alexandre Dumas produced his first romantic play, *Henri III et sa Cour*, and was engaged upon *Antony* (1831). Vigny set himself to enter these lists with *Chatterton*.

In its turn the French novel of that period opened for itself all the paths which it was to follow further in the course of the century. First historical novels began to spring up, perhaps owing to the example of Walter Scott and the English. In the hands of great artists, this style at once counted among its achievements powerful works, the *Cinq-Mars* of Alfred de Vigny (1826), the *Chronique de Charles IX*, by Mérimée (1829), and shortly after *Notre Dame de Paris* by Hugo (1831). Moreover in *Adolphe*, by Benjamin Constant (1826) and *Le Rouge et le Noir*, by Stendhal (1831), we have profound studies, in the form of novels, of the psychology and philosophy of individuals and of history. The lyrical novel also took its rise with the first works of George Sand; and the *Comédie Humaine* of Balzac, with its powerful presentation of a complete society, is a world in itself.

History itself, in this great movement of ideas, this revolution of form, had a fresh birth owing to the efforts of great writers, who made it their task to ransack the pages of the past for new sources of life and of truth. Fired by Chateaubriand, Augustin Thierry strove to rediscover the character and the soul of vanished generations. He wrote the *Conquête de l'Angleterre par les Normands* in 1825, and in the letters upon the History of France, which he published from 1820 to 1827 in the *Courrier Français* and the *Censeur Européen*, he helped to awaken in France a passion for national history, a taste for ancient chronicles and for truth. Guizot, who was more strictly a philosopher working upon ideas, but who was also an anxious seeker after truth, told the history of the *Révolution d'Angleterre* (1827-8) in order to draw from it a lesson based upon the documents; and as one of his lecture courses he prepared the *Histoire de la Civilisation en Europe*. Villemain, a successor to Madame de Staël, proclaimed, though in an incomplete and superficial fashion, a new method of literary history. Last, Jules Michelet, like Quinet, who was also engaged from 1827 with the philosophy of history in his *Commentaires sur Herder*, took up the *Scienza Nuova* discovered by Vico to devote himself to it entirely. Appointed professor immediately after the close of his student years, inspired by Chateaubriand, learned moreover, and a child of the people, in his *History of France* he united the conditions of a great work, which are rarely found combined to so high a degree—science and poetry. The work did not see the light till “the brilliant morning of July, 1830.” But it was in this fruitful period of the Restoration that the author found his inspiration and the resources of his genius.

This period can in no sense be measured by the political struggles, the intrigues of Court or of Cabinet, the dark plottings of the priest-party or the conspiracies of the Republicans. What we must look to is the intense vitality which grew up in the whole sphere of the intellect. Through the orators and polemists it penetrates and in some sort expands the domain of politics. The resplendent eloquence of Royer-

Collard, Camille Jordan, Benjamin Constant, General Foy, de Serre, and Chateaubriand, was not always understood by their party, but was always listened to. The youth of France thronged to the Sorbonne, round Guizot, Villemain, Cousin, and Jouffroy. Perhaps theirs was not, strictly speaking, instruction. But in fact, by the sincerity and the talent of the masters, by the eagerness and the intellect of the pupils, instruction it was. In the thick of the party strife, where pamphlets had their birth, those of Paul-Louis Courier and of Lamennais appeared in sudden glory, destined long to survive the struggle which gave them birth. Extraordinary talent was shown in journalism, and in journalistic criticism; and the brilliant writers of the *Globe* deserve especial mention.

Lastly, life itself, quickened by this fever of growth, gave back to the artists in their turn their perception of life. The painters of the "flamboyant" school, in place of the neutral tones which the school of David had too long imposed upon them, called for emotion and movement. Géricault gave the signal in 1814, and still more in 1819 with his *Raft of the Medusa*. Delacroix, a great genius who combined with inspiration a severe artistic conscience, startled men with his *Dante's Bark* (1822), and carried them away with the *Massacres of Scio* (1824). Eugène Deveria in 1827 was spreading upon his canvas the colours of his *Birth of Henry IV*. Ingres alone stood firm against them, taking his stand upon draughtsmanship, proving by his portraits of what value it was to preserve the ancient methods. And in sculptors such as Rude and David d'Angers, and in musicians such as Auber and Rossini, who recreated opera in 1828 and 1829, the same victorious effort to realise the national dream of glory and of liberty can be recognised.

## CHAPTER IV.

### ITALY.

ITALY had been the most distinguished victim of the ruling principles of the Congress of Vienna, and of the emulous desires of its members. Austria came forth from the Congress the actual ruler of the Peninsula, as mistress of the rich provinces of Lombardy and Venetia, and immensely superior in armed forces to the minor Italian States which she confronted. Hence the policy of the latter was controlled by fear, the most efficient of guardians. Now that the right of might had been vindicated and that satisfaction had been given to the paltry ambitions of the ruling families, restored to hereditary thrones by the logic of legitimist theory, it seemed as though Italy must perforce live at peace, submissive to her rulers, relapsing into the sleepy indifference in which she had lain for centuries past. But certain bodies may be compressed, though not crushed; indeed, from their compression they derive a new strength, an elastic force, which increases their energy. Equality before the law, liberty of conscience, freedom of speech and of the press, free access to all posts, and above all the right to national self-government—these were not passing phantoms called up by the Revolution, and its short-lived passage over Italian soil had not been without effect. It was a fatal error to ignore, or to feign to ignore, the fact that the people was no longer a confused and passive crowd, but rather an organic body with aspirations and desires which would soon become demands. Contempt for the people was no longer a part of the accepted order of things; it had become an insult, and like every other insult, it produced reaction and rebellion. Hence, about thirty years after the Treaties of Vienna there set in a period of reform which was in direct opposition to the leading principles of those treaties. This period closed with the risings of 1848 and 1849, which in their turn constituted an open and systematic attack upon Austria, the authority to which the Congress had placed Italy in practical subjection.

Let us now proceed to examine the causes which, during this time of despotic rule exercised or inspired by Austria, helped to bring about so radical a change and to train minds for those brave deeds which

altered the course of Italian history. What was it that, from 1815 to 1846, kept alive the sparks of patriotism, which afterwards burst into so marvellous a flame? In the sphere of action the period of reform was heralded by conspiracies, and in the field of thought by a general intellectual movement, which affected philosophy, literature, and art.

Prince Metternich, convinced that every point yielded to the demands of the Liberal party would necessitate further concessions, had adopted in Italy a policy of unqualified absolutism. He declared that such concessions would lead, in the first place, to the union of Italy as a single republican State, and, in the second, to fierce discord between the heterogeneous parties into which this State must split, in consequence of the diversity of its inhabitants. In order to escape this danger he determined, from the outset, to destroy in the Italian people the very germs of civil life, and to stamp out even the desire for self-government. The means for the execution of this purpose were ready to his hand in the provinces subject to Austria. For the other States, he had provided in Modena and in Tuscany Austrian Archdukes, in Parma an Austrian Archduchess, and had promised to them and to the other rulers of the Peninsula Austrian aid at the first sign of a revolutionary outbreak. Under this yoke life in Italy was always hard, and at times intolerable.

The letters-patent of April 7, 1815, placed a Viceroy at the head of the new kingdom of Lombardy and Venetia; but, in order to facilitate administration, it divided this kingdom into two States, separated by the Mincio—the Milanese on its right, and the Venetian on its left. Each State was ruled by a Governor, one having his headquarters in Milan, the other in Venice, both being in due dependence on the Aulic Council. Thus the new kingdom was one in name only, and its territories were, in fact, two provinces, subject to Vienna. All its business was transacted in the distant capital; naturally there were many delays; and this, added to Austrian ignorance of Italian affairs, counteracted all the advantages which might have accrued to this kingdom from connexion with an important State. The taxes were exceptionally heavy. The kingdom of Lombardy and Venetia, of which the population formed one-eighth and the territory one-eighteenth of the Austrian Empire, was forced to contribute one-fourth of the state taxes; and every year, after meeting the local expenditure, Lombardy forwarded thirty-four, and Venetia twenty-three, millions of *lire* to Vienna. In 1817 Metternich complained to the Emperor: “There is little of the industrial spirit in the kingdom of Lombardy and Venetia; in spite of the increased demands for consumption, Italy receives from foreign countries the greater part of the necessities of every-day life.” But the system of taxation was designed to repress, in the interests of Austrian manufactures, every attempt at improvement of home industries. Thus, even in the matter of trade, this province, destined to so brilliant a future and so full of latent force, was treated as a conquered territory.

To education Austria devoted a zeal unknown in the rest of Italy. In 1846, out of 2247 townships, there were only fifty which had no elementary school for boys. Secondary schools were established in the chief towns of each district. But political manipulation prevented this praiseworthy and generous system from bearing good fruit. Francis I had once said, "I require obedient subjects, not enlightened citizens." And Cantù tells us that, in accordance with this maxim, the schools were content to promote mediocrity and to discourage superior talent. Mazzini may perhaps exaggerate when, in the *Apostolato popolare*, he declares that the catechism used in the elementary schools taught that "subjects should conduct themselves towards their sovereign as faithful slaves towards their master." Nevertheless, it is certain that an attempt was made to destroy all patriotic feeling in the minds of children; and we can still read in the geographical text-books used at that time the dogmatic assertion that Lombardy and Venetia form geographically a part of Austria. The university chairs were filled from Vienna; these posts were won by competition, in which the fittest took no part and novices and charlatans prevailed. However, in the faculties of mathematics and of medicine there were brilliant minds, who triumphed over scorn and neglect.

The rigour of censorship was extreme. The chief censorial tribunal was at Vienna, on which were dependent provincial inspectors with very limited powers. To Vienna, therefore, the manuscripts of many original works and of all modern histories were transmitted. The action of the censors was petty and vexatious; they even corrected Dante; Filangieri's *Scienza della Legislazione* was prohibited and mutilated; the tragedies of Alfieri were condemned. There were no political newspapers, with the exception of the privileged Gazettes of Milan and of Venice, which were composed in the government offices. The police system, which cost five millions, was a vast and complicated network from which nothing escaped; on the slightest suspicion it made or unmade a man; no appointment was ratified, no favour was granted, without recourse to the reports of unworthy agents or officious spies. The impediments arising from centralisation, the pedantic arrogance, and the aggressive interference of the officials, were galling to the citizens, who had not forgotten the promptness, the generosity, and the adaptability characteristic of the French rule. Hence Metternich, in one of his reports to the Emperor, was obliged to utter this frank warning: "Your Majesty is aware that the delay in the conduct of business, our supposed wish to Germanise entirely the Italian provinces, the composition of the tribunals, the daily nomination of Austrians for the posts of magistrate and other public offices, are causes of constant irritation which counteracts all the advantages accruing from our government, as compared with that of the other Italian States."

Fate was less cruel to the reconstituted duchy of Parma, which

bordered upon Lombardy. Its new ruler, the Archduchess Marie-Louise, was amiable and well-disposed. Under her government, Parma saw her impaired finances restored, magnificent buildings erected, a new and wider system of education established, justice strengthened and purified. But, either from filial affection, or from motives of self-interest, she submitted to the will of Austria. She was, moreover, indolent and dissolute, allowing herself to be swayed by the Austrian envoys. And although Count von Neipperg, who was first her lover and afterwards her husband, exercised a healthy influence on her conduct of affairs, his successor, Baron Werklein, "a man of small intelligence, solely devoted to amassing wealth," soon counteracted the good results of the first peaceful years. Thus even the people of Parma came to suffer from the tyranny of an intriguing police, from the insatiable greed of public officials, and from the ignorance and arbitrary rule of bigotry.

The inhabitants of Modena from the beginning were less fortunate. Their ruler, Francis IV, was a Cesare Borgia, without the distinction, the courage, and the will-power of that unscrupulous politician. Francis had a certain amount of intellect combined with boundless ambition and a proud and cruel disposition, and he defined authority as despotism. From the time of his accession he showed himself for what he was; he granted marked privileges to the nobility and clergy, the traditional supports of the throne according to legitimist theory, and he revoked all laws and ordinances subsequent to 1791. Throughout his reign he ruthlessly plundered his subjects, spent large sums on convents, entrusted to the Jesuits the education of the young, enrolled himself as a champion of intolerance, persecuting the Jews whom he virtually deprived of citizenship, and reduced the independence of the magistrates to a mockery. Acts of liberality, which sprang from his natural love of display, for example, the institution of the *Monti-farina*, which sold corn to the poor at a reduced price, arrangements for the care and protection of idiots and of the deaf and dumb, and his patronage of literature and the exact sciences, were set off by the use which he made of the eight millions of lire annually extorted from his subjects. A great part of this went to swell his ample private fortune; the rest served to maintain the police, the system of spies, and the prisons. Hence it is not surprising that so early as 1817 the Austrian Commissioner at Rovigo, in his report to Vienna on the state of Modena, should speak of "extreme discontent," and should state that "a dangerously large number of the inhabitants wished to revert to the former régime."

In Tuscany the Government was that of benevolent despotism. In accordance with the mild traditions of this province, the House of Lorraine endeavoured to maintain its position by an easy-going policy, which was soothing rather than irritating, insidious rather than oppressive. It tried to divert from dangerous channels the strong current of intellectual force, and to employ it in schemes for material welfare. Hence

mediocrity reigned supreme; and Gino Capponi complained of "the profound melancholy of the mind condemned to inaction and constraint." The keen-eyed, sharp-tongued people, who prided themselves on being no man's dupes, lashed their patriarchal despotism with light and cutting derision which defied all attempts to suppress it. A large class of officials, ignorant, idle, arrogant, and vexatious, made themselves felt in every act of common life. They were called the *sedicini*, as if the receipt of their wages on the sixteenth of the month was their most important function. The army was as inefficient as the bureaucracy; few in numbers, without discipline, self-respect, or warlike spirit, the soldiers were commonly known amongst themselves by the significant nick-name of "mice." Count Vittorio Fossonbroni, the Premier, was a faithful representative of the spirit of the Government: an acute intelligence, a profound sceptic, whom studied indolence had rendered incapable of any effort in thought or action. His sole aim was a long, easy, and cheerful life. When his office hours were over he laid aside all care for business, saying with a smile, "To-morrow, to-morrow! dinner will spoil, the State can wait."

In Piedmont, which had remained faithful to its ancient dynasty, it must be admitted that the return of the exiled Princes was greeted with sincere and general enthusiasm. On May 20, 1814, after a period of French rule, Turin saw once more the members of its royal House. Massimo d'Azeglio, then in his sixteenth year, was in the ranks of the civil guard drawn up to receive them. In his *Ricordi* he gives the following description of this return so long and universally desired: "I was on guard in the Piazza Castello, and I can distinctly recall the appearance of the King and his staff. Their dress was old-fashioned, almost grotesque; for they wore powder, pig-tails, and hats dating from the time of Frederick II; but to me, and to all present, they seemed both beautifully and correctly attired; prolonged and resounding acclamations assured the good Prince beyond doubt of the affection and sympathy of his most loyal subjects of Turin." But discontent followed closely on the heels of this short-lived joy. On entering the city, Victor Emanuel declared that he felt as though he had been asleep for fifteen years; and he certainly began to treat his subjects as though he had awakened from prolonged slumber. His famous edict of May 21 ran as follows: "Setting aside all other laws, henceforward our subjects shall obey the Royal Constitutions of 1770, together with the statutes made by our Royal Predecessors before June 23, 1800." This edict ignored the hard-won reforms of recent times and reestablished a medieval system of privileges and disabilities, of restriction and repression. The people were divided into "pure" and "impure," the former being those who had refused to accept honours or posts from the French. These alone were selected for appointments; and as they were of a low stamp, the Ministry, the law-courts, the army, and the offices, were filled with

mediocre and ignorant men, all inexperienced, and many of them dishonest. The latter, *i.e.* the “impure,” though not subjected to actual measures of revenge—for this would have been contrary to the benevolent nature of their sovereign—suffered, so Cesare Balbo tells us, every moral and intellectual indignity short of persecution and physical torture. Nevertheless, amid the disillusionments of the Restoration, the Piedmontese remained loyal to the ancient House of Savoy. But the educated classes in particular did not hesitate to show their scornful impatience of a Court which wavered between the influence of a retrograde aristocracy and of a bigoted, zealous, and aggressive clergy. This should have warned the rulers that, though they themselves might have slumbered, their subjects had remained awake and had made progress.

But the worst Governments in Italy were those of the Papal States and the kingdom of Naples. Even writers who were not ill-disposed to the Holy See recognised that its administration was more harmful in its results and more oppressive than that of Austria. Austria had set up a despotic rule, rigid and harsh to the point of cruelty, but regulated by fixed laws and supported by a system of finance which was not intolerable to the prosperous inhabitants of Lombardy and Venetia. The Church, on the other hand, had restored a Government far more despotic, and rendered more destructive and oppressive by its internal confusion—a blind, changeable, and capricious Government, whose rapacity worked by means of an arbitrary system of taxes, too onerous for its needy subjects. Vannucci declares that from 1818 to 1848 there was no justice in Rome; the judges were corrupt, there was no personal safety. A Bishop’s tipstaff had the power to arrest; three forces of police spied upon the subjects; there were eighty thousand barbarous and conflicting laws in operation; and the administration was a chaos of heterogeneous institutions. D’Azeglio’s *Ricordi* give a living picture of Rome as it was then, a complex of fraud, favouritism, and cowardice. The author blushed in the presence of his foreign friends to think that he was an Italian. The Restoration had strengthened the Holy Office, extended the ecclesiastical exemptions, reestablished entails, and revived the tortures of the mallet and the horse. In short, the condition of the people had become such as to occasion the remarkable prediction of Marquis Crosa, the Sardinian envoy, to Count Solaro della Margherita: “It is only reasonable to suppose that, if the present state of things continues in Rome, some fundamental crisis will take place; the most probable issue is that the great city will become merely an ecclesiastical capital, retaining only the shadow of her temporal power.”

Ferdinand IV had reascended the throne of Naples with false professions in his mouth. The declaration of May, 1815, had proclaimed individual and civil freedom, security of property, access for all alike to all posts, and judicial independence. But at the same time Ferdinand, in whom failure to respect the most solemn oaths was a fixed

habit, was negotiating with the Emperor of Austria for a treaty of alliance which should contain the following secret clause : " Since the engagements for the internal peace of Italy, on which their Majesties enter by this treaty, bind them to preserve their respective States and subjects from reaction and from the risk of hasty innovations, which would conduce to fresh disturbances, it is agreed between the two High contracting parties that His Majesty the King of the Two Sicilies, in restoring the Government of his kingdom, will not admit any change that is not in accordance with the ancient institutions of the monarchy and with the principles adopted by His Imperial Majesty and Royal Highness for the internal administration of his Italian Provinces." Thus the principles of Austrian government were established in the kingdom of Naples. The instrument chosen to enforce them was the Prince of Canosa, formerly agent of Queen Caroline, chief of the *Sanfedisti*, a patron of brigands, and a bitter enemy of all progress and of Liberal ideas. Even at that time some of the important offices in the State were filled by able and cultivated men. To such, for example, were due the new codes, which in parts show a profound skill in the science of legislation. But what was the advantage of sound laws ? The corruption of almost all those chosen to enforce them was such as to disgust the foreign envoys accredited to the Neapolitan Court. The *canorristi* and the brigands were protected by, and in turn protected, those whose duty it was to suppress them ; the judgments of the magistrates were conditioned, on the one hand, by fear of the executive, and, on the other, by the lavish bribery of the interested parties. In short, administrative life on every side presented those signs of decadence, corruption, and baseness which led William Gladstone, a generation later, in his crushing attack on the Bourbons of Naples, to speak of their Government as the " negation of God."

In face of this determined and powerful organisation of despotism, what could the Italians do ? What means had they to make their protests heard, what platform to proclaim their wrongs, what tribunal to vindicate their rights ? Every lawful way was closed to them ; all public demonstrations were prohibited ; conspiracy was the only weapon of the governed against their governors. The use of this weapon has been severely censured ; some have laid stress on its intrinsic immorality ; others have thrown doubts upon its efficacy. Already Ugo Foscolo had declared that to restore Italy the " sects," or secret societies, must be destroyed. But in what other field, in what other form, could the patriots of that day manifest the love which they bore to Italy ? The Italian conspiracies and insurrections are to be considered, not as isolated events, but as incidents in a general movement. Viewed in this light, as confused and obscure embodiments of the ideals which later took a more legitimate and definite form, as explosions of indignation leading to reprisals, which again awakened noble wrath and fresh

magnanimous revolts, it is not possible to deny their value; they must be regarded as an indispensable preliminary of the painful labour of a nation's redemption.

The Italians have ever been, and perhaps are still, a people singularly prone to faction. The mystery and the surprises of conspiracy attract their fervid imagination and satisfy their mute rebellious instinct, resulting from long years of servitude which, even at the present day, renders all exercise of authority difficult among a people that is by nature kindly, industrious, and generous. Towards the close of the Napoleonic era, when the decline of the military glory which had dazzled the multitude revived the desire and the hope for liberty, numerous secret societies were already scattered in different parts of the Peninsula. Thus, even before the fall of Napoleon, in Bologna the *Raggi*, in Mantua the *Centri*, the *Anti-Eugeniani* in Milan, the *Massoneria* in Upper Italy, the *Carbonari* in Naples, were developing their subterraneous and intricate existence. These societies fostered diverse aspirations, but all were united in opposition to the constituted authorities dependent on the French. Later, when by the decrees of the Congress of Vienna the Italians had been excluded from all prospects of free government, these societies multiplied, and their activity became more intense and more audacious. By reason of their essential secrecy their history is obscure, if not impenetrable; and it is impossible to give a correct account of their number, their acts, and their power. We find trustworthy information concerning them in the important collection of the *Secret Papers of the Austrian Police*, taken from the Venetian archives, and published by Daniel Manin. From these we learn that national independence was the common aim of all these societies; but it is also clear that their action was not coordinated, and that they had no clear or identical vision of the future beyond the attainment of this end. From the same papers it is clear that the "sects" possessed numerous adherents; for instance, from the report of a Bourbon general we learn that, in the city of Lecce alone, the *Adelfi* and similar societies could reckon forty thousand members, the majority of whom were armed.

The most widely-spread and influential was that of the *Carboneria*, which had its headquarters in the kingdom of Naples. Colletta defines it as "a vast society of landowners, who desired peace and improved conditions." It was already flourishing in the time of King Joachim, who was forced to take measures against it; but after the restoration of the Bourbons it extended its action and increased its power. Many of the prosperous middle-class belonged to it; but the majority of its members were soldiers who hoped for advancement, provincials, lawyers in search of employment, and finally, those who, by reason of their political views or of the positions which they had occupied during the French *régime*, were opposed to or mistrusted the Government of the

Restoration. At Naples its leaders were waiting till an accident should set in motion the accumulated force of silent indignation and suppressed discontent. The signal was given in July, 1820, when men's minds had been unusually stirred by means of the success of the Spanish Revolution.

On July 2, two sub-lieutenants, Morelli and Salvati, followed by a force of 127 horsemen, left their quarters at Nola and set out for Avellino crying, "Long live God, the King, and the Constitution," and flying the tricolour banner of the *Carbonari*, black, red, and blue. At Avellino they were joined by others, and, inducing the Governor to join them, they started for the capital. They were few in number; it was but a small *pronunciamiento* on the part of the army and of the revolutionary societies, which could easily have been suppressed by the forces controlled by the Government. But the Ministers were weak and undecided; and the Bourbon King, like most of the later representatives of his House in Naples, was a coward. When the news reached him, he was in the Bay, having embarked on a luxurious yacht to meet his son, the Duke of Calabria, who was coming from Sicily. On hearing the unexpected news, he was seized with an agony of terror; declared that he would fly to Sicily, or remain at sea, and was with difficulty persuaded to land. Meanwhile, profiting by the delay caused by the timidity and uncertainty of the authorities, the band of rebels increased in number and opened communications with other centres of rebellion. In the night of July 4–5 the *Carbonaro* general, Guglielmo Pepe, knowing that he was suspected, escaped from Naples, stirred up the people to riots, and placed himself at the head of the rebels. The King summoned his Ministers and asked their advice. Terror-stricken and incapable, they all thought it best to yield and appear to support a movement which they were not in a position to check. Very early on the morning of the 6th, five *Carbonari* arrived at Court, and, in the name of the people, whom they represented as being all in arms, imposed upon their sovereign a Constitution, the Spanish Constitution of 1812 (described in a later chapter), which was popular and ready to hand. The Duke of Ascoli intimated the King's assent; and when the good people of Naples rose from their beds they learnt that their Government was changed, that constitutional rule had been substituted for absolutism. Many were under the delusion that this was the beginning of a new era; and the patriotic poet, Gabriele Rossetti, intoxicated with joy, saluted the dawn of Parthenopean liberty with a hymn which soon was on the lips of all: "Thou art fair with the stars in thy locks, sparkling like living sapphires, and sweet is thy breath, thou crimson herald of the dawn. From the neighbouring height with a smile of rapturous longing thou dost proclaim that in the balmy garden of Italy servitude is at an end."

But, in their dreams of hope fulfilled, these patriots forgot the

jealous vigilance of Austria and the innate treachery of Ferdinand. From the outset, the new order was weakened and discredited by internal agitation, by the domination of the victorious *Carboneria*, by the childish extravagance of the Liberals, who were devoid of experience and intoxicated with rhetoric. Nevertheless, it is possible that the Constitution would have stood firm and gained in strength if the skill and power of Austria, that watchful sentinel, had not at once been employed for its destruction. So early as July 25 Prince Metternich had sent a circular to the German Courts to inform them that Austria could not tolerate the Revolution of Naples, and that, if need arose, she would send an army to suppress it. Before attempting this intervention she needed the consent of the other Great Powers; at the Conference of Troppau Metternich set himself to obtain a free hand for Austria, that she might be at liberty to stifle throughout the Peninsula such ideas and movements as might result in the triumph of independence. As for Ferdinand, who, shortly before, at the opening of Parliament, together with the princes, had sworn on the Gospels to respect the Constitution, he had lost no time in secretly informing the sovereigns assembled at Troppau of his intention "to leave his kingdom and to resume absolute power with the help of the Austrian army." Accordingly, in the following November, he received an invitation to Laibach to discuss in Congress the political affairs of his kingdom. The Parliament was unwilling to allow him to go; but he addressed to the Chamber an elaborate epistle, a signal monument of falsehood and treachery, declaring that he wished to go to Laibach solely "in order to act as peacemaker for the common good, and to obtain the sanction of the Powers for the newly-acquired liberties"; and he added, with formal solemnity, "I declare to you, and to my nation, that I will do everything to leave my people in the possession of a wise and free Constitution." His Parliament, deceived by this declaration, permitted him to cross the borders. He proceeded to Laibach and denounced the Constitution to those who dreaded the dissemination of Liberal ideas as much as, or more than, himself. It was not difficult to come to an understanding. The Congress, which maintained that it was its right and its duty to concern itself with the peace of Europe, and that the condition of the kingdom of the Two Sicilies was dangerous for the Powers, agreed that an Austrian army should be sent to restore order in Naples.

The Neapolitan Parliament did not hesitate to declare war. General Pepe was eager for it; the best of Ferdinand's subjects desired it, believing, with patriotic credulity, that their King had been constrained by the Powers at Laibach; the *Carbonari* clamoured for it; and war was proclaimed—not by a valorous resolution of the people, nor, as Colletta says, from a desire for glory, but in lightness of heart. Pepe placed himself at the head of the army, which was not inferior in numbers to

that of Austria ; and the troops met on March 7, 1821, near Rieti. The untrained, undisciplined soldiers had no confidence in their own power to resist the shock of the enemy, and broke before the battle had well begun. This defeat at a blow changed the position of affairs. Humble and inglorious submission followed in all parts ; in the Parliament, which had but yesterday shown itself so proud and inflexible, only twenty-six deputies had the courage to vote for a protest drawn up in emphatic and haughty terms by Giuseppe Poerio. On March 23 the Austrian army entered Naples to restore absolute government ; shortly afterwards Ferdinand returned, having broken his journey at Florence to place, in expiation of his treachery, a votive lamp in the Church of the Annunciation. Such was the inglorious end of the Neapolitan Revolution. But the flame of patriotism, once kindled, was not yet extinguished, whatever might be the illusions of the easy victors of the day. And these worked with blind obstinacy to keep it alight by inaugurating a period of violence, persecution, and cruelty.

Whilst, between the treacherous intrigues of the Bourbons on the one hand and the imprudence of the rebels on the other, the breath of liberty, which had passed over the fair Parthenopean soil, was dying away, there broke out a second revolution in the extreme north of Italy, in Piedmont. Even here the *Carbonari* had many adherents, especially in the ranks of the army. Moreover, other secret societies had sprung up, drawing their recruits from among the better classes of the population. All these societies, whether their programme was more or less audacious, united in one common aim expressed in the cry for the expulsion of the Austrians from Italy and for a Constitution. The good and gentle disposition of Victor Emanuel had led people to hope that when the movement was declared he would end by joining it, especially as it was controlled by men of rank and birth in whom he could trust. Such were Count Carlo di San Marzano, his *aide-de-camp*, Giacinto di Collegno, commander of the artillery, Guglielmo Moffa di Lisio, Colonel Regis, the Prince della Cisterna, Santorre di Santarosa, the Marquis of Priè, and others, who were in favour at Court or held important posts in the Government. In this circle of leaders and amongst all those eager for change the news of the Neapolitan Revolution produced the utmost excitement. On July 29, 1820, Sylvain Costa de Beauregard wrote : "We stand on the brink of a precipice; innumerable placards demand a Constitution similar to that of the Spanish Cortes. The King is assailed by anonymous memorials demanding a Constitution. .... Words fail to describe the universal conditions of feverish excitement. The events in Naples have completely turned our heads." The conspirators had planned a rising for the moment when the Austrian army should be occupied with the Neapolitan revolutionaries. No serious preparations were made, but there was abundant enthusiasm. Much was hoped from Prince Carlo Alberto di Carignano, the heir-

apparent to the throne, whom the conspirators believed to be their leader, and whose action, in their opinion, would carry the army with him, and with the army the King.

Concerning this Prince, who, although at the time he did not respond to the prayers of the revolutionists, afterwards sacrificed himself in order to keep faith with them, there has raged the fiercest controversy. On the one hand, his behaviour in this conjuncture was the occasion for charges, which found a popular echo in Berchet's poem, "Carignano, thy name is held accursed by every nation"; on the other, it found supporters and admirers, who even went the length of asserting "that his action in 1821 was the boldest and most courageous of all his political life." His was a strange character, full of seeming contradictions, which led Carducci, in a celebrated poem, to call him "the Italian Hamlet." But the contradictions were only apparent. It was his conduct in 1821 and 1833 that provided his enemies with an opportunity of attacking the memory of one who bestowed on Italy that generous gift, the *Statuto*. It is said that in 1821 he betrayed his friends, after promising to help them in the movement; that in 1833 he persecuted the Liberals, condemning some to exile and others to death. But, after many years of discussion, the exact nature of his promise still remains in doubt; we do not know whether it was a desire which the revolutionaries interpreted as an intention or an intention which the force of circumstances transformed into an unsatisfied desire.

It is certain that, by education, inclination, friendship, and habits of thought, he was in sympathy with the ideals of Balbo, San Marzano, and Collegno; but it is also certain that to their first advances he made the following unequivocal reply, "My conduct will always be determined by my duty and my loyalty to the person of the King." It was this conception of his duty towards his sovereign and the traditions of his House, which deterred him from taking too active a share in the development of the rising; and his prudence, which some called weakness, served him in good stead at this juncture, seeing that the movement, which had originated in a desire for reform, had exceeded the limits intended by those who had been its chief promoters, and that it would have involved him in a rebellious faction, and cut short a career advantageous to his country.

With regard to his severity towards the rebels in 1833, it was excessive and therefore reprehensible; but his critics should remember that this was at the beginning of his reign, when he was, on the one hand, exposed to the suspicions of Austria, who would assuredly have removed any Italian prince who showed Liberal tendencies, and on the other, firmly convinced that these revolutionary outbreaks would end by weakening the prestige of a dynasty and of an army which he foresaw would be called to accomplish a task of national importance. It is indisputable that, throughout his life, he was ruled by one clear

and dominant passion, namely, hatred of Austria; and this feeling, given the conditions of Italy, was patriotic, and justifiable. His political career began and ended with the expression of this sentiment; —first, when, as a young boy on reading the famous proclamation of Schwarzenberg he exclaimed, “To avenge this shame we must drive the Austrians from Italy”; and, lastly, after Novara (1849), on his way to voluntary exile, when “pale with the pallor of death and of hope,” at Nice he declared to the son of Santorre di Santarosa, “If, at any time, at any place, a constituted Government should raise a force against Austria, the Austrians may be sure of finding me, a simple soldier, in the ranks of her enemies.” This hatred of Austria, and the conviction that, to be efficacious, it must be shown in valorous and warlike action, formed the sole article of his faith, and the programme of his career as a king: a faith which was only to end in the gloomy silence of Oporto with his life; a programme which he bequeathed in the agony of defeat, unfulfilled but not abandoned, to the more fortunate hands of his young son.

The insurrection in Piedmont advanced up to a certain point with the cry of “Long live the King.” On March 10, 1821, before the news of the defeat of Rieti, which had occurred on the 7th, the garrison of Alessandria hoisted the tricolour flag, and demanded the Spanish Constitution and war against Austria, who held the King in her bondage. The conflagration quickly spread; on the 12th the garrison of Turin followed the example of Alessandria. The authorities, undecided and timorous, raised no opposition; nor did Victor Emanuel follow the advice of those few who counselled him to place himself at the head of the loyal troops and to quell the bold attempt with one decisive blow. On the one hand, he was unwilling to break the promises which he had made to Austria, whose decision to maintain absolutism in Italy had been recently reported to him by San Marzano on his return from Laibach; on the other, he could not bring himself to shed the blood of his subjects in fratricidal warfare. He therefore decided to abdicate in favour of his brother, Carlo Felice; and, since the latter happened to be then at Modena, he entrusted the Regency to the Prince of Carignano, who, surrounded by rebels who demanded a Constitution, struggled hard and long, but finally yielded. He writes: “I told them that it was not in my power to make any change in the fundamental laws of the State, which must await the decrees of the new King; that anything I might do would be null and void; but that, in order to prevent a massacre and the disorders with which we were threatened, I would allow them to proclaim the Spanish Constitution, pending the command of their sovereign.” So it came to pass; and the announcement of this concession was proclaimed from the balcony of the royal palace to the assembled crowd. That night the inhabitants of Turin seemed mad with joy. But their exultation did

not last; for, within five days, a decree of Carlo Felice arrived from Modena whereby he annulled the steps taken without his consent, and commanded Carlo Alberto to leave Turin immediately. The latter, obliged to pursue one of two courses, to desert the insurgents, or to declare himself a rebel against the King, the head of his House, chose the former, and obeyed. His unexpected departure threw confusion among the rebels, despite the heroic and judicious firmness displayed by Santarosa: and the party of absolutism, encouraged by the approval of its sovereign, gained vigour and courage. The battlefield of Novara saw the fratricidal strife which Victor Emanuel had feared; soldiers of Piedmont under General de La Tour attacked other soldiers of Piedmont commanded by Colonel Regis; the former, with the assistance of a body of Austrian troops which had crossed the Ticino, had no difficulty in compelling the latter to retreat.

Thus faded the vision of liberty, which had passed, like the phantom of a dream, over the lands of Piedmont. The greater part of the fugitives hastened to Genoa, and sought safety at sea, hoping to reach Spain, where the Revolution was still successful. There the young Mazzini saw them, "poverty-stricken, of warlike aspect, their faces lined with profound and poignant grief." One of them went up to the mother of the future conspirator, and held out his hand, with the words, "For the exiles of Italy!" The lady, with streaming eyes, pressed some money into his palm. "For the first time on that day," writes Mazzini, "there was vaguely presented to my mind, I will not say the thought of country and of liberty, but the thought that it was possible, and therefore a duty, to fight for the freedom of one's country."

In the remaining districts of Italy, during the years 1820 and 1821, although there were no actual revolutionary outbreaks, there were frequent conspiracies which alarmed the Governments. Especially in the provinces of Lombardy and Venetia the police found many traces of conspiracy; and these untoward discoveries, which they purposely exaggerated, produced fresh tortures and fresh victims. Among the latter the most distinguished was Count Federico Confalonieri. There is no doubt that he was at the head of the Liberals in Lombardy, and that he was in correspondence with the party of action in Piedmont; but, in spite of the acute and painstaking researches of d'Ancona, we do not know to what extent he was actually committed, or how far he had carried the organisation of the Liberals. It is certain that his condemnation, together with that of others, was the result of a deliberate intention to provide criminals, rather than the legitimate issue of a well-founded accusation. Confalonieri was not arrested until December 13, 1821, when the revolution in Piedmont had subsided, and the calm of terror was everywhere restored. He had no keen sense of guilt towards Austria, and watched with indifference the threatening clouds of suspicion as they gathered around him. On the evening before

his arrest, the wife of General Bubna, who was on intimate terms with the Countess, went to his house, with the intention of conveying him in her own carriage to the frontier. And, a few days before, General Bubna himself, on meeting him in Milan, had said significantly, "My dear Count, I dreamt that you were in Switzerland." But both hint and invitation were unheeded by him, for he was unwilling to leave his beloved wife, and perhaps imagined that he would have no difficulty in proving his innocence. His trial consisted in a prolonged, subtle, and laborious attempt on the part of the public prosecutor, Salvotti, to build up the specious proof of a crime of high treason. Prince Metternich encouraged the legal ardour of his Milanese officials with the following words: "It is of the utmost importance that this leader of the Liberal party should never at any time reappear on the scenes as a victim of arbitrary power." And, in obedience to those general instructions, false charges were invented, suspicions were treated as proofs, and the silence of pretended accomplices was regarded as hostile evidence. In short, everything was done to give an appearance of justice to the death sentence of Confalonieri. The sequel to this trial was heartrending.

His wife, the generous and beautiful Teresa Casati, addressed a petition to the Emperor; she herself, her brother, and her father-in-law, proceeded to Vienna in order to sue for mercy; and, undaunted by the first refusal, with tears, prayers, and, above all, with the sympathetic help of Maria Teresa, she obtained a commutation of the sentence of capital punishment in favour of imprisonment for life.

The Count was to be sent to Spielberg. But, on his way thither, he was to have one more experience of the perfidious methods and the uneasy suspicions of Austria. Whilst passing through Vienna on his melancholy journey to the fateful castle, he noticed a sudden change in the cruel treatment to which he had hitherto been subjected. Every consideration was shown him; he enjoyed comforts which were almost luxuries, and which formed a striking contrast to the fetters which he had worn until the previous day. These were the blandishments of the astute rulers of Austria, who hoped by these means to obtain from him revelations, and above all to learn what had passed between the conspirators in Lombardy and Carlo Alberto. One evening during his sojourn in this city the door of his chamber was thrown open and there appeared the figure of Prince Metternich, whom he had known in Paris at the time of the wedding of Marie-Louise. The wily Minister made use of all his arts, drawing dazzling pictures of freedom and advancement in order to induce the prisoner to speak. But the latter held firm, and with high-bred courtesy evaded the attacks of his skilled antagonist. After the conversation had lasted for some time the two parted with the formal politeness of men of the world, the one to go to a ball at which he was expected, the other to a dungeon, from which he foresaw that he would never be released.

Confalonieri was imprisoned in the grim Moravian castle together with Gaetano Castillia, Giorgio Pallavicino, Pietro Borsieri, and others convicted of the same offence.

The repressive measures adopted by the Governments subsequent to the risings of 1820 and 1821, although terribly severe in some districts, as, for instance, in the Milanese which had a melancholy preeminence, nevertheless failed to extinguish the fires of rebellion which smouldered beneath the peaceful and picturesque aspect of the Peninsula; indeed, in many cases they fanned and fed them. Here and there they were manifested in the form of risings which awakened the fears of the police, who avenged themselves by excessive and unjustifiable severity. In 1828, for instance, the inhabitants of Cilento in the province of Salerno, weary of the oppression of Ferdinand's successor, the dissolute and bigoted Francis I, took up arms and broke into rebellion. Colonel Guglielmo del Carretto was sent by the King to repress the rising. As a reward for the unexampled cruelty of which he made a parade, carrying from village to village in iron cages the heads of his victims, he received from his grateful sovereign the title of Marquis and a generous pension.

The French Revolution of 1830 naturally added fuel to the flames of Italian patriotism. The false hope was widely entertained that Paris would give active support to the efforts of the Liberals; this hope had been specially encouraged by General Pepe, who, by skilful persuasion, had obtained from General Lafayette the promise of arms and money. The illusion had greater hold on Central Italy, where it was not long in producing tangible effects. On it were based the rash hopes of Ciro Menotti, a tradesman of Modena, a high-minded man with generous ideas. Distrustful of popular risings with republican aims, he had deemed it opportune to profit by the ambitions of Duke Francis IV, who coveted an extension of his narrow dominions. Menotti entered into communication with the Duke, and found no difficulty in persuading him that the French Revolution, renewing the age of unrest in Italy, would give him the opportunity of extending his principality and adding to his power. Thus the Duke joined the band of conspirators; but the confident attitude of Austria, and the timid and uncertain policy of the new Government of Louis-Philippe, soon convinced him of the vanity of his dreams and of the aims of Menotti's adherents. Fearful of having compromised himself with the Cabinet at Vienna, to give a signal proof of his loyalty as an Austrian Archduke he became the accuser and violent persecutor of the very party to which he had given such extensive pledges. When the conspirators assembled at the house of Menotti in order to receive their final orders, a regiment of ducal troops surrounded the house, and practically destroyed it, making prisoners of the conspirators, most of whom had been wounded in the fray. The next morning Francis IV wrote to the Governor of Reggio: "Last night it was discovered that a terrible plot had been made to overthrow me.

The conspirators are in my hands. Send the executioner." The executioner was immediately despatched; but his arrival at Modena coincided with the news that a revolution had broken out in the neighbouring Bologna. The Duke, terror-stricken and uncertain of what the future would bring forth, took refuge in the fortress of Mantua, dragging at his heels the unfortunate Menotti, a prisoner in fetters, whose execution was thus deferred for a few days.

The revolutionists in Bologna had also been relying on help from France; they invoked also the principle of non-intervention, proclaimed by the new French Government of July, 1830. At the very time of this outbreak Marshal Sebastiani, Foreign Minister of Louis-Philippe, made this public declaration: "The Holy Alliance rested upon the principle of intervention, which destroyed the independence of all the minor States. The contrary principle, which we have approved, and which we shall uphold, assures universal liberty and independence." Relying on this support, the revolutionary movement, which had begun at Bologna, soon spread to all Romagna, Emilia, the Marches, and part of Umbria. The temporal power of the Pope was tottering; Francis fled from Modena, and Marie-Louise from Parma, and the tricolour waved triumphant from the lower Po to the upper Tiber. But Prince Metternich did not hesitate to come forward again as arbiter of the destiny of Europe, and to frustrate the designs of Louis-Philippe's Ministers. In a peremptory manner he sent instructions to the Austrian ambassador in Paris: "We beg that the French Government will not embarrass the protective action which we may be commissioned from the highest quarters to take." At the same time he commanded the Austrian troops to invade the provinces of Central Italy. The parliamentary eloquence of General Sebastiani was exchanged for the more prudent diplomacy of Casimir Périer, who, wishful to prevent war, sought for a path of dignified retreat: and in less than two months there remained no trace of the rising which had been so unexpected, and, withal, so imposing in appearance.

This outbreak and all preceding risings had failed because they originated with purely local organisations. As a rule, the aim of the conspirators and the means whereby they sought to attain it, were limited to the boundaries of a province or of a tract of land corresponding to the ancient historical divisions of the Peninsula. That the efforts of the Piedmontese might assist the inhabitants of Calabria, that the causes of discontent, and hence of revolt, were common to all, that the multitudes of the north should combine with those of the south in a war of liberation was a conception which had not yet penetrated to the masses, though it had occurred to a few individuals. In 1821 the risings in Naples and in Piedmont had advanced, as it were, on parallel lines, without joining hands; and, if the Piedmontese interested themselves in the struggle between Austria and Naples, it was only to

take advantage of it as weakening their own adversary. General Pepe, who had foreseen the advantage of a simultaneous outbreak, says in his memoirs with regard to these risings, "If the Piedmontese had rebelled on the first of March, instead of on the tenth, or if they had informed me of their plans, affairs in Italy would have taken a more fortunate turn than would be generally believed." The sense of brotherhood was absent or feeble; and the want of this unity of heart and will carried with it the want of unity in action, and prevented the fusion of those forces which were scattered, tense and eager, throughout the country. A power was needed capable of drawing together all the threads of the revolutionary organisation, and of inducing all conspirators, high and low, to transform themselves into representatives of the sacred rights of nationality. This power was found in Giuseppe Mazzini.

His political ideals had grown to maturity during the months of his imprisonment on suspicion as a *Carbonaro* (1830). He had meditated deeply, and had seen the defects of the Italian conspiracies and insurrections; the people must first be educated, then made to feel the indignity of oppression, drawn to a unanimous rebellion, and taught to think not only of their own district but of the whole of Italy as of their native country. According to him no real obstacles existed "for twenty-six million men, who wished to rise and fight for their country." On his release from prison in 1831 the Sardinian Government offered him the choice between exile and police supervision; and he took up his headquarters in Marseilles. There he founded "Young Italy," the society which was to be the instrument of the realisation of his ideas. He called it by this name because his appeal was specially addressed to youth. "Place youth at the head of the insurgent multitude," he said, "you know not the secret of the power hidden in these youthful hearts, nor the magic influence exercised on the masses by the voice of youth. You will find among the young a host of apostles of the new religion." A man of burning faith, of blameless life, creative in thought, heedless of the stumbling-blocks of practice, a writer of rich and vigorous prose, full of movement and fire, he was born to win proselytes; and before long enthusiastic followers ranged themselves around the banner, on one side of which he had inscribed the words, "Liberty, Equality, and Humanity," and on the other, "Unity and Independence"; magic words which summed up the programme of the future patriotic mission of the Italians. For two years the band was limited in number. It was a heroic enterprise; a few young men, with no aid of family or wealth, and, excepting their leader, of no great ability, proposed to mould the destinies of their country and prepared for war against a great military Power. But in their veins was the feverish ardour which Mazzini had inspired. With untiring industry they laboured for years; they organised centres of "Young Italy" wherever an opportunity presented itself, spreading wide the net of their conspiracy. The

opinions of the society were published and disseminated by means of a newspaper which appeared at long and irregular intervals. In this Mazzini and his comrades advised the young men of Italy to lay aside their trivial writings and love poems, and, instead, to devote their literary skill to advancing the good of the people by sacrifices of every kind; they were urged to travel, to bear from land to land and from village to village the torch of liberty, to expound its advantages to the people, to establish and consecrate its cult. They were told to "climb the mountains and share the humble food of the labourer; to visit the workshops and the artisans, hitherto neglected; to speak to them of their rights, of their memories of the past, of their past glories, of their former commerce; to recount to them the endless oppression of which they were ignorant, because no one took it on himself to reveal it." And this appeal found a ready response. At the beginning of 1833, owing to the efforts of Mazzini, the society reckoned 60,000 members.

But far more efficacious than the immediate outcome of the organised conspiracy were the permanent results of his patient and burning exhortations, which were destined for some time to work secretly in men's hearts, rather than in action on the battle-field. The unfortunate issue of the *pronunciamiento* of the Piedmont militia in 1833, and the still more unfortunate result of the invasion of Savoy, which was attempted in the following year by a handful of fanatics, under the leadership of the inexperienced Ramorino, proved that the time was not yet ripe for a serious outbreak, and that common-sense was not the most conspicuous virtue of the followers of Mazzini. But the fiery words of the apostle—who seemed to draw fresh life, fresh courage, from defeat, and, undismayed by the horrors of torture and imprisonment, declared that "ideas grow quickly when watered with the blood of martyrs"—illuminating the civic consciousness of Italy, fulfilled their educative function and produced more effect than a victory or than the fall of a tyrant. This was shown in 1844 by the glorious and touching episode of the two Bandiera brothers, Attilio and Emilio. They were officers in Venice, sons of an Austrian admiral who had played a most important part in suppressing the revolt in Romagna. Filled with enthusiasm by the writings of Mazzini, they resolved to devote their lives to the liberation of their own country. They had won over to their designs Domenico Moro, another Venetian officer of the navy; and these three, leaving the Austrian ships which they commanded, went to Corfu, there to wait until the news of some event in the Peninsula should call them to action. There broke out in Calabria one of those trifling insurrections which were then of such frequent occurrence in the kingdom of the Two Sicilies, and which were invariably repressed without delay. A false or exaggerated account caused the Bandiera to attach more than due importance to the event, and they decided to hasten to the assistance of the rebels. They were

joined by a few other patriots, and the little band of nineteen landed at Cotrone and set out for Cosenza. But, betrayed by a companion, they were quickly surrounded by Bourbon troops, and after a short struggle all were captured. Nine of them, including the brothers Bandiera, suffered the extreme penalty, and died bravely, crying, as they fell beneath the bullets of King Ferdinand's soldiers, "Long live Italy." Such heroism was not exceptional at a time when heroism came naturally. But it was the first time that a band of Venetian youths had chosen for the field of their patriotic exertions a remote district in the south of Italy; this was the first solemn manifestation of the brotherhood which linked all the peoples scattered from the rugged Alps to the sun-bathed shores of the blue Ionian Sea. Among the little band which fell crushed by the odious tyranny of the Bourbons in the valley of the Rovito, there were natives of Perugia, of Romagna, of Frosinone, and of Modena; and the diversity of the districts to which the victims belonged was eloquent proof that one programme and one banner had begun to concentrate the aspirations of the Italians, hitherto disunited.

Meanwhile, the sympathies of the Liberals were awakening in favour of Carlo Alberto, the sovereign who had once so cruelly disappointed them, and who in 1831 had succeeded Carlo Felice on the throne. The harsh and almost ferocious reaction of 1833, occasioned by a conspiracy in the army of Piedmont, had not succeeded in destroying their affection for him; and the reforms which he had afterwards effected in his States had sufficed to revive it, especially amongst the more moderate of his subjects. The promulgation of the Civil Code, which included many of the principles originated by the French Revolution; that of the Penal Code, which acknowledged the equality of all citizens before the law; the wise and lenient financial administration; the erection of suitable buildings for the service of the State, prisons, lunatic asylums, and hospitals; the foundation of important institutions of different kinds, such as the Savings Bank, the Commission of National History, and the Department of Statistics—indicated a movement towards more notable and radical changes. Men understood that the King must proceed with caution, that, as he himself asserted, he constantly stood "between the daggers of the *Carbonari* and the poisoned chocolate of the *Jesuits*." But, on the other hand, there was ground for hope in one who could write thus to Count Giuseppe Ricci: "Ah, Ricci, the form of Governments is not eternal, we shall march with the times." He was hampered by religious scruples and by the influence of the priests; but all understood that, if these ties could have been severed, or even relaxed, he would have made more generous concessions and would have wielded an avenging sword against the prolonged and shameful oppression of Austria. "At present," he exclaimed, "I should be unwilling to commit any action contrary to the precepts of our holy religion, but I feel assured that to my dying day the words 'Patriotism'

and 'Freedom from Foreign Rule' will cause my heart to throb." Hence the Church must herself make smooth the way for the bold thoughts which seethed within his breast; the Church must first seem to approve the enterprise which attracted him. This was shortly to come to pass through Cardinal Giovanni Mastai Ferretti, who became Pope on June 16, 1846, with the title of Pius IX.

During this period of thirty years, literature, which joined hands with politics, played an important part in the movement of preparation. On the fall of the Italian kingdom the Romantic School established itself; it stood forth as a protest against the old order, against the tyranny of tradition, as a symbol of the sympathy between letters and the spirit of modern society. Hence we see that, in the struggle between the Romantics and the Classicists, which was at its height in the early days of Austrian rule, the Liberals sided with the Romantics and the reactionaries with the Classicists. The Romantics came to regard literature as a weapon against despotism and a means of spreading patriotic ideas. First and foremost among the organs of this new intellectual tendency was the *Conciliatore*, a review which took up the broken course of the *Caffè*, and which succeeded in living to one hundred and eighteen numbers, despite the suspicion, the vigilance, and the hostility of the police. The names of its contributors are significant of its spirit; among them there were Pellico, Berchet, Romagnosi, Porro, and Confalonieri, all of whom risked life and fortune in the conspiracies and rebellions of that time. Between the lines of the literary criticisms, of the articles on art, or of the discussions on political economy, we can decipher the visions, the wishes, the impulses of citizens who dreamed of a free and peaceful Italy; and the dreams had a fervour which was evident through their disguise, and aroused the suspicions of the Government. The word romantic, says Pellico, was acknowledged to be synonymous with *Liberal*, and no man dared call himself a classicist unless he were an extremist or a spy.

The dramatic output, which at that time was unusually abundant, partook on the whole of the romantic and patriotic character. The taste of that generation revealed itself in the foreign masterpieces chosen for translation; Ferrario's rendering of Schiller's *Conspiracy of Fiesco* and *William Tell* kindled afresh the desire for independence and the hatred of despotic rule. In original drama Pellico showed that under the veil of fiction and through the story of the past it was possible to touch the wounds of the present and to illustrate the hopes of the future. And it is probable that the moving legend of Paolo and Francesca produced less effect on the public than the impetuous words of the former in Act I, and his cry:

For thee, for thee, mother of valiant sons, my Italy,  
If hatred rise to wrong thee, I will draw my sword.

Nor was Manzoni forgetful of the condition of his country whilst composing the *Adelchi* and the *Conte di Carmagnola*. In the latter the evils of internal strife and the eagerness of foreigners to profit by it are set forth in the celebrated chorus of the battle of Maclo dio; and its noble flow of rebukes and exhortations, which were inspired by the political sentiments of the author, secured for these verses the popularity of a patriotic hymn.

In the *Adelchi* the allusions to the present situation were so unmistakable that the Censor exercised without mercy in several passages his right of suppression, writing in the margin of the manuscript, "For what does Signor Manzoni take us? Does he think that we cannot perceive his meaning?" But Benedetti and Niccolini advanced still more boldly on the same roads; the *Cola di Rienzo* of the former, written between 1820 and 1821, aroused a real enthusiasm; the love of a Colonna for the daughter of Cola was only an episode in the play; the real subject of the tragedy was political revolt; and the inspiration of the poet was naturally Liberal and anti-Papal in character. Hence, by an anachronism which was not wholly illogical, and which often tended to enhance the effect, the play is representative of the feeling of revolutionary Italy. Niccolini, a more subtle artist, attacked the crimes and outrages of Austrian rule under a French mask in *Giovanni da Procida*; and in *Antonio Foscarini* he revealed his passion for liberty, which afterwards burst forth audaciously in *Arnaldo da Brescia*, wherein he set forth how the Emperor and the Pope, acting together, had been the cause in the past and in the present of the servitude of Italy.

Even historical works were pervaded by this spirit of opposition to the Governments which had been set up after the Napoleonic era. For instance Cantù, although instructor in a Royal-Imperial College, was so free in the descriptions and the judgments of his *History of Como* that the censors of Milan and of Como were obliged to alter or suppress part of the work. He was followed by Colletta, who, in his *History of the Kingdom of Naples*, openly denounced the disappointments and betrayals of the Revolution of 1820. This work is an indictment of the Bourbon Ferdinand I, the production of a merciless inquisitor, who spares no pains to expose before the public all the wrongs committed by this King and his Government. The book is in itself a historical event, because its publication proved that, although some Italians might preach resignation to the will of God, and submission to such princes as He may send, yet there were others who dared to make a solemn protest, and demonstrate that such misfortunes were not caused by Providence, but rather by the weakness of the many, and the wickedness of a few.

Throughout the peninsula there was circulated a literature of revolt, the sole aim of which was to inspire men with patriotic feeling and to instigate rebellion—lyric poems, which were really hymns of war;

stories, which incited men to deeds of vengeance; reviews and journals which were in fact the organs of the revolutionary spirit.

Among the most noteworthy of such lyrical poems are the *Canti Italici* of Amedeo Ravina, which, circulated in manuscript form in 1821, entailed a sentence of death for the author, though he contrived by fortunate chances to escape the penalty. With civic enthusiasm, which was more remarkable than his poetic inspiration, he prayed in these songs for the union of all Italy, for the restriction of the Papacy to the spiritual dominion, and for the security of freedom. The same notes were sounded more skilfully by Berchet, who, having escaped from the clutches of the Austrian Government in Milan, lived as an exile in France and England. His *Profughi di Parga*, which appeared in London in 1824, and of which thousands of manuscript or printed copies were circulated, enjoyed a success which equalled or surpassed that of the best poems of Monti or Foscolo. The moving and pathetic subject of this poem had been praised by Goethe, and had tempted Byron. Such lines as these, "No, by Heaven, we will not serve the tyrant," "Perchance the day is not far distant on which all men will call each other brother," expressed the agony of suffering and the cry of the oppressed. His other romantic poems aimed a direct blow against Austria. These were collected in one volume, bearing on the frontispiece the symbol of a lamp, which was being filled with fresh oil, and the significant motto *alere flammam*. His fluent, sentimental, and limpid style enabled him to accomplish the patriotic aim which he set before himself, and which was revealed by the effigy and the motto. *Clarina*, one of these poems, immediately became very popular. The heroine encourages her lover to fight as a volunteer for the redemption of Italy, but the attempt fails through cowardice on the part of the leaders; thus Clarina, mourning for her exiled love, seemed to personify ill-fated Italy. And in an almanac for 1832, which was addressed *To the women of Italy*, they were reminded of the duty to follow her example: "Let the words of poor Clarina to her betrothed dwell in your souls." The same ideals inspire Berchet's other works: his *Fantasie*, which delighted Mazzini, his hymn, *All' armi, All' armi...*, which celebrates Ciro Menotti's revolt at Modena, in short, every expression of his poetic afflatus, so that he was known to his contemporaries and to posterity as the Italian Tyrtaeus. His companion in exile was Gabriele Rossetti, who sang of the wrongs suffered by Greece and Poland, of the French revolt against Charles X, but, more than all, of his Italy—following on his lyre her agonising alternations of hope and despair, of courage and depression. And amid this goodly company may also be noted:—Tommaseo, Torti, Prati, Grossi, Scalvini, and lastly, Alessandro Poerio and Goffredo Mameli, two heroes who fell sword in hand, the former before Venice in 1848, the latter before Rome in 1849. Meanwhile, Brofferio, Giusti, and others, wrote satires attacking the Governments with ridicule, which

frequently proves a more efficient weapon than the fury of a righteous indignation. Even Leopardi, the greatest lyric master of the day, although absorbed in struggles and revolts more intimate and personal, was inspired at times by the prevailing spirit of patriotic fervour; and his ode to Italy, and *Bruto Minore*, by recalling to Italians their past history, threw light and glory on the duty which lay in the present. But the poet, with his melancholy, his pessimism, his philosophy of despair, appealed but little to a generation of quickly-kindled enthusiasms, romantic, and greedy of hope. His merit was hardly recognised until some years after his untimely death (1837).

Silvio Pellico's *Mie Prigioni*, for its intrinsic merit and for its popularity throughout Europe, deserves an important place amongst the polemical prose of this period. The strength of this book lay in its moderation. Pellico does not attack with rancour the men who had unjustly kept him in prison for ten years, nor does he stop to glorify the cause for which he had suffered. On the contrary, he begins with the declaration that he had no intention of dealing with politics, just as a lover might refuse to speak of the lady who has wronged him. Pellico relates only the *Odyssey* of his sufferings and misfortunes and in the most temperate language. But this dispassionate account of his sorrows, which won the sympathy of all good men, constituted a formidable attack upon his enemies and those of his country. Every tear shed was a drop of hatred stored up against the foreign tyrants; he thought only in his recital of moving his readers to pity, and left the feeling of scorn and anger, the desire for revolt and freedom, to mature of its own accord from the contemplation of the terrible ten years spent in Spielberg.

There appeared other more aggressive works on this theme, both in the field of fiction and biography. For instance, Guerrazzi's sensational romance, *L'Assedio di Firenze*, seemed an open challenge. The author said to Mazzini, "I wrote this book because I could not fight a battle." The *Precursore*, a Liberal newspaper, secretly published, recommended it "to all loyal Italians who would learn to what disgrace, and to what infamous tyranny, their country had long been subjected by the mad folly or by the avarice of vile and ambitious foreigners." The *Precursore* went on to say that the book had already inspired such terror that the Argus-eyed police were ransacking houses and buildings to hunt out and destroy the copies. No less effective were the *Ettore Fieramosca* and the *Nicolò de' Lapi* of d'Azeglio. But no prose work, possibly not even the incendiary articles of *Young Italy*, exercised so powerful an influence as Pélico's calm narrative of his experiences. Hence, it was truly said that this tiny volume was more harmful to Austria than a lost battle, than the work of many revolutionary societies, or the results of many outbreaks.

Tuscany formed an important centre of literary activity; it was, perhaps, the only one where authors ventured to speak their minds in

public. Here Leopold II, who had succeeded to the throne in 1824, seemed wishful to continue the tolerant régime of his father, Ferdinand III. In 1819, Pietro Viesseux, a trader of Oneglia of Swiss descent, had settled at Florence. He, in concert with Gino Capponi, Cosimo Ridolfi, and Niccolini, had founded a scientific and literary society, open to all who took pleasure in free and illuminating discussion. This literary reunion gave birth to the *Antologia*, a review founded by Capponi in imitation of the English periodicals. It had a wide circulation; its contributors and correspondents were drawn from the most diverse schools, the connecting link being the unification of Italy. Such were Raffaele Lambruschini, the priest, Gabriele Pepe, the *Carbonaro*, Carlo Troya, the "Neo-Guelf," Niccolini, the "Anti-Guelf," the classical and restrained Giordani, and Mazzini, the impetuous Radical. It was a hive of conflicting doctrines, of varying ideals, converging towards a frontal attack upon the dominant reaction under Austrian influence, and working together in the generous purpose of the dissemination of culture, of striking all fetters from the conscience, of redeeming the common country, and reestablishing its dignity as a nation.

Philosophers were inspired with the same fervour, not only in their actions and their practice, but also in those of their writings which were rather of a speculative character. Indeed in attacking the sensational philosophy which had held sway in Italy at the time of Gioia and Romagnosi, Antonio Rosmini tried to divert the Italians from this school of thought, which, by declaring the senses to be the only source of truth, destroyed men's faith in absolute justice, in an ideal order depending on immutable principles, and hence, in the eternal right to independence and freedom. The writing and the actions of the Abbot Rosmini were in perfect harmony; the Jesuits were his spiritual, and the Austrians his political, foes: suspicions and persecutions drove him from his home in Roveredo; in 1848 he pleaded boldly and eloquently but in vain before the Pope for the long-desired confederation of the Italian States. The priest Vincenzo Gioberti, although in his scientific views opposed to Rosmini, was united with him in the love of Italy, for whom Gioberti suffered so much, and in whose cause his writings, described in a later chapter of this volume, had so great an influence.

Science did not fail to play her part in the promotion of the national cause. She helped it indirectly, chiefly through the medium of scientific congresses. A group of Liberals had succeeded, not without difficulty, in persuading Leopold II that scientific congresses would increase his reputation and that of Tuscany, which had always shown itself favourable to learning. Accordingly, in 1839, such a congress was held under his auspices at Pisa. The circular letter of invitation containing the programme was drawn up by Viesseux, who was anything but a man of science; and this participation of the founder of the *Antologia*, the moderate but energetic advocate of Liberal ideas, caused

men to question the orthodoxy of the meeting. In fact, those tyrannical rulers who were most subservient to Austria tried to frustrate the scheme; the learned men in the Papal States were strictly forbidden to attend the congress, and a threat of excommunication gave the good-natured Leopold ground for reflexion. But, in spite of all these obstacles, the meeting took place. There were many discourses, watched over by the spies of various Governments, who reported that the most successful were those which digressed the furthest from subjects of a scientific nature. The enthusiasm reached its height on the day of the consecration of a monument to Galileo, when Rossini made a speech exposing the shame of Galileo's celebrated trial by the Inquisition. Thus a harmless meeting of learned men, of which the ostensible aim was "the advancement of natural science," was transformed into a solemn manifestation of national feeling. The example set by the Grand Duke of Tuscany was followed by other Princes, whose ambition was equal to or greater than his own; Ferdinand II and Carlo Alberto finally permitted similar congresses to be held, which if they did not advance the ends of science, proved very favourable to those of politics, since they established intercourse between the most distinguished men in the country and provided an opportunity for the revelation and coordination of the impulses which led to the assertion of the most sacred rights of nationality.

Moreover, painting and sculpture, by their choice of subjects, took their part in the great enterprise; but even more effective was music, which made a direct appeal to the passions of the people. At that time the performance of opera proved very disturbing to the authorities, in some cases through the intention which governed the inspiration of the master, in others by the interpretations which the public delighted to put upon certain innocent passages. For instance, Gioachino Rossini was anything but a revolutionist; nevertheless his *William Tell* was found to contain revolutionary music, full of political significance, of which he himself was quite unconscious. In the most solemn scene of this drama, when the representatives from the three Cantons, after swearing "in the name of their sorrows" to vindicate their liberty at all costs, hail the sun as it rises over the eternal Alps with that august and terrible name upon their lips, from the deep voices of the chorus, and from the bass chords of the orchestra there seemed to proceed a menacing and formidable presage and an irresistible call to deeds of prowess and of self-sacrifice. Vincenzo Bellini, again, had the nature of an artist with all its heedlessness and nonchalance; for him politics had no meaning. Nevertheless his audience was so intimately touched by his music, it acted so powerfully upon their noblest impulses, that they endowed it with a significance which it did not in fact possess; and the cry of the *Puritans* roused the pit like a stirring shout of war and victory. The Censors and the Governments were active in forbidding the

performance of certain plays, and in correcting the most dangerous phrases of certain *libretti*; but the one measure merely irritated the public, and the other, by its clumsy perversion of the text, provoked a contemptuous smile, or redoubled the fervour of applause and protest. On the other hand, the note of patriotism, which pervaded the music of Verdi, was sincere and deliberate. This was understood by his contemporaries; and the stupendous chorus of *Nabucco* seemed then and is still the most passionate appeal to a distant Fatherland. His *Ernani*, given at Venice in 1844, founded on the romantic drama of Victor Hugo, itself the symbol of revolt for an entire school of literature, contains the most perfect musical expression of the spirit of freedom. The men of 1848 found in it a magnanimous rebellion against tyranny, a denunciation of violence, and the cry of a people rising against their tyrants. In the *Lombardi*, who sigh for their distant homes, and sadly call to mind the streams and meadows of their native lands, they discovered a forecast of coming events; and in *Attila*, the well-known passage in which the Roman general Aetius offers the whole world to the leader of the Huns, provided that he may himself retain Italy, was clearly intended to excite the multitude by the simple and universal language of harmony.

Thus we see that as in the life of action, so in that of thought, bold and vigorous forces worked for the regeneration of Italy. The people, who at the opening of the Congress of Vienna had desired only peace, were now determined, at all costs, to free themselves from the yoke under which they lay. Metternich had declared that Italy was merely a geographical expression, an ill-fated phrase which implied a still more ill-fated policy. At the beginning of 1846, everything combined to show the author of this phrase and this policy that Italy was something more than a word written upon a map, that it was a nation conscious of its rights, rich, if not in material strength, in the fervour of self-sacrifice, and certain thereby, sooner or later, to achieve its desires.

## CHAPTER V.

### THE PAPACY AND THE CATHOLIC CHURCH.

Pius VII, on his return to Rome in 1814, was greeted with demonstrations of exuberant joy. The Romans had always held his person in loving reverence. The memory of so many trials borne with patience and fortitude threw a halo round the mild, noble-minded Pontiff. He was known to be animated by the best intentions; and the future seemed bright with hope. As in the early years of the reign, the government again devolved upon Cardinal Consalvi, Secretary of State, who remained responsible for the home and foreign policy of the Papacy. The Minister who influenced so powerfully the course of events, both in Church and State, was not only a remarkable but a singularly attractive personality.

Ercole Consalvi was born in Rome in 1757, and was a scion of the ancient House of the Brunacci of Pisa. At Frascati, and subsequently in Rome, Consalvi studied jurisprudence and theology, and in 1783 began his ecclesiastical career, in which he rose steadily. He always attributed his selection of this career to profound conviction, and his life was without blemish; but he was never ordained a priest. It was not till he had reached the age of forty-three, when he was made a Cardinal, that he took minor Orders. Consalvi received a good classical education. He loved music and poetry, was the friend of Cimarosa, travelled widely in Italy, and always remained a great favourite in the circles of the leading Roman aristocracy. At the wish of Pius VI he exchanged in 1792 administrative for judicial work, and was appointed to the high office of *Uditore* to the Court of the Rota. When Rome became the rallying-point of the French exiles, they found no warmer friend than Consalvi.

This easy-going, somewhat worldly, manner of life came to an end in 1796, when, after the foundation of the Cisalpine Republic, Pius VI appointed him Assessor to the Congregation which was to reform the Papal army in agreement with its commanders, the Austrian generals. The undertaking proved a failure. The Papal troops were beaten, and the Court of Rome, coming to terms with the French, agreed to the

fatal articles of Tolentino, by which the Pope recognised the Cisalpine Republic and gave up the Legations. The assassination of the French general Duphot by Papal soldiers in 1798 led to the occupation of Rome and to the proclamation of the Republic. Consalvi, who was held responsible for what had occurred, had to surrender the Castle of St Angelo: and, as he scorned flight, he was made prisoner, and taken to the frontier in the company of convicts.

After a short stay at Naples, he joined the imprisoned Pius VI near Florence; but, the permission to remain with him having been refused, he went on to Venice. He was in that city during the victories of the second Coalition, at the death of the Pope, and at the time of the Convocation of the Conclave. Consalvi owed his nomination as Secretary to the Conclave to the influence of the Cardinal of York, second son of the Chevalier de St George. Austria and Naples occupied the Pontifical States; even Spain demanded Papal territory for Parma; while Naples claimed Ponte-Corvo and Benevento. But Consalvi headed a strong opposition to the Austrian candidate, Cardinal Mattei; and on March 14, 1800, the election of Cardinal Chiaromonti (Pius VII) was carried. Ecclesiastical independence was thus asserted. One of the first steps taken by the new Pope was the appointment of Consalvi to be Pro-Secretary of State. Austria now refused to allow the coronation of the Pope to take place in St Mark's, because she would have no part in an act which symbolised the assumption of the Temporal Power; and Marquis Ghislieri, the Emperor's ambassador, claimed once more the Legations for Austria. The Pope, who persisted in his refusal and in his intention of returning to Rome, had to choose the sea route, because he was not allowed to pass through the Legations, which Austria demanded. Before he reached Rome, conditions had altered. The victory of Bonaparte at Marengo on June 14 had prompted Austria and Naples unconditionally to restore the States of the Church. France, on the other hand, seized the Legations, and for fourteen years remained mistress of Italy. In the month of August Consalvi was made a Cardinal, and the affairs of the Papal State were entrusted to him.

The saintly, pious, conciliatory Pope had great common sense, but no superior gifts of mind. A certain irresolution made him dependent upon the advice of others. Consalvi's influence gave its character to his Pontificate. Their relations to each other thenceforward were always of the most intimate character. Consalvi has been called the soul of the Pope, the man who held the double key to his heart. The personal sympathy of Pius VII never failed him.

His contemporaries describe Consalvi at the time as being a tall, good-looking man, of charming manners, lively disposition, genuine kindness of heart, great natural dignity, and, while true to his friends, incapable of hatred. His unusual ability, his extraordinary powers of work, and dexterity in business, justified the confidence of the Pope.

Consalvi was accessible to modern ideas on political questions, and therefore exposed to the attacks of the reactionaries. But Pius VII knew well that he would uphold the spiritual sovereignty of the Curia in its unrestricted integrity. He had acted accordingly in Paris during the negotiations for the Concordat, and had always maintained the claims of the Papacy to its Temporal Power. The circumstance that he represented these principles was the true cause of his resignation in 1806, which the Pope was compelled to accept under pressure from Napoleon. But the preceding six years of administration had sufficed to bring Consalvi into conflict with the representatives of the established hierarchy. Although a Papal decree had restored the priestly rule throughout the Pontifical State, and brought into force the ordinances which had been disregarded during the Revolution, the amnesty which, notwithstanding many restrictions, granted a certain compensation to those who had bought national property, the taxation of the secular clergy, and the fact that a policy of retaliation was carefully avoided, impressed upon the Papal restoration a stamp of high statesmanship and moderation, which the reactionaries never forgave. The hopeless financial situation was the stumbling-block. The already impoverished people were loaded with increased taxation; yet the State was unable to pay the creditors more than half their due. The opposition to Consalvi was led by Cardinal Braschi; but, notwithstanding their intrigues, Consalvi remained, after his resignation, the confidant of the Pope up to the moment when he left Rome. He clearly saw, however, that Pius himself could not master his opponents, to whom the suppression of an abuse was a perilous innovation, and who objected to the most urgent and beneficial reforms, such as free trade in corn, the regulation of the public debt, and an improved monetary system.

Six months after the forcible removal of the Pope in July, 1809, Consalvi was summoned to Paris, and, together with Cardinal di Pietro, compelled to travel under military escort. Incensed by his stubborn opposition, Napoleon divested him of the insignia of his rank and declared both his stipend and his private fortune to be forfeited. In June, 1810, he was relegated to Reims for a period of two years and eight months. His memoirs were written at this time. They are not insincere, but they were jotted down under the sting of the persecution he suffered at the hands of the Emperor, and are not consistent with his earlier estimate of Napoleon.

It was Consalvi who steeled the opposition of the Pope at Fontainebleau, where he spent eleven months—from February, 1813, till the following January. Again an escort conducted him into exile at Béziers. The defeat and downfall of Napoleon, however, soon set him free. He actually met the Emperor at Fréjus, on the road to Elba, when he himself was returning to Italy. They did not speak; but, when Napoleon recognised him, he remarked to the Austrian who accompanied

him: "This man, who never would become a priest, is more of a priest than all the others."

Consalvi had been absent from Rome since 1809, nor did he enter it now. He met the Pope at Cesena and followed him to Foliango, where, "in the joy of his heart," Pius VII reinstated him as Secretary of State. For the moment, however, Cardinal Pacca took his place, and Consalvi hastened back to Paris. Thence he proceeded by London to Vienna, to represent the Pope at the Congress.

The interregnum in Rome from January to May, 1814, between the retrocession of Rome to the Pope and his return, had generated a series of complications, destined to hamper the future activity of Consalvi. His opponent, Cardinal Rivarola, who acted as Papal Legate in the absence of the Pope, inaugurated the reaction by suppressing the French laws, with the exception of those relating to mortgages. Cardinal Pacca adhered to this policy. He had been Nuncio at Cologne from 1786 to 1793, after that at Lisbon, and, under Pius VII, the very soul of the opposition to Napoleon. He restored the Inquisition, which tribunal so late as 1816 passed a sentence of death at Ravenna. His most personal work, however, was the restoration of the Society of Jesus. In the Bull of August 7, 1814, Pius VII indirectly characterised the suppression of the Order as a grievous crime. Pacca considered himself happy to be a means of reparation, because he reproached himself with having approved, in his youth, the *Provinciales* of Pascal.

The Congregation of the Index now proceeded against all publications of a political character; and before long 737 accusations of heresy were received. The supporters of the previous administration, and chiefly the priests, were treated with uncompromising severity; many were deposed, called upon to disavow their views, punished or expelled, and deprived of their incomes. Consalvi was perfectly aware that the protests of the Powers assembled in Vienna, against a policy of vengeance in Rome, were well founded. He recalled to Pacca the fact that in 1800, in similar circumstances, he had persuaded Pius VII to grant an amnesty, and, while safeguarding principles, to excuse and pardon individuals in consideration of the circumstances in which they had been placed. In bitterness of soul he asked how he was to win back the temporal possessions of the Papacy, when a system was at work which must lead to the loss of even that portion which was left. He partly accomplished his object, and in August, 1814, a limited amnesty was proclaimed. Yet he remained isolated. His influence could not save individuals; he had to apologise for his outspokenness, and promise amendment. His fall would have been certain, could he have been replaced at the Congress.

However, Consalvi remained indispensable, though continuing to be misunderstood. During the Congress of Vienna he had triumphed through methods, which he had already outlined at Venice in 1800 in

an appeal to the Emperor Paul of Russia. To the jealousies of the Catholic sovereigns and their inroads on ecclesiastical territory he opposed the goodwill of the heterodox Powers, Russia, England, and Prussia. The majority of the diplomatists at Vienna, especially the English and the Russians, pressed for constitutional guarantees, the granting of a general amnesty, and the confirmation of the secularisation. Papal subjects were not to be handed over "like sheep," and especially the Legations were to be constitutionally governed.

Consalvi's opposition to this last pretension won the support of Metternich. He insisted on the impossibility of making distinctions between Papal subjects, and argued that a constitution drawn up for the entire Papal States would hardly suit Austria. In consequence the proposal was dropped, and Consalvi avoided binding promises. At the same time, however, in a report to Cardinal Pacca, he said that he himself in 1800 had introduced that limited participation of the laity in the government, now claimed by the Powers at Vienna, and that in his opinion it was a matter of common decency to concede it. If, after twenty-five years of separation, obsolete methods were to be employed in ruling the Legations, the Papacy would be courting disaster.

Against Consalvi's opinion, Pacca had obtained in 1814 the condemnation of the Freemasons and the *Carbonari*. The existence of secret societies spread all over Italy was indeed a serious danger. The French at the time of the Republic had made use of them. The example proved contagious. The Counter-revolution from 1798 to 1799 opposed the Sanfedists to the Jacobins. This secret society took its name from the terrible bands of Cardinal Ruffo, and since his time had existed in the States of the Church. The Sanfedists formed a kind of secret police, whose denunciations were nominally directed against secret societies but practically used against all inconvenient persons or views. The Sanfedists hated Liberalism, but also Austria, Metternich, and Consalvi, who tried to master them, but being unable to do so, had finally to tolerate them. So early as 1814 the "Guelfs," and with them the idea of an independent Italy, came to the front. It is not without cause that they were thought to have held communications with Napoleon at Elba. But by Pacca and those who shared his views all sovereigns and statesmen from Joseph II to Stein, the *Tugendbund* in Germany, the Protestant Bible Societies, the Liberals—everybody in fact who did not hold their opinions—were stamped as Freemasons.

Metternich had no such delusion, but he deemed it his interest to support it. Austria had become the dominant Power in Italy and the one great obstacle to the realisation of the national hopes. He needed the cooperation of the Italian Courts, and notably that of the Curia. He came to an understanding with Consalvi on the ground of solidarity against the Revolution. Their long, intimate, almost affectionate

correspondence, which stretches from 1815 to 1819, leaves somehow the impression that Metternich had the best of the bargain. His constant warnings to Consalvi to remain firm, to uphold a healthy moral code, to defend principles and the sacred foundations of society, of the throne and the altar, have a perceptible tone of command. Still, in 1815, Consalvi refused to join the Italian League of Defence, as well as the Holy Alliance. The Holy Alliance, he said, had no creed. Moreover the Pope was bound to the strictest neutrality with regard to all nations, and could not dream of asserting his rights by the sword. But in 1816 Lebzelter reported from Rome that Consalvi was now practically won over to the interests of Austria, and wanted her support.

The *Motu proprio* of July 6, 1816, proclaimed the programme of Consalvi for the centralisation of government, a bureaucracy on Napoleonic lines. The feudal rights and customs were abolished, with the exception of the game laws. The baronial jurisdiction still in part survived, but was found so inconvenient and so expensive that in nearly every case it was voluntarily relinquished. The customs, laws, and privileges of communes, towns, and provinces were also abolished. The Papal territory, which included three million inhabitants, was subdivided into twenty-one Legations under Cardinals, or Delegations under Delegates. To them the Governors, who were selected from the "prelature," were subject, and only exercised the inferior jurisdiction. Over all were the ordinary Courts, the Court of Appeal, and lastly the Rota Romana and the Congregations. The councillors of each commune chose the corporation, but were themselves chosen by the Legates, and their appointment was ratified by the Consulta in Rome. If a vacancy occurred, the members were to exercise the right to complete their numbers, subject to the approval of authority. Consalvi agreed that every province should have a council of laymen; but even these were nominated at Rome. They had no executive power, and could only give advice on prescribed topics. Consequently the whole bureaucratic system rested upon the priesthood and upon the *prelatura*. This order or caste of laymen, wearing the ecclesiastical garb and observing the rule of celibacy, was no longer confined to members of noble or wealthy families. The positions in the administration and the tribunals reserved for its members were no longer lucrative. The priesthood looked upon it with contempt. The education of its members was as deficient as that of the clergy; and both, having lost their property, were subsidised by the State.

By the sale of Church property Napoleon had succeeded in bringing the finances of the old Papal States into order, and in reducing the National Debt from seventy-four to thirty-three millions of *scudi*; and, although the Papal States had hardly any exports, their revenue was raised from three to six millions by the improvement of their commerce. After the Restoration, the States of the Church were charged with part of the debt of the kingdom of Italy—though with reduced interest.

Consalvi, moreover, had to endow both the Roman Congregations and the Cardinals, and also to compensate for losses incurred the 1824 monasteries and 612 nunneries, which were restored. In 1816 the deficit amounted to 1,200,000 *scudi*. In 1821 Austria still owed the payments due for the garrisons, which under protest of the Pope occupied Ferrara and Comacchio. Members of the Bonaparte family advanced the necessary funds for the reception in Rome of the Emperor Francis in 1819. In these circumstances the chief sources of revenue, tobacco and salt, were leased for a period of twelve years. Taxes in arrear were collected by coercion, and others levied in advance. Expenditure was covered by fresh loans. This method of administration led to systematic and extensive malversations and fraud on the part of the tax-farmers. In 1817, orders for pensions or grants bearing a forged signature of the Pope were paid from the public chest. In 1820, 11,000 criminals were in State prisons and the cost of their maintenance was leased, with the result that they were nearly starved, and that the usurers pocketed large profits. Conscription had been abolished, and the army numbered 7000 men. But there, also, the administration was no better. Dishonesty developed into a system. Consalvi was perfectly aware of it. When he asked for a serious investigation, the Minister of Finance was wont to withhold the necessary explanations. At the same time the constant increase of taxation added to his unpopularity.

Since manufactures were non-existent, and commerce was confined to agricultural products, such as hemp, wool, and cattle, Pius VII in 1801, in the interests of agriculture, had suppressed the *Annona*, an institution which had prohibited the export of corn and enforced severe regulations on the home market. At first this measure, which granted free trade in corn, seemed eminently just. The consequence, however, was that agriculture languished, because the soil passed out of the hands of small landowners into those of large proprietors. They in turn leased the land and controlled the market, because they were able to discover ways of escaping the weight of communal taxation. They found it more profitable to raise stock than to till the land. To meet the difficulty, the Government restored the *Annona*, a measure promptly followed by dearness, bread riots, and disturbances. Nevertheless, Consalvi succeeded, at the end of his administration, in balancing the finances, but at the cost of the total neglect of public education. The Clerical Middle Schools taught hardly anything but Latin. The professors of the two great Universities of Rome and Bologna, and of five smaller ones, had to use prescribed text-books. It required a special intervention of Consalvi to obtain leave from the Censorship that Settele, Professor of Astronomy, should be allowed to explain the system of Copernicus, if only as a hypothesis.

After the abolition of the Napoleonic Code, the decisions of Common Law remained in force, modified by Canon Law and the Apostolic

Constitutions. These contradicted each other, thus causing hopeless confusion. Consalvi called upon Bartolucci, a legist of great repute, to work out a code of Civil Law; but it was never sanctioned by the *Congregazione Economica*. The suggested rules of legal procedure were never enforced; and the separation of judicial from administrative functions was not carried out. The Cardinal Legates encroached upon the domain of justice by arbitrary intervention. The administration had its own special and separate jurisdiction, and the clergy appealed to episcopal Courts, among them to the Inquisition, which condemned all offences against religion. The *Uditore Santissimo*, also, independent of all tribunals, and, under the immediate authority of the Pope, was the highest judge of Appeal in ecclesiastical matters. The *Consulta*, another ecclesiastical tribunal, passed sentences of death or hard labour for life on political criminals who had incited the people to rebellion, even if they had done so by the mere distribution of pamphlets, without having recourse to arms. The Roman Courts were venal, and favouritism prevailed. Laws were unable to stop that organised brigandage, which in the Roman mountains had even withstood the power of the French. Entire tracts of country were in a state of war; and the brigands, though feared, were invested with a romantic halo. In 1818 a terrible famine broke out which, more especially in the Apennines, led the starving population to revolt. Military measures had failed. The brigands even drew recruits from the ranks of the Papal soldiery and police. The police itself was untrustworthy, and, moreover, hampered by the rights of sanctuary vested in a certain number of convents and churches.

In these circumstances, Consalvi determined to enter into personal negotiations with the brigands. He made a kind of treaty with them. They consented to submit to one year's imprisonment, if the State would then guarantee them sufficient means to begin a peaceful existence. Rome thus witnessed the extraordinary sight of the entry of three large waggons full of brigands. Masocco, the most feared of all, was accompanied by his wife, and the Duchess of Devonshire thought fit to present her with her own necklace. Other bands followed the example of submission and the outlook seemed hopeful, when a terrible epilogue followed. Masocco was to negotiate with Cesari, the leader of the last recalcitrant band, but was shot down by his command. In order to revenge the death of his friend, Amarini seized upon the family of Cesari and, tearing them from the hands of the police, murdered six women and young girls with his own hand. He then gave himself up to justice. Cesari held out for some time, and murdered all those of his prisoners who were Papal subjects. In the end, a Roman carabineer shot him near the place where his family had fallen. In the early twenties travellers were still stopped by robbers in broad daylight. When the *Carboneria* began to flourish, one evil replaced another.

Drastic measures had to be taken by the Government against the families of the robbers as well as against those who harboured them, and their stronghold, Sonino, was destroyed.

It was the fate of Consalvi's system of bureaucratic tutelage, that the capable and trained officials, which it presupposed, were non-existent. On the one hand, the reforms which he granted were not carried out; on the other, the pressure he brought to bear was interpreted as despotic interference. The loss of innumerable local liberties and privileges turned the aristocracy, who had benefited by them, against Consalvi. They joined in opposition with the Cardinals and Bishops, who complained of the curtailment of their spiritual jurisdiction. The Cardinals who were most hostile to Consalvi were Severoli, Somaglia, Litta, Mattei, Pacca, della Genga, and Castiglioni, the last two of whom were destined in time to wear the tiara. In 1818 Count Apponyi, the Austrian ambassador, states unhesitatingly that the Sacred College was animated with feelings of bitter enmity against Consalvi. It came to such a pass that at Velletri Mattei set up a distinct administration and jurisdiction, and gave orders that all decrees which did not suit him should be burnt by the hangman. The Legates, Rivarola, Severoli, Somaglia, in letters and pamphlets openly denounced the Government as hostile to religion. Pacca persecuted all those who had held office under Napoleon; della Genga, Vicar-General of Rome, enforced all the old penal laws against the Jews. Consalvi refrained from taxing Roman Princes and capitalists more heavily because he had been frankly told that they would refuse to pay. It was impossible to contend against such a sea of difficulties. With an aged and ailing Pope, Consalvi had to be content with half-measures so far as internal administration was concerned.

His diplomatic skill on the contrary was displayed to full advantage in many successful negotiations with the Powers. The period, which has been termed the era of the Concordats, opened in 1816, but the experience of Consalvi dated back as far as 1801, when he was sent to Paris to negotiate the French Concordat with the First Consul. The results of Napoleon's policy had been that the Catholic Church in France, deprived of its property, dependent upon the State, hampered by the Organic Articles, and hopelessly crippled as to its episcopal freedom, was driven towards Rome and became, what it never had been, Ultramontane; and upon Napoleon's fall the Concordat was at once attacked.

The first attack was made by antagonists of Consalvi, by the *Zelanti*. On May 30, 1814, della Genga arrived in Paris as Papal ambassador to the Allied sovereigns. He found that they had already left, and handed his instructions to the French Government, who welcomed re-cruminations against the ecclesiastical policy of Napoleon. The Papal

grievances were summed up under five headings: liberty of worship and of the Press; the *Code Napoléon* in its dealings with divorce, usury, etc.; the Organic Articles; the appointment of laymen as Ministers of Public Worship. Finally the repeal of the Concordat was recommended; "for in order to save France from a schism, the Pope had been forced to accept whatever could be obtained from a Government which considered religion as a branch of politics and was secretly bent upon its destruction."

A few days after this dangerous step Consalvi arrived at Paris. He made an enemy of della Genga by explaining in bitter terms how unnecessary and even detrimental his action had been. Forced to go on to London, he did not return to Paris until July. He found the reaction at the helm. The Abbé de Montesquiou, as Minister of the Interior, which then included the administration of Public Worship, and Talleyrand, as Minister of Foreign Affairs, backed, in the name of the King, the views of della Genga. The Concordat was assumed to have been extorted and was to be revised before Pius VII would crown the King at Reims, a ceremony which never took place. In order to save the personal dignity of the Pope, all transactions which had passed between France and the Holy See since 1797 were declared null and void, the French invasion having impeded his liberty of action. The King promised to restore and to endow the 132 old bishoprics, if, on his part, the Pope consented to summon the Bishops of the Concordat, the *Évêques de circonstance*, as Montesquiou called them, to tender their resignation. Of the Bishops who had been deposed in 1801 and who had refused to resign, only ten or twelve were still alive. They considered themselves to be alone legitimate, and looked upon the others as *intrus*, and upon the Pope as a *prévaricateur*.

Consalvi was horrified to hear that a Bishop, Cortois de Pressigny, was on his way to Rome as Envoy Extraordinary. The Cardinal realised what was at stake, if the Pope was to own to a mistake in his government of the Church. He forestalled Pressigny by a special courier. He implored both the Pope and Pacca not to concede the reinstatement of the deposed Bishops, except by granting fresh canonical institutions as well as separate Bulls. Consalvi further advised that time should be gained, and that firmness should be combined with assurances of goodwill towards the person of the King, always well received in France. In a letter, dated from Vienna, Consalvi wrote to Pacca that France was really little known in Rome. As a proof of it he enclosed the text of new Organic Articles far more stringent than those of Napoleon, which Louis XVIII, in the month of August, had proposed to his Cabinet. However, Consalvi gave up the Concordat in its original form, because Rome was anxious to secure the concessions of the King. Consequently, he proposed alterations based on the Concordat of 1516, or even an entirely new agreement. The question was still under consideration in Rome, when the return from Elba postponed all ecclesiastical negotiations until 1816.

After the Congress at Vienna, Consalvi, on his return to Rome, was again the official head of the Government, but while at Vienna, and later during the negotiations with England, his liberty of action had been checked by contrary influences. He had only spent twenty-six days in London. They sufficed to enlist all his sympathies for England, where the friendly attitude of Pius VII since 1809 had not been forgotten. In Vienna the English had fought for the interests of the Papacy. Since the days of Pitt the great problem of Catholic Emancipation occupied the minds of politicians. Lord Castlereagh entered into a close friendship with Consalvi. He still hoped to bring about an understanding with Rome on the lines of the Bill which had been thrown out in 1813. The conditions of that Bill, described in a later chapter, were submitted to Quarantotti, the Vice-Prefect of the Propaganda. With certain limitations he accepted them in February, 1814.

But the influence of O'Connell was now in the ascendant. The Irish rejected all interference in their religious concerns on the part of a Protestant King. They declared Quarantotti's rescript to be nothing else than the violation of the Irish Church discipline concerning the election of Bishops. In vain Consalvi warned the Curia not to sacrifice Emancipation, which was already anything but popular in England, to the obstinacy of the Irish. The Pope was himself desirous that the Irish Bishops should be brought to make concessions. Nevertheless, the Pope did not persuade the Irish to concede anything on the questions at issue.

Consalvi's next task, in 1815, concerned Russia. It had been proposed to appoint a Metropolitan at Vilna. The Congregation in Rome refused to acquiesce, because the powers with which he was to be endowed would have reduced the Pope to a figure-head. When, at the same time, all other concessions were refused Consalvi intervened. He needed the goodwill of the Emperor Alexander in temporal matters, and won his favour by conceding him the right to propose candidates for sees. It was done, not in so many words, but virtually, by the support given by the Pope to the candidates of the schismatic sovereign, notwithstanding that de Maistre, in 1816, and Consalvi, so late as 1823, suspected the Archbishop of Mohileff of schismatic leanings. The Polish Constitution of 1815 placed the Catholic Church under Imperial patronage. The hierarchy was to be endowed with inalienable landed property and the Bishops had seats in the Royal Senate.

Among the Catholic States Spain gave the example of fierce reaction. The Nuncio Gravina exercised a fateful influence over Ferdinand VII, the worst sovereign restored to power on the fall of Napoleon. His Government identified itself with the Inquisition, and with the enforcement of orthodoxy. The Jesuits reentered Spain, and the religious Orders again took possession of their convents. All who had bought ecclesiastical property were compelled to make full restitution

without compensation. The clergy of earlier days had accepted the reforms of Charles III and also the Concordats of 1753 and 1780, which, in accordance with the old Spanish principle, restored ecclesiastical patronage to the Crown. The Spanish clergy now supported the extremest claims of the hierarchy. The Pope and Consalvi, on the other hand, fully realised that, unless the impoverished State was permitted to tax the clergy, the Catholic monarchy would soon perish. In April, 1817, four Bulls were willingly published, empowering the reforming Minister Garay to do so. Moreover an offer was made of an extraordinary ecclesiastical contribution of thirty millions for the next six years, and the use of certain other ecclesiastical revenues for State purposes. Gravina was recalled, and succeeded by Giustiniani, a sensible man, who plainly showed his intention of discountenancing reaction. It was, however, impossible either then or later to break down the fanatical and ultimately useless resistance of the clergy. It was not the fault of Consalvi that it raised a storm of anti-clerical passion which swept over Catholic Spain, resulting in fierce riots, civil wars, and revolutions ruinous to the country and the dynasty.

Among the Italian Princes the pious Victor Emanuel, King of Sardinia, paid homage to the Pope. He besought the Roman authorities to ease his conscience by a special brief confirming the secularisations of convents and Church property, which had occurred during the revolutionary period. The indults by which the Crown had held the right of nominating the Bishops were not ratified; but the same rights were granted by a new Bull. In return, the King was to restore the ecclesiastical jurisdiction and the convents. Further he was to make important financial concessions and prohibit the teaching of Gallican doctrines. On these bases a Concordat was afterwards signed by Leo XII. Meanwhile a new spirit awoke in Piedmont. A memorandum of the President of the Senate declared that the aspirations of Rome were a danger to the State. The appointment of a Nuncio at Turin was refused. In 1816 Consalvi complained of arbitrary appointments to Chapters and benefices, notwithstanding all the concessions which had been granted. So early as 1815 the future leader of the Catholic reaction, Count Joseph de Maistre, Minister to the Court of St Petersburg, advised the King to put himself at the head of the Italians. He warned him to observe the spirit born of the Revolution and to appoint men who represented it to posts in the Civil Service and even to positions at Court. He advocated the marriage of the heir to the throne with a Russian Princess, so as to escape from dependence on Austria. His advice was unheeded, and Charles Albert wooed a bride in Florence.

In Tuscany, though in a somewhat milder form, the old administration revived, which in 1786 had produced friction between the Curia and the Grand Duke, afterwards the Emperor Leopold. His adviser, Scipione Ricci, Bishop of Prato and Pistoia, had, on the eve of the

Revolution, made a fruitless attempt to reform the Church on Jansenist principles. The scheme failed, but the tradition survived. The clergy remained subject in all temporal matters to the jurisdiction of the State, which recalled the Orders but continued to superintend the management of their property.

Since the days of Pius VI relations with Naples had been strained. The King refused to send the customary tribute to St Peter, on the plea that all feudal dues had ceased to exist. The Pope retaliated by threatening him with the wrath of God; he refused confirmation to 86 out of 130 Bishops in the Two Sicilies when the King showed his intention of carrying on the strife. A Concordat became an imperative necessity, and was concluded in 1818, thanks to a personal understanding between the Minister Medici and Consalvi, at Terracina. It was entirely in the interest of the Curia. The King presented the candidates for the 85 bishoprics. The Pope examined his selections and moreover exercised a considerable influence in the appointments to minor posts. Intercourse with Rome was freed from all constraint, and the spiritual jurisdiction of the King was considerably limited. The ecclesiastical Courts resumed their sittings, and the convents, in so far as endowments were still available, were restored. Education was under the control of the Bishops. They could call upon the Government to interfere with the dissemination of pernicious books. Ecclesiastical property that had not been sold was restored to the Church, which had the right of adding to its possessions. The Pope was to receive 12,000 ducats a year out of the income of the bishoprics; and the clergy were promised a compensation for the loss of exemption from taxation. The skill of Consalvi was met half-way by the King's great desire to use the Church as a support of absolutism. Many of the clauses favourable to Rome were, however, restricted in the following years; and the apostolic Legation of the King, which gave him certain direct powers over the Church, was maintained in Sicily in contravention of an article of the Concordat.

In France, in the autumn of 1815, after Richelieu had become Chief Minister, Blacas, the confidant of the King, carried to Rome proposals for a fresh Concordat. Even when toned down and in their ultimate form, they involved most far-reaching concessions. The Pope was not pressed for any retraction concerning 1801, but was simply asked to reestablish the Concordat of 1516, whereby Leo X had, in return for considerable material benefits, transferred to the Crown the right of ecclesiastical appointment which had belonged to the Chapters. Louis XVIII offered in return to abolish the Organic Articles appended to the Concordat of 1801, in so far as they were in contradiction with Canon Law and the doctrine of the Church. He further intended to establish a large number of new bishoprics and to endow them accordingly, either with State securities or

settlements on landed property. In urgent cases the Pope and the King should be empowered to depose or transfer Bishops without their consent. Further concessions were promised. In June, 1817, Pius VII signed the Concordat, which met nearly all his wishes. He promulgated it to the Christian world, and in July issued Bulls fixing the areas of the new sees. But the renewal of his protest with regard to Avignon and the Venaissin gave rise to an exceedingly bitter feeling in France; and the fact that this Concordat, involving as it did changes in internal administration, required the approval of the Chambers, had been ignored in Rome and overlooked in Paris. It met there with a fierce opposition, backed by public opinion. Bishops who saw their sees menaced appealed to Gallican liberties, and the new delimitation of the dioceses was rejected. The Liberals raised a cry against a return to the Middle Ages, against an attack on religious liberty, and against tampering with the Charter. Richelieu was forced to abandon the Concordat in the shape approved of by the King. The new scheme contained alterations which Rome deemed unacceptable. Consalvi complained, not without cause, that the French Government had not kept faith. It had forced the Pope, much against his will, to cancel the Concordat of 1801, and it now rejected a new treaty. But it was entirely owing to the moderation of Consalvi that the French episcopate consented to a peaceful arrangement with Rome. The Pope was brought to accept as sole compensation the gradual increase in the number of bishoprics, to be carried into effect in accordance with constitutional forms. In August, 1819, this temporary confirmation of the Concordat of 1801 became definite.

The momentous episode led to fresh complications. Metternich was greatly displeased by the far-going concessions of the Catholic Powers to the Curia. In the Austrian hereditary States the ecclesiastical legislation of the latter days of Maria Theresa and Joseph II had been in practice softened, but it was still in force. Francis I tolerated no opposition to it and ruled his Italian kingdom in the same spirit. He found the Napoleonic Concordat of 1803 still in force in Lombardy and upheld it in spite of the disapproval of Rome. In Venetian territory, where Canon Law had been adopted after the fall of the Republic, he met with opposition from the clergy, who considered the Austrian laws, especially those relating to marriage, an encroachment on ecclesiastical jurisdiction. Nevertheless they were upheld. The Pope elected an administrator for the vacant Patriarchate of Venice, and Consalvi warmly supported him. In 1816, however, the Emperor installed a vicar of his own choice. He insisted on the *Placetum regium*, i.e. the necessity of royal sanction for the publication of Papal or Ecclesiastical decrees, and declared that Bishops in his dominions were not bound to visit Rome, either for examination or for consecration. The Jesuits and other Orders were not recalled. The catechism was taught only in the churches; the schools were

controlled by the State. Consalvi had hoped to conclude a Concordat with Austria; but he had no chance of success. The Emperor was devout and a sincere believer, but immovable in ecclesiastical matters. In 1816 Metternich was instructed to claim from Rome for the Austrian Crown the right to nominate to all the episcopal sees and high ecclesiastical posts in the Venetian territory and in Ragusa, as well as to subdivide the dioceses in Lombardy, in Venice, Tyrol, and the Vorarlberg. Metternich constantly represented to Rome that he was unable to contend against the Febronian principles largely held by the Austrian bureaucracy and even by the clergy. But he was himself so far from holding the ultramontane views of his latter years that the pretensions of the Curia had no more decided opponent. In 1817 he went to Italy, and Consalvi anxiously expected him in Rome. Metternich did not come. "The extraordinary compliance which France had shown in settling the Concordat" induced him, on the contrary, to break off all official correspondence with Consalvi. He wrote to the Emperor Francis, explaining how he intended to profit by the "consternation" caused by his not appearing at the Papal Court to obtain by means of a private and confidential correspondence all the concessions claimed by his sovereign.

In 1819, after thus preparing the ground, he accompanied Francis to Rome. Pius VII avoided all points of controversy, and expressed such moderate and reasonable opinions that the Emperor wished he had a Bishop like the Pope to oppose the exorbitant pretensions of the Curia. Metternich came to the desired understanding with Consalvi.

Already in 1815 ecclesiastical affairs in Germany had occupied the attention of the Congress at Vienna. Metternich had forced Consalvi to promise not to enter upon private negotiations with German Princes without his consent. He himself wanted a German Concordat to be concluded at the *Bundestag* at Frankfort. His confidant was his cousin Henry von Wessenberg, the friend and Coadjutor of Dalberg, the Prince Primate. Through Wessenberg he hoped to induce Germany to accept principles "which are really ours, without our seeming to impose them." What Metternich, Dalberg, Wessenberg, and their followers strove for was a German national Church, according to the doctrine of *Febronius*, of the Gallicans, the Emperor Joseph, and the resolutions of Ems.

It was found impossible in Vienna to recast the ecclesiastical organisation of Germany. Consalvi demanded in vain the restoration of the Holy Roman Empire, the reinstatement of the ecclesiastical electorates, and the restitution of Church property. When his demands remained unheeded, he entered a Papal protest. Equally little was obtained at Frankfort. Dalberg died in 1817. His (still unconfirmed) Coadjutor at Constance, Wessenberg, was summoned to Rome to answer for his conduct regarding ecclesiastical reforms. He was called upon to retract; and, notwithstanding the intercession of the Grand Duke of

Baden and his selection by his clergy, he was not made a Bishop, but, on the contrary, the diocese was suppressed. From that time Wessenberg ceased to play a part in ecclesiastical politics. His disgrace in Rome caused the plan of a German Concordat to be abandoned. Metternich then proposed as a possible compromise that separate Concordats should be drawn up on a common basis, as no single Prince would be so blind as to make greater concessions to the Curia than the other German sovereigns.

Bavaria was the first to demand her own separate national Church. Since the dissolution of the Empire the Bavarian territorial alterations with the consequent new subdivision of bishoprics had necessitated an understanding with Rome. The attempt, however, had repeatedly failed. From 1524 until the beginning of the nineteenth century Bavaria had been steadily reactionary in domestic affairs, though predisposed to a State Church. The most important purely German Catholic State passed as being the stronghold of the Counter-reformation. It was transformed in the days of Napoleon by a foreigner of great abilities, the Savoyard Count Montgelas. This Voltairian statesman secularised and reformed so ruthlessly that he lost Tyrol. At the Congress of Vienna Bavaria had successfully laboured for the exclusion of ecclesiastical affairs from the competence of the Diet. Montgelas wanted a Bavarian Concordat with the Papacy after the Napoleonic example, but he overrated the decadence of Papal power and was blind to the reviving Ultramontane feeling in the Catholic world. When, in 1814, he resumed negotiations for a Concordat, Pius VII replied to his overtures by demanding the abolition of all Bavaria's ecclesiastical reforms, viz., the equal treatment of Churches, secular control of schools, and recognition of mixed marriages. The Crown Prince, Marshal Wrede, the King's daughter, Caroline Augusta, who was a friend of the Jesuits and was now married to the Emperor Francis, Metternich, and all Church influences, combined against Montgelas; and in February, 1817, he was suddenly dismissed.

It remained all important for the Curia to influence the attitude of the German Protestant Princes by exacting from Bavaria the greatest possible concessions. The plan succeeded, owing not a little to the mismanagement of Häffelin, the Bavarian Minister in Rome. Häffelin was a priest, who had formerly belonged to the freethinking *Illuminati*, and was now created a Cardinal in recognition of his accommodating conduct. The *Zelanti* of the *Congregazione degli affari ecclesiastici* framed the Bavarian Concordat on the principle that not the ecclesiastical laws of the country but Canon Law alone should obtain in Bavaria. In return for the grant of two archbishoprics and six bishoprics to be filled by the King's nomination, Bavaria conceded the right of the Bishops to supervise schools and morals and to demand from the State the suppression of pernicious books; new monasteries might be founded and Canon Law was to take precedence of Bavarian State Law. It was the most complete

submission made by a modern State. At the same time the Curia received the promise that the Concordat should become part of the Constitution of the kingdom. This was settled in 1817, consequently before the French Concordat was, against the wish of the Pope, brought before the French Chambers and rejected.

The Bavarian Constitution established equality for the three religious denominations, religious freedom and liberty of conscience, State control over education and over the administration of Church property, taxation of all citizens. All these provisions were contrary to Canon Law, but they already existed in the religious edict of 1809. In 1818, the Constitution and the Concordat were simultaneously promulgated. The treaty with Rome excited much indignation, and the King himself repented of his concessions. As yet the Pope had not confirmed the episcopal appointments, which the King had made only on the strength of a Papal indult, which granted him that right for ever. Rumour spoke already of a schism, because Catholics were forbidden by the Pope to take the unconditional oath to the Constitution. In these circumstances Consalvi resumed the direction of the difficult negotiations. He saved the chief clauses of the Concordat by obtaining a statement from the King, to the effect that the Constitutional oath referred only to civil life, not to Divine laws or Catholic doctrine. But an edict was promulgated which "interpreted" the Concordat by repudiating its intentions and reaffirming the previous conditions of ecclesiastical affairs. The antagonism between spiritual and secular authority remained latent for the moment. The Concordat, still in force in Bavaria, secures for the Church her independence and provides for public worship and the maintenance of the clergy at the expense of the State. The Jesuits are excluded from the country.

Prussia, like the whole of Protestant Germany, had been regarded since the Peace of Westphalia as a mission country. The chiefs of the mission were the Bishops, and, in case of the complete secularisation of a bishopric, it was governed by an apostolic vicar. Prussia was not forced to regulate the ecclesiastical conditions of her Catholic subjects until she had absorbed the ecclesiastical States on the Rhine and in Westphalia. The Catholics complained that for twenty-five years the western bishoprics had been left vacant, that the episcopate had nearly died out, that the Catholic Church in the Prussian State had been completely wrecked by the course of political events, so that, with the exception of the faith itself, everything had to be entirely reconstructed. It was fortunate that the great historian Niebuhr was appointed Prussian Minister to the Holy See. Niebuhr occupied a singular position. He was a sincere Christian, inclined towards mysticism. In the Catholic Church, as he understood it, the Temporal Power was doomed. But his Conservative creed taught him to respect what existed. He expected from Governments civil reforms; he held that the State

should leave the Church in freedom, and should not attempt ecclesiastical reforms. He quoted Lessing, "who had expressed his disgust at *Febronius* and his doings." He knew that the attempt to liberate the episcopate and the Church in accordance with the ideas of Wessenberg would enlist the sympathy of very few Catholics, and be looked upon with indifference by Protestants. On the Rhine and in Westphalia it would only make Catholics disaffected. Niebuhr wished for adequate provision for the support of the clergy, for Catholic schools, universities, and seminaries for the education of priests. He claimed for the Bishops the right to exercise ecclesiastical censure. Should the Bishops exercise this right in an injudicious or tyrannical manner, the Church, not the State, would suffer. Mixed marriages already formed the subject of debate with Rome. Niebuhr proposed that marriages between Catholics should be legal in the eye of the State, when contracted according to Canon Law, and that as regards declarations of nullity and separation Canon Law should decide. This compromise proved a failure. It was only after years of bitter strife and long negotiations that the convention between Prussia and the Curia, described in a later chapter, was arrived at. The examples of France and Bavaria had been sufficient warning against a Concordat. The election of the Bishops was left to the Chapters, who were enjoined by Papal brief to propose only worthy persons for the King's approval. The Pope gratefully accepted the endowments offered by the State, and gave his consent to the new diocesan areas. Hardenberg's presence in Rome (1821) settled the remaining difficulties with Prussia.

Hanover made Erastian claims, which caused the negotiations for a Concordat with that kingdom to be abandoned. It was only in 1824, under Leo XII, that Consalvi's concessions were reluctantly accepted. The Hanoverian Government thereby kept the right of veto on Bishops chosen for her two Catholic sees.

Consalvi and the Pope had a worse experience in dealing with the Commission of Frankfort in 1819, which was entrusted with the ecclesiastical affairs of the smaller German States of the ecclesiastical province of the Upper Rhine, headed by Baden and Württemberg. It was proposed that the parish priests and Bishops should present three candidates for a bishopric, of whom the sovereign should select one. The Metropolitan was to accept him, in spite of Papal objections, if such were considered unfounded, or if the Pope's disapproval was not made known within the limited time. This proposal was rejected in Rome as treasonable to the Church. The Pope declined to invest Protestant Princes with a kind of patronage over Catholic Churches which he had refused to Napoleon. In these circumstances nothing was attained except a fresh distribution of the dioceses. The five new episcopal sees were only filled under Leo XII, 1827-9.

The influence of Metternich, who, from 1819, became in ecclesiastical

matters more friendly to the Curia, brought about in Baden a turn of events highly favourable to Rome; the Grand Duchy accepted conditions similar to those existing in Prussia. The conditions were offered as an ultimatum to the other States, and finally accepted.

Through these four treaties, with Bavaria, Prussia, Hanover, and the ecclesiastical Province of the Upper Rhine, the Catholic Church in Germany, excluding the mission country administered by the Propaganda, was reorganised and endowed. Consalvi did not arrive at a similar result either with Switzerland or with the Netherlands. The Pope and the Belgian Bishops in 1815 had condemned the Constitution of the Netherlands on the ground that liberty of religious worship and of the Press was not acceptable to Catholics. The Constitution, however, was carried against them. The request of the Netherlands, that the Concordat of 1801 existing in Belgium should be extended to Holland, was refused by the Curia in 1818, on the ground that there was no reason to renew such concessions. Negotiations which lasted for nine years ended in 1827 with the extension of that Concordat to the Netherlands, but excluding from it the right of the State to select Bishops, which was refused to a non-Catholic King. At the same time, a Bull sanctioned a revision of diocesan areas. The Government delayed the execution of the Treaty, and the Revolution of 1830 rendered it inoperative in Belgium. With the support of the Belgian Liberal Catholics, who adopted the doctrines of Lamennais, the Catholic Church in Belgium, after 1830, was separated from the State, but kept its privileges. The Bishops were nominated by the Pope and chose their parish priests independently of the Government.

The negotiations relating to a bishopric of Luzern were wrecked by jealousies in the Swiss Confederation and by the pretensions of oligarchical magistrates to supervise, not only the administration of Church property, but also the education of the clergy in the seminaries, and their correspondence with Rome. The King of Sardinia had to overcome conscientious difficulties, before he finally consented to meet the wishes of Geneva and to add a few parishes of the bishopric of Chambéry, situated in his territory, to the bishopric of Freiburg. Every Swiss Canton legislated independently, in Church matters as in others. In these negotiations no hierarchical pretension was in theory sacrificed to the State. The conflicting claims tacitly survived. The *Zelanti*, however, brought the serious charge against Consalvi that he was a mere opportunist, and had, for the sake of a *modus vivendi*, not pressed claims he might have established. The Pope was aged and infirm: the conviction of statesmen, that after him negotiations would become still more difficult, facilitated the task of Consalvi; and even the reactionary pontificate of Leo XII was compelled to uphold the policy which he had inaugurated.

The era of the Concordats was also that of the Congresses. The reactionary Powers succeeded in subduing by military force the revolutions

in Spain, Portugal, Naples, and Piedmont. The necessity, as Gentz put it to Chateaubriand, of opposing the alliance of European Powers to the progress of disorganisation and to the common danger of conspiracies, also governed Metternich's policy towards Rome. The position of Consalvi never proved more difficult than during the revolution at Naples, which spread to the Papal *enclaves*, Benevento and Ponte-Corvo, and threatened the Patrimony itself. The Spanish Constitution of 1812 had been proclaimed in Naples, and had found supporters in Rome, even among the Cardinals. The Sanfedists hoped to rid themselves by a Counter-revolution of the system called by them the tyranny of Consalvi. They wished to establish a constitution which recognised no other denomination than the Roman Catholic religion. The elections were to be carried out with religious ceremonies, and secular priests were to be eligible as deputies. Proclamations and posters in this sense were to be seen side by side with manifestos of the *Carbonari* proclaiming death to the priests and calling for a republic. But the Austrians put the revolution down in a couple of weeks. During this crisis, which threatened him in a twofold manner, Consalvi showed extraordinary moderation and presence of mind.

In the States of the Church the "sects" were so leniently treated that even murderers escaped their just punishment. Consalvi resolutely stopped the cruel inquisitorial methods followed by the Cardinals San Severino and Rusconi in the Romagna. He informed Prince Metternich that order had been restored in Rome and in the provinces. He asserted, for the Pope, the right of absolute neutrality and did his utmost to prevent the Austrians from marching into Papal territory and occupying Ancona; but he was unsuccessful. At Laibach and Verona the Papal Nuncio, Cardinal Spina, upheld this policy of non-intervention, to which Consalvi remained faithful, even when in Spain and Portugal an anti-Roman movement threatened schism and was supported by part of the clergy. The convents were suppressed; some of the revenues of the Curia were curtailed and others abolished; the Nuncio in Madrid received his passports; the Patriarchate in Portugal was arbitrarily reduced to Metropolitan rank, and Church property was confiscated. Nevertheless in 1823, after the French occupation of Spain, the Curia refused to inflict ecclesiastical censures. As in 1821 with regard to Naples, so now Consalvi unhesitatingly declared that ineffective threats would compromise the Pope and even expose him to ridicule.

Until the rising in Naples was put down, Pius VII refrained from renewing expressly against the *Carbonari* his former condemnation of the Freemasons. When, at Tropau in 1821, the three Powers, Austria, Russia, and Prussia, demanded of the Italian Courts the gradual introduction of indispensable reforms, Consalvi rejected this interference in internal affairs of the States of the Church as incompatible with Papal

independence. His own position towards his opponents would thereby have become more difficult. He warned Metternich that, if the Pope supported, even indirectly, constitutional reforms in the kingdom of the Two Sicilies, he could not refuse similar institutions in the States of the Church, nor could he condemn the Spanish Constitution of 1812, which admitted no other than the Catholic religion. Metternich's proposal for common action against the Revolution, and especially for the establishing of a central committee to supervise and punish political offences in the Italian peninsula, was rejected in 1823 at Verona, in consequence of the combined opposition of the Papal and Tuscan Governments.

On August 21, 1823, Consalvi lost his father, friend, and master, Pius VII. Although seriously ill himself, he attended the Pope in his last sickness. After the customary prayers by the bedside he could not control himself, sank on his knees, burst into tears and kissed the feet of the Pontiff. However different the mild Pius VII, so strong in misfortune and so conciliatory in action, was from his energetic and resolute Minister, each possessed that constancy of purpose, kindness of heart, and devotion to duty, which left on this pontificate a mark of grandeur, and won for its head the reverence and love of mankind. Consalvi himself died on January 24, 1824. In his will he desired that all the presents he had received should be sold, and the money employed to pay for the monument of the Pope, in the church of St Peter, on which Thorwaldsen was at work. Metternich acknowledges that, during the most trying moments of their long relations, Consalvi never failed in perfect courtesy, and never betrayed a sign of disappointment. He left this world with the sentiments of sincere piety which had dominated his life.

Pius VII, as well as Consalvi, was a lover of art. In the year 1822 the *Braccio Nuovo* of the Vatican Museum was opened. The excavations were continued without stint. Canova and Thorwaldsen were favourites of the Pope. In the old convent of San Isidoro, the German school of painters revived Christian art. Here Overbeck of Lübeck, Pforr of Frankfort, Cornelius of Düsseldorf, Schadow, Veit, Führich, and others, led a monastic life, and lived only for art. When the brotherhood dispersed, its members carried their tradition far and wide. There was no literary life, but Consalvi never gave up the predilections of his youth for classical poetry. Amongst the many foreigners who visited Rome, one of the most distinguished was Elizabeth, Dowager-Duchess of Devonshire, a lady of great charm and cultivation of mind, who became Consalvi's devoted friend and ardent admirer. Her house was the centre of the world of artists and men of letters. The Duchess was beloved by the Romans as the benefactress of the poor, and only survived the Cardinal by two months.

Annibale della Genga, the new Pope of the *Zelanti*, was elected on

September 28, 1823, against the will of Austria, and took the name of Leo XII. His biographers relate that soon after his election, lying ill at the Quirinal, he sent for the dying Consalvi, who, during the Conclave, had energetically opposed his candidature. After an interview of two hours the Pope appointed the Cardinal Prefect of the Propaganda, expressing his admiration for his views, and the wish to benefit by his advice. For this it was too late. Cardinal della Somaglia, a man of eighty, who had coveted power for forty years, was made Secretary of State. The severe, almost monastical system of Leo XII destroyed much that Consalvi had painfully constructed.

Leo XII's first encyclical repudiated toleration as indifference, and censured the Bible Societies. The secret societies were solemnly condemned in 1826. Cardinal Rivarola, the originator of the reaction of 1814, and Legate at Ravenna, endeavoured without legal procedure and by secret inquisitorial methods to root out the *Carboneria*. In three months he condemned 508 persons. In seven cases he pronounced sentences of death, which however were not carried out. Under the "Precesto Politico" 368 persons were placed under police supervision and forced to spiritual observances. In Faenza, where it had come to open war between the Sanfedists and the *Carbonari*, Rivarola had recourse to the idea of arranging marriages between hostile families. The people humorously called them marriages between cats and dogs. An attempt to assassinate Rivarola, who fled to Genoa, caused him to be replaced by the prelate Invernizzi at the head of a commission which, by a system of paid informers, filled the prisons. Seven executions at Ravenna and two in Rome spread terror amongst the people, who, in the first-named city, fled into the country on the day of the executions. Invernizzi now changed his tactics. He promised a pardon to members of the "sects," in exchange for a voluntary confession, and did not further molest the thousands who came pouring in, but left them exposed to the suspicion and revenge of the Sanfedists. A Spaniard, Marco y Catalan, was against his own will appointed Governor of Rome, and even regulated worldly amusements, so that, for instance, waltzing was forbidden. The persecution of the Jews, who were confined to the Ghettos throughout the States of the Church, and the restriction preventing them from buying property, induced all the rich Jews to emigrate. By means of *Motuproprios* of October, 1824, and December, 1827, Leo XII abolished the organisation of his predecessor. The Provincial Councils were suppressed. Civil offenders were tried by a single judge. The episcopal jurisdiction was extended to all cases concerning ecclesiastical persons or property, blasphemy, breaches of the commandments of the Church, or sins against the seventh Commandment. A congregation for studies supervised the entire educational system, which was entrusted to a great extent to the Jesuits, and paralysed initiative.

The Pope wished to do everything by himself, and worked incessantly. He mistrusted his officials as a class to such an extent that he instituted a *Congregazione di Vigilanza*, which was to watch them and to examine the complaints made against them. The effect was to develop a system of delation. Moreover, notwithstanding the diminution of taxation and earnest endeavours of the Pope, the finances, during this pontificate of five years, became more and more confused, and Consalvi's financial successes were undone. The Pope, who lived most frugally himself, lavished money upon public works, especially upon churches and convents, and began the rebuilding of the Basilica of St Paul without the walls, which was destroyed by fire.

Leo XII was a friend of ecclesiastical reform, and conferred the Cardinal's hat on the sole representative of such views in the Roman prelature of that time. This personage was Giuseppe Antonio Sala, a prelate of the Dataria, who had been frequently employed by Pius VII and Consalvi in the negotiations with France and Germany. Sala had already outlined plans of reform under Pius VI, and at the time of the French invasion his diary throws a lurid light on the condition of the Roman secular clergy and of the convents. The Revolution seemed to him to be a judgment of Heaven. "Fire and sword must be applied," he says, "to purify the clergy; there is no other hope." But Sala equally hated the Jansenists, the French, the Concordat of 1801, and regarded every attempt to adapt modern views to the Church as an unmixed calamity. In 1800 at Venice, and again in 1815 in Rome, he advocated ecclesiastical reforms in a Roman spirit, by strict adherence to the decrees of Trent. At the same time he insisted on the absolute separation between the spiritual and the temporal, terming the latter "merely accidental and secondary." Sala wished to see the administration of the States of the Church entrusted nearly exclusively to well-qualified laymen. A serious attempt to carry out these proposals for reform was never made, but some of the numberless measures adopted by Leo XII, and also his dislike for the prelature, show how great the influence of Sala must in fact have been.

In matters of foreign policy the Austrian influence now waned before the French. Chateaubriand became French ambassador in Rome in 1828. At the same time the Ministry of Martignac in Paris broke with the clerical reaction, and the June Ordinances were published, which placed the small seminaries under the control of the University, limited the number of ecclesiastical students, and prohibited religious Orders not recognised by law, consequently also the Jesuits, from teaching. Leo XII promulgated a Brief approving the Ordinances. In a conversation with Chateaubriand, he reiterated that they did not injure religious interests. He described O'Connell's attitude as inconsiderate and violent, and denied his assertion that a Concordat with England was pending. Things were not ripe for that. "Jesus Christ,"

he added, "never spoke of the forms of government, but simply enjoined obedience to authority."

With Leo XII, who died, hated by the people, on February 10, 1829, the attempt to force medieval conditions upon the States of the Church did not end. Castiglione, a decrepit old man, was elected Pope on March 31 and took the name of Pius VIII. Chateaubriand, who got hold of the diary of a Conclavist, says that a letter of the Vicar-General of the Jesuits—Pavani—which he thus came to know, opened his eyes. "I had thought Pascal a calumniator, who had bequeathed us an everlasting lie. Pascal did not exaggerate. The letter of Pavani, worthy of Escobar, deserves a place in the *Provinciales*. The Society, suspected even by the Sacred College, but recently reestablished and universally detested, nevertheless thinks itself entitled to dispose of the tiara and to meddle in everything. Their audacity is great." Chateaubriand, who left Rome soon after, advised the Conclave to choose a Pope suitable to the time. In his reports he predicts the future unity of Italy and scorns the confusion of ideas which mistook an irresistible movement for the machinations of a handful of Jacobins. The primary cause of the decline of the Papal Government was its financial condition. "The taxes," he says, "amount to fifty millions, and hardly leave the landowner one per cent. of his income; the duties bring next to nothing; smuggling is universal. The Duke of Modena has erected on his own territory a warehouse for goods subject to duty, which after nightfall are smuggled into Bolognese territory. Italy is ripe for revolution." Such were his last words on the eve of the crisis of 1830.

Pius VIII and his Secretary of State, Albani, to whom the Pope owed his election, only governed for twenty months. Pius VIII got rid of the system of spies which his predecessor had organised, but did not prevent Albani, who was anything but esteemed, from strengthening the Sanfedists, and continuing irritating political inquiries, thereby strengthening the revolutionary societies. Riots and disorder at Cesena, Imola, Bologna, preceded the storm of 1830 in the States of the Church. Pius VIII lived to see Catholic Emancipation in England, and did not hesitate to recognise the July Monarchy. He died on November 30, 1830, with a last useless appeal for peace in Italy. While the Conclave was sitting for the election of his successor, the Roman police frustrated a plot headed by the brothers Bonaparte. With the assistance of discontented officers, they had intended to raise the cry of "Italy, Rome, Liberty," and revolutionise the Eternal City. The Bonapartes fled. On February 2, 1831, Mauro Capellari, a monk and a theologian, was elected, and took the name of Gregory XVI. He came from Belluno in the Venetian territory, and was the author of writings defending the Papal sovereignty and infallibility as well as the monarchical constitution of the Church. As his Secretary of State he appointed Bernetti, who had already filled that post for a short time under Leo XII.

On February 4 the Revolution broke out in Bologna, spreading over the Romagna, the Marches, and even over Umbria. Papal soldiers passed over to the enemy. Hired mercenaries perpetrated all kinds of cruelty in Rimini, Ravenna, Forlì, and Cesena. The Legate fled from Bologna, where the Italian tricolour was hoisted, and a provisional Government appointed. The representative of the Pope, Cardinal Benvenuti, was taken prisoner. Within a fortnight four-fifths of the States of the Church had fallen away, and the National Congress at Bologna openly proclaimed the object of the movement to be the unity of Italy. They counted upon the support of France, which, however, failed completely, Louis-Philippe having bound himself to the principle of non-intervention. Gregory XVI demanded help from Austria, which had just suppressed the revolution in Parma and Modena. The Austrian troops entered Bologna on March 21, and ten days afterwards the rising was suppressed.

Consalvi had consistently rejected the interference of foreign Powers in the domestic affairs of the Papal States. Gregory XVI had himself appealed for foreign aid and was thus no longer able to make good any similar claim to independence. A memorandum which was drawn up in Rome in 1831 by the ambassadors of France, Austria, Russia, Prussia, jointly with the representative of England in Florence, demanded an extended amnesty, laymen in the civil service, the establishment of municipal and provincial Councils elected by the people, the institution of a Council of State, and of a Consulta for the Finances, composed of laymen. This was a sequel to the *Motuproprio* of 1816, and equally doomed to failure. Bernetti had to pretend to accept these proposals. With the exception of thirty-eight cases he conceded the amnesty; and on July 5 a *Motuproprio* of the Pope granted a provincial and municipal representation which the Powers considered to be sufficient. The restrictions of 1816 were adhered to. The Government named the Councillors, Rome and the neighbourhood being excluded. Improvements were made in the administration of justice. In the provinces the Courts were composed of laymen, Courts of Appeal were instituted, and the monstrous *Uditore Santissimo* was abolished. The Legates were still to be ecclesiastics, but their officials were to be laymen, that is to say, members of the prelature. However, provincial protests showed that these reforms remained a dead letter. But the representative of England alone realised the danger, and predicted trouble.

The situations in the Legations very soon led to anarchy. With the exception of Comacchio and Ferrara, the Austrians had evacuated the Papal territory in July, 1831, but in January, 1832, they were recalled by the Legate-Cardinal Albani. Thereupon Casimir Périer, the energetic Minister of Louis-Philippe, issued a proclamation to the inhabitants of the rebellious little seaport of Ancona, whither he sent a French fleet. France, he said, had come to support the cause of the people against despotism, and to resist the encroachments of Austria. With the

support of the Liberal Government in England, against the will of the Continental Powers, French troops landed in Ancona, where they remained till 1838. Metternich termed this intervention a violation of international law, Lord Palmerston defended it, and, finally, the Papal Government itself had to submit. The assassination of the Papal Governor of Ancona, the rallying-place of the Liberals, induced Gregory XVI to put the town under an interdict; and the attitude of France changed after Périer's death, on May 16. The French troops drove the Liberals out of the city and helped to restore the Papal authorities. Bernetti, supported by Metternich, refused all further reforms with the explanation that they could only be granted by a Government which was perfectly free. For his defence the Pope counted on his 5000 mercenaries, mostly Swiss, and on the voluntary militia which, under the name of Centurions, were employed by Bernetti in the Romagna in preference to regular troops. These dreaded forces of the Sanfedists, which nominally cost nothing, were maintained at the expense of the Liberals, and exercised a reign of terror which d'Azeglio has called a disgrace to mankind and to religion. In the exceptional tribunals, which had been constituted, the same persons acted as accusers and judges. The proceedings were secret. Repression was the policy of the Government and became more accentuated when Gregory XVI dismissed Bernetti in 1836 and appointed the Genoese, Lambruschini, Secretary of State. Even the Pope had to bow to the despotic will of the new Minister.

Matters were so far settled that at the termination of the Austrian occupation in 1838 the Papal administration was restored in the Legations under the rule of Cardinal-Legates, who, like Amat and Grimaldi at Ravenna and Forlì, did their utmost to lighten the burden of the system. One rising, at Viterbo, was suppressed with inexorable severity by the Delegate Antonelli, the future Secretary of State of Pius IX. The apparent restoration of order, which enabled the Pope to travel through the Marches, proved delusive. In 1843 bodies of freebooters gathered in the Romagna. Mastai, Bishop of Imola, and two Cardinals, who happened to be with him, were very nearly taken prisoners by Ribotti, a leader of these bands. Ribotti escaped. The severe Legate Spinola was superseded by the still sterner Cardinal Vannicelli. In May, 1844, seven sentences of death were carried out; and his rule was so inflexible that the Cardinal-Legates Amat in Ravenna and Gizzi in Forlì helped the victims of his Courts-martial to fly, and protested against proceedings which could have no effect in pacifying the country. The insurgents addressed from Rimini in 1845 an appeal to the Papal Government, praying once more in moderate language for the redress of grievances impossible to bear. They demanded a general amnesty and a new civil and penal code, abolition of confiscation of landed property and of sentence of death for crimes of treason, emancipation of

laymen from ecclesiastical jurisdiction and from the Inquisition in matters of faith; the trial of political offences by ordinary Courts; election for municipal Councils subject to the ratification of the Pope. The municipal Councils were to propose candidates for the provincial Councils; these in their turn to nominate for the Council of State. But the three Assemblies were to have merely consultative functions. The petitioners further demanded the right of financial control, and admission to the civil service for laymen who did not belong to the prelature. Public education, with the exception of religious instruction, was to be removed from the control of the Bishops and clergy; the Preventive Censure on publications was not to be abolished, only restricted. Foreign troops were to be disbanded, and a national guard formed. Reforms, such as the experience of well regulated States might show to be beneficial and adapted to the spirit of the age, should be gradually introduced.

The document was drawn up by Farini, who became afterwards the Minister of Pius IX. On many points it was in harmony with the *Motu proprio* of 1816 and the reform projects of 1831. This statement of claims gives a truer picture than any elaborate description of the condition of the Papal States under Gregory XVI. But we may add that in 1846, the year of the Pope's death, the annual deficit amounted to 900,000 *scudi*. The National Debt had risen by 26,000,000. The "Protest of Rimini" against the blind fanatical party which had captured the Pope was addressed in the name of the Roman population to the Princes and the people of Europe, and was read all over Italy. Lambruschini, who once more succeeded in suppressing the rising, disclaimed in a special pamphlet the intention of yielding in any way to the Revolution. The secular Government remained unchanged, committed to a policy of repression, filling the prisons, setting up permanent Courts-martial, and, in the last resort, counting upon the support of Austria.

The spiritual authority of the Pontiff, however, had in this period to deal with questions in comparison with which the interests of the threatened Temporal Power appeared comparatively unimportant. In the early twenties of the nineteenth century religious views within the Catholic Church took a turn which produced modern Ultramontanism. The new tendencies stood in direct contradiction to those of the eighteenth century, to the Jansenist movement and the Febronian ideas which succeeded it.

Since the rule of Fleury, Jansenism was dead in France. Individual Jansenists survived for a long time in private life, under the sting of affliction, in several bishoprics and universities. In Louvain, whence Jansenism had started, Quesnel was supported. Van Espen taught there, and his disciple, Nicolas von Hontheim, wrote under the name of *Febronius*. Hontheim, who was Coadjutor of Trier, and an excellent man, endeavoured, under the influence of Gallican doctrines, to create a

German national ecclesiastical law. He started, in his work, *De statu ecclesiae et de legitima potestate Romani pontificis* (1763), from the assumption that Papal authority, chiefly owing to the forged Decretals, had exceeded its original limits, had been changed into monarchical rule, and should be restored to its original position as it existed in the eight first centuries of the Church. The Papal monarchy should be replaced by an episcopal government. The Pope was to keep the first place among Bishops; his Primacy was to be maintained for the preservation of the unity of the Church. But Christ was the sole Monarch of the Church, guiding her through the Holy Ghost, saving her from error. The infallibility of the Church was, however, not an *infallibilitas revelationis*, but *directionis*; and, on this basis, an understanding between Catholics and Protestants, Hontheim's chief object, could be arrived at. For this practical end he recommended the instruction of the people, the convection of a National Council, the introduction of National Synods. An assembly of Catholic Princes and Bishops of Germany should be called together and a Statute finally limiting the power of the Primacy should be issued. The *placetum regium* and the *appellatio ab abusu* were to be the legal barriers erected against the encroachments of the Curia.

*Febronius* was read in all Catholic countries, attacked and defended, and finally condemned by Clement XIII in 1764. The author retracted in 1778, at the imperious demand of Pius VI. The retractation was ambiguous; but Hontheim died in 1790, at peace with Rome. He had lived to see the four Archbishops of Trier, Mainz, Cologne, and Salzburg draw up at the Congress of Ems, in 1786, 23 articles which, in a Febronian spirit, regulated and partly transformed the position of the German Metropolitan Churches towards Rome. Should the Pope not accept the "Punctations of Ems" within two years, a German National Council was to be summoned, so as to assure their application.

Joseph II, who himself desired the establishment of a national Church placing the episcopate and the clergy under the tutelage of the State, when called upon by the four German Archbishops to carry out the resolutions of Ems, expressed his entire agreement, on condition, however, that the Bishops should previously be brought to concur. This was never accomplished. The subjection to Papal control was in reality a guarantee of independence for these Bishops and for the high ecclesiastical dignitaries in the Empire. They were afraid of losing it, should they be submitted to the strict rule of the Metropolitan authorities or to that of the State, as was the case in Austria. Their opposition, and the doubtful attitude of the Electors of Mainz and Trier, who negotiated privately with the Curia, shattered the plan for the organisation of the German Church even before the death of Joseph II. On the eve of the Revolution, a reform introduced by ecclesiastical Princes who ruled in accordance with the principles of the *Aufklärung*, and of whom not one showed intellectual superiority or dignity of life, was an anachronism.

As Nuncio at Cologne, Pacca had tried to obstruct in every possible way a movement which he termed a conspiracy against the Church. He himself and his followers indiscriminately ascribed it to the Jansenists, the Gallicans, the Philosophers, the Freemasons. He denounced *Febronius* as an infamous book ; he accused Pius VI of neglecting the duties of his supreme office, because he hesitated until 1789, before he threatened the four Archbishops with censure, with the reservation that innovations in Church discipline should really be intended. But it cannot be denied that Hontheim, Gerhard van Swieten, and the priests and theologians of their school, supported many things which the Jansenists of the days of the Abbé de Saint-Cyran and Pascal would have emphatically condemned as the very root of the evil against which they had raised the standard of religious reform. Nevertheless Jansenism was held chiefly responsible for the National Church movement.

After the eighteenth century, all the reactionary powers of the Church were arrayed against the Jansenist and Febronian doctrines. This opposition became a system after the Restoration had become an accomplished fact in continental Europe. It had been preceded by the Romantic movement, an intellectual phase which made for peace in the religious strife. The reaction of sentiment against the exclusive and dry ideals of eighteenth century logic, the love of the past, the revival of the science of history, were so many elements favourable to Catholicism. In the domain of religion Romanticism checked controversy. The struggle against unbelief inclined all Christians to place common faith above merely denominational differences. The Breton Chateaubriand, who knew no other creed than the Roman Catholic, nevertheless called the book which inaugurated French Romanticism *The Genius of Christianity*. In the whole work there is only one passing allusion to the Papacy. When 25 years later Chateaubriand reiterated his confession of faith, it sounded like a protest, which Romanticism would have endorsed, against the aggressive attitude of an altered time : "I belong to the general community of all mankind, who since the creation of the world have prayed to God. Independent of all powers except Him, I am a Christian, without ignoring my weaknesses, without thinking myself better than other men, without being a persecutor, an inquisitor, an informer, without wishing to accuse my brother or to calumniate my neighbour. I am not a sceptic, disguised as a Christian, who considers religion a useful means of compulsion for the people. I explain the Gospel, not in the interest of despotism, but as a comfort for the sorrowing....Those who nowadays would bind the Catholic religion to a particular form of government, and place her in opposition to science and progress, severing her from society as it now stands, would drive nations towards Protestantism instead of realising that this Catholic religion is the highest order, the very essence of reason, is, in fact, light itself."

The same views inspired the German Romantics. Their greatest poet, Novalis, was a Catholic in feeling, died a Protestant, and directed the hope of the future towards an eternal ineffable community, a living Christianity. Their greatest convert, Friedrich Leopold Stolberg, never reviled the faith he abandoned, and mentions Bossuet's eirenical *Exposition de la Foi Catholique* as the book which decided his return to the old Church. Their greatest political writer, Joseph Görres, raised himself to the rank of a "European Power," not only because he attacked Napoleon, but because he represented the cause of nationality and liberty against absolutism. Romanticism became hostile to the Governments, when in Europe the Restoration became identified with the reaction.

The Restoration required a theory strong enough to justify its existence. It was provided before the Counter-revolution began. Its expounders were laymen who had been driven by the excesses of the Revolution into unrelenting hostility to modern methods of government. De Maistre, the greatest of these reactionaries, called the Revolution diabolical; "the Counter-revolution," he says, "is nothing if not Divine."

Chronologically, Karl Ludwig von Haller, the Swiss convert and a jurist, was one of the first representatives of the new political philosophy. His work, *The Restoration of Political Science*, was directed against the doctrines of the *Contrat Social*. According to Haller, the State is a society of persons whose individual requirements produce general laws. These rest on the necessity for help and protection, which can only be accorded by an authority provided with adequate force. The sovereign is only bound by Divine and natural laws. The obedience of the subject is limited by the reciprocal demands of order and liberty. Opposition to authority may be legitimate, but is rarely advisable. Division of powers, representation of the people, and "paper constitutions" are discarded. State Assemblies are restricted to the right of suggestion. The possession of power, even in republics, is not a mere chance, or a simple fact. It is the consequence of the government of the world, and every sovereign rules "by the Grace of God." The chief object of the ecclesiastical State is not to promote justice or well-being, but to inform doctrine. A community of the faithful requires a Church, and a Church must have a hierarchy. Its maintenance necessitates landed property and temporal power. In dangerous times ecumenical Councils are recommended, but placed under the authority of the Head of the Church on earth. The liberty and welfare of individuals is subordinate to doctrine.

The publication of Haller's book in 1816 was regarded as a political event. The Vicomte de Bonald had taught similar theories so early as 1796. He is the advocate of the alliance between the throne and the altar, of the religious and monarchical sovereignty, according to the patriarchal ordinance of the family. All cognition is dependent on

revelation. Man has not the right to substitute his own understanding for the general reason, which is the gift of God and the source of the traditions preserved and handed on by the spiritual authority. Absolute government is best in the State as well as in the Church. Its support is the nobility, which has set an example of self-sacrifice and of strict obedience to duty, in contrast to the modern craving for enjoyment, luxury, and gain. The maintenance of primogeniture, the direction of education by the Church, the abolition of the French Charter, "a work of madness and darkness," the indissolubility of marriage, are conditions laid down by Bonald for the success of the Counter-revolution.

In such theories a far more powerful mind, the Savoyard Count Joseph de Maistre, greeted the expression of his own views. From 1802 until 1817 he represented at the Court of St Petersburg his landless King, who did not understand him, and left him in want. During these years he wrote *Du Pape*, *De l'Église Gallicane*, *Les Soirées de Saint-Pétersbourg*, which have furnished modern Ultramontanism with its general stock of ideas and doctrines. Already, in 1815, de Maistre maintained that, outside his system, the defence of Christianity was impossible. According to him the origin of political institutions is not human but Divine. Generations, past, present, and future, form a whole. A nation is not a chance result but a living organism. Individual reason may err, but the general reason of mankind is infallible. It is entrusted with a treasure of tradition, of Divine origin, which corroborates Christian truth. Sovereignty, whatever name it may assume, comes from God, and its essence is to be not despotic but absolute. It is based, not on human law, but on the unfathomable will of God. Legitimate kings are His delegates and for that very reason subject in spiritual matters to the representative of spiritual sovereignty—the Pope. There is only one true Church, and that is the Catholic. The Pope is its absolute and infallible head. It is not a mistake but a folly to place a Council above a Pope, for without him all decisions are null and void; the duty of obedience is the first duty of all. The originators of rebellion and of revolution alike are the Protestants and their kinsmen the Jansenists, in second line the Gallicans. Perhaps, says de Maistre, we laymen shall be able to provide the Pope with weapons which may prove all the more useful, because they were forged in the rebel camp. De Maistre hardly overrated his powers. He possessed the mind and the wit of Voltaire as well as a splendid eloquence, capable of every form of expression. He was philosophically trained, and read Plato, Bacon, Malthus, Kant, in their own tongue, as well as the Mystics and the Fathers of the Church. He used and misused history for his own ends, as one who knew it well. He did not live to witness the triumph of that regenerated religion, which he had preached, and which according to him was only another name for the restored theocracy. His book *Du Pape* was the only one which he himself published, before his death in 1821. The

mantle of the Prophet fell from his shoulders on those of an eloquent priest, Félicité de Lamennais, the greatest talent of the French Church since Massillon.

He too had begun his literary career with an attack on the Gallicans, on the Jansenists, and on the Organic Articles. In 1817, in his thirty-fourth year, he reluctantly entered the sacred ministry. Between 1817 and 1823 there followed the several volumes of his *Essai sur l'Indifférence en matière de Religion*. Indifference, according to him, is the culpable equalisation of Error and Truth, the root of all the evil of the day. "What is truth, Monsieur l'Abbé?" de Maistre had asked; "the only One who could have given an answer did not choose to do so." Lamennais retorts: "Man has in his unstable intelligence no infallible test for truth. He has to search for it outside himself in the *sensus communis*, that is in those general postulates on which nearly all men agree. The confidence in the authority of that judgment is not accidental or changeable; it is innate in our nature. The question is not to prove its infallibility. It is sufficient to appeal to the fact that such an authority exists because it is impossible to reach beyond it. Now, all truths indispensable to mankind have originally been revealed by God, preserved by tradition, and safeguarded by the authority which is evolved by the general consent of mankind. Finally, they developed into Christianity, are set before us in the Catholic Church, and are embodied in her Head. Through the Pope alone individual reason receives the truth. All authority, all temporal power and sovereignty, are founded on him. He decides the problems of science, the fate of States, he is the living tradition of mankind." The final appeal to mankind is the key to Lamennais' system. When Monarchy and Papacy had failed him, he turned to the people, to Democracy.

The struggle lasted ten years. Even Charles X opposed the demand of Bonald, of Lamennais, and of the posthumous works of de Maistre, that he should adapt his government to Theocracy. At the moment when 15,000 ecclesiastical posts were vacant, Lamennais suggested that all education should be entrusted to the clergy, and declared the University, at the head of which was a mild and sensible Bishop, to be a hotbed of atheism. Consequently, in 1826, nearly all the Bishops and Archbishops of France united in defence of the rights and principles of the Gallican Church, continually attacked and insulted by Lamennais. When the Ministry of Martignac, with the consent of Rome, determined to close educational establishments directed by the Jesuits or by other non-authorised congregations, the breach between Lamennais and the Monarchy was completed. With the work entitled *Des progrès de la Révolution et de la guerre contre l'Église* (1829) he openly joined the opposition. He predicted the collapse of the existing order of things and claimed, in the name of Catholics, liberty of the Press, of conscience, and of education.

He did not attempt to explain the suddenness of the change. He wrote that liberty, which had been claimed by atheism, was henceforward to be demanded in the name of God. He welcomed the Revolution of 1830 as the beginning of the liberation of the Church from the tyranny of the State. Separation from the State was the condition of salvation and the design of Providence. With the aid of the rising generation, of Lacordaire, of Charles de Montalembert, and encouraged by the Revolution in Belgium, and by Catholic Emancipation in England, Lamennais founded the newspaper *L'Avenir*. It welcomed all revolutions, those already accomplished, and those yet to come. It advocated liberty of conscience, revision of the Concordat, and suppression of the *Budget des Cultes*. The Catholic democracy was bound to accept the entire Catholic doctrine and the absolute power of the Pope, to whom the prerogatives of the Bishops were unconditionally surrendered. The revised Constitution of 1830 guaranteed freedom of education : the young collaborators of Lamennais grasped the occasion and formed the *Agence Catholique*. A year had not passed before they had exhausted the patience of the Government, which they pressed to intervene in Poland, as well as that of the episcopate, which they continually charged with being indifferent and devoid of principle. An episcopal petition asked in 1831 for the interference of Rome. At the same time, the proclamation of the theories of *L'Avenir* coincided with risings in Italy. Lacordaire, who always remained an advocate of Italian unity, did not deny to the subjects of the Pope the right to regulate their own destinies : "a free spot on earth," so he wrote in *L'Avenir*, "will always be found for the Pope." Pressed by the disapproval of the episcopate and by the interference of the Government, the contributors to *L'Avenir* now likewise appealed to Rome. Already, in 1820, Lamennais, addressing himself to de Maistre, had deplored the hesitations of the Holy See, which would not realise that the traditional methods had become inadequate, and failed to comprehend de Maistre's splendid defence of the Papal Power. De Maistre, agreeing with Lamennais, answered that he felt ashamed of Catholicism, that he based greater hopes on England than, for instance, on Austria or on other countries, where the truth was permitted to decay. De Maistre was dead when, in 1824, Leo XII received Lamennais at the Vatican. The idea of conferring the Cardinalate upon him was given up, owing to distrust of his doctrine on the part of Roman theologians.

Lamennais, together with Lacordaire and Montalembert, returned to Rome in 1831, with a promise of entire submission to the decision of the Pope. Gregory XVI was reigning. Threatened by the Revolution, pressed by the Powers to concede reform, supported only by foreign bayonets, he refused then and later to alter his system of government. The supposition that he would foster an alliance between the Church and Democracy as suggested by Lamennais was inconceivable.

Nevertheless the Pope hesitated to pronounce judgment. Lacordaire was the first to see the hopelessness of the cause. He left his friends, returned to France, and soon afterwards entered the Dominican Order. On his way from Rome, at Munich, where he was welcomed by the survivors of German Catholic Romanticism as the champion of the Church, Lamennais received the crushing intelligence of Roman disapproval. The Encyclical *Mirari vos* of the month of August, 1832, condemned liberty of conscience, of religious worship, freedom of the Press, separation of Church and State, "and other hateful errors—*deliramenta*—of those, who, possessed by an undue love for liberty, did their utmost to undermine authority." Not a stone remained in its place of the edifices constructed by *L'Avenir*. The Papacy, whose unlimited authority de Maistre and Lamennais had proclaimed, and which the latter sought to separate from the Governments and to place at the head of nations, utterly failed him. It adhered to the powers that be, condemned the Revolution in Poland in exchange for Russian intervention in favour of the Temporal Power, and placed the gospel of democracy under a ban. Lamennais had left Rome with the impression that it was "*la plus hideuse cloaque qui ait jamais souillé l'œil humain.*" He had always been a fanatic at heart, a solitary, melancholy, and, to those who knew him well, a gentle, dreamer. Without historical training, or a true notion of the essence of religion, in the violent tension of subdued passion, with an erroneous view of the world, surrounded with the pathos of splendid rhetoric, Lamennais reduced the religious problem to a mere question of power. The theocrat of 1820 had raised misgivings even in the mind of de Maistre, when he demanded the abdication of the State before the one ruling Church. Lamennais, after having thrown the monarchy overboard, attacked the entire episcopate and the traditions of ages, out of which the French Church had grown, because they constituted an obstacle to ecclesiastical absolutism. There remained the Pope. He called on the Pope to place himself at the head of democracy, and to establish a new order of things on the ruins of present institutions.

Gregory XVI was not a man of remarkable intelligence, and his reign prepared the downfall of the Temporal Power. But he very rightly remarked to Montalembert in 1837, referring to Lamennais, "This Abbé wanted to give me a power" (the Pope extended his arms) "—a power with which I should not have known what to do." His successor, Pius IX, arrived at a different conclusion. The Council of 1870 became, in the history of the Church, a posthumous triumph of the Lamennais of 1820.

The formation of a Catholic party likewise dated from him. The short existence of *L'Avenir* had been sufficient to show the value of a Catholic combative press and organisation in the struggle of the hour. Not one of his disciples followed him in his breach with Rome. They

did not, however, lay down the weapon which he had placed in their hands. Montalembert, Lacordaire, and their friends, inaugurated the struggle for freedom of education on the grounds of constitutional rights. They were called "Liberal Catholics," because they understood how to make the requirements of the modern State serve their purpose, and marched to victory with the watchword, "Equal rights for all"; but their religious doctrine remained Ultramontane. Their example was followed in Germany, when the Prussian Government in 1837 had become involved in a quarrel with the Archbishops of Cologne and Posen concerning mixed marriages. In the contest between State rights and ecclesiastical law Prussia resorted to violent measures, which threatened the religious peace of the German Catholics. Görres, whose national aspirations based on the mission of Prussia in Germany were shattered, passed into the ecclesiastical camp. His *Athanasius* opened the attack on the ill-advised Government, which had to give way. The "*Kölner Wirren*" led to the lasting formation of a German Catholic political party. Its logical development caused it, as had been the case in France, to accentuate Roman in contrast to nationalist tendencies, and to support the temporal power of the Papacy. Owing to this change, religious interests were subordinated to political exigencies, and Catholics who under these conditions refused to join the party were exposed to seeing their orthodoxy disputed. Long before these results became apparent, when the Catholic cause was still upheld by a close union among its representatives, the Papacy was confronted with another necessity—that of coming to terms with the Italians.

The Catholic *Risorgimento* became a force to be taken into account. This movement takes its rise from Napoleon's creation of an Italian kingdom. However incomplete the plan may have been, it yet suggested to the Italians the idea of unity, and foreshadowed its realisation by the grant of a constitution, a code, a civil service, and an army. At Elba, in 1814, the idea of placing himself at the head of an United Italian State was not uncongenial to Napoleon. It was taken up in 1815 by Murat. Pellegrino Rossi, the future Minister of Pius IX in his Liberal days, signed on April 4, 1815, as Commissioner-General of the King of Naples, a proclamation calling on the Italians to fight for their independence. Murat's declaration of war against Austria, and his fall, simplified the task which Metternich had in view.

Through Austrian influence, under the rule of the reinstated dynasties, Italy actually fell under foreign domination. No one more fully realised for Italy the consequences of the Congress of Vienna than de Maistre. In 1814 he clearly foresaw that the division of Italian territories would necessarily lead to war. "Beware of the Italian spirit," he wrote from St Petersburg to Turin. "The King of Sardinia must put himself at the head of the Italians. Should he become an obstacle, the hated Austria would take his place." De Maistre described the House

of Savoy as greater than its dominions. He claimed Venice for it, and suggested the aid of France, "because she never succeeded in keeping her conquests." In these exhortations no mention was made of the Papacy. The monarchy was warned not to attempt the impossible, not to cling to the past, but to prepare for the future.

The foresight of the politician was heralded by Italian Romanticism. In addition to the writings described in an earlier chapter, the *Inni Sacri* of Alessandro Manzoni, published in 1815, may be mentioned. With the *Promessi Sposi*, published in 1827, the same author presented his nation and the world with a nearly faultless masterpiece. He exalted the mission of poetry to the ideal task of preparing the moral resurrection of a people. After struggles of doubt Manzoni had been won back to Christianity by the writings of Port-Royal and of Pascal. The unity of faith in Italy permitted the religious philosopher to lay almost exclusive stress on ethics. In politics he equally disapproved of violent measures and of conspiracies. His immense authority was opposed to Mazzini, who supported both; and later on it weighed heavily in the scale in favour of a united monarchical State.

In marked contrast to the moderation of Manzoni, the Piedmontese, Vincenzo Gioberti, a priest and philosopher, next entered the lists in 1843 with the publication of the *Primato Morale e Civile degli Italiani*, followed two years later by the still more important *Prolegomeni al Primate*. Gioberti wrote in exile, at Brussels, and his fantastic outpourings gave rise to the question whether the author ever believed in his own dream or whether his object had been to delude the Papacy as to the real significance of the movement. In any case, after the appearance of the *Primate* the idea of Italian unity, up to then represented by Mazzini, became embodied in Gioberti. The *Primate*, which this work proclaims, is that of Italy. The Papacy, the seat of Catholicism, the guardian of civilisation, had secured for the Italian people the first rank amongst nations. Not by violence and revolution, but by a return to the Guelf policy of Julius II—not by centralisation, but by a confederacy—could the unity of Italy be obtained without foreign help. The Papacy was not an impediment to that unity, but rather its necessary condition. The present weakness of Italy was due not to the Governments or to the clergy, but to the decline of literature, to the laziness and mediocrity of the higher classes. The vision of Gioberti was the resurrection of Italy, by means of a primacy in science and in art founded upon religion. The Pope was to be not only the head of the universal Church, but also the head of the Italian League. He was by right the paternal arbiter and peace-maker of Europe, the spiritual father of mankind, the protector of the Latin race, and the heir of the Imperium.

The Jesuits realised the danger of these views, and attacked Gioberti, who replied in his *Prolegomeni*, and later in the *Gesuita moderno*. In

the *Prolegomeni* he termed the suppression of the Society of Jesus just and opportune, and accused it, though less vehemently than in 1847 and in the *Gesuita moderno*, of having destroyed the ancient discipline, the hierarchical order in the Church, and thereby wrought inextricable confusion in the minds of men. He spoke in absolute contrast with de Maistre, who advised the Papacy to use "its Janissaries," because a sect, like the Freemasons, could only be opposed by a corporation, such as the Jesuits, and because the doctrine of the Jesuits was essentially the Catholic doctrine.

Gioberti's view was, curiously enough, not unsympathetic to Gregory XVI. Neither he himself, a Camaldolesian monk, nor his Secretary of State, the Barnabite monk Lambruschini, were friends of the Jesuits. Theiner, the learned German theologian, was commissioned by Gregory XVI to justify the suppression of the Order, with the aid of the material contained in the Papal archives. Pellegrino Rossi, who, in 1845, was appointed by Guizot French ambassador to the Holy See, encountered few difficulties, when, notwithstanding the opposition of the French Catholic party, he obtained the promise of the suppression of the Jesuits in France. The promise was rendered nugatory by the passive resistance of the Society itself, which rightly counted on the future victory of the French Ultramontanes. This victory was won after the fall of Louis-Philippe, in the days of Pius IX.

In the year 1843 another Piedmontese, Count Cesare Balbo, attempted to deal with similar questions. The *Speranze d'Italia* were dedicated to Gioberti, but the sober-minded political thinker banished the *Primate* into the realm of dreams. Balbo's chief problem was how the liberation of Italy from foreign rule was to be effected. The twofold position of the Popes and their consequent relations to Catholic Christendom disqualified them to lead a movement, whose object was independence. For its realisation Balbo counted on political eventualities. The collapse of the Ottoman Empire, the ambitious plans of Russia, pointed to an Austrian mission in the near East, and compensation on the Danube for the provinces lost in Italy. Until such an occasion arose, Balbo recommended a Lombard Federation, headed by Piedmont. He discredited revolutionary methods or appeals for foreign assistance. He advocated a moderate policy, and directed the efforts of his countrymen to the elevation of the moral standard, an increase of culture, and an improvement of internal conditions.

Massimo d'Azeglio, Manzoni's son-in-law, in his *Ultimi casi di Romagna*, which appeared in 1846, spoke with reverence of Catholicism and of its head, but ruthlessly exposed all the consequences of Papal misrule, principally in the Romagna. He showed the arrogance and incapacity of the Delegates, the arbitrariness of the administration, the chaotic proceedings of the Courts of law, and the impotence of the supreme authority in Rome. D'Azeglio speaks as an eyewitness,

like the Bolognese Marco Minghetti, who corroborates his facts. The *Preccetto Politico di Prima Classe* was in force against all those who were not actually condemned, but merely suspected. Whoever came under this edict of police was not allowed to leave his residence, had to be at home at certain hours, to report himself once a fortnight to the police inspector, to go to confession every month, and show his certificate of confession to the police. Finally, he had to submit once a year to three days of spiritual exercises in a convent selected by his Bishop. Whoever did not keep these rules was sentenced to three years' penal servitude. This *Preccetto Politico* caused the condemnation on one occasion, in the Romagna alone, of 229 persons.

In 1832 was published a plan of reform, drawn up by the most learned priest in Italy, the Catholic philosopher and founder of an Order, Antonio Rosmini. Some of the ideas of Sala can be traced in Rosmini's *Cinque Piaghe della Santa Chiesa*. His proposals of reform are an energetic protest against the worldliness of the Church and the decay of the priestly ideal. Sala had advocated the separation of the spiritual from the temporal domain. Rosmini recommended the participation of the laity in the elections of Bishops and parish priests, reform of the education of the clergy, and, if not a total separation between Church and State, at least the greatest possible independence for the Church, and renunciation of earthly advantages. By acknowledging the constitutional system in an Italian Confederation, Rosmini still thought it possible to preserve the Temporal Power and to secure the primacy for the Pope amongst the Italian Princes.

Fully recognising that his system was crumbling away, and that a younger generation would have to deal with altered conditions, Gregory XVI died on July 1, 1846. The ardent longing of Rosmini and of his friends for reform in Church and State, the national aspirations of the Italian patriots for unity, liberty, and independence, the hopes of the world, centred on the new wearer of the Tiara.

An astonishingly short Conclave, the shortest held for three hundred years, resulted in the election of the Bishop of Imola, Cardinal Count Giovanni Maria Mastai-Ferretti, who ascended the Chair of St Peter as Pius IX. He was only fifty-four years of age, and known to be pious, kind-hearted, and of a bright, genial disposition. It was rumoured that he was a student of the works of Gioberti, Balbo, and d'Azeglio. The most tragical pontificate of modern times opened with a generous amnesty. It was welcomed with boundless hope, and Italians cherished the belief that the dream of the Middle Ages was realised, and that at last they witnessed the advent of *Il Papa Angelico*.

## CHAPTER VI

### GREECE AND THE BALKAN PENINSULA.

THE Treaty of Bucharest, concluded on May 28, 1812, between the Russian Emperor and the Ottoman Sultan, marks an important epoch in the development of what was to become known, a few years later, as the Eastern Question. By this instrument the Russian frontier was advanced to the Pruth and to the northern, or Kilia, branch of the Danube. More significant still, the claim of Russia to interfere between the Sultan and his Christian subjects, foreshadowed in the Treaty of Kutchuk Kainardji of 1774, received a new sanction in the fifth article, which confirmed "the contracts and conventions which had been counted among the privileges of Moldavia," and in the eighth article, which stipulated for certain concessions to the insurgent Servians. Whatever the views of the Powers interested in setting bounds to the southward advance of Russia, the times were not propitious for any active protest against an arrangement which, for years to come, was to make Moldavia and Wallachia practically Russian provinces, and set the seal on claims which, sooner or later, would lead to further encroachments of the Orthodox empire on the Turkish power.

The Eastern Question, during the next fateful years, was obscured by the vaster issues raised by the titanic struggle which ended in the downfall of Napoleon. The Emperor Alexander I, moreover, had been placed by the outcome of the Moscow campaign in the van of united Europe; and, whatever the suspicions that might be entertained of his ultimate designs in the East, the supreme necessity of maintaining an unbroken front against the common revolutionary enemy served for many years to prevent these suspicions from finding open expression. The perils involved in the probable break-up of the Ottoman empire were, indeed, fully appreciated by statesmen. For Great Britain, anxious for the security of her Mediterranean power and of the trade-routes to India, the integrity of that empire had long been a political axiom; and Napoleon's dreams of Eastern conquest, which at Tilsit he had shared with Alexander, had, in spite of the vast spaces dividing the Tsar's frontiers from those of the British flag, already begun to inspire in

English statesmen that fear of Russian designs upon India which was to become the main inspiration of the policy of Great Britain towards the Muscovite empire. Austria too, formerly the protagonist of Europe against the Turk, had changed her attitude under the menace of Russia's advance upon her flank. Nothing but her weakness would have suffered her to tolerate the virtual annexation of the Danubian principalities, which not only placed in the Tsar's keeping the key to the great waterway by which German commerce found its way to the Black Sea, but was regarded as only the first stage in an advance which would carry the Orthodox armies to the shores of the Bosphorus, absorbing the Slav population of the Balkan peninsula, and threatening with dissolution, if only by the force of racial and religious attraction, the loosely-knit monarchy of the Habsburgs. Nowhere was Metternich's policy of propping up mouldering institutions more necessary to Austria than in the Ottoman empire.

Apart even from the menace of Russia, the prospect of maintaining the integrity of Turkey seemed remote enough, and every sign pointed to its impending dissolution. Unlike the barbarian invaders of the Western empire, the Ottomans had never been absorbed in, or succeeded in absorbing, the peoples they had conquered; and their rule in Europe had continued to be what it was in the beginning, that of an alien invader encamped upon foreign soil. Moreover, between conquerors and conquered there were no avenues of sympathy, for between them lay the impenetrable barrier of creed. Islam was the code of the Ottoman State; but within this code there was no place for the unbeliever; and the conqueror of Constantinople had found in the Orthodox Church a convenient machinery for governing the mass of the subject populations whom his arms had failed to convert. Two theocracies, mutually contemptuous and exclusive, were thus established within the State; and the rival religions became the symbols of conflicting interests and ideals in every relation of life. To the Mussulman, his creed was the source and justification of his conscious preeminence; to the Greek, Orthodoxy was the palladium of his national existence, and, since the shadow of the advance of Holy Russia had fallen upon the Ottoman empire, the sheet-anchor of his hopes and ambitions. Moreover, though this Christian State within the State was endowed with extensive privileges, it possessed, as against Islam, no rights. The Patriarch of Constantinople, as the responsible organ of the Sultan for the government of the Orthodox Church both in spiritual and temporal matters, exercised a wider power than he had enjoyed under the Byzantine Caesars; but his relation to the Sultan was, none the less, that of a slave. The same was true, in various degrees, of every Christian *rayah*. From the contemptuous tolerance of his conquerors he had obtained a greater measure of liberty than that enjoyed by dissidents in any other country in Europe. Catholics in Ireland and Protestants in Austria might envy

him his privileges. He was free to exercise his religion, to educate himself as he pleased, to accumulate wealth; however humble his origin, in a system which accounted nothing of birth, he could hold high office in the Government, become dragoman to the Porte, or *voyvode* of a province, and be addressed by the Sultan himself as "Illustrious Prince." Yet he remained essentially a slave, liable at any moment, by some caprice of greed or suspicion on the part of his master, to be hurled from wealth and power into penury or death.

A system so inherently bad could fail to be fatal only under very peculiar conditions. So long as a succession of great Sultans wielded the sword of the Prophet and led the hosts of Islam to ever fresh conquests, it had worked well enough. The Christian population were well content to be free of the burden of military service; and the blood-tax (*haratch*), with which, each year, they bought the right to exist, supplied the Sultans with the sinews of war. There could be no question of serious disaffection within the Khalif's empire, when outside it the Christian Powers could barely hold their own against his arms. But it is essential to the health of a dominion based upon a militant religion that it should advance. Victory is the evidence of its Divine sanction; and the moment it begins to recoil the very qualities of fanaticism which gave it strength may prove a source of weakness. The eighteenth century witnessed the rapid crumbling of the Ottoman Power, and the partial ruin revealed the faulty foundation on which it was and is based. The blight of Byzantium had fallen upon the house of Othman; the Commanders of the Faithful no longer themselves rode at the head of their armies; and to the masterful rulers of the type of Mohammad II and Suleiman the Magnificent had succeeded a feeble race, recluses of the harem, the puppets and victims of their own slaves. This atrophy of the central power suffered a system to grow up which proved too strong for the efforts of the few Sultans who had the strength of mind and the will to attempt to arrest the process of decay. The Janissaries, once the mainstay of the Sultan's power at home and of his expeditions abroad, had learned their strength, and played at Constantinople the part of the Praetorians at Rome. As a military force they had become useless; but, when the reforming Sultan, Selim III (1789–1807), attempted to introduce European discipline and drill, they rose in insurrection, held him a prisoner in his palace, and, to prevent his rescue by the ordinary troops, murdered him.

While the Sultan was thus held powerless in his capital, plentiful opportunity was given for the play of individual ambitions among his vicegerents in the provinces. The centralised and effective autocracy, which has been rendered possible in modern Turkey by the telegraph and railways, had never existed in the Ottoman government. The Governors of provinces were left undisturbed, so long as they furnished with tolerable regularity the tribute due in money or in kind, and an

occasional sackful of heads as evidence of their loyal zeal. The vast spaces of the empire made any effective control impossible; and such complaints as penetrated from the outlying corners of the empire to the Palace could easily be met by offending Pashas with bribes judiciously distributed. It thus became easy for unquiet and ambitious spirits to go far towards carving out for themselves within the empire principalities, and even empires, recognising but a nominal subjection to the Sultan and threatening, should the Porte endeavour to assert its sovereignty, to make their independence effective, and so produce the dreaded disruption of the Ottoman Power from within. In 1804, Pasvan Oglu, Pasha of Widdin, had risen in revolt, and the Janissaries settled about Belgrade had joined him. The Porte, in desperation, had armed the Servian *rayahs*. Turks, Albanians, and Serbs combined had crushed the Mussulman revolt; but the Servians in their turn now used the occasion to strike, under the swineherd Kara George, for their own independence. In spite of the concessions granted in the Treaty of Bucharest, which satisfied neither party, the hostilities dragged on, and only ended in 1817 with the grant of autonomous government to Servia. Meanwhile, Ali, Pasha of Janina, who had helped the Sultan against Pasvan Oglu, was busy building up, by intrigue, by bribes, by violence, the power which, on the eve of the revolution in Greece, had all but made him arbiter of the fate of the whole Balkan peninsula; and in Egypt Mehemet Ali was laying the foundations of the power which ultimately enabled him to measure his strength successfully against the Commander of the Faithful, and, for a time, to rule supreme over an empire which stretched from the Soudan to the Taurus Mountains.

Among the solvent forces which threatened the stability of the Ottoman empire, however, the more or less successful efforts of ambitious Pashas to take advantage of the weakness of the central authority were not the most important. More significant were the first stirrings of the racial movement, which, in the east of Europe especially, was destined to play so large a part in the historic drama of the coming age. The Greeks of the Morea, urged on by the promises of Russian agents, had risen in 1774, only to find themselves abandoned to the fury of the Mussulmans when it suited the policy of the Empress Catharine to make peace with the Porte. But the new spirit, of which this abortive rising had been the expression, survived and developed, encouraged by the very improvement in the general condition of the Greek population which resulted from the relaxation of the tyranny of the central power. In their village communities, which the Turks had suffered to survive, the Greeks had the elements of the vigorous local life which suited their genius; in the Orthodox Church they possessed the organisation necessary to bind them together in the sense of a common nationality. Long before the outbreak of the insurrection the wealthy island communities of the Aegean and the Adriatic, though nominally forming part of the

Ottoman empire, had enjoyed a practical independence tempered only by the obligation to send to Constantinople an annual tribute in money and in sailors to man the imperial navy. Their armed trading-brigs—carrying from 20 to 30 guns, and some nearly as large as frigates—many of which, since the Treaty of Kutchuk Kainardji, had sailed under the Russian ensign in order to secure the privileges conceded in the Straits and the Black Sea, were destined to play a decisive part in the struggle for independence.

In the Morea and on the mainland there was indeed no such practical autonomy as in the islands; but here too the weakness of the administration had suffered a spirit of independence to grow up which asserted itself in the only way open to it—brigandage. In the wild society of the Balkan peninsula public opinion, so far as it could be said to exist, had nothing but admiration for robbery under arms, which among the Orthodox *rayahs* was surrounded by a religious and patriotic halo when directed against the Mussulman oppressors. Thief (*kleph*) and hero (*palikar*) became in popular parlance all but interchangeable terms; and the barbarous exploits of famous bandits were celebrated by the peasants in a thousand songs and legends. Nor had the attitude of the Ottoman Government tended to discourage this point of view. The difficulty of maintaining order suggested to the Sublime Porte the expedient of setting a thief to catch a thief; and it was only necessary for a brigand chief to become sufficiently powerful and wealthy to ensure his being made a Pasha, if a Mussulman, or, if a Christian, to be taken into the pay of the Government as a captain of the militia (*armatoli*) established to police the mountain districts. The famous Ali of Janina himself, who lived to be courted by Napoleon and patronised by the British Government, began his strange career as an outlaw and a robber; and of the wild leaders, who afterwards adorned and disgraced the national revolt of the Greeks, the greater number had been trained in his service.

Into this savage and unquiet society had early been borne echoes of the revolutionary turmoil in France. Ali Pasha, a tricolour cockade tacked to his turban, babbling of Liberty and Fraternity to a commissioner of the French Republic, while keeping an eye on the Ionian Islands, was indeed no more serious than Ali drinking to the health of the *Theotokos*, with an eye on the dominion of Greece. But Janina was not the only road by which ideas from the outside world penetrated into the fastnesses of Hellas. On the educated Greeks of the Dispersion the influence of the Revolution was profound; and it gave a new stimulus to the efforts already being made to preserve and reconstruct the glorious traditions which the main body of the race had all but lost. The national problem was, moreover, not as yet complicated by those sectional jealousies which have since made the Macedonian Question the despair of Europe. Whatever the elements which in the course of ages

had gone to make up the population of Greece, the Orthodox Church had absorbed them into herself and made them the inheritors, if not of Hellas, at least of the Empire of Byzantium. In the Danubian principalities, it is true, the oppressions of the Greek hospodars and their agents had made the name of Greek stink in the nostrils of the Rouman peasantry; but in the south of the peninsula Bulgar, Kutzo-Vlach, and Orthodox Albanian, had not yet learned the virtue of racial, as distinct from religious, hate; and, Greeks by creed, they felt themselves also Greeks by nationality. Rhigas, whose stirring revolutionary songs did so much to rouse in Greece the passion of revolt, and whose execution in 1794 made him the proto-martyr of the new Hellenic nationality, was a Vlach who had found his inspiration in Paris.

Like so many subsequent revolutionary agitations, the Hellenic movement, which culminated in an armed national uprising, received its first impulse from a propaganda purely linguistic and literary. To the enthusiasts of the Greek revival the first step towards gathering up the broken threads of the national tradition seemed to be to make the modern Greeks familiar with the great monuments of their heroic past. The Church preserved for them the memory of the Orthodox empire; but a new force was necessary to carry the national imagination back, behind "the grandeur that was Rome" to "the glory that was Greece," and substitute for the national style of Romans (*Roumaioi*) the forgotten name of Hellenes. But the Greek language mirrored very accurately the heterogeneous constitution of the Greek race. The Hellenic foundation survived, but overlaid with elements representing each succeeding wave of barbarism which had swept over and left its jetsam on the soil of Greece. To the peasant of the Morea, as to the townsman of Athens, the Greek of the literary masterpieces of antiquity was an unknown tongue; and, if this is no longer the case, the change is due to the conscious linguistic revolution which is for ever associated with the name of Adamantios Korais. He too, like Rhigas, had studied at Paris; and he made it his life's mission to interpret to his fellow-countrymen the Hellenic literature which he had there learned to love and admire. What Luther's Bible did for Germany, the English Bible for England, the Welsh Bible for Wales, that Korais did for modern Greece by his translations of the Classics into a language which was, as it were, a compromise between the *patois* still used in ordinary conversation and the stately language of the originals. His success proved once for all that, where rivalry of races is in question, literary monuments are factors not to be ignored by far-seeing statesmen. The effort was grotesque enough when, with the name of Hellenes, the pupils of Ali of Janina assumed the style and affected the attributes of Homer's heroes; but the fiction appealed to the imagination of a Europe which knew only, and knew familiarly, the Greece of Plato and of Pericles. It gave an impetus to the wave of Philhellenism which did so much to

solve the practical question of the liberation of Greece from Ottoman misgovernment; and it supplied to the infant State, born after so much travail, a language and a tradition which linked it consciously with an inspiring past.

Of the extent and importance of this racial and religious movement inside the Ottoman empire European statesmen, until the eve of the War of Independence, had little idea. There was, however, in the situation revealed between the Peace of Bucharest and the opening of the Congress of Vienna enough to alarm those interested in avoiding a renewed rupture between Russia and Turkey, and to suggest to them the expediency of bringing the integrity of the Ottoman empire under the guarantee of the treaties established by the Congress. That this was not accomplished was due, in the first instance, to the obstinate pride of the Porte itself. The privileges granted to the Servians under the Treaty of 1812 had been left, perhaps purposely, vague and ill-defined; the Ottoman Government interpreted them according to its own ideas; and Russia complained, with reason, that the continued oppressions of the Turkish officials constituted a breach of the treaty. But this was not all. By two secret articles annexed to the Treaty of Bucharest, Russia, in exchange for the demolition of the forts at Kilia and Ismail on the Danube, was to obtain permanent possession of the road from the Black Sea to Tiflis through the valley of the Phasis, the use of which had been granted to her by the Porte in order to facilitate the Russian operations in the war with Persia. These articles the Sultan had refused to ratify; and the relations of the two countries had come to be fixed by the public treaty only. Russia, however, refused to evacuate the territory in question, and not only laid claim to almost all the highlands between the Caspian and the Black Sea acquired by conquest or by concessions from chiefs claiming sovereignty, but aimed at acquiring the lowlands of the Black Sea littoral, which Turkey asserted to be hers by long possession and undoubted right. As Sir Robert Liston pointed out, the crisis need never have arisen; for Russia might well have evacuated a position which she could always take again should occasion arise. Unfortunately the Sultan had backed his demand with a threat of war; Russia, refusing to be bullied, had replied by extending her pretensions; and at the period of the Congress of Vienna matters had reached a deadlock. In vain the British Government urged upon the Porte that the European guarantee of the integrity of Turkey must depend upon the settlement of these outstanding questions, "since it is impossible to guarantee the possession of a territory the limits of which are not fixed." It was proposed that the matters at issue should be settled by the joint intervention of Austria, France, and Great Britain. To this the Emperor Alexander gave a provisional assent; but the Sultan remained obdurate; and, in the hurry of the close of the Congress, after Napoleon's return from Elba, the whole question was

shelved. The relations between Russia and the Ottoman empire were thus left in a state of tension, which before long, during the Greek revolt, was to produce effects justifying the fears of those who now sought to end it.

Between the Congress of Vienna and the outbreak of the Greek revolt, the Eastern Question was obscured for the world of diplomacy by the more absorbing problem of preserving western Europe from any fresh outburst of the suppressed revolutionary forces. Meanwhile the sectional elements of Greek disaffection were being gathered and organised in the great armed secret society, the *Hetairia Philike*, founded at Odessa in 1814, against which Metternich in vain warned the Ottoman Government; in Egypt Mehemet Ali, taught the value of western armaments by his experience in the Napoleonic wars, was gradually building up his power; and *Ali of Janina*, adding, by force or by fraud, pashalik to pashalik, was preparing, in his extreme old age, for the master-stroke which should sever the bond connecting him with the Sultan, and establish him as an independent sea-power on the Mediterranean. The times were obviously not unfavourable for such a design. Ali, with characteristic instinct, had backed the winning side, and contributed in his own sphere to the ruin of Napoleon's power. He now proceeded to exploit the gratitude of the Powers, and of Great Britain especially, for his own ends. In the course of the war with France he had succeeded in gaining possession of most of the towns on the Adriatic coast of Albania, still forming part of the Venetian territory. Voniza, Prevesa, and Butrinto had in turn fallen to him; and in 1814 he was busy building forts along the coast, some of which were a menace to any Power holding the Ionian Islands. Of the former Venetian possessions on the coast, the little town of Parga alone, with its excellent harbour, had so far defied his power. Early in 1814 he had laid siege to it, and, in March, had succeeded in bribing the commandant, a Greek in French service, to surrender it to him, when the inhabitants rose, expelled the French garrison, and handed over the place to the British, who continued to hold it. The fate of the place was now bound up with the destiny of the Ionian Islands. In a memorandum written in December, 1814, Colonel (afterwards Sir Richard) Church pointed out to Lord Castlereagh the importance to Great Britain of retaining her grasp on these islands. The armed Greek trading-ships would, he argued, transfer themselves to the Ionian Islands, if these were placed under the British ensign, and would thus increase the British sea-power in the Mediterranean. At the same time, by garrisoning the islands England could prevent a flank attack by France or Russia upon the Ottoman empire. Further, if the towns captured by Ali Pasha on the coast of the mainland were taken from him and, with Parga, placed under the British flag, the door would always be open for British entry into the Balkan peninsula in case of need.

Unfortunately for the reputation of the British Government, this

advice was only followed in part. By the Convention, signed at Paris on November 5, 1815, between Great Britain, Russia, Austria, and Prussia, the Ionian Islands were indeed placed, not under British sovereignty—since both the Emperor Alexander and the English general who had taken over the islands had promised them “a free and independent government”—but under British “protection,” which, as Capodistrias suggested, “should be so arranged that Great Britain would have virtual if not nominal sovereignty.” The fate of Parga, however, was different. So early as September, 1814, Ali had written to Lord Castlereagh claiming it on the ground of the guarantee given in 1802, and had followed this up by despatching to England a mission fortified by a letter from the British ambassador at Constantinople, Sir Robert Liston, in which he called to the memory of Ministers the Pasha’s “supereminent qualities” and his services against the French. The position was a difficult one. The town had been freely delivered by the Pariots to the British, with a view to preserving them from the very man who now claimed its delivery on the ground of a guarantee solemnly given. The choice lay between maintaining for ever a British garrison in a place which seemed to Ministers of a value quite incommensurate with the risk of complications to which it was likely to give rise, and surrendering a population which had placed itself confidently under British protection to a ruler who, in spite of his “supereminent qualities,” was notoriously an unscrupulous ruffian. The latter course was adopted, on the plea that in occupying the town the English had made no promise of doing so permanently; the Pariots were offered an asylum in the islands, and, by a Convention signed by the British and Turkish commissioners on May 17, 1817, the last citadel of Greek independence was handed over to Ali Pasha; although this Convention, as well as that of November 5, 1815, was not ratified by the Sultan until April 24, 1819.

The “Lion of Janina” was now at the height of his power; the wild hill-tribes of Albania and Greece were subdued by the bloody justice of a tyrant who would allow no robbery but his own. For many years the Porte, gratified by the more regular inflow of tribute from Albania and by the bribes which Ali knew how to place at critical moments, had shut its eyes to the menace of the Pasha’s growing power. This, however, became at length so obvious that his enemies at Court needed but a suitable pretext for rousing the Sultan to action. This was afforded in 1820 by the unsuccessful attempt of Ali to procure the assassination of his enemy Pachobey, a member of the Sultan’s household. A decree of deposition was now issued against the sacrilegious Ali, who had dared “to fire shots in Constantinople, the residence of the Khalif, and the centre of security”; and the bulk of the Ottoman forces, under Kurshid Pasha, were despatched to enforce it. For two years the intrepid Ali held his own, though betrayed by the vassals

whose allegiance he had maintained by terror alone, and even by his own sons, whose heads were none the less destined to fall to the Sultan's vengeance. At last, in the spring of 1822, the old "Lion," trapped in his island castle of Janina and still, in spite of the outbreak of the Greek revolt, surrounded by Kurshid's hosts, was forced to sue for terms. He received the measure he had so often dealt to others. Kurshid granted him an interview, received him graciously, and dismissed him with the most friendly assurances. As he left the tent he was stabbed in the back; his head was cut off and sent to Constantinople.

Meanwhile, to the Hetairists, the preoccupation of the Ottoman forces in Albania presented the best possible opportunity for executing the plans which had been long maturing. The organisation of the revolt being ready, it only remained to find a leader. The first to be approached was Capodistrias, who refused on the ground that the times were not propitious for such a movement. In any case he may well have thought that, as Foreign Minister to the Emperor Alexander, he could best serve the Greek cause by remaining where he was. The leadership rejected by Capodistrias was accepted by Prince Alexander Ypsilanti, son of a former hospodar of Wallachia and member of an old Phanariot family which boasted its descent from the Imperial Comneni. The prince, who had fought with distinction in the war against Napoleon and had been a popular figure during the gaieties of the Congress of Vienna, was an officer in the Russian service and aide-de-camp to the Tsar. This alone would have suggested to the world the powerful backing of Russia; and, when the prince, accompanied by other Greek officers in the Russian service, crossed the Pruth into Moldavia on March 6, 1821, he issued a proclamation in which, while calling on the people to rise against the Ottoman tyranny, he specifically stated that he had the support of "a Great Power."

It is this claim alone which gives to the Greek rising in the Principalities any importance in history. For the rest, Ypsilanti's enterprise was futile alike in its avowed aim, in its execution, and in the scene he had selected for its base. The restoration of the Greek empire of the East was not likely to appeal to Russia; the summons to the Vlach peasantry to rise in such a cause was unlikely to find any response among a people who hated the Greeks worse than the Turks, since they had for many generations been their immediate task-masters; and, lastly, the incompetence of Ypsilanti himself ruined any chances which, in view of the usual unpreparedness of the Ottoman Government, a rapid advance might have given him. Instead of pressing forward boldly to Bucharest and occupying the line of the Danube before the Turks could gather an armament, he loitered at Jassy, gratifying his vanity and offending his followers by playing the monarch, while alienating the sympathy of all right-thinking men by his criminal weakness in condoning the hideous massacres of inoffensive Mussulmans at Galatz, Jassy,

and elsewhere, by which the Greek cause was disgraced. As for the promised support of Russia, on which he had expressed such confident reliance, he was soon undeceived. Metternich at Laibach had little difficulty in persuading the Emperor Alexander, repenting of his earlier encouragement of Liberalism, that Ypsilanti and his followers were but revolutionists of the usual dangerous type; and a letter, signed by Capodistrias, was despatched to the Greek leader, upbraiding him for his misuse of the Tsar's name, and ordering him at once to lay down his arms. He would have been well advised to obey. Instead, he declared that the Tsar's public disavowal of him was but a stratagem to preserve the peace of Europe, and that he had been secretly assured of Russian support.

The pretence did not save him. Dissensions broke out between the Greeks and those Vlach boyars who had joined them. The Ottoman forces meanwhile pressed on into the Principalities, nowhere meeting with effective resistance, until, on June 19, 1821, the crushing defeat of the main Greek force at Dragashan ended the revolt in Wallachia. Ypsilanti himself, on a false pretext, deserted his followers and fled across the Austrian frontier, to be kept a close prisoner for seven years by a Government which had little sympathy with revolutionary leaders. In Moldavia the rising was quelled with equal ease. When it was clear that no aid was to be expected from Russia, the boyars deposed the hospodar Michael Sutzo, who had supported Ypsilanti; and he escaped across the frontier. The Turks entered Jassy on June 25; and the Greeks who still remained together retired to the Pruth. Here, at Skaleni, in a camp hastily entrenched, they made their last stand, displaying a courage against overwhelming odds which did much to retrieve the disgrace and folly which had characterised the movement as a whole. With the crushing of this forlorn hope, the rising in the north came to an end, and together with it the dream of reestablishing the Greek empire of the East.

To Metternich the Tsar's public disavowal of sympathy with the Greek insurgents, and the subsequent collapse of Ypsilanti's movement, seemed to remove all immediate peril of dangerous complications in eastern Europe. To the diplomatic world the revolt in the Morea, which had come to a head at the beginning of April, 1821, appeared a matter of comparative unimportance, which might well be allowed to burn itself out "beyond the pale of civilisation." It was not long, however, before what had seemed at first but another local rising of the *rayahs* against Turkish misgovernment, began to assume a character and proportions which filled the European chanceries with apprehension. Archbishop Germanos raised the standard of the Cross at Patras on April 2, 1821; and not many weeks had passed before the world began to realise how essentially the insurrection in southern Greece differed from that which had failed so egregiously in the Principalities. The *Hetairia*, in fact, had never approved of Ypsilanti's misdirected enterprise; and its agents had been active in stirring up a general

insurrection in those parts of the empire where, as yet, no conscious divisions of race and of interests separated a population united in common hatred of the infidel and the oppressor. The rising in the Principalities was a class movement, which would in any case have broken on the stubborn hostility of the population it pretended to emancipate ; the rising in the Morea was the general upheaval of a race against alien rule—the first of those nationalist revolutions which, during the nineteenth century, were to transform the map of Europe. What gave to the war of Greek independence its peculiar character of ferocity was, that—as usual in the East—race was confounded with religion, and that to the hatred of the oppressed for the oppressor was added that of the true believer for the infidel.

Though the apostles of Greek independence had long been agitating in the Morea and the islands, the rising was not the outcome of any carefully devised plan ; nor, when it broke out, was there any organisation prepared to direct it. It began in isolated outrages on Ottoman officials and massacres of small bands of Albanian Mussulman mercenaries, which culminated in April in a general insurrection of the Christian population and the promiscuous slaughter of all Mussulmans.<sup>7</sup> Within six weeks of the outbreak of the revolt not a Mohammadan was left in all the Morea, save the remnant who had succeeded in escaping into the fortified towns. These, too, as one by one the strong places were starved into submission, were massacred with every aggravation of cruelty and treachery. The first phase of the rising culminated in the storming of Tripolitza, the capital of the Vilayet, followed by the butchery in cold blood of 2000 Mussulman prisoners without distinction of age or sex. By the close of the year, with the exception of some half-dozen fortresses closely invested by wild hordes of brigands and peasants, the whole Vilayet of the Morea had passed from the obedience of the Sultan, and the insurrection had spread beyond the Isthmus of Corinth, throughout continental Greece, and over the mountain passes into Thessaly and Macedonia.

The details of the war that followed, however much they appealed to the romantic spirit of the age, are of very subordinate interest in the history of Europe ; and it must suffice to notice the general character of the struggle, reserving for more particular mention those events which more especially influenced the attitude of the European Powers towards it. Broadly, the war may be divided into three periods : the first (1821-4), during which the Greeks, with the assistance of volunteers from western Europe, were pitted against the Ottoman Government alone ; the second, from March, 1824, when the disciplined forces of Mehemet Ali of Egypt were thrown into the scale against the insurgents ; the third, from the effective intervention of the European Powers, in the autumn of 1827, to the close. For many months the war was no more than a chaotic struggle between hostile hordes of barbarians.

The few educated Phanariot Greeks, like Demetrios Ypsilanti or Prince Mavrocordato, who at the first news of the outbreak had hastened to place themselves at the head of the national cause, proved quite incompetent as leaders in irregular warfare and powerless to control the barbarous spirit of cruelty which they deplored. Their well-meant efforts to provide the nascent Hellenic State with a Liberal Constitution on the most approved western model were not more successful; and the real leaders of the people during the earlier stages of the war were the brigand chiefs and the primates and demogeronts whose traditional local authority saved the structure of Greek society from dissolving into utter anarchy.

Two main factors contributed to the success of the Greeks. The detention of the flower of the Ottoman forces, under Kurshid Pasha, the ablest of the Sultan's generals, before Ali's island stronghold of Janina, enabled the revolt to make uninterrupted headway during the first critical months. The revolt of the islands, by cutting off from the Ottoman Government its only reserves of good seamen, assured to the insurgents the command of the sea. In size of ships and weight of metal the Turks were superior; but, when their line-of-battle ships at last put to sea, manned by motley and untrained crews of Algerine pirates, Genoese mercenaries, and Constantinopolitan quay-porters, they fell an easy prey to the swift-sailing brigs and fire-ships of the Greeks. "The Greeks," wrote Wellington, "have the superiority at sea; and those who have this superiority must be successful." This truth was abundantly illustrated in the course of the war. The great expedition of Ali, Pasha of Drama, which in the summer of 1823 threatened to crush the insurrection in the Morea, was forced to retire owing to the failure of the Ottoman fleet to come to its support, and, taken at a disadvantage in the defile of Devernaki, was exterminated on August 6. The heroic defence of Missolonghi (May 7, 1825—April 22, 1826), was rendered possible only by the fact that the Greek admiral Miaoulis could enter the lagoons and throw supplies into the town. The appearance in the summer of 1824 of the well-equipped fleet of Mehemet Ali of Egypt changed the fortune of the war at sea, just as, in the following year, Ibrahim's disciplined troops turned it on land. Against the barbaric hordes of Dramali or of Reshid, the Greek *klephths* and peasants had more than held their own; they were powerless against the modern armament and modern tactics of the Egyptian leader. From the moment of Ibrahim's landing in the Morea it was realised that, if the Greeks were to be saved from practical extermination, they must oppose western methods to western methods; which meant, in effect, that those of the European Powers which desired their preservation must intervene.

The attitude of the Powers at the outset of the revolt has already been described. So long as it was merely a question of an internal revolt against the Ottoman Government, none of them was disposed

to suggest an intervention which would have carried with it incalculable consequences and placed in jeopardy the whole international structure so painfully established by the European Alliance. But the rapid march of events soon stultified the policy of aloofness which had triumphed at Verona. The hopes of Metternich were dashed by the initial triumphs of the insurgents, and the policy of leaving the revolt to burn itself out "beyond the pale of civilisation" was frustrated by the refusal of the western peoples to follow the lead of their Governments. In Europe at large the news of the "resurrection of Greece" had been received with an outburst of unbounded enthusiasm, which grew with each new victory of the insurgent arms.

Everything in the temper and conditions of the times tended to encourage this Philhellenic ardour. Of the actual conditions obtaining in the Levant the western world was then even more completely ignorant than now; but all Christendom sympathised with this revolt of Christians against infidel oppression; continental Liberals, gagged by Metternich's police, found a voice for their own grievances in championing the cause of a nation struggling to be free; and the cultured classes, educated almost exclusively in the lore of classical antiquity, forgot the long centuries of corruption and degradation, and saw in the rough peasants of the Morea and mariners of the islands only the descendants of Leonidas and Odysseus. Philhellenic societies, of which the members were drawn from all classes, sprang up all over western Europe; and within a few months of the outbreak of the revolt money and volunteers were pouring in to the assistance of the Greeks. Veterans of Napoleon's disbanded armies, like Colonel Fabvier, English officers, like Colonel Thomas Gordon and Sir Richard Church, brought to the insurgents the invaluable aid of their military experience. In the autumn of 1823 Byron, the most celebrated and romantic figure of the age, himself came, prepared to give his life for the cause which he had already illustrated by his genius. In spite of the ostentatious neutrality of the Powers, the Reis Effendi could justly complain that the Ottoman Government was fighting not the Greeks only, but all Europe.

For this fact the Porte was itself largely to blame. The news of the massacre of Mussulmans in the Morea was received in Constantinople with one of those outbursts of blood-lust, inspired at once by panic and by fanaticism, to which the usually easy-natured Turks are liable. A wild cry for retaliation went up; and Sultan Mahmud, though a man of moderate and comparatively enlightened views, allowed himself to be carried away by a paroxysm of rage into cruelties which were as impolitic as they were horrible. Though preparations for suppressing the rising were hurried on with feverish haste, nothing was ready; and the Sultan thought to strike terror into the insurgents by an example which none could fail to understand. By the law of the Ottoman empire the Patriarch of Constantinople was responsible for the good

behaviour of his flock. By the Sultan's orders, then, on the morning of Easter Eve (April 22, 1821) the venerable Gregorios was seized, immediately after the morning Eucharist, and, with two of his Bishops, all three in their sacerdotal vestments, hanged before the gate of the patriarchal palace. The bodies, after remaining for a few days, were cut down, dragged by a Jewish rabble through the streets, and thrown into the Bosphorus. The effect of this outrage was immense. Even the Emperor Francis was roused to protest against this ignominious doing to death of a Christian prelate; while Metternich deplored the barbarous folly which had introduced a new and more perilous element of discord into a situation already sufficiently delicate. In Russia public indignation knew no bounds. The body of Gregorios had been picked up by a passing Greek merchant-vessel and carried to Odessa, where it was buried with the honours of a martyr; and throughout Russia a cry arose for a crusade against the infidel, to avenge the head of the Orthodox Church and purge the metropolitan see of Orthodox Christendom of the pollution of the Mussulman occupation. For a moment Alexander wavered, but the news found him, not in Russia, but at Laibach, where Metternich was at hand to persuade him that the revolt in Greece was but the work of the same "sects" whose evil machinations it was his glorious mission to have frustrated in other parts of Europe, and to point out that a war with Turkey would imperil the whole fabric of that Confederation of Europe which it had been the Tsar's life-mission to build up. This reasoning was sufficient to convince the Emperor, who had no desire for war; his will prevailed over that of his people; and the immediate peril was over-past.

The situation, however, quite apart from the continued successes of the Greeks, remained extremely critical. Though peace was preserved, Russia replied to the gage of defiance flung down by the execution of the Patriarch by withdrawing her representative from Constantinople and concentrating 100,000 men on the frontiers of the Principalities. Diplomatic relations, she declared, could not be resumed until Turkey had satisfied her just demands in respect of outstanding grievances, and given guarantees for the cessation of further outrages on the Christian population, placed, by treaty, under the protection of the Orthodox Tsar. The Emperor Alexander, indeed, maintained that the withdrawal of his Minister made for peace; for, had he remained, he would have had to report the outrages passing under his eyes. Moreover, the Porte in a moment of temper might have put him into the Seven Towers. "This proves," wrote Lebzeltern to Metternich on September 16, "that the Emperor does not know how narrowly the Minister escaped this fate, and those who do know are careful not to tell him." As for Alexander's personal attitude, Lebzeltern reported him as saying: "I have no ambition; my Empire is already too big for me—I am not bloodthirsty, everyone knows it—and this war would not be to Russia's interests."

The whole energies of the Powers interested in the maintenance of

the *status quo* in the East were now directed to restoring diplomatic relations between Russia and Turkey and so removing the peril of war. In this matter Metternich and Castlereagh, since Troppau poles apart in their general policy, found themselves once more united. The conferences at Hanover, in October, which to the world seemed but one more conspiracy against popular liberties, were devoted to the discussion of the attitude of the two Powers towards the Turkish crisis, and the policy determined upon was perfectly simple and straightforward. Austria and Great Britain agreed to bring pressure to bear upon the Porte to remove the just causes of grievance which Russia had against it, by satisfying those of her claims which were based upon undoubted treaty stipulations, and by guaranteeing to the Christian *rayahs* a tolerable measure of civil and political rights. To the success of this policy two obstacles presented themselves: the stubborn pride of the Ottoman Government, and the Greek sympathies of Capodistrias, who was "trying to serve one master and two causes," and using "Russian power for Greek ends." Capodistrias was, however, since Laibach, a diminishing quantity; and Metternich left no stone unturned in order to complete the overthrow of his influence. Before the assembling of the Congress of Verona, the Austrian Minister was free from a dangerous rival who latterly had only maintained his office by his "suppleness" and "the want of a man to take his place."

The death of Castlereagh made no alteration in the policy of Great Britain towards the Eastern Question; for George Canning took up the matter where his predecessor had dropped it and developed it on the lines which he had laid down. In a despatch of September 27, 1822, to the Duke of Wellington at Verona he made his attitude perfectly clear. British action in the Greek Question must be decided according to the general course of British policy since the conclusion of the war. "Our object in common with our allies has been to maintain peace, aware that a new war, in whatever quarter it might be kindled, might presently involve all Europe in its flames. Our object, as with respect to ourselves, has been to avoid all interference in the internal concerns of any nation—an interference not authorised in our case, by the positive rights or obligations of Treaty, nor justified, as we think (except when a Treaty, or some very special circumstances may authorise it) by the principles of International Law." The Turkish Question had a double aspect. In the struggle between the Porte and its Greek subjects England "had neither the right to interfere nor the means of effectual interference"; and, whatever her sympathies, she was bound to respect in the case of Turkey that national independence which she demanded that others should respect in herself. In the outstanding issues between Russia and Turkey on the other hand, it was the duty and the right of England to mediate; though "the rights which treaties give, treaties must be held to limit."

Apart from the old standing grievance of the non-execution of the secret clauses of the Treaty of Bucharest, the main causes of complaint which Russia had against the Porte were two. Though the northern revolt had been completely suppressed, the Principalities were still—contrary to distinct treaty arrangements with Russia—occupied and devastated by Turkish troops; and, equally contrary to the letter of existing treaties, certain Greek brigs sailing under the Russian flag having been seized in the Dardanelles, the Porte had claimed the right to search all ships passing the Straits. To persuade the Porte to yield on these points became the immediate object of Great Britain and Austria alike; and at Constantinople their representatives worked assiduously to this end. But, in the first half of the year 1822, the events of the war were hardly calculated to produce a yielding temper in the Ottoman Government. On the eve of the Congress of Verona, indeed, it seemed as though the Eastern Question would be settled for the time by the swift collapse of the revolt. On April 22 the hideous reprisals of the Ottomans culminated in the awful massacre of Scio, by which the most flourishing community of the Greek archipelago was wiped out of existence; and a few months later the unopposed march of the Pasha of Drama into the Morea promised to place insurgent Greece at the mercy of the Sultan. The news of the massacre of Scio, as was natural, roused intense feeling in England; and public opinion was loud in favour of intervention to rescue the Greeks from the annihilation which seemed to be impending. Canning, though his evident desire “to take the part of the Greeks” excited the anxiety of his colleagues in the Cabinet, set his face resolutely against this agitation. He denied that Great Britain was under any obligation, or possessed the right, to interfere. As for demanding from the Porte guarantees for good government, by whose sanction were these guarantees to be made effective? If by that of Russia, the war, which it had been the main object of the Powers to avoid, would become a certainty; if by that of the European Alliance, either its dignity would be compromised in the event of the Ottoman Government refusing to accept its dictation, or a war would result “of which no human foresight could anticipate the issue”—a dilemma which has been ever since the essence of the Near Eastern Question.

The situation was again profoundly modified by the events of the autumn and winter of 1822. The disastrous retreat of the Pasha of Drama had left the Greeks masters of the Morea, and in December Nauplia fell; while, in western Hellas, the stubborn defence of the Suliots had saved the Greeks from the destruction threatened by the parallel march planned by Kurshid. When Omar Vrioni, his lieutenant, at last marched southward, the army of Dramali was already destroyed; Petrobey, chief of the Maina, was able to hurry to the assistance of the defenders of Missolonghi with a thousand men; and on January 23,

1823, after an unsuccessful assault, the Ottoman commander raised the siege of the town and retired northwards. While the Greeks, in spite of their suicidal dissensions, were thus retrieving their cause on land, they had also once more gained the command of the sea: a result mainly due to the terror inspired by the Greek fire-ships, ever since, on the evening of June 18, in revenge for the massacre of Scio, Kanaris had destroyed the flag-ship of the Turkish admiral with three thousand souls on board. With the Ottoman generals defeated and counselless, and the Ottoman fleet, demoralised and helpless, lying for shelter under the guns of the Dardanelles, it was clear that the Turks were not masters of the situation, nor were likely soon to become so. The situation was, in fact, exactly that contemplated in the instructions of Castlereagh at Verona for the eventual interference of Great Britain—a situation parallel in many particulars with that created in the West by the revolt of the Spanish Colonies. The recognition of the independence of the South American States became necessary, owing to the need for regularising the great trade which had sprung up between them and Great Britain during the revolutionary period, and which was seriously hampered by the pirates who, owing no allegiance to any responsible Government, took advantage of the obsolete colonial laws of old Spain to prey upon the commerce of all nations. The case was similar in the Aegean and the Adriatic. The maritime Greeks, nominally subject to the Sultan, turned more and more to frank piracy, and, all Turkish vessels having been swept from the sea, carried into Nauplia as prizes of war the traders of all nations impartially. Since it was useless to make the Ottoman Government responsible for a state of things which they were powerless to control, it became necessary to fix the responsibility on the *de facto* Government of Greece. On March 25, 1823, accordingly, the British Government formally recognised the Greeks as belligerents. "The recognition of the belligerent character of the Greeks," wrote Canning, "was necessitated by the impossibility of treating as pirates a population of a million souls, and of bringing within the bounds of civilised war a contest which had been marked at the outset on both sides by disgusting barbarities."

This language, which in fact implied no more than what appeared on the surface, seemed to the statesmen of the Alliance to veil a threat of most sinister import to the European system. A year before, Prince Lieven had reported to the Tsar his impression that Canning was "more insular than European." This opinion, which Canning himself would doubtless have considered a compliment, seemed now confirmed by a step which appeared to advertise the intention of Great Britain to act in an international question not only independently of her allies, but in a sense diametrically opposed to what, in their opinion, formed the fundamental principles of their union. Her attitude at Troppau, at Laibach, and at Verona, had been one of protest; but the protest had

not as yet been followed by active opposition. Now, for the first time, she had cast her aegis over a revolutionary movement, and by doing so apparently ranged herself among the forces hostile to the ideals of the Grand Alliance. Metternich, who had hitherto steadily opposed any concerted intervention in the affairs of Turkey, now changed his attitude in face of the apparent danger of an isolated intervention of England, and made approaches to Russia with a view to joint action. He found the Emperor Alexander in a mood to respond to these advances. He had always been, he said, in favour of joint action. So early as the beginning of 1822 Prince Lieven, in a conversation with Lord Londonderry, had discussed the question of a common protocol to be presented to the Porte, demanding the fulfilment of Russia's rights "authorised by treaties and by the right of protection which these concede over the Greeks." Londonderry had refused to be a party to any instrument demanding from the Sultan a guarantee of better administration of the Christian provinces, on the ground that this would have been to recognise the right of Russia to interfere in the internal affairs of Turkey. England, he said, had no common rights, and therefore could take no common measures, with Russia, and in any case could never sign a document containing the words "Christian provinces under the protection of his Imperial Majesty." In view of this refusal, the recognition of the Greek flag seemed to Alexander to argue the intention of Great Britain to arrogate to herself alone that right of protection which she had denied to Russia, and to take advantage of the Tsar's obligations to the European Alliance to oust him from his legitimate influence in the near East.

In these circumstances, Russia and Austria, hitherto estranged by their conflicting interests in the Eastern Question, once more drew together. In October, 1823, the Emperors Francis and Alexander met at Czernovitz, where the whole question of an eventual intervention of the European Concert was discussed. That such an intervention would, sooner or later, be inevitable was now admitted. It was more difficult to decide what form it should take and on what principle it should be based. The unexpected persistence of the Greeks had ruined Metternich's plan of isolating the war, which Canning had now brought "within the pale of civilisation"; it was no longer possible to treat the insurgents as commonplace rebels against legitimate authority. The dilemma was indeed a formidable one. To help the Sultan to crush his rebellious vassals was obviously impossible, even had Alexander been himself out of sympathy with the sentiment of his people; to side with the insurgents against the Ottoman Government would have been to give the lie to every principle on which the European system had hitherto been based. Canning wrote exultingly of the diplomatic "bog" in which the statesmen of the Alliance were floundering, and from which there was no escape.

The conflicting interests in the Eastern Question which were destined

to resolve the great Alliance into its elements were indeed not slow in revealing themselves. The Emperor Alexander was growing restive under the insulting persistence of the Ottoman Government in refusing to redress the universally admitted wrongs of Russia; his mind, though he still clung to the idea of European solidarity, was tending more and more in the direction of the traditional policy of the Tsars; and the war-party at St Petersburg, which had languished since the dismissal of Capodistrias, was once more in the ascendant. Alexander learned, indeed, at Czernovitz that the Turks had given way on some of the more important matters in dispute—the evacuation of the principalities, and the free navigation of the Straits; and in response to these concessions he sent Minciaky to Constantinople, as his agent to watch over the carrying out of the new treaties. The question which lay nearest to the heart of the Russian people, however,—that of the guarantees of good government for the Orthodox *rayahs*—remained unsettled; and it was intimated to the Porte that the reestablishment of full diplomatic relations must depend upon the satisfaction of still further claims. The meaning of this vague demand was revealed before the Tsar left Czernovitz. He there made the informal suggestion that a Conference of the Powers should be summoned to St Petersburg to arrange for a concerted intervention in the Turkish Question, on the basis of the erection of Greece and the islands of the Archipelago into three autonomous principalities, under Ottoman suzerainty, and guaranteed by the European Concert. The proposal was formally repeated in a Russian circular note of January, 1824, in which it was pointed out that “the efforts of the Imperial Government to bring about a collective intervention were the best proof of its disinterestedness.”

Neither Metternich nor Canning was greatly impressed by this argument. Austria could not contemplate with equanimity the establishment in the south of the Balkan peninsula of semi-independent principalities, on the model of Moldavia and Wallachia, subject, if not to the formal protection, at least to the preponderant influence, of Russia. Metternich's sensational counter-move was to propose the erection of Greece into a sovereign and independent State. As for Canning; he objected to Great Britain becoming a party to a conference, only that she might serve “as a buffer between the colliding interests of Russia and Austria.” Concurred intervention seemed to him impossible, in view of the utterly irreconcilable objects of the parties to it; and, were this intervention based, as Alexander desired, on the principles of the Holy Alliance, the logical outcome would be that Russia would claim to march into Turkey as Austria had marched into Naples, as the mandatary of Europe—the very issue which it had been the study of Austria as well as of England to avoid. Great Britain would be stronger, and her action more effectual, were she to remain outside any combination.

By the time the Conference met, in June, 1824, Canning had somewhat modified his views. If both parties to the struggle in Turkey were willing to submit to its decisions, the Conference might prove serviceable as a board of arbitration whose verdict would be backed by the august sanction of the Concert, though all idea of an ultimate appeal to force must be rigidly excluded. With this idea Sir Charles Bagot was allowed to attend the opening meetings of the Conference, and in July Stratford Canning was sent on a mission to St Petersburg. It was soon apparent, however, that the conditions essential for a peaceful intervention did not exist. The Ottoman Government protested against any intervention of the Powers in its affairs; the Greeks refused to be bound by the decisions of a Conference which would in all probability suggest a settlement falling far short of their aims. In those circumstances, Canning, in November, finally decided to take no further share in the common deliberations; and, when the discussion of the Russian circular of January, 1824, was entered upon, Bagot withdrew from the sittings. The seal was thus set upon the breach between Great Britain and the European Alliance; and the Emperor Alexander declared that all negotiations on the Eastern Question with the British Government were closed.

The condition of things which Canning had foreseen now arose. England being removed, Austria and Russia were brought face to face; and it was soon clear that their interests were in sharp antagonism. Metternich, who early in 1825 had visited Paris and won over Charles X to his views, absolutely refused to consider the Russian proposal for a series of semi-independent Greek States. For Austria, he maintained, there were only two possible alternatives—the complete subjection or the complete independence of Greece. Russia, on the other hand, objected equally strongly to setting up an independent Christian State, which might develop into a peril to her own influence. Under these circumstances the Conferences could but issue in a lame conclusion. On March 13, 1825, it was resolved to present a joint note to the Porte, offering the mediation of the Powers in the Greek Question. Since this offer was purely benevolent, and backed by no suggestion of coercion, it was, as might have been expected, indignantly refused. The new turn taken by the fortunes of the war in 1825 had, indeed, not tended to weaken the stubborn resolution of the Sultan. His own undisciplined troops having proved unequal to the task of crushing the insurgents, Mahmud had humbled himself reluctantly and with misgiving to ask aid of his powerful vassal Mehemet Ali of Egypt, who had responded by sending a disciplined army under his son Ibrahim, escorted by a powerful and well-equipped fleet, for the conquest of Greece. The insubordination of his captains prevented Miaoulis from taking the Mussulman armada at a disadvantage before it could reach its point of concentration; and Ibrahim reached Suda Bay in Crete without

mishap at the close of 1824. On February 24, 1825, he landed at Modon in the Morea.

From this moment the fortunes of the insurgents seemed desperate. The Greek bands everywhere broke and fled before the onset of disciplined troops; and the Egyptian commander, who was to prove his military capacity in more arduous enterprises, set to work with systematic ruthlessness to reduce the country to submission. The horrors of the earlier period of the war paled before those of its latest phase; and even those who had been left cold by the tales of massacre committed by barbarians on one side or the other were roused to protest by a policy which seemed to aim at the extermination of an entire population, and the colonisation of a European country, hallowed by glorious associations, with Mussulman negroes and *fellaheen*. All Europe watched with breathless interest the defence of the little town of Misso-longhi, behind the mud ramparts of which the forlorn hope of Greece seemed to be making a last heroic stand against the flood of barbarism.

It was under these conditions that the long silence between the Russian and British Governments in the affairs of the East was at last broken. Canning took the initiative. His cousin Stratford Canning (Lord Stratford de Redcliffe) was commissioned, on taking up his post as ambassador at St Petersburg in the summer of 1825, to suggest a joint intervention of the Powers, but still with the stipulation that no coercion should be used against the Porte. Russia, however, would listen to no proposal for intervention unless combined with a willingness to use force, if necessary; she would be no party to any repetition of the futile joint representations to the Porte which had effected so little in the past; and declared that "intervention, once begun, must continue till its end is gained." The position thus defined, the Russian Government withdrew into its former attitude of mysterious reticence; but Prince Lieven, the Tsar's ambassador to the Court of St James', was instructed to listen to any "confidential communications" which Canning might make on the subject, and to draw him on by hinting that, if Great Britain finally refused to consider the eventual necessity of using force, Russia would be prepared to settle the question alone. This veiled threat, following on the ominous silence of the Russian Emperor, had its effect. Canning admitted that Russia and Great Britain were the only Powers from whom a settlement of the Eastern Question could be expected, since Austria's attitude towards the Court of St Petersburg had been "foolish and disloyal," and Prussia was too unimportant to be considered in the matter. "Mr Canning and I," reported Lieven, "are on the path of confidences. The time has come to act."

The confidences were interrupted by the death of the Emperor Alexander, which took place at Taganrog on December 24, 1825; but Canning, now fully persuaded that the road to a satisfactory solution lay in a separate understanding with Russia, determined to open

negotiations with the new Emperor. In January, 1826, accordingly, the Duke of Wellington was sent as special envoy to St Petersburg, to congratulate Nicholas I on his accession, and at the same time to come to an understanding as to common action in the affairs of the Ottoman empire. For such a mission the Duke was specially adapted. His great reputation, and his known sympathy with the European system, made him a *persona grata* at the Russian Court; while the changed situation in the relations of the Powers obviated any danger of his running counter to Canning's policy. "The Duke of Wellington," wrote Canning, "would not have done for any purpose of mine a twelvemonth ago. No more would confidence in Russia. But now—the ultra system being dissolved, by the carrying of every point which they opposed—the elements of that system have become useable for good purposes. I hope to save Greece through the agency of the Russian name upon the fears of Turkey without a war." The instructions of Wellington were to offer to the Tsar the mediation of Great Britain between Russia and Turkey on the one hand, and between Turkey and the Greeks on the other. At the same time, if a Conference of the Powers were suggested, he was to stave it off "by multiplying conditions."

The Emperor Nicholas was, indeed, as little inclined as Canning to submit the Eastern Question to the continental Allies, by whom he conceived that Alexander had been badly treated; and he was now, as on subsequent and more fateful occasions, anxious to settle the matter by a separate understanding with Great Britain. The mutual sympathy between Nicholas and Wellington, whose qualities were well calculated to draw them together, facilitated the negotiations; and on April 4, 1826, was signed the Protocol of St Petersburg, the first formal step in the establishment of an independent Greece. According to this instrument Great Britain was empowered to offer to the Ottoman Government a settlement of the Greek Question based on the establishment of Greece as a vassal and tributary State. Russia promised her cooperation "in any case"; but by Article III it was stipulated that, should the Porte reject the proffered mediation, the signatory Powers should take the earliest opportunity, either separately or in common, of establishing a reconciliation on the basis of the Protocol.

The changed attitude of the British Government involved in the signature of this instrument was due largely to the well-founded dread of isolated action on the part of Russia. On the other hand, Canning justified an intervention to which he had refused to be a party, so long as it was repudiated by both sides to the quarrel, by the new attitude of the Greeks, who, cowed by Ibrahim's successes, had sought the "good offices" of Great Britain and had even suggested placing themselves under her protection. The terms embodied in the Protocol were substantially those agreed upon at a conference between Stratford Canning and

certain of the Greek leaders, held on the island of Perivolakia in January. In spite, however, of the apparent cordiality of the Anglo-Russian *entente*, causes of friction were not long in showing themselves. The Emperor Nicholas, though prepared to act in concert with Great Britain in the Greek Question, was fully determined to retain in his own hands the settlement of the specific grievances of Russia against the Porte. While Wellington was yet at St Petersburg, and during the negotiations which led up to the April Protocol, Minciaky, the Russian agent at Constantinople, was directed to present an ultimatum to the Ottoman Government demanding the evacuation of the Principalities by the Turkish troops, the release of certain Servian deputies, and the immediate despatch to the frontier of plenipotentiaries for the purpose of arranging a final settlement. The ultimatum was despatched on March 17, 1826; and in a circular note of the 16th the Russian Government justified its action to the Powers. The ultimatum, it urged, concerned the affairs of Russia alone. Russia would be grateful if the Powers would press the Porte to make concessions, but asked no more than strict neutrality in case of war. As to Greece, the Emperor would know how to enforce on the Turks respect for the dictates of humanity and European peace.

The impression made upon the British Government by this action was naturally not altogether favourable. It was felt that Wellington had to a certain extent allowed himself to be hoodwinked; and that, under cover of friendly negotiations with a view to joint intervention, Russia had taken the first step towards that isolated action which it was the aim of British policy to forestall. The premature publication of the Protocol of April 4, which it had been intended to keep secret, increased the risk of war. Sultan Mahmud, not unnaturally, resented the intrusion of fresh demands before he had time to consider those already presented, and saw in them one more proof that Russia desired to drive him to extremities. His immediate answer was to hurry on the military reforms which he hoped would put him in a position to bid defiance to the Tsar's threats. The measures he took to achieve his ends, however, recoiled upon himself. The Janissaries, whose traditional privileges were threatened by the Sultan's plans, rose in revolt on June 15; and, though Mahmud, with the aid of his Anatolian troops, was able to crush the insurrection and to exterminate the turbulent Praetorians who had so long tyrannised over his predecessors, the immediate result was so seriously to weaken his available forces that he was compelled to come to terms with Russia. On October 7 was signed at Akkerman a treaty conceding all the demands of Russia with regard to the Principalities, the navigation of the Straits, and the cession of certain Circassian fortresses. Full diplomatic relations between St Petersburg and Constantinople were now resumed, and the dreaded war was again postponed.

Meanwhile the Protocol had not resulted in any effective action.

Canning resented the haste with which its terms had been communicated to the other Powers, as tending to revive "the principle of an unasked authoritative interference of the Alliance," with which this, "a corporate movement in a particular case," had nothing to do. The Emperor Nicholas, on the other hand, noted the apparent reluctance of Great Britain to take action, and began to suspect that her motives had been solely to prevent any isolated action of Russia. Canning, indeed, wished to hold the Protocol in reserve, and to use it only in the event of the Porte rejecting the separate mediation of England. The stubborn spirit of Sultan Mahmud soon made it clear that no mediation unsupported by a threat of force would have any chance of success. In view of the continued Turkish successes against the insurgents, it was indeed hardly reasonable to expect any other attitude; and Russia continued to urge the necessity for enforcing the terms of the Protocol. In June Prince Lieven was instructed to point out the notorious plan of Ibrahim for exterminating the Greeks of the Morea, and to ask whether the British Government had represented to the Porte the intention of Russia and England to unite in preventing this. The attitude of the British Ministers in face of this direct appeal seemed to justify the suspicions of Russia. Wellington, denying that the intention to depopulate the Morea had been proved, declared that the object of the Protocol had been purely pacific, and that Great Britain had never departed from her firm objection to the coercion of Turkey.

A long correspondence between the several chanceries followed. Metternich, who had stigmatised the Protocol as a "feeble and ridiculous production," and regarded Canning's whole policy in the Eastern Question as fatal to the peace of Europe, based as this was upon the sanctity of treaties, was obdurate; and Prussia faithfully supported his views. Charles X, on the other hand, in his capacity of "Most Christian King," was favourable to an armed intervention, which savoured of a crusade. By the end of August Canning, still to a certain degree actuated by dread of isolated action on the part of Russia, ventured a step forward. On September 4 he addressed a note to the Russian Government suggesting that Great Britain should point out to the Sultan that "the sentiments of humanity and the interests of commerce" made it necessary for the two Powers to insist on his accepting their mediation on the basis of the Protocol and suggesting, in the event of his refusal, to withdraw the British and Russian representatives from Constantinople, to establish diplomatic agents in Greece, and, possibly, to recognise the independence of the Morea and the islands. To this note the Tsar replied by a general acquiescence, but suggested that, before threatening a breach of diplomatic relations, the two Powers should demand the establishment of an armistice, so as to prevent the extermination of the Christian population. The particular claims of Russia had been satisfied by the Treaty of Akkerman; and the Russian Government was anxious not to renew the

crisis, if this could be avoided without sacrificing the cause of the Greeks. Only in the event of the armistice being refused were the Powers to take any coercive measures; and, as to their nature, on September 29 Lieven was instructed to point out to Canning that the plan, suggested by himself, of isolating Ibrahim in the Morea by intercepting succours from Egypt would be the easiest way of convincing the Porte without a declaration of war. This could be done by a union of the fleets of the Powers willing to share in the pacification of Greece.

Common action was delayed by the hope of still bringing into line, on the basis of the Protocol, all the Powers interested in the Eastern Question. But the Conference, opened in London in the spring of 1827, only emphasised their irreconcilable differences. Metternich protested as energetically as ever against any coercion of Turkey, and repudiated "mediation" at the request of "rebels"; Prussia, as usual, followed obediently in his wake; and the two Powers which alone seemed to remain faithful to the principles of Troppau withdrew from the Conference.

The question of the conversion of the Protocol into a formal treaty, suggested so early as January by France, was now seriously taken up. Russia was prepared to adopt this course, on condition that the ultimate appeal was to be to force. "We are invited," wrote Count Nesselrode, "to sanction a principle. We invite the recognition of its consequences." "It is part of their civil and religious system that Orientals never act save in obedience to absolute necessity," Prince Lieven had written on January 21, 1827, at the same time pointing out that the Porte was perfectly able to distinguish between a mere "demonstration" and a serious business. This was a proposition the truth of which a rich experience has since brought home to all the Powers. But Canning was by no means willing to break with the traditional British policy, and still objected to making the rejection of mediation by the Porte a *casus belli*; and, on April 4, the Protocol was presented to the Sultan by the British and Russian ambassadors. The result was what the Russian Government had expected. The Porte indignantly rejected the proffered mediation as an impertinent interference in the affairs of Turkey and as irreconcilable with the precepts of the Koran. Canning now realised that the only way to hold Russia to the spirit of the Protocol, and to prevent her from declaring war on her own account, was to forestall her by agreeing to apply coercive measures. This resolution accentuated the crisis in the Cabinet produced by the illness of Lord Liverpool and the succession of Canning to the premiership. In April, Wellington, who was opposed to the conversion of the Protocol into a treaty, had refused a place in the new Government, and he was now in open opposition to the policy of Russia, and to any coercion of Turkey. This attitude was to produce its effect later; for the present the Tory Cabinet was embarked on a course opposed to the Tory tradition.

On July 6, 1827, the Protocol of St Petersburg was converted into the Treaty of London; Austria and Prussia refused to sign; and the final settlement of the Greek Question was thus left to Great Britain, Russia, and France. By the ostensible articles of the new treaty the three signatory Powers engaged to procure the autonomy of Greece, under the suzerainty of the Sultan, without breaking off friendly relations with the Porte. By additional secret articles, however, suggested by Canning, it was agreed that, in the event of the Ottoman Government refusing the mediation of the Powers, commercial relations by means of Consuls should be established with the Greeks; that an armistice should be proposed to both sides; and that this should be enforced by all the means that might "suggest themselves to the prudence" of the High Contracting Parties. In general it was held that a "pacific" blockade of Ibrahim in the Morea, as already proposed, would be the readiest way of bringing him to terms; and instructions to this effect were sent to the admirals of the allied Powers in Levantine waters, to whom necessarily a wide discretion was left.

On August 16 the ambassadors of the three Powers presented a joint note to the Porte, demanding the immediate arrangement of an armistice with the Greeks, and threatening, in case of refusal, to take in common the measures necessary to enforce it. The Porte, as usual, met a dangerous situation by an attempt to procrastinate; and Metternich, encouraged by the death of Canning on August 8, still hoped to retrieve the situation. He was encouraged also by the language of the Emperor Nicholas, who, while consenting to sign the Treaty of London, had expressed his deep regret at having to do so without two of his brother sovereigns of the Holy Alliance, for which he still proclaimed his heart-felt attachment, and protested his abhorrence of the Greeks as "subjects in open revolt against their legitimate sovereign." In Metternich's view the impending catastrophe might yet be averted, if the Porte would consent to accept the good offices of Austria, and explain to the intervening Powers that it was the method, and not the substance, of their proposals that it resented. The Austrian note embodying these proposals was presented at Constantinople on October 20. It was too late. That very afternoon the dilatory threads of diplomacy had been rudely torn, and the fate of Greece decided, in the Bay of Navarino.

The events leading up to the battle of Navarino demand a somewhat more detailed treatment than the other episodes of the war, since they produced a more immediate, profound, and lasting effect upon the general diplomatic situation. The terms of the Treaty of London had been communicated to the British and French admirals at Smyrna on August 11, 1827. They were empowered to propose an armistice to both combatants and to make it effective, by peaceful means if possible, by force if necessary. Admiral Codrington sailed at once for Nauplia,

where he found the Greek Government, as was to be expected, only too glad to accept the armistice. By the Turks, however, it was rejected with scorn; preparations were hurried on for reducing the two island strongholds of Hydra and Spezzia; while at the same time an Egyptian fleet of ninety-two sail left Alexandria and succeeded, on September 7, in joining the Ottoman squadron in the harbour of Navarino. Codrington arrived five days later, and informed the Ottoman admiral that any attempt on his part to leave the bay would be resisted by force. The British squadron was soon joined by the French, under Admiral de Rigny, and the two admirals now communicated the terms of the Treaty of London to Ibrahim. The Pasha replied that he could do nothing without the commands of the Sultan, but, pending the arrival of instructions from Constantinople, undertook that none of his ships should leave the bay. Upon this the allied squadron withdrew, leaving a couple of guardships to watch the Ottoman fleet.

The situation was now sufficiently critical; for the Greeks, having placed themselves in the right by accepting the armistice which the Turks had refused, were free to continue hostilities. They took full advantage of their opportunity; and, on September 23, a Greek flotilla, under Captain Hastings, attacked and destroyed a Turkish squadron lying off Salona. To Ibrahim this seemed a gross breach of the Convention; and he sailed out of the Bay of Navarino to avenge the disaster. Warned by the guardships, Codrington intercepted the Turkish squadron and turned it back. On reaching Navarino, Ibrahim found his instructions awaiting him; they were, to defy the Powers and remain where he was. The crews of the allied fleets watched the columns of smoke from the burning villages, which were the signals of his defiance.

The allied fleet had, meanwhile, been completed by the arrival of the Russian squadron; and the three admirals held a council of war at which it was decided to present an ultimatum to Ibrahim demanding fresh securities, the return home of the Ottoman and Egyptian fleets, the cessation of hostilities, and the evacuation of the Morea. The answer was evasive; and Codrington, the senior admiral in command, decided to make a demonstration by sailing into the Bay of Navarino. On the morning of October 20, accordingly, the allied fleets entered the bay, unmolested by the Turkish forts, and cast anchor opposite that of the Ottomans. No battle had been intended, though the ships were cleared for action; but the refusal of the Turks to move some fire-ships which threatened the allied line led to an altercation; shots were exchanged, and the battle soon became general. By nightfall the Mussulman armada had ceased to exist.

Judged by its immediate and ultimate consequences, Navarino may be considered one of the decisive battles of history. Ibrahim, indeed, though his cause was now hopeless, still remained firm in his defiance.

"For Europe," however, as Metternich wrote, "the event of October 20 began a new era." Russia had, indeed, already proposed that, in view of the continued obstinacy of the Porte, the three Powers should proceed to "vigorous measures" for restoring order in Greece. In a despatch of September 26, Nesselrode instructed Lieven to sound the British Government on this point. The Powers were to offer their mediation for the last time, and, in the event of a fresh refusal, to withdraw their ambassadors from Constantinople. Russia would then occupy the Danubian Principalities until the Porte should submit. In the event of Great Britain raising difficulties, the Russian Government was prepared to act alone under Article III of the Protocol of St Petersburg. As to "the ultimate destiny of Turkish territory in case of the fall of the Ottoman empire," Lieven might discuss this with British Ministers, but was not to raise it. This despatch showed a singular want of appreciation of the change produced in the British Cabinet by the death of Canning. The new Ministers had always disliked the Treaty of July 6; they had no intention of pressing its provisions to their logical conclusion. Lieven did not judge it expedient even to mention the suggested Russian occupation of the Principalities, still less to hint at the greater question of the destiny of Turkey. The British Government objected even to an effective blockade of the Greek coast, and were supported in this by France; the most that Lieven could obtain was a direction to the admirals "to police the waters of the Levant so far as concerns the Ottoman flag." This being the temper of the British Cabinet, it is easy to realise the sensation caused when the news reached London that Codrington, without waiting for instructions, had shattered the Ottoman sea-power. The panic was not allayed by the attitude of Russia. The Emperor Nicholas, not unnaturally, regarded the common victory of Navarino as a proof of the unity of the three Powers. He now proposed, in a despatch signed by Nesselrode on December 5, to follow up the blow by himself marching into the Principalities, while the Maritime Powers were to force the Dardanelles and impose the Treaty of London on the Sultan by threatening Constantinople itself.

It is possible that a strong Minister like Canning would have bowed to the logic of events and realised that, for the moment at least, Navarino had hopelessly broken the traditional policy of Great Britain towards Turkey. But Goderich was now Prime Minister, Dudley Foreign Secretary; and from neither could any but half-measures be expected. Moreover, though the Tsar declared that in occupying the Principalities he had in view no permanent annexation, the mood of both France and England was one of unconquerable suspicion. In vain the Imperial word was fortified on December 12 by the signature on behalf of all three Powers of a Protocol declaring that, should war result, none of them would seek to derive from it any exclusive benefit,

whether commercial or territorial. The British Government clung to the delusion that war might yet be prevented, and entrenched itself behind the fiction that nothing had occurred hopelessly to compromise the traditional friendship between Great Britain and the Sultan. In the King's Speech at the opening of Parliament, January 29, 1828, the battle of Navarino was referred to as an "untoward event," which it was hoped would not disturb the harmonious relations subsisting between His Majesty's Government and the Sultan! The folly of any such hope was soon patent to all the world. The somewhat shamefaced explanations of the Powers were met by the Porte with a vigorous protest against this "revolting outrage" on a friendly Power in time of peace, and a demand for compensation and an apology. These were refused, even by Great Britain, which threw the blame on the Turks, as having been the aggressors in attacking a fleet entering a friendly harbour in time of peace. Further negotiations did nothing to improve the situation; the breach was obviously irreparable; and the ambassadors of the three allied Powers withdrew from Constantinople.

The wrath of Sultan Mahmud, hitherto with difficulty restrained, now burst forth with unmeasured violence. On December 20 he issued a solemn *hatti-sherif* denouncing the cruelty and treachery of the Christian Powers and calling the faithful to a holy war against the infidel. Russia especially was singled out for denunciation; and the recently concluded Treaty of Akkerman was declared null and void. This was the opportunity and the excuse for which the Emperor Nicholas had long waited. However much the other Powers might dread and dislike the isolated intervention of Russia, the formal repudiation by the Ottoman Government of obligations so recently contracted made it impossible to resent such intervention. Navarino had, in fact, placed the diplomatic situation, and to all appearances the military situation, completely under the Tsar's control. And this state of affairs the Russian Foreign Office was at little pains to disguise. The repeated declarations of the Emperor Nicholas that he aimed at no permanent conquests, and the "sterile" self-denying Protocol of December 12, might or might not serve to allay the anxieties of the Powers; but, if they should refuse to allow the Tsar "to merge his special grievances in the general cause," Count Nesselrode roundly declared in a despatch of December 26, that he would act "*selon ses convenances et ses intérêts.*"

The wisest course for the British Government, in these circumstances, would probably have been to yield to the logic of events and make the best of a bad situation by joining with Russia in following up the victory of Navarino, and so preventing her isolated action. This course was actually urged by France. But, at the beginning of January, 1828, Goderich was succeeded in the premiership by Wellington; the new Cabinet was opposed to Canning's policy in the Eastern Question; and

Wellington refused to take any action calculated to imperil the integrity of the Ottoman dominions. He would adhere to the Treaty of London only on condition that its provisions should be carried out by peaceful means. When, on January 6, a Russian despatch announced the Emperor's intention of occupying the Principalities during the March following, with or without the consent of Great Britain, the British Government, after some weeks' delay, replied by a formal protest against a course which would entail the downfall of Turkey and the outbreak of a European war. At the same time Wellington outlined a scheme for the settlement of the Greek Question, based on the maintenance of effective Ottoman control over Greece.

Meanwhile the diplomatic situation was becoming more and more strained. The Emperor Nicholas declared that he would not recede one step, and that, if England persisted in her indifference to the interests of her ally, Russia would consider herself free from her engagements under the Treaty of July; and Prince Lieven enquired sarcastically whether the British Cabinet considered the *hatti-sherif* ordering a general massacre "an act of internal administration." But, though it was clear that war could no longer be prevented, all the Powers were equally interested in avoiding a general conflagration. Within the British Cabinet itself voices were raised in favour of concession; and Russia was by no means anxious to take a line which would have isolated her in face of a hostile Europe. To the newer school of Russian statesmen, moreover, the traditional policy of Peter the Great and Catharine had begun to appear of doubtful wisdom, and the maintenance of Turkey as a weak State under Russian influence of more solid advantage than the break-up of the Ottoman empire, with all the unknown and perilous issues that this might involve. The despatch of February 14, in which Count Nesselrode announced to the Powers Russia's intention of declaring war, was studiously conciliatory in tone. The insolent attitude of the Porte had left the Tsar no other alternative; but Russia, while making war for the redress of her just grievances, invited the Powers to take advantage of this to carry out the provisions of the Treaty of London, which she would, in any case, make the basis of her ultimate action. At the same time, in order to disarm the suspicions of the Maritime Powers, the Tsar declared that he would respect the Treaty of June 19, 1801, regarding neutrals, which had been solemnly annulled by Alexander I in 1809; and Count Heyden, the Russian admiral in the Mediterranean, was instructed to exercise his belligerent rights "provisionally and moderately," and, in the event of the London Conferences issuing in a plan in favour of Greece, to join his squadron with those of the other Powers. Thus the Treaty of London had become the instrument for producing the very situation it had been devised to prevent. Great Britain could not, in the circumstances, deny the right of Russia to make war; and Russia, so long as she adhered to the Treaty, had

not to fear the intervention of the other Powers. The most that Wellington could do was to protest that the refusal of the Allies to cooperate with Russia would not justify her in breaking away from the Treaty and settling the Eastern Question "*selon ses convenances et ses intérêts.*"

The Russian army crossed the Pruth on May 6, 1828; but the war that followed was by no means the "military promenade" that all Europe expected to witness. The unexpected vitality of the apparently moribund Turkish empire, and the superlative fighting qualities of the Turkish troops, were once more proved; and it was only after two hardly fought campaigns that General Diebitsch was able to dictate terms to the Ottoman Government at Adrianople.

Meanwhile the Emperor Nicholas continued his efforts to settle the Greek Question in concert with the other Powers. Wellington, however, was irreconcilable. His policy in the Eastern Question was directed wholly to the preservation of the Turkish Power; and Greece, under the Presidency of Capodistrias<sup>1</sup>, elected by the national assembly in March, 1827, seemed in danger of becoming a Russian outpost set on the flank of Turkey. The British Government refused the Tsar's invitation to follow his example in making a loan to the Greek President; and in June Huskisson, who had been throughout favourable to the Russian view, left the Cabinet, while Dudley was replaced by Aberdeen. For the moment Great Britain seemed to be committed to a complete reversal of Canning's policy in the Greek Question.

On June 15 the Tsar made a further advance by renouncing altogether his character as a belligerent in the Mediterranean. It was not, however, the conciliatory attitude of Russia, but the unexpected reverses of her arms which stirred the Powers to further action, by giving them the hope of settling the Greek Question in the sense least unfavourable to their views, and so forestalling the effects of the ultimate victory of Russia. Wellington, moreover, believed that, were the affairs of Greece once settled, Russia would gladly make peace.

The plenipotentiaries of the three Powers had reassembled in London; and the proposal of the French Government, anxious to cover its waning reputation at home by military prestige abroad, to intervene actively in order to secure the evacuation of the Morea, was accepted by Wellington as the most effective counter-move to the Russian declaration of war. He only stipulated that Great Britain should not be required to take any active part in coercing her old ally. Russia, for her part, saw no serious objection to a course which would form a most valuable diversion on the flank of her enemy. On July 19, 1828,

<sup>1</sup> Count Capo d'Istria, after his election to the Presidency, dropped his title and assumed this Hellenised form of his territorial name. Following a common, though not universal, practice, we have adopted throughout this *History* the style by which he was perhaps most widely known.

accordingly, was signed the Protocol of London, by which the armed intervention of France was authorised and its objects defined.

On August 30 a French expeditionary force, of 14,000 men under General Maison, reached Petalidi in the Gulf of Corinth, only to find that their purpose had been forestalled by the politic impetuosity of Sir Edward Codrington. Mehemet Ali had, in fact, for some time been only waiting for an excuse to retire from a situation of which he realised the ever growing danger; and, when a British squadron appeared off Alexandria, he readily responded to the ultimatum of the British admiral by signing, on August 9, a convention arranging for an exchange of prisoners and the immediate evacuation of the Morea. Ibrahim himself met the French general with the news; a review of the Turkish troops was held in his honour, on the eve of their embarkation; and the task of the French troops resolved itself into making roads and keeping order in the Morea, pending the settlement of its fate by the Powers.

The diplomatic situation meanwhile was being rapidly modified by the developments of the war. In view of the unforeseen difficulties of the campaign of 1828, the neutrality of the Mediterranean, which deprived the Russian arms of the main advantage won at Navarino, became intolerable to the Russian Government; and, in October, the Emperor decided to proclaim the blockade of the Dardanelles. This was greeted in England with a great outcry, not only as a gross breach of faith, but as a serious menace to British commerce. Relations between the Cabinets of London and St Petersburg became increasingly strained; and a breach was only prevented by the anxiety of Russia to preserve the Triple Alliance, though now "only nominal," until she should have triumphed over her difficulties. While protesting, therefore, against any separate action of France and Great Britain in the Greek Question, she expressed her continued willingness to act in concert with them if the Cabinets "could agree on a common course—and keep to it." The reproach implied in the latter phrase was not wholly unjustified; for the policy of the British Government was, in fact, shifting nervously with every change of circumstance. The widening rift in the Triple Alliance had brought Metternich once more into the field; and correspondence passed between Vienna and London. The Austrian Chancellor was now thoroughly awake to the fact that the time was past for mere protests against any alteration of the *status quo*, and renewed the proposal, originally advanced merely as a move in the diplomatic game, for the independence of Greece—a solution which, he maintained, would be more satisfactory, not only to Europe but to the Ottoman Government, than the creation of a vassal State, since it would obviate the risk of the constant interference of the Powers in the affairs of Turkey. Nothing, however, but the force of circumstances could coerce Wellington into a course which he believed would imperil the ancient relations of amity between Great Britain and the Porte. If he moved in the direction of

the emancipation of Greece, it was against his will, and because the logic of events was too strong for him. That something must be done was abundantly clear. The first definite step in the recognition of Greek independence had been taken when, on November 16, 1828, the Conference of London signed a Protocol placing the Morea, with the adjacent islands of the Cyclades, under the guarantee of the Powers. Events in Greece itself soon compelled a further measure of concession. In the autumn and winter of 1828-9, General Church had, in the face of enormous difficulties, caused mainly by the indifferent character of his undisciplined forces, succeeded in clearing western Hellas, north of the Gulf of Corinth, of the Turks. In these circumstances a further Protocol of the London Conference, signed on March 22, 1829, extended the frontier to the line of Arta-Volo, including in the country guaranteed by the Powers a large part of Continental Greece, together with the important island of Euboea. Greece, under this instrument, was still to be a tributary State, but autonomous, and governed by a Prince selected by the Powers.

This settlement, which was very far from satisfying the Greeks, had only been accepted by the British Government with reluctance, and for fear of a worse thing. To Prince Lieven Wellington explained with great candour that, in signing the Protocol, Great Britain had only had in mind to settle the Greek Question "before the end of your war," in order to remove one of the greatest obstacles to peace. Against this view, however, which assumed that the Russian war and the Greek cause were absolutely distinct, Russia protested vigorously, claiming the right, under Article III of the Protocol of St Petersburg, to act "separately." At the same time, she undertook not to exact from the Porte anything more than the terms of the Protocol of March 22.

Circumstances soon placed her in a position to carry out her views. While the Powers were still hesitating and negotiating, the war in the Balkan Peninsula came to a sudden and dramatic end. This result was due entirely to the audacious genius of the Russian commander. In the summer of 1829 Diebitsch with some 13,000 men had pressed on over the Balkans, leaving in his rear the unbroken armies of the Grand Vizier and the Pasha of Skutari. This apparently rash strategy was successful. With his rear to the Black Sea, of which Russia held the command, his communications were assured; while the mountains lay between him and the Turks at Shumla, who were powerless to harm him. Constantinople lay at his mercy; and the Porte, bowing to the inevitable, signed with him, on September 14, the Treaty of Adrianople. In this, true to his promise, the Russian Emperor stipulated for no territorial increase in Europe. The cession of Anapa and Poti, however, marked a fresh stage in the Russian advance in Asia, which it was feared would end by giving her control of the Euphrates Valley route to India. In addition to this, the Danubian Principalities were created practically independent

States ; the treaty rights of Russia in the Bosphorus and Dardanelles were once more confirmed ; and, last but not least, the terms of the Protocol signed by the Powers in conference at London on March 22 were embodied in the Treaty.

The news of this outcome of the war was received in London with consternation. In Wellington's opinion, if the Treaty were allowed to stand, Turkey would cease for all practical purposes to exist. The Principalities had virtually been annexed to Russia "during her good pleasure"; the abrogation of the Ottoman right of search in the Straits cut at the root of Turkish sovereign independence; by the Russian advance in Asia the position of Persia, indispensable to the security of the British rule in India, was threatened; by the inclusion of the terms of the March Protocol Russia would reap whatever advantage was to be gained by the recognition of Greek independence. It was this latter fact, together with the belief that the integrity of Turkey was already doomed, that led the British Government yet another step forward in the emancipation of Greece. If Greece was to be taken from the effective control of the Sultan, it was better that she should be created an independent State, than a vassal principality like the Danubian States, looking to Russia for the protection of its interests. Metternich again urged this view very strongly; and, though Wellington still hesitated, Aberdeen, in January, 1830, supported it as the solution that "all Europe" expected. In the previous October both Wellington and Aberdeen had suggested that the new Greek State should be placed under the guarantee of the Treaty of Vienna, and Wellington subsequently proposed to extend this guarantee to Turkey as well. This was, in the circumstances, not likely to appeal to the Russian Government; and, in order to prevent Russia from being placed in antagonism to the united opinion of Europe, the Emperor Nicholas consented to cooperate with the other Powers in a settlement of the Greek Question which seemed to deprive him of the advantage gained at Adrianople. The sacrifice was, indeed, more apparent than real; for Capodistrias, in the name of Greece, had indignantly rejected the terms of the Protocol of March 22, which gave but the shadow of independence. Accordingly, on February 3, 1830, a new Protocol was signed in London embodying the terms which, in the altered circumstances, the British Government was prepared to allow. In only one respect were these more generous than those which the Greeks had indignantly rejected. The new State was to be independent, under Leopold of Coburg as "Sovereign Prince"; but its frontiers were to be more contracted even than those defined by the March Protocol, and only a fragment of Greece was to be restored to liberty. It was clear that, in recommending this settlement, it was the intention of the British Government to leave the new State at the mercy of the Porte. Capodistrias rejected it, as he had rejected that of March 22; and Prince Leopold, refusing to accept a task, which

under this Protocol he declared would be impossible, resigned his candidature.

Nor were those the only circumstances that forced the Powers to further concessions. In July the affairs of Greece were overshadowed by the revolution which hurled Charles X from the throne of France; and the new and anxious problems thus raised made any settlement of the Eastern Question for the time being better than none. The main obstacle to a generous settlement had, moreover, been removed by the fall of the Tory Government in November, 1830. Palmerston, who succeeded Wellington, had always been in favour of fixing the frontier of the new State at the line of Arta-Volo. On September 26, 1831, accordingly, a Protocol was signed establishing this as the northern boundary of Greece; and, at the same time, the sovereignty was offered to Otto, second son of King Louis of Bavaria. The King accepted the offer for his son, a lad of seventeen, on condition that he should be King, and not merely sovereign prince, of Greece, and that the Powers should guarantee a loan sufficient to enable him to carry on the government. These terms were agreed to; and, on May 13, 1832, the treaty was signed, but was antedated May 7 at the request of the British Government, which on that day had suffered defeat in the House of Lords on the Reform Bill and resigned. Thus a new Christian kingdom was added to the States system of Europe, and was placed, not under the guarantee of the general Concert, but under that of the three signatory Powers, Great Britain, France, and Russia. Since the assassination of Capodistrias (October, 1831) the country had been plunged in anarchy, and the establishment of a recognised government was imperatively needed. On January 28, 1833, Otto, first King of Greece, landed at Nauplia, to attempt the impossible task of restoring, with the aid of Bavarian officials and Bavarian mercenaries, law and order among a race of brigands and herdsmen.

## CHAPTER VII.

SPAIN.

(1815-45.)

THE course of the Peninsular War from June, 1813, described in a previous volume, produced a change in Napoleon's attitude towards Ferdinand, with whom he started negotiations which led to the Treaty of Valençay (December 11). By this treaty Ferdinand recovered the Crown of Spain, and undertook that the British troops should not remain in the country after the withdrawal of the French. But the Regency still existing in Spain and the Council of State both refused to acknowledge this treaty, on the ground of the decree passed by the Cortes on January 1, 1811, to the effect that no engagements should be valid which might be made by Ferdinand during his captivity. The Cortes, which were sitting at the time in Madrid, ratified this decision by their decree of February 2, 1814, forbidding the recognition of Ferdinand as King until he should swear to the Constitution. But Napoleon disregarded the disavowal of the treaty by the Spanish authorities, and, seeking in that moment of supreme trial to diminish his international difficulties, set Ferdinand free to return to Spain (March 7). Ferdinand hastened to do so; and on the 22nd, while the Allies were still struggling against the French troops in Catalonia, he entered Spain. By his words, which were studiously vague, and by his acts, he showed at once that he did not intend to respect the system established in Spain during his absence. Disobeying the Cortes, he changed the route fixed for him by them, travelling first to Saragossa and thence to Valencia (April 16). A few days earlier (on the 12th), a group of sixty-nine deputies had presented to him an address suggesting the restoration of the *ancien régime*. This was just what the King desired; and, secure of the support of many soldiers and officials, he signed on May 4, in Valencia, a proclamation declaring "null and of no effect" the Constitution and the decrees of the Cortes. This act, which was not made public for some days, was followed by the unexpected arrest in Madrid, on the night of the 11th, of all the Liberal deputies.

Thus began the persecutions which marked the reaction. At the beginning of 1815 this reaction was complete; and, in view of all the

circumstances, it must be admitted that it was logical and inevitable. The Constitution of 1812—notwithstanding the sincere belief of some patriots, such as the learned Martinez Marina, that it was only the restoration of the ancient Spanish Cortes and of a Liberal system which had preceded absolutism—meant, in fact, a complete change in political organisation. Its doctrines sprang on the one hand from the ideas which had formed the programme of the “philanthropic” ministers in the eighteenth century, especially during the reigns of Ferdinand VI and Charles III, and, on the other hand, from the powerful influence of the French Revolution, and also from the influence of the United States system, which made itself felt through the deputies from the Colonies. From these sources the Constitution of 1812 emerged as an ultra-Liberal code, some of whose chapters (namely III and IV of *tit. II*) are literal translations of passages in the French Constitution of 1791; while in other points, such as the separation of powers, it reflects doctrines of English origin. Its leading principles were—the declaration of the Rights of Man; the sovereignty of the nation; limited hereditary monarchy, the King being chief of the executive, controlled by the Constitution and, in some of his functions, by the Cortes; the Cortes, set up as a national institution with legislative sovereignty; personal inviolability of the deputies; power to reform the Constitution; elective municipalities; universal incidence of taxation, the exemptions of the privileged classes being abolished; and other points of less immediate importance. To these must be added further reforms made by the Cortes, such as the abolition of the Inquisition—although religious offences were henceforth punishable in the Bishops’ and the Civil Courts; the abolition of feudal jurisdiction, of seigniorial rights, and vassalage, and of the proofs of nobility required from those who wished to enter a military Order or to hold other posts of honour; equality of rights among Spaniards and Americans; the restriction of the number of religious communities; and the law abolishing entails.

But the reforming party which had achieved these reforms in the Cortes of Cadiz represented only a minority—doubtless the most intelligent and cultivated part of the population, but still only a minority. Against it were the feelings and interests not only of the royal family—attacked in its privileges and deeply wounded in its pride by these new political principles—but also of many of the nobility and clergy, who had been injured in their interests and alarmed by the reforms passed in the Cortes and by the tone of the philosophic ideas of many Liberal members; although the Constitution declared that the Catholic religion was, and always should be, the sole religion of the Spanish nation. These national elements of opposition were aided by that general European movement of reaction against the spirit of the French Revolution which followed the victory of the Allies over Napoleon. Thus upon Ferdinand’s return to Spain the backward step was inevitable; even if the King had been hampered by scruples, he would have been driven

to it by the majority of his subjects and by the influence of the other sovereigns.

But the personal character of Ferdinand and the blindness of the absolutists drove the reaction to extremes. Louis XVIII and the *émigrés* did not venture to restore completely the *ancien régime*, though they had stronger reason to do so. Ferdinand did more than restore his own absolute power; he went back to a system which undid even the reforms of the eighteenth century (as for example in the decree of May 29, 1815, permitting the return of the Jesuits), and he stained the reaction with ferocious persecutions. This was largely due to the character of the King, rancorous, cruel, disloyal, ungrateful, and unscrupulous, as he had already shown himself in the conspiracies against his father and Godoy and during his residence in France. But from the national point of view it was a great error to break so completely with the group of reformers. Although these were a minority within the country, they represented a genuine opinion, held by men of culture and intelligence, who would have provided the best element of administration under a king equal to his mission—men who, however mistaken in the actual occasion of their reforms, represented something which it was madness to expunge entirely from the national life. These were also the men who had largely helped to organise the resistance against Napoleon, defending the throne for the King during his captivity in France. By merely carrying out what he had promised in his proclamation of May 4, 1814, the convocation of Cortes “to establish firmly and legally whatever the good of my people requires,” by remembering that in the same document he had declared “that never in ancient Spain were her kings despots nor did her good laws and constitutions allow it”—he would have saved the country many convulsions. Since the Liberals were sincere monarchists, and the Moderates, as afterwards appeared, were numerous among them, the new monarchy might thus have been peacefully and firmly established. But Ferdinand preferred to indulge his own and others’ rancour, refusing to acknowledge anything that had been done in his absence, and throwing himself into the arms of men generally incapable and blinded by political passion.

Persecution, however, did not at first go so far as in the second reaction in 1824. It is true that the clergy and the violent absolutists committed excesses against the Liberals in many places, for example in Majorca, which had been an important centre of refugees from the Peninsula during the war of independence. But not much blood was shed, notwithstanding the petitions of the extremists, who, in one of their periodicals, the *Atalaya*, urged that “all the imprisoned Liberals should be at once hanged and afterwards.....the cases against them stated.” This moderation was partly due to the intervention of Wellington.

But, if no one was put to death, other penalties fell upon the supporters of the Constitution. Almost all the deputies who still

remained in Cadiz were arrested, their houses searched, and their papers seized. Domiciliary visits were general. Every book of a Liberal flavour was destroyed and also every copy of the Constitution. The most absurd pretexts sufficed to condemn the suspected. The trials of the deputies were dropped after some delay, because the ordinary Courts found no ground for the sentences desired by the absolutists. Displeased at this, the King himself assumed jurisdiction in these cases and decided them by a Royal Order of December 17, 1815, containing the list of the accused and their respective penalties, with the command that "on that same night they should be taken from the prisons and conveyed forthwith to their respective destinations, so that in the morning the people of Madrid may find the thing accomplished." By virtue of this decision the most eminent members of the Cadiz Cortes who had failed to escape abroad were sent, some to the African fortresses, others to castles, monasteries, or abbeys in Spain, there to suffer sentences, amounting in some cases to eight years' imprisonment, with prohibition to receive any visit and exclusion for life from Madrid and the royal residences. Although Ferdinand had promised Napoleon to respect the *afancesados*, these also were victims of the political reaction, being exiled from Spain or banished to a distance of twenty leagues from the capital with their families, to remain under the observation of the authorities. In consequence of this, many officers remained abroad for several years, in France or elsewhere.

The political system established by the King was purely absolutist. The system of Ministers instituted by the Cortes was replaced by the previously existing Secretaryships, subject to the will of the King and to the authority of the Royal Council and Chamber of Castile. This body and also the other Councils, notably those of the Indies, of the Treasury, and of the Religious Orders, were restored in the same form which they had possessed in 1805 according to the laws of the *Novísima Recopilación*. But this system of functionaries and offices was no more than a show, for behind them stood another power, the inner group or *camarilla* which the King had formed of his intimate adherents, among them the notorious Escoiquiz, the Nuncio Gravina, the *parvenu* Duke of Alagón, besides one Chamorro, formerly a water-carrier—a sort of jester whose buffooneries amused the King—Ugarte, formerly a porter, and others of that stamp. This *camarilla* had much influence in affairs, but not so much as to master the King's will. Although Ferdinand was certainly ignorant of the instructions given by Charles I to his son Philip II, he practised the jealous watchfulness which is advised in them, using the *camarilla* against the Secretaries and each member of the *camarilla* against all the rest: thus all watched each other, and the King was kept informed of the doings and intentions of all. Accordingly the dismissals of Secretaries were so numerous that from 1814 to 1820 more than thirty were deprived of office by the caprice or suspicion of

the King or the intrigues of colleagues. Dismissal was generally accompanied by exile or imprisonment; and Ferdinand, who sometimes affected a blunt candour, used to explain that some had been removed as "shortsighted," others as "long-handed," or "incapable," or "too clever," remarks which were often very true. With the members of the *camarilla* he acted similarly; thus even Ugarte, one of the most favoured, was imprisoned for some time in the *alcazár* of Segovia, and the Canon Ostolaza, a fierce persecutor of the Liberals, was confined in 1818 in the monastery of Batuecas. But while they enjoyed the royal favour the Secretaries and the creatures of Ferdinand trafficked freely in offices and public affairs, nor was the King untouched by the extreme political corruption of the period. One of the most scandalous examples of this corruption was the purchase from the Tsar of five ships of the line and three frigates, almost all of which proved useless, notwithstanding their enormous cost of 54,400,000 *pesetas* (over two millions sterling). The persons chiefly involved in this affair were the King himself, Ugarte, the Russian ambassador Taticheff, and Eguia, Minister of War.

The results of this Government were seen in a depressed and poverty-stricken country, commerce and industry ruined, the public service neglected, the Treasury bankrupt, the army and navy unpaid and starving, and the naval forces almost reduced to the King's pleasure-boats on the Tagus and the pool of the Retiro. The only relief offered for the extreme indigence of many naval officers, of whom one died of starvation at Ferrol, was permission granted to them to support themselves by fishing (February 12, 1815). Meantime the King's personal guards were munificently paid and loaded with favours. The situation was temporarily relieved by the appointment of Garay as Secretary of the Treasury (December, 1816). The annual deficit then exceeded 116 million *pesetas* (between four and five millions sterling), excluding the interest on the debt. Garay presented a scheme which was completed by later decrees, fixing the revenue at 714 millions and substituting for the innumerable existing taxes a direct contribution valued at 250 millions, preserving, besides, various monopolies and the dues levied on goods entering the towns. To increase the new contribution, he abolished the exceptions or immunities enjoyed by some regions and by certain classes, especially the clergy; and he made arrangements for the gradual reduction of the debt. The King, who was wasteful and extravagant, welcomed this reform for the sake of the increase of revenue; and the Pope agreed to an annual contribution of thirty millions from the clergy, besides other taxes on ecclesiastical revenues. But the protests of the people against the single contribution, the disappointment of the King whose treasury gained less than he had expected, the intrigues of the clergy against the new impost, and perhaps other causes connected with the scandal of the Russian ships, brought about the fall of Garay (1818); his plans were undone and the finances returned to their former confusion.

While Garay was thus attempting financial reform, some slight relaxation of the general system of oppression took place towards the end of the period. This change was partly due to the Queen, Isabel of Braganza, Ferdinand's second wife, married in 1816. Although a decree of April 25, 1815, had forbidden the publication of any periodical except the *Gazette* and the *Diario de Madrid*, some non-political periodicals were now tolerated. Among them the *Crónica Científica y Literaria* deserves special mention; it was edited by the semi-Liberal José Joaquín de Mora, who together with Alcalá Galiano carried on in its pages a controversy in favour of classicism and against the Spanish drama of the seventeenth century, which their adversary Böhl de Faber, a follower of Schlegel, wished to restore to public favour. This controversy was the first episode in the literary conflicts which were to end after some years with the victory of Romanticism. In fact, the dramas of Calderón, Lope, Tirso, and the rest, had never ceased to be represented in Madrid, even during the prevalence of neo-classical taste in the eighteenth century: and, at the very time when Böhl was defending them, the great actor Máiquez included them in his repertory, side by side with works of different quality translated from the French. While the intellectual repression was thus somewhat relaxed, primary schools were established in Madrid; the public relief of distress was extended; the picture-gallery founded by King Joseph was reorganised; and Madrid was embellished by some considerable public works.

But this partial relief did not suffice to cover the many defects of the Government, still less to satisfy the aspirations of the partisans of the Constitution or *doceñistas*, as they were called. To most men of Liberal ideas the Constitution of 1812 was an object of idolatry, sustained by the sentimentalism and enthusiastic idealism of the period. They believed public welfare and national prosperity to be impossible apart from the Code of Cadiz. This belief (which was shared by many foreigners, among whom were some English), together with the desire of vengeance inevitably roused by Ferdinand's persecutions, produced repeated insurrections which aimed at overthrowing absolutism. All the leaders were military officers: Espoz y Mina in 1814; Porlier in 1815; Richard, who attempted to assassinate the King, in 1816; Lacy in 1817. All these attempts failed, and most of the leaders with their associates suffered death. Except in the case of Richard, all these conspiracies and risings aimed merely at restoring the Constitution under the rule of Ferdinand, preserving the strictest allegiance to monarchy, notwithstanding the odious character of the King. Nevertheless, according to Alcalá Galiano and other contemporaries, the Spaniards were beginning to feel contempt for Ferdinand. Alcalá Galiano, whose knowledge of men was very wide, wrote in 1818 that even among vigorous opponents of the fallen Constitution he observed disgust at the state of things; "respect for the royal person," he adds, "had diminished."

The military character of the insurrections and the predominance of military leaders is explained by the fact that among the general population, little affected by Liberal ideas, it was impossible to find a sufficient number of armed adherents to effect a revolution, while military discipline made of the soldiery a docile instrument, and the officers, men of considerable cultivation, much affected by French ideas, and indignant at the persecutions and at the official neglect of the army, furnished ready material for revolutionary action. Later these conditions were modified by personal struggles and by the ambitions of commanders, which prolonged, as will presently appear, the era of those military insurrections which form so large a part of the history of Spain almost throughout the century. Meantime the organisation of the National Militia, by arming the *bourgeoisie* and the people, introduced a new civilian element into the revolutionary party.

The failure of all the movements from 1814 to 1820 increased in every case the severity of Ferdinand towards all who were suspected of Liberalism, and produced fresh victims. Even men like Escoiquiz and the famous *guerrillero* "El Empecinado" were banished for addressing to the King some observations on the inefficacy of a system of terror and on the need of attracting the more advanced group by means of reforms. Thus opinion was being prepared for new explosions, which were soon to introduce a second constitutional period.

The excesses of the reaction in Spain disgusted not only Spaniards but also the sovereigns and Governments of the Great Powers. Louis XVIII clearly showed this disgust by refusing the aid of the Spanish troops sent by Ferdinand under Castaños after Napoleon's escape from Elba, while accepting the aid of other nations in the campaign of 1815. At the Congress of Vienna in 1815 the obstinacy of Spain incurred a rebuff, deserved by the King, but not by the Spanish people, which had taken its full share in the overthrow of Napoleon's power and in a war which had roused the enthusiasm of all Europe. The claims of the Spanish representative, a diplomatist of moderate capacity named Gomez Labrador, were disregarded; Spain refused to sign the Final Act, and was not invited to join the Holy Alliance. In return Ferdinand refused to recognise or accede to the decisions of the Coalition of 1815.

But, if the Spanish monarchy was neglected abroad, at home in the Court of Madrid the Powers contended for influence over the Government and strove to guide its policy or win advantages. Great Britain and Russia were conspicuous in this effort through the persistent intrigues of their ambassadors, Henry Wellesley and Count Taticheff. Russia favoured a moderate policy, partly from expediency, since an extreme system, by driving Spaniards to the brink of revolution, was dangerous to Europe; partly because the Tsar Alexander was still in that phase of semi-Liberal romanticism which he afterwards abandoned. The British Government and ambassador at that time supported

absolutism; but on the other hand they were displeased with Ferdinand for his ingratitude towards Wellington and disregard of Wellington's prudent counsels, and for his vexatious measures against British commerce and even against British subjects living in the Peninsula. These motives of dissatisfaction, together with the strong Liberal feeling existing in England, produced vigorous attacks from the Opposition in Parliament upon Ferdinand and his councillors. These attacks injured English influence in Madrid for the time, and Taticheff contrived to obtain the supremacy, partly by means of Queen Isabel, whose desire for moderation he supported. Thus came about the slight respite of two years (1816-8), which began with the elevation to power of José Léon y Pizarro, a man of sound intelligence and political experience, who was expected to give a more humane and Liberal turn to the Government, and which ended with the fall of Garay. To recover favour, Great Britain supported the claims of the Bourbon family in Italy, and obtained at last the Treaty of June, 1817, which secured the reversion of Parma, Piacenza, and Guastalla to the Infanta Marie-Louise, formerly Queen of Etruria, and her male descendants. The insurrection of the American Colonies offered a fresh opportunity to Great Britain to gain influence over Spain. The open assistance lent by her to the insurgents as well as her influence in Portugal, which through her Colony of Brazil represented a powerful factor in the Trans-Atlantic political problem, convinced the Spanish Government of the need of closer relations with Great Britain; and at last, after a fruitless effort made with the support of Russia in the permanent Commission of the Allied Powers, it attained this end by the Treaty of September 17, 1817, which opened to Great Britain the commerce of the Indies and prepared the way for the abolition of the slave-trade. But this did not destroy at the time the influence of Taticheff in the Court, and especially in the *camarilla*, some of whose members were guided by him, nor did it prevent the intervention of other Russian politicians in Spanish policy.

Among these was Prince Galitzin, an amateur of literature and art and intimate with the writers of the time, who resided in Madrid as a secret and busy agent of Russia. Among his friends was Mora, editor of the *Crónica Científica*, who was induced by Galitzin to aid him in drawing up a memorial upon the political, military, moral, and economic state of Spain, persuading him that it was to be presented to Capodistrias, with a view to obtaining the support of the Tsar in pending questions. Mora, induced by the intrigues of Galitzin, succeeded in bringing into the affair the Secretary of Justice, the illiterate Lozano de Torres, to whom he proposed a mission to the Courts of foreign Powers and an interview with Capodistrias. This mission was to be entrusted to Mora himself, in order to ascertain exactly what truth there was in rumours of conspiracies and plots against the Spanish State, rumours of which the incept Spanish diplomacy seemed totally ignorant. The

proposal having been accepted by the King, Mora started secretly on April 20, 1819, for Italy, where according to Galitzin he was to meet Capodistrias and show him the memorial. The interview with the Russian Minister did not take place; but on his journey through Spain, Italy, and France, Mora became convinced that the Government of Ferdinand was discredited in the opinion of Europe, and that everywhere conspiracies were aiming at a Spanish revolution, chiefly supported by American agents from the Spanish Colonies and from the United States, who hoped thus to aid the emancipation of Spanish America, and also by the Freemasons and the King of Sardinia himself. One of those who informed Mora of these movements was Godoy, who was then in Rome, his naturalisation in Austria being opposed by Ferdinand through the ambassador Cevallos. By the advice of Mora, given on the strength of the revelations made in his despatches, Ferdinand made one of his frequent changes of Secretaries; but he refused to establish or subsidise in Madrid a political periodical which might counterbalance the polemics carried on by the English Press. Other advice given by Mora was also neglected; and when this improvised diplomatist urged the King to disarm the conspirators by granting a Constitutional Charter on the lines of the French *Charte*, and also an amnesty to the Liberals and proscribed *afrancesados*, he was recalled from his mission and returned in disappointment to Madrid at the very time when Capodistrias was writing to him from Paris—perhaps not with serious intentions—inviting him to an interview in the French capital. Meantime the United States Minister, George Erving, was pressing upon the Spanish Government the cession of the Floridas, which was finally accomplished by the Treaty of 1819, ratified on October 20, 1820. In return Erving professed complete neutrality with regard to the Colonies, although it was well known that frequent help was sent from the United States to the insurgents, and that the American Freemasons boldly supported the movement with the knowledge and connivance of the Federal Government.

According to Mora's communications agents from North and South America swarmed throughout Europe, with centres of action and vigilance established in Lisbon and in London to observe the movements of troops destined for America and to prepare for the outbreak of an insurrection on the eve of their departure: by these means, apart from the effects upon Spain herself, the struggle in the Colonies would be closed. The Italian *Carbonari* were in communication with the Lodges of Philadelphia, and, in concert with William Shalderque, the United States agent in Leghorn, had despatched one of their number, the agitator Sertini, from Genoa to Barcelona. Shalderque had correspondents in several parts of the Peninsula, through whom he distributed money to prepare the Revolution. Rumours of this American gold were current in Cadiz at the end of 1819 and beginning of 1820; and some Americans afterwards boasted of having thus contributed to the

revolution. These rumours were recalled many years afterwards by the anonymous author of the *History of Fernando VII* (1842); but, although Mora's information may have been partly true, it should be noted that Alcalá Galiano—who, like most converts, is very candid in his memoirs—absolutely denies that the conspiracy received such support, and dwells upon the indigence of the Cadiz conspirators, who, at the end of 1819, succeeded with great trouble in collecting through the contributions of some Cadiz merchants about 4000 dollars; a sum quite insufficient to suborn officers and soldiers. The fact is, that whatever interest the Americans may have had in raising hindrances in Spain against the reinforcement of the Spanish forces in America, there existed in the Peninsula sufficient elements for the support of more or less serious revolutionary action without external aid or incitement.

The revolutionary movement gathered force gradually, as in other countries. We have already said that the majority of the intellectual element, although a minority of the whole population, had more or less pronounced Liberal tendencies, leaning either towards the *doceañistas* or the *afrancesados*. The intellectuals were joined by many men of the middle class, especially merchants, some nobles and ecclesiastics, and many officers of the army. The list of the conspirators and Freemasons of that time, and the names of those who after the triumph formed the juntas and municipalities in Madrid and the other capitals, clearly prove that in every class, and particularly in the *bourgeoisie*, Liberal ideas claimed adherents. Even among those who had recognised the absolutist Government of 1814, and those who occupied public posts, partisans were to be found not perhaps of the Constitution of 1812, but at least of a moderate constitutionalism, or of a more Liberal monarchy. In Cadiz the chief part of the population favoured these ideas, doubtless owing to the influence of the Cortes which had sat in that city. In some regions, as in Asturias, the most prominent men, and almost all the patriots who in 1808 had organised resistance to the French, joined the Liberal movement, although afterwards many of them changed sides, becoming excessively Conservative. The general feeling of the young men was the same. Notwithstanding the vigilance of the authorities, the books of the Encyclopedists and the abundant political literature, not yet adequately studied, which had sprung from the discussions of 1810-3, passed from hand to hand, as well as pamphlets and poems more or less seditious and inflammatory, in which young men secretly vented their aspirations for a vague liberty, all the more eagerly desired because not clearly defined. The refugees of 1814, chiefly living in England, carried on thence a persistent campaign (described in Mora's despatches) against the absolutism of Ferdinand and his *camarilla*, with the support of the English Liberal Press, which always by some means found entrance into Spain. The officers, who had been made prisoners in the War of Independence and had returned to Spain, constituted, as has been said, a considerable

Liberal element, influenced as they were by French ideas; and some of them, as Riego and San Miguel, were members of foreign secret societies, such as that of the Freemasons.

Freemasonry had existed in Spain from the middle of the eighteenth century. The persecutions of 1814 and the propaganda of the returning refugees greatly increased its range, first in dependence upon centres established in other countries, but afterwards with a separate organisation. Not all the Masons were revolutionists, but all aided one another; and under the shadow of the Lodges the Radical elements steadily worked for revolution and drew in fresh adherents, some of them convinced partisans, others hardly understanding to what they were committing themselves. Alcalá Galiano says that in 1817 Spanish freemasonry on the whole "was not yet determined to act vigorously and directly against the Government," although most of the malcontents and converts to Liberalism were becoming Masons. In the insurrection of Lacy, which was supported by the Murcian Lodge, not all the conspirators were Masons; and the Cadiz Lodge hesitated before approving the conduct of the Lodge of Algeciras, which had welcomed the fugitives from Catalonia. But in 1819 matters took a more decided political turn. The Andalusian Masons, especially those of Cadiz and Seville, who had wide ramifications in the garrisons and in the army which was being assembled at Cadiz to be embarked for America, decided under the influence of some enthusiasts to push on the revolution. Among the civilians, two young men took the lead in the conspiracy, Alcalá Galiano, son of the brave sailor killed at Trafalgar, and Mendizabal, who was employed in the provisioning of the troops, a man then obscure but afterwards a leading figure in Spanish politics.

Notwithstanding the insignificance and timidity of those who ostensibly ruled the masonic society of Cadiz, matters were actively pushed on through the enthusiasm of a few men and the illusory hopes entertained by the military members of large monetary contributions and powerful aid from the Sovereign Chapter sitting in Cadiz. Among the armed forces the movement was much aided by the repugnance generally felt in the army and navy against embarking for America. This repugnance, which is not uncommon in colonial wars and can be paralleled in the modern history of several countries, was justified in this case by the mismanagement of the expedition and such scandals as that of the purchase of Russian ships, which were destined for America. It was also believed that the movement would be directed by General O'Donell, Conde de La Bisbal, an Irishman by birth, commander of the expeditionary army, whose ambiguous conduct and decided tolerance towards the conspirators seemed to show a disposition to revolt. But, when all was ready for the outbreak, La Bisbal—whether upon his own initiative or upon the persuasion of Sarsfield, the second in command—arrested the commanders of battalions at Puerto de Santa María (Cadiz—July).

This blow upset for the moment the plans of the revolutionists; but, contrary to expectation, it was not followed by regular prosecutions, nor did it prevent the reunion of the conspirators and the renewal of their efforts. These efforts at last won the adhesion of two officers, Colonel Quiroga, who was appointed military leader of the insurrection, and Rafael del Riego, commander of the regiment of Asturias.

On January 1, 1820, the day previously fixed by these leaders, Riego, with the force under his command, proclaimed in the town of Cabezas de San Juan the Constitution of 1812; thereby acting against the plans of the civilian leaders of the movement, who, according to Alcalá Galiano, were far from desiring merely the restoration of a political code which some of them regarded as defective. On the night of January 1, Riego entered Arcos and seized the person of General Conde de Calderón. He was there joined by the battalion of Seville, whose second in command, Francisco Osorio, had revolted on the same day. Quiroga, who had been prevented by a storm of rain from leaving the barracks on the date fixed, started on January 2 and took possession of the town of San Fernando, where the Minister of Marine was made prisoner. This easy victory might have been followed by a march into Cadiz, but for the hesitation and blundering of Quiroga, who let slip his opportunity. Thus the military authorities had time to prepare for defence; and, although the conspirators within the city attempted without success to win over the scanty garrison, while Riego on his side led his troops into Puerto de Santa María and seized the arsenal of Carraca, yet the revolution stood still for many days and was threatened with complete failure. An expedition led by Riego to Málaga and Córdoba, to inspirit the soldiers and win the adhesion of other places, proved fruitless, as well as an attempt made in Cadiz by agreement with some royalist officers (March 10). Fortunately for the constitutional cause, the hesitation which had prevailed throughout Spain upon the first news of Riego's *pronunciamiento* was ended on February 21 by the revolt of Corunna; an example quickly followed by all Galicia, Asturias, Saragossa, Barcelona, and Pamplona. La Bisbal himself, who was in Madrid at the time and had been commissioned by the Government to crush the constitutionalists, revolted at Ocaña, perhaps because he was now assured that the revolution would succeed.

All these events filled the Court with fear and the Liberals of Madrid with hope. It seems inexplicable that from January 1 to February 21, on which date Corunna seconded the movement of Cabezas de San Juan, the Government remained inactive, or merely attempted some feeble measures against the insurgents. From December, 1819, when the central authorities apparently discovered that an attempt was being made to renew the movement which had been checked by La Bisbal and Sarsfield in July, it was evident that, instead of vigorously crushing the symptoms of rebellion, they were attempting to thwart it by timid

reforms. They began by announcing a new penal code and the mitigation of processes and penalties in the case of political prisoners. This trifling promise satisfied no one, and nothing more was heard of it; but on March 4, the gathering force of the revolution being now evident, a royal decree commanded that the Council of State should be reorganised and that the Council and the Judges should consult the King "as to what they thought expedient for the good government of the monarchy." On the 6th an order appeared announcing the convocation of the Cortes; and finally on the 7th, by advice of General Ballesteros, an extraordinary Gazette declared that the Cortes would meet at once, and that the King "in accordance with the general will of the people had decided to swear adhesion to the Constitution of 1812." Thus, almost without bloodshed, the revolution of 1820 triumphed.

According to an eye-witness, Mesonero Romanos, this Gazette produced indescribable relief among the more cultivated and wealthy part of the population of Madrid, grandees and titles of Castile, military officers of every rank, rich proprietors, bankers and all the commercial classes, lawyers, physicians, literary and scientific men. Mesonero states that in the expressions of rejoicing the lower classes took no share, being generally, as has been said, not very favourable to constitutionalism, either from ignorance of its meaning or from the weight of the long tradition of absolutism. The intellectual character of the movement, partly aristocratic, partly *bourgeois*, appeared in the spontaneous meeting held on the same day in the town-hall by people of the classes already mentioned, when the new municipality of Madrid was appointed by acclamation. In Cadiz, where the news of the decree of March 7, followed by an order that the troops should swear to the Constitution, had suddenly changed the position of the insurgents, the revolution still had a distinctly military character; and it was evident that the leaders, especially Riego, intended to make the most of the credit of having started the revolution and to establish a rival power which should balance the civil power now being organised in Madrid. Riego and Quiroga sent emissaries to the King, to congratulate him on having sworn to the Constitution and to offer him the submission of the "Liberating Army." Both were raised to the grade of general, an honour which Riego was unwilling to accept, partly from real disinterestedness—a trait which in his childish, impulsive, and sentimental character was compatible with the ambition which sometimes turned his head—partly because he resented the grant of the same reward to Quiroga and to two other officers whom he thought less deserving than himself. But if some cleavage thus began to appear between the two forces, civil and military, which had risen from the revolution, no difference of opinion appeared in the spirit of generosity which at first marked the victory of the constitutionalists. In fact, not only was no excess committed against the supporters of absolutism; but,

although the deputies who in 1814 had urged the King to restore absolutism were arrested, the majority of the Cortes, which met in 1820, desired that they should not be brought to trial; and accordingly they were set at liberty. The King took the oath on March 9; and on the 10th a royal proclamation appeared containing a phrase afterwards famous:—"Let us advance frankly, myself leading the way, along the constitutional path." We shall presently see how far the frankness of Ferdinand went.

All the proscribed persons and refugees of 1814 naturally returned to Spain; and some of the most eminent—Argüelles, Canga Argüelles, and others—were included in the first constitutional Government. The Cortes having been summoned, there was an interregnum of four months during which the administration was conducted in a strange fashion, being divided between the Ministry and the provincial revolutionary juntas, which did not disperse, one of them continuing to sit even in the capital of the monarchy. Side by side with these authorities, which had a certain official character and continued the tradition of 1810-2, another power presently arose which in an unofficial and irregular manner profoundly influenced public affairs—the power of the clubs or "patriotic societies" formed upon French models. Some of these were begotten by the enthusiasm of youth, others were formed with the reasonable hope of instructing and guiding public opinion; but all were swayed as a rule by the most impetuous radicalism. The most famous societies of Madrid were that of the Café Lorencini, entitled "The Patriotic Society of the Friends of Liberty," that of the Café Gran Cruz de Malta, and that of the "Friends of Order," commonly known as *La Fontana de Oro*, because it met in the basement of the inn so named. In this last the leading orator was Alcalá Galiano, who had left Cadiz for Madrid. A characteristic mark of these societies—not indeed confined to them, for it pervaded the political life of the time—was the abuse of rhetoric which inflamed men's minds and won rapid popular triumphs. Oratory was supported by a formidable stream of patriotic and topical verse, and by music which provided a setting for political hymns and songs. Two of these had an extraordinary vogue: the hymn of Riego, whose authorship was disputed among several claimants, the fact being that there were several hymns, of which one prevailed and became for half a century the Liberal anthem; and, secondly, the *Trágala*, so called from its refrain (*Swallow it*) which referred to the Constitution of 1812.

Prominent in the Liberalism of that time was the National Militia, which thenceforth played a large part in politics. The Code of 1812, which created this force, directed that it was to be formed in each province "of the inhabitants of the province in proportion to its population and condition," not serving continuously but only "when circumstances required." In the principal cities a number of nobles voluntarily

joined this militia in 1820 side by side with the *bourgeoisie*; Mesonero mentions the names of more than sixteen ancient and illustrious houses on the roll of the Madrid militia.

On July 9 the Cortes were opened, meeting in a single Chamber like the Cortes of 1810. Their composition was fairly homogeneous, with a predominance of moderate Liberals and men of cultivation and social weight, professors, writers, magistrates, noted students of science, as Lagasca, Azaola, Císcar, and others. Many deputies of 1812 were now reelected, among them the group of Liberal priests which included Martinez Marina, Muñoz Torrero, Villanueva, Ruiz del Padrón, Martell, and others.

Although the deputies did not all equally reverence the Constitution of 1812, some even desiring its reform or complete alteration, the opinion of the majority established as the symbol of the Liberal cause the Code of Cadiz; its integrity was the fundamental doctrine upon which the Cortes based their labours. In accordance with a precedent of 1812 it was ordered (April 24) that the text of the Constitution should be explained in the primary schools. The Cortes sat until November 9, and passed many important measures, among them the abolition of entails and of the settlement of estates, the suppression of many religious Orders, the abolition of pecuniary subsidies to the Papal See, the regulation of the patriotic societies with a view to prevent excesses, and the punishment of the priests who were conspiring against the constitutional Government. The Cortes of 1820, as well as the succeeding Cortes of this period, have been blamed as anti-clerical. Such was, in fact, their character; and in view of the political situation this was natural, for the greater part of the clergy were anti-constitutional. Their sympathy with absolutism had been proved in the reaction of 1814, which, in spite of Garay's unsuccessful opposition, committed the error of ratifying the exemption from taxes of the clergy, who now selfishly aimed at escaping from public burdens even more completely than in the time of Philip II. Finally, the absolutist traditions of the Church in past centuries and, above all, the great struggles of the civil tribunals with the Church in the eighteenth century, together with the strong and long-existing national sentiment, which demanded a reduction of the number of ecclesiastics, formed a powerful intellectual inheritance for the politicians of the time. Among the results were, besides the already mentioned laws, the suppression of the Jesuits, the prohibition for the future of religious vows, the confiscation of the property of the suppressed communities, and the obligation of the clergy, both regular and secular, to military service. It is notable that the confiscation was supported by such moderate Liberals as Martinez de La Rosa, Toreno, and one Bishop (Castrillo). Among the clergy themselves, there was a minority of reformers in ecclesiastical matters, represented by learned men like Archbishop Amat, Villanueva, and others, whose books formed the

doctrinal basis of this policy. The ideas expressed by Villanueva in his *Letters to Roque Leal* were so well received that the Government named him Ambassador in Rome; but the Vatican refused to receive him. This episode, together with other causes, produced the rupture of relations with the Curia, which was declared on January 23, 1823, when the Nuncio received his passports.

Notwithstanding all their labours, the Cortes of 1820 satisfied nobody. The Radicals found them too moderate and cautious in reform; the Moderates, and much more those who saw nothing but danger in the revolution, found them too violent, especially in ecclesiastical matters. The latent division between the Liberals of 1812 and those of 1820 now distinctly showed itself. The former were inclined to moderation, aiming at a firm establishment of the Constitution, even at the cost of some modification of its character. The latter, thorough revolutionaries, although only in some points really more radical than the Constitution itself, claimed to be the only true Liberals; and with the help of the patriotic societies and the personal influence of Riego, they obtained some concessions which were insufficient to satisfy them, and, in fact, rather deepened the dissensions. Thus, in the very year when the revolution triumphed, the Liberal forces were not only divided but embittered, and weakened for any combined action or resistance.

A notable event gave the signal for rupture. The Ministers and the Moderates had from the beginning viewed with apprehension the attitude of the troops which had revolted in Andalusia. The continued maintenance of that army was also a financial burden which the Government thought superfluous, since, the oath to the Constitution having been taken throughout Spain, a military force for its defence seemed unnecessary. But the new Liberals, especially the friends of Riego, considered that the dissolution of that force would be not only a slur upon the officers who had started the revolution, but also a positive imprudence, for it was known that the Constitution had many enemies; and events afterwards proved that those who took this view did not exaggerate the danger. On the other hand the independent attitude of Riego, which became more pronounced every day, and the plans for armed resistance formed by some extremists in Madrid and by the majority in Cadiz supported by the Lodges, seemed to justify disbandment; and the Government persisted in its intention. Riego was secretly summoned to Madrid to discuss the matter. The surprise was great in Madrid when Riego, travelling incognito, unexpectedly arrived on August 31. He did not observe the discretion demanded by his position, but showed his intemperance and vanity in his conferences with the Ministers, at the pompous reception prepared for him by his partisans, at the banquet given in his honour by *La Fontana*, and at the function in the Teatro del Principe which he attended after the banquet. There was a disturbance; and the Government in growing alarm banished Riego and

some other officers to Asturias in order to cut the matter short. This act of energy produced a sedition, which was promptly suppressed. *La Fontana* closed its sittings, the exiled officers departed, and the "Liberating Army" was disbanded without offering resistance.

But there was a definite divergence between the two Liberal groups. The partisans of Riego expelled the friends of the Government from the Lodges; and a new masonic centre was established, known as the *comuneros*, a name borrowed from that given to the Castilian insurgents of 1520. The breach was delayed by the conclusion of an agreement at the end of 1820 between the extremists and the Government, whereby Riego was recalled from exile and appointed Captain-General of Aragon, while some of his friends entered the Ministry or obtained official posts; but the beginning of 1821 brought a final rupture, and the establishment of the *comuneros* as a new secret society, opposed to the Freemasons, but imitating their organisation and ceremonies. This society was at first unimportant but afterwards gathered such strength that in 1822 it numbered 10,000 members, still maintaining its ultra-Liberal character and adhering to Riego. This split was fatal for the constitutionalists, all the more that it was complicated by the existence of other groups of conflicting views, always struggling with one another and exciting dissensions. Such were, first, the group of the *afrancesados*, who, after their return to Spain, soon showed themselves so moderate that they opposed the Liberals; secondly the societies of *Carbonari*, either modelled upon those of Italy, or actually founded by Italian refugees, such as General Pepe, after the failure of the Neapolitan and Piedmontese revolutions; and, thirdly, the republican legitimists and French adventurers, such as Bessières, Montarlot, Vaudoncourt, and others, whose proceedings (to be mentioned later) were on the point of producing grave disturbances in Spain. Again, the moderate Liberals who desired a reform of the Constitution, such as Martinez de La Rosa, Toreno, Feliu, Caso Manuel, and others, formed at the end of 1821 a semi-secret society, named "Friends of the Constitution," and nicknamed the *anilleros*, from the gold ring which was their symbol. Their chief object was to strengthen and enlarge the power of the Government, in order to avoid anarchy. We shall presently trace the various incidents which marked the spread of the struggle between these several groups.

These dissensions were cleverly turned to account by Ferdinand and the absolutists. It is needless to say that the King had never, for a moment, sincerely accepted the revolution. The man, who in 1814 had not understood the force of accomplished facts and the meaning of Liberal opinion, could still less understand them when he found himself violently deprived of his absolute power. Thus it is not strange that, immediately after swearing to the Constitution, the King began to plot against it, and that there were repeated collisions between him and the successive Liberal Governments. From the beginning of 1820 there

were various indications of reaction in several places, including Madrid. In October the King refused to sanction the law for the extinction of nunneries and diminution of monasteries, and only yielded before the threat of a revolt and the decided attitude of the patriotic societies. On October 25, Ferdinand went to the Escurial, whence he encouraged anti-constitutional conspiracies, at the same time carrying on, through Alcalá Galiano and Fray Cirilo, ex-General of the Franciscans, negotiations with the Radicals, who with manifest folly accepted this ignoble and dangerous alliance, in order to overthrow the Government. As if these proceedings—publicly carried on—were not enough, there now appeared near the Escurial an armed party calling themselves "Defenders of the absolute King"; and finally, on November 15, the Ministers were astonished by the royal nomination, contrary to the Constitution, of the violent absolutist General Carvajal as Captain-General of Madrid. The actual holder of the post, General Vigodet, refused to give up the command; there was a serious sedition in Madrid, a proof of the unpopularity of Ferdinand, who was obliged to annul the appointment, to dismiss his confessor, and to return to Madrid. At his entrance into the city, the King heard many gross insults in which the natural indignation of the Liberals at the royal duplicity found vent. Ferdinand, concealing his rage, awaited an opportunity to strike a blow at the Government. He found it at the reopening of the Cortes, on March 1, 1821. Some days previously, the King had intimated that the Cortes ought to take measures to prevent insults to his person. At the opening ceremony he pronounced the usual speech, which had been composed by Argüelles; and at the end he added a paragraph in which, after declaring his loyalty to the Constitution, he bitterly complained of the insults heaped upon him in the streets and in the clubs, and of the backwardness of the executive in checking them; this appendix became known as "*the King's pig-tail.*" Its immediate result was the resignation of the Ministers and the nomination of others, among whom were several *anilleros*. Ferdinand's action was partly prompted by desire to rid himself of a Ministry which had discovered his intrigues with armed parties of Royalist insurgents.

But these armed bands were not the chief danger for the Constitutionalists. Ferdinand, distrusting his Spanish partisans, had early applied to the foreign sovereigns for help in overthrowing the Liberals. His first application was made on October 25, 1820, the day on which he went to the Escurial, in a letter carried to Louis XVIII by the Portuguese diplomatist Saldanha: in it Ferdinand declared that he was a captive, and that Spain was about to plunge into anarchy, and begged the French King to obtain the aid of the Allied Powers. Already in March, the Tsar Alexander, alarmed by the success of the Spanish Revolution, had upon his own initiative presented to the Powers a proposal for armed intervention in Spain; but Austria, Prussia, and England, dreading

the increase of Russian or French influence in the Peninsula, opposed it, as did also Louis XVIII himself, who was sufficiently occupied with the public affairs of his own kingdom. The revolution at Naples, where the Spanish Constitution of 1812 was proclaimed, brought forward again the project of an anti-revolutionary combination of the Powers. At the Congress of Troppau the matter was discussed both generally and with special reference to Italy; and the Tsar took occasion to express to one of the French envoys his desire that France should do in Spain what Austria had done in Naples. But again the project fell through. Ferdinand, however, continued to solicit Louis XVIII; and events in Spain certainly told in favour of his applications.

In fact the evident disloyalty of the King had aroused Liberal sentiment; and, on the other hand, the extremists redoubled their efforts to remove the Moderates from power. The conflict was twofold, and gave rise to the gravest occurrences. The Cortes of 1821, after the change of Ministry, continued their labours until June 30, passing some important laws concerning judicial administration, revenue, education, and other matters. Debates upon the failure of the Neapolitan and Piedmontese revolutions showed that the deputies did not grasp the bearing of these events upon Spanish affairs. Certainly the domestic situation was enough to absorb the attention of earnest constitutionalists. The armed bands of absolutists daily increased; the higher ranks of the clergy vehemently resisted the execution of the laws concerning ecclesiastical matters. The Government used sometimes vigorous, sometimes moderate, measures, but logically refrained from refusing to their enemies the advantages of Liberal government. The extremists regarded this as a weakness, allowing the absolutists to conspire and to harass the Government. Hence followed various disturbances in several cities, and on the part of the Liberals a change from their generous bearing of earlier days towards those who were suspected of absolutism to one of violence and persecution. The gravest episode of this period of political excitement was the assassination of Vinuesa, parish priest of Tamajón, who was imprisoned in Madrid as author of a conspiracy, regarded by some as the dream of a madman, by others as a device deliberately contrived in concert with the King. After a long trial he had been condemned to a term of imprisonment, which seemed to the extremists a trifling punishment, indicative of royal bribery or pressure. On May 4 the mob attacked the prison and murdered Vinuesa. In these outbreaks of political feeling refugees from abroad took no small part. Among them two Frenchmen were prominent—Bessières, who attempted to start a Republican revolt in Barcelona, and Cugnet de Montarlot, who attempted to obtain the support of Riego for an invasion of France in order to promote a French Republican movement. Some historians have denied the reality of these dealings, assuming that Montarlot was an agent of the French Government who hoped to

compromise Riego by this pretended conspiracy. But the fact of Montarlot's dealings with Riego and also with other extremists is certain. Although the levity and quixotism of Riego seemed to invite such proposals, a letter written by him on August 12 to another French refugee, Vaudoncourt, who shared Montarlot's aims, proves that Riego recognised the duties of his position, and was not prepared for an enterprise involving international complications. Nevertheless the French Government complained to the Spanish Ministry of the real or supposed complicity of Riego in these fantastic plots; and, the complaint being supported by Ferdinand, Riego was harshly and rashly removed from his command in Aragon. This act produced in many places seditions or demonstrations of extremists, who took for their banner the portrait of Riego. The demonstration which took place in Madrid was dispersed by the police without bloodshed in the spot known as Las Platerias, near the Plaza Mayor (September 17). But the agitation continued and was reflected in the Cortes themselves, which met in extraordinary session (September 24, 1821, to February 14, 1822), and, in spite of the violent discussions following the fall of the Ministry, devoted their attention to projects and laws of great importance, such as the administrative division of the Peninsula, customs and taxes, a proposed Penal Code, and public charity.

In 1822 symptoms of growing disorder showed themselves both in the division of the Liberals and in the activity of armed bands of absolutists, which received from the French Government, not indeed official aid—for Villèle did not venture so far—but encouragement and assurance of impunity for the conspiracies planned in France and for the aid in money and arms thence derived. At the beginning of the year, Ferdinand, through his uncle the King of Naples, once more solicited aid from the Powers; but as before, the matter, notwithstanding the support of the Tsar, remained for the time undecided. In the new Cortes of 1822, the extremists, favoured by the law forbidding the reelection of former deputies, obtained a large majority, a serious matter under the circumstances, and all the more so seeing that a Moderate, Martinez de La Rosa, was head of the Government. The Cortes soon showed their tendency by appointing as their President Riego, who had no qualifications for the post. The parliamentary conflict which at once began was complicated by seditions and repression in the provinces. The number of bands was so great as to constitute a state of civil war, carried on without quarter. In Aranjuez, in Valencia, and in Madrid itself, there were in May and June attempts at absolutist demonstrations and risings, in the last of which (June 30), an officer of the King's Guard, a man of Liberal ideas, named Landabum, was killed by his own soldiers. This event was the prelude to a veritable insurrection, begun by four battalions of Guards, which left Madrid and encamped in the Pardo. Fearing an attack, the people of Madrid made

preparations ; and, when the battalions from the Pardo silently entered Madrid, they were beaten off, chiefly by the stout resistance of the National Militia (July 7). The King, upon whose connivance the mutineers had reckoned, is said to have appeared after their defeat upon a balcony of the Palace and to have encouraged the pursuit. The Guard was disbanded, and a new Ministry of Radicals was formed.

But the international danger was now taking definite shape. The French Government, not satisfied with indirectly supporting the Royalists, lent to Ferdinand a large sum through its ambassador La Garde to aid a counter-revolution. La Garde himself, with the envoys in Madrid of Russia, Austria, Prussia, and other States, after the events of July 7, addressed a note to the Minister of State, speaking of "the horrible situation of his Catholic Majesty and his family," and of "the dangers threatening their august persons," and plainly declaring that "the relations of Spain with all Europe would depend upon the treatment of his Majesty." This threat was soon to be translated into the decision of the Congress of Verona, which was preparing to meet.

The new Ministry attempted to strengthen the Liberal position by placing proved Liberals in important posts in Madrid and in the provinces, and by vigorously pressing the war against the insurgent bands. These had seized La Seo de Urgel, a Catalan town, where they established a "Supreme Regency of Spain during the captivity of Fernando VII." On August 15 this Regency addressed a proclamation to the country urging the liberation of the so-called "captive King," and also applied to Metternich for help ; but Metternich was not disposed for an intervention which might favour Russian plans.

The proclamation of Urgel, the spread of the civil war, and the known attitude of the foreign Powers roused the activity of the Liberals. Arrests, seditions, orations in the clubs, attempts to rouse public feeling against the enemies of liberty, were redoubled, while the civil war increased in ferocity on both sides, the constitutionalists gaining some success and forcing the Regency to fly to France. But the decision of the Congress of Verona modified the situation. Although the application of the Regents of Urgel was not entertained by Metternich, it was viewed with favour by the French envoys Montmorency and Chateaubriand, who, contrary to the instructions and desires of Villèle, worked steadily for an intervention, to be carried out by France. At the meeting of October 20 Montmorency asked the other envoys whether the Allied Powers would recall their ambassadors from Madrid if France should recall hers, and, whether, in case of war between France and Spain, Louis XVIII might reckon upon the aid of his allies. The Tsar replied in the affirmative, offering a large army either to maintain order in France during the war, or to enter Spain ; but the opposition of the British plenipotentiary, Wellington, and of Metternich, frustrated this plan. Yet the design was not abandoned; and it now seemed certain that,

should the Congress decide upon intervention, France would be charged to execute it. Nothing was effected by Wellington's declaration—following the instructions of Canning—that his Government would not lend itself to intervention, nor by the detachment of Great Britain from the policy of the Holy Alliance. Although Villèle, supported by Louis XVIII, sought at least to postpone intervention, the forward policy prevailed, and the Congress decided upon military intervention in Spain (October 30). Chateaubriand, who for dynastic and patriotic reasons desired war, having been appointed Minister (December 28), contrived to overrule Villèle; and at the end of 1822 everything was ready for action.

Great Britain, touched in her international interests and also influenced by a strong popular sentiment favouring the Spanish Liberals, attempted to obtain from the Spanish Government some concessions which might avoid intervention. Her ambassador A' Court, and afterwards Lord Fitzroy Somerset, a special agent of Wellington's, laboured with that object. San Miguel and his Ministry have been blamed for not yielding to this pressure; but this censure is undeserved. In the first place, the ultra-Liberal sentiment then dominant in Spain forbade the Government to make concessions; secondly, the proposed concessions were presented under the form of pressure by foreign nations which contrary to all right desired to meddle with the internal affairs of Spain; and in any case these concessions would scarcely have prevented action, which in the case of the Holy Alliance proceeded deliberately from enmity to constitutional principles, and enabled the French monarchists to gain credit for their dynasty by an easy triumph of arms. The Spanish Liberals could not fail to see that they would be alone in the struggle; for the British Government, notwithstanding its sympathies, had declared that in case of war, it would remain neutral; and even in those critical days A' Court was pressing the Government for a settlement of the question concerning the injury inflicted upon British trade in America by the blockade of the insurgent Colonies.

Early in January, 1823, the ambassadors of France, Russia, Austria, and Prussia, presented to the Spanish Government notes declaring their common attitude. They all demanded the abolition of the Constitution of 1812, the liberation of the King, whom they regarded as a prisoner of the Liberals, and the cessation of the anarchy which, with manifest exaggeration, was described as prevailing in the country. But, except the Russian note, which seemed to suggest the need of simply restoring the absolutist *régime*, their representations pointed to a moderate monarchical system or even (as in the case of the Prussian note) declared that it was not for foreign nations to determine what political institutions should be established in Spain, the essential points being the restoration of public tranquillity and the safety of the King's person. The language was very vague except with reference to the Constitution, which was vigorously condemned. These notes produced a profound effect in the

Cortes. The unbounded indignation of the Liberals showed itself in patriotic speeches. The Ministry replied to the notes by declining to displace the Constitution of 1812, repudiating intervention as contrary to the law of nations, and boldly refuting the charges brought against the Liberals. The result was the withdrawal of the ambassadors from Spain, those of Russia, Prussia, and Austria departing on January 14, 15, and 16, respectively; the French ambassador soon followed, having spent his last days in promoting dissensions among the Liberals.

The turn which matters were taking was now evident; it was definitely shown a few days later in the speech read by Louis XVIII at the opening of the French Chamber, in which, after stating that the Spanish Government had declined all accommodation, he declared that he had sent orders to recall his ambassador and that a hundred thousand Frenchmen were ready to enter Spain. Great Britain still strove to prevent the war, urging through her ambassador in Paris that the demands of the Powers were inadmissible in their actual form, and that propriety permitted no more than a "recommendation" that the Constitution of 1812 should be modified. But Great Britain went no further; and the Spanish Government prepared for war.

The difficulties of the situation were increased by want of money, by the existing civil war, by the certainty that the King was encouraging the insurrection of all his partisans, and by the doubtful fidelity of some military commanders. Yet four bodies of troops were formed under Mina, Morillo, Ballesteros, and La Bisbal, while San Miguel himself served under Mina against the French. The offers made by certain foreigners in November, 1822, to form a foreign legion were only accepted by decree of the Cortes on April 30; and in May a contract was made with the self-styled English "general," Sir Robert Wilson, for the organisation of the Legion with the aid of arms and stores furnished by a committee sitting in London, which despatched an expedition commanded by Major Dickson and Thomas Steele; but all this produced no result. In Madrid the alarm was great; and in the middle of January it was increased by the advance to Guadalajara of an absolutist band led by Bessières, the republican conspirator of 1821.

The Cortes, considering Madrid unsafe, decided on February 15 to migrate elsewhere with the King and the executive; but, when San Miguel laid the matter before him, Ferdinand refused to leave the capital; and the Ministry was dismissed and replaced by another in which the *comuneros* had a majority. But the King failed to parry the blow. The Cortes returned to the matter, and on March 3 decided to move to Seville. The King pretended an illness, making it impossible for him to travel. But the Cortes, rejecting this and other subterfuges, insisted; and on March 20 they started for Seville with Ferdinand, the members of the executive, and a few militia troops. Eighteen days later the French crossed the frontier. Their entry into Madrid (May 23) and their advance towards

Andalusia caused a proposal for another migration of the Court, from Seville to Cadiz. The King again refused; whereupon the Cortes, upon the proposal of Alcalá Galiano, agreed (June 11) to declare the King temporarily incapacitated and to appoint a Regency which should act only until their arrival at Cadiz. This decision contained the disadvantages of all half-measures, constituting as it did a slight upon the King and yet not disarming him, since in three days he was restored to his functions. But it showed that the King had completely forfeited the respect of the Liberals—his dethronement had been actually proposed in Madrid—and it also showed that the Liberals still hoped for success. At that time they still counted upon most of the forces organised by San Miguel; but these troops, with the exception of those commanded by Mina, offered scarcely any resistance. It was not long before Morillo capitulated in Galicia (July 10) and Ballesteros in Andalusia (August 4); soon afterwards, in the middle of September, Riego was defeated and taken prisoner. Only Mina in Catalonia, Plasencia in Estremadura, and a few leaders in the eastern region, resisted with stubborn energy to the end. The country, far from seconding their efforts, rather offered facilities everywhere to the French advance. Thus it was clearly proved that the constitutional system was not popular, and that at all events the mass of the people had not acquired any sense of the advantages of that system which some years later was to provide a basis for democratic parties.

Cadiz, blockaded from June 24 and unaided from without, could not hope to escape a speedy surrender. Although up to the end there were not wanting optimists, both real and pretended, to sustain enthusiasm, discouragement gradually spread among the soldiers and country-people; and, partly owing to personal interests, partly owing to the intrigues of the King, who soon opened communications with Angoulême, largely also owing to the use of money, a capitulation was arranged stipulating for the liberation of the King from his "captivity," i.e. the control of the Liberals. On October 1 he passed over to the French camp, after he had first promised a general pardon and the formation of a moderate Government—a fresh piece of royal perfidy, as will presently appear.

Thus closed the second period of constitutional government. It perished not so much from its errors, which have received excessive attention, as from indifference to its principles in the mass of the population and in consequence of the European reactionary movement, which led to foreign intervention. If only the external acts of its political life are taken into account, it seems to have represented in Spain a mania for liberty which could only end in anarchy; but, if its intellectual and legislative achievement be considered, it must be recognised that it did much for the intellectual progress of the country and also laid the foundation of institutions which for more than a century were to be the basis of Spanish juridical life. A systematic study, such as has never

yet been made, of the laws passed and the projects discussed in the Cortes and of the abundant legal and political literature of the period will prove that in the minority, consisting of highly educated men, there was a considerable ferment of intellectual energy, which, whether well or ill directed, was full of hope. The influence of the Encyclopedists was now shared by newer authors, among them Bentham, who for some time gave character to our juridical philosophy. A great development of periodical literature also provided a vehicle for French doctrinaire ideas and for the economic theories of the time, including Saintsimonism. The institution of the General Direction of Studies (1821), the reform of the College of San Isidro and of the Seminary of Nobles (1822), the establishment of the so-called "National Academy" on the model of the French Institute, the foundation (1820) of the original *Ateneo*, destined afterwards to have a profound influence on Spanish culture, and of the famous school (*Colegio de San Mateo*) directed by Lista and Reinoso, which educated the literary youth who were soon to enthrone Romanticism—all these movements helped to lay the foundation of the new education, both higher and popular.

But this intellectual movement was smothered for a time by a reaction more violent, blind, and cruel than that of 1814. Scarcely had the French entered Spain when its excesses began. Supported by the bayonets of Angoulême the absolutists established in Madrid a Regency which proceeded to persecute the Liberals with the aid of the *voluntarios realistas*, who formed a kind of opposing force to the National Militia and were the source of the future Carlist troops. On receiving news of the decree depriving the King of his functions, this Regency published a decree of general proscription (June 23), proclaiming the penalty of death for all the Liberal deputies and for most of those who were engaged in the Liberal cause. Scarcely had Ferdinand recovered his liberty when he substituted for his promises of pardon made in the Cadiz proclamation a new order (October 4), more sweeping than the decree of the Regency, passing sentence of death on almost all the supporters of the Constitution and even on those who had simply showed attachment to Liberalism or had shouted *Viva Riego* or *Mueran los serviles* or any similar cry. This order, which was not published in the *Gazette*, appeared in the *Diario de Madrid* and was posted at all the street corners. The King's confessor Saez was placed at the head of the Ministry; military committees were appointed to prosecute political prisoners; councils known as *juntas de la fé* were instituted unofficially with objects resembling those of the Inquisition—for the King with curious inconsistency refused to restore the Holy Office—and imprisonments, executions, and acts of violence, were horribly multiplied. Many historians also mention a kind of semi-secret clerical society called the Society of the Exterminating Angel, having its centre in Catalonia but working in many places, terrorising Liberals and Freemasons with persecutions; but

others, in the absence of authentic documents, deny or doubt its existence. If it be a legend, it is a characteristic legend, for by this or by similar methods the extreme reactionaries, among them many of the clergy, avenged themselves cruelly upon all whom they regarded as enemies. Riego, the personification of Radical constitutionalism, was hanged with savage pomp.

Angoulême at once protested against these excesses; but he was powerless to check them, for Villèle, though always inclined to moderation, was overruled by Austria, Russia, and Prussia, which supported the violence of the absolutists and urged the Regency to leave no trace of constitutionalism when once the King had been released. The instructions to Angoulême were decisive on this point; and Metternich used the plainest language to the Austrian ambassador in Paris in a despatch of March 23. All that Angoulême did was to aid the escape of the deputies and the members of the Government who were in Cadiz. But the continuance of sanguinary punishments at once drew a protest from the British Government and at length one from the French. Chateaubriand himself, on March 17, 1824, threatened Ferdinand with the withdrawal of the French troops, which were still in Spain: and at last the Russian ambassador, Pozzo di Borgo, interposed, but only procured the dismissal of Padre Saez and a decree of amnesty (May 1). This decree was a sanguinary farce, containing so many exceptions that it scarcely pardoned anyone; yet it angered the extreme absolutists. In effect the persecutions continued as before; and the fall of the French Ministry which included Chateaubriand (July), followed by the death of Louis XVIII (September), removed the only slight check upon the extremists and increased their rigour towards the Liberals. An attempt at insurrection planned by Colonel Valdés and other refugees living at Gibraltar (August) furnished a pretext to justify this rigour. From that time to the end of 1829 the political history of Spain consists merely of a series of alternations between terrorism and relaxation of coercive measures, according as extremists or moderates prevailed with the King, or as he desired to conciliate this party or that.

The extremists found leaders in the royal family, namely the King's brother Don Carlos, and the latter's wife, Maria Francisca of Braganza. Whenever these two saw that Ferdinand was relaxing his first rigour, they promoted or encouraged absolutist demonstrations and even revolts, such as that which was led by the restless Bessières in 1825, and that which broke out in Catalonia in 1828, directed by a Supreme Junta established in Manresa, in order to free the King from "the disguised Liberals who swayed him." These demonstrations of force, although they were harshly chastised by Ferdinand, always produced a fresh period of persecution for the Liberals. But the pure Royalists, now known as *apostólicos*, were no longer satisfied with this. Distrusting the King, they now thought that their principles could only be secured if Ferdinand were replaced by his brother Don Carlos. Thus a party, which at first

had been distinguished only by its principles, became a personal party, which began to be called Carlist. The proclamation published at the end of 1827 by "a federation of pure Royalists" stated this plainly. Some moderation had been introduced into the Government through the personal influence of Ballesteros, Minister of the Treasury, when the Queen, Maria Amalia of Saxony, third wife of Ferdinand, died (May 17, 1829). She had married the King in October, 1819, somewhat less than a year after the death of Isabel of Braganza.

The King being childless and feeble in health, the hopes that Don Carlos would be his successor gained force. But, the King showing a disposition for a fourth marriage, the conflict of ambitions in the royal family proceeded without disguise or shame. The conflict was led by two women, the wife of Don Carlos, Maria Francisca, who had always exercised great influence over the King, and Maria Carlota of Naples, wife of the Infante Don Francisco, another brother of Ferdinand. Doña Carlota had personal grievances to avenge, due to her inferior position in the palace and to slights received from Doña Francisca. The personal enmity of these two women had naturally separated them politically, so that Doña Carlota came to be regarded as a hope for the Liberals, although in fact she was no less royalist than her rival. This political antagonism, exploited by both parties, gave to the question of the new marriage a bearing which was to have lasting consequences for Spain. The candidate preferred by Carlota was her sister the Neapolitan princess Maria Cristina, a beautiful and attractive woman. The partisans of Don Carlos attempted to discredit her, representing her as an ardent Liberal, a proceeding which only had the effect of throwing her more and more into the arms of the non-apostolicals, thus determining her place in politics. But the King would not regard either these rumours or the calumnies which were cast upon the honour of the future Queen. Vanquished by her beauty, he chose her as Queen; and Maria Cristina made her state entry into Madrid on December 11, 1829. On her journey through France the Liberal refugees saluted her; and she promised to use her influence in their favour, desiring to win some sympathy in order to counterbalance the influence of the *apostólicos*. The Liberals on their part were naturally drawn towards one who represented the destruction of the Carlist preponderance in the Court.

The new Queen soon became the arbiter of her husband's will, so far as this was possible with Ferdinand; and favourable results would probably have followed for the Liberals, but for an event which affected all Europe—the French Revolution of 1830. Alarmed at the doctrinaire Liberalism of Louis-Philippe, Ferdinand committed the error of not recognising the new King; and the latter, reasonably offended, aided or at any rate did not hinder the conspiracies which Alcalá Galiano, Mina, and other refugees, some of whom came from England, were contriving, encouraged by the spirit of liberty which stirred the nations

of Europe and which in England inspired the policy of Palmerston. But neither the French nor the English Government officially supported the conspirators, although the former was solicited by them; and, so soon as Ferdinand recognised Louis-Philippe, all forbearance towards the refugees ceased. The various expeditions attempted in 1830-2 by Mina, Torrijos, and others, all failed; and another period of terror made men doubt whether the new Queen's influence could effect anything. This reaction was directed by Calomarde, Minister of Justice, whose obscurantist zeal went so far as to decree the closing of the Universities, the focus of the Liberal spirit which stirred the youth. Persecutions were redoubled against Freemasons and heretics, some being condemned to death; and books suspected of Liberalism were more strictly forbidden, although they continued to circulate in numbers, propagating ideas which were soon to bear fruit.

But a more serious question engaged the attention of politicians. The Queen was with child, and, if she should bear a son, the triumph of Maria Cristina and her sister would be complete: not so if a daughter were born, owing to the state of the law concerning the inheritance of the crown. Contrary to the traditional custom and law prevailing in the several medieval States of Spain, Philip V had in 1713 been obliged to publish—not without protest—an act (*auto acordado*) which, by always giving the preference of succession to the male line, aimed at preventing any union of the Spanish and French crowns in one person. This act has been called the Spanish Salic Law. The international situation which caused this new rule having passed away, Charles IV, in agreement with the Cortes assembled in Madrid, in 1789 abrogated the act and restored the law of *Siete Partidas* which permitted the succession of women. This reform, which was in consonance with the national tradition, was not published at the time, but kept secret, although recorded in the archives both of the King and of the Cortes. Accordingly Cristina, in order to meet every contingency, induced the King to publish, on May 19, 1830, the *pragmática* or law of 1789. Don Carlos was furious, and became more so when on October 10 a girl was born, who was named Maria Isabel and was at once proclaimed Princess of Asturias, that is to say, heiress to the throne. Thenceforward the struggle between Don Carlos and the Queen centred in the question whether the law of 1789 should be maintained or abrogated. Cristina found little support in the Ministry, where Calomarde represented the interests and sentiments of the *apostólicos*; but she sought support in the army, flattering it and attracting partisans as best she could. In September, 1832, Doña Francisca and Calomarde, taking advantage of a serious illness which brought the King to the point of death, and favoured by the absence of Carlota who was in Seville at the time, mastered the enfeebled spirit of Ferdinand, intimidated Cristina with the threat of a civil war, and procured the abrogation of the law (September 18). But Ferdinand

having recovered from this mortal attack, Carlota, who had hastened to the spot on learning what had passed, contrived to alter entirely the course of events. The abrogation of the law was annulled ; the whole Ministry was changed ; and Cristina was authorised (October 6) to arrange State affairs during the King's illness. The result was that the law of 1789 was restored and was solemnly promulgated a second time on December 31, and a Liberal turn was given to policy. The Universities were reopened ; and on October 15 a decree of amnesty, although containing numerous exceptions demanded by the King, permitted many refugees of 1824 to return to Spain.

Thus the Liberals decisively attached themselves to Isabel and to Cristina, who became the object of a romantic devotion which had its literary manifestation in numerous occasional publications, interesting as indicating the spirit of the time, while the absolutists formed the party of Don Carlos. Conspiracies and attempts at insurrection naturally followed, which led the Government to grant to Don Carlos "permission" to go to Portugal (May 13, 1833). Three days later he departed. The Cortes having assembled in the ancient Spanish manner in June, the oath was taken recognising Isabel as heir to the throne, although Don Carlos protested in a note which he sent to his brother on April 29, upon hearing that the Cortes had been summoned. Soon afterwards, on September 29, the death of Ferdinand closed a reign full of cruelty and shame.

If Cristina, who was Queen Regent during the minority of her daughter, had sincerely embraced the Liberal cause, the Spanish political problem would have been simple and plain ; a struggle between Absolutists and Constitutionalists would have enabled the latter to organise a legitimate party following the development of ideas in Europe at large. But it happened otherwise. After winning her first triumph, Cristina took a retrograde step, evading reforms and accepting the guidance of such timid Moderates as Cea Bermudez, who had been a Minister of Ferdinand's, and generally inclining towards those who had no love for the Liberal programme. She did not perceive that public opinion was not what it had been in 1814 and in 1823, and that constitutional and Liberal principles had made great advances among the masses who had formerly rejected them. Doña Isabel, when she became Queen, fell into the same error or was led into it by her councillors ; and thus it was that, while other nations settled their internal struggles more rapidly and securely, the political conflict in Spain was disastrously prolonged and assumed a double form, first in the civil wars against declared absolutism or Carlism, secondly in the efforts to induce Cristina, her daughter, and the groups of courtiers, to accept frankly the Liberal programme, efforts which, meeting a violent resistance, produced seditious shocks and revolutions. In addition to this, there still existed among the Liberals many of the factors which had

produced the divisions between the moderate and extreme sections; besides a certain indecision as to aims, which, together with the entrance of new ideas, led to the rise of political tendencies hitherto unknown.

The refugees in France and England from 1824 to 1833 had undergone the influence either of Doctrinaires and Radicals, or else of English institutions and habits; and the resulting sentiments affected and impaired that reverence for the Constitution of 1812 which subsisted for many years. The internal history of the combinations and conflicts produced by these various influences in Spanish Liberalism is most interesting, explaining many events which otherwise would be obscure. The Absolutists, even though the spread of Liberal ideas was rapidly diminishing their ranks, still possessed for a long time a majority in various districts and in the rural population. Their cause was identified, not always justly, with local interests concerning the maintenance of ancient *fueros* and sentiments of medieval independence. Thus they continued, almost down to our own days, to be formidable enemies, whose defeat cost much blood and treasure.

The Regency of Cristina may be divided into three periods. The first (1834-5) is a period of timid reforms carried out rather to attract the Liberals and counterbalance the weight of the Carlist party, than by deliberate choice of the Queen. It includes the Ministries of Martinez de La Rosa and Toreno; and its legislative tendency is represented by the constitutional charter known as the *Estatuto Real*. The second period (1836-7) is marked by the Radical policy and the large reforms of Mendizabal and Calatrava, together with a brief restoration of the Code of 1812, soon replaced by the Constitution of 1837. The third period (1838-40) marks a return to Moderatism, ending in a revolutionary movement and the abdication of Cristina. Accompanying these internal political events and producing some of their principal episodes, the civil war follows its course, having been begun by the Carlist party soon after the death of Ferdinand.

When Martinez de La Rosa was called to power (January, 1834) in order to gratify the Liberals, who were disgusted at the anti-constitutional proclamation published by Cristina on October 4, 1833, the Carlists, organised as soldiers in Navarre and the Basque Provinces by their first General, Zumalacarregui, who had been a colonel in the army, constituted a real danger. The new Ministry promptly introduced some reforms, among them the extension of the amnesty to the refugees, and, accepting the proposals of Palmerston, signed the Treaty of April 15, between Great Britain, Portugal, and Spain, securing British aid in the double revolution, dynastic and constitutional, which was agitating both Peninsular States. The adhesion of France, completing the "Quadruple Alliance," raised the hopes of the Cristinos, although it produced the rupture of diplomatic relations with Austria, Russia, and Prussia; but in fact it only brought advantages for Portugal,

where, with the aid of Spanish troops, Dom Miguel was defeated and Dona Maria da Gloria was restored. Don Carlos, who was still in Portugal, though closely pursued by General Rodil, escaped with the help of the British Admiral, who conveyed him to London. He was left in such freedom that some weeks later he was able to return to Spain and place himself at the head of his partisans (July 9), aided with arms and money by the French Legitimists. The Government sought armed help from Great Britain and France, but without success, for Great Britain refused to intervene or to allow France to intervene; and Louis-Philippe, notwithstanding his engagements, showed himself more inclined to favour Don Carlos, in order to conciliate Austria, Prussia, and Russia. All that Martinez de La Rosa could obtain was the loan of an Algerian legion, and permission to raise a British legion, which afterwards proved a valuable military aid. More beneficial from the humane point of view was Lord Eliot's Agreement with the two armies, Carlist and Liberal (April 28, 1835), so called because it was effected by the action of that British envoy, with the object of saving the lives of prisoners, who hitherto had been pitilessly sacrificed to the fury of both contending parties. An accident relieved the situation for the time, removing the chief danger. The Carlists occupied all Navarre and the Basque Provinces up to the line of the Ebro; but they held no fortified place. The eastern Powers required, as a condition to their recognition of Don Carlos as King of Spain, his possession of such a military base; the same was demanded by foreign bankers disposed to provide a loan, and by the courtiers of Don Carlos desirous of possessing a capital. In order to satisfy these three demands, Don Carlos ordered Zumalacarregui, contrary to the general's decided opinion, to take Bilbao. Five days after the beginning of the siege of that city, the Carlist general was wounded by a bullet, and being unskilfully treated died on June 24, 1835. The Carlists were obliged to raise the siege in July: this was the first notable success of General Espartero, who was afterwards to become famous.

In the same month the Government was changed. Martinez de La Rosa, who was unequal to so serious and delicate a situation, could not resist the double pressure of the Radicals and Moderates, besides the domestic and diplomatic difficulties of the Civil War. His whole policy is condensed in the already mentioned *Estatuto Real*, published in April, 1834, resembling the French *Charte* of 1814. This concession from the sovereign to the nation denies the national sovereignty, which was the basis of the Code of 1812, contains no declaration of rights, and establishes a parliamentary system of two Chambers, or *estamentos*, one of *próceres* or Senators, and one of Deputies, both absolutely dependent on the Crown, and really possessing no more than the right of petition, like the ancient Spanish Cortes. It need not be said that a constitutionalism so limited did not satisfy the true Liberals, as presently

appeared in noisy conflicts between the Ministry and the large body of Radical deputies in the Lower House. Nor were extreme reformers satisfied with the ministerial measures, resembling the Liberal legislation of 1820-3, and directed against the intrusion of the clergy in politics, and against the Religious Orders. The extreme Radicals, steeped in anti-clerical ideas, and dreading the power of the enormous number of monks and nuns—31,000 monks and 22,000 nuns according to the census of 1835—and indignant at the support of Carlism and of absolutist ideas by the Religious Orders, simply desired their destruction. The agitation for that end, together with the accusation, frequent in the history of epidemics, that the cholera which then visited Madrid was produced through the poisoning of the water by monks, brought about in July, 1834, a popular sedition, in which some disorderly crowds attacked the monasteries and murdered several monks. The Government failed to check these acts of savagery, showing once more their weakness and vacillation. Early in 1835 and after the fall of Martinez de La Rosa the murders were repeated in other cities, unchecked by the first measures of the new Ministry, which once more expelled the Jesuits and closed every monastery of less than twelve monks.

But the movement which had begun with violence against the monks soon became an insurrection against the Government, whose moderation was disliked ; and, the revolutionary movement spreading to almost all the provinces, the Government was powerless, although anxious to chastise the rebels severely. In this crisis appeared the man who was to lead the Liberal forces, to remedy by a bold stroke the confusion of the Treasury, and to create new interests in defence of the constitutional system. This was Mendizabal, whom we have already seen in Cadiz in 1819. He was now named Minister of the Treasury by Toreno. His arrival in Madrid in September, 1835, from exile in England, and his frank declarations to the Queen and to the Ministers, produced a decisive change. The new-comer undertook the Government and contrived to pacify the revolution simply by publishing decrees which satisfied some aspirations of the advanced party, granting pardon to all insurgents and reorganising some branches of the administration. He also promised in his programme of September 14 the restoration of the public credit, and the termination of the war "by the unaided resources of the nation"; and he contrived to inspire such confidence that the Chambers, by a vote of December 23, authorised him to reform the Treasury. This he accomplished by means of decrees, of which the most important are, that of February 19, 1836, which declared all the real property of the extinguished Religious Orders to be for sale; and that of March, which, supplementing another decree of October 11, 1835, suppressed with some exceptions the monasteries, diminished the nunneries, and confiscated the property of the suppressed Houses.

The result of Mendizabal's policy soon appeared both in the war

and in the opinion of the so-called Conservative classes. In the war, by increasing the army, improving its equipment, and paying attention to the soldiers, he encouraged the Isabelinos, and rendered possible the improvement of the military situation in the north. Among the Conservative classes the sale of ecclesiastical property, which took place under conditions more favourable for the purchaser than for the State, created a network of interests, which necessarily thenceforth told in favour of the preservation of Isabel's throne, since Don Carlos could not be expected to respect these purchases. Thus the Minister enlisted material interests as indirect support for the legitimate dynasty. In international affairs his Government had further important results: he gave greater influence in Spanish policy to Great Britain than to France; whereas, notwithstanding the doubtful conduct of Louis-Philippe, Martinez de La Rosa and Toreno had always leaned towards France, although unsuccessful in their requests for intervention. Assured of the cooperation of Mendizabal, whose political education had been English, as he often showed in his conduct, the British Cabinet prepared to act independently of France, desiring at all costs to prevent French intervention and the execution of the supposed design of Louis-Philippe to marry one of his sons to Queen Isabel. A momentary breach between Thiers and Metternich threatened to thwart the British plans, although for the benefit of Spain, since Thiers induced his sovereign to modify his former attitude of tolerance towards the Carlists, to increase the French legion, and to permit the troops of Cristina to traverse French territory in executing an enveloping movement.

In this condition of things a new revolution, caused by the fall of the Mendizabal Ministry and the renewed preponderance of the Moderates in the Government and in the Court (May 15, 1836), disturbed all combinations. The dissolution of the Cortes, whose majority was advanced or "Progressive," and the publication of a proclamation by Cristina vehemently accusing the supporters of Mendizabal, brought about an insurrection, which in August involved all that part of the Peninsula not dominated by the Carlists. The victory of the revolutionists led to the insurrection of a part of the garrison of La Granja, a royal residence then occupied by the Court. These troops, led by two sergeants, compelled Cristina to order the proclamation of the Code of Cadiz (August 13). This revolution was largely attributed by the Moderates to intrigues on the part of the British ambassador, Lord Clarendon.

The state of anarchy, which had prevailed in the country since May, 1836, favoured the Carlists, who, though several times defeated by Córdoba, Narvaez, Evans, and other generals, recovered from their losses, and continued to maintain the war, at least in the north. In Valencia a new leader had appeared, Ramón Cabrera, a man of remarkable military faculties, although not equal to his predecessor. He gave to the struggle in the eastern districts and in Aragon a ferocious character by

his cruelties to prisoners, which led to sanguinary reprisals by the Isabelinos, especially the shooting of Cabrera's mother, which was terribly avenged by him. The Carlist General, Gomez, made a daring raid through the two Castiles and Andalusia, without decisive results. Bilbao, besieged a second time, was again relieved by Espartero after a brilliant victory (December, 1836), which, however, did not conclude the war. The British Government, which decidedly favoured the Queen, lent her £540,000 for military expenses; while the British Legion fought admirably before Bilbao and elsewhere. On the other hand, the eastern Powers sent monetary aid to Don Carlos. The year 1837 was marked by an energetic campaign under Espartero, which closed triumphantly with the capture of most of the Carlist fortresses. Two other expeditions in that year require some preliminary explanation.

The new Progressive Government, raised up by the revolution of 1836 and directed by Calatrava, passed two sets of important measures: one relating to the Carlists and the opponents of the Liberal cause, whose property was seized, and to the war, which was pushed on by a new conscription of men from 18 to 40 years, and by a forced loan of two millions sterling; the other of a social character, insisting upon a policy of desamortising the landed property accumulated by corporations, civil and religious. In the field of pure politics, departing from the spirit of the revolution, which had demanded the Constitution of 1812, Calatrava formed a new Constitution, that of 1837, which agreed with the former in some of its principles, particularly that of the national sovereignty, but differed from it in the institution of two Chambers, in the absolute veto of the Crown, and in the restriction of the suffrage. But even here Progressive influence appeared in the elective character of the Upper House or Senate, in the right granted to the Cortes to assemble of themselves if the King should neglect to summon them in any year before December 1, and in other details. The influence of the English Reform Bill of 1832, which also appears in the Constitution of 1837, deserves mention as a new example of the intellectual action exercised by English institutions upon Spanish politicians almost from the beginning of the century. Although the new Constitution was not welcomed either by the Moderates or by the recalcitrant *doceañistas*, it was for a long period the fighting banner of the advanced Liberals; and it had the twofold importance of assuring the constitutional principle, which thenceforth was never denied, and of ending the sentiment of idolatry for the Constitution of 1812.

The Moderates, seeking means of injuring the Progressives, now attempted to suborn the troops in order to rouse an insurrection, and succeeded in sowing disaffection in the army. Among other expressions of this disaffection was a demonstration made by a group of officers of Espartero's brigade, then stationed in Madrid. This movement, which was not chastised by the general as might have been expected, produced

the fall of Calatrava's Ministry, and the appointment of another with Espartero himself as Premier (August 18, 1837). The presence of these troops in Madrid was due to the approach of two Carlist expeditions, one led by General Zariategui and the other by Don Carlos himself. The former was defeated at the very gates of the capital and retired upon Valladolid. The second, after traversing Aragon, Catalonia, and Valencia, with varying fortunes, and having been reinforced by Cabrera's troops, approached Madrid, and reached Vallecas at the moment when Espartero had left the place, called away by necessities elsewhere. Madrid, weakly garrisoned, was in great danger of capture; but Cabrera, marching upon the capital on the morning of September 13, was stopped on the way by an order from Don Carlos. The motive of this order is not clearly known; but, from some contemporary allusions, the following explanation seems probable. Cristina had for some time been negotiating with Don Carlos for the termination of the war by means of a marriage which should unite the two dynastic branches. The understanding implied in these negotiations was probably the reason of the expedition of Don Carlos, who, upon approaching Madrid, expected that the gates would be opened to him by the Queen, and that a reconciliation and a change of policy would follow. But at the last moment, for unknown reasons, Cristina drew back, informing Don Carlos of her altered resolution; thus the plan fell through. The expedition retired through New Castile, joined temporarily the forces of General Zariategui, and at last reentered the Basque Provinces, pursued by Espartero and other generals. The Carlist cause had been morally defeated and undone. Fresh raids, attempted in 1838, were unsuccessful; and, on the other hand, the first movements in favour of peace appeared among the troops of Don Carlos. In Aragon and Valencia alone Cabrera obtained in this year some successes, marked by barbarous cruelties to prisoners, which produced further sanguinary reprisals by the Isabelinos in Valencia, Murcia, and Alicante. In political matters the year 1838 is marked by a fresh predominance of Moderate tendencies in the Government, showing itself chiefly in a project of municipal law involving almost absolute centralisation, with the loss of the greater part of the political and administrative independence of the municipalities. This project was strongly opposed by the Progressives. In November a popular movement, probably fomented by the Moderates, occurred in Seville, in which two generals were concerned, who thenceforth were to play a large part in politics, Córdoba and Narvaez. The latter, who had distinguished himself in the Carlist War, alarmed the Liberals by his dictatorial tendencies and his ambition, which presently clashed with that of Espartero, producing between the two generals a bitter personal enmity, which was afterwards to affect events at least as much as political differences. Narvaez, being banished upon the accusation of Espartero, fled and left Spain.

The year 1839 was to be fatal to the Carlist cause, already profoundly undermined by various causes of disorganisation, among them the personal insignificance of the Pretender, his departure from the army, the group of intriguers who continually aroused his jealousy towards his best generals, his ingratitude towards these generals, and the administrative disorder which left the soldiers unprovided, while the expenses of the Court increased. As usually happens in such cases, two parties were formed—a Court party, uncompromising and fanatical; and a military party prepared for compromise and ready to give an energetic and orderly impulse to the war, and to avoid alienating the sympathies of the people by violence, cruelty, and uncertainty of political aims. The leader of this party from the middle of 1838 was General Maroto, who was placed in command of the army by Don Carlos, and who soon won the firm attachment of the soldiers. The struggle between him and the courtiers began at once, producing frequent acts of disrespect and defiance of authority in military matters, and calumnies which aimed at discrediting the General. When matters went so far that his life was threatened, he took energetic measures, and arrested and shot several generals and courtiers who were plotting a military insurrection against him (February 19). This bold act impressed Don Carlos, deprived the courtiers of their preponderance, and was the prelude to negotiations with Espartero, initiated by Maroto, who placed himself at the head of the movement towards peace arising from weariness of a war of which the end could not be discerned, and from disillusion concerning the person of Don Carlos. Several proposals, in which Great Britain and France had a share, having been rejected by Espartero, the two generals at last concluded an agreement which was signed on August 31, 1839, at Vergara. Espartero undertook to recommend to the Cortes the confirmation or modification of the *fueros*, while the military grades and civil posts of the Carlists who submitted were to be recognised. Don Carlos, who had attempted in vain to carry with him the troops of Maroto by presenting himself to them, naturally declined to accept the agreement; but, although he still commanded the allegiance of considerable forces, he retired to France without attempting any resistance. Cabrera maintained the war for some months in Aragon and Valencia; but repeated defeats at last compelled him also to cross the frontier, accompanied by many followers (June 6, 1840). Thus closed the struggle which for seven years had stained the Peninsula with blood.

At the time when this occurred, the political contest between Moderates and Progressives was reaching an unexpected solution. The former, being masters of the situation, pushed forward the already mentioned project of Municipal Law, which was passed by the Cortes of 1840. In order to pass into law, it only required the sanction of the Queen Regent, who on June 11 had started for Catalonia, probably with the double object of testing public opinion and of attempting to win

over Espartero in order to effect a *coup d'état* which should overthrow the Constitution of 1837. But she found a great part of the people opposed to the Municipal Law; and Espartero, who had risen greatly in influence and popularity after the agreement of Vergara, and who had already declared his adhesion to the Constitution, declined to play the game of the Moderates, and advised Cristina to refuse her sanction to the new law. The Regent promised to do so, but afterwards changed her mind and sanctioned the law. This irregular conduct immediately produced a serious insurrection in Barcelona (July 18). To appease this, Cristina, with Espartero's consent, appointed a Progressive Ministry; but soon afterwards in Valencia, whither the Court had moved, she replaced it by a Moderate Ministry.

This change provoked a fresh revolution in Madrid, which soon spread to the provinces and compelled Cristina to approve the appointment of a new Ministry, whose composition was suggested by the Revolutionists, with Espartero as Premier. This humiliation, the Progressive programme of the new Government, and the gross attacks made upon the Regent in an anonymous pamphlet attributed to the journalist Gonzalez Bravo, in which her second marriage with the guardsman, Muñoz, was denounced—an act which she had persistently denied in order not to lose the Regency—vexed her to such a degree that she found no other issue to the situation than abdication. Accordingly, on October 12, notwithstanding the prayers and the counsels of the Ministers, she abdicated. On this occasion she read an autograph speech, in which she entrusted to the Cortes the nomination of a Regent and attributed her own abdication to differences of opinion with the Government concerning certain political reforms, especially the Municipal Law. Thus ended the Regency of Cristina, which began so hopefully, and was marred principally by her habitual insincerity and the blindness with which she always listened to the advice of the Moderate Party. Apart from politics, it pleased her to protect literature and art; thus her name is connected with an important movement, which took a decidedly romantic turn, guided by the Duke of Rivas, Gutierrez, Espronceda, Figaro, Zorrilla, and many others. During the years 1834–40 these authors express in their writings the French and English influences received during the emigration and diffused both by literary periodicals, such as *El Artista* and *No me olvides*, which began to multiply in Spain from 1834, and also by such characteristic associations as the *Liceo* (1837) and the *Atenco*.

The new Progressive period, initiated in October, 1840, marked on the one hand the culminating point of Progressive policy, following the lines traced by the Liberals of 1820 and 1836, and of the popularity of Espartero, offering the first example in Spain of those Governments directed by generals which afterwards became frequent. On the other hand it was distinguished by the open appearance of new tendencies,

which had already been germinating in public opinion but were without sufficient strength to take form in acts of violent opposition. Such were the republican ideas which had been gradually forming a party and which in 1842 produced in Barcelona a formidable insurrection. In this case republican interests, apparently the guiding motives, were mixed with local interests, stirred up by the manufacturers of the city, who had suffered from the repression of contraband by the Customs Inspector Zurbano, a man possessing Espartero's confidence. This insurrection was only suppressed by the arrival of Espartero and the bombardment of the city (December 4).

But this was not the most pressing danger for Espartero, who was a straightforward man and a sincere Liberal, but inexperienced and, although anything but a dictator in intention, drawn in fact to dictatorship by his military education and by his ambition, which was being strengthened and increased by success. The whole period of his rule from October, 1840, to the end of June, 1843, is simply a struggle against the Moderates, against the ex-Regent, and against Liberals who were dissatisfied or jealous of his preponderance. The opposition of Cristina showed itself at once in the proclamation from Marseilles (November 8, 1840), which condemned the Progressive Government and protested against her forced abdication; this proclamation provided a watchword for all the enemies of Espartero and a pretext of hostility for all the European Governments except that of Great Britain, which steadily supported the General. The nomination of Espartero as Regent by the Cortes of 1841 (May 8) deprived him of the support of those who desired the regency of a triumvirate. The appointment of Argüelles in July as guardian to the Queen drew a new protest from Cristina, who, as Isabel's mother, claimed the continuance of that charge as a right. The ex-Regent, surrounded in France by Moderates, planned or encouraged conspiracies which came to a head in Pamplona (October 2), and in Madrid (October 7), where the generals Concha and León led an attack upon the palace in order to seize the person of the Queen, who was declared to be held prisoner by the Esparteristas. Both attempts were frustrated; but fresh movements took place in 1843 supported by a section of discontented Liberals. First, Brigadier Prim revolted at Reus and declared the Queen to be of age; then, other troops mutinied, led by personal enemies of the Regent, such as Narvaez, Concha, Serrano, Pezuela, and others. The counter-revolution spread, and Espartero, abandoned by most of the troops, was obliged to fly. He embarked for England on June 30. Thus ended his Regency, and with it the predominance of the Progressive party; for, although those members of that party who had aided the counter-revolution might fairly expect to reap part of its fruits—an expectation which seemed to be realised when the first Ministry included the Progressive Olózaga—yet the Moderates were not long in shaking them off.

The leader of the Moderates from 1843 to 1845 was General Narvaez, a dictator by nature, so harsh and cruel in repression that it was said of him that he never left alive an enemy who fell into his hands. All the reforms effected by the Progressives were abrogated, as well as the Constitution of 1837, which gave place to a new Constitution, that of May 23, 1845, an essentially doctrinaire pact or composition between the sovereign and the nation, as the first phrases of the preamble indicate. The principle of popular sovereignty is implicitly denied, and the confirmation of royal power appears in the provisions whereby the monarch recovered the right of nominating the Senate, while the Cortes lost the privilege of spontaneous assembly recognised by the Constitution of 1837, and in other details. Other points to be noted are the abolition of trial by jury for offences committed by the Press, a significant silence concerning the principle of uniformity of codes and *fueros*—doubtless intended to avoid rousing the suspicions of Navarrese and Basques; and the conversion of “judicial power” into simple “administration of justice.” Yet the Moderate reaction continued the centralising policy in the new Education Law of 1845, destroying the ancient independence of the Universities, and also continued in some degree the anti-clerical tradition; for, although many of the laws passed since 1836 were revoked and relations were renewed with the Papacy, the reopening of the religious Houses was definitely refused. The progress of toleration in Spain is shown in the fact that, notwithstanding the victory of Moderatism, no check was set upon the Protestant propaganda which had made much way during the Progressive Government.

At the close of the period treated in this chapter, the dynastic question assumed a new aspect with the abdication of Don Carlos in May, 1845, in favour of his son the Count of Montemolin, and with the revival of the project for the marriage of the latter with Doña Isabel, who, contrary to the Constitution, was declared to be of age in November, 1843. This project brings definitely forward the famous question of the Spanish marriages, which had been already raised, but which in its development and solution belongs to a later section of this *History*.

## CHAPTER VIII.

### THE SPANISH DOMINIONS IN AMERICA.

THE first phase in the growth and organisation of the Spanish dominions in America may be said to close with the publication of the New Laws for the Indies in 1542, fifty years after the first voyage of Columbus. In that half-century the vassals of the Crown of Castile, by occupation of coasts, table-lands, and interior outposts, had effectively staked out the limits of an empire twice the size of Europe. The New Laws declared that the Indians were free men, to be treated like the King's subjects in Castile; but this attempt to repair the violence of conquest and of slavery by a sudden revolution, abolishing native Indian institutions, was hasty and disastrous. The first Viceroy of New Spain suspended their execution on the plea of necessity; but in that fairly settled country they were in some degree gradually enforced during the following twenty years. The attempt to enforce them in Peru led to a rebellion, a civil war, the Viceroy's death, and a long series of disorders.

The decade 1570-80 closes more definitely in South America the period of conquest and of civil wars. In 1577 the King sent a list of questions to all Governors in the Indies; their answers furnished a full statistical account of the whole Empire. The possibility of this collection indicates a considerable degree of stability in both viceroyalties, in the more recently acquired dominion of Peru as well as in the older viceroyalty of New Spain in North America, where the peaceful period may be dated a generation earlier. The era of consolidation, of administration following expansion, is distinctly marked in South America by the Government of Francisco Toledo, Viceroy and legislator of Peru, who, in the laborious service of twelve years (1569-81), five of them spent in travel, drew up an elaborate and admirable code of laws and cast the government of Peru into the form which subsisted for two centuries. Thus, before the close of the sixteenth century, the great wave of expansion had spent itself; the framework of empire had been put into definite shape, both geographically and politically; and the kingdoms and provinces of the Crown in the Indies invite survey as a system already fairly established.

The Spanish Indies in the year 1580 extended through the tropics and far into both temperate zones; they possessed an unexampled diversity of natural features, climates, and altitudes—torrid coasts, vast table-lands, snow-fields extending through the central regions of heat, strips of sandy desert, trackless forests and swamps, river-systems mysterious in their magnitude—and an immense interior frontier everywhere bordered by savage tribes. The retention and administration of these dominions, a task perhaps greater than their acquisition, can best be explained by following the methods whereby, during the conquest, each step in advance was secured.

The administration of outlying regions was at first usually entrusted to an *adelantado* or frontier commander. Two tasks were particularly laid upon him—the reduction, conversion, and preservation of the natives, and the foundation of Spanish towns. Every *adelantado* was legally required to found at least three towns; and his lieutenants aimed at perpetuating their memory in the same way. Royal decrees prescribed the form of these foundations; in choosing sites, injury to the natives was to be avoided; the *plaza* or central square was marked out by the founder with solemn ceremony; round it were set the public buildings—*cabildo* (town-hall), church, hospital, and prison; the streets were traced intersecting at right angles and enclosing equal blocks; every man received a rectangular building-site within the town and a piece of land without, thus becoming a *vecino* or householder in the civic community; every *vecino* became an *encomendero*, receiving an *encomienda*, a trust or fief of one or more villages of Indians, who were to pay him tribute or fixed labour in return for protection and Christian instruction; these *encomenderos* owed military service in case of need and were intended to form a knightly class, “to defend, enrich, and ennoble the kingdom and to care for the Indians.” In most parts of New Spain and of Peru, where the natives were already subjected, these *encomiendas* were valuable grants; but in remoter parts, especially the savage regions of the River Plate, they were precarious or useless, depending on the power or inclination of the *encomendero* to conquer or retain his supposed tributaries. The larger towns received the dignity of cities; the smaller, often having only a dozen or a score of *vecinos*, were usually styled *villas*. Although the first settlers often had native wives, the Spanish towns were clearly distinguished both in law and in fact from Indian settlements or villages—Spaniards being legally excluded from the latter, just as Indians were excluded from Spanish towns or confined to a special suburb with separate organisation; but all cities, towns, and villages were popularly comprised in the comprehensive and colourless term of *pueblos* or *poblaciones*, that is, settlements or inhabited places, clearly divided into *pueblos de Españoles* and *pueblos de Indios*.

Considering that the first settlers, especially in South America, were adventurers, partly gathered from Portugal, Italy, Flanders, Germany,

and the Levant, as well as from Spain, men brutalised by long hardship, savage warfare, and constant danger, the measure of success attained by these municipal institutions is remarkable. A royal decree granted the rank of *hidalgo* to all the companions of Pizarro; but men of such origin and life could hardly be gentle lords of their Indian vassals; as *encomenderos* they were cruel tyrants, but as *vecinos* and councillors they knew how to fill their place. In the remoter provinces the *cabildo* or town-council was often the only stable authority in a wide district; on the death of a Governor it either undertook his functions or named his temporary successor. Asunción affords an extreme example: a royal decree of 1537 empowered the River Plate settlers to name their Governor in case of vacancy; as conquest merged into settlement, the *cabildo* of Asunción claimed that this power had passed to them, and pushed it far beyond the royal intention both in scope and in date, declaring vacancies without warrant and appointing Governors of Paraguay in disregard of Viceroy and of King; so late as 1730 Asunción is like a city-state, alternating between anarchy, oligarchy, and elective monarchy. The *cabildo* of Caracas, to which the right of governing during vacancies was renewed in 1675, arrested the Governor in 1725 by viceregal order.

The first *regidores* or town-councillors were named by the *adelantado*; but afterwards these posts were purchased from the King, frequently with the right of sale or transfer. Thus the *cabildos* might seem to have preserved little popular vitality; yet they were valued as a means whereby Spaniards born in the Indies might attain important and profitable positions. In small towns even such an oligarchical and official body had a certain popular character; two *alcaldes*, and in larger towns other officials also, were annually elected from among the chief *vecinos*; thus in Mexico twelve prominent magistrates were annually elected by the *cabildo*. The *cabildos* differed considerably in privileges and customs; but they generally had the power of summoning the civil and ecclesiastical officials and the principal *vecinos* to a meeting called *cabildo abierto*, or open *cabildo*, for the discussion of any pressing matter of general interest. The history of these bodies helps to solve a difficulty; the countenance and aid granted by the Crown seem hardly sufficient to account for the subjection to royal authority of territories won so largely by individual effort and at private cost. In the *cabildos* the Crown and the settlers are seen working in cooperation; by means of civic institutions the royal authority was gradually extended, but never became so complete or universal as might appear.

Although in the eighteenth century the Bourbon Kings, aiming at closer supervision over the Indies, restricted the number of municipalities, seldom created new ones, and took care to appoint some European *regidores*, the *cabildo* remained throughout a valuable institution, serving as a channel of public sentiment and ultimately providing

a means of achieving independent government. In 1792 deputies from all the Venezuelan municipalities, invited by the *cabildo* of Caracas, met to discuss certain fiscal proposals of the Governor.

Another civic institution transplanted to the Indies was the *consulado*. This commercial chamber, already existing in five Spanish cities, was established in Seville in 1543, when the "university" of traders to the Indies was authorised to elect annually a Prior and two Consuls, constituting a tribunal and chamber of commerce, supported by a small tax on trade. *Consulados* similarly constituted and elected were established in Mexico and Lima to judge commercial suits and manage under legal rule the entire trade of both viceroyalties, with power to appoint or admit as deputies in other towns local merchants, partly representing local trade. The *consulado* concerned itself not only with commerce, markets, and prices, but also with means of communication, roads, bridges, navigation of rivers, improvement of ports; it frequently aided the Crown with subsidies for commercial and military purposes; the *alcabala* or tax on sales was usually farmed either by the *cabildo* or by the *consulado*. Although the law required that one of the three councillors of the Lima *consulado* should be a Creole, wholesale trade was generally in the hands of European merchants; and the *consulado*, naturally favouring the established monopoly, was a conservative, a monarchical, and sometimes a reactionary, body.

The *mesta* or pastoral corporation, including in its brotherhood every owner of 300 sheep, was early established in New Spain with a tribunal whose magistrates were appointed by the *cabildo* of Mexico. In the great towns every trade was organised into a society with its saint and feast-day, sometimes also its militia company; *cofradías* or religious guilds were universal and were early introduced among the Indians, providing unscrupulous clergy with a ready means of extortion. The Universities of Mexico and Lima had all the privileges of Salamanca; during the colonial period about twelve minor Universities were founded whose degrees were only valid in the Indies; in places remote from a University the Jesuit Colleges had power to grant degrees.

But in general the theory of government was one of supreme royal authority. "These and those kingdoms" (*estos y esos reinos*) is the style officially used of the King's dominions in Spain and in America. The King claimed to be Emperor of the Indies, successor to Montezuma in New Spain and to the Incas in Peru; the Indies were not regarded as colonies; they were "kingdoms and provinces" inhabited by native vassals and including certain Spanish settlements besides; accordingly the government and well-being of "the two commonwealths" (*las dos repúblicas*) of Spaniards and of Indians were to be secured by royal authority set over them; the native dynasties having been replaced by His Catholic Majesty, the institutions of the Castilian monarchy were imported into the Indies for the government of kingdoms and

provinces, just as municipal institutions had been imported for local administration and the security of conquests; while for the government of the Indians some attempt was made to preserve and adapt native institutions. Legislation consisted in *cédulas reales*, royal decrees issued in the King's name by the Council of the Indies, which had supreme authority over all civil matters and scarcely limited authority over all ecclesiastical matters; for by papal Bull the entire patronage of the Indies was vested in the King; and the Pope was precluded, except in reserved cases, from communicating directly with the Church in America, no Bull passing thither unless approved by the Council; even the tithes were granted to the King on condition of supporting the Church and teaching the Indians. The activity of the Council was all-pervading: a perpetual stream of *cédulas* was showered upon the Governor of every kingdom in the Indies, treating with almost ludicrous minuteness the greatest and smallest matters of state, justice, religion, trade, finance, social conduct, etiquette, precedence, and private morality.

There were two viceroyalties. The Viceroy of New Spain, holding his Court with royal state in Mexico, nominally controlled all the Spanish dominions in North America and the Philippine Islands; but in fact only the kingdom of New Spain was directly subject to him: the Philippines, the kingdom of Guatemala, and the provinces of Yucatan and of New Biscay, were distinct Governments ruled by Captains-General, supplying their annual deficit by a *situado* or grant from the Mexican treasury, but only subject to viceregal intervention in case of disturbance or unexpected vacancy. There were three *audiencias*, at once administrative Councils and Courts of appeal, in the cities of Mexico, Guatemala, and Guadalajara: the *oidores*, judges, and councillors in these Courts being lawyers sent from Spain. Every kingdom was divided into districts, each ruled by a *corregidor* or *alcalde mayor*, residing in the district capital, usually a "town of Spaniards"; every Indian village had its Indian councillors and officers, and also its Indian *cacique*, sometimes hereditary, sometimes nominated for life by the Viceroy; a group of Indian villages was commonly placed under a Spanish deputy of the *corregidor*, living in the principal village of the group. The Antilles, which were divided at different dates into two or three distinct Governments, were sometimes regarded as belonging to the viceroyalty of New Spain, since they drew *situados* from the Mexican treasury. Havana was regarded as the naval fortress of New Spain.

The Viceroy of Peru, holding a more magnificent Court in Lima with higher rank and larger salary, had nominal control over dominions extending 3500 miles along the coast, from Panamá to Valdivia, and 3000 miles overland from Lima to Buenos Aires. Except Caracas, which was attached to the Government of Santo Domingo and financially supported by the Mexican treasury, all Spanish South America depended upon him. The kingdoms of Chile, Quito, New Granada, and Tierra

Firme, and the three River Plate provinces of Paraguay, Tucumán, and Buenos Aires, formed seven distinct Governments; but viceregal intervention was frequent, for Panamá was the gate of Peru and the only authorised entrance to the South Sea and to the interior of the Continent, and depended upon Peru not only for the salaries of its officials, but also for grain to feed its inhabitants; the kingdom of Chile got from Peru its annual *situado* and supplies of men and stores for the endless Araucanian war on its southern frontier: the Viceroy was also enjoined to prevent European trade to the interior through the forbidden port of Buenos Aires, a place carefully kept in poverty and supplying its annual deficit by a *situado* from Peru. The system of *corregidores* and of Indian villages generally resembled that of New Spain; but, owing to the vast distances and the great mountain ranges, control was more difficult and doubtful; in great part of the *serranía* or mountain provinces the Spaniards paid little regard to Government; and in the provinces to the east of the Andes the system could only be imperfectly applied owing to the savagery of the natives in the Chaco and on the Pampa. Throughout most of that region there were no Indian *pueblos*; and every Spanish town formed in effect a separate settlement continually exposed to attack by savages and obliged to take measures for its own preservation. Several towns perished, while others were often threatened with extinction by Indian attack.

There was no complete uniformity in the system, which was often modified by local conditions. There was a tendency to preserve delimitations and arrangements made by the earliest Governors, which were not everywhere alike. The terms *corregidor* and *gobernador* covered many gradations of power, dignity, and emolument. Important places on the coasts and frontiers were placed under Governors of higher rank and authority than the *corregidores*, often possessing military command. The independence of the three River Plate provinces was probably due to circumstances more than to theory; and Buenos Aires by her position gradually acquired a certain predominance over the others. The province of Charcas or Upper Peru held an ambiguous position, being subject to the close supervision of Lima and yet possessing an *audiencia* whose jurisdiction included the whole River Plate region.

Every official, from the Viceroy downwards, on leaving office was subjected to a *residencia* or enquiry into his conduct, held by a special judge who threw open his court to all complainants of whatever colour. This *residencia* was in many cases, perhaps in most, a mere form; in remote districts the judge was the magistrate's successor; but there are many recorded instances of searching and thorough enquiry. In case of reported misgovernment a Visitor was often sent to examine a Governor's conduct and suspend him if necessary.

The careful system of delegated and supervised authority was marred by the want of a permanent and well-paid civil service; a *corregidor*

holding an ill-paid post for three or five years returned to private life with a fortune. This defect was partly remedied by the usual promotion of deserving officials: but the *residencia*, sometimes protracted for years, owing to the judge's death or an appeal to the Council, tended to interrupt continuity; for no one might take another office pending this enquiry. Lax and irresponsible administration also arose from the impossibility of control at so great a distance from Europe and over such vast regions. The officials themselves were unable to reconcile, execute, or even grasp, the multitudinous *cédulas*, which were often ambiguous, inconsistent, or trivial. Many being soon abrogated or amended, it was difficult to say what decrees were actually in force; the code of laws commanded to be prepared in 1635 was not published till 1680 and already required a commentary. In 1797 a Viceroy informs his successor that the Mexican palace contains 156 large volumes of royal *cédulas* issued since 1600. Thus Indian jurisprudence was a matter of long, profound, and inconclusive study. Although the general intent of the laws was clear and a Governor guided by equity and known rules could satisfy their spirit, there was a natural tendency to convenient neglect. The Viceroys always exercised a dispensing or suspending power; the subordinate Governors and *corregidores* were no less independent; a royal *cédula* was kissed and placed on the head with the words, "I obey, but I do not execute"; and in turn the white settlers rendered what obedience they chose. "Here all men govern," writes the Peruvian Viceroy in 1689; "the people have more part in all political discussions than in any other provinces of the world; a council of war sits in every house." In 1744 Ulloa writes, "Everyone here considers himself a sovereign." Sanctuary was a great abuse, for the house of any priest or of any *caballero* sheltered a fugitive from arrest; this latter privilege was jealously guarded by the Creole aristocracy, who bitterly resented its forcible abolition in Lima in 1730.

But, if there was laxity in Lima, there was astonishing licence in the mining districts. The pride and the disgrace of Peru was the *Villa Imperial* of Potosí, situated on a sterile plain 13,500 feet above the sea, beside a conical hill 2000 feet high, which from the discovery of its silver treasures in 1545 was the envy of the world. For many leagues round the soil produced nothing; yet in 1611 the population was estimated to be 160,000, including 66,000 Indians. The miners and adventurers living among the snows in the tropics were even more reckless and lawless than most mining populations. The Basques, being the richest and most numerous merchants, prominent in the *cabildo* and in the offices of the royal treasury and mint, were attacked by the Andalusians, aided by the Creoles; frequent tumults grew into combats under chosen leaders; intermittent fighting continued, with many killed and wounded, for forty years until in 1623 the Viceroy organised an armed force to impose peace. But the strife revived, and there was no

peace in Potosí till 1750. The discovery of a rich mine at Puno in 1680 produced still more scandalous scenes of bloodshed and disorder. People so careless of their own lives naturally did not spare their Indian labourers, for everything was dear at Potosí except silver and human life. In 1802 the treasurer of Potosí estimated that only one-fourth of the silver extracted since 1545 had paid the King's dues; the lowest estimate puts the contraband silver at one-half. Things were abnormal in these mining districts, which but for their mineral wealth would have been abandoned to a few Indian shepherds; but everywhere frequent disorders arose from the enmity between Spaniards born in Europe and *Criollos*, Creoles, or Spaniards born in America; the former, nicknamed *Gachupines* in New Spain and *Chapetones* in Peru, usually held the chief offices in Church and State; the latter resented their inferiority none the less because it was partly due to indolence and want of education. The *mestizos* of mixed European and Indian blood, often illegitimate in birth, and the *mulatos* of mixed European and African blood, were people of ambiguous position, prone to vicious and disorderly ways, and the worst oppressors of the Indians.

The danger to life and health in emigration promoted the universal laxity. Of thirty-six Peruvian Viceroyals from 1550 to 1801, ten died in office, and four on the return journey or immediately afterwards. The mortality among the Viceroyals of New Spain was almost as great. To Cervantes the Indies are the refuge of scamps and broken men, and Quevedo leaves his sharper after a career of rascality preparing to cross the sea. By restricting emigration to licensed passengers of known character the Kings strove earnestly to prevent this evil; but the repetition of the royal *cédulas* shows their futility. By favour of the ship-captains many unlicensed emigrants, among them not a few foreigners, reached the Indies; many succumbed to pestilence at Portobello; many got no farther than Cartagena, where the *chapetonadas* or immigrants' fevers swept them away; and the survivors were often rescued from homeless misery by the hospitable negroes and ended by marrying negresses. But many, reaching the interior, infested the mining districts and Indian frontiers, notwithstanding repeated commands that they should be arrested and sent to Spain or pressed into the army.

In New Spain, a country more accessible, more normal, of sounder foundation and better government, the proverbial rule of life was *Vivir y dejar vivir*, "Live and let live." In Peru, which never shook off the taint of its baser mode of acquisition, the motto was *Comer y dejar comer*, "Eat and let eat." Officials were largely paid by perquisites, and were not required to decline gifts; but corruption went far beyond these limits. Viceroyals and Governors had great opportunities, particularly in the distribution of patronage; for they appointed many of the *corregidores*, filled temporarily all unexpected vacancies, and nominated all parish priests on the recommendation of the prelates.

Many yielded to the temptation; the upright and energetic, unsupported by the *audiencias*, could do little against universal custom. Administration was hampered by the multitude of officials and by the disputes of competing authorities. The Viceroy might preside in the *audiencia* without power to speak or vote; the *audiencia* might report directly to the King, criticising the Viceroy; Viceroy and *audiencia* were constantly at variance as to the vague limits of their functions. The city of Mexico contained at least ten distinct tribunals. The three ecclesiastical Courts of the Inquisition, the Santa Cruzada, and the diocese, frequently clashed: the special Courts of merchants, of soldiers, of priests, and of royal officials, caused frequent disputes of jurisdiction; but most serious were the dissensions between Viceroy and Archbishops, between Governors and Bishops. The prelates held a political status, being charged to enforce the laws concerning conduct and humanity, and they not infrequently became Viceroy and Governors; the disputes were waged with the weapons of the law and of excommunication, but sometimes also with lethal weapons. Quarrels between authorities were frequent, and also popular seditions against authority accompanied by the cry *Viva el rey y muera el mal gobierno*; in fact, movements as serious as many, which in the nineteenth century have been dignified with the title of Revolution, were scarcely abnormal. In capital cities custom or convenience permitted in emergencies the assembly of the magistrates and chief *vecinos* in a junta or convention, whose decisions had a quasi-constitutional force—a body somewhat resembling the *cabildo abierto*, but more distinctly political and not merely municipal in character. In Mexico such a junta in 1623, following and sanctioning an episcopal protest and a popular sedition, deposed the Viceroy—an act which was accepted by the Crown. Such movements are not steps towards independence; they are rather, like the activities of the *cabildos*, survivals of the individual or corporate vigour which marked the Conquest. They can be regarded as pointing towards emancipation only in so far as they indicate the possibility of independent action inherent in the character and ways of the people.

The same licence pervaded the Church. The complaint recurs throughout that the clergy are recruited from two sources: some are the outcasts of Spanish parishes and monasteries; others are Creoles, either idle and dissolute men driven by disgrace or want to take Orders, or else men put into religion by their parents with a view to getting a *doctrina* or Indian parish and making a fortune out of the Indians. Many benefices, including most of the *doctrinas*, were by special dispensation in the hands of regular clergy almost exempt from episcopal control. The rule of celibacy was generally evaded; religious duties were hurried through, and the instruction of Indians was reduced to an absurdity; amidst general immorality in the towns, the regulars set the worst example, making their monasteries places of licence and pleasure. The

quadrennial chapters of the Orders held for the election of provincial prelates were scandalous scenes of disorder and strife—Creoles and Europeans contending for these lucrative posts, which held the patronage, subject to viceregal confirmation, of all the parishes administered by the Order: the victor was conducted home by the idlers of the town, waving banners and clashing castanets. From 1629 the different Orders were successively commanded to elect a European and a Creole alternately. At the first Franciscan election held in Lima in 1680 under this rule the Creole *padres* resisted the command, made a murderous attack upon the commissary-general of their Order, and fought in the streets against the infantry sent to suppress the disturbance. The scandals of these chapters recur in viceregal and episcopal reports down to the nineteenth century. But there were large exceptions to these disorders; the missions required and found self-sacrificing and devoted priests; the Franciscans were better than the other Orders; and the Jesuits observed admirable conduct, maintaining the same discipline as in Europe, expelling unworthy members and devoting themselves in their colleges to education, to study, and to religious and charitable ministrations.

In a general view it would be misleading to dwell exclusively on the widespread irregularities in Church and State: they are represented and deplored in official and legal treatises which are themselves examples of laborious public service. In a large and general sense the Latin heritage of organised life was preserved, and it would be easy to multiply examples of upright and single-hearted zeal.

The tribunal of the Inquisition, sitting in Mexico and Lima from 1570 and in Cartagena from 1603, was a powerful organ of government, charged to supervise conduct and also to exclude strangers; but this latter commission seems to have been neglected; for the foreigners who were frequently brought before the Inquisition in Cartagena were summoned not as aliens but as heretics. During the union of the Spanish and Portuguese Crowns (1580-1640) the Portuguese, though legally aliens, were tolerated in the Indies; and in 1605 the Inquisition of Lima received royal orders to moderate its zeal against Portuguese Judaisers: but thirty years later the tribunal reports to the King that the trade of Lima is dominated by suspected Portuguese, that the streets seethe with them, and that a Spanish shopkeeper can only succeed by partnership with one of them. A hot persecution followed; torture produced evidence; one woman died upon the rack; finally, at an *auto de fé* held in 1637 sixty-three Portuguese were exhibited as convicted of Judaism, while eight carried palms in token of triumphant acquittal; eleven of the convicted suffered death. The accusation of Judaism was probably true in most cases; the retail trade of Lima was passing into the hands of Portuguese Jews, until the Inquisition stepped in. John Hawkins' men, captured at Vera Cruz in 1567 and

enslaved, were generously treated by their Spanish masters until the Inquisition of Mexico attacked them, when three were burnt and the rest suffered various penalties. Of the English pirates taken with Oxenham in 1573 four suffered death, one of them by fire, through the Inquisition of Lima ; and in 1622 an Englishman, the agent of an English merchant of Seville, was burnt in Cartagena. These seem to be the only instances of the torture or death of Englishmen through the Inquisition in South America ; thirteen of the Englishmen captured with Richard Hawkins in 1595, after being reconciled or admitted to the Church as penitents, were imprisoned by the tribunal at Lima, but released by royal command; and the few Englishmen and Dutchmen brought before the tribunal and reconciled after 1600 were treated much more leniently than Spaniards and Portuguese. In the first twenty years 30 persons were executed out of 1265 judged by the tribunal in Lima ; 270 of these were ecclesiastics, accused sometimes of erroneous or ambiguous doctrine, sometimes of saying mass without possessing full Orders, sometimes of soliciting their penitents, a crime which recurs throughout the history of the tribunal. Among the charges against laymen are blasphemous, immoral, or scandalous expressions, witchcraft, bigamy, and other domestic irregularities.

Although composed for people inapt for commerce, careless of gain, and free in spending it, yet a third part of the Code of Laws for the Indies deals with commerce. The precise and limited course of trade, at first in some degree dictated by circumstances, was afterwards maintained by authority for convenience of control and taxation, and for the exclusion of foreigners as well as for defence. At first trade was permitted from several Spanish ports ; but in fact ships seldom sailed except from the Guadalquivir ; and the Indian trade was soon confined to Seville. Then, the law prescribing adequate armament being generally evaded, so many ships, sailing singly, were taken by French corsairs, that about 1529 they were ordered to wait for one another and sail in company ; about 1550 this rule was more rigorously enforced, and convoy was ordered to the Canaries on the outward voyage and from the Azores on the return. This system was afterwards further developed ; two fleets annually sailed from the Guadalquivir ; one, generally called the *flota*, accompanied by two warships, sailed to Vera Cruz, where European goods were exchanged for silver, cochineal, indigo, and hides in the fair of Jalapa ; the other, the *flota de Tierra Firme*, was popularly called the *armada* or the galleons, being convoyed by the eight war-ships which constituted the *armada real de la guardia carrera de las Indias* or *armada del mar del Norte*. In West Indian waters the few ships for the islands and for Venezuela were detached, while the main body sailed to Cartagena, a sleepy city which for a few weeks awoke to the activity of the fair in which the merchants of New Granada dealt with those of Seville. Meantime the silver bars from Potosí had been carried by llamas to the port of Arica, thence by the *armadilla* or

little squadron to Callao, and thence to Panamá by the two ships which constituted the *armada del mar del Sur*, a force first organised after Drake's capture of the one treasure-ship between Callao and Panamá; from Panamá the silver was carried by mules northwards to Portobello. On the arrival of the *armada del mar del Norte* from Cartagena, the pestilential village of Portobello, usually abandoned to a few negroes, a handful of officials, and a small garrison frequently relieved, became for six weeks one of the great centres of the world's trade. The agents of the Seville and Lima merchants first met to fix prices, and then the chests of silver bars were exchanged for bales of silk and cloth; but during the fair many died; and, if war or accident detained the galleons for the winter, the pestilence swept away the crews and soldiers.

Trade from Europe to the viceroyalty of Peru was rigidly confined to these fairs; European goods reaching Buenos Aires by this strangely circuitous route, including a land journey of one thousand leagues from Lima, were worth six times their original cost; but from 1620 the port of Buenos Aires was allowed to export annually two shiploads of local produce, in exchange for European goods for local use, not for transport to the interior. Even this concession, opening the way to contraband, was viewed with indignation by the "commerce," or *consulado*, of Lima. Regularity in the sailing of the fleets was impracticable; the *flota* was often intermitted, the *armada* still more often; from 1656, owing to the loss of Jamaica and other disasters on the Atlantic, probably also to the decay of Potosí, the *armada* became in theory triennial, and from 1685 only occasional. These irregularities were partly remedied, perhaps partly caused, by costly licenses granted to ships, known as "register ships," to carry a limited cargo; the limit was always exceeded.

The rule directing trade to Seville had one exception; a galleon, usually accompanied by a smaller ship, sailed annually from Manila to Callao till 1592, and thenceforward to the port of Acapulco on the west coast of New Spain, laden with Chinese goods, principally silk and muslin, to return to Manila carrying Government officials and priests for the Philippine missions, also silver limited by law to 500,000 *pesos*, but amounting in fact to three or five times as much. The voyage from Acapulco to Manila and back occupying fourteen months, Acapulco had a trans-oceanic fleet of four ships, an annual fair which temporarily doubled the population, and a small colony of Chinese residents; the arrival of the Manila galleon was one of the great annual events of New Spain, and this regular trade with aliens—for it was in fact trade with China—is cited as one of the causes contributing to a sounder state in that kingdom. Though the *consulado* of Seville repeatedly protested against this trade, as infringing Spanish monopoly, the Crown refused to suppress it, on the ground that its suppression would involve the abandonment of the settlements and missions in the Philippines together with the chance of evangelising

China; but the limited trade hitherto allowed between Peru and New Spain was totally prohibited in 1631, the Seville trade having suffered from the Peruvian preference for Chinese goods obtained through New Spain.

Commerce with the Indies was managed by the *Casa de Contratación* established at Seville, consisting of a tribunal and council with numerous officials, whose duty it was to supervise the preparation of the fleets and enforce the multitudinous and minute regulations by repeated visits on board; on the despatch of the fleets, to prevent the sailing of foreigners, unlicensed passengers, contraband goods, or freights exceeding the legal limits; and on their return, to make sure that none of the men had deserted, that there was no unregistered silver or other contraband, to see to the unlading and the payment of dues and to prevent gold and silver from passing out of Spain. The *Casa* appointed the officials of the fleet, until these posts were made vendible. The *consulado*, which ranked as a branch of the *Casa*, undertook part of its work. In 1718 the *Casa*, including the *consulado*, was transferred to Cadiz, which had been since 1680 the actual port of sailing. The imposts upon trade were enormous, collected both in Seville and in the ports of arrival, and they tended to increase until the proverb ran that the King took one *flota* in every three. In 1635 fresh dues were imposed to support the *armada del Barlovento*, a small permanent West India squadron, to cruise about the islands and along the Spanish Main, and in case of need to convoy the *flota* from Vera Cruz to Havana. The three armadas, of the North Sea, of the South Sea, and of the Windward Isles, completed the Indian naval establishment; but they were always inefficient. The Spaniards were equally weak in seamanship and artillery; there were many Germans, Dutch, and English, among the gunners and sailors; the commanders were often land officers; and, down to the eighteenth century, the war-ships were still unwieldy galleons, of a pattern long abandoned elsewhere, always cumbered with cargo and passengers and incapable of serious fighting.

The regular army in the Indies usually consisted merely of small garrisons in the chief ports, with some troops in the south of Chile and in the north of New Spain; most of the soldiers were Creoles and *mestizos*, drafts from Spain being always speedily thinned by death and desertion. The garrisons, especially on the Pacific coast, were as inefficient as the fleet; the soldier's trade was abhorred in the Indies; and during the 250 years following conquest there was a general disposition for peace. The militia furnished by the inhabitants of the towns varied much in numbers and in efficiency; negroes, though sometimes legally excluded from it, were generally admitted; pure Indians were excluded, with some exceptions. The interior Spanish settlements seldom contained regular soldiers; the obligations of the *encomenderos* were forgotten, as the *encomiendas* diminished in number.

and value ; and in fact the defence of such settlements fell upon all the inhabitants, often aided by friendly Indians.

In 1497 pardon was granted to criminals who should go to Santo Domingo ; and during the succeeding generation any Spaniard might emigrate whose ancestry was not tainted with Judaism, Mohammedanism, or heresy ; nor were the Emperor's subjects or even other foreigners rigidly excluded ; but this freedom was soon restricted. No one was allowed to leave Spain for the Indies without the King's license, which was only given sparingly to men of approved character. Doubtless the dread of losing population was a motive, but so also was the government of the Indies. They were not to become European colonies ; the commonwealth of the Indians was to be preserved ; white men were to live under control in organised groups in cities as servants of King and Church ; every precaution was to be taken against the evil, constantly denounced by Kings and Viceroy, of idlers and vagabonds living among the Indians and bringing disrepute upon "policy" and Christianity.

These regulations were constantly broken ; gain tempted the ship-captains to carry contraband goods and unlicensed passengers in every fleet, notwithstanding the threatened penalty of death for this latter offence ; repeated *cédulas* denounce the constant arrival of unregistered silver, escaping the royal dues. But not only subjects committed irregularities ; occasionally the King seized at Seville the silver of the merchants, giving in exchange promissory notes of doubtful value. The system of annual fairs, coupled with the great risk of shipwreck or of capture by corsairs, induced a precarious uncertainty ; profits were enormous and ruin frequent. Foreign goods might be sent to the Indies, provided that they were the genuine purchased property of Spaniards. Any Spaniard could trade with the Indies through a member of the "commerce" of Seville ; but the members were forbidden to act as agents of foreigners. This prohibition was disobeyed ; and early in the seventeenth century a large part of the goods sent westward was despatched by foreigners through Seville merchants, who were never known to betray these secret and illegal trusts.

The study of Spanish-American laws and institutions is in itself incomplete and therefore misleading ; for the actual course of events is largely a history of infractions, evasions, and authorised exceptions. The Spanish settlers generally welcomed smugglers without enquiring too nicely whether they were corsairs and enemies of the Crown ; from the beginning of the seventeenth century the Dutch seated in Curaçoa almost monopolised the trade of Venezuela ; in the Antilles the French down to 1697 and the English down to 1670 preferred piracy or war, but did not neglect contraband, which continued after the conclusion of peace. The Portuguese in southern Brazil pushed an immense contraband trade with the River Plate, and founded in 1678 the fort of

Colonia del Sacramento as a smuggling post, ten leagues from Buenos Aires across the estuary ; during the following eighty-five years the place was five times taken by the Spaniards and five times restored to the Portuguese on conclusion of peace.

The internal taxation was gradually assimilated to the oppressive system prevailing in Spain ; the *alcabala*, or tax upon all sales, was introduced after 1573, notwithstanding protests which in Quito reached the pitch of insurrection. Bread and corn were exempt from this tax, as well as arms, compounded medicines, trained horses, paintings, "because of the excellence of that art," and books in Latin and Spanish ; books were also exempt from import duty, but were subject to a strict censorship, "feigned and unseemly histories" being excluded. The other chief internal sources of revenue were the royal dues on minerals, the sale of municipal and other offices, the Indian tribute, stamped paper, the monopoly of playing-cards, taxes upon all civil and ecclesiastical salaries, part of the incomes of vacant benefices, the tithes which were partly applied to secular purposes, and the sale of the Bull of the Holy Crusade, granted by the Pope to support war against the infidel, but always renewed with occasional brief interruptions. This last very profitable source of revenue was administered by a special treasury and tribunal in every capital ; and the purchase of the Bull was pressed upon everyone in biennial courses of sermons. Frequently the King, pleading the necessities of war against infidels and heretics, applied to his subjects for loans and also for *donativos* or free gifts, meaning in fact heavy extra taxes.

In New Spain silver at the mines paid to the King  $1\frac{1}{2}$  per cent. plus one-tenth of the remainder, in Peru  $1\frac{1}{2}$  per cent. and one-fifth of the remainder down to 1736, when, owing to the decay of the mines, the dues were reduced to the scale of New Spain. Mercury, required for the extraction of silver, was a royal monopoly, being sold by the King to miners at his own price ; it came partly from Europe, partly from the Peruvian mine of Guancavelica, belonging to the King, but worked by contractors. The silver *real*, reputed one-eighth of an ounce, and worth about  $6\frac{1}{2}d.$ , was the unit in reckoning small sums ; but the general unit was the reputed silver ounce or piece of eight *reals*, usually called simply *peso*, equal to about 4s. 4d. ; the Mexican mint has coined these dollars for 350 years. The ducat, a Spanish unit little used in the Indies, was, from the middle of the sixteenth century, not a coin but a sum of money, namely eleven *reales*, about equal to 6s.

Six Indian diggers were assigned to any mine-hunter, who on discovering a vein of silver had the right to stake out a space of sixty by forty yards ; an equal space belonged to the King and was always sold if found saleable ; anyone on paying 100 *pesos* might then stake out a limited claim, which was forfeited unless worked to a certain depth within a fixed time. The most numerous and most successful mine-

hunters being foreigners, it was decreed that foreigners should have these rights equally with Spaniards and Indians, also that German experts might be employed. These decrees are an instructive commentary both on the efficacy of the laws excluding foreigners and on the common notion that Spaniards had an inordinate passion for gold and silver; about 1640 a competent writer says that "most of the calamities of the Indians at Guancavelica are due to the cruelty, iniquity, greed, and depraved morals of the foreigners who flock thither." The way from Brazil could not be barred; nor were the ports in fact effectively closed. The naturalisation of foreigners long established in the Indies was permitted from 1562; yet the decrees excluding foreigners are constantly repeated.

These large taxes produced a disproportionately small revenue. Some were farmed; others were collected by the ordinary magistrates, who received a percentage on the amount; there was much waste, carelessness, and dishonesty, in collection as in expenditure. Most of the revenue was spent in the Indies on the elaborate and costly civil and ecclesiastical establishment; a surplus came from the treasuries of the mining regions in New Spain and Peru; but these regions were but a small part of the geographical area of the Empire, and the greater part of their surplus was absorbed by the loss incurred in other provinces; frequently it was only by borrowing and sometimes by advancing money themselves that the Viceroy's were able to remit to Spain the sums expected by the King. Complete records of the amounts so sent to Spain are not accessible, but before 1590 the annual despatch seldom exceeded 1,500,000 *pesos*. From 1600 to 1700 about 4,000,000 *pesos* probably represents the usual amount, but much of this was lost by shipwreck and disaster; during the eighteenth century the amount increased, and after 1760 it increased greatly, owing to the tobacco monopoly, the growth of trade, and the progress of mining in New Spain; towards the close of the eighteenth century the Crown drew annually from the Indies about eight millions of *pesos*, while the *situados* to Cuba, Manila, and other places, further absorbed three or four millions. But the actual average was probably considerably less than these usual amounts owing to periods of depression and to the occasional intermission of despatch in war-time; in the latter case the deficiency was not fully made good in succeeding years. From 1579 to 1650 the royal dues at Potosí usually exceeded 1,000,000 *pesos*, and in eighteen of those years they approached or passed 1,500,000: the subsequent decay of Potosí was more than balanced by the increased product of New Spain, which produced from 1775 about two-thirds of the revenue sent to Spain. In 1795 the Spanish-American mints coined thirty-eight million *pesos*, of which twenty-four millions were struck in New Spain. In each of the following years the Mexican mint coined over twenty-five millions.

The *asiento de negros* or contract for supplying African slaves to the

Indies, which in the eighteenth century became the object of international diplomacy and war, has a separate history. The slave-trade, being repulsive to Spaniards, was generally granted by contract to foreigners; in 1595 a Fleming undertook to pay 100,000 ducats a year for the monopoly, embarking annually 4250 slaves, of whom 3500 were by the contract to reach the Indies alive: in 1600 the Portuguese Governor of Angola took the contract, the ratio of mortality being raised, 5000 negroes to be embarked and 3500 landed at Cartagena and Vera Cruz; similar contracts were granted down to 1640, when the revolt of Portugal interrupted the trade. Portuguese were now excluded; Spaniards were unwilling; Dutch and English, though ready enough, were not acceptable agents; but after twenty years' interval a Genoese house gave an increased price for the monopoly; in 1676 the *consulado* of Seville took the contract; in 1696 the Portuguese Company of Guinea undertook to land in six years and a half 10,000 tons of negroes at three "pieces" (*i.e.* negroes) to the ton, paying 112 *pesos* per ton for the privilege; in 1701 the contract was transferred to the French Company of Guinea for ten years; lastly, in 1713 it was granted as the price of peace to the English South Sea Company, which undertook to send 4800 pieces of proper height and age annually for 30 years, the sovereigns of Spain and of England each to receive one-fourth of the profit.

The attempt to employ negroes in the Andes failed; nor were they ever numerous in Chile or the River Plate region or the Mexican table-land; but in the tropics, apart from the mountains, they relieved the less enduring Indians in mines and pearl-fisheries as well as in ordinary labour. The nature of the country facilitating escape, bands of *cimarrones* or runaway negroes early infested the woods and hills of Tierra Firme; but usually the negroes easily adopted the religion and customs of their new country, where they were generally treated with more humanity than among other Europeans, especially when they were servants to individuals; for a certain patriarchal character has always marked the Spanish household, the master regarding every dependent as a member of the family. A slave could legally purchase his freedom for a moderate sum, whatever his original cost might be, and could compel a master convicted of harshness to sell him to another. In the coast towns of the tropics there were many free negroes and mulattos, who provided companies of militia. Humboldt found the negroes much better treated in Cuba than in Jamaica; in considering Spanish treatment of the Indians this testimony should not be forgotten.

The treatment and government of the Indians cannot be dismissed in a dogmatic summary, owing to the divergence of actual fact from constitutional theory and also owing to the innumerable diversities of the Indians themselves. The people of Anahuac and of Cuzco and some of their neighbours had developed a considerable degree of mechanical

skill and social organisation ; but within fifty leagues of both these centres the natives descended through grades of lower culture to the most abject or ferocious savagery. Their relations with the Spaniards varied from hearty and loyal allegiance or complete subjection to independence and intermittent warfare. Down to the eighteenth century few white settlers, except in a few Peruvian coast towns, were separated by more than 100 miles from savages, many of them cannibals, many of them inveterate enemies, raiding the frontier towns to carry off Spanish women into savage concubinage and Spanish boys to be reared as Indian warriors, often to become the most intrepid and wily leaders against the Christians. The immense differences of natural features and climate meant corresponding diversities of population ; there were wide differences between the people of the torrid coasts, those of the interior forests and swamps, those of the tropical table-lands, the mountaineers of the south temperate region, and the nomads of the Pampa ; and smaller local divisions were infinite. In 1864, 120 living idioms were reckoned in Mexico, of which 35 were distinct languages, besides 62 extinct tongues ; about 1790, 350 idioms, 35 of them distinct languages, were counted in Quito alone ; Azara, in 1809, after years of observation, remarks that the differences between the small tribes on the Paraguay are greater than the differences between European nations.

But enquiry naturally turns to the peoples of New Spain and of Peru, tribes more settled and advanced, though indolent, apathetic, inert, and careless of self-preservation, when judged by European standards. The shock of conquest and revolution, service as porters and auxiliaries in war, labour in mines and in the building of ships and cities, displacement of customs and sentiments, caused a great diminution of inhabitants. The brutal conquerors of Peru, themselves daily exposed to hardship and death, were indifferent to the lives of their auxiliaries ; even in New Spain the extensive and solid Spanish cities are monuments of suffering and mortality continued after the conquest, the want of beasts of burden being supplied by men. But more were killed by epidemics than by all these causes ; twice before 1580 the indigenous plague of *mazahuatl* swept New Spain with appalling mortality ; but more wide-spread and continuous were the ravages of the newly-imported European fevers, small-pox and measles. In every fresh advance during three centuries these plagues accompanied the white men and destroyed at intervals one-sixth or one-fourth of the King's newly-subdued Indian vassals ; even in the settled parts the pestilence continued without ceasing, and the frequent epidemic outbreaks were only less destructive than the earlier visitations.

The "commonwealth of the Indians" was treated as distinct, the natives being regarded as a separate part of the body politic. The first object of Government was to "reduce" the natives, to gather them into considerable villages possessing Indian magistrates and a white

priest; they were thus to be made "politic" people, to learn "civil life," and to be instructed in Christianity. "Before the Indians can be made Christians, they must be made men," writes Toledo, who deplores the extreme difficulty of the task, saying that the Indians still live as they did under the tyranny of the Incas, sunk in apathetic indolence and only working at command of their *caciques*, who exploit them ruthlessly. Even apologists and defenders of the Indians constantly repeat the same verdict: "They are timid and pusillanimous people, indolent but submissive, of small understanding, imitative but not inventive!"

In every Indian *pueblo*, including the *cercados* or native suburbs of Spanish towns, the Indians annually chose, in presence of the Spanish priest, councillors and two *alcaldes*, who had considerable summary powers to flog and imprison for drunkenness, immorality, and theft, more serious cases being remitted to the nearest Spanish town; the lash was preserved from pre-Conquest times to chastise Indians in cases where white men were fined. The Indians were legally classed as *gente miserable*, people unfit to take care of themselves, having the privileges and limitations of minors, forbidden to alienate property or make considerable contracts except through the official Protector; they were exempt from the Inquisition as being, like children, unable to grasp matters of doctrine, and, though nominally subject to episcopal Courts, in fact were never brought to account for doctrinal matters. But the *curas*, even the most devoted and humane, everywhere punished absence from mass with the lash, which is declared by a champion of the Indians to be indispensable, since without it none would attend; they were subjected to a reduced number of fasts and feasts and a less rigid matrimonial table of affinity, and were not required to purchase the Bull of the Santa Cruzada or to give any offerings in church or dues for masses, baptisms, marriages, and funerals. They were exempt from *alcabala*; the payment of tithes was a disputed matter, only partially enforced with many relaxations; apart from the turn of paid but forced labour, called *tanda* in New Spain and *mita* in Peru, the only contribution to the State was the tribute or capitation tax paid by all males between 18 and 50 years of age; this varied in different times and places from one *peso* to nine, paid in kind where metal was scarce. Though there were instances of hardship, the tribute was not usually excessive, being much less than exactions endured before the Conquest, and it was commonly remitted in famine or other calamity; but to minor officials it was a ready occasion for extortion.

In return, the Indians were entitled to possess sufficient land for their support; but Spanish graziers often encroached and damaged the crops. The novel institution of individual property caused much perplexity and litigation in Peru, the Indians carrying their trivial disputes to the *audiencia* and often dying on the long journey through various climates. A heavy abuse from the beginning was the exaction by the

*encomenderos* of unpaid and excessive personal service in lieu of paid tribute; to prevent this and other grievances, an *encomendero* was forbidden to live on his *encomienda*, and was bound to inhabit a stone house in the capital of the district; yet this illegal personal service was not wholly eradicated even in 1780. Hospitals were everywhere built for the Indians; a paid Protector was appointed in every district, besides the chief Protector in the capital, who was specially charged to secure justice for them in the *audiencia*; and humane treatment was unceasingly enjoined upon all officials.

In the vicinity of the Spanish towns, apart from the mines, the Indians seem to have been well treated and fairly content. Toledo in 1570 found that the only well-managed hospital in Lima was that established for the Indians. The murder of an Indian was punished by death. In 1630 the Indians of the *cercado* of Lima are described as "instructed in policy and Christianity and *españolizados* so that they seem like Spaniards; they live in 200 houses and have among them eighty negro slaves, more than are owned by all the other Indians of Peru." Though the general rule forbade fire-arms and horses to Indians, those of Lima furnished militia, both horse and foot. In the Peruvian coast valleys, destitute of mines and adapted to negro labour, the Indians readily learned mechanical arts and earned good wages in the armada and in the dockyards; their villages were ruled tranquilly but rigorously by Indian *alcaldes* who excluded all Spaniards and negroes. In Lima, Cuzco, and La Plata, as in the Indian quarter of Mexico, there were colleges for Indian nobles, although these foundations were sometimes neglected or diverted to other uses. Many Indians flocked to the Spanish towns, either living at random, free from tribute, in the markets and in the courtyards of the houses, or else attaching themselves to Spanish families as hereditary serfs.

Although the laws of protection and tutelage admit the impossibility of treating Indians like white men, yet from 1542 to 1600 Spanish legislators aimed at making them equal to Spaniards by ordering the abolition of every kind of serfdom and of all forced labour, and enjoining that negroes should be substituted for Indian workmen; but even these sweeping decrees contain ambiguous additions admitting necessary exceptions. Discretion in applying the laws is left to the Viceroy; where negroes are not available, Indian labourers must be used; in any case idleness is not to be allowed. In fact, the Conquest had brought with it a problem hitherto unfamiliar. Life under European conditions required labour in public works, in mines and factories, and above all on farms: the few white settlers scattered in small groups were not prepared to perform this labour in countries already possessing a docile peasantry; but the peasantry, needing almost nothing, ignorant of the use of money, abased by the shock of subjection, and perplexed by strange conditions, did not care at first to labour for wages. On the other

hand, they were accustomed to work at command, for the polity of the Incas had rested upon serfdom and forced labour; royal decrees could not induce Governors or settlers to dispense with institutions already existing and in their opinion necessary. The attempt was abandoned; while unpaid service in lieu of tribute was absolutely forbidden, serfdom and paid forced labour were both admitted; serfdom indeed was still discountenanced in many ambiguous decrees, and was rather tolerated as an existing institution and authorised by prescription than distinctly legalised. The serfs, called *yanaconas* in Peru, were attached to the soil, could not be sold, and were entitled to payment and instruction. The repetition of these rules indicates their frequent breach; yet many serfs were well treated and content; they were often in fact tenants sharing the crops with the Spanish landlord; many chose serfdom, especially as domestic retainers, in order to escape *mita* and tribute.

Forced labour in civic works, on farms, in mines and factories, was regulated by the *mita* or succession of labourers, whereby only a certain proportion of the men, varying in different provinces from one twenty-fifth to one-fifth, might be summoned from their homes at one time to serve for a fixed wage. Provisions for their protection are repeated and multiplied; about 1610 it was forbidden in Peru to employ Indians in the sugar-factories, where they were liable to be hurt by machinery and by drinking spirits, or to employ them as woodcutters, since falling trees killed or injured them, although the usual exception is added that when royal galleons are being built Indian woodcutters may be indispensable. It may be questioned how far external care could protect people so little able to take care of themselves—people who in former times had, on the death of an Inca, killed themselves in crowds; but in fact the decrees for their protection were evaded, especially in the Peruvian mining districts. The *mita* of Potosí, which was treated by Viceroy as a great matter of State, may be described in illustration. About 1575 Toledo assigned the 95,000 Indian villagers inhabiting seventeen districts as *mitayos* for Potosí; one-seventh of them were annually summoned to labour in the mine one week in three; thus 13,500 Indian *mitayos* were always present, of whom 4500 at a time worked underground, receiving a daily wage of four *reales* or two shillings, half the wage of a free Indian. The *mitayos* were to be carefully protected from hardship and danger; but humane regulations were frustrated by the greed and lawlessness of the mine-owners and by the rapid diminution of the *mitayos*. In 1633 the 95,000 assigned by Toledo had dwindled to 25,000, and in 1678 there remained less than 1700. In 1681 an energetic Viceroy was sent with orders to restore the *mita*, which had lapsed from the disappearance of the Indians, to the great loss of the mining industry; by a careful count of Indians and by adding fourteen districts, he enrolled 21,000 *mitayos*, making an annual shift of 3000,

who were now to work two weeks out of three. And then begins a fresh cycle of hardship, apathetic submission, and decrease, hastened by a terrible epidemic of cholera in 1720. In 1788 the intendant of Cochabamba, a province adjoining Potosí, reports that three of his Indian villages had been completely depopulated by the *mita*, and that of the Indians who annually went to Potosí one-third never returned ; in explanation he describes the exhausting, dangerous, and unwholesome character of the work, and the fatal change of climate. The mercury mine of Guancavelica, requiring about 600 labourers at a time, consumed its *mitayos* even more rapidly than Potosí. But worse than either were the *obrages* or cloth factories, in which the Indians were shut up unseen except by their exploiters and delivered over to a hopeless, grinding slavery, their legal pay being so manipulated on pretext of food, clothing, and payment of tribute, that they were always in the master's debt, owing him unending toil ; reiterated royal commands failed to release them.

Viceregal and other reports are almost unanimous in ascribing the decrease of Peruvian Indians to ill-treatment and dangerous or excessive labour, to the long journeys, sometimes of 150 leagues, from their homes, and to the interruption of domestic life ; but there were other causes. It was the interest of *corregidor*, *cura*, and *cacique* to resist an accurate census and frustrate the *mita*, keeping the Indians to be exploited by themselves ; many Indians fled to the unconquered heathens, or to districts exempt from *mita* or to Spanish towns ; many bought immunity from *mita* ; many after their year of service remained at Potosí as free labourers, either working in the mine and in the numerous accessory tasks or collecting surface silver and buying stolen silver to be sold again. In 1600 a free labourer in the mine received a *peso* daily, besides what he could make by stealing ; the Peruvian rule of life, "Eat and let eat," was extended to the Indians ; and stolen ore was regularly sold by them in public market to Spanish speculators. In 1610 the practice was regulated and authorised, every free Indian miner being allowed one load of ore daily ; the sale of this brought up his daily earnings to a minimum of 13 *reales* or 7 shillings.

But in their own villages the Indians were often the victims of three tyrants, the *corregidor*, the *cura*, and the Indian *cacique*. The *corregidores*, being authorised to purchase mules and other necessaries for sale to the Indians, often bought the unsaleable stock of Lima tradesmen, spectacles, playing-cards, books, toilette powder, velvet, silk, compelling their Indian subjects to purchase these at the seller's price and reaping almost incredible profits at the cost of terrible suffering. But a nearer and more constant oppressor was the *cura*, usually a regular priest almost exempt from episcopal control ; official reports show the *cura* unlawfully engaged in trade, exacting forbidden dues, compelling children to bring offerings, multiplying festivals to increase extortion, sometimes

turning the church into a cloth factory and compelling the parishioners to labour all Sundays and feast-days.

The worst destroyers of the Indian were epidemics and alcohol. From the most cultured to the most savage all were the slaves of intoxication; during any brief absence of the *cura* an Indian *pueblo* plunged into an orgy of drunkenness and incestuous debauchery; to the abstemious Spaniard this vice branded the Indians as bestial people and justified the distinction universally drawn between Indians and *gente de razón*. With all their denunciations of ill-treatment, some officials are vaguely conscious that the decay of Indians is a matter beyond their control; one Viceroy attributes their decrease to their subjection to strangers; an early historian of Quito, after describing the devastation of conquest, is still at a loss to explain the total depopulation of large districts, and finally ascribes this to the secret judgment of God.

Yet the grievances were great. "The Indians have scarce a tongue to complain; if they attempt it, they are intimidated by the *corregidor*," writes the Viceroy in 1681; appeal to the *audiencia* was generally fruitless; one official would not condemn another. Small disturbances and conspiracies were not uncommon and were little regarded by the authorities; but about 1730 these sporadic troubles became more frequent, partly owing to an attempt to make a census. In 1742 an Indian of Cuzco, a fugitive from justice or injustice, taking an Inca name and proclaiming a restoration of the Empire, organised a revolt or rather an invasion among the *Chunchos* of the *montaña* or forest region on the east and north-east frontier of the central Peruvian provinces, between 10° and 16° south latitude. Many missions were destroyed; the Spaniards were confined to their towns and the frontier was thrust back for half-a-century; yet the Viceroy reports that the *corregidor* of Tarma is needlessly anxious for strong measures, and that the case is one for missionaries, not for arms. In 1750 an Indian conspiracy in Lima, not the first, indicated stability rather than weakness; for the militia company of Indian nobles in proof of fidelity voluntarily attended the execution of the leaders. A rising of some *pueblos* in a neighbouring province with an attempt to raise the whole kingdom was more alarming; and the Viceroy suggests that it is perhaps unwise to allow the Indians on the proclamation in Lima of a King's accession to represent in ceremonial procession the departed line of Incas.

In 1780 the *cacique* of an Indian *pueblo* in the district of Tinta to the south of Cuzco, after a vain attempt to represent Indian grievances to the King, invited the *corregidor* to his house, and, pretending a royal warrant, tried and executed him; then, taking the Inca name of Tupac Amaru and asserting a commission from the King, he seized the treasuries of two districts and raised a paid army of 17,000 men, which he led against Cuzco, claiming to be the deliverer of Indians, Creoles, and  *mestizos*, but threatening death to all who should resist him. Other

leaders sprang up in the southern *serranía*, notably a baker calling himself the Inca Tupa Catari, who plunged with his followers into orgies of drunkenness and homicide, killing white men, women, and children, and threatening civil war against Tupac Amaru. The latter, repulsed from Cuzco, turned his arms against all except Indians; at first many *mestizos* and some Creoles favoured the rising, but they were soon alienated by massacre and outrage; and after four months of aimless warfare and some vain attacks on small towns his diminished forces were defeated by a Spanish officer commanding 15,000 men, mostly loyal Indians under their *caciques*. But meantime more serious troubles afflicted Upper Peru (now Bolivia), extending even to Tucumán; in some places only whites were killed, in others all *mestizos* and all Europeanised Indians of every sex and age, in one place every man wearing a shirt; one town was flooded by cutting an embankment, and its 10,000 inhabitants were drowned. Tupac Amaru's nephew, pretending a commission from Charles III, was still in command of 15,000 men a year after the first outbreak, but was at last brought to capitulate; 100,000 people are said to have perished in the troubles of 1780-3. Tupac Amaru was executed with medieval tortures, proof of the panic inspired by the rebellion.

This movement cannot fairly be regarded as the attempt of an oppressed nationality to amend its wrongs; there was no general rising of the Indians and no cohesion among the insurgents. It is a yet greater error to regard this as the beginning of the struggle for independence; whatever the first intention of its authors may have been, the movement was in fact aimed, not at the emancipation of the Spanish settlements, but at their destruction; the rising was a partial movement in the "commonwealth of Indians," whereas the later struggle for emancipation was a movement in the "commonwealth of Spaniards," to which most of the Indians were indifferent or hostile.

This insurrection produced a reform—the abolition of *corregidores* throughout the Indies except in New Granada, and the institution of *intendentes*, officials of high rank and character, ruling large provinces and directly responsible to the King; each *intendencia* was divided into *partidos* ruled by *subdelegados*. But there was one great defect, due to the chronic necessities of the treasury; the *subdelegados* were paid by a percentage of the Indian tribute collected by them; and the old story of neglect and oppression by priests and officials continued.

The history of the *encomiendas* illustrates the decrease of the Indians. Originally granted for two or sometimes three lives, after which term they were to pass to the Crown, these fiefs began to fall in before the close of the sixteenth century; but the Viceroy retained a valuable patronage by renewing them, often to families other than the first possessors. Their action was received at first with vigorous reprimand, then with acquiescence; the Crown took to making these grants to

courtiers living in Spain ; and the principle of perpetuity, at first rejected, was in some degree admitted. The possession of rich *encomiendas* by ecclesiastical and charitable foundations impeded their extinction ; yet during the seventeenth century many lapsed to the Crown. After 1751, the Crown absorbed the remainder without much difficulty, depopulation having almost extinguished their value. About 1790, in Chile, fifty-three surviving *encomiendas*, comprising 960 Indians, were extinguished ; the richest *encomienda* in Cochabamba then consisted of nine Indians ; in Paraguay the Protector reported the existence of 122 *encomiendas*, comprising about 2000 Indians, who were still illegally subjected to unpaid personal service for two months every year. But it must be remembered that, as the Indians decreased, the *mestizos* increased ; Indian women preferred union with white men ; and many of those who passed for white were of mixed origin. Everywhere there was a limited society of well-to-do Creoles and Europeans who jealously guarded their purity of blood ; but only in the province of Buenos Aires, bordered by savage tribes, was the bulk of the population European.

In New Spain the Indians fared better ; the country was easier to control and more thickly populated, and the natives showed more endurance under the new conditions. The drainage canal of Mexico, employing thousands of forced labourers for two centuries, did not destroy population as did the *mita* of Potosí ; the great mining era of New Spain was the settled age of the eighteenth century, not, as in Peru, the age succeeding the Conquest. Notwithstanding much injustice and oppression, the Indians increased in number and improved in condition during the eighteenth century, especially after 1770, about which time the *tanda* was abolished and all labour made free ; and in 1805, according to Humboldt, the Indians, except in the *obrages*, were better off than the peasantry over a great part of northern Europe ; labour in the mines, though exhausting, was short and better paid than in Europe. The few remaining Indian cities and the two Indian quarters of Mexico, with their separate Indian *cabildos* exercising authority over groups of subject Indian villages, were treated with dignity and consideration. So long as the Spanish power lasted, the people of the “free city” of Tlascala retained with unimportant modifications the privileges granted by Cortés, and even carried these privileges to the distant frontier settlements which they made in support of Spanish Imperial expansion ; it may be doubted whether any other conquering power has ever observed such a treaty for three centuries. It is true that the attempt of Spanish legislators to endow the body of natives with *policía*, to make them “civil people” in the European sense, overshot the mark of possibility ; the unmixed Indians in general remained merely passive members of the body politic ; so late as 1864 the Mexican Indians are truly described as still depressed and indifferent. Yet the “New Laws” for the liberation of the Indians promulgated

by the Habsburg Emperor were not ineffective; three centuries after his time an invading Habsburg prince was put to death by a pure-blooded Indian acting as constitutional head of the Mexican commonwealth.

The treatment of Indian subjects naturally leads to the frontier question, the attitude of Government towards the unsubdued *gentiles*. To the north of New Spain and to the south of the River Plate and of Chile, there were long irregular frontiers; several provinces of both continents contained savage *enclaves*; moreover, there was an immense undefined interior border-line, extending westward from the mouth of the Orinoco to the Andes, thence irregularly southwards to Salta, then in a great curve round the Chaco, past Córdoba to Santa Fé; from this point a narrow and ill-defined strip of Spanish settlement, bordered to east and west by savagery, extended northwards up the Paraná and Paraguay to a point north of Asunción.

The close of armed conquest in the sixteenth century did not end European expansion. As in other empires, the safety of the frontiers demanded advance; nor was the condition of the Papal grant of the Indies, the conversion of the heathen, ever forgotten. The extension of royal power over regions properly belonging to the Crown was an undoubted duty and privilege; and the beneficence of this work was a political and religious axiom. But a sincere and partly successful effort was made to carry on this work without violence or bloodshed. Philip III commanded that attacks upon the heathen should cease and that advance should only be made thenceforth by the peaceful persuasion of missionaries. Abstinence from armed aggression became so much an established maxim that, in 1680, a junta of Bishops and Governors met in Tucumán to discuss whether it was lawful to make offensive war on the Chaco Indians, who constantly raided the towns. The initiation of the policy of pacific advance is marked by the royal invitation to some Italian Jesuits to undertake the pacification of the savage country on the upper Paraná. Thus began in 1609 the famous missions in the province of Guaira, generally known as the missions of Paraguay, although they were remote and politically separate from the earlier settlement round Asunción, and most of them lay outside the present limits of the Paraguayan Republic.

Many of the Guaránis, a people practising a rude agriculture but otherwise savages, living in little groups in the woods, menaced on the north by ferocious cannibals and on the east by the Paulistas, lawless Brazilian slave-raiders, were now gathered into "reductions," each ruled by a Jesuit priest with one or two assistants. After a destructive raid of Paulistas in 1630 fire-arms were introduced, and a regular Indian militia, both cavalry and infantry, was formed; these troops were repeatedly sent by their Jesuit chiefs to save the towns of Corrientes, Santa Fé, and Asunción from attacks of savages, and to help the Spanish troops of Buenos

Aires against the Portuguese. In 1705 the King formally thanked them for their service against the infidels ; and in the following year they assaulted and took with reckless daring the Portuguese fort of Colonia. This curious commonwealth of some thirty Indian villages, exempt from outside control, and administered by elected Indian officials under the admirable rule of the priests, was the most orderly, stable, and contented community south of the tropics. In 1740 their inhabitants numbered 144,000 ; but they were reduced by epidemics, by mortality in the military service of the King, and by the results of an iniquitous treaty ceding seven of the reductions to the hated Portuguese, whereby those seven villages were driven into revolt, followed by destruction through a Hispano-Portuguese military expedition ; at the expulsion of the Jesuits in 1767 they numbered 110,000. After that event the reductions were handed over to civil administrators and young regulars of other Orders who hurried to seize the houses, gardens, and orchards of the Jesuits, caring little for the Indians ; and the province gradually relapsed into depopulation and barbarism.

These missions, though secluded from intrusion, were not secluded from observation ; they were jealously watched by the authorities of Asunción. Their merit is proved by the inspections and reports of Governors and Bishops, by the letters of Jesuits to one another, by the analogy of their work throughout the Indies, by the exaggerated or trivial character of the charges brought against them in 1767, and by the reports of two separate royal commissioners sent to Guaira after the expulsion, who contrast the former admirable system with the succeeding disorder. A remarkable testimony to the general merits of the Jesuits is afforded by the petition of the "substitute" American deputies to the Cortes of 1810, who demanded, among other reforms, the restoration of the Company in America.

Not only in Guaira but on almost every frontier the missionaries, especially the Jesuits, pushed forward the dominions of the King and the Church ; in their repeated expeditions into the Chaco and other savage parts many lives were lost with small visible results ; but in the regions of the Orinoco and the Amazon large tracts were reduced. Industrious and orderly communities, cited as models by neighbouring civil Governors and containing thrice the population of the Guaira missions, were formed among the Mojos and Chiquitos between the head waters of the Paraguay and Madeira rivers ; and in the eighteenth century some impression was made even upon the ferocity of the Chaco Indians and of the Chiriguanes to the east of Upper Peru. This religious conquest was also a great political system, ordered and paid for by the King ; the missions on reaching a certain stability and order were generally erected into *doctrinas* or settled Indian parishes ; and the reductions became *pueblos*, regular villages liable to tribute and sometimes subject to the ordinary civil administration.

The expulsion of the Jesuits in 1767 was the greatest blow inflicted on the Indies since the Conquest. In the *pueblos de Espanoles* their colleges contained the ablest, most industrious and most orderly subjects of the King, historians, naturalists, geographers, teachers, ministers to the sick and poor ; on the frontiers they were the best teachers and protectors of the natives and the firmest pillars of the monarchy. It was also a great shock to the missions and to European influence on the frontiers. The other Orders could not supply their place at once, nor had the newcomers 150 years of experience to guide them. A great part of the ground lost was never regained ; indeed some interior parts of South America were less known to white men in 1850 than in 1750 ; but between 1770 and 1810 much progress was made in California and in the Orinoco region. In both these regions, especially in California, where there were apprehensions of foreign intrusion, the missions were followed by a kind of skeleton military occupation consisting in *presidios*, small posts placed at wide intervals, each garrisoned by twenty or thirty horsemen, generally recruited among the frontier cow-boys.

The missions had their defects. Sometimes the method of peaceful persuasion was varied by armed raids, the missionaries indulging the tribal instincts of their neophytes by leading them against their heathen neighbours to carry off children to be reared as Christians ; moreover, in the older and more tranquil missions, as in the *doctrinas* formed out of them, there was often a tendency to the covetous and selfish administration found elsewhere. Yet Humboldt, after long travel in 1799-1800 among the Orinoco missions, though finding many faults, sums up decidedly in favour of "the great and useful establishments of the American missions," controlling countries four or five times as large as France and forming a vast zone round the European dominions ; this estimate does not include the extensive missions of California and of the northern provinces of New Spain. It may safely be alleged that so vast a region of savagery has never elsewhere been pacified with so much patience and so little violence, and that an immense indefensible frontier has never won comparative security at so little cost of life and treasure.

It has sometimes been said that there is little to tell concerning the Spanish Indies between conquest and independence, two exciting epochs which overshadow the intervening period. Yet the exploration and conquest of the wilderness, the spread of geographical knowledge and of European influence, the study and treatment of savage peoples—that process which in other continents has fixed the attention of the world—cannot be quite uninteresting in South America, where for two centuries such work was pursued by the quiet enterprise of priests travelling in pairs, often perishing by obscure but not unexpected deaths, which are only recorded in the annals of their Orders. But

the drum and trumpet also woke the coasts and islands of the Spanish Indies ; in every Spanish war since 1500 the Indies have played a part, sometimes a preponderating part. The French, the Dutch, and the English, all seized insular fragments of this Empire and repeatedly attempted acquisitions on the mainland with little success. From 1521 French sailors preyed upon the returning ships ; in 1537 Havana was robbed by a French corsair, and in the following twenty years was twice sacked and burnt ; Santiago de Cuba and Cartagena suffered the same fate. The French were followed by Dutch and English smugglers, slave-traders, and corsairs. The Spanish main was repeatedly scoured ; first Drake, afterwards Cavendish, raided the Pacific, till then a Spanish lake ; but these raids, though they showed the way to others, had little permanent effect in themselves. More ignoble but more lasting were the enterprises of the seventeenth century ; the French *boucaniers* or cattle-hunters of Santo Domingo, already lawless and half-savage, being driven to piracy by Spanish hostility, were joined by Dutch, Portuguese, and English adventurers, a rascally community loosely held together by greed of booty and enmity to Spain. French settlements in the islands and the English capture of Jamaica in 1655 gave them a secure footing and official protection ; from the capture of island caravels and the occasional cutting off of a treasure-ship they passed to organised war in considerable fleets, sacking the Spanish towns on islands and mainland with murder, torture, arson, and outrage. In 1670 Henry Morgan crossed the Isthmus with two thousand men and burnt Panamá. But in that same year the Treaty of Madrid, whereby Spain recognised existing English possessions, deprived the English buccaneers of official protection. Some now became pirates in the Pacific, whither Dutch expeditions had preceded them ; others joined the French buccaneers, who rioted in the Caribbean Sea down to the Peace of Ryswick ; in 1683 they even sacked Vera Cruz, committing every kind of atrocity.

The War of the Spanish Succession (1702–13) opens with Benbow's unsuccessful expedition against Cartagena ; the aims of the English appear in the secret treaty made in 1707 with the Austrian claimant " King Charles III of Spain," to the effect that a joint Anglo-Spanish Company should be formed to trade with the Indies, or, if this could not be done, that the English should be admitted to trade with the Indies, and that all other foreigners, but especially the French, should be completely excluded. Apprehensions concerning French commercial rivalry were natural, for the French not only held the *asiento de negros*, but were also allowed during the war to send " register ships " round Cape Horn, practically monopolising trade with Peru.

In 1713 Philip V obtained peace by granting to the English the *asiento de negros* for thirty years and also the right to send annually one loaded ship of limited tonnage to a fair in Cartagena or Portobello or

Vera Cruz. After the peace efforts were made to suppress smuggling; but nothing could hinder the vast system of contraband now developed by the English under cover of the slave-trade and of the *navío de permiso*. English slave-depots were established in the principal ports; goods were introduced under pretext of clothing and feeding the negroes; each depot became a great store of smuggled merchandise; slaves were no longer brought in large numbers to fixed ports, but small ships at odd times carried negroes from Jamaica to various destinations, every ship a smuggler. In the occasional fairs the *navío de permiso* was loaded far beyond the limit and was accompanied by smaller ships which anchored out of sight. Free from the enormous dues laid upon Spanish merchandise, the English were able to undersell the lawful importer and reduce the legal fair to a nullity. In this contraband trade the chief delinquents were the Spanish merchants receiving the goods and the customs officials who had good reason to connive; the English merchants came to regard it as by prescription a legitimate and regular business; and much indignation arose when a Spanish coastguard fleet was organised which impeded the trade and pushed the right of search to its extreme limits. After long friction and much negotiation between the two Courts, Great Britain declared war in 1739. During this war the smuggling from Jamaica still continued. A body of 250 Spanish smugglers on the Isthmus formed a little army, supplied with arms and ammunition by the English enemy, controlling the municipal elections of Panamá, and regularly navigating the Pacific; on being attacked they built a wooden fort, hoisting the English flag, and were only exterminated by a regular military expedition. The Indies were wholly unprepared for defence; the garrisons and military stores of Cartagena and Callao were in a ludicrous state of neglect; and the two "frigates" constituting the armada of the South Sea were ancient and shapeless barges built by negroes at Guayaquil. Yet two British expeditions, attacking from the North and South Seas in order to join hands across the Isthmus, failed; and the efforts of Vernon and Anson secured no adequate success.

The peace of 1748 favoured an attempt at reform and control. Already, since the accession of the Bourbons, something had been done, notwithstanding the difficulties of war; tried public servants, not necessarily great nobles, were appointed Viceroy; and the establishment of the viceroyalty of New Granada relieved the unwieldy Government of Peru. Yet a secret report presented to Ferdinand VI in 1744 after nine years' residence in South America by the two young astronomers and naval officers, Ulloa and Juan, reveals astonishing scandals; no enemy could have produced by way of satire a more scathing exposure of incompetence, dishonesty, corruption, neglect, waste, oppression of natives, and universal immorality, both political and domestic. There is some internal evidence of rhetorical exaggeration and of the impulsive

egoism of youthful critics; in any case a confidential report which notes faults with a view to reform obviously cannot be taken as a complete historical account; yet almost every article in the indictment is supported by independent authority. A serious effort at reform was now made. Though the *flota* to Vera Cruz was continued biennially, the galleons and the fair of Portobello were abolished in 1748, the trade of Peru thenceforth passing in register ships round the Horn; the remaining *encomiendas* were ordered to be vested in the Crown, a reform gradually accomplished during the following fifty years; parishes served by regular clergy were to be given to seculars as vacancies arose, a replacement necessarily slow but actually realised. Under Charles III fresh vigour appears; the privilege of sanctuary was restricted; the appointment of a Minister for the Indies simplified the cumbrous supervision of the Council. The efficiency of the administration was greatly increased by the establishment of separate Governments in the outlying parts of New Spain and also in Buenos Aires, erected in 1776 into a viceroyalty comprising everything east of the Andes from Lake Titicaca to Patagonia, with an *audiencia* in the capital from 1796, besides that in La Plata. Venezuela had become a separate Government under a Captain-General in 1731. The institution of *intendencias* (1781-5), the first great alteration in the system of government since 1580, tended generally to closer responsibility and better administration. The organisation of the militia after 1767 indicates considerable efficiency, a very large part of the white and mixed population being enrolled. The eagerness of the Creoles to get commissions in this militia, their addiction to genealogies, and the general respect paid to descendants of *conquistadores*, indicate a certain historic sentiment of Spanish loyalty. About 1775 the *consulado* of Mexico lent to the Viceroy for the reformation of the mint 2,000,000 *pesos* without security or interest; and a mining magnate of New Spain gave to the King two full-rigged ships of the line, and lent him a million *pesos* without interest.

One curious phase of this reform was an attempt to reduce into settlements the scattered white men of the frontiers, mountaineers, woodmen, and shepherd-horsemen, detached from law and government; a constant concern about the uncontrolled and vagabond character of these pioneers of European influence particularly marks the official view of expansion. But natural opportunity and the pastoral habits of Spaniards overcame regulation; the *rancheros* or frontier horsemen of New Spain, perpetually warring with savage Apaches and Cumanches, the Venezuelan *llaneros* or horsemen of the plains, of mixed European, African, and Indian origin, the *gauchos* of Buenos Aires, many of them of pure European race, but half Indianised by a barbarous life and savage warfare, independent of all the world with a horse, a *lazo*, and a knife, and the somewhat similar but less savage *huasos* of Chile, are

characteristic products of Spanish settlement. But something was now done towards the suppression of violent crime and the regulation of the frontiers.

The great increase of trade enjoyed by Havana during the thirteen months of British occupation in 1762-3 probably suggested a loosening of the shackles upon commerce. From 1764 mail-boats partly laden with merchandise sailed from Corunna to the West Indies every month and to Buenos Aires every two months; in the following year trade with the Antilles was opened to nine Spanish ports. This led to such an increase of trade and of customs-dues that further concessions followed; from 1774 the kingdoms of the Indies were allowed to trade freely with one another. Finally in 1778 this privilege was extended to Spain, all Spaniards being allowed to trade with any American port; efforts were made to link the chief towns with the coast by roads, a work hitherto neglected partly on the ground that roads facilitate invasion. *Consulados* were established in many capitals, replacing the deputies of the central *consulado* of Lima or of Mexico. Chambers of mining, supported from the public revenue, were instituted in Peru and New Spain.

But the reform of government involved great cost and much discontent among the Creoles; the tightening of authority was not welcomed, and still less the greater strictness in collecting old taxes and the imposition of new ones. In the British war of 1762-3 the temporary loss of Havana and Manila and even the subsequent cession of the detached settlements in Florida were unimportant, except for the heavy financial burden following the war and causing some sporadic unrest. The war of 1779-83, undertaken by Charles III in support of the English-American colonists, indirectly shook the allegiance of some of his own American subjects by pressure of taxation. The government monopolies of tobacco and spirits established in 1752 were now everywhere enforced, and many tobacco plantations were ordered to be destroyed. At Socorro in New Granada some malcontents revolted in 1780, assuming the name of *comuneros*, and offered the throne of New Granada to the *oidor* vainly sent against them with a small force; 15,000 men were soon under arms, demanding the abolition of the tobacco monopoly and of certain taxes. They were pacified by concession of their demands; but, fresh disturbances arising, the leaders were arrested and the agreement was repudiated by the Viceroy. It is significant that, although the leaders invited the Indians in proclamations which talked of Tupac Amaru and of Peruvian independence, some Indians who joined the revolt were not welcomed; the movement was practically confined to the commonwealth of Spaniards. In 1784 two agents of the *comuneros* visited England in hopes of getting arms and support; and the Spanish ambassador in London reported to his Government that they were believed to have had an interview with one of the Ministry.

This movement and other smaller disturbances occurred at a critical

epoch. The successful revolt of the English Colonies in North America was followed by a larger intercourse with foreigners and the partial infiltration of Liberal and revolutionary ideas; a nervous apprehension in the Government showed itself in a ludicrous crusade against suspected books, in a new dread of education in the Indies, and in political imprisonments. The outbreak of the French Revolution naturally increased the political excitement among a section of educated Creoles and also the suspicious activity of the authorities. The two generations which comprised the movement of official reform and stricter administration had also brought development in the character and attitude of the white or mixed population. A brief opening of Pacific trade to the French during the latter part of the war of 1739-48 had attracted some French settlers to Chile, introducing an external influence greater than their mere numbers might seem to carry. The Peninsula sent an increasing number of immigrants, especially vigorous and stubborn settlers from the Basque provinces. After 1780 the word "colony" came into use, doubtless borrowed from abroad, but perhaps implying a new theory and a recognition of changed conditions. The people were acquiring a new political self-consciousness since the time when in 1702-13 the Indies had tranquilly awaited the issue of a dynastic struggle in Spain.

The French war of 1793-6 and the British war of 1796-1801 brought with them fresh financial burdens, especially repeated *donativos*; the latter war also brought the plague of cruisers and privateers and the interruption of communication with Spain, leading to trade with neutrals and even with the enemy; for during this *guerra de compadres*, or war of comrades, numbers of Spanish ships under their own colours traded between the mainland and the British West Indies, carrying licenses signed by British officers. Venezuela was most exposed to external influence through communication with the United States, with Trinidad and Jamaica, and with Santo Domingo, once the metropolis of the Spanish Indies but now emerging from French rule into a stormy independence.

In 1797 some European Spaniards confined in La Guaira for a revolutionary attempt in Spain organised a conspiracy which drew in about seventy inhabitants of that port, among them several officials, one of whom, Espana, has given his name to the movement. But the attempt found little general support; most of the Creoles, especially the landowners and cattle-masters, were conservative or indifferent; and to skilled foreign observers the Spanish monarchy still appeared unshaken. Although many now preferred to call themselves Americans rather than Creoles, the term *Españoles* still included all the white population of the Indies; and it was not until the outbreak of the revolutionary war that the terms Americans and Spaniards came to be used in opposition.

At the opening of the nineteenth century the dominions of the Spanish monarchy extended through seventy-nine degrees of latitude,

from San Francisco to Chiloe; in the extreme north and south the line was thin, but it was unbroken; and the Castilian language was spoken through a distance equal to the length of Africa. Over a great part of two continents a heterogeneous population were not unwilling vassals of the Spanish Crown; whatever internal reasons may have existed for revolution, the actual impetus came from without, for it was only upon the fall of the Spanish monarchy in the Peninsula that these American dominions were detached; indeed it would be almost as true to say that Spain fell away from the Indies as to say that the Indies fell away from Spain.

Spanish rule in America is often regarded as a gigantic and short-lived mistake; but in fact its long continuance is only less noteworthy than its vast extent and the gradual diffusion of Spanish ideas and ways through that extent. One aspect of that rule is remarkable; from the middle of the sixteenth century the dominant note of the Spanish dominion is peace, a peace unknown in those regions before or after the Spanish era. Indian warfare, though serious enough to those inhabiting the threatened regions, was trivial compared to some disturbances of the *Pax Britannica* in the nineteenth century; no external enemy ever penetrated more than a few leagues from the coast; the army in Spanish America was little more than a coastguard and a military police on some of the frontiers. If there is something of Oriental immobility in this long and peaceful continuance, there is also something of Latin stability and permanence both in local methods and in general result. Spain in America inherited and preserved something of the majesty of the Roman Peace.

In discussing the often-repeated accusation of Spanish oppression, it is necessary to define what sort of oppression is meant: whether oppression of the Indians by the whites, or oppression of the whites by the Spanish Government. If the former is meant, then the Creoles were as guilty as the Europeans, and both were more guilty than the Spanish Government and its immediate representatives. If the latter, the restraint of the whites was in fact the measure of protection enjoyed by the natives; free immigration and large autonomy granted to European settlers would have meant extermination or enslavement. But the theory of a universal control which should foster both "commonwealths" and protect the weaker was largely ineffective; and in this failure lay the troubles of the Indians. The difficulty of the task is illustrated by the various judgments passed upon the work of the Spaniards. Some critics accuse them of oppression; others find that they solved the problem of the European attitude to conquered aliens; while a modern historian blames the folly of Spain in striving to preserve inferior peoples, and commends as natural and sensible the Anglo-American method of extermination.

Accordingly, in discussing the merits of the Government towards the whites it should be clearly grasped that colonisation in the usual sense was not intended by the Spanish Crown nor apparently desired by the

Spanish people; it is only permissible to blame the Government for not encouraging colonisation if the fact is faced that such encouragement would have meant the disappearance or complete enslavement of the natives. Nevertheless, although restraint of immigration and control of settlers were necessary for the preservation of the "commonwealth" of Indians, the whites had distinct grievances resembling those which weighed upon Spaniards in the Peninsula, especially the slow and uncertain course of justice which left prisoners for years untried in gaol, an extravagant and wasteful system of taxation, and a narrow restriction of trade, accompanied by heavy imposts; but the general rigour of Government was tempered by the discretion of rulers, while an over-active or troublesome Governor could be removed by his subordinates or by a popular movement, generally with impunity. The usual exclusion of Creoles from the highest posts was a grievance; but both its extent and its significance were much exaggerated during the struggle for independence, since a very large number of subordinate posts, some of them commanding large influence and dignity, were usually held by Creoles. In fact, almost all the revolutionary leaders were connected with the royal service through posts held either by themselves or by their fathers. In Chile and in Buenos Aires the earlier stages of the revolution were largely directed by two Creole lawyers educated in Spain, of whom one, Rosas, was legal assessor to the Governor of Chile, the other, Belgrano, was secretary of the *consulado* of Buenos Aires.

The severest critics of the Spanish dominion have been Spaniards, among whom a multitude of reformers denounce abuses, plead for the injured, and urge remedies; on the other hand its praise comes rather from foreigners. Vancouver in 1795 is no less unstinted in praise than Richard Hawkins, prisoner in the Indies in 1594; observers such as Humboldt and Depons, historians such as Robertson, Helps, and Bancroft, though unsparing in criticism and in the recital of damaging facts, nevertheless leave the reader with a sense of sympathy and admiration. The facts demand some explanation; here was an empire which, by the testimony of its own administrators, was honeycombed with continuous decay in all directions; yet this empire survived repeated external shocks, continually extended its influence, and after three centuries evoked the admiration of foreign observers. This vitality is not explained by the theoretic system of administration, nor yet by the practical neglect of that system. Perhaps the explanation may partly be found in personal character; for, the cumbrous machine of Government being used by officials and settlers as much or as little as they chose, matters were moulded in kingdoms and provinces by the character and wishes of Viceroy, Governors, and *Oidores*, in districts and parishes by those of *Corregidores*, *Curas*, and *Caciques*. Examples constantly recur of admirable and loyal service, which has something Oriental in its simplicity and self-abandonment; in emergencies the presence of one

capable leader counterbalances all vices. Again, the undefinable Spanish quality of *hidalguía*, which animated the better part of the community, especially in New Spain, showed itself in a noble charity and hospitality, a liberal and careless use of wealth, indifference to material results, and an old-fashioned uncalculating loyalty, sometimes almost fantastic.

There is something medieval in the Spanish dominion down to its close; the Middle Ages supply the best parallel to its apparent inconsistencies—high ideals and shameful vices, tender humanity and shocking ferocity, thoughtful provision and actual neglect, cult of formulas and indifference to facts, exaltation of ceremonial faith and shameless profligacy, a theory of all-pervading sovereignty and acquiescence in constant breaches of that sovereignty. The first Bourbon King in 1708 impresses upon his Governors the conditions upon which Alexander VI granted the Indies to the Catholic sovereigns; in the age of the French Revolution the conversion of the *gentiles* is still the constant care of European Ministers and proconsuls; in the legal code reprinted in Madrid in 1791 the first law concerning the Indians is the testament of Isabel *la Católica*; the crude medieval note is almost startling in the formula which in the nineteenth century still summarised public duty, “the service of Both Majesties.” This comparison with the medieval spirit may help to explain the strength of the Spanish sovereignty, a strength which lay perhaps more in the region of ideas than in that of facts; the service of God and the King was a comprehensive guide, appealing with diverse significance to a Castilian duke or an Indian neophyte; and, if to most men a trite counsel of perfection was meaningless, still there were some to whom the most single zeal and devotion in Church or State was a matter of course, a duty performed with the utmost simplicity and indifference to reward. The “preservation of the two commonwealths of Spaniards and of Indians” was a matter of extreme difficulty, only attainable by the pursuit of an idea through all imperfections and by submission to religious restraint. In the Spaniard extremes meet; but the apparent contrasts are not due to any complexity in Spanish character, but rather to its simplicity, a simplicity which follows with equal facility the most diverse impulses and motives. During ages of weakness, poverty, and misgovernment in Spain itself, a Spanish character was impressed upon half of the New World; this has been done partly by laws and government, but much more by the genius of the Spanish nation, a genius which has been best interpreted by the author of *Don Quixote*.

## CHAPTER IX.

### THE ESTABLISHMENT OF INDEPENDENCE IN SPANISH AMERICA.

ALTHOUGH the example of successful colonial insurrection in North America had little immediate effect in South America, a link between north and south is perhaps to be found in Francisco Miranda, a Spanish officer born in Caracas, who is said to have served with Washington and Lafayette. Leaving the Spanish army, he visited the United States in 1785, to discuss with Washington plans of South American emancipation. Afterwards, travelling in Europe, he was received with attention by Princes and Ministers and served as a general in the French revolutionary army. Between 1790 and 1806 he urged in turn upon France, Great Britain, and the United States, as each in succession was involved in disputes or war with Spain, an expedition to aid revolt in the Indies. In 1796-8, Pitt's Government contemplated extensive operations against South America; and the Governor of Trinidad issued a proclamation promising in case of resistance to Spanish Governors "all the succour to be expected, be it with forces or with arms and ammunition." But the occasion passed, partly because President Adams was unwilling to cooperate, although Alexander Hamilton, expecting to command an expedition, wrote to Miranda, "the plan ought to be a fleet of Great Britain and an army of the United States." Meantime Miranda, while living in London and importuning Ministers, was organising Republican secret societies among Spanish-Americans living in Spain and England; thus the gospel of emancipation, scarcely heard in the Indies, was being propagated in Europe; from Europe were to come almost all the leaders as well as the ideas which guided the struggle. In 1804-5 hostilities between Great Britain and Spain seemed to bring Miranda's opportunity; he had repeated interviews with Melville, and with Sir Home Popham, who was to command a squadron to support him; steps were taken with a view to an attack on Buenos Aires, and large operations were contemplated; but in July, 1805, Pitt suspended the project, being at that time in hope of detaching Spain from France by means of the coalition then in course of formation, though he intended to resume the scheme

in case of failure. Next year Miranda with 200 men sailed from New York with the knowledge of Jefferson and Madison, and attempted without success a descent upon the Venezuelan coast. Starting again from Trinidad and supported by the British Admiral of the West India Station, he landed near Coro; but, meeting no welcome from the inhabitants and losing the support of the Admiral upon erroneous news of peace negotiations, he abandoned the attempt.

Meantime Popham, as noted in a previous volume, sailed from Cape Town without orders against the River Plate, carrying 1600 troops under Beresford, who in June, 1806, marched unresisted into Buenos Aires, an unwalled town of 50,000 inhabitants. On his approach the Viceroy fled helplessly to Córdoba, thereby in some sort abdicating Spanish authority in the capital. Beresford, instead of proclaiming independence, named himself Governor, exacting from all officials an oath of allegiance to the British Crown. But in six weeks he was overpowered and compelled to surrender by the townspeople, aided by a relief force which had been organised in the Banda Oriental by a naval officer named Liniers, acting in concert with the *Cabildo* of Buenos Aires. This victory achieved by the people was followed by political action; the *Cabildo*, to satisfy the popular demand, summoned the magistrates and chief *vecinos* to a Junta, which entrusted the Government to Liniers, deposing the Viceroy. Liniers was afterwards formally appointed Viceroy by the King.

Further British operations in 1807, also noted elsewhere, resulted, first, in the capture of the fortified town of Montevideo, but afterwards in the capitulation of Whitelocke at Buenos Aires and the retrocession of Montevideo. In spite of this disaster, an army of 10,000 men was assembled at Cork to act against Spanish America, probably by way of the Gulf of Mexico, under Sir Arthur Wellesley; but peace with Spain in 1808 caused the expedition to be diverted to the Peninsula. The avowed motive of Pitt's designs had been the opening of markets to British trade; in fact British policy towards Spanish America was commercial rather than imperial; but in 1806-7 Ministers appear to have been carried away into schemes of conquest by Popham's raid.

Although no single step in the defence and reorganisation of Buenos Aires was entirely without precedent, this striking series of military and political events might almost seem to constitute a revolutionary development. The King's representative had been set aside; invasion had been twice repelled; capitulations had been arranged; and Government had been reconstituted—largely through municipal and popular action. Opinion had been educated not only by internal movements, but also by external influence and example; for, during the seven months of British government in Montevideo, the first newspaper of the River Plate was there published in Spanish and English; an active trade was carried on, the bay being crowded with British shipping and the

people hurrying from distant Andine provinces to make their purchases before the evacuation ; much was done by the English to spread Liberal notions of trade and of politics. Moreover, although allegiance in the cities was unshaken, many of the lawless inhabitants of the plains had received with exultation the news of the first British invasion and of the collapse of authority. On the other hand, the Creole battalions of citizen soldiers organised to resist the English had not been disbanded, and the people were flushed with victory over a powerful invader. Some modification of government was inevitable and had in fact been already initiated on the spot. Although the notion of independence was as yet only silently nursed by a few theorists, the materials of revolutionary thought and action had been prepared. Moreover, these events had been watched with eager interest throughout South America, especially in Chile, whence money had been sent to aid resistance to the English. And it was largely owing to these preliminary movements that, when the occasion came, Buenos Aires was able to achieve her independence by a peaceable and uninterrupted process, and that her forces were thus set free to aid the emancipation of Chile and to prosecute large strategical and political designs far beyond the River Plate region.

In 1808 the ground had been thus prepared in the southern continent, when the collapse of the Spanish monarchy initiated a long series of disorders and struggles in the Spanish kingdoms on both sides of the Atlantic. During the events which led to the establishment of Joseph Bonaparte in Madrid as King (1808), provincial Juntas sprang up in several Spanish cities ; in May the Junta of Asturias declared war against the French ; the Junta of Seville with some success claimed supreme authority over Spain and the Indies. Within twenty days of his arrival, Joseph fled from Madrid before Spanish armies. In September, a Central Junta of deputies from the provincial bodies met at Madrid; but in two months it was flying southwards, while Napoleon entered the capital and restored Joseph. The Central Junta in December, 1808, united with the Seville Junta to form one body, which sat in that city for fourteen months, sinking lower in discredit while French armies overran Spain ; in January, 1810, the Junta, escaping to Cadiz, resigned, appointing a Regency of five to arrange for Cortes representing Spain and America ; a deputy was to be chosen by the Governor and *Cabildo* of every American capital ; but, pending their arrival, their seats were to be occupied by Americans who happened to be in Cadiz. The Cortes, meeting in September, 1810, appointed as Executive a Regency of three; in 1812 a Liberal Constitution was promulgated which subsisted till 1814, when Ferdinand, restored to the throne, dismissed the Cortes and established absolutism : this system lasted till 1820, when the army destined for the reconquest of America revolted and aided in restoring the Constitution of 1812. Amidst much disorder and some armed strife the Constitution stood, until in 1823 a French army entered Spain and

restored the absolute monarchy to its career of tyranny. During these vicissitudes South American emancipation was achieved.

Thus the fifteen years of struggle, revolt, and constitutional effort in America (1809-24) were years of revolutions and constitutional effort in Spain; in fact, the revolution of America was worked out on both sides of the Atlantic. It was begun, not by a deliberate revolt against Spain, but by an attempt to repair or replace the fallen monarchy. First, the monarchy which was the only constitutional link between Spain and America disappeared: then Spain herself seemed to disappear, and the kingdoms of the Indies felt themselves to stand alone, and attempted to provide for their own government. In so doing they found themselves in conflict with Spanish Governors and Peninsular authorities: the result of that conflict was separation.

On the abdication of Charles IV in 1808, Ferdinand VII was proclaimed King in every Spanish-American capital with universal applause. Presently—in some places even before his proclamation—French emissaries arrived with letters from the Minister and Council of the Indies, announcing the abdication of Ferdinand and the confirmation of all actual Governors and officials by Joseph, the new King. The news was everywhere received with cries of *Viva Fernando Séptimo* and with a burst of indignation at this French insult to the nation. Next came letters from the Juntas of Asturias and of Seville, each claiming to be a national Government and asking contributions to the defence of the mother-country. The national resistance was greeted with enthusiasm; the offers of Princess Carlota of Brazil, sister of Ferdinand, to arrange for the provisional government of the Indies, met with no response; but *donativos* poured in, and large sums were remitted to Spain. Thus, the first act of disobedience to the Council of the Indies was a revolt against the French intruders; in the course of three years it was gradually turned into a revolt against Spanish authority by the force of circumstances, by the agitation of a few separatist politicians, but most of all by the unsympathetic or hostile attitude of the colonial Governors and of the successively improvised Governments of Spain. Joseph's confirmation brought suspicion upon the existing Governors, who were generally more inclined to await events than to lead or follow the popular movement. At Caracas the difference between the popular and the official attitude was emphasised by the arrival at La Guaira of a British frigate, announcing the Anglo-Spanish alliance against Napoleon, just after a French frigate had brought news of King Joseph's accession. The Governor officially received the French captain and refused the demand of the English commander that the French frigate should be seized or given up to him. On the other hand the Englishman was received with enthusiasm by the populace, who were only prevented by an armed guard from murdering the Frenchman in the streets.

In the general tension and uncertainty a profound effect was produced over the whole continent by a few sporadic disturbances, confined to limited areas and apparently of little importance in themselves. In August, 1809, the *audiencia* of La Plata in Upper Peru, after a long dispute with the Governor, deposed him and assumed his functions. This act of a royal Court, consisting of European magistrates, and historically the strongest pillar of Spanish authority, followed many precedents and was hardly unconstitutional; under normal conditions it would have merely produced an interminable written "process," passing into oblivion with the royal appointment of a new Governor. But under existing conditions it meant a revolution; and the neighbouring city of La Paz, catching the infection, proclaimed autonomy. A Creole officer commissioned from Lima suppressed and rigorously chastised these disturbances. But the movement in Quito, although it was rather personal than constitutional in origin, had more significance and wider influence, both on account of the distinct statement of those motives of revolution which were afterwards everywhere professed, and also on account of the shock produced throughout the Spanish Empire by its tragic issue. In August, 1809, a group of citizens of Quito, constituting themselves into a Sovereign Junta, deposed the Governor and assumed his authority, alleging "the example of our transatlantic brothers, the present unsettled state of Spain, the annihilation of the lawfully constituted authorities," and the danger of passing under French dominion. Troops sent by the Viceroy from north and south found that the movement had already collapsed; but the leaders, notwithstanding a previous promise of pardon, were imprisoned, and a year later were murdered during a riot in which many citizens were killed by soldiers. A new Junta was then formed under the presidency of the Governor, a Spanish nobleman aged eighty years, who had served the King in the Indies for forty years; in December, 1810, he was a second time deposed. Having retired to a convent, he was dragged thence by a mob and murdered in the streets.

These and other confused local conflicts, although their general effect has been universally recognised, may seem rather to obscure than to introduce the succeeding movements. But the course of events in Spain has a more obvious significance. In January, 1810, the Central Junta, before dissolving in Cadiz, issued a proclamation inviting the Indies to send deputies to the Cortes in the following terms: "You are no longer what you were, bowed beneath a yoke harder in proportion to your distance from the centre of power, regarded with indifference, vexed by greed, and destroyed by ignorance. After nominating your deputies, your destinies will no longer depend upon Ministers or Viceroys or Governors; they are in your own hands." This curious incitement to revolution reached America together with news, still more eloquent, that the Central Junta had dispersed and that the French had overrun

Andalusia ; already opinion had been prepared by theorists, arguing that with the monarchy all external authority had fallen, and that the self-styled rulers in Spain were merely intruders ; now, they argued, "Spain is lost .....there is no more Spain." Between April and July, 1810, all over South America the principal municipalities, usually by means of *cabildo abierto*, and sometimes under the presidency of royal Governors, soon to be displaced, formed juntas to "preserve the authority of Ferdinand VII." Of the numerous councils thus formed the most important were those of Bogotá, Cartagena, Caracas, Santiago de Chile, and Buenos Aires, which either themselves grew into revolutionary Governments or appointed supreme executive authorities. But only in Buenos Aires was the work uninterrupted ; and therefore it seems advisable to narrate first the only revolution whose course was continuous and free from external checks, and thus to provide an example, which is also a commentary upon the varied struggles of other provinces.

On the news of the King's abdication, his son Ferdinand was proclaimed in Buenos Aires amidst a burst of indignation at Napoleon's pretensions. The offer of Princess Carlota of Brazil, Ferdinand's sister, to undertake provisionally the protectorate of the River Plate, was rejected ; and the message of the Seville Junta announcing the formation of a national Government in the King's name was received with enthusiasm. Elio, the ultra-royalist Governor of Montevideo, who afterwards perished in defence of absolutism in Spain, suspecting Liniers, who was French by birth, of lukewarmness, refused obedience to the Viceroy and summoned a royalist Junta in Montevideo ; the *Cabildo* of Buenos Aires thereupon deposed Liniers, who was promptly reinstated by the new Creole battalions. Communications were broken off between these two cities, which, though both loudly proclaiming the same King, were thus brought to a state of passive hostility by the collapse of monarchy in Spain. The Central Junta of Seville in a manner sanctioned sedition by continuing Elio in command, thereby approving his independent attitude.

The confusion of authority in Spain and in the Indies—the claims of Ferdinand, of Joseph, of Carlota, of the Seville Junta, the new and vague activities of the *Cabildo*, of the citizens, and of the victorious Creole battalions, the doubtful attitude and source of viceregal command—favoured the objects of a small group of men educated in Europe during the revolutionary period, who were quietly working for independence; and thus, when Admiral Cisneros, a veteran of Trafalgar, arrived as Viceroy appointed by the Central Junta, he found that in the viceroyalty, as in Spain, administration was passing from the hands of officials to those of semi-municipal, semi-popular bodies. In fact, owing to the absence of external shocks and the greater vigour of the *Cabildos*, this evolution was more tranquil and in a sense more constitutional than in Spain, every step following precedents which had royal sanction. Cisneros himself

was compelled by financial difficulties to act as head of an autonomous State in admitting neutral trade. Circumstances and even the necessary actions of devoted royalists were separating Spain from America; the cry of *Viva Fernando* might cover the most contrary opinions; and, but for sentiment and habit, there was no reason why a Viceroy appointed by a Junta in Seville, which was partly municipal, partly elected, and partly self-constituted, should not be controlled or deposed by a similar Junta in Buenos Aires.

In these unstable conditions, the small party having the most definite and logical aim held strong ground; and they were aided by events. In 1809 news came of the revolutionary movements in Upper Peru and in Quito; and Spain seemed to be sinking under an overwhelming wave of French invasion. The *Cabildo* of Buenos Aires, now equally divided between Europeans and Americans, was the only effective Government, guided however by a small secret society of separatists. The commander of the Creole battalions, approached by these men, promised to declare for independence upon the capture of Seville by the French. That event was announced in May, 1810, whereupon a *cabildo abierto* decided that the *Cabildo* should appoint a governing Junta, on the ground that Spain was submerged and that on the fall of the monarchy the power passed to the people. Cisneros was required to resign; and on May 25 a triumvirate of revolutionary tendencies was appointed "to preserve the integrity of these parts of his American dominions to our beloved sovereign Ferdinand VII and his successors." Thus was effected the bloodless revolution of Buenos Aires, which at this point passes from the municipal stage to the more difficult task of forming a State, to be treated later.

Most of the interior provinces, though without any definite scheme of common action, followed the lead of the capital. Liniers, leading a reactionary movement in Córdoba, was captured by a volunteer expedition from Buenos Aires and hanged. But the attempt to unite the whole viceroyalty failed; an Argentine expedition, offering to Paraguay in the name of Ferdinand VII independence and union with Buenos Aires, found that the Paraguayan leaders had virtually achieved independence and that they declined union. Elio, now named Viceroy by the Spanish Regency, still held Montevideo, which at last yielded to Argentine attack in 1814; but some local movements in the Banda Oriental, the province whose capital is Montevideo, and a Brazilian invasion, withdrawn through British influence, indicated that union with Buenos Aires was doubtful. Upper Peru, invaded by Argentine forces as belonging to their viceroyalty, was successfully defended by the Peruvian Viceroy with American troops and generals (1811-2); but on the other hand Tucumán was defended against royalist invasion from Peru. The theory of allegiance to a dethroned and captive King who had never reigned, although sincerely held by the great majority, could not long survive

war against two Viceroys and the hostility of every successive Government in Spain. In 1813 the royal symbols were disused; but it was not until 1816 that a Congress at Tucumán proclaimed the independence of the Argentine Provinces. In the following year this independence was secured by an expedition into Chile which defeated the Peruvian royalists on the Pacific slope of the Andes and thus redeemed failure in Upper Peru. This external action demands mention here, because it was the logical outcome and necessary safeguard of the Argentine revolution, securing it against external molestation or reconquest. In a larger historical sense, however, this movement does not belong to Argentine history but rather opens a fresh phase of the struggle, initiating that aggressive advance against royalism in America in which every part of the Continent was concerned. Its course will therefore be traced later as part of the continental war.

While the River Plate region was thus gradually achieving a revolution, confused indeed by domestic problems and disputes, but undisturbed by any external troubles beyond the need of frontier defence, the movement in other capitals had passed from the municipal stage into various phases of armed conflict between royalists and insurgents, as well as between contending parties and leaders among the insurgents themselves. In 1811-2 revolutionary Governments were formed in Chile and also in the north of the Continent; but, failing to win general popular adhesion, they all succumbed during the years 1814-5 before the forces of royalism or reaction. It is impossible to give a lucid summary of these multifarious movements from 1811 to the critical interval of 1815-6, with all their vicissitudes of local ebullitions, wide-spread insurrections and reactions, attempts at government, sanguinary defeats, and collapse of newly-risen despots, oligarchies, councils, and congresses. But an attempt must be made to follow the main course of events in those centres from which the Governments of independent States ultimately emerged.

In Chile the earlier development, which began in 1808 with a reform of the *Cabildo* of Santiago by cooperation between the Governor, Colonel García Carrasco, and the citizens, and culminated in the deposition of that Governor (August, 1810), was more tranquil than the movement in Buenos Aires and more typical of the orderly and quasi-constitutional use of Spanish institutions. The Junta of Santiago went so far as to convene in 1811 a Chilian Congress which appointed an executive triumvirate; but this parliamentary effort produced, as in every similar case, disorder and confusion, complicated by jealousies between Santiago and Concepción; and in 1814 the nascent Republic of Chile, notwithstanding a brief effort of union among contending parties, was extinguished by invasion from Peru.

The viceroyalty of Peru, in spite of some local disturbances, was firmly held for the King throughout this period (1811-6) and down to

1820, separating the countries of the southern hemisphere from the northern provinces of New Granada and Venezuela, and effectually preventing cooperation between north and south down to 1822. Thus, though the two movements interacted upon each other by way of example and policy, the northern group of revolutions followed a distinct course, marked by greater violence, confusion, and bloodshed, and by more astonishing vicissitudes of failure and recovery. Venezuela and New Granada, divided from each other by the eastern chain of the Andes, at first acted separately; indeed the rugged mountain kingdom of New Granada was itself broken both geographically and politically into many centres of action, among which Bogotá and Cartagena stood out as rival claimants for supremacy or separate sovereignty. Though perpetually shaken by internal discord and sporadic civil wars, a loose and ill-defined league of provinces maintained Republican independence in New Granada until the arrival of the Spanish army of reconquest in 1815. But, in a large sense, the movements of Venezuela and of New Granada tend to flow into one current whose course can best be traced by following the revolutions of Caracas. These also supply the main personal interest of the struggle owing to the guidance of two distinguished Caraqueños, first Miranda, the precursor of independence, and afterwards Bolívar, the Liberator.

Caracas, the cradle of tropical independence and the first focus of armed war against Spanish authority, had a more stormy history than any of her neighbours, being twice captured by the royalists and twice recovered by the patriots. The movement began, as elsewhere, with a municipal revolution. After agitation carried on by separatists throughout 1809 and the despatch of commissioners to seek help in England, the *Cabildo* of Caracas, with the addition of some elected members, became in April, 1810, "the Junta formed to preserve the rights of Ferdinand VII." The Governor, who at first was nominally president of this Junta, was soon deported, with the *Oidores* and principal officials; and a few months later the revolutionists began civil war by attacking the royalist city of Coro. The Cadiz Regency responded by declaring a blockade of Venezuelan ports and granting letters of marque to West Indian privateers—measures which definitely stamped the Caraqueños as rebels and recognised or initiated a state of war between the Spanish authority and the insurgent Americans. The Caracas Junta, being generally recognised in Venezuela outside the royalist provinces, requested the *Cabildos* to elect a Congress, which in April, 1811, chose a small executive with Miranda, newly arrived from England, as President. In July, 1811, the Congress, persuaded by Miranda, gave the first example to Spanish America of a proclamation of complete independence.

But Monteverde, a Spanish naval lieutenant, leading a body of Creoles, swelled by friendly Indians, from the royalist province of Coro, attained unexpected success in consequence of the earthquake which

on Holy Thursday, 1812, the first anniversary of the meeting of Congress, destroyed Caracas and killed 20,000 people in the revolutionary towns, sparing the royalist places. The clergy preached Divine judgment to a terrified people; Puerto Cabello, the strongest fortress in the country, was abandoned by its commander, Bolívar, a prominent member of the old Creole aristocracy; and in July, 1812, Miranda signed a capitulation securing free departure to the patriot leaders. On entering Caracas Monteverde found Miranda in prison, where he had been confined by Bolívar and other officers. Miranda remained a prisoner—to die four years later in a Spanish dungeon—while Bolívar received a safe conduct and passed to his estates. The only Government now was in the hands of a few irresponsible royalist *guerrilleros* ruling with capricious cruelty; but henceforth Bolívar devoted his life and fortune to emancipation and reorganisation. He was at this time a childless widower of twenty-nine, educated in Europe, where he had imbibed revolutionary ideas. Puny and ill-proportioned in body, of a worn, anxious, and melancholy countenance, possessing little military experience or skill, a true urban Creole in candid vanity and unashamed sensuality, he moved some to repulsion, others, including many of his British subordinates, to devoted affection. Repeatedly beaten and apparently abandoning his associates, but always renewing the struggle, he was universally recognised as the chief inspiration of the movement and ultimately as the Liberator of five extensive Republics.

Retiring now to New Granada, which in turn had declared for complete independence, he raised troops in Cartagena and invaded Venezuela, proclaiming retaliation and war to the death, pardon to American enemies, but no quarter to Spaniards. Thirteen months after Miranda's capitulation he entered Caracas, and assumed the title of *Libertador*. But meantime one Boves, a Spanish sergeant who had been dismissed from the army for misconduct but had obtained a militia commission in the civil war, was gaining an extraordinary ascendancy over the half-savage mounted herdsmen of the plains by superior skill, daring, and ferocity, by early successes and promises of booty and debauchery. Boves was almost the only white man in his army of 4000 *llaneros*, whom he led in the name of the King to a savage war of barbarism against civilisation, of the desert against the towns. Crouching almost invisible by their horses' necks, and charging with the lance, these half-naked barbarians were irresistible; they spread panic through the country and approached the capital. In June, 1814, Bolívar suffered a crushing defeat, which caused many of his troops to desert to the royalists and exposed Caracas to capture. Accordingly, having first killed his 880 royalist prisoners, he abandoned the place, leading a crowd of fugitives on a terrible flight of seventy leagues to Barcelona, where the inhabitants—such was the jealousy between cities—closed their houses against them. The Venezuelan Republic perished a second time;

and Bolívar crossed the Andes once more, to serve the Congress of New Granada in reducing its unruly cities to obedience.

But meantime Ferdinand had been preparing an expedition for the reconquest of the insurgent provinces. Originally intended for the River Plate, it was diverted to the Spanish Main, doubtless because the royalists possessed no base in the River Plate after the fall of Montevideo in June, 1814. In April, 1815, a fleet of sixty transports convoyed by war-ships arrived at Cumaná carrying a siege-train and 10,000 troops under the command of General Morillo, a man who had served as a sergeant of marines at the battle of St Vincent and had fought his way up from the ranks; he is said to have been recommended for this American command by Wellington. Finding the Venezuelan towns already reduced, and Boves, who might have been a troublesome subordinate, removed by death in battle, Morillo quietly moved westwards, accepting the adhesion of the Venezuelans. Thence he passed to the invasion of New Granada.

That country had passed five years of stormy independence in apparently futile disputes and even armed quarrels, due to the difficulty of consolidating the action of a crowd of municipalities, each with its junta acting separately; while a garrulous but disregarded Congress, largely consisting of idle lawyers, was discussing theories, passing minute enactments, and talking about Greece and Rome, a few of the leaders vainly striving for a strong central executive. Bogotá, the ancient capital, and Cartagena, the chief port, had become centres of independent Republican provinces, indifferent or hostile to the Congress. When Morillo landed, Bolívar had just reduced Bogotá by arms and was now besieging Cartagena, also Republican, which in turn was at war with Santa Marta, a rival port which was naturally Royalist. In the south the Indian and Creole inhabitants of Pasto and Patia, stubbornly royalist, drove back from their mountains every patriot advance from the north and preserved Quito for the King down to 1822. In these conditions, the Republic or Republics of New Granada fell before Morillo. Bolívar, whose misdirected activities had opened the way to the enemy, fled to Jamaica. In the course of 1816, 125 persons were executed as traitors in New Granada. In that year only the River Plate provinces remained independent; for the energy of the Peruvian Viceroy had not only preserved Peru, but had also recovered Chile by a campaign which overwhelmed all resistance. Except in the River Plate provinces the war might seem to be at an end; for in every other centre the revolution after five years of effort appeared to be crushed and its leaders dead or driven into exile. This general collapse was due perhaps less to external attack than to the weaknesses and defects of the new essays at government which had not shown themselves preferable to the former system.

In the south, in the security of achieved independence, deliberate and tranquil preparations were being made with much military skill and

political foresight for a decisive move to counter this advance of royalism. And even in the north the ruin was not quite complete, although recovery was slow and indeed scarcely perceptible for nearly two years. Starting from points 6000 miles apart, two distinct movements of recovery from south and north—the Argentino-Chilian movement, led by San Martín and Cochrane, and the Colombian movement, led by Bolívar—deprived Spain of a continent. The former movement comprised the lands south of the tropics, crushed the Spanish navy in the Pacific, and initiated but did not complete the revolution of Peru. The northern movement covered the whole tropical region and finally included Peru and Upper Peru, taking up the struggle against these central strongholds of royalism at the point where San Martín had laid it down.

These separate movements, which were finally enabled to meet and in some degree to merge together by naval victories on the Pacific and by successful invasion of Peru, require separate narration. But it must be remembered that they were simultaneous and complementary to each other. Communications passed between the leaders; and the order of events indicates that the earlier operations and successes of San Martín not only encouraged the more doubtful struggle in the north, but also suggested or guided in some degree the movements of Bolívar. Moreover the invasion of Chile and Peru by San Martín has an essential connexion with the invasion of New Granada by Morillo. Had the Spanish expedition taken its intended route to the River Plate, the Argentine forces would have been required there for defence. The diversion of the expedition to the Spanish Main left these forces free for external action. Ferdinand was only able to strike at one point; but there can be no doubt that Morillo hoped, after pacifying New Granada, to advance southwards and, keeping up his strength by American enlistment, to join hands with the royalist forces of Peru and so overwhelm the insurrections in Chile and the River Plate provinces. This plan was frustrated in part by the guerrilla warfare in the north, but in great part also by the advance upon Peru of Republican naval and military forces from the south, which fully engaged all the strength of the vice-royalty and even divided Morillo's forces. Thus the invasion of Peru by San Martín was the American response to the invasion of New Granada by an army from Spain.

It will be convenient to describe the southern movement first, since its earlier successful advance rendered possible the later successes of Bolívar. San Martín, born in the River Plate region, the son of a Spanish official, was educated in Spain, and entered the army: a prisoner first in France (1794) and then in England (1797), a fighter in many campaigns from 1793 to 1811, he brought with him valuable experience, when, having reached the rank of lieutenant-colonel, he offered his sword to Buenos Aires and transplanted thither the revolutionary secret society

to which he had belonged in Spain. After holding command in the war of Upper Peru, he solicited the Governorship of a sub-Andine province, where for two years, uncontrolled by the Buenos Aires authorities, he gathered and trained the army of Argentine recruits and Chilian refugees which was to strike at Peru through Chile. In 1817-8, having led 5000 men from Mendoza over a pass 12,000 feet high, San Martín, in conjunction with the Chilian O'Higgins, defeated the royalists first at Chacabuco (February, 1817), and then, after a considerable reverse, in the decisive battle of Maipú (April, 1818), which practically won over Chile, though the war lingered on in the extreme south.

In the same year a frigate escorting ten transports with 2000 troops sailed from Cadiz against Chile. One of the transports was carried by its mutinous soldiers to Buenos Aires; and the Chilians, thus forewarned, contrived to capture most of the transports and also the frigate, which became the flag-ship of an improvised Chilian fleet. In November, 1818, this fleet was placed under the command of Lord Cochrane, the finest living naval leader, who had already distinguished himself by remarkable feats of war as a captain in the British navy. Being obliged to leave that service, he offered his sword to Chile; and in three years he swept the Spanish flag from the Pacific. He was a seaman probably not far inferior to Nelson in skill, insight, and dash; but his qualities as a commander were marred by an impracticable violence of temper and an intrusion of personal aims which produced constant quarrels and undignified recrimination. His first serious effort, an attack upon Callao, was unsuccessful; but in January, 1820, the strong fortress of Valdivia was captured through an extraordinary assault, led by his commander of marines, Miller, who had joined San Martín at the age of twenty-two after much active service in Spain and the United States.

After the victory of Maipú two years elapsed before advance into Peru was rendered possible by Cochrane's naval strength, by San Martín's military preparations and understanding with the Chilian Government, and by the posture of affairs in Europe. For in 1819 the Buenos Aires Government, disturbed by Gaucho rebellions, and alarmed by the prospect of invasion by the expedition then assembling at Cadiz, recalled San Martín and his army. The revolt of the army of Cadiz and the consequent abandonment of that expedition enabled San Martín to disobey this command and to execute his long-designed scheme of advance to the north. In September, 1820, the "Liberating army of Peru," under San Martín, was transported in Cochrane's squadron to the neighbourhood of Lima. Soon afterwards Cochrane achieved the astonishing feat of carrying off the frigate *Esmirnada*, which was anchored under the guns of Callao; and the finest battalion in the royal service, which had been sent southward by Morillo to aid the defence of Peru, deserted to San Martín, 650 strong, chiefly Creoles who had replaced during five years of war the Spaniards brought by Morillo. Thus the first success of this

invasion inflicted a blow not only on the viceroyalty of Peru, but on the Spanish army of invasion in the north. Yet San Martín, disregarding the impatience of his men and the exasperation of Cochrane, remained inactive and even watched royalist reinforcements marching into Callao.

Expeditions to the north under Arenales, and to the south under Miller, showed what could be done; but San Martín argued that his mission was emancipation, not conquest, and that his mere presence would win over Lima. Herein he was right; but he was wrong in thinking that the possession of the capital would bring over the country, or that he could win Peru without beating the royalist officers who held all the interior and could recruit at leisure. The royalists evacuating Lima in July, 1821, San Martín entered and proclaimed Peruvian independence, naming himself Protector with absolute power. After assembling a Congress as futile as the others and proposing a Peruvian monarchy under a European prince, San Martín retired in 1822 into private life. Lima was reoccupied by the royalists, who had deposed the Viceroy as not sufficiently zealous and put in his place the veteran officer La Serna, who had been one of the defenders of Saragossa in 1809. Thenceforth the emancipation of Peru belongs to the story of Bolívar, who in 1822 brought the Venezuelan war to a successful end and moved south upon Peru.

The separate narrative of the northern movement may now be resumed at the critical epoch of 1816. In that year the Republics of New Granada and Venezuela were reduced to a few patriot *guerrillas* precariously struggling among a royalist population in the *llanos* or plains lying between the Orinoco and the belt of coast towns. Here Paez, an almost illiterate peasant, gathered a party of horsemen which he increased by small successes, and also by the unusual method of sparing the lives of his royalist prisoners, many of whom, formerly followers of Boves, now joined Paez on learning from him what *la Patria* meant. Supplies were obtained from the unfortunate missions; and, when Bolívar, who with other refugees had been organising a fleet and a small expeditionary force in Hayti, appeared in the *llanos*, he was at once recognised as chief. Although his carelessness in command was sometimes disastrous, his presence brought strength. The capture of Angostura in July, 1817, and of San Fernando in February, 1818, won for the patriots the line of the Orinoco. Confined to this region, and occupying a town so royalist in sentiment that he was in danger of assassination by the women, Bolívar, hearing of the proposed intervention of the Powers in 1818, issued from his capital, Angostura, a proud declaration of independence and of equality with Spain, while to the Argentine Provinces he sent a message proclaiming the unity of South America.

Yet no progress was made in the campaign of 1818 against Morillo, who had now returned from New Granada. The *llaneros* were splendid *guerrilleros*, quick in sudden assault, surprise, or raid, wearing out the

royalists with continual annoyance, and baffling pursuit by disappearing into the plains and driving away the cattle, living on beef without salt or bread, expert in the craft of plain and river, consummate horsemen and swimmers; but they were as yet useless in the mountains, unfit for distant and decisive campaigns, and recognising no leader but their "comrade" Paez. Moreover the Republican fleet, commanded by a Dutch Creole from Curaçoa and largely manned by British sailors, accomplished less than might have been expected. Bolívar gave a new turn to the war by engaging British troops, mostly disbanded veterans of the Peninsula and of Flanders. First came officers and sergeants to train Bolívar's men; then came soldiers. Before the end of 1818 at least 6000 British subjects arrived. Five-sixths of them perished in the war, some in sanguinary fights, some under stress of labour as prisoners in the torrid climate of Panamá, but most by famine, pestilence, and hardships, such as they had never known in European warfare: they joined an army of almost naked men, destitute of baggage, commissarial, surgeons, and ambulance, fighting in a tropical country of indescribable difficulty, where capture meant probable death and victory was followed by a general slaughter of prisoners, where the path of war led across plains which turned from desert to swamp with the change of season, through a labyrinth of deep rivers infested by crocodiles and mosquitos, and over a vast mass of frozen mountains.

Having installed a Venezuelan Congress at Angostura, Bolívar, in 1819, led 3000 troops westward up the Orinoco behind the line of royalist occupation, crossed the Andes, where many men and horses died of cold, liberated New Granada by the victory of Boyacá, and entered Bogotá. After this stroke of large political strategy, he returned to Angostura and proclaimed the union of New Granada and Venezuela in the Republic of Colombia. In 1820 Morillo, having concluded an armistice with Bolívar, returned to Europe; and in 1821 his successor was beaten in the battle of Carabobo, where Bolívar's British troops, who bore the brunt of the fight, suffered terrible loss. Venezuela was practically independent; and the Liberator entered Caracas in triumph. The northern movement had reached its conclusion, and the Republic of Colombia had achieved real existence under the Presidency of Bolívar.

But the Liberator still had a great task before him in the extirpation of royalism from the Continent, first by loose cooperation with San Martín, and then by taking up the continental war at the point where it was dropped by the Argentine leader. Peru, with its dependencies of Quito in the north and Upper Peru in the south, was still to occupy the Liberator for four years. That viceroyalty in fact constituted a third geographical region, intermediate between north and south; and its emancipation forms the third and final phase of the struggle, the conclusion of the successes gained first by San Martín and then by Bolívar. In 1822 San Martín appeared to be in possession of Peru; but

Quito was still royalist. Thither Bolívar now directed his forces; and, thirteen years after her first revolutionary movement, Quito was freed through the victory of Pichincha (May, 1822), won by the Colombian Sucre, the most modest and humane of the revolutionary leaders, and probably the best general produced by South America. Then, after some reverses, Guayaquil and the adjacent provinces were secured with the help of troops sent from Peru by San Martín. At last in July, 1822, an interview took place in Guayaquil between the two chiefs, the Protector of Peru and the Liberator of Colombia. To San Martín this interview was a disillusionment; he offered indeed to serve under Bolívar; but in September, 1822, he resigned his command and retired, after inviting Bolívar to lead his Colombian army into Peru and complete the work of independence. Thus Bolívar took up the work where San Martín had left it. Cochrane, having finished his task, had already resigned his Chilian command, to pass into the service first of the Brazilians and then of the Greeks. A brief royalist occupation of the capital followed; in September, 1823, however, Bolívar entered Lima and proclaimed a constitution, but was soon appointed absolute Dictator by a moribund Congress. He had left Lima to prepare for the field, when he heard that a mutiny of Argentine soldiers had restored Callao and Lima to the royalists and that Sucre was in a precarious position in the Peruvian highlands. Retiring northwards, though almost prostrated with illness, he raised a fresh army in southern Colombia and moved south to join Sucre. This southward march perhaps surpassed in difficulties and endurance all that went before; horses dragged up precipitous and almost pathless tracks to Alpine heights, whole battalions prostrate with mountain sickness, an entire division of 3000 men groping helpless and agonised for a day from snow-blindness—these were some of the incidents of the march. On August 5, 1824, the first shock took place at Junín, where the partial defeat of the patriots was turned into victory by a cavalry charge under Miller; in this skirmish, which lasted forty-five minutes, not a shot was fired; but 360 royalists were killed by lance and sabre, and that night almost all the wounded died of cold. Three months later Sucre with 6000 patriots met 9000 royalists at Ayacucho between Lima and Cuzco, about midway between Buenos Aires and Caracas. In the battle 1000 patriots and 2100 royalists fell; La Serna, the last Spanish Viceroy in the Indies, remained a prisoner; and a capitulation was signed which included the 23,000 royalist troops remaining in Peru.

Ayacucho sealed the independence of Peru and of South America. Callao held out for fourteen months, and in January, 1826, within a month of its fall, Chiloe, the last royalist stronghold in America, surrendered to the Chilians. From that time the Spanish cause, though favoured by groups in the towns, was only upheld in the field by some *guerrillas* and brigands in Chile and Venezuela, who were finally suppressed about 1830.

In 1824 Bolívar received with acquiescence a message from the

Colombian Congress, informing him that through absence in Peru he had ceased to be head of their State; but after Ayacucho he was supreme in two new Republics established in Peru and Upper Peru. He formed Upper Peru into the Republic of Bolivia with a constitution under which three Legislative Houses were established, and a President was appointed for life and empowered to nominate his successor. This "Bolivian Code" was in turn accepted by Bolivia, Peru, and Colombia in Bolívar's presence and abandoned in his absence. Leaving Sucre as Bolivian President, he was received in Lima (February, 1825) as Dictator and Liberator and ruled there for more than a year, attempting to establish either a union or a confederation between Peru and Bolivia and also working for the assembly of a Pan-American Congress at Panamá; but the inefficiency of the Colombian Congress and the independent attitude of the towns demanded his return northwards, while Paez, Governor of Venezuela, wrote entreating his presence, declaring that he could not check the popular desire for separation from Colombia, the people despising the distant Congress of Bogotá. All the authorities of Lima besought him to remain; and the *Cabildo* resigned in a body, declaring that upon his departure Peru must cease to exist. Bolívar appeared to hesitate; but in November, 1826, after nearly five years' absence in the south, he was triumphantly received in Bogotá and some months later in Caracas.

Successive Colombian Congresses renewed his supreme power; and for two years he was in fact sole ruler and legislator; but he failed in his attempts to form a vast northern Republic and to unite it in federation with its southern neighbours. His deputies in Bolivia and Peru were dethroned after his departure; and in 1829 the towns of Venezuela, one after another, in *cabildo abierto* resolved on separation from Colombia and compelled their governor Paez to assume independent authority. In 1830 Guayaquil and Quito broke away to form the Republic of Ecuador. In 1829 Bolívar's Government, in the hope of securing union and stability, proposed to the British and French Ministers that on the Liberator's death a Bourbon prince should reign over Colombia. In May, 1830, having assembled a Congress to settle future government, the Dictator resigned his office and retired to Cartagena, announcing his departure for Europe. But the Congress fell into contempt; the country was plunged into civil war; and the general voice seemed to be recalling Bolívar to command when he was struck down by consumption. On December 10, 1830, he dictated a message exhorting Colombians to union; a week later he died at the age of forty-seven. The five Republics which had called him Liberator sank into the cycle of confusion, disorder, and rapid revolutions which is not even yet closed. Venezuela alone under the supremacy of Paez maintained for seventeen years comparative tranquillity, but upon his fall and exile was plunged into similar disorder.

The strange career of Bolívar almost baffles judgment; it is the story of the emancipation of half a continent through efforts chiefly guided by one man; yet, in view of his moral and physical weaknesses, it is not easy to grasp the personal qualities which won for him the worship of the people and the love of his associates. To money he was indifferent; a million *pesos* voted to him in Bolivia he spent upon the liberation of all the slaves in the Republic. Alone among the revolutionary leaders of South America, he formed around him a group of able men devoted to himself and to the public service. He himself wrote a biography of Sucre; and, although both men must have known that Sucre was the better commander, Bolívar rejoiced in his friend's triumph as if it had been his own. Paez, though most outspoken about his chief's faults, always wrote to him in terms of tender intimacy, even while he was disavowing Bolívar's authority and leading the separation of Venezuela; and in his autobiography, written forty years later, Paez repeats these expressions. Bolívar's design of combining several extensive Republics in one vast federation has often been dismissed as a day-dream; and in truth the physical and political difficulties were great. The road from Caracas to the south of Bolivia, traversing the scene of his activities, through great and varied obstacles, measures 4300 miles; and the groups of population through this vast region were divided by the historical cleavage resulting from separate settlement and separate government by Spain. The road from Caracas to Piura traversing his Republic of Colombia measures 2200 miles. Whatever might have been achieved by permanent and undisguised personal rule, the effort to unite Venezuela under one Congress with New Granada was impracticable; so was probably the inclusion of Peru in a scheme of federated Republics. But a federation of Republics north of the Equator, which seems to have been his last design, might well, with a few more years of life, have been accomplished. His attempt to convoke a Pan-American Congress cannot be dismissed as a grandiose absurdity; possibly he intended a closer union than was possible, but combination for defence was a reasonable aim. Bolívar died, bitterly lamenting the failure of that constructive work which he valued above independence; yet few men have achieved so much in so short a time.

Upon Bolívar's death and the division of Colombia into three Republics the Spanish-American States may be said to have formed themselves geographically, following generally the former Spanish divisions. But political form had not yet been attained. Though republican constitutions nominally existed, no central Government except personal autocracy really prevailed anywhere. Paraguay had already sunk under a despotism, indescribable in its grotesque horror, which lasted for sixty years (1810-70) under three successive tyrants; elsewhere, dictators, directors, and autocratic presidents succeeded one

another with bewildering rapidity, each ruling irresponsibly in his capital, but seldom possessing undisputed authority beyond a limited district; for the delimitation of frontiers, which meant the separation of certain geographical areas from one another, did not necessarily imply the consolidation of each area into a compact community. The constructive work of the *cabildos* in forming independent urban governments, essential as it was to the movement, was inimical to the formation of large territorial States; in 1828, Bolívar in his efforts at consolidation actually decreed the suppression of all municipalities; and in Venezuela a junta convoked by Paez passed a similar measure.

The conflicting centripetal and centrifugal tendencies which divided every State were commonly styled Unitarism and Federalism, the latter word being strangely used in a sense almost opposite to its usual meaning and implying an effort not at union, but at separation. Municipal leaders and military chiefs, having some indistinct notion of the United States Constitution, believed that in detachment and subdivision they were imitating its peculiar merits. Thus Bolívar and others, who aimed at uniting separate bodies and might fairly be called Federalists, were styled Unitarists, while the separatist efforts and independent activities of contending provinces and towns were described as Federalism. In the River Plate region these tendencies were at first described by the more expressive names of Capitalism and Provincialism.

The many separate efforts towards organisation, remarkably alike in their general character, rested upon local civic feeling combined with attachment to the monarchy; the disappearance of this latter motive left no principle of union. Except the Spanish divisions of kingdoms and provinces, there were in general no clear guides to the military and political grouping of population; and there was a natural though unfortunate sentiment against the maintenance or restoration of anything resembling the Spanish centralising system. Comparison with the United States is misleading, in the first place Spanish America possessed no parliamentary system; secondly New Granada alone is equal to the thirteen British Colonies in mere extent, besides presenting immensely greater difficulties of communication. As for union of the whole Continent, Caracas and Buenos Aires could communicate with Europe almost more easily than with each other.

The task was further complicated by the awakening of the forces of disorder used and in some degree organised by the revolution, forces which had been increased by the banishment of the Jesuits and the dispersion of their neophytes. The half-barbarous population of the frontiers, which had held no place in the political scheme under Spanish authority, had discovered its strength; those who had been vagabonds or scattered peasants, ignorant and careless of political matters, were now material ready to the hand of any ambitious politician or any rude chieftain who might command their allegiance by superior horsemanship,

daring, and intelligence. Already during the revolution the forces of the cities and of the wilderness, of civilisation and barbarism, of old order and new violence, were in a state of tension within the patriot ranks. The authority of the royal Governors disappeared; the more popular local system of civic government, already possessing a prescriptive power of self-modification to suit new conditions, remained. In general these civic bodies faced their strange responsibilities with a certain wholesome vigour and moderation; but their limitations of action are obvious and easily paralleled. They were disturbed and diverted from their natural functions by those wider operations, both military and political, in which they could share only in a partial and subordinate manner; and again they were shaken and confused by the disorderly external forces organised in rivalry or in defence of them, which now penetrated into their councils.

One point, which demands separate mention, is best illustrated by a Peruvian episode. Pachacamac, an Indian *cacique*, who for his services against Tupac Amaru had received a colonel's commission in the Spanish army and had been promoted brigadier for services against the Argentines in Upper Peru (1811-2), at one time even acting as Spanish Governor of a province, was induced in 1814 to join a revolutionary conspiracy in Cuzco; he assembled a force of insurgent Indians, but was defeated and hanged. This is the only instance of anything like an organised or distinct Indian movement on behalf of the revolution in South America; and the official Spanish report on this disturbance states that the Indians felt more animosity towards Creoles than towards Europeans. This was natural, since their nearer and more numerous oppressors were Creoles, whereas the more remote and less familiar power of Viceroy and Governors might possibly protect them. The Indians, so far as they took part in the struggle, were naturally divided, following their priests or other leaders who gained their confidence on either side. But throughout the Continent on the whole they were royalist, although in Peru many were forcibly impressed as patriot soldiers. In Colombia the natives, more barbarous in character, did little serious fighting, though both sides used them in pursuit and slaughter; but some tribes near Lake Maracaibo, which enjoyed autonomy subject to payment of tribute, suffered heavily in fighting for the King.

The Indians in resisting the revolution were defending their own distinct existence, which depended on the continuance of Spanish authority. The strange rhetoric with which the revolutionary leaders, ignoring their own European origin, strove to persuade themselves and the natives that they were redressing the wrongs of the Conquest, revenging Atahualpa, and restoring oppressed peoples, did not deceive the Indians. The revolution was rather a completion than a reversal of the Conquest, since it fixed the possession and dominion of the conquered countries by the descendants of Spanish conquerors and settlers. Striking testimony

to the merits of the Spanish native policy is found in two decrees by Bolívar (1828); one aimed at restoring the ruined Missions; another ordered the reestablishment of Indian tribute and of Protectors, since the new system which subjected the Indians to the ordinary taxes and nominally equalised them with other citizens not only exposed them to various wrongs and extortions, but was actually resented by some of them as a loss of dignity.

The disorderly course of the tropical Republics after Bolívar's death need not be followed. But the two temperate regions of the River Plate and of Chile have a clearer history. The plains stretching northwestward to the Andes possessed no city which could rival Buenos Aires, and all those regions depended upon that port. Hence there was a general impulse in 1810-2 to follow the lead of Buenos Aires; but that impulse could scarcely create a nation. Governments experimentally formed in the capital and constantly changed, which retained with difficulty the adhesion of the capital itself, could not be expected to command that of the other provinces; and the cities of the interior, while not claiming complete independence, would not accept subordination. The Gauchos of the Pampa, exercised in the recent wars and ready under leadership to gallop against any authority, royal or republican, were at hand, partly to aid, partly to dominate, this local sentiment. The leader who formed and directed these various forces against centralised government was Artigas, once a cattle-raider, bandit, and smuggler on the Brazilian frontier, then (1798) a commander of mounted police distinguished by the ruthless efficiency with which he chastised his old associates. When the revolution began, he continued in the royal service; but, unused to the discipline of regular war and resenting command, he deserted to the Argentines besieging Montevideo; soon taking offence against his new commanders, he proclaimed the independence of the Banda Oriental and made war indiscriminately on Argentine and Brazilian invaders, so that this able but capricious cut-throat is now revered as the founder of Uruguayan or "Oriental" nationality. His prowess and success attracted to him the chiefs of Santa Fé and of Entre Ríos, Gaucho *caudillos* like himself. Thus, partly a bandit-chief, partly the head of a loose league of half-pastoral, half-municipal States, he held three provinces detached from the Confederation and hostile to Buenos Aires. After the fall of Artigas in 1818, provincialism, finding a centre in Córdoba, was encouraged by the inefficiency of the unstable central Government, which can only be indicated and illustrated by the following brief summary.

The municipal stage of the Argentine Revolution closes with the appointment by the *cabildo* of a ruling Junta on May 25, 1810. Then begins a series of brief attempts at administration; juntas, triumvirates, congresses, and directors, rapidly succeeding one another,

the *cabildo* forming a fixed point and repeatedly resuming the task of inventing a government. In 1814 a mission was sent to Europe to find a King, a Spanish prince if possible, an Englishman if Spain should prove impracticable; and in 1815 the Supreme Director Alvear wrote to the British Minister in Brazil: "These provinces desire to belong to Great Britain, to receive her laws, to obey her government, and live under her peaceful influence"; but this letter was never delivered. The Congress which in 1816 decreed the independence of the Argentine Provinces seriously discussed the enthronement of an Inca as Emperor in Cuzco—a proposal whose only real interest lies in the implied design to revive the former union of Peru and the River Plate; others favoured a Bourbon or an English prince. In 1819 the Director Puyrredón opened negotiations with France for the coronation of the Prince of Lucca in Buenos Aires. Rivadavia, a man of high character and capacity, introduced some order and dignity into the administration (1821-7); but he failed to conciliate the provinces, and even in Buenos Aires the respite from trouble was brief.

War with Brazil (1825-8) for the possession of the Banda Oriental was closed through the mediation of Great Britain, the disputed region being declared an independent Republic. The indignation in Buenos Aires over this treaty increased the confusion; the resulting mutinies, revolutions, and personal quarrels, opened a way to a Gaucho chieftain, who by his wealth in land and cattle, his splendid horsemanship, and his mastery of the rude code of Pampa chivalry, had established a kind of principality on the southern frontier and had organised a little army of Gauchos and Indians; the step to supreme power was easy, and at last Buenos Aires sank into uneasy tranquillity under the dreadful rule of Juan Manuel Rosas (1832-52).

Chile emerged earlier than the other States from the series of wars between chieftains, *pronunciamientos*, and purely personal dictatorships, and established in 1833 a presidential system, oligarchical, conservative, and sometimes autocratic in character, which subsisted in comparative tranquillity for fifty years, supported however by force against several risings, two of which (1851 and 1859) developed into sanguinary civil wars, followed by some modification of personal government.

The efforts made to solve or evade the most pressing political problems during the actual progress of the struggle for emancipation and the first essays at reconstruction, have been already discussed. But the internal political movements of the succeeding generation demand some comment. The history of Spanish America since 1830 is the history of many separate States, varying in number from ten to sixteen as the centralising or decentralising tendency has prevailed. The European student of this history seems to be reading a language whose grammar he does not know; political action moves on an unfamiliar plane; and in the

catalogue of names and events it is hard to unravel motives or results. Even the accepted political vocabulary is here used with a strange sense. "Nationality" cannot have quite its European meaning in a group of States whose origin, language, customs, and sentiments, are generally similar. There are indeed sometimes clear distinctions of character and even some ethnological differences due to the greater or less mixture of Indian or African blood and, more recently, to European immigration; but frontiers have been rather defined by geography, by convenience, by causes almost accidental, by historical jealousies; and the States are often kept apart by artificial rather than natural antipathies. "Revolution" does not mean constitutional change and need not mean change in methods of administration, but merely a forcible attempt, whether successful or not, to replace rulers; thus any seditious movement from a sanguinary civil war to the *pronunciamiento* of a battalion is called a revolution. "Constitution" does not mean the rule and principle of administration, but merely a frame or form controlled by personal action; thus among so many States possessing parliamentary constitutions it may be doubted whether before 1880 a congress ever met which was in any essential sense either legislative or representative, and few rulers have dispensed with the support of bayonets. In fact, these States might appear to have maintained a certain equilibrium by means of tension; the chief ruler, if he finds the machinery of state unworkable, having the prescriptive right to supersede forms by a *coup d'état*, and the people, when Government becomes intolerable, having the prescriptive right of rebellion. Bolívar declared that the workers for independence had ploughed the sea, and died exclaiming that he had not found liberty. In 1842 San Martín wrote to a Chilian: "The labour and the blood given for the independence of America have been, if not wasted, at any rate unfortunately spent in most of the new States, except in your country."

These countries, with their medieval atmosphere, came suddenly under the influence of modern ideas. Their guides were inspired by a mixture of philosophical theory, of French revolutionary sentiment, and of ill-understood constitutional notions borrowed from England and the United States. The people, almost indifferent to the Anglo-Saxon exotic of elected Legislative Chambers, continued to regard government as a thing to be endured or, if found unendurable, to be forcibly altered. All the revolutionary leaders at some time or other favoured monarchy or practised despotism; and it is generally through autocracy that some kind of order has been or is being evolved. And the real progress which has been effected should be generously recognised. The large emigration from Europe to Spanish America during the last generation shows that in some of the States political conditions are not usually unfavourable to industrious and peaceful life.

In Mexico—to use the name taken by New Spain on emancipation—the revolution, which promised to be more tranquil than elsewhere,

was diverted and confused by personal action. On receiving news of the Spanish Revolution in 1808, the Viceroy, acting with the *cabildo*, summoned to a Junta the royal and municipal officials with the chief *vecinos* and declared war against Napoleon. In view of rival messages from the Juntas of Asturias and of Seville, this Mexican Junta declared that no obedience was due to any authority not emanating from the sovereign, and that the Government of New Spain resided in the Viceroy and actual magistrates; but money was sent to the Seville Junta to aid defence. The leaders of this early movement were already aiming at independence, either on principle or from a belief that Spain could not withstand the French; but these aims could not yet be avowed amid the general sentiment in favour of the monarchy. The arrival of a French frigate caused a riot in Vera Cruz, and the despatches which she brought were ostentatiously burnt by the Viceroy. Had Charles IV succeeded in his design of escaping to Mexico, he would certainly have been welcomed with enthusiasm. The Viceroy was preparing to call a Congress of deputies from all the *cabildos* to settle future government, when the European party, alarmed by this encouragement of Creoles and acting with the *audiencia*, deposed the Viceroy—an act afterwards confirmed by the Central Junta. The Mexican treasury despatched further large sums to Spain, besides private contributions; but a request for a loan of twenty million *pesos* a few months later somewhat damped this enthusiasm; and reports of Spanish disasters raised doubts.

In 1809 a movement in Valladolid was suppressed. In September, 1810, the arrest was ordered of a few men who used to meet in Querétaro to discuss revolution under pretext of literary debate; thereupon one of them, Hidalgo, priest of Dolores, called upon his parishioners, chiefly Indians, to follow him against the Europeans "who were betraying the country to the French." Booty and the crusading cry "Ferdinand and the Virgin of Guadalupe" brought recruits; the pillage of the rich mining town of Guanajuato increased their numbers; and soon an undisciplined horde estimated at 80,000, chiefly Indians and *mestizos*, was moving upon Mexico. But Hidalgo, who was no soldier, did not attack the terrified city. Though accompanied by capable officers and a nucleus of troops, he achieved few regular successes. He raised a great part of the country and occupied some towns; but the white population was generally against him, and in 1812 he was taken and executed. His forces, already dispersing into parties of brigands, were reorganised by the lawyer Rayón and the priest Morelos, who became commander. Morelos proved a better leader than Hidalgo, but pursued a similar warfare for three years, principally in the south. In 1815 he was taken and shot. The Spanish *guerrillero* Mina, who had raised Navarre against Napoleon in 1808 and had attempted to rouse a Spanish revolt against Ferdinand in 1814, made an effort to revive the insurrection by leading two hundred followers from the north into Mexico, but after six months

of guerrilla warfare he met the same fate. In January, 1817, the remaining leaders capitulated, accepting an amnesty, and the civil war was over; but many of the Indians had scattered into troops of brigands, destroying property and interrupting traffic; and the whole country had been thrown into a disorder which continued sporadically for many years.

The insurrection was rather a confused struggle between classes and colours than a war between *rey* and *patria*. Though the insurgent chiefs were separatists, most of their followers believed that they were serving God and the King; in fact, led by royal and religious emblems, they were more royalist than the champions of authority; Hidalgo is said to have told them that Ferdinand was among them, shut up in a closed carriage. Mexico was the most orderly, prosperous, and intelligent of the American kingdoms, the most apt for the tranquil evolution of decent government. Whatever may be said for Hidalgo's character and motives, he shattered this prospect by rousing the forces of ignorance and disorder and plunged the country back into barbarism. Under Morelos the movement became more regular and attracted in a great degree the sympathies of reformers, largely owing to the successes which rendered possible an attempt at republican government in the south; but its spasmodic origin and barbarous elements limited the range of action. In the later and successful revolution the Indians took no part.

Meantime the revolutionary tendency was growing in the towns, and even in the viceregal camp; Calleja, chief suppressor of the insurrection, was suspected of independent sympathies until he was appointed Viceroy. The Creole Colonel Iturbide, while besieging an insurgent stronghold in 1814, confided to a colleague his desire for independence, adding the words, "but first we must finish with these people." The constitutional restoration in Spain in 1820 and the election of Mexican Deputies to the Madrid Cortes produced a split in the European party. In 1821 General Iturbide, one of the chief suppressors of the insurrection, proclaimed at Iguala his three proposals: (1) an independent Mexican Empire, the throne to be offered to Ferdinand, or in case of his refusal to another Spanish prince; (2) the exclusion of all religions but the Catholic; (3) the union of Mexicans and Spaniards. This scheme satisfied the army and rapidly gained adherents; the Viceroy Apodaca, appointed under the absolutist régime, was deposed by the constitutionalists; and the new Viceroy, O'Donojú, found himself obliged to recognise the "plan of Iguala" by signing the Treaty of Córdoba. Iturbide, entering the capital, installed a governing Junta, followed by a Congress. But the Spanish Cortes having repudiated the Treaty of Córdoba, this Congress was compelled by the populace to proclaim Iturbide Emperor of Mexico. Ten months later the Emperor was forced to abdicate by the military revolt of Santa Ana (1823). From that time the stormy history of Mexico is comprised in the biographies of three men, Santa Ana,

Juarez, and Porfirio Diaz; the alternation of military *pronunciamientos* and republican or personal efforts being complicated by the successful aggression of the United States and the efforts of French ambition. The cycle of disorder and recovery, of defeat and resistance, closes with the beneficent despotism of Diaz, who became President in 1877 and has ever since been the ruler of Mexico.

In Guatemala, as elsewhere, the Spanish revolutions caused responsive movements in 1808-9; but these subsided until 1821, when Guatemala moved in sympathy with Mexico. Of the two parties, one favouring union with Mexico, the other desiring complete independence, the latter prevailed, after one hundred and eighty *cabildos* had voted on the matter. In the subordinate provinces of Honduras, Nicaragua, San Salvador, and Costa Rica, some desired union with Mexico, some union with Guatemala, and some complete separation. This last question seems never to have been decisively settled.

The Revolution of America as viewed from Europe falls into three periods. The first (1808-14) corresponds to a period of invasion, of rapid revolutions, of constitutional effort in Spain. During the years 1808-10 the movements in America were on the whole sympathetic with those of Spain, but were gradually turned into an anti-European revolt, largely by the hostility of the successive Governments in Spain, which all professed to find rebellion in constitutional movements resembling those to which they owed their own origin, and, while proclaiming national and popular authority, demanded submission and obedience in America. In May, 1810, the Regency declared American ports open to neutral trade, but was obliged by the Cadiz monopolists to withdraw that decree; in fact, the Regency and the Cortes, partly dominated by the municipality and commerce of Cadiz, which regarded American trade as their perquisite, were compelled to assume a reactionary and absolutist attitude, which left no choice between submission and independence. Twice the offer of mediation by Great Britain, welcomed by the American deputies, was declined by the Cortes. Such action was not compensated by the liberation of the Press (1810) or by the Constitution of 1812 which established elective Municipalities and elective Provincial Councils in America as in Spain. These measures favoured reform; and, in the conditions which followed in Spain, reform in America meant revolution. In almost every debate on America in the Cortes European and American deputies were on opposite sides; an elaborate scheme of reform presented by the American deputies was shelved by a general declaration that Americans and Spaniards formed one nation. Even the constitution of the Cortes was a grievance; the Americans protested against the device of substitutes, declaring that the assembly should await the arrival of the elected deputies, and also that representation should be proportionate to

population—an arrangement whereby Spaniards in the Spanish Parliament would have been outnumbered by Americans ignorant of Spain and also ignorant of every part of the Indies but their own.

During this period considerable reinforcements were sent to Mexico; but in general there were few European troops in America, and the struggle was mainly between Americans on both sides, though most of the royalist leaders were European. Yet on the whole the royalists were successful except in Buenos Aires.

The second period (1814-20) corresponds to Ferdinand's absolute Government in Spain. The King's promise to call Cortes in which America should have satisfactory representation was presently followed by an attempt to suppress insurrection by despatching European troops. But the Spanish monarchy was unequal to this effort, which would have required two or three strong naval squadrons. The only decided gain was the conclusion of the civil war in Mexico—a success which rather opened than closed the door to political revolution. In South America, notwithstanding some initial successes, the royalist cause lost ground during this period. At its close the region south of the tropics was practically free from Spanish dominion; Peru, the centre of royalism, was invaded; and in the north of the continent only the Isthmus and the coast towns of Venezuela obeyed the King.

In the third period (1820-4) the restoration of the Constitution in Spain introduced a certain moderation into the struggle. Bolívar and Morillo agreed that thenceforth quarter should be given and that desertion should not be punished with death, since the war was a war of opinions, with friends and relatives in opposing ranks; San Martín concluded an armistice with an envoy from Spain; a Colombian agent even entered Madrid, where he was courteously treated. It was noted that Spanish officers in Peru were less bitter against the insurgents than were their Creole colleagues; and during the closing phase of the struggle several Spanish war-ships passed into American hands through the desertion or easy surrender of Spanish officers and crews. Although the Cortes in 1822 vehemently repudiated all notion of recognition, next year it was proposed in negotiations between Spain and Buenos Aires that hostilities should cease for eighteen months, and that Buenos Aires should induce the South American Governments to contribute twenty million *pesos* in aid of Spanish resistance to the French. These proposals, which were closed by the French invasion of Spain, indicated a consciousness that constitutionalists in Spain and revolutionists in America were really fighting the same battle, and seemed to foreshadow the recognition of independence by the constitutional Government of Spain.

After the revolt of the army at Cadiz in 1820 the royalists fought without further aid from Europe. Spain had despatched 42,000 troops to America, including the West Indies, between 1811 and 1819. Of these "expeditionary troops" 23,000 remained in 1820; in that year there were

in America, besides volunteers, 87,000 disciplined royalist troops, counting both regulars and militia, 41,000 of them stationed in New Spain, 19,000 in the West Indies and only 27,000 in South America. Of the 87,000 perhaps about one-third were Europeans. After 1820 a group of officers, veterans of Saragossa, Albuera, and Vittoria, fought on for Spain with troops chiefly raised and trained in America : of the 9000 royalists who fought at Ayacucho not more than 500 were Spaniards born in Spain.

Throughout the war, the first diplomatic object of insurgent leaders and republican Governments was to obtain British support. In 1809-10 Venezuelan envoys sought aid in London and are said to have received official assurance of protection against French interference. Such protection was the natural outcome of British policy, so long as French ascendancy in the New World was to be feared ; indeed, the chief service of Great Britain to the revolution resulted from the series of naval victories culminating in Trafalgar, which made it impossible either for France or for Spain to operate effectively across the Atlantic. But since alliance with Spain now precluded any aid to insurrection, British commodores and West Indian Governors were instructed to encourage reconciliation between the insurgents and the Spanish Junta or Regency. Yet British offers of mediation were felt to give some moral support to the insurgents ; and in 1817 a United States diplomatist, referring to these offers, says that Great Britain had thrice interfered on behalf of Buenos Aires and adds that the British Minister in Rio de Janeiro favoured the Argentine revolution. In 1814 Great Britain by treaty with Spain undertook to prevent her subjects from furnishing arms, ammunition, and war-stores to the insurgents ; yet British subjects predominated among the European officers of all nations who joined the insurgents on the conclusion of the great war. British ships, ignoring Spanish authority and the pretended Spanish blockade, traded with revolutionary ports ; British commodores in the Pacific, who held a kind of diplomatic position, maintaining amicable relations with both contending parties, generally leaned in sympathy towards the insurgents.

In 1817-9 the Spanish Government not unnaturally complained of this attitude of an allied Power. Agents from the revolutionary Governments raised loans and enlisted soldiers in London undisturbed ; whole regiments were formed in Great Britain, the officers wearing Venezuelan uniform in public ; ships, chartered for the Spanish Main, were openly loaded with military stores and artillery. Finally the ablest of British sailors, accompanied by many British officers and seamen, led a fleet against the Spaniards. The mercantile interest generally favoured the insurgents, as also did the anxious and growing body of subscribers to the large loans continually being raised in London by revolutionary authorities. Not until 1819 was a tardy and ineffective measure passed, after much debate, to prevent enlistment for alien service.

In May, 1817, Ferdinand, with the support of Russia, suggested to the Allied Powers that they should aid him in reducing the insurgents. For nearly a year communications passed on the proposal. But the attitude of Great Britain, together with the many and obvious difficulties of arranging the terms of intervention, led to its abandonment. Great Britain was, however, bound by alliance with the Powers and with Spain; and, when, in February, 1819, the United States communicated to her their intention of receiving a Consul from Buenos Aires and expressed a hope for the recognition of the new States by Great Britain and the European Powers, Castlereagh replied that the hope of peace on the basis of Spanish supremacy with improved administration was still entertained by the European Alliance. In 1817-8 the United States sent Commissioners and soon afterwards Consuls to Spanish America; and in 1822 they recognised the national independence of Colombia, Chile, Buenos Aires, and Mexico. Meantime, as the ultimate success of Spain became more hopeless, particularly after 1820, Great Britain found her ambiguous attitude more unsatisfactory and was drifting away from the policy of the European Alliance. Since 1790 or even since 1702 trade had been the chief motive of British policy concerning Spanish America; and now the British trade which had recently sprung up suffered much from the confusion of authority and from the swarms of West Indian pirates, who, calling themselves royalist or patriot privateers, attacked unarmed ships of all nations.

At the Congress of Verona (1822) the British envoy, Wellington, presented a note to the effect that Great Britain had been obliged to recognise the existence *de facto* of several Governments so far as to treat with them; that pirates could only be extirpated by cooperation with the actual authorities on the coasts; and that such cooperation must lead to further recognition. To this suggestion the French envoy returned an ambiguous answer; the other Powers rejected any suggestion of recognition so long as Spain should maintain her claims. The subsequent proceedings of the Congress, the proposal of France to send an armed force into the Peninsula, the adhesion of the other Powers, the protest and withdrawal of the British envoy, are related in other chapters of this volume.

Great Britain, now detached from the European Alliance, was threatened with the danger of French supremacy not only in Spain, but also in the Indies, a danger similar to that which she had opposed by arms in 1702-13 and in 1808-14. In March, 1823, just before the French invasion of Spain, Canning intimated to France that Great Britain considered the separation of the Colonies from Spain as accomplished; adding that their formal recognition was a question of time and circumstances, that Great Britain intended no territorial acquisition in Spanish America, and that she was satisfied that France had no such design. In August the French army, having traversed Spain, was besieging Cadiz; and in

view of a proposed conference of the Allies to settle the affairs of Spanish America, Canning anxiously sought the cooperation of the United States in a policy which, while leaving the ground open for an amicable settlement between Spain and the Colonies, should oppose the acquisition of any part of Spanish America by any other Power. The United States Minister in London undertook to pledge his Government to this cooperation, if Great Britain would promptly recognise the independence of the new States. Canning declined immediate recognition; and accordingly the two Governments, having certain objects in common but differing in their attitude both towards Spanish America and towards the European continent, proceeded to take separate action. Cooperation was made more difficult by Canning's desire to prevent the United States from obtaining complete supremacy in both American continents, and also by the determination of the United States to avoid any engagement which would limit their freedom of action. In October, 1823, Canning told the French ambassador that Great Britain would recognise the new States if France should employ force against them, and clearly signified uncompromising opposition to any such action. In December, President Monroe addressed to Congress his famous message, aimed not particularly at France but at the designs of the Holy Alliance and at any possible European aggression or advance in America. Meanwhile, in the autumn of 1823, Canning had prepared the way for closer relations with the new States by sending British Commissioners to visit Spanish America and by appointing British Consuls. Finally in January, 1825, Great Britain recognised the independence of Buenos Aires, Colombia, and Mexico. Canning, although his delay in recognition had lost him the cooperation of the United States, had nevertheless succeeded in his main object of thwarting French designs beyond the Atlantic. His apprehensions had not been unfounded, for Chateaubriand had intended that French princes should reign in Spanish America.

Unhampered as were the United States by European connexions, their official attitude towards the new States actually constituted was more candid and generous than that of Great Britain; but on the other hand it should be noted that the United States, by prohibiting Mexican and Colombian designs for the liberation of Cuba and Porto Rico, prevented the completion of emancipation and secured Spanish dominion in the Antilles for seventy-five years longer. The action of the United States and of Great Britain fixed the status of the new Republics, although Spain kept up the pretence of prosecuting the war down to 1830. About that date the Papal See, which at first had denounced rebellion and commanded submission, established definite relations with the new Republics, a matter perhaps not less essential to them than the recognition by Spain which in turn they severally received in the course of the following five-and-twenty years.

## CHAPTER X.

### BRAZIL AND PORTUGAL.

ON November 29, 1807, the Regent Dom John, accompanied by his mother, the insane Queen Maria I, his wife Carlota Joaquina, his two sons and six daughters, with a numerous following of nobles and functionaries and the treasure of the kingdom, set sail from the Tagus for Brazil. This event marks an epoch alike in the history of Portugal and of its great transatlantic Colony.

On the following day, November 30, a French army under Junot occupied Lisbon. Portugal had long been an object of special dislike to Napoleon on account of its traditional relations of friendship with England; and by a treaty concluded at Fontainebleau between France and Spain (October 29) it had been agreed that the two Powers should jointly invade Portugal and divide its territory between them. Feeling resistance to be hopeless, Dom John, after establishing a Council of Regency, betook himself with the entire royal family on board the fleet, and, leaving his country to the protection of England, sought refuge in Rio de Janeiro. The history of Portugal during the eventful years that elapsed between the date of this event and the Congress of Vienna has already been treated in a previous volume. It is otherwise with the affairs of Brazil. The transference of the Court to Rio de Janeiro had such an influence, immediate and far-reaching, upon the position and the development of the Colony as to demand a brief notice.

The importance of Portugal at the close of the eighteenth century rested to no small extent upon her possession of Brazil. The mere area of Brazil, with its 3700 miles of Atlantic sea-board and inland depth of some 2500 miles, was enormous; it was rich in fertile territory, in gold, and diamonds; and it possessed in the River Amazon and its tributaries the most magnificent navigable river system in the world. That so small a people had been able to occupy and administer successfully this vast dependency across the seas is one of the wonders of history; unfortunately, as the Colony had grown and thriven and had acquired a vigorous life of its own, the distant motherland had never

risen to any high conception of its duties to the daughter State. Even the ideas of Pombal upon political economy and freedom of commerce had been no more enlightened than those of his contemporaries, and his reforms, after his fall, had ceased to be carried out. The traditional policy, which held that Colonies existed solely for the benefit of the home country, even after the severe blow it had received by the revolt of the British North American Colonies, had continued up to 1807 to govern the relations between Portugal and Brazil. All intercourse and commerce between Brazil and foreign nations was prohibited. The vessels of allies were occasionally permitted to visit certain ports; but the crews were only allowed to land under supervision. All manufactures, except that of sugar, were forbidden; and the Crown drew vast revenues from the tithes, which under a Papal Bull it had appropriated, and from the royalties of the gold and diamond mines. With the arrival of the Prince Regent and the establishment of the seat of government at Rio, all this was abruptly changed. A royal decree of January 28, 1808, threw open the ports of Brazil to the commerce of all friendly nations. Industries were freed from all restrictions; and the exploration of the interior was encouraged. Supreme tribunals were created; and a National Bank, a Royal Printing Press, a Military Academy, and a Medical School were established. These reforms were in no small measure due to British influence, which was dominant in the Portuguese Court; and there can be no doubt that the concession of freedom of trade was highly advantageous to British commerce.

The Brazilians welcomed the advent of the royal family with no little enthusiasm; and the measures taken by the Prince Regent for promoting the welfare of the country gave him at first considerable popularity. But Dom John, though well-meaning, was weak, indolent, and undecided; and he had to provide for the crowd of needy adventurers, ecclesiastics, nobles, and officials, who had followed him. The expenses of the Court were enormous, and compelled the Regent to raise money by a lavish distribution of offices and honours. Titulary distinctions had been hitherto almost unknown in Brazil, and they were now eagerly sought; and native Brazilians vied with emigrant Portuguese in soliciting royal favours and places. It was said that Dom John conferred more honorary insignia while he was in Brazil, than had all the Kings of the House of Braganza who had preceded him.

With the return of peace the Portuguese hoped that the Court, whose prodigality continued to impose in its absence heavy charges on the impoverished finances of Portugal, would return to Lisbon; but Dom John had become attached to his life at Rio de Janeiro, and preferred to remain where he was. On March 20, 1816, the mad Queen Maria I died; and the Prince Regent, who had already, by a decree of January 16, 1816, declared Brazil to be a kingdom, on ascending the throne assumed the title of John VI. King of Portugal, Brazil, and the

Algarves. This elevation of Brazil to the rank of a kingdom, and the resolve of the King to fix his residence at its capital, caused the profoundest dissatisfaction in Portugal, which saw itself in danger of becoming a dependency of its former colony.

The position of John VI in Brazil itself was, however, not free from disquietude. The additional burdens imposed upon the country had aroused considerable dissatisfaction in the northern provinces, especially in Pernambuco. The revolt of the Spanish Colonies found an echo in Brazil, and already in 1814 a secret organisation was working for the establishment of a republican form of government. To render his position more secure, Dom John took advantage of the peace in Europe to summon a body of 4500 veteran troops, who had served in the Peninsular War, to garrison Rio de Janeiro and Bahia. In 1817 the revolution broke out prematurely in Pernambuco; but the rebels were unable to make any stand against the disciplined force sent against them under the command of Count dos Arcos. The insurrection was harshly repressed; and the leader, Domingues José Martins, with a number of his followers, was executed.

In Portugal, meanwhile, there was a rising storm of discontent. The King was denounced, not only for sacrificing the interests of the mother-country to those of Brazil, but for allowing British influence to be supreme in the councils of the Regency, which in his name exercised the despotic powers of the Crown. The services rendered by England during the Peninsular War were forgotten, for the impoverished land was crushed by the burden of taxation; and a people intolerant of foreign rule laid no small share of the blame for their misfortunes upon the malign counsels of Sir Charles Stuart, the British diplomatist, and Marshal Beresford, who continued to hold the office of Commander-in-Chief. The resentment felt against the Government was deepened by the severity with which in 1818 an attempted *pronunciamento* by General Gomez Freire de Andrade, who had served under Napoleon and had strong French proclivities, was suppressed by the energy of Beresford. An insurrectionary rising in 1820 had a different issue. Beresford was temporarily absent in Brazil, when a revolt broke out at Oporto, August 24, headed by some leading officers of the garrison; and a revolutionary Junta was formed. A similar outbreak took place at Lisbon on August 29; and the leaders, acting in concert with those at Oporto, forced the Regency to yield to their demands. The Cortes, which had not met for upwards of a century, were summoned for the purpose of drawing up a Constitution; and the British officers, including Lord Beresford, were deprived of their posts in the army. The Cortes, which were animated by the most democratic sentiments, spent four months in preparing the basis for the new Constitution. All traces of feudalism were abolished; the Inquisition was suppressed; equality of all persons before the law, liberty of the Press, and the admissibility of

all citizens to all offices, were established. To a single elective Chamber all legislative and administrative powers were confided, the King retaining merely a suspensory veto.

The news of the events of 1820 caused a great sensation in Brazil. Both the Portuguese emigrants and the native Brazilians showed strong sympathy with the democratic principles which had triumphed in the Peninsula. In various parts of the country and in Rio itself both the military and the people declared for the popular cause. The weak but amiable King was undecided what course to adopt; and he had to choose between the views of two parties in his own household. The Queen Carlota Joaquina, a woman of turbulent disposition and loose morals, had for years plotted and intrigued against her husband. She was absolutist in her views, and devoted to the interests of her younger son, Dom Miguel, who shared her views. Opposed to her was the Prince Royal, Dom Pedro, who in 1817 had married the Archduchess Leopoldine Caroline of Austria, and was now twenty-two years of age. Dom Pedro had inherited his mother's restless and ambitious temperament, but not her principles; and he now put himself forward as the champion of Liberalism, and displayed an energy, enterprise, courage, and activity, which prepared for him a conspicuous, if somewhat tragic, role in the troubled years that were to follow. The irresolution of John VI was dominated by the stronger will of a son, with whose character and aims he had little sympathy. A manifesto, dated February 18, 1821, announced the intention of the King to send Dom Pedro to Portugal to treat with the Cortes, and promised the introduction into Brazil of such portions of the Constitution as might be found suitable and expedient. The publication of this manifesto led to an insurrectionary outbreak at Rio, in which the military joined; but it was repressed by the personal intervention of Dom Pedro, who read to the assembled crowd a decree in which the King gave his unreserved approval to the Constitution to be drawn up by the Cortes, though its terms were as yet unknown. This was a concession such as no self-respecting ruler should have granted except under actual compulsion; and, as a matter of fact, the Brazilians had afterwards grave causes for dissatisfaction with the treatment which their interests received at the hands of the Cortes. Meanwhile, strong pressure had been put upon the King by a powerful body of public opinion both in Portugal and Brazil, and by the British Government, to induce him to return to Lisbon. Greatly against his inclinations, the unfortunate monarch once more gave way. A decree of April 22 appointed Dom Pedro Regent and Lieutenant in Brazil; and four days later John VI set sail for Lisbon. He was accompanied on his return by a crowd of Portuguese nobles and hangers-on of the Court—some three thousand it is said—and he carried off vast sums in specie, which were withdrawn from the Bank. His departure in such circumstances aroused tumultuary demonstrations, which were, however, suppressed without bloodshed; and

Dom Pedro was left in a country seething with discontent and in a condition of practical bankruptcy.

It was a decisive moment in the history of Brazil. The impolitic and short-sighted measures adopted by the newly-elected Cortes hastened a crisis in the relations between the motherland and the colony, which, though sooner or later inevitable, need not have been immediate. Without waiting for the presence of the full quota of the Brazilian deputies, a decree was passed (September 29, 1821) which abrogated all the tribunals and institutions created by John VI in Brazil, and ordered the Regent to lay down his office and return at once to Portugal. Later decrees gave instructions for the strengthening of the Portuguese garrisons in Rio de Janeiro and Bahia, and for the sending out of provincial Governors responsible to the executive in Lisbon. The intention was clearly a restoration of the old colonial system. These decrees produced alarm and indignation in Brazil. The Patriot party, which had hitherto consisted almost entirely of those favouring republican institutions, was now transformed into a national one. The officials, who had lost their posts through the abolition of the tribunals, became ardent advocates of the cause of independence; and even the Royalists had no scruples in denouncing the decrees of the revolutionary Cortes, whose Jacobin tendencies they detested. There was a strong feeling that Dom Pedro should not be allowed to leave the country; and the Prince himself was for some time doubtful as to his course of action. He knew that the chief towns were strongly garrisoned by the disciplined troops of what was known as "the auxiliary division"; and he was averse from taking any step which could make him appear to be a traitor to Portugal and a rebel against his father. His whole correspondence during this anxious time of difficulty and uncertainty proves his sincerity. Between the King and Dom Pedro there had been for some time a strongly marked divergence of views; but little doubt remains that there was a secret understanding between them, when they parted in April, 1821, by which the Regent was given a more or less free hand, should difficulties arise. His task was to preserve intact the interests of the Crown to which he was heir. But he was placed in the dilemma of having to choose between loyalty to the land of his birth, or loyalty to the land of his adoption. At first, the claims of Portugal had the upper hand. Despite the pressure that was put upon him, Dom Pedro announced his intention of obeying the decree of the Cortes and quitting Brazil. But circumstances became too strong for him.

The movement for Brazilian independence at this critical juncture of indecision and confusion found a capable and statesmanlike leader in José Bonifacio de Andrada. He was in 1821 Vice-President of the Provisional Government of San Paulo, which province, and the adjoining province of Minas Geraes, had been for some years the chief centres of Separatism. José Bonifacio was the eldest of three brothers, all men of

scientific acquirements, and was a native of San Paulo. He had been educated at Coimbra, had travelled much, and had gained a European repute for his learning and especially for his discoveries in mineralogy and metallurgy. In the Peninsular War he had fought for his country against the French; but after the peace he had been disgusted with the corruption and ineptitude of the Regency, and in 1819 he returned to his native land. The result of his experiences caused him to become an eager advocate of the party of independence. He felt that Brazil could no longer remain a vassal State of Portugal, but must seek her own destinies. When the news arrived of the decrees of the Cortes, by an address, by a deputation, by agitation, in all of which Andrada played a chief part, pressure was exercised on the Prince Regent; and his hesitation was at last overcome. He promised to stay and to defend the interests of Brazil, not against his father, but against the Cortes. This decision had good results in appeasing public opinion, and was welcomed both by the Royalist and Patriot parties. The attitude of the Portuguese garrisons at first caused serious apprehensions; they remained staunch to their flag, and were quite capable of holding their fortified positions at Rio de Janeiro and Bahia against vastly superior numbers of undisciplined Brazilians. By a judicious mixture of persuasion and firmness the troops at Rio were, however, induced to leave the country. They were promised three months' pay in advance; and the Prince himself threatened to open fire upon them from a gun-boat, unless they immediately embarked. They set sail for Lisbon, February 15, 1822.

José Bonifacio de Andrada and his brother Martin Francisco had meanwhile been entrusted by the Regent with the principal posts in the Ministry; and the direction of affairs was placed in their hands. As soon as the garrison had set sail, a decree was issued (February 16) calling together from the various provinces a council of representatives. A further step towards separation was taken (May 13), when, in answer to a supplication from the municipality of Rio de Janeiro, Dom Pedro accepted the title of "Perpetual Protector and Defender of Brazil." This was followed (June 3) by a decree for the creation of a Legislative Assembly. All this was not accomplished without disorder. In San Paulo and Minas disturbances arose, which, however, were quelled by a visit from the Prince in person. The recalcitrant behaviour of the Portuguese garrisons in Pernambuco and Bahia caused more trouble. Those in Pernambuco before long yielded to the terms offered them and left the country; but at Bahia a strong reinforcement of 1500 men reached General Madcira from Lisbon in August; and he continued to offer a successful resistance to the attacks of a large besieging force of Brazilians. The breach between Portugal and Brazil had issued, indeed, in what was practically a state of war. A decree of August 1 declared all troops quartered in Brazil without orders from Dom Pedro to be rebels. The

rupture was completed by the declaration of the independence of Brazil made at San Paulo by the Prince, September 7, 1822. At Rio on October 12 (his birthday) he was, in the presence of a vast concourse of people, acclaimed as Constitutional Emperor of Brazil.

The next step was to secure the recognition of the authority of Pedro I throughout the provinces. The command of the Imperial fleet was entrusted to Admiral Lord Cochrane, under whom were serving Captains Grenfell and Taylor, and a number of other capable and daring British seamen. Bahia, the chief centre of resistance, was blockaded by sea as well as by land; and after an obstinate defence General Madeira was forced to capitulate and embark with his troops for Portugal, July 2, 1823. Maranham and Pará were next reduced to obedience. The Portuguese suffered continual losses at sea during this time, their ships being pursued even across the Atlantic, and captured in sight of their own shores. The garrison of Montevideo, the capital of the Banda Oriental, which had been conquered by a Portuguese expedition in 1817, was the last to be expelled; the town and territory were formed into the *Provincia Cisplatina*. By the close of 1823 all opposition to the new régime had been overcome; and the independence of Brazil under the rule of the Emperor became an accomplished fact.

While these events had been taking place beyond the ocean, the political situation in Portugal had undergone a complete change. One of the last acts of the Constituent Cortes of 1820 had been to issue a decree (September 19, 1822), in which Dom Pedro was ordered to return within a month, on pain of losing his right of succession to the Portuguese Crown; while all military officers and others obeying the *de facto* Government at Rio were proclaimed traitors. The Legislative Assembly, elected under the Constitution of 1822, showed itself no less determined to suppress the rebellion in Brazil, but internal troubles speedily concentrated its whole attention upon home affairs. A date, December 3, had been fixed before which all official persons were required to take their oath to the new Constitution on pain of banishment. The proud spirit of the Queen, Carlota Joaquina, would not submit to this. She refused, and sentence of banishment was pronounced against her; but on the ground of ill-health a delay was granted, and events decreed that it should never be enforced. The crossing of the Pyrenees by a powerful French army to support Ferdinand VII against a popular movement in Spain gave fresh life to the cause of Absolutism in Portugal. A rising led by the Count of Amarante (February, 1823) in Tras-os-Montes was at first a failure; but the counter-revolution initiated by him soon gathered strength. Many of the soldiery were ready to fight against a system of government which had led to the loss of Brazil. The Infante Dom Miguel placed himself at the head of a movement with which he was thoroughly in sympathy, and issued a proclamation calling upon the people to restore to the King his liberty.

The main body of the troops joined him. John VI himself, always ready to follow, never to lead, and now at his wits' end how to act, left Lisbon. The Cortes, finding themselves without moral support, dissolved of their own accord. The King, however, who had imbibed some of the Liberal ideas professed by his elder son, was not yet disposed to place himself in the hands of the Absolutist party, whom he distrusted. Acting on the advice of his Minister, the Count of Palmella, John VI, while declaring the Constitution of 1822 abrogated, appointed a Junta to draw up a new parliamentary Constitution for a limited monarchy after the English model. These proceedings by no means commended themselves to the Queen and Dom Miguel, who determined to take vigorous action.

On April 30, 1824, Dom Miguel seized the palace, banished Palmella, and carried on the government in his father's name. The King, who was virtually a prisoner, was obliged to submit, but shortly afterwards (May 9) managed to make his escape and to fly for refuge to a British man-of-war in the Tagus. His appeal led to united action being taken by the ambassadors of the Powers for the restoration of his authority, in which the leading part was taken by Sir William A' Court, the British envoy. Palmella was replaced at the head of the Ministry, and Dom Miguel compelled to withdraw from Portugal. He took up his residence at Vienna. The result of foreign interference in the internal affairs of Portugal was the establishment there of a system of parliamentary government. The term anarchy, however, more truly describes the general condition of the country. The King, always feeble and vacillating, was now in miserable health and subject to epilepsy. He had no opinions of his own, and had become the mere shuttlecock of parties, a pliant instrument in the hands of stronger men. On August 29, 1825, he was induced through British influence to recognise the independence of Brazil and give up his title to the sovereignty in favour of Dom Pedro. His sudden death followed six months later.

In Brazil the experiences of Dom Pedro after his acceptance of the Imperial title had been scarcely less troubled than those of his father in Portugal. The Emperor made a great profession of his attachment to Liberalism and democratic views, but he was at heart dictatorial and arbitrary. Dom Pedro was a man of strangely complicated character, of high courage but no stability, at once obstinate and capricious in temper; his restless ambition was coupled with talents distinctly mediocre, his high conception of public duty with laxity of private morals and unscrupulousness in action. He lacked conspicuously those higher qualities of statesmanship which were essential for the successful accomplishment of the difficult task that lay before him.

The Constituent Assembly called together to draw up a Constitution for the Empire met on May 3, 1823. The Andrada brothers, by virtue of their commanding abilities no less than from their dominant position in

the State, took the leading part in its deliberations. Up to this time the Andrada Ministry had been all-powerful, and had overridden opposition by methods that were high-handed and at times vindictive. In consequence they had made many enemies. It was attributed to their influence that Dom Pedro had declared in his opening speech "that in accordance with his oath he would defend the Constitution, if it should be worthy of Brazil and of himself." This declaration provoked loud protests from the Patriot party. A proposal to expel all Portuguese suspected of hostility to the national independence roused the enmity of the Royalists. A coalition was formed against the Andradas, which succeeded in gaining the ear of the Emperor, who had become tired of dictation. The Ministry was dismissed on July 17; their successors were Royalists of a moderate type. With them came a change of policy with regard to the Portuguese. The prisoners of war were invited to enlist in the service of Brazil, and many did so. The Andradas now threw themselves, both in the assembly and in the press, into violent opposition to the Government. Dom Pedro was incensed, and determined on strong action. A new Ministry, more pronouncedly Royalist, was formed (November 10) and a *coup d'état* resolved on. Three days later, the Emperor surrounded the Chamber with a strong body of soldiers and artillery, and ordered the immediate dissolution of the Assembly. The deputies were forcibly expelled; and the three Andradas and some other leaders were arrested, placed on board ship, and sent away to France. By this despotic act of violence the Emperor found himself placed in the position of a dictator.

The next step of Dom Pedro was to issue a proclamation justifying what he had done and promising to convoke another Assembly, before which he himself would lay the project of a Constitution, more Liberal than that contemplated by the body just dissolved. "The salvation of the country, which is confided to me as Perpetual Defender of Brazil, has required these measures." Such was Dom Pedro's conception of Liberalism. He was quite willing that the country should have free institutions, but as a concession from himself, the sovereign. His descent and his training alike forbade him to admit, what was undoubtedly the case, that his powers as Emperor had been conferred on him by the people. A Council of State of ten persons was commissioned (November 26) to draw up the project of a Constitution; and their task was at once taken vigorously in hand. By January, 1824, their labours were completed; but, instead of their proposals being submitted to a new National Assembly, as had been promised, copies of the project were sent round to the Municipal Councils of the various provinces. The majority of these were declared to have given their approval; and on March 24 the Emperor took the oath to the new Constitution.

The reception accorded to this mode of procedure was generally satisfactory, for, though the Constitution emanated from the Emperor,

its provisions were, as Dom Pedro had undertaken that they should be, thoroughly Liberal in their character. It established freedom of religion, of the press, and of speech, equality of all citizens before the law, representative institutions—consisting of two Chambers—a responsible Ministry, an independent judiciary. The members of both Chambers, the Chamber of Deputies and the Senate, were chosen by provincial electors, themselves elected by universal suffrage. The Deputies were elected for four years; the Senators were nominated by the Emperor from triple lists submitted to him, and held office for life. The Senators had to be at least forty years of age and to be possessed of a certain amount of property. When the two Houses differed, either of them could claim the summoning of a General Assembly of both Houses for conference. The key to the Constitution was declared to lie in what was styled the Moderative Power, *i.e.* the power placed in the hands of the sovereign, consisting of a suspensory veto on legislation, the nomination of Senators and of Ministers, the right of dissolving the House of Deputies and summoning the General Assembly, the power of pardon and revision of judicial sentences, the nomination of Bishops, magistrates, ambassadors, and presidents of provinces, and other like prerogatives. In the discharge of his executive functions the Emperor, however, acted on the advice of his Ministers, whose signature was required in order that any act should obtain validity, and who were responsible to the representatives of the people. The Constitution of 1824 was thus eminently fitted to offer to Brazil the prospect of enjoying under free institutions the advantages of a settled and stable Government. In so far as it failed to effect this, the fault lay not in its provisions, but in the undeveloped character of the people which was to live under it, and in the political shortcomings of its administrators.

This same month of March, 1824, saw the opening of negotiations between Portugal and Brazil for peace through the mediation of England. Brazilian commissioners were sent to London, and during the summer were engaged in trying, through the intervention of Canning, to effect a settlement with the Portuguese plenipotentiary. Hostilities were suspended during the negotiations. At first, the Brazilian demand for independence and the Portuguese assertion of sovereignty seemed hopelessly incompatible. The accomplished diplomatist, Sir Charles Stuart, who was despatched by Canning first to Lisbon and then to Rio, was at length able to bring about an arrangement, by which King John, after assuming, *pro forma*, the title of Emperor of Brazil, resigned it in favour of his son, and acknowledged the independence of the former Portuguese colony, while Dom Pedro undertook that the Brazilian Government should be responsible for a debt of £1,400,000, contracted by Portugal with Great Britain in 1823, and should pay to King John the sum of £600,000 for his palace and other private property in Brazil. The treaty was signed at Rio, August 29, 1825. In this document no

mention was made of the succession to the Portuguese Crown ; but Dom Pedro openly announced that he resigned any claim to it.

Events were speedily to show that the renunciation was accompanied by reserves. On March 6, 1826, John VI was taken suddenly ill, and in four days died, not without suspicion of poison. A decree, dated March 7, nominated the Infanta, Isabel Maria, Regent until the legitimate heir and successor (unnamed) should issue his instructions. The Regency at once acknowledged Pedro IV as King. This act was, however, looked upon as a mere formality—the recent treaty of separation had made it impossible for a man to be at once Emperor of Brazil and King of Portugal—and it was assumed that Dom Pedro would abdicate in favour of his brother. Had he done so, there would have been no opposition, for the revolutionary party of 1820—the *vintistas* as they were styled—was at a low ebb in 1826; and the utmost that they hoped for was to effect the transformation of the old Cortes of Three Estates into a Constitutional Assembly. But this simple course did not commend itself to the vanity and ambition of Dom Pedro. He wished once again to pose as a monarch conceding of his own free will Liberal institutions to his people. The British plenipotentiary, Sir Charles Stuart, who had brought over the treaty of separation from Lisbon the previous year, was still at Rio, and on being consulted by the Emperor upon his project, expressed his disapproval. This able diplomatist knew Portugal and the Portuguese thoroughly, whereas Dom Pedro had left his native land when he was but twelve years of age. But the Emperor persisted in carrying out his ideas. A Charter was drawn up, which he conferred upon his Portuguese subjects, as a gift from their King; and then, by a decree dated May 2, he abdicated the Crown in favour of his daughter, Dona Maria da Glória, aged seven, upon condition of her taking an oath to the Charter. This condition being complied with, Dom Miguel was recognised as Regent, but with the further condition that he should marry his niece, a child seventeen years younger than himself. Sir Charles Stuart became once more the intermediary between Rio and Lisbon. He arrived in Portugal with the Charter, July 2. It met with a chilling reception. No one had expected the interference of the "Brazilian" with the internal affairs of the country; and it was resented by the great mass of the population. The Council of Regency at first declined to publish the Charter, but their hands were forced by the military *pronunciamento* of General Saldanha, who was in command at Oporto. This officer, a strong adherent of the Liberal cause and popular with his troops, declared that, if the oath to the Charter were not taken before May 31, he would march with his army on Lisbon. The Council yielded. The Charter was published, May 12; and the oath was taken both at Oporto and Lisbon by all the various authorities on the 31st amidst scenes of popular enthusiasm.

Saldanha was hailed as a hero by the *vintistas*, and became the head

of a Liberal Ministry, August 3. He was anxious that Dom Pedro should come in person to Portugal, or at least that he should retain the Infanta Isabel Maria in the Regency to the exclusion of Dom Miguel. But the Emperor, finding that the representatives of all the Powers were unanimous in their support of the Regency of Dom Miguel, would not listen to the proposal. Indeed he had but little choice. At the very time when the oath to the Charter was taken at Lisbon, insurrections broke out in Tras-os-Montes, Minho, and elsewhere, the soldiers acclaiming Dom Miguel as King. These movements were successfully stamped out by the Government; but thousands of emigrants flocked across the Spanish frontier, and a strong armed force—under the leadership of the Marquis of Chaves—for the support of the Absolutist cause was formed with the secret connivance of the Spanish Government, ready to invade Portugal when opportunity should offer. Of the Powers, Austria and Russia openly favoured Dom Miguel, but through the influence of Canning were induced to join with England and France in adopting a waiting policy. The instructions of Canning to Lord Stuart and to A'Court, the British Minister at Lisbon, were that the Portuguese people were to be left free to choose their own government. The official policy was one of non-intervention; nevertheless, such was the anarchy in all parts of Portugal at the end of the year, that the British Government despatched a division of 5000 men under General Sir William Clinton for the restoration of order, and at the same time demanded from Spain the internment and disarmament of the Portuguese Absolutist bands under Chaves. In March, 1827, the Charter, supported by British bayonets, had been accepted throughout Portugal; but it is needless to say that the armed intervention of the foreigner did not endear to the Portuguese people the liberties conceded to them by their Brazilian King.

Meanwhile Dom Miguel had been residing at Vienna under the eye of Metternich. His attitude after the death of his father had been perfectly correct. He had written both to Rio and to Lisbon, acknowledging Dom Pedro as the legitimate sovereign of Portugal. On October 4, he took his oath to the Charter; on October 29, he was solemnly affianced to his niece. This step was taken on the advice of Metternich under pressure from England. By thus complying with the conditions laid down by his elder brother for his abdication, Dom Miguel removed all obstacles to his return to Portugal as Regent during Dona Maria's minority. That he took the oath as a political necessity and with the secret reservation of his legitimate rights, is practically certain. His subsequent actions showed that he did not regard his oath as binding on his conscience; his Jesuitical training would make it easy for him to rest content with the absolution of the Church for a breach of faith committed on behalf of the good cause. At the moment, in his letters to Dom Pedro, the Infanta, and the Kings of England and of

Spain, his professions of sincere adhesion to the constitutional *status quo* were all that could be desired ; and it was as Regent in the name of Maria II, and as an upholder of the Charter, that Dom Miguel sailed from Plymouth on board a Portuguese ship of war, to assume the reins of government. He landed at Lisbon, February 22, 1828.

It was not, however, the intention of the Queen-Mother, nor of the powerful absolutist and clerical party of which she was the moving spirit, that Miguel should occupy the position of a Chartist Regent. Carlota Joaquina had inherited vast wealth, and since the death of John VI had been spending it freely in the interests of her beloved son and of the "apostolical" cause ; and soon all eyes were looking for the advent of Dom Miguel, as the saviour of the country. The handsome young Prince was the idol of the populace, and his reception at Lisbon was marked by a frenzy of enthusiasm, amidst loud cries of *Viva Dom Miguel I, rei absoluto.* Nevertheless, the Infante did not as yet commit himself. In the presence of the united Chambers, on February 26, he accepted the Regency and took the oath, once more, to the Charter. But, from the first, public opinion acclaimed him as King ; and as such Dom Miguel acted. The Chambers were dissolved, March 14, and were not again summoned. No one troubled about them ; they perished without a murmur. With the departure of the British troops, on April 2, recalled by the Wellington Ministry, the chief support of the Constitutional party was removed ; and practically no resistance was offered to an Absolutist restoration.

The Regent, in May, took the decisive step of summoning the old historic Cortes of the Three Estates. They met, June 23, and on the proposal of the Bishop of Vizeu offered the Crown by acclamation to Dom Miguel. The Prince accepted the offer, assumed the title of King, and, on July 7, took the oath before the Cortes. In Oporto alone, where the Chartist leaders, Saldanha, Villa Flôr, Palmella, Sampaio, and others had gathered, a Junta was formed and armed opposition was offered to the acceptance of the new régime. In Lisbon, and generally throughout the land, the proclamation of Miguel I was received with enthusiasm. At Oporto a number of volunteers from Coimbra and elsewhere joined the troops which had declared for Dona Maria ; but the Junta did not dare to await the approach of a strong Miguelist force. Palmella, Saldanha, and their friends fled to London, July 3. Their army, to the number of between 5000 and 6000 men, retreated in utter disorder into Galicia. A miserable remnant, 2500 strong, penniless and in rags, took ship for Plymouth, where they were interned.

It was thought safest to send their Queen, Maria II, to London, where she was surrounded by the exiled leaders of the Constitutional party, foremost amongst whom was Palmella. But, though the Queen was received with all the marks of respect due to her rank, the British Government under Wellington steadily declined to take any steps to

intervene in the internal affairs and dynastic struggles "of a free nation." A Portuguese historian (Martins) makes on this the sarcastic comment, "the Court received Maria II as Queen, and the Government received her troops as brigands."

Meanwhile, in Portugal, Dom Miguel's position had been consolidated. The Absolutist party, when at length they felt the reins of power firmly in their grasp, determined to make a clean sweep of their adversaries. The decree went forth that Liberalism was to be extirpated. For awhile there was a veritable reign of terror in Portugal. A considerable number of persons, on the ground of being implicated in revolutionary movements, perished by the hands of the executioner; thousands of others, sometimes on the merest suspicion, were thrown into prison. How far Miguel was himself responsible for this vindictive and barbarous policy it is difficult to say. Naturally pleasure-loving and fond of applause, Miguel, though coarse in his tastes, was not by disposition cruel; but he undoubtedly allowed himself to be the pliant instrument of his mother's behests, and was surrounded by a group of men dominated by clerical and political prejudices of an extreme type. This at least may be affirmed of him, that despite his faults and the crimes committed in his name, he continued throughout his troubled reign to be the idol of the nation, the King of his people's choice. To the last the Portuguese masses were Miguelist to the core.

The British policy of non-intervention, carrying with it a recognition of the *de facto* Government, was followed by Austria and France. The claims of Palmella to be the representative of Portugal at the Court of St James' were not admitted. Dom Pedro was informed that his abdication was regarded as definitive, and as debarring him from interference with Portuguese affairs. If he wished to take active steps to support his daughter's claims to the Crown, it must be by a declaration of war on the part of Brazil. Earnest efforts were, however, made by Great Britain and Austria to heal the fraternal feud by urging the marriage of the uncle and niece without the Charter. But, though the negotiations dragged on, they proved futile. With the return of Maria II to Brazil, August 29, 1829, the first chapter in the story of her struggle with Miguel for the Portuguese Crown is closed.

The second chapter had already opened in the tiny island of Terceira, one of the Azores. The inhabitants of the Azores, including those of Terceira, had in the spring of 1828, following the example of the people of the motherland, declared themselves Miguelist. The small garrison of Angra alone remained faithful to the Liberal cause. For four months (May–August) they remained isolated in their entrenchments, surrounded by a hostile population. At last (September 8) a number of emigrant officers and some stores were landed by a Brazilian frigate; a provisional Junta was formed; and the cause of Maria II, which seemed abandoned by all men, found a spot on which her authority was recognised, and her

flag could fly. Terceira became henceforth the centre for organising armed resistance to the Miguelist power.

The authorities at Lisbon did not trouble to make themselves masters of Terceira during the long months during which the garrison of Angra could have offered no effectual resistance to a Portuguese expedition. For this negligence a heavy retribution was to be exacted in the coming years. Palmella and Saldanha in England were more far-sighted; money was raised; and at the end of 1828 Saldanha set out from Plymouth with a strong force of Portuguese refugees for Terceira. He was not, however, allowed to land. A British squadron compelled the expedition to turn back (January 11, 1829), and to seek refuge in France. During the following three months, despite the vigilance of the British blockade, small groups of emigrants found their way to the island; and many also came from Brazil. In June the Count of Villa Flôr, nominated by Palmella Captain-General of the Queen's dominions, landed and assumed the command of a heterogeneous force of 2800 men. Arms were plentiful, and the place was well fortified. A few weeks later a Miguelist squadron, carrying a strong force of 3500 men for disembarkation, at length appeared before Terceira. The attack however was badly planned and never pressed home; the garrison defended themselves with spirit and courage; and the fleet withdrew without effecting its purpose (August 11, 1829). The unaccountable failure of this long-prepared effort to wrest from the Constitutionalists their one foothold in the Portuguese dominions had a decisive influence upon later events. Palmella himself moved from London to Terceira, March 30, 1829, where a Regency was established in the name of Maria II. The little island, hitherto a place of arms, was thus transformed into a seat of government.

Nevertheless, for awhile the prospects of Maria did not grow brighter. Dissensions arose between Palmella and Saldanha. Pedro recognised the Regency, but he had his own troubles in Brazil, and declined to give any active assistance to his daughter, though at the same time carrying on negotiations to bring about a settlement of difficulties on the marriage basis. The Powers would not commit themselves, but showed themselves generally well disposed to the *de facto* rule of Miguel.

The events of 1830, however, effected an entire change in the attitude of the Western Powers. The revolution of July in France replaced Charles X by Louis-Philippe; and in England a Whig Government came into power, in place of the Wellington Ministry, with Lord Palmerston in charge of foreign affairs. Early in this same year Carlota Joaquina, the moving spirit of the Absolutist reaction, died (January 7). In February an abortive revolution broke out in Lisbon, which was cruelly repressed. It was at this time that the reign of terror, the watchword of which was "Death to the Liberals and Freemasons," attained its height. Infatuated in their devotion to Dom Miguel, the Portuguese

people seemed to have been seized by a blind frenzy. It was the last revival of the old superstition of Sebastianism. The hero-King, whose return had for two centuries and a half been wistfully looked for, had found his personification in the young Miguel of 1828, whose advent amongst his people was openly spoken of as that of a Messiah. To the Absolutist and "apostolical" principles which lay at the root of Miguelism, the Orleanist monarchy of July and the Reform Whigs of 1830 were alike opposed; and it was not long before their opposition was changed into enmity. Dissensions arose with England concerning acts of violence committed upon British subjects both on sea and land. The harsh treatment accorded to two French residents in Lisbon led first to a breach of diplomatic relations, then to the despatch of a squadron under Admiral Roussin, which entered the Tagus (July, 1831) and compelled the Portuguese Government to make humiliating reparation and to surrender their fleet. This strong action met with the tacit support of Great Britain, which was thoroughly in sympathy with the Government of Louis-Philippe in this matter, and took no steps to defend its old ally from French attack.

Meanwhile events had been taking place in Brazil which had brought about the abdication of Dom Pedro (April 7, 1831). The arbitrary temper of the Emperor, his extravagance and dissolute life, and, still more perhaps, the disastrous issue of the war with the Argentine Republic, had disgusted the Brazilians with their erratic sovereign and made his retention of the crown an impossibility. Leaving his son, who at the age of six was proclaimed Emperor as Pedro II, under the guardianship of José Bonifacio de Andrada, now recalled from exile, the ex-Emperor set sail for Europe, April 13. His departure was undoubtedly for the advantage of Brazil. During the minority of Pedro II the country, in spite of a number of local insurrectionary movements, enjoyed freedom and made material progress. Andrada rendered himself unpopular, and was in 1833 replaced by a Council of Regency. The following year the Constitution of 1824 was revised by Congress. No important change was made in its main provisions, but it was broadened and extended by the concession of provincial and municipal self-government on a large scale. This policy of decentralisation in a country of such vast area and varying physical conditions was a very wise proceeding, and has probably preserved the unity of the Brazilian State. In 1835 Antonio Feijoo, Bishop of Maritana, was elected by Congress as sole Regent. He held office for two years, and was followed by Pedro Araujo de Lima (1837-40). Pedro II at fifteen years of age was in 1840 declared by Congress to have attained his majority. He was crowned July 18, 1841. Intelligent, fond of study, and possessed of tact and moderation, the young Emperor was able during the earlier years of his reign to secure the love and respect of his subjects. He successfully devoted his best efforts to the

maintenance of political tranquillity and to the development of the immense natural resources of the country.

Dom Pedro's failure in South America had not quelled either the fire of his ambition or his love of adventure; and he set out with the intention of driving the "usurper" from Portugal by force of arms. With the young Queen he took up his residence in London. Here they were joined by Palmella from Terceira, where Villa Flôr had been left in command. This officer was within a brief period able to make himself master of the entire archipelago of the Azores. The seizure of the Miguelist fleet by Admiral Roussin in the Tagus rendered his task a light one. The reception accorded to Dom Pedro and his daughter in London on the part of the Grey-Palmerston Ministry was friendly; and the ex-Emperor was able quietly to consult with his friends and mature his plans. Under the influence of the counsels of Palmella, Dom Pedro determined to enter upon the contest with his brother in the capacity of defender of his daughter's rights. Like the visionary knight-errant that he was, he dreamt that he had only to effect a landing in the realm, which groaned beneath the tyranny of Miguel, in order to rally the people round the banner of their young Queen.

In August, 1831, Dom Pedro, taking with him Maria II, betook himself to France. He had already assured himself of the friendly disposition of Louis-Philippe, who now received the exiles with open arms, and assigned the Château de Meudon as their residence. Palmella and Silva Carvalho were left in England to raise money. The task was successfully achieved; and a loan of £2,000,000 at 5 per cent. was negotiated by the aid of the Spanish financier, Mendizabal (September, 1831). As the bonds were issued at 48, the rate of interest was really more than 10 per cent. The first necessity was a fleet. Two East-Indiamen were bought and transformed into the frigates *Rainha* and *Dona Maria II*, which were stationed at Belle-Isle. The crews were English, and a retired British naval officer, Captain Sartorius, was appointed admiral. About 300 mercenaries were likewise enlisted in London, and placed under the command of Colonel Hodges. These formed the nucleus of the liberator army, and were duly embarked, January 3, upon the vessels at Belle-Isle. All this was done beneath the eyes of the French Government, who had no scruple in thus espousing the cause of Dona Maria; but in England Palmerston was anxious not to sanction any open breach of neutrality. "I counsel you," he wrote to Palmella, "to let your vessels depart as quickly as possible, in order to avoid any new difficulties that the agents of Dom Miguel might raise"; he even threatened that, unless prompt action were taken, the British Ministry might find themselves obliged to recognise officially the Government of Dom Miguel.

On February 10, 1832, the expedition, consisting of two frigates, the *Rainha* and *Dona Maria*, with two schooners, the *Terceira* and *Amelia*,

and a transport, sailed from Belle-Isle. Dom Pedro had embarked in the *Rainha*, on which Sartorius had hoisted his flag. He was accompanied by the chiefs of the Constitutional party, Palmella, Loulé, Freire, Mousinho, but not by Saldanha. The soldier whose sword had made the Portuguese nation accept the Charter in 1826 was now debarred by the author of that Charter from taking part in an expedition whose professed object was its restoration. Saldanha had shown too plainly that he did not trust the man whose deeds had so often belied his words.

The fleet reached the Azores at the end of February; and Dom Pedro at once concentrated in his own hands all the powers of government—he became regent, general, and admiral. His activity was ceaseless; and, though he made many mistakes, it was the opinion of Colonel Hodges and other competent eye-witnesses, that without the personal efforts of the Emperor the expedition would never have left the islands. Under the supreme authority of the Regent, Palmella became Minister of Foreign Affairs and of the Interior (the duties of the latter office were for the present non-existent); Mousinho da Silveira took over Finance and Justice. Villa Flôr was appointed General-in-chief and Sartorius Admiral-in-chief. The all-important Ministry of War was placed in the hands of an incapable man, Agostinho José Freire. But all these were subjected to constant personal interference, even in matters of detail, on the part of Dom Pedro, who himself was accustomed on all subjects to seek the advice of his adjutant of the camp, Cândido José Xavier, and almost invariably to follow it.

At first the English troops, who had received as yet neither clothes nor shoes, were very insubordinate and at Angra committed many excesses. When clothes and accoutrements at last arrived, Freire actually refused to allow them to be delivered to the troops, for whose equipment he was himself responsible, until a duty of 15 per cent. had been paid upon them. By the exertions of Colonel Hodges, who has left a most interesting personal narrative of the expedition, the English auxiliaries, after being placed in a separate encampment for some weeks at Praia, were brought into a state of thorough discipline, and formed the backbone of the Constitutional army. A battalion of 500 French mercenaries, which landed at a later date, were also good troops. The rest of the army, which in all numbered 6500 men, was not of high quality. About half consisted of local levies in the Azores from a population with Miguelist sympathies. Still less trustworthy were the soldiers of the Miguelist garrisons who had been taken prisoners and forced to take service with their conquerors. It seemed a mere act of madness to dream of attempting an invasion with such an insignificant force; but the Emperor was firmly convinced that, so soon as he had set foot on Portuguese soil, the entire population would rise *en masse* to welcome their liberator; and, when the fleet set sail (June 27), all on

board looked upon their triumphant entry into Lisbon within a fortnight as a certainty.

How great was their delusion ! The news of Dom Pedro's arrival at Terceira and of his intentions had no sooner reached Portugal, than with a unanimity rare in history all classes of the people vied with one another in showing their devotion to the throne and the cause of Miguel, the King of the nation's choice. Forced loans were raised ; donatives were freely offered ; the imposition of severe taxation, such as that upon doors and windows, was submitted to without a murmur. Volunteers flocked in by tens of thousands. In this month of June, 1832, when Sartorius was weighing from St Michael, there were in Portugal 80,000 men under arms, of whom 50,000 formed the army for the field, and 30,000 garrisoned the fortresses. Such was the national enthusiasm, that there would have been no hesitation to fight, even had France and England openly declared for the cause of Dona Maria. The thought of defeat at the hands of Dom Pedro single-handed never entered men's minds. If the so-called "Liberator army" landed, not a single man should escape.

On July 7 the fleet of Sartorius sighted the town of Villa-de-Conde. So confident was Dom Pedro of a favourable reception, that Bernardo de Sá was sent on shore with a flag of truce to summon the Governor, Cardoso, to submit and to join the Constitutional forces with the garrison. The envoy was greeted with loud cries of *Viva Dom Miguel*, and barely escaped with his life. The eyes of the Emperor were now first opened to the fact that he might have to encounter serious opposition. The coast however was here open and the weather favourable ; and the whole army was safely disembarked near the village of Mindello, without a shot being fired. The Portuguese Government had expected the attack to be made in the neighbourhood of the Tagus with Lisbon as its objective, and had concentrated their chief attention on its defence. To General Santa Martha, with a division of 12,000 men, four thousand of whom garrisoned Oporto, had been confided the task of guarding the northern coast. A great opportunity was now offered to the Miguelist general. Villa Flôr was bound to seize a base of operations for his army ; but it would have been madness for him to advance against Santa Martha's far superior force at Oporto with Cardoso from Villa-de-Conde ready to fall on his rear. Almost equally hazardous would it have been to attack Villa-de-Conde with Santa Martha's division behind him. But, if in the Constitutional army there was confusion of counsels and a conspicuous lack of military capacity, on the side of their opponents the conduct of the war from first to last was marked by a dead level of absolute incompetence. Oporto was evacuated by Santa Martha ; even the Serra de Pilar, which on the south side of the Douro commands the city and its river harbour, was abandoned. In the afternoon of July 9, the liberator army took

possession of the town ; and on the following day the fleet entered the river. Great however was the disappointment of Dom Pedro at the suspicion and coldness with which his entry was greeted. There was no enthusiasm ; the inhabitants shut themselves up in their houses, and clearly regarded him as an enemy. He was equally deceived in his expectations that the Miguelist levies would at the earliest opportunity desert the cause of the "usurper" and flock to the banners of the young Queen, in whose name he had come to liberate them from tyranny. So far from this being the case, he was speedily to find himself enclosed within the walls of Oporto by vastly superior forces.

The first bloodshed was at Penafiel (July 18), where a body of troops, including the English battalion under Colonel Hodges, which had been pushed out by Villa Flôr to reconnoitre and collect provisions, repulsed a Miguelist force under Cardoso. The victors were not however strong enough to pursue, for two Miguelist armies were already advancing upon Oporto, one under Santa Martha from the north, another under Povoas from the south. On July 23 a second battle took place, Dom Pedro in person leading out his entire force to assault the position of Santa Martha at Ponte Ferreira. An indecisive encounter took place, chiefly remarkable for the military incapacity displayed by the leaders on both sides. It dispelled, however, the last hopes of Dom Pedro that the country would rise in his favour. Two courses only remained to him, either to escape by sea or to fortify himself strongly in Oporto and to await the course of events. He decided for the latter. In his desperate position, with powerful armies encircling him with a ring of steel, the Emperor never lost heart, and personally superintended the erection of lines of trenches, redoubts, and batteries, upon the series of hills on which Oporto lies, and upon the precipitous Serra de Pilar on the opposite bank of the river. By his exertions and example, slowly but surely the position was converted into an impregnable fortress.

Meanwhile the Portuguese armies, now under the sole command of General Gaspar Teixeira, were gradually pushing their approaches nearer, the sallies of the garrison being driven back on several occasions with loss. Batteries were erected on all commanding positions on both sides of the Douro, and a heavy bombardment was directed upon the town and the vessels in the river. Much damage was done, both to buildings and shipping, but nothing of a decisive nature. Had the Serra de Pilar not been allowed to fall into the enemy's hand through the supineness of Santa Martha, the Miguelist batteries would have been able to close the river, and probably to render the town untenable. Gaspar Teixeira, however, as a general showed himself in no way more capable than his predecessors. He had around Oporto about 35,000 men ; and yet, with this vast superiority of force, he allowed the besieged to go on quietly entrenching themselves, without attempting an assault upon any of their positions. When the assault was at length

delivered (September 29) it was repulsed with heavy losses. At the news of this disaster the consternation and anger were great in Lisbon. Dom Miguel himself conducted reinforcements to the front. Blame was laid upon the hapless Teixeira, who was removed from his command, and was replaced by the previously discredited Santa Martha.

With the advent of Santa Martha an attempt was made to repair Teixeira's chief omission, by closing the mouth of the Douro. While the investment of the city was made closer and closer, the left wing was gradually pushed down the river towards the Foz, and batteries erected on the banks, which at length made it impossible for merchantmen to make their way up-stream. They had to anchor in the roads and send their boats to run the gauntlet of the batteries in the dark winter nights. How great was the error in leaving the bar of the Foz open so long may be gauged by the fact that between September and December 1400 foreign mercenaries, English, Belgians, and Germans, with their armament and 300 horses, joined the garrison.

At the end of September Palmella had been sent to London to seek another loan, for funds were exhausted, and further to secure, if possible, the friendly mediation of the British Government. But money was not to be had except on ruinous terms; and Palmerston would take no steps to intervene, though he promised personal protection to Dom Pedro in case of "a complete catastrophe." As the autumn and winter went on, the situation in Oporto seemed desperate. Nevertheless, the courage of Dom Pedro never gave way; and his indomitable energy was the soul of a defence, which was destined to lead to ultimate victory. In October he took the supreme command into his own hands in the place of Villa Flôr, who was rewarded for his services with the title of Duke of Terceira. Provisions of every kind became very scarce; the foreign troops were half-mutinous for want of pay; the Miguelist batteries kept up an almost continuous bombardment day and night; the bar of the river was swept by the enemy's guns and rendered well-nigh impassable; but through all the dark and dismal months the garrison never failed. There was much useless bloodshed. On the one side a continual series of futile sorties, which led to nothing; on the other side a series of equally futile assaults, chiefly on the Serra de Pilar, always repulsed.

Palmella, accompanied by Mousinho de Albuquerque, left charged with a second mission to England (November 22). He met with a very cold reception, and was plainly told that the departure of Dom Pedro from Portugal must be the preliminary to any mediation on the part of the Powers. Palmella's failure led to his dismissal from office. His place was taken by the Marquis of Loulé; Silva Carvalho became Minister of Finance and Justice; and the influential Cândido Xavier, Minister of the Interior. With the new year came fresh changes. Experience had taught Dom Pedro his deficiencies as a general; and on January 1 he

handed over the chief command to General Solignac, a Frenchman, who had served with distinction under Masséna. He resolved also to call to his aid the experienced and popular Saldanha; and the democratic leader, despite the rebuff he had received from the Emperor in the previous spring, at once responded to the appeal. He reached Oporto (January 21), and was entrusted with the important post of the defence of the fortifications at the Foz, which were still in the hands of the Constitutionalists, and by the aid of which it was still possible to land at a small bay to the north of the bar of the river, and so keep open a communication with the sea. By the skill and vigour of Saldanha the efforts of the Miguelists to cut off this communication entirely, and so to starve out Oporto, were frustrated. The possession of the defences of the Foz was in reality the key to the whole position. Had the Miguelist general seized them at the very beginning of the siege surrender must speedily have followed.

When the middle of February was reached, both sides began to feel utterly wearied out and exhausted. The Miguelist enthusiasm and certainty of victory had slowly evaporated, as the endless siege went on, and the prospect of taking Oporto by force of arms grew darker. Santa Martha was replaced, as General-in-chief, by the Count of San Lourenço, but with small advantage to the besiegers. In the Miguelist camp money was as scarce as it was in that of Dom Pedro; and their privations at times were not much less severe. Yet Dom Pedro and his advisers saw clearly enough that Oporto could not be held much longer. Famine was in the city; dogs, cats, and rats, were being eaten; there were only two courses open—surrender or escape to the Azores. At this moment of despair the idea of retrieving the situation by a bold counter-stroke took shape. It appears that Captain Charles Napier first suggested to Palmella in London the proposal to purchase some steamers and convey in them, under the protection of the fleet, a strong body of troops to make an armed descent upon Lisbon and the south of Portugal. This proposal was by Palmella communicated to the Regent. At first it was rejected as impracticable. Not till the spring was well advanced was it seriously discussed, as a kind of forlorn hope, and finally adopted.

Sartorius had, during the months which had elapsed since the disembarkation at Mindello, succeeded in keeping open the sea approaches of Oporto. But, though he had on at least two occasions been within striking distance of the Miguelist fleet, he had through excess of caution failed to bring it to a general action or to inflict any serious damage upon it. He was accused of cowardice, if not of treachery. The truth is that, though Sartorius was undoubtedly lacking in dash and audacity, he had extraordinary difficulties to contend with. His crews, which were composed entirely of English mercenaries, were kept for months without pay, victuals, or clothes, and were frequently on the verge of

mutiny. In March their pay was nine months in arrear. If Sartorius during the stormy winter months managed to keep his fleet in being, and from his bases at Vigo and Bayonne to prevent the enemy from sealing the entrance to the Douro, he by so doing performed a service of vital importance to the beleaguered forces in Oporto. But Dom Pedro and his counsellors were dissatisfied with his inactivity, and determined to deprive him of his command, and replace him *ad interim* by Captain Crosbie, one of his officers. But Sartorius arrested the agents sent to supersede him; and the Regent was informed that, unless the arrears of pay were at once discharged, Sartorius would sail with the squadron to Flushing and sell it. There was no choice but to yield. Money was raised by forced contributions, and was forwarded to the Admiral together with a decree confirming him in his command. Having thus exacted reparation in the most humiliating form for the insult that he conceived to have been offered to him, Sartorius voluntarily resigned his post. Captain Napier, who was still in London engaged with Palmella in getting a supply of steamers for his projected expedition to the South, was nominated his successor.

The coming of Napier, a man of daring character and bold initiative, was the turning-point in the fortunes of the war. Napier, with the eye of a keen and experienced sailor, saw that the issue depended upon the command of the sea. He was quite aware that Dom Pedro's small fleet of converted merchantmen was inferior to that of Dom Miguel in the size and the number of ships; but it was manned entirely by English sailors, and, despite their indiscipline and lack of equipment, he had no fear of staking the fate of the Queen's cause upon a pitched battle with the enemy's forces. He has left a vivid narrative from his own pen of the brilliant success that attended his operations.

It was on June 1, 1833, that Napier and Palmella, with Mendizabal and Rodrigo da Fonseca, landed at the Foz and made their way to Oporto. They had brought with them five steamers, 500 English and Belgian mercenaries, and, perhaps most important of all, a sum of £18,000 for the exclusive service of the expedition. Their reception by Dom Pedro was chilling. He was suspicious of Palmella, and, after the rebuff he had suffered from Sartorius, had no very friendly feelings to the new commander, whose downright speech and brusqueness of manner were not to his taste. The Council was divided on the subject of the expedition. Solignac resigned, and was replaced by Saldanha. Napier wanted to make a direct attack on Lisbon, and asked for 5000 men, and, finding that Dom Pedro would not make up his mind, threatened to return to England. His firm attitude led to a compromise. It was agreed that the expedition was to make some point on the coast of the Algarves, and not Lisbon, its objective, and that it was to consist of 2500 men only. The Duke of Terceira was appointed to the military command, Palmella to be civil Governor of the conquered

territory. On June 21 Napier weighed anchor. He had with him the five transport steamers he had brought, three frigates, a corvette, and a brig, mounting 176 guns.

The story of the landing at Mindello and the occupation of Oporto repeated itself. On June 24 the force disembarked in the bay of Cacellas without opposition and occupied Tavira, which was deserted. The army then marched on Faro, the capital of the Algarves, where Palmella established a provisional Government. The inhabitants in the south showed themselves no less hostile than those in the north. They looked upon the invaders as heretics and bandits. Mollelos, the Miguelist Governor, had retreated, and was awaiting reinforcements from Lisbon with which to attack and overwhelm the small invading force.

But the issue was not to be left to the blundering Portuguese generals. Napier knew his own mind, and his objective was Lisbon. To reach Lisbon the enemy's fleet had to be destroyed, and on July 2 he set sail from Lagos Bay to find it. The Miguelist fleet at the same time put out from the Tagus to meet him. It numbered two battleships, two frigates, two corvettes, three brigs, and a schooner, mounting 378 guns. The disproportion in numbers and in weight of metal between this naval force and Napier's was enormous; but the quality and condition of the Portuguese crews was wretched; the British Admiral was not unaware of this, and, though his own crews were scarcely more experienced than their adversaries, they were all daring and reckless British seamen, who could and would fight. Napier therefore determined to avoid an artillery action; and on the afternoon of July 5, off Cape St Vincent, he bore down upon the Miguelist fleet, giving instructions to his captains to go straight for the enemy, grapple, and board. In his own words, he was resolved to make "one desperate effort to save Portugal or lose the cause." "There was no medium; all must be gained, or all lost." The battle began at 4 p.m. and in two hours all was over. The two Portuguese men-of-war, the two frigates, and a corvette had hauled down their flags. Two small vessels alone returned to Lisbon. For the second time a decisive victory had been won by British sailors off Cape St Vincent. The Miguelist fleet had ceased to exist.

The success of Napier's daring venture stirred Terceira to emulation. The Duke had on July 4 withdrawn his small force to Loulé on the coast. The army of Mollelos, already much superior in numbers to his own, was being reinforced; and Terceira was timid about his communications with the sea. The arrival of Napier with his prizes at Lagos produced a complete revulsion of feeling. Terceira at once resolved to take the offensive and advance into Alemtejo. He entered Messejana July 17. Here he learned that Mollelos had made a flank movement, and occupied Beja, which had declared for the Queen's cause, and by doing so had committed the error of uncovering the road to Lisbon. Without a moment's hesitation Terceira made up his mind to cast

caution to the winds and march straight on the capital. His little band, 1500 infantry all told, rent the air with acclamations on hearing their chief's bold proposal, and, having two days' start of an army of 4000 men in their rear, went forward to attack a city, whose garrison was at least three times that number. It was a stroke of mad audacity, which nothing but success could justify. And it succeeded.

No opposition was encountered, until Setubal was reached (July 22). Here was a small Miguelist force, which however fled in disorder at Terceira's approach. His numbers were unknown, and the mere daring of his march struck his foes with panic. The fugitives brought the news of their rout to Lisbon, and aroused the authorities to the imminence of the peril. The Duke of Cadaval had already sent a division to join Mollelos, and had (July 23) despatched a force of 3000 infantry and three squadrons of cavalry under the command of Telles-Jordão to Almada. With great rapidity Terceira pushed on from Setubal to the shore of the Tagus estuary, and on the evening of the 23rd encountered the advanced troops of Telles-Jordão at Piedade. In the narrow space between the hills and the river, where manœuvring was impossible, a battle ensued, which ended in the complete defeat of the Miguelists. As they fled in the dark with the object of embarking at Caçilhas for Lisbon, a great number lost their lives; among the killed was Telles-Jordão himself. The following morning Almada surrendered.

Nevertheless, Terceira was really in a most critical position. Between him and Lisbon lay the broad Tagus. Close upon his heels, and cutting off his retreat, was the army of Mollelos. In the city the Duke of Cadaval had some ten to twelve thousand men and abundance of artillery wherewith to oppose a landing. A continuance of light northerly breezes prevented Napier from forcing the bar of the river, and coming to the aid of the General. But Terceira was saved by the action of Cadaval himself. The nerves of Dom Miguel's Ministers had been utterly shattered by the shock of the defeat at Piedade following so quickly upon the disaster off Cape St Vincent. At a council held at early dawn on the 24th it was resolved to abandon Lisbon. Cadaval withdrew with the troops to Lourés, accompanied by his colleagues and a large number of officials and priests. The same day Terceira's army crossed the river in boats from Caçilhas and took possession of the capital without firing a shot. Even the powerful forts, which commanded the entrance to the Tagus, were abandoned; and Napier, to his surprise, was able on the morning of the 25th to sail in and bring his fleet to anchor before the town, unopposed. He at once took steps to secure the arsenal with all its stores, and to refit his squadron. Three days later, on the 28th, Dom Pedro, who had set out from Oporto as soon as the news of the occupation of Lisbon reached him, disembarked. A section of the population of the capital had always been attached to the Liberal cause; others, who had suffered from the Miguelist

tyranny, or were weary of the burden of the war, were ready to welcome a change; and Dom Pedro was warmly greeted as he made his way through the streets to the palace of the Ajuda, which he now revisited after an absence of twenty-six years.

Dom Miguel, at the time of the capture of Lisbon, was with the army before Oporto. The command of this army had been taken over, on July 13, by Marshal Bourmont, a French legitimist, an officer of tried capacity. By his orders a fierce assault was made upon the lines (July 25), which like all previous attacks was repulsed after heavy fighting with severe loss under the eyes of the King. This was the last act in this remarkable siege, for the news of the fall of Lisbon reached Dom Miguel the day after his defeat; thoroughly discouraged, he resolved to withdraw his forces, and form a junction at Coimbra with the troops under Cadaval and Mollelos. At last, after a siege of eleven months, Oporto was free—"a siege that," to quote the comment of Napier, "with an enterprising enemy, ought not to have lasted eleven days." And now once again, as the same shrewd observer points out, lack of enterprise lost to Dom Miguel a great opportunity of regaining Lisbon. By the middle of August no steps, despite the vigorous representations of the British Admiral, had been taken to fortify the capital. Had the King with the large force gathered at Coimbra marched straight on Lisbon, he would in all probability have carried it by a *coup de main*. Not until August 13 did the army, consisting of 24,000 men in three divisions, move southward; and so slow was its progress that time was allowed to Dom Pedro to construct fortifications before the town, and to make preparations for defence. Just as at Oporto, an assault on the lines (September 5) was repelled with loss; and Marshal Bourmont was forced to content himself with a blockade, which, as the sea was open, was useless. Conscious of his failure, Bourmont resigned his command (September 21) and was succeeded by General Macdonnel, a Scotchman, who had formerly served in Spain. A successful sortie by Saldanha, who had left Oporto for Lisbon on October 23, terminated the blockade. Macdonnel retreated to Santarem to be in his turn blockaded. For the first time in the war the roles of besieger and besieged, as played by Miguelists and Constitutionalists, were interchanged.

The cause of Dom Miguel was still, however, far from desperate. Except in Lisbon and Oporto, the whole country north and south recognised him as its King; and the short experience that Lisbon had had of Pedroist rule was far from favourable. The Regent posed as a victorious dictator, and, rejecting the counsels of moderation, which were urged upon him by Palmella, and by Lord William Russell who after the fall of Lisbon had been accredited as British Minister to the Court of Maria II, preferred to pursue a policy of reprisals and confiscation. The Jesuits were expelled; the papal Nuncio was requested

to withdraw ; and all who had served under the Absolutist régime were treated as enemies. Napier, who was a strong adherent of the party of conciliation, scathingly says of the new Government, which he had done so much to set up—"one species of tyranny was substituted for another ; there was a change of men, none of measures ; they were rulers of a party, not of a kingdom....They thought themselves masters and took no pains to conciliate." To such an extent indeed had the hallucination that he was already master of Portugal gained possession of Dom Pedro, that on October 1 he issued a decree summoning the Cortes, although his authority did not actually extend beyond the fortifications of the two towns which he held in military occupation.

Thus passed the autumn of 1833. The young Queen had arrived (September 22) from France accompanied by the Empress. Dom Miguel with his main army in Santarem was contained by the Constitutional army under Saldanha at Cartaxo. The garrison at Oporto was threatened afresh by the Miguelist army of the north under d'Almar. Both sides were grievously in want of funds, more particularly the Miguelists. Both sides, and specially the Government of Dom Pedro, were distracted by divided counsels and rival ambitions. The year 1834 was marked by more vigorous operations. Saldanha advanced northwards to Leiria, which he captured (January 14), cutting off the enemy from Coimbra. At Pernes he gained (January 30) a barren victory over a Miguelist force under Povoas. He followed this up by a more important triumph at Almester (February 18). The month of March saw Napier at the head of a body of English marines and sailors disembarking at Caminha and making himself master of the province of Minho. Another army under Terceira penetrated by the Douro into Tras-os-Montes, where he was joined by a Spanish force. This force had entered Portugal in virtue of the Quadruple Alliance concluded (April 22) between Great Britain, France, Spain, and the Government of Queen Maria, for the purpose of putting an end to the war and expelling Dom Miguel from Portugal. The allied army encountered a retreating body of the enemy (May 16) at Asseirceira, and after a brave resistance completely defeated them. It was the last stand of the Miguelists.

Dom Miguel was still at the head of 18,000 men at Santarem, but their spirit was broken. He beat a hasty retreat to Evora-Monte, but only to surrender. A Convention was signed (May 24) ; and on this occasion Dom Pedro, in opposition to the wishes of many of his counsellors, showed himself magnanimous. The army was to lay down its arms ; but the officers, on taking their oath to the new Government, were allowed to retain their posts, and the soldiers were free to return to their homes. An amnesty was granted for political offences, of whatever nature ; and there was to be no confiscation without sanction of the Cortes. By the terms of the Convention Dom Miguel, though condemned to perpetual exile from the Peninsula, was granted a life pension of sixty

*contos of reis*—or about £1500 per annum. Nothing could have exceeded the incapacity and errors committed from first to last by Dom Pedro and his adherents except those actually committed by their opponents. Of the Pedroists the acute and friendly critic, Napier, observes: "With regard to military measures or plans they never had any.... When they were shut up in Oporto, I am not aware of one wise statesmanlike decree they issued, or one that had the least tendency to conciliate the opposite party; and, when they arrived in Lisbon, there was hardly one political act they did, that Dom Miguel would not himself have counselled them to do in order to make Dom Pedro unpopular." If then Dom Miguel, with all the advantages of the devoted support of a united nation, and the possession of far superior forces, failed to maintain himself on the throne, some idea can be formed of the utter lack of all the qualities of successful leadership, in himself, his generals, and his advisers. The fallen prince was too proud to accept alms at the hands of his brother. He sailed on May 30, and at Genoa issued a protest (June 20) against the enforced relinquishment of his rights to the Portuguese Crown, and refused to take the pension. In thus accepting a lot of poverty, which he afterwards bore with exemplary patience, Dom Miguel, as he makes his exit from the page of history, commands a certain measure of respect in his hour of misfortune.

On August 15 the Cortes assembled. Dom Pedro, who had for some time been suffering from illness brought on by the excessive fatigues and privations of the past two years, gave a long address in which he rendered an account of the events of his regency, of the burden of which he asked on the ground of his health to be relieved. The Chambers, however, insisted that he should retain his powers during the minority of the Queen; and on the 29th at the Ajuda palace he took the oath as required by the Charter. It was his last act. He retired to the palace of Queluz to seek repose, but rapidly became worse, and, after some weeks of severe suffering, expired on September 24. He had not yet reached his 35th year. The strangely adventurous career of the ex-Emperor and ex-King, whose crowded life thus ended, while still in early manhood, in the hour of a triumph as unexpected as it was complete, had throughout its changing fortunes an element of the romantic, the eccentric, and the chivalrous. It was probably a happy thing for Portugal, nay for Dom Pedro himself, that death came so soon. A temperament so restless as his, after the storm and stress of such varied agitations and experiences, could scarcely have found satisfaction in retirement.

The short dictatorship of Dom Pedro had been productive of lasting results. A succession of decrees had given effect to the reforming and legislative ideas of the minister Mousinho da Silveira, a really constructive statesman. Tithes were abolished, hereditary rights and privileges swept away, the numerous monasteries and convents were closed and

their property nationalised, judicial and administrative functions were separated, monopolies suppressed. The semi-feudal Portugal of history and tradition disappeared in 1834, and Queen Maria II entered upon her reign in a transformed land. But there was no master-hand at the head of affairs, and in an impoverished and backward country, which had just passed through so many cruel vicissitudes, unrest, party spirit, and general discontent, were for a lengthened period to hamper progress and render sound and stable government impossible. The marriage of the Queen to Augustus, Duke of Leuchtenberg, son of Eugène Beauharnais and brother to Dom Pedro's second wife (December 1, 1834), was unfortunately followed by the speedy death of the new Prince Consort (March 25, 1835). A second husband was speedily found for her in the person of the youthful Ferdinand of Saxe-Coburg, the nephew of King Leopold I of Belgium; to whom she was married on April 9, 1836. They found themselves confronted by a troubled situation and grave disorders.

There were three main parties, whose struggles and intrigues filled up the whole of the distracted reign of Maria II. The Chartists upheld Constitutional Government in accordance with the provisions of Dom Pedro's Charter of 1826; the Septembrists, or democratic party, wished to revert to the principles of the Constitution of 1822; the Miguelists favoured absolutist rule and clerical predominance in the State. The Queen at the time of her second marriage was but 17 years old, Ferdinand only 20. She was almost a stranger to Portugal, her husband a foreigner both by race and training. In such circumstances it was but natural that the young and inexperienced sovereign, though not lacking in courage or in character, should have been swayed by the advice of a small Court coterie composed chiefly of foreigners, or that she should have made mistakes in her efforts to maintain the authority of the Crown amidst the rivalry of self-seeking politicians, and the ceaseless strife of factions. The decades, which follow the close of the war of succession, contain a dismal record of insurrections and counter-insurrections accompanied by the rise and fall of ministers. The briefest summary of the chief events that marked them must here suffice.

The Chartist leaders, Palmella, Saldanha, and Terceira, held the chief posts in the Administrations of the first two years of Queen Maria's reign. In September, 1836, a revolution took place at Lisbon, which placed the Septembrists under Lumiares, Sá-da-Bandeira, and the brothers Passos in power. The Charter was suppressed, and the Queen was compelled to take the oath to the Constitution of 1822 (September 9-11). An attempt was made to shake off the yoke by a *coup d'état* planned in the palace of Belem, and known as the *Belemzada*; but it was foiled by the energy of Manuel Passos (November 4). A Ministry was formed under Sá-da-Bandeira, which remained in office until April, 1839, except for a short interval in the summer of 1837. This year, 1837, was marked by a formidable Chartist insurrection under Saldanha and

Terceira, known as the revolt of the marshals. Several actions took place with varying success, but at length the forces of the Government were victorious, and the two marshals went into exile. On September 16, an heir to the Crown, afterwards Pedro V, was born, and the title of King Consort was conferred upon Ferdinand. In 1839 a moderate Ministry succeeded that of Sá-da-Bandeira under Count Bomfim as president but with Costa Cabral, the Minister of Justice, as its moving spirit. The return of a Chartist majority to the Cortes in the following year was a sign that the ascendancy of Septembrist principles was at an end; but it was not till January, 1842, that the counter-revolution was effected. The action of Costa Cabral himself precipitated the issue. The Minister's bold *pronunciamento* at Oporto led to the restoration of the Charter. On February 10, a decree reestablished the Charter of 1826, and a Cabral administration was formed under the nominal presidency of the Duke of Terceira, which lasted until April, 1846.

There can be no doubt that in bringing about this revolution Costa Cabral by forcing the hands of the Queen's Government really acted in accordance with the royal wishes. Henceforth as Minister of the Interior he wielded almost dictatorial influence in the country. To him was due the new administrative code of 1842. Against the Cabral *régime* there was a coalition of oppositions, Miguelist, Septembrist, and dissentient Chartist; but for some years the Ministry was strong enough to hold its own against all efforts to subvert it. But, though many risings were successfully and firmly suppressed, the growing hostility to the dictator at length came to a head in the revolutionary outburst of May, 1846; and Cabral, now Count of Thomar, had in his turn to give up office and go into exile. But the revolution of Maria da Fonte, as this general rising is usually called, was not to be appeased by the departure of the obnoxious Minister. An insurrectionary Junta was formed at Oporto; and Saldanha, now at the head of the Ministry, found himself unable to save the dynasty without the assistance of a British squadron in the Tagus. The opening of the year 1847 saw rebellion still rampant in the land, and defying throughout the spring the efforts of the royal troops under Saldanha. Foreign intervention was invoked. In June a Spanish and a British force marched upon Oporto and a British fleet blockaded the Douro. The rebel city surrendered (June 30) and the Junta was dissolved. The Convention of Gramido (July 24) brought to an end a civil war that had caused widespread distress throughout the country. It left the Government discredited, industry at a standstill, the State bankrupt. The closing months of 1847 saw tranquillity restored in Portugal, but it was the tranquillity of exhaustion.

## CHAPTER XI.

### THE GERMANIC FEDERATION. (1815-40.)

THE Napoleonic domination in Germany had been submerged by the strongest wave of really national feeling which Germany had experienced since the early days of the Reformation ; and for a year or two statesmen as well as poets thought that this patriotic enthusiasm might find permanent expression in a free, independent, and national German State. The quarter of a century which followed the War of Liberation was, however, a period of disillusionment, of hopes belied, promises broken, and reforms deferred. Reaction set in ; and in 1840 Germany seemed further off from union and liberty than it had been in 1815. This result was natural, though unforeseen. The German peasant who returned from Waterloo or Paris was more intent on rebuilding his ruined cottage than on agitating for a vote ; the middle classes had enough to do in restoring German trade and manufactures ; while Prussian and other statesmen were amply burdened with the task of assimilating the new provinces with which recent events had enriched their sovereigns.

There were other causes for the barrenness of the efforts towards progress and reform. The chief was perhaps their lack of unity. It is difficult for a nation to deal with more than one great constitutional problem at a time ; yet Germany at one and the same moment was confronted with nearly all the problems which England took ten centuries to solve—the relics of feudalism, the relations between executive and legislature, and between Church and State, and the strength of centrifugal forces. This chaos of conflicting issues produced a similar confusion of political parties. Some wished for German unity ; Metternich described it as an “infamous object.” Of those who wished for unity, some desired it under Austria’s hegemony, and Stein had tentatively suggested a revival of the Empire in the House of Habsburg ; a few saw salvation only in the predominance of Prussia. Others again, regarding both Prussia and Austria as semi-foreign Powers, wanted a purely Germanic federation ; and a few desired a democratic republic. Equally divergent were men’s conceptions of domestic government. There were advocates of bureaucratic absolutism after the Napoleonic model ; old-fashioned

aristocrats, hating both bureaucracy and other people's liberties, and calling both indifferently Jacobinism, demanded the restoration of the former system of provincial Estates; while the Liberals desired popular representation, central parliaments, and responsible Governments. The fall of Napoleon was interpreted in two opposite senses; he was regarded by sovereigns as the embodiment of revolution, by their subjects as the incarnation of tyranny; the former saw in his ruin a justification of legitimist absolutism, the latter a vindication of popular liberty. Patriotism was still local rather than national; Prussian administrators found it easier to rectify the frontiers of a State than those of a parish; and men whose souls transcended parochial politics became, as a rule, cosmopolitan.

Yet there had been a certain simplification of German particularism. The reduction in the number of German sovereign States from three hundred to thirty-nine was not in itself a great step towards unity; for the elimination of so many competitors from the struggle for power sharpened the rivalry among those which survived; and the vertical lines which divided Germany, while becoming fewer, grew also deeper and clearer. But this territorial particularism was the only one which remained of importance. The horizontal lines were being obliterated; the knights had disappeared as a political force; the free cities were now reduced to four—Frankfort, the seat of the new Diet, Hamburg, Bremen, and Lübeck, which owed their immunity not so much to any respect for municipal liberty or conservative feeling as to their fortunate distance from the great acquisitive Powers. The abolition of serfdom removed the greatest of class distinctions; and, although the highest of State officials could not bring a *bürgerlich* wife to Court, the divisions of caste were losing their political, as distinct from their social, importance. Finally, Germany had—last but one of the countries of Europe—destroyed the temporal power and absorbed the temporal domains of the first of the medieval Estates, the Church.

Thus territorialism had beaten all its enemies, and particularism had become geographical and monarchical; for the republican and aristocratic sovereignties, which had hitherto made up no small part of Germany, had now been almost extinguished in favour of monarchy—a new-fangled sovereignty, as Görres complained, which despoiled the Church, destroyed the aristocracy, held the third Estate in bondage, and was the real Jacobinical and revolutionary element in Germany. The most unpopular of these great sovereignties was Prussia, who, as the Austrian President of the Diet unkindly reminded her, had made her conquests at the expense of other German Powers. She had now taken Austria's place as the largest occupier of purely German soil. She had, indeed, failed to secure the territorial continuity after which she hankered; and the various agreements, not always carried out, into which she entered with Hanover and Nassau, for the construction

of military roads, were but slight compensation. But she enveloped Germany as Austria had never done; and to her, in virtue of her Rhine provinces, would now fall the national duty of defending the fatherland against a French attack. As Prussia and Austria had been developed out of the Nordmark and Ostmark by their duty of protecting the medieval Empire, so the Imperial dignity was the reward of Prussia's championship of modern Germany. The post of danger was also the post of honour and profit. But it was not one of Prussia's choice; Frederick William III would willingly have bartered Rhine lands for Polish and Saxon territory, and have thus involved Prussia in that condition of composite nationality which weakened the rule and distracted the energies of Austria.

Austria was no less short-sighted in this respect. Deliberately she shirked the duty of defending the frontier of Germany, and with malicious satisfaction saw it devolve upon Prussia: she preferred Venice to Belgium, Salzburg and the Innviertel to Vorderösterreich, i.e. her lands between the Rhine and the Lech: she recalled her far-flung western line, and retreated south-eastwards to assume uneasy Italian and Slavonic dominions. She sacrificed her position in Germany to her ambitions in Europe, and sought to withdraw as much of her territory as possible from the Germanic Confederation. She was no longer an essentially German State; and the efforts of her German rulers to control their Hungarian, Slavonic, Czech, and Italian subjects consumed Austria's energies and undermined her position in face of her rivals. Both Prussia and Austria, in fact, regarded territorial consolidation and scientific frontiers as the chief bases of political greatness. The tradition of Frederick the Great was still strong in his land; by drastic administration he had made Silesian and Polish provinces integral parts of his realm; and his successors thought to extend the process without any regard to other considerations. Religious diversity had lost its importance; nationality had barely made itself felt; Europe was measured out in so many thousand square miles and so many millions of souls, and the individuality of peoples and provinces was entirely left out of account.

The settlement of 1815 had thus to some extent prepared the way for the events of 1866 and 1870-1; but Prussia had still a great work of internal development to accomplish before she could throw down the gage to Austria, and as yet she lacked the statesmanship to carry her through such a struggle. There were Prussians who saw that the contest must come; but for the present subserviency to, and not rivalry with, Austria was the dominant characteristic of Frederick William's policy. Such antagonism as there was in German politics was rather due to the fear which south-German States like Bavaria, Württemberg, and Baden felt of both Prussia and Austria; and the Liberalism, which these States somewhat unexpectedly evinced, has been attributed more

to the dislike of the military monarchies than to any love of constitutionalism for its own sake. Wangenheim, the Württemberg statesman, regarded Swabia as the real heart of Germany, and projected a German league to check the semi-foreign Austria and Prussia. Montgelas, the Bavarian Prime Minister, hoped to make Bavaria the centre of this league, and tried to find a second Tilly in Marshal Wrede. Baden, having no hopes of its own in this direction, was more national in sentiment. The other German States could play but a subordinate part. Hanover's connexion with England tempered any German ambitions she might otherwise have conceived; and a similar result attended the union of Schleswig-Holstein with Denmark and of Luxemburg with the Netherlands. Electoral and Grand-ducal Hesse, Nassau, Oldenburg, and the two Mecklenburgs, followed for the most part the traditional idiosyncrasies of the petty German Courts; but the Duke of Weimar, one of the four Thuringian-Saxon sovereigns, made himself prominent as a patron of Liberalism; while Saxe-Coburg was distinguished for the number of princes it exported.

The dissolution of the old Empire in 1806 destroyed the last formal bond of unity between these various States; but the Congress of Vienna called the Germanic Confederation into being to fill the void. Thirty-eight sovereign Powers made up the confederate body; Hesse-Homburg, which had been inadvertently omitted, was included in 1817, but the number remained thirty-nine only until 1826, when the line of Saxe-Gotha died out. The subsequent extinction of the Houses of Anhalt-Köthen, Anhalt-Bernburg, and Hesse-Homburg (1866), and the surrender by Hohenzollern-Sigmaringen and Hohenzollern-Hechingen of their sovereign rights to Prussia, reduced the number to thirty-three before the dissolution of the Confederation in 1866. Its object, as stated by its authors, was to guarantee the external and internal peace of Germany and the independence and inviolability of the Confederate States. Its members undertook to defend not merely Germany as a whole, but each individual State in the case of attack, and mutually guaranteed all those possessions which were included in the Union. Austria, however, brought only its German States into the Confederation, so that the Federal body was not pledged to the defence of Venice, Hungary, or Galicia; and the Prussian and Polish provinces of the Hohenzollerns were similarly excluded. The Confederates bound themselves to make no war on one another, but to submit their differences to the mediation of the Diet, and in the last instance to the decision of a Court of arbitration (*Austrägalinstanz*).

The organ of the Confederation was to be a Diet in permanent session at Frankfort-on-the-Main, in which every sovereign State should be represented. This Diet (*Bundestag*) was to have an ordinary and a general assembly; in the ordinary assembly there were to be seventeen delegates, one each for the eleven chief States, Austria, Prussia, Bavaria,

the kingdom of Saxony, Hanover, Würtemberg, Baden, Electoral Hesse, Grand-ducal Hesse, Holstein, and Luxemburg; one for the Grand-ducal and Ducal Saxon Houses; one for Brunswick and Nassau; one for the two Mecklenburgs; one for Oldenburg, Anhalt-Dessau, and the two Schwarzbuchs; one for another group of petty sovereigns; and one for the four free cities. But in the general assembly, or the *Plenum*, every sovereign State was to have at least one vote; Austria, Prussia, Saxony, Bavaria, Hanover, and Würtemberg had four each; Baden, Electoral Hesse, Grand-ducal Hesse, Holstein, and Luxemburg three each; Brunswick, Mecklenburg-Schwerin, and Nassau two each; the total number being sixty-nine. The ordinary assembly was to prepare measures for discussion in the *Plenum*, and to decide what business should be submitted to the fuller body. But the *Plenum* alone could determine questions relating to the fundamental laws of the Confederation, its organic institutions, and "other arrangements of common interest." The Austrian representative was to preside in both assemblies, and to have a casting vote; in the ordinary assembly a bare majority was enough; in the *Plenum* there must be a two-thirds majority. But whenever it was a question of "fundamental laws, organic institutions, individual rights, or religious affairs," the Federal Act declared that a majority should not suffice, either in the *Plenum* or in the ordinary assembly; although not expressly stated, unanimity would then be indispensable.

Such was the assembly which some men hoped would solve the problem of German unification. Its legal and constitutional position was, however, involved in ambiguity. The foregoing provisions were embodied in the Acts of the Congress of Vienna, and as such they were imposed by the authority of the Great Powers which had assumed, as Würtemberg afterwards complained, the dictatorship of Europe, formerly usurped by Napoleon. It is true that the committee, to which the Congress had entrusted the regulation of German affairs, was exclusively composed of German members; but the national committee derived its authority from the European Congress. Foreign Powers sent envoys to Frankfort to watch the proceedings of the Diet and see that it did not tamper with their work, the Federal Act; and the Baden Minister, Hacke, welcomed their presence as a safeguard and support of German sovereigns against Prussia and Austria. When members began to discuss the Federal Act, as Cromwell's Parliament did the Instrument of Government, Count Johann Rudolf von Buol-Schauenstein, the President, declared that the Act was like the Bible; they might expound it, but they could not change it; it was fundamental law. Yet the Great Powers were not the real obstacle in the Diet's path. The Federal Act had made express provision for the discussion by the Diet of fundamental laws, and indeed prescribed the "*rédaction*" of fundamental laws as the first task of the Diet. When, four years later, a notable addition was

made to the Federal Act, it was done without the intervention or consent of foreign States.

It was not, however, accomplished by the Diet, but by the German Cabinets; and it was from them that the real resistance to the Diet came. The Federal Act and the Diet were in fact a compromise between two conflicting policies. Both the party of German unity, as represented by Stein, and the German Liberals, looked to the Diet to achieve the union of the Fatherland. To them the Germanic Confederation was a *Bundesstaat*; but Buol, at the opening of the first session of the Diet, explained that Germany was not a *Bundesstaat* but a *Staatenbund*, not a federal State, but a federation of States. The success of a federation depends upon the extent to which each federating State is willing to delegate its sovereignty to the federal authority; but the authors of the Federal Act took their stand upon the indefeasible rights of hereditary sovereignty and would part with none of them. The Diet was foredoomed to impotence; it represented solely the particularist and centrifugal forces of Germany, and the American Congress would resemble it if it consisted of a Senate only, without a House of Representatives. It was in fact, like the Polish Diet, a diplomatic congress, not a parliament. In the German, as in the Polish, Diet there was practically a *liberum veto* and a system of *mandats impératifs*. Its members were simply the nominees of the various Governments, and were absolutely bound by their instructions. There was no constitutional machinery for executing the Diet's decrees; and resort to force was barred by the Federal Act. It was the duty of the Diet, thought Metternich, to abjure all intervention in disputes between sovereign Princes and their subjects, even when those disputes related to such provisions of the Federal Act as the promise of representative institutions; for "their rights of sovereignty remain intact" and "the federal union simply tends to secure to these rights an increase of strength and extent."

Such was the general opinion of the Diet held by Governments which found in Metternich their ablest champion. The mere fact that the Liberals regarded the Diet as a means towards German unity prejudiced Austrian statesmen against it, for unity itself savoured of the one and indivisible republic. Some sort of federation was necessary to protect Germany from French and Russian pressure; but it was an evil to be kept within narrow bounds. To Metternich the Germanic Confederation was nothing more than a defensive league of German sovereigns against foreign and domestic foes. Its external function was to protect the German monarchs against the Jacobinism of the French and Russian Governments; its domestic business was to save them from German Liberalism. Its organisation was certainly better adapted for this purpose than for those which Stein hoped to see it accomplish; and, if this is to be regarded as the genuine function of the Federation, it was in a high degree successful. For more than a generation Germany

kept Liberalism at bay and escaped the ravages of constitutional government.

The Federal Act fixed September 1, 1815, as the day on which the Diet should be opened; but first Napoleon's return from Elba, and then the threat of civil war in Germany, postponed the execution of this clause. Bavaria was the cause of the latter disturbance; she rebelled against Austria's appropriation of Salzburg and the Innviertel on the one hand, and on the other set up a claim to Baden's share of the Palatinate. The dispute with Austria, which nearly led to war, was, however, settled by the Treaty of April 14, 1816, which compensated Bavaria for her losses to Austria by giving her the Palatinate west of the Rhine and some districts in the Odenwald. At length the Diet was opened by Count Buol in the Thurn and Taxis palace at Frankfort on November 5, 1816. The business awaiting its consideration was as extensive as its powers were circumscribed; for the Act of Federation was a programme rather than a constitution. The Diet was to determine such questions as the freedom of the Press, the nature of the constitutions to be introduced into the various States of the Confederation, the formation of a federal army, the regulation of commerce, and in fact the whole range of internal and external relations of Germany. But, before it had even approached a solution of any one of these problems, it was to afford public proof of impotence. The Elector of Hesse was perhaps the most arbitrary of German Princes; and his determination to regard as invalid every act done in his territories since their incorporation in the kingdom of Westphalia involved his subjects in intolerable hardships. In the eyes of the Liberals one of the chief functions of the Diet was to guarantee German subjects against the tyranny of Princes; and the grievances of the Hessian people were soon brought to its notice. The Elector at once repudiated the Diet's right to interfere, and the Diet replied by ostracising Hesse's representative at Frankfort and requesting Austria and Prussia to withdraw their envoys from Cassel. Even Buol denounced the Elector's attitude, and asserted the Diet's supremacy; and the Prussian representative Goltz concurred. But both Buol and Goltz had acted without consulting their Cabinets. Metternich read Buol a lecture on the impropriety of belittling the dignity of sovereigns; Prussia remained inert; and the Diet was compelled to swallow its indignation and leave the Elector to do what he liked with his own.

The Liberals did not always lose by the Diet's incapacity. The Duke of Saxe-Weimar had promptly redeemed his promise by granting his dominions a Constitution in May, 1816, before the opening of the Diet. He was acting in the spirit of the original draft of Article 13 of the Federal Act, which had pledged every member of the Federation to grant his subjects a representative constitution within a year. But this promise had been emasculated by the omission of the time-limit, and the substitution of "will" for "shall"; the clause became a prophecy

and not a command; and, as Görres complained, it was mangled and maimed until it guaranteed to the German people no more than an “unlimited right of expectation.” The Diet, however, regarded the fulfilment of this pledge as a matter for its own discretion, and resented Saxe-Weimar’s precipitancy as a bid for popularity or a claim to superior virtue. It was still more annoyed when a petition for the execution of this article was presented to itself. On this point the Cabinets were almost unanimous; and even those which, like Württemberg, made a show of Liberal sentiments to win the favour of the Tsar, secretly intrigued against the Liberals at the Diet. The promise had been made on the eve of Waterloo; there was no such hurry now; and sovereigns began to doubt whether the popular energy, which had been evoked to destroy Napoleon, should be perpetuated as a check upon themselves. Meanwhile the Grand Duke of Saxe-Weimar was being hailed in the press as the only German sovereign who kept his word; and a prompt and formal repudiation of the pledge would produce a bad impression. The Diet, therefore, must neither affirm nor deny, but leave this as a matter to be decided by the individual wisdom of princes.

A like fate befell the eighteenth article of the Federal Act, which required the Diet to draft a uniform law dealing with the freedom of the Press and the limits of copyright. In the summer of 1817 Hardenberg had a memorial on this subject prepared for discussion with Metternich. In it he made a distinction, afterwards adopted by Metternich, between learned and scientific works and journals or newspapers. Complete freedom for the former was to be combined with an effective censorship of the latter. The Austrian Chancellor again thought this a question for individual sovereigns to settle; and, although the Diet appointed a commission to deal with the matter, it came to no decision until other events had led Metternich to modify his attitude towards that body. So long as Liberal sentiments found favour in the Diet, Metternich considered it necessary to hold it in check. When in 1819 the reactionary spirit became supreme, the Diet might be allowed the exercise of its powers. The one conclusion of importance at which the Diet during these years arrived was to deny to the “mediatised” princes those collective votes in the assembly of which the Federal Act had held out hopes. That achievement was not enough to invalidate Görres’ description of the Diet as “a central power which does not rule, but is ruled by, the separate parts; an executive wholly destitute of authority, which cannot proceed against the refractory, and is not in a condition to execute anything whatever because it can never obtain the requisite unanimity; a legislature which will never investigate its own competence; a judiciary which no one is bound to obey; an assembly which ever seeks but never finds authority for its acts in an interminable weaving of diplomacy.”

Prussia was not so obstructive as Austria, but she refused the lead against Metternich; in Bismarck's words, "an open quarrel between their representatives at the sessions of the Confederation was something unheard of, and was avoided under all circumstances as endangering the existence of the Confederation." Prussia's aggrandisement at the expense of the other German States had made her unpopular; and there was no Prussian party at Frankfort. Her influence was further weakened by the injudicious action of Hanlein, who, on Stein's refusal, had been appointed Prussia's first representative at the Diet. Convinced of the futility of the Federation as organised by the Federal Act, Hanlein drew up a scheme by which the Habsburg was to be always German Emperor and the Hohenzollern German King; the two Great Powers would thus dominate Germany and give substance to the Federation. Buol had only to communicate this project to the smaller Courts to ensure its failure and Hanlein's recall. He was succeeded by William von Humboldt, who sought in vain to foster Prussia's credit and soon retired in disgust. Prussia's chief object was the organisation of a strong federal army. The military resources of the Confederation were considerable, and a scheme was drawn up showing that the various States could furnish contingents amounting to 300,000 men. But this was only a paper army, and there was no guarantee that it would develop into an efficient fighting force in the field. Prussia's efforts in this direction were in vain; the minor German States, and especially those in which Liberalism was strong, favoured a peaceful cosmopolitanism. They feared that war would inevitably encourage the preponderance of one or other of the two great military Powers, and consequently advocated the neutrality of the Federation in European questions.

Particularism and cosmopolitanism were natural allies against nationalism; but Prussia herself was by no means free from the particularism with which she charged all the other German States. It was Prussia's fault that two at least of the unifying schemes which came before the Diet failed. One was the *Austrägulordnung* by which all the members of the Confederation were to submit their mutual differences to arbitration—a provision which might have avoided the wars of 1864 and 1866. But Prussia would only admit the principle of arbitration so far as legal questions were concerned; political interests must be determined as hitherto by diplomacy or the arbitrament of arms. The other conflict arose over the article of the Federal Act which guaranteed to Germans the right of *Freizügigkeit*; that is, that citizens of one State should become citizens of any other State to which they might choose to migrate. Prussia objected on the ground that civil and political rights could only be acquired in Prussia by long service, and that it was impossible to concede to immigrants greater advantages than those enjoyed by Prussian natives. Finally, the Prussian Government—in spite apparently of Frederick William's opposition—withdrew East and

West Prussia and Posen from the Confederation. The object was to assure to Prussia an international position independent of the *Bund*, and to remove her foreign policy from Confederate control. Hardenberg even desired to exclude all Prussia's provinces east of the Elbe. Prussia, indeed, could not make up her mind which policy to pursue—whether to identify herself so far as possible with the *Bund*, or to hold aloof; and, while Prussian statesmen pursued in some respects a separatist policy, they bitterly denounced the indifference of other German Powers to their schemes for a Federal army and Federal regulation of commerce. So early as 1816 Humboldt had come to the conclusion that Prussia could entertain no hopes of the Diet; that her policy must in future be to interweave her north-German neighbours into her political and administrative system; and that Berlin, not Frankfort, must be the centre of her efforts.

Humboldt was right in regarding Berlin as more important than Frankfort: not merely because the administrative activity of Prussia was destined to bear more fruit than the debates of the Diet, but because Berlin was in reality the pivot of the constitutional question. Whether Germany was to become constitutional or not depended far more upon the action of Frederick William's Government than upon the votes of the Frankfort delegates. Austria, it was certain, would oppose to the last any and every step in the direction of popular representation or of parliamentary control over the executive; but the Tsar Alexander was still in 1815 what Metternich called a Jacobin. Frederick William, who had not the strength of mind to pursue a policy of his own, always oscillated between Russia and Austria; but until 1818 Russian influence was greater than that of Austria, and the probability seemed to be that Prussia would adopt a Liberal rather than a reactionary course. In Germany Prussia was in 1815 regarded as the champion of Liberalism. Hardenberg, who shared with Stein the glory of Prussia's regeneration, was still Chancellor; he was generally supported by moderate Ministers like Niebuhr and Humboldt, while there were some as advanced as Beyme who advocated a single-chamber parliament, publication of debates, representation of peasants, and trial by jury. The army was thought to be a hot-bed of radicalism, and the *landwehr* a *garde nationale*. The terms of peace had added to its discontent; Blücher threatened to resign; Gneisenau's headquarters at Coblenz were described as a *Wallenstein's Lager*; Wellington said that Prussia was in no sounder a condition than France; and the Tsar thought he might yet have to rescue Frederick William from his own troops. The liberation of Germany was ascribed to the enthusiasm of the people and not to the wisdom of Governments, to the *Freischaaren* rather than to the regiments of the line; and loud were the demands that these services should be recompensed by the grant of popular representation and constitutional liberty.

On the other hand there was a no less determined Opposition. This party originated in the resistance to the abolition of serfdom; it was at first feudal and aristocratic; and, so long as Stein and Hardenberg controlled the Government, was anti-monarchical. It was also particularist in its resistance to the national aims of the Liberals; "a man cannot," wrote Ferdinand Buchholtz, "be both a patriot and a feudal aristocrat." But their common enmity to the national German Liberals drew the aristocracy and the monarchy together; and, while the Liberals grew ever more republican and democratic, the aristocrats captured the Government and became monarchical in sentiment. Their leader was Prince Wittgenstein, the confidant of Metternich; he was supported by General Job von Witzleben, who shared with Prince Charles of Mecklenburg-Strelitz the intimacy of Frederick William, and by Ancillon, who was half a Frenchman and had been a *protégé* of Queen Louisa and Stein. Their great objects were to prevent the fulfilment of Frederick William's repeated promise of a representative system, and to interpret in the narrowest sense the thirteenth article of the Federal Constitution.

Both these engagements contained various ambiguities; and the sharpest distinction was drawn throughout the whole controversy between popular representation, such as that long enjoyed in England and introduced into France by the Revolution, and the old system of Estates which had existed in Germany since the Middle Ages. These Estates had invariably been provincial, not national, in character; voting *par ordre* and not *par tête* had been the rule; and their most extensive privileges had been limited to the right of granting certain taxes. Generally the Orders in these Estates had been close corporations, but there was every variety in the numerous provinces, new and old, which Prussia possessed in 1815. In a few the peasants were represented; in some only the prelates, the knights, and the cities on the royal domain; in Vorpommern the Swedish system of four Orders prevailed. In the provinces which had come under Napoleon's sway, all these Estates had been abolished; in others they had fallen into abeyance; in some they had never existed; in a few they still dragged out an ineffective being. Did the promise of Frederick William and the article of the Federal Act merely mean that Estates were to be confirmed where they existed, and created where they did not? Did it further imply that a central national parliament was to be constructed out of these *disjecta membra*? Or, finally, was a *tabula rasa* to be made, and a new system to be evolved, based on the abstract rights of individual men and not on the territorial privileges of narrow corporations?

There was a fairly general agreement, in Berlin at least, that if there was to be such a thing as German Liberalism, it must be historical and not abstract, and that the constitutions, if ever they were to exist, must be linked with what had gone before. On this point Stein and Görres were of one mind; and Liberals of the French school, like the Freiburg

professor Rotteck, were in a minority. But within these limits there was room for wide divergence. Beyme considered the old Estates as an offspring of medieval darkness, which could not bear the light of modern days; while Klewitz and Ancillon advocated their retention. The real controversy resolved itself, like every other German issue, into a question of particularism against nationalism. Should the representation of the people be provincial only, or should there also be a central representative body? Hardenberg's idea was that representatives should be chosen from the provincial Estates to form a national deliberative assembly. This was far enough removed from the Liberal ideals of that day and from what is now regarded as self-government. It was not suggested that this assembly should control the executive; it was not proposed that Prussia should occupy a more advanced constitutional position than England did in the sixteenth century. But even this was too revolutionary for most of the German Governments; and, indeed, the obstacles to the practical application of the scheme were well-nigh insuperable.

The *Reichstag* or national legislature could obviously not be established until all the provinces enjoyed the *Landtage* from which it was to be elected; and, before the *Landtage* were organised, some sort of principles must be laid down for their composition. Eventually in 1817 three commissioners, Altenstein, Beyme, and Klewitz, were appointed to perambulate the provinces and ascertain the state of public opinion on the subject. They were to ask two leading questions: whether it was practicable and advisable to grant representation to the peasants as well as to the nobles and citizens; and whether there should be a national as well as a provincial system of Estates? It was not by any means a *plébiscite*; for, as a rule, only members of the existing Estates and notables were asked for an opinion. Most expressed themselves in favour of provincial representation, but many were against the superaddition of a national system; "the notion," wrote Kesselstadt, "of belonging to a great State is strange to a great number of Prussia's subjects." Privileged classes wanted their old privileges and their old provincial isolation. Some favoured, some opposed, the representation of the peasants. The Polish provinces wanted an assembly which should have power to decide as well as to discuss political questions; while in the Rhine provinces there were all sorts of revolutionary ideas about second chambers and methods of popular election.

Here was a chaos out of which only a united, determined, and able Government could hope to evolve any order; and the Prussian administration was divided, vacillating, and without any statesman of the first rank. Hardenberg's best days were over; in 1819 Metternich declared that he was "morally as well as physically in a state of weakness bordering on childhood"; but he clung to office with a tenacity worthy of a better cause. The decay of Hardenberg's influence deprived the

In the highest sphere of Prussian government an important step was taken by the establishment (March, 1817) of a Council of State (*Staatsrath*) to exercise a general supervision over the several departments, which in Austria still remained without cohesion or control. It was to comprise the royal Princes, the Ministers and heads of departments, the Field-marshals, generals in command, and the *oberpräsidenten* of the provinces. In Germany, as in England, the first years of peace were a period of distress; bad harvests and floods intensified the evils of an unsound financial system. The Prussian public debt in 1815 was 217,000,000 *thalers*, and the annual deficit was nearly 2,000,000 *thalers*. Innumerable tariff-walls impeded trade more effectively than they protected manufactures; there were sixty-seven tariffs in the old provinces of Prussia alone, and they affected nearly three thousand different articles. Germany was inundated with English goods, and prevented by her own restrictions from offering effective competition. The nineteenth article of the Federal Act required the Diet to regulate the commercial relations of the various German States; and List, Nebenius, and other economists prepared schemes with this object. But to expect a comprehensive treatment of the question from the Federal Diet was vain; Hanover was bound to the commercial policy of England, Schleswig-Holstein to that of Denmark, and Luxemburg to that of the Netherlands; an international congress like the Diet could not deal with any problem from a national point of view. Austria, moreover, clung to her old system of provincial dues and customs; elsewhere, indirect taxes were made the basis of the State's finances, or separate classes were separately taxed—all fatal obstacles to a national tariff policy.

Prussia must therefore find a remedy for herself, although from the diversity of her provinces her difficulties were exceptional. The credit for the financial reform embodied in the law of May, 1818, belongs to Karl Georg Maassen, a native of Cleves and a disciple of Adam Smith. His objects were to free internal trade and so promote fellow-feeling among the various provinces; to provide the State with fresh sources of revenue; and to afford Prussian industry some protection against English preponderance without destroying the wholesome stimulus of foreign competition. All internal customs were abolished; and within the Prussian realm goods might be freely imported, exported, and transported through the various provinces. Prussia thus became a great free-trade area. With regard to external trade, import duties were not to exceed ten per cent. on manufactured goods, and raw materials were to be free. Further reductions were made in 1821, though transport duties on foreign goods were kept high, in order to put pressure on other German States to adopt the Prussian system. The outcry in the rest of Germany was great; smugglers stood aghast. The smaller States fancied themselves threatened with a sort of economic mediatisation. Prussia was charged with the grossest kind of particularism, with

isolating herself from the rest of Germany and preventing a united commercial policy. In reality the law of 1818 was one of the earliest and greatest triumphs of the principles of Adam Smith; for the corn laws and navigation laws were still in full play in England. Maassen is now almost forgotten; but the free trade petition from the City of London, presented by Alexander Baring (afterwards Lord Ashburton) to the British Parliament in May, 1820, spoke of the "shining example which Prussia had set the world."

Altenstein's administration of educational and ecclesiastical affairs was as intelligent as Maassen's treatment of the tariff question, though in education as in every other department the service of the State was made the supreme object. The decay into which Luther's University of Wittenberg had fallen under the Saxon *régime* was a good excuse for its incorporation with that of Prussian Halle, which had proved its devotion to the Hohenzollerns during its subjection to the kingdom of Westphalia; but the chief motive, no doubt, was that the Saxon youth might imbibe Prussian traditions at Halle, and not Saxon traditions at Wittenberg. Similar reasons dictated the selection of secular Bonn rather than ecclesiastical Cologne as the seat of the new University for the Rhenish province. Altenstein's transference to Breslau of the remnants of the University of Frankfort-on-the-Oder, and his foundation of numerous *gymnasia*, were less tinged with particularist motives. Metternich denounced these schools as seed-plots of revolution, and declared in 1818 that "the whole institution in every shape must be closed and done away with." In his views upon elementary education Altenstein was far in advance of the rest of Europe; his system was based on three cardinal principles—universal and compulsory education, equal treatment of religious faiths, and the apportionment of school-expenses among all the heads of families in the school-district.

While Prussia was thus laying the foundations of her future greatness, Austria's energies were exclusively confined to maintaining her past acquisitions. There was considerable affinity between Frederick William III and the Emperor Francis I; and a good understanding prevailed as a rule between Vienna and the reactionary party at Berlin. But Austria lacked the patriotic enthusiasm which the War of Liberation had evoked in Prussia. The popular movement against Napoleon had come too soon in Austria; Stadion and Hofer failed where Stein and Schill succeeded; and Austria fell back upon the old traditions. Every sort of enthusiasm, except for the Emperor's person, was discountenanced; and, when Francis I was shown the draft of an address of recognition to his troops for their services in the war, he struck out the word "Fatherland" wherever it occurred, and substituted "my peoples" or "my State." Austria was a monarchical machine and nothing more; she could not be a nation. The territorial consolidation, to which she had sacrificed her German future, was a barren gain, because the racial

elements in the Austrian dominions were too disjointed for any bureaucratic cement to bind them in a stable edifice. Made by the marriage of princes, she was marred by the discord of peoples. Progress along national lines, the only lines possible in the nineteenth century, was impossible for Austria, for every development of nationality threatened the Empire's disruption. What national movements meant to Austria was shown in 1848 when Croat fought Hungarian, and German fought Czech, and all fought Italian, and when the Empire was only held together because one national force neutralised another, and a balance of national antipathies did duty for Imperial sympathy.

Hence Conservatism was imposed on Austria by the very conditions of her being. The force which threatened to disturb the *status quo* was the Revolution, "the only affair in Europe of any moment"; and Austria, as "a political body which rests on unchanging principles," was, as Metternich thought, providentially charged with the duty of combating Liberalism in Germany and in Europe. The weakness of the Liberal impulse in Austria made that task easier. Francis had not hampered himself, like Frederick William, with promises of constitutional reform. He was, it is true, bound like any other German sovereign by the thirteenth article of the Federal Act; but according to Metternich "it was open to every sovereign Prince to treat the subject as an affair of internal administration"; and the way in which the Emperor of Austria treated the subject is illustrated by his comments on Metternich's draft of the Carlsbad Decrees. "I think," wrote Francis, "it would be best that every State, which has still no representation by Diet, should have the bestowal of it deferred...I hesitate to grant to the Diets a share in legislation, or to grant the proposed assembly of deputies from the provincial Diets." Austria was not, of course, without provincial Estates. "I also have my Estates," said Francis. "I have maintained their constitution, and do not worry them; but if they go too far I snap my fingers at them or send them home." These Estates were, as a rule, no trouble to the Emperor and no comfort to the people. They were framed on patriarchal principles; and it was only in Hungary and Transylvania, where the opposition was rather particularist and medieval than Liberal and modern, that the Government had any cause for anxiety.

Nor did Austria redeem this antiquated attitude towards constitutional government by bureaucratic enlightenment. Metternich was apparently conscious of the evils of her administrative anarchy; but the only practical remedy he proposed was the organisation of the domestic government of all the Austrian provinces, except Hungary and Transylvania, under one Minister. No such thing as a Cabinet in the English sense existed. Each department went its own way or rusted in its own groove, with an occasional admonition from the Emperor. The vaunted Austrian "system" was systematic ineptitude; and the

Emperor's principle of government, it has been said, was to give no service its full reward, no faculty its complete development, no man his right role. Every force was discouraged lest it should grow too strong. The army was distrusted ; "It is right," said Francis, "to use a general in the field, but we must not permit him any influence in times of peace"; the best of his generals, Schwarzenberg and Radetzky, and the most capable of his brothers, the Archdukes Charles and John, were denied the Imperial confidence. The one idea of the Emperor Joseph II which his nephew firmly grasped was that the Church was a branch of the civil service ; and Metternich boasted that no Court was freer from the dictation of Rome, while he regarded Bible-reading among the masses as a dangerous epidemic, and dreaded Alexander's mysticism almost as much as his Jacobinism. Industry and commerce were left to languish ; an attempt at reforming taxation was made, but in the interests of the great landholders, who escaped their proper share of the national burdens. A national bank was founded in 1816 ; but for the relief of financial embarrassments Metternich preferred to rely on the private favours of the brothers Rothschild. The schools founded or reformed by Joseph maintained a beneficent activity ; and the proportion of the population in receipt of elementary education, though only half as great as that in Prussia, was yet greater than that in England. But the Universities, literature, and higher education met with little encouragement. "He who serves me," said the Emperor to the staff of the Laibach Lyceum, "must teach what I command"; and University professors were subjected to the particular attentions of a detestable police system administered by men of the dubious character of Count Sedlnitzsky. The charge of neglecting literature is not refuted by the presence in Austria of competent publicists like Gentz, Pilat, Adam Müller, and Friedrich Schlegel, for they were governmental servants enlisted abroad to defend Austrian policy in the eyes of foreign critics. "No Government," wrote Metternich, "can pursue a firm and undeviating course when it is daily exposed to the influence of such dissolvent conditions as the freedom of the Press"; and the press in Austria was a department of the chancery. When Metternich in 1817 appointed the editorial staff of the *Jahrbücher der Literatur*, he informed them that he would look after the political part himself; and he often dictated the articles in the Austrian *Beobachter*.

Both in domestic and foreign affairs the Austrian conception of statesmanship was purely negative. "As for policy," wrote Metternich, "Austria frames none...our policy is exclusively confined to the maintenance of treaties and of the public repose." "Govern and change nothing" was a lesson solemnly inculcated in the will of Francis I. "We follow," Metternich explained to Palmerston, "a system of prevention in order that we may not be compelled to follow

one of repression....We are firmly convinced that any concession a Government may be induced to make strikes at the basis of its existence....Concessions properly so called can only have to do with rights of sovereignty...they can only be made by a sovereign at the expense of the capital of his own existence." Both Metternich and Francis I had some inkling of the fact that they were defending a losing cause. "My realm," said Francis in an unguarded moment to a Russian diplomatist, "is like a worm-eaten house; if one part is removed, one cannot tell how much will fall." "After all," wrote his Chancellor, "the thought I secretly entertain is that ancient Europe is at the beginning of the end"; and again he wrote: "I have come into the world either too early or too late....Earlier, I should have enjoyed the age; later, I should have helped to reconstruct it; to-day I have to give my life to propping up the mouldering edifice."

Prevention was the sum of Metternich's domestic policy; and his foreign policy was its repetition on a more extended scale. He regarded himself as a European chief commissioner of police; and the coolness, tenacity, and subtlety of his diplomacy secured for Austria a temporary predominance in Europe to which she was not entitled by material resources. He has been charged with failing to foresee the revolution of July; no charge could be more unjust. "France," he wrote in 1828, "is lost....The institutions she possesses do not suit her, and they will fall to pieces. But many things, even the throne, may fall before they do. For France there is nothing but the Republic or the Empire....It is possible that France may have yet once again to pass through confusion to arrive at order." It was not his diagnosis but his prescriptions which were at fault. From the point of view of means and methods his chief limitation was his exclusive reliance on diplomacy as the support of the Austrian system; skilled in the use of his materials, he neglected to render them sound. That, it is true, was not his department; he was not really a Prime Minister in the English sense, and it was not entirely his fault that there was such a glaring contrast between the grandiose schemes hatched in the Austrian chancery and the lifeless pedantry of the rest of officialdom. Personally Metternich had many domestic virtues, and the charges of malversation brought against him after his fall must be somewhat discounted. He was no bigot, still less an Ultramontane, and he read his Bible in Luther's translation, "the best," he said, "which has ever been made in any country." The French characterisation of him as *fin, faux, fanfaron* is the verdict of an enemy piqued by Metternich's complete overthrow of French domination in Italy.

While Austria threw her whole weight into the scale against constitutional progress, and while Prussia halted between two opinions, the south-German States, Bavaria, Würtemberg, and Baden, from various motives took the lead in the Liberal cause. The complexity of the

problem was not so great for them as for Prussia ; Napoleon had cleared the ground by sweeping away the old Estates, and revolutionary principles had made some headway among the population. In Bavaria the accession of the Zweibrücken line in the person of Maximilian Joseph (1799-1825) had introduced a policy of religious toleration ; and the acquisitions of Bavaria during the Napoleonic régime brought fresh elements into the most conservative of German States. The King himself was popular, had French sympathies, and after 1815 left the French administrative system almost untouched. His Minister, Montgelas, the founder of the modern Bavarian State, was a cool politician who cared little for German unity, and wished to sow discord between Prussia and Austria, hoping to draw profit therefrom for himself and his master. He initiated a reform of schools and Universities, and abolished serfdom in theory, though many of its burdens remained. But he was a bureaucrat, not a Liberal ; and his centralising policy weighed heavily on the local independence of the *Gemeinden*. He regarded the King and the administration as the real representatives of the people, and declared that the Germans did not understand representative government. His constitutional commission reported in favour of an Upper House consisting of state councillors and a Lower House nominated by the King from a number of candidates chosen by an indirect and circumscribed method of popular election. Tenants and peasants were to be excluded as being represented by their landlords ; and in certain cases the King was empowered to levy taxes on his own authority. This farcical constitutional project was rejected through the influence of the Crown Prince Ludwig ; and Montgelas acquiesced in this decision, as it afforded an excuse for letting the question drop and leaving his bureaucracy unchecked. The outcome of his efforts to erect a Bavarian national Church on the ruins of the Papal system in Germany has been shown in an earlier chapter of this volume.

The popular indignation, with which the Concordat was received, suggested that the best way out of the difficulty was to grant a Constitution and shift the responsibility on to the shoulders of a legislature. Other motives worked in the same direction. There was a financial deficit which a parliament might repair ; and Bavaria was competing for popular and Russian support in its contest with Baden about the Palatinate. She began to dream of seizing the Liberal lead which was slipping from Prussia's hands, and of heading a confederation of Liberal States against the reactionary military monarchies. Baron Zentner, whom Metternich afterwards described as "the father of the Bavarian Constitution" and "the first defender in Germany of the representative system," now took Montgelas' place. He thought that bureaucratic absolutism could be combined with constitutional forms ; and under his leadership the work of drawing up a Constitution was completed by May, 1818. This constitution established legal equality and comparative freedom of

the Press. The Upper Chamber was to contain some royal nominees, but the majority was to be elected by the nobility and upper classes. In the Lower Chamber half the deputies were to be elected by the peasants, a quarter by the towns, and a quarter by the smaller gentry and clergy. On the other hand the electoral system was complicated; the Diet was to have no initiative; it was to meet but once in three years, and discuss the budget but once in six. More important were the provisions for local government; the *Gemeinden* were to have the disposal of their property and the free election of their local officials. Self-government in some degree was thus granted both for the higher and lower ranges of political administration. At the same time an edict was promulgated which "interpreted" the Concordat by repudiating its intentions and reaffirming the previous condition of ecclesiastical affairs. It was a victory of the temporal over the ecclesiastical power, and for a few months Bavaria enjoyed the felicity of being celebrated in the press as the most Liberal of German States.

In Württemberg the course of constitutional progress was not so smooth, although it enjoyed greater initial advantages. The old Diet (*Landtag*) of the country had exercised quite exceptional powers; its permanent committee at Stuttgart was the real sovereign of the land; and Charles James Fox declared that no European constitution deserved the name save those of England and of Württemberg. Ecclesiastically Württemberg was the strongest hold of Lutheranism; and Bunsen declared that it was the only country in which the Lutheran Church had a "living constitution." It had inherited almost intact the old possessions of the medieval Church, administered an excellent system of schools, and produced an almost puritanic condition of morals. But the extension of Württemberg southwards and westwards by the grace of Napoleon brought Catholic elements into the State and destroyed the Lutheran privileges. The last Duke and first King of Württemberg, Frederick, the worst and ablest of his race, adopted Napoleonic maxims, abolished the Estates, created a new army, introduced bureaucratic absolutism, and established religious equality. His tyranny excited general disgust, which Frederick thought to disarm, on Napoleon's fall, by the promise of a constitution. This document was promulgated in May, 1815, was universally denounced as worthless, and unanimously rejected by the Estates. In vain the King appealed to England, Prussia, and Denmark, against his subjects. Even Metternich withheld support; and, with the exception of the Munich *Almannia*, the whole German press attacked the King. As a concession to public feeling, Wangenheim was admitted to Frederick's Cabinet; and on his recommendation the King promised a revision of all laws passed since 1806, unlimited right of the Estates to grant or withhold taxation, and the responsibility of all public servants. The Estates were not satisfied; they wanted only one Chamber; Wangenheim proposed two. Wangenheim was something

of a philosophic Liberal; the Estates were, like the poet Ludwig Uhland, all for *das alte gute Recht*; but other men of leading such as Cotta and Hegel now sided with Wangenheim.

The death of Frederick, which occurred on October 30, 1816, somewhat eased the situation. His successor William, capable, ambitious, and arrogant, was nevertheless popular; and still more so was his short-lived wife, Catharine, the sister of the Tsar. William wished to emulate the Liberal fame of his brother-in-law, and in March, 1817, considerably improved upon the last concessions of his father. But he was now seeking to conciliate, not a people, but an intractable clique; and, although almost the whole nation was in favour of his scheme, it was once more rejected by the aristocrats and the clergy who formed a majority of the Estates. The Diet was thereupon dissolved; and William said that, while carrying out his other promises, he would on the question of the Constitution await the resolutions of the Federal Diet. This meant a long period of expectation, and in the meantime the King ruled absolutely. Serfdom was legally abolished, and some of the lords' privileges were surrendered; the right of free emigration was accorded; and effective measures were taken to relieve the agricultural distress consequent upon the floods and famine of 1817-8. But William with ease acquired a taste for absolutism, and secretly worked for the nullification of the thirteenth article; while the folly of the *Landtag* enabled the German reactionaries to point to Württemberg for a confirmation of their views, and to say that even under the most Liberal of monarchs a constitution was unworkable.

Baden, the last of these three south-German States, had hitherto played an insignificant part in German history; but the dominions of the margravate had been increased tenfold under the long reign of Charles Frederick (1749-1811). These acquisitions consisted mainly of Vorderösterreich, of gleanings from the bishoprics of Constance, Strassburg, and Speyer, of the Palatinate on the right bank of the Rhine, of free cities, and of the lands of mediatised princes. It was an artificial creation without a history, and Rotteck was a typical representative of its unhistorical, doctrinaire Liberalism; but no part of Germany was so free from particularism or from jealousy of Prussia. Its position on the Rhine and its own weakness made it look to Federal strength for protection against France. But its first difficulties were with Bavaria, which coveted Baden's share of the Palatinate and set up a claim to Baden itself on the contingent extinction of Charles Frederick's issue by his first wife. The new Grand Duke Charles married Stéphanie Beauharnais, but his sons died while his daughters survived. His father, however, had contracted a second marriage with the Countess von Hochberg, which Bavaria denounced as *unebenbürtig*, denying utterly the children's right of succession.

The young Grand Duke's position was also confronted with popular

discontent favoured by the absolutist system which he had introduced with his French wife; and he was compelled to consider the question of granting a Constitution. A dispute as to whether it should comprise one or two Chambers caused delay; and in July, 1816, Charles announced that he would not commit himself until the Federal Diet had come to some conclusion in the matter. Public indignation revived, and the situation was complicated by ecclesiastical disputes with the Papacy. The Grand Duke was a Protestant, but two-thirds of his subjects were Catholics. Some of these, like Heinrich von Wessenberg, the Vicar-General of Constance, dreamt of a national German Church; and at Frankfort a conference of deputies from the smaller German States was held under the presidency of the Würtemberg Minister Wangenheim to press this scheme. But Austria and Prussia held aloof; a national German Church was almost inconceivable without a national German State; and in any case the rising tide of ultramontanism would have made the plan impracticable. Meanwhile the Bavarian danger grew more threatening. Berstett, the Grand Duke's Minister, persuaded him in October, 1817, to issue a *Hausgesetz* asserting the indivisibility of the Baden dominions, and the succession rights of the Hochberg line, which were recognised by the Congress of Aix-la-Chapelle in November, 1818. Metternich thought that this smacked of French republican ideas; and Bavaria broke off diplomatic relations. Public opinion, however, favoured Baden; and, to maintain the good impression as well as to earn the respect of the Tsar, the Grand Duke of Baden improved upon Bavaria's example and not merely promised but granted a Constitution. It was drawn up by Nebenius, and signed in August, 1818. Alexander's Polish Constitution was taken as a model. The nobles were gratified by the creation of an Upper House; the towns were to have 22 representatives and the country districts 41; and every other year the Diet was to have an opportunity of discussing the budget.

The constitutional question in other German States exercised less influence on German history. Repeated subdivisions of Nassau had gone so far that at one time its eighty-five square German miles of territory were governed by twenty-seven independent sovereigns, two of whom, one a Catholic, the other a Protestant, ruled over the two halves of the town of Siegen. All these lines died out except that of Weilburg; but common feeling had been weakened, and common constitutional action was impossible. The Nassau Diet was first opened in 1818; Stein was excluded from the Upper House; and the *Gemeinden* were denied the usufruct of the domain forests. This necessitated the introduction of poor-rates; and the consequent discontent led to violence which afforded an excuse for the abrogation of the Constitution. "Thus," complained Görres, "there was here established a pattern-State of the new constitutional school by which all men are made equal in one common servitude." In Hesse-Darmstadt the grant of a constitutional

system was deferred from year to year notwithstanding popular demands. In Hesse-Cassel the Elector paid even less regard to the feelings of his subjects; the old avarice, the old military system, the old judicial abuses returned. Saxony and Mecklenburg had to be content with the merest ruins of a feudal system of Estates, which possessed only deliberative powers and exercised no control over the finances; and in Schleswig-Holstein agitation centred round a prolonged dispute between the old Estates and the Danish King, who wished to reduce his duchies to conformity with his kingdom. A more general representative system prevailed in Hanover, where the land-tax was equalised, and exemptions and torture were abolished; but the nobility were supreme and the deliberations of the Estates were secret. Northern Germany acquiesced in the ancient ways, until a breath from the Revolution of 1830 passed over the land.

The net result of the movement for constitutional progress was a bitter disappointment to that portion of the German people which took an interest in public life. The Federal Diet had practically confessed its incapacity to justify the confidence reposed in it by popular opinion; and the individual Governments, with the exception of Bavaria, Baden, and Saxe-Weimar, had failed no less signally to solve the problem. Energies which might have been directed into constitutional channels were diverted into the paths of revolution or retired into abstract speculation; and the two were not uncommonly combined. When statesmen and politicians declined the leadership of progressive opinion, it fell into the hands of professors and men of letters. The Universities and *gymnasia* became the centres of political agitation; professorial chairs were turned into platforms, lectures into harangues, and classes into public meetings. The revolutionists, complained Metternich, conscious that the adult generation would not serve their nefarious project of German unity, turned "their attention to those who are to be educated, a plan which commends itself even to the most impatient, for the student generation includes at most a period of four years....A whole class of future State officials, professors, and incipient literary men, is here ripened for revolution." The intellectual atmosphere of Germany was indeed charged with electricity; but it was the repressive conduct of Governments which gave a political direction to the storm. The dominant tendency of thought after 1815 was a Romantic reaction against the sceptical and utilitarian doctrines of the encyclopedists, and Friedrich Schlegel, Adam Müller, and Haller, found a vogue for their almost medieval ideas. But the more Liberal disciples of Fichte were by no means party politicians; and the famous *Burschenschaft* system, which gave nightmares to Metternich, originated in June, 1815, in a desire to place before German youths a nobler ideal of life than was afforded by the *Landsmannschaften*. The virtue of the latter in Metternich's eyes consisted in their provincial and particularist organisation, the vice of the former in its

neglect of these distinctions; German students might be allowed to organise in Saxon, Swabian, Bavarian, and Franconian societies; but to create a national union savoured of revolution. When the *Burschenschaft* first took a political colour it was merely a Teutonic protest against French fashions and French ideas, an object which might have appealed even to Metternich.

The centre of this movement was the University of Jena, which enjoyed the patronage of the Liberal Duke of Saxe-Weimar; and Jena, owing to the freedom of its printing-press, became also the centre of an outburst of journalistic fervour. Here the *Isis* of Oken, the *Nemesis* of Luden, Ludwig Weiland's *Friend of the People*, and Martin's *New Rhenish Mercury* attacked the ineptitude of the Federal Diet and the repressive activity of Metternich, and preached the doctrines of liberty and national independence. The effervescence came to a head at the Wartburg festival (October 18, 1817), which the students of Jena organised as a joint celebration of the Reformation and of the battle of Leipzig. There were prayers and sermons, then a dinner and toasts to Luther and to the Grand Duke, and finally a bonfire. In imitation of the Reformer, Massmann, the master of the revels, committed to the flames emblems of reaction, militarism, and French fashions—Schmalz' pamphlet, Kotzebue's German History, and other obnoxious works, a corporal's cane, a pig-tail, and a corset. It was for the most part a youthful indiscretion; but, when professors like Kieser could say that for genuine significance the demonstration had never been surpassed, there was perhaps some excuse for the alarm of Courts and Cabinets. Richelieu wrote from Paris to enquire whether it was a revolution; Frederick William sent Hardenberg to make enquiries on the spot; and Metternich experienced the joy of a justified prophet of evil.

The affair was not in fact entirely innocuous. Nor did it stand alone; there was a tumult at Breslau, a sanguinary affray among the students at Göttingen, a religious disturbance in Saxony, and in Swabia a refusal to pay the taxes; while Karl Follen had a plan of assembling a mob on the field of Leipzig and proclaiming a German republic. But the danger was mainly of the Government's own manufacture. They dammed a river and made a flood, and then, to save their property, were driven to further damming. In this work they now received the invaluable assistance of the Tsar. The real cause of Alexander's change of views is somewhat of a mystery; possibly the free-thinking tendencies of some German Liberals alienated him more than their political tenets. At any rate, the dissolution of religious ideas was one of the principal causes alleged for the present discontent by the Moldavian Stourdza in his memoir on the condition of Germany, which so impressed the Tsar that he had fifty copies printed for private circulation among the sovereigns and statesmen at the Congress of Aix-la-Chapelle. The immediate cause of the revulsion in Alexander's

mind is said to have been his discovery in June, 1818, of a conspiracy among his troops which reminded him of the fact that his father had been the victim of a military plot. Whatever the cause, the effect was to remove the only barrier against repression in Europe, to bring Russia and consequently Prussia into line with Austria, and to assure to Metternich a dominant position in Europe and almost a dictatorship in Germany.

In the Universities and the Liberal press the Tsar was regarded as a traitor to the cause of progress, and the consequent resentment led to an act which intensified the reaction. The sentimental poetaster, Kotzebue, was at this time conducting a reactionary weekly journal, in which he announced that Stourdza's pamphlet, brought to public notice by the enterprise of the London *Times*, was to his certain knowledge an official document. He had been more than once in Russian employ; he was now denounced in Luden's *Nemesis* as a Russian spy on the journalists of Germany, and, according to Gentz, was even credited with the principal, if not the exclusive, responsibility for Alexander's apostasy. He had himself been a student at Jena, and apparently a Liberal, but now his paper was filled with attacks on the Universities even more offensive than Stourdza's pamphlet; and enthusiasts regarded him as "a prisoner of souls," whose removal was a public duty. On March 23, 1819, Karl Sand, a student of Jena, a lecturer to the *Burschenschaft*, and a youth of exemplary conduct and extremely pious sentiments, called upon Kotzebue at Mannheim, and stabbed him to the heart. The deed, and still more the palliation of it by men like Görres, led Gentz and Metternich to assert that the real culprits "were Frics, Luden, Oken, Kieser, and others of the same class, of whom the Universities must be purified at any price." But the effects were felt in wider circles than the Universities. A Prussian constitution, exclaimed Hardenberg, was now impossible. He had struggled at Berlin against the feelings of the King, and had fought a drawn battle so long as Frederick William wavered between the influence of Alexander and that of Metternich. But now Russia had approached the Austrian point of view; the Prussian King would never set himself in opposition to the two; and the prospect of a Prussian constitution vanished.

Metternich was at Rome when the news of Kotzebue's murder reached him. He imposed a dignified silence upon the *Beobachter*; others would now be loud enough in saying what Austria had said all along. But he was prompt to take advantage of the situation. "You will observe," he writes, "a singular coincidence between the discoveries and arrests in Prussia and Germany, and my passage of the Alps." Arndt and the brothers Welcker were suspended from their professorial chairs; Jahn was imprisoned; and even Gneisenau, Stein, and Boyen were placed under police surveillance. In the panic of the moment Metternich was sure of a majority even in the Federal Diet. The

only exception was the Duke of Saxe-Weimar—*Oberbursch* as he was nicknamed at the Diet—who, in spite of recent events, declared through his envoy at Frankfort that freedom of thought and teaching must continue at the Universities; and even he was forced by Hardenberg to limit the freedom of his press and prosecute his professors. The Diet might now be made to serve the cause of reaction. But it must be impelled by the Cabinets; and Metternich proposed a meeting of the Ministers at Carlsbad. He prepared the ground by a personal conference with Frederick William at Teplitz in July, 1819. There, reinforced by a fresh argument in the shape of the attempted assassination of the Nassau Minister, Ibell, Metternich impressed upon the Prussian King the necessity for vigorous measures. According to his own account, he represented Prussia as the centre of a wide conspiracy; only the subordinates had been discovered, the heads were “without doubt to be found among the highest ranks of your Majesty’s servants.” But Austria would come to Prussia’s rescue “if your Majesty is determined not to introduce any representation of the people into your kingdom, which is less fitted for it than any other,” and if, it was hinted, Frederick William would only give his confidence to worthy Ministers, like Wittgenstein and Bernstorff. At Metternich’s suggestion, these two were associated with Hardenberg in a further conference, when the programme for the Carlsbad meeting and for a subsequent gathering at Vienna was arranged. Prussia surrendered to Metternich’s dictation; she agreed to the suppression of the licence of the Press, to the appointment of a commission for the visitation of the Universities and the removal of recalcitrant professors, and to the creation of a special judicial body to investigate, in the name of the Confederation, the supposed conspiracy against the Governments. The subsequent gathering at Vienna was to consider among other questions the “correction of the thirteenth article of the Federal Act.” Prussia also undertook to grant no popular representation; and a few months later Humboldt, Boyen, and Beyme, who had protested against the Carlsbad Resolutions, were forced to resign. Hardenberg effaced himself, and died in 1822; and the Wittgenstein party gained almost complete control. “All danger,” wrote Metternich, “is for the moment averted.”

Sure of the support of Prussia, and no longer fearing the Liberalism of the Tsar, the Austrian Chancellor could view with equanimity any opposition which might be raised at Carlsbad by Bavaria or Baden. Both those Governments had begun to relinquish their constitutional zeal as soon as the settlement of the quarrel between them had rendered them less eager for popular favour; and, as a matter of fact, the discussions at Carlsbad passed off with so little friction that at the close (September 1, 1819), Metternich’s colleagues tendered to him a “unanimous expression of unbounded respect and gratitude.” The labours which earned this testimonial are held to have fettered opinion and

postponed constitutional liberty in Germany for a generation. The conclusions faithfully followed the lines laid down at Teplitz, and they were recommended to the Frankfort Diet by identical instructions from the various Cabinets to their deputies. The model was Metternich's despatch to Buol. He called attention to the prevalent evils and errors, to the various interpretations placed upon the thirteenth article, to the incorrect ideas of the powers of the Federal authority, to the defects in Universities and schools, and to the abuses of the press. "The grounds," he remarked, "which had formerly decided the Federation not to interfere in the affairs of single States, must now make way for higher considerations." The Federal Diet must be recognised as the supreme legislative authority, and local legislatures must not oppose it.

After all, Metternich could be an opportunist; and even the sacred rights of sovereigns, when they were Liberal, must bend before the Diet, when it represented the forces of reaction. So the Diet was to bind the sovereigns to appoint civil commissioners to control the Universities; to prevent the publication of unlicensed journals or pamphlets, and to hold themselves responsible to the Federation for any obnoxious publications in their States; and to dismiss all professors who forgot their duties to their Kings. An inquisition into the secret societies was to be established at Mainz, with powers to examine and arrest any subject of a German sovereign; all law-courts were required to supply such documents as it demanded, and to undertake any enquiries which it might impose. The inquisitors were not, however, to be a law-court in themselves, but simply a Federal Commission with enormous powers, charged to report results to the Diet, which would then create such judicial machinery as might be necessary. These proposals were considered by the Diet on September 20; and that body, which had wasted four years in discussing the Federal Act, sanctioned Metternich's code in as many hours.

But this was only part of Metternich's programme. The Carlsbad Decrees were, ostensibly at least, only provisional and temporary; they did not touch the fundamental constitution of the Federation; that was, according to the Governments, beyond the Diet's competence. The Diet was only a legislative, not a constituent, body; the constituting authority was the union of Cabinets. It alone could modify or extend the Federal Act; and for this purpose a meeting was opened at Vienna in November, 1819. Metternich would have liked the Conference to be permanent under his presidency at the Austrian capital; and it would have been a long step towards the revival in fact, if not in name, of the medieval Empire under Austrian auspices. The present Conference lasted some six months; it was opened by Metternich in an address in which he pointed out that its object was to fix the functions of the Diet, the extent of its jurisdiction, the limits of its powers, and even the forms of its procedure.

Beneath this smooth exterior Metternich concealed the intention of eliminating all elements of constitutional control from German States. But he met with unexpected resistance from Bavaria and Württemberg. In Bavaria the soul of the opposition was the Crown Prince Ludwig; and he was supported by Zentner, who declined to quash his own constitution by a *coup d'état*. In Württemberg Wangenheim still had hankerings after a purely German league independent of Austria and Prussia; and he had already balked Metternich's plan of empowering a majority of the Diet to act in default of unanimity. This resistance prolonged the Congress at Vienna; Metternich was eventually compelled to abandon some of his designs; and the Constitutions already granted were permitted to exist on sufferance. Nevertheless, sixty-five articles of a more or less reactionary character were adopted. The gist of them was to charge the Federation with the duty of maintaining order and despotic government in States which were unable to fulfil that function themselves, and of preventing any individual legislature from asserting supremacy over its monarch; if any German State attempted to do what England had done in 1688, the Federation was entitled by this new fundamental law to interfere by force of arms. What is technically known as "responsible" government was to be prohibited throughout Germany by an organic Federal law; and the Federation was thus converted from a league of States into a league of sovereigns.

It was at the same time made clear that the Federal Diet had no independent power, but was merely the agent of the Cabinets. These fundamental laws were not to have even the appearance of being promulgated by its authority; and the method adopted at Carlsbad, of communicating the resolutions of the Ministers to the Diet and binding all representatives to vote for them, was here rejected on Austria's demand. The Vienna resolutions were drafted in the form of Acts ratified by the Governments belonging to the Federation; the Diet was merely to deposit them in the Federal archives, and publish them "in the usual constitutional manner." This, says Metternich, was to show that "the Diet was not the sovereign of the Federation." Another object equally dear to the Chancellor's heart was achieved. The Federal Constitution had, as he admitted, been placed under the express and solemn guarantee of the great European Powers; and Alexander thought that this gave the non-German Cabinets a claim to be heard in its modification or extension. He proposed to Castlereagh that they should take a hand in this third Congress of Vienna. But Castlereagh was largely under the spell of Metternich; and Austria was left to work its will within the Federation. "One word spoken by Austria," wrote the Chancellor at the conclusion of the Congress, "will now be inviolable law throughout Germany."

His triumph was a little premature. William of Württemberg regarded his small successes at Vienna as a great victory over Metternich.

In 1820, Lindner in his anonymous *Manuskript aus Süddeutschland* revived what was called the “*Triasidēe*,” that is, the idea of a league between Bavaria, Württemberg, and Baden against Austria and Prussia. Wangenheim was the protagonist of this policy, and gathered round him a band of ambassadors who played at being a congress and amused themselves by placing the two Great Powers in a minority. The chief effect of this move was to ruin the Federal schemes of national defence. While Prussia was spending huge sums upon its Rhine fortresses, the contributions to the proposed Federal fortifications were tardily forthcoming; even the millions, which had been deposited with the Rothschilds for the construction of a fourth Federal stronghold in addition to Luxemburg, Mainz, and Germersheim, lay idle, because Austria and the other south-German States could not decide between the claims of Rastatt and Ulm. A similar barren result attended the schemes for a Federal army. Prussia desired the division of the Federal forces into two great armies—one led by Prussia for North Germany, the other led by Austria for the South. The Diet would have none of this proposal, and decided that there should be one supreme commander-in-chief, exclusively responsible to the Diet. But he was not to be appointed till war broke out, and not the least effort was made to secure uniformity or harmony between the various contemplated army-corps.

The ambitions of the south-German States were more effectively obstructive than progressive. They were aggrieved at the gradual restriction of the European concert to the greater Powers. The original Congress of Vienna had been almost ecumenical; but invitations to those of Laibach and Verona were only sent to the five Cabinets of Austria, Russia, England, Prussia, and France; and Württemberg drew up a protest against the exclusion of the minor German sovereigns and against the idea that the resolutions of a Congress, at which only two German States were represented, could bind the Germanic Federation. Metternich replied that Austria and Prussia were entitled to the distinction, because they had only entered the Federation with the express reservation of their rights as European Powers; and that the resolutions of the Congresses concerned Greece, Italy, and Spain, and not the Federation. The reply would have been conclusive but for the fact that Württemberg's protest had been evoked by a despatch drawn up by Metternich himself, recommending these minor States to imitate the measures taken by the Great Powers to put down revolution. About the same time there appeared in the Stuttgart *Beobachter* an attack on the Congress of Verona. Metternich required the Württemberg Government to modify its attitude, and on its refusal broke off diplomatic relations. Other Powers threatened to do the same; and the Mainz Commission suppressed the Stuttgart *Beobachter* without consulting the King.

Under these circumstances Württemberg had to yield; and her Ministers, Wangenheim and Wintzingerode, were sacrificed in the cause

of peace. Bavaria was alarmed by the discovery of a madcap project among the students at Erlangen to proclaim a German republic; and the erstwhile constitutionalist, Zentner, was flattering Metternich by telling him that without the Carlsbad Decrees Germany would have been lost, and that his despatch to Buol on that occasion had been a masterpiece. Buol had now been succeeded as president of the Diet by the more masterful Münch-Bellinghausen, who practically turned the Diet into an Austrian committee; and there was a wholesale purging of the less reactionary members. The complaints of the Holstein Estates against the King of Denmark were rejected; and the memorials of Dahlmann were branded with the Federal censorship. In Prussia the last vestiges of Liberalism were eliminated from the Government. "Hatzfeldt," writes Metternich in June, 1824, "has made a terrible clearance at Berlin. They have taken advantage of a temporary illness of Herr von Altenstein to alter his whole department. The King appears to me to have acted like a man who only waited for an opportunity to lay about him on all sides." Metternich's rejoicing over the ruin of Altenstein's educational work seems to have been ill-founded; but in other respects there was reason in his jubilation. Jahn was once more imprisoned; de Wette, editor of Luther's works, lost his professorship; and Schleiermacher's sermons and hymn-books were subjected to the censorship. A new edition of Fichte was forbidden and even one of Ulrich von Hutten. Haller's *Restoration of Political Science*, which would certainly have been considered illiberal even in the Middle Ages, became the constitutional text-book of Berlin.

It was the heyday of Metternich's prosperity. "They look for me as for a Messiah," he wrote of his approaching visit to Johannisberg in the summer of 1824; and there, on the estate which Stein had coveted as a reward for the liberation of Germany, Metternich put the coping-stone on his work of suppression. "Under the pretence of visiting my vineyards," he wrote, "I shall advance the great affairs which will come off at Frankfort." The great affairs came off at Frankfort in August. The Carlsbad Decrees, which had been enacted for five years as a temporary measure to deal with an exceptional conspiracy, were now established as a permanent bulwark of sovereigns against their people; and a perennial discontent was taken for granted. The special commission of Mainz had its powers renewed; and that "first and greatest of evils," as Metternich termed the publicity of the Diet's proceedings, was restricted to the publication of its protocols. The Diet had done its work; it had committed a practical *filo de se*, and in 1828 Austria proposed its adjournment *sine die*. In Germany, as in Naples, in Piedmont, and in Spain, Metternich appeared invincible; at the Court of St Petersburg he had overturned Capodistrias and persuaded the Tsar to hold his hand in the Balkan Peninsula. While Russia had thus, on the one hand, as Metternich said, "ruined its influence with the Porte and at

one blow destroyed the grand work of Peter the Great and all his successors," on the other hand it lost all respect in the West; and the mobilisation at Metternich's request in 1821 of a hundred-thousand Russian troops to keep watch on Germany while Austria was engaged in crushing the Italian revolts, announced to the world at once the power of Metternich and the determination of the sovereigns of Europe to maintain at the point of the sword the cause of the Holy Alliance. And yet there was no peace in the Austrian Chancellor's mind. "Public opinion," he confessed, in 1821, "is absolutely diseased. At Vienna, as at Paris, Berlin, and London, in the whole of Germany and Italy, as well as in Russia and America, our triumphs are rated as so many crimes, our conceptions as so many errors, and our projects as so many follies."

If Metternich had despondent moments in 1821, the events of the succeeding years were not likely to dispel his gloom. Under the influence of his pet aversion, Canning, England completed its severance from the European System which Castlereagh had tentatively begun. The accession of Nicholas I in 1825 terminated the Chancellor's brief control of Russian policy; the subsequent liberation of Greece transferred Austrian influence in the Levant to the three victors of Navarino; and from the accession of Charles X in France Metternich was full of forebodings. "We cannot conceal from ourselves," he lamented in 1827, "that the union known by the name of the Alliance has for some time been little more than a pretence." Even at home, in Hungary, the Austrian Government had in 1825 to acknowledge defeat. In defiance of the old Hungarian Constitution, the Magyar Diet had not been summoned for thirteen years; and throughout that period the magnates had waged war on the Government in their local assemblies, where they enjoyed even more rights than they did in the Diet. The coronation of the Emperor's fourth wife as Queen of Hungary at length necessitated the summons of the Diet; and the strength of the Opposition, led by Szechenyi, compelled the Emperor to abandon the idea of crushing its liberties and to promise henceforth to summon the Diet every three years. It is true that the old exclusive, aristocratic spirit of the Diet had little in common with the Liberalism which Metternich dreaded, and he was less loath to make concessions to the former than to the latter. But by 1825 Liberalism had made its appearance; and Metternich bemoaned that the two oppositions, the old and the new, were merged together, and that he "encountered in Hungary all those things on which during my whole public life, especially in the last ten years, I have made war."

In Bavaria also the accession of Ludwig I in 1825 seemed to afford a ray of hope to the Liberals. He began by repealing the censorship law, and recalling the exile Görres to a chair in the University of Munich. A patron of art and a literary *dilettante*, an enthusiastic Philhellene, and an earnest Catholic, Ludwig equally hated absolutism, revolution, and unbelief. He publicly refused to be an unlimited monarch, but he

protested in his letters against the idea of being a king who reigned but did not govern. He dreamt of a sort of medieval constitutionalism, and when this failed to satisfy more ardent reformers, his Liberalism cooled and his enlightenment found its chief expression in building the Pinakothek and the Glyptothek, and the University buildings at Munich, and attempting to make his capital the artistic metropolis of Germany. Public life, even in those south-German States which retained a Constitution, was a feeble plant. The powers of the Diets were small and their horizon circumscribed; their discussions were chiefly remarkable for personalities and rhetoric; and the elections were often decided by hints from the Government. In Prussia the succession of Nicholas I weakened Austria's hold, and Bernstorff, the Foreign Minister, lost favour in Metternich's eyes for daring to accept the task of mediating between Russia and the Porte in 1829, and to differ from Austria as to the respective claims of Dom Pedro and Dom Miguel to the throne of Portugal. "We shall," wrote Metternich in alarm, "see Prussia ally itself with Russia." In domestic affairs also the Prussian Ministers pursued a line of their own which was anything but agreeable to Austria. It is true that Frederick William held fast to his promise to grant no national representative system, and the final organisation (1823) of the provincial system of Estates in the three old orders of nobles, cities, and peasants, set the seal on Prussia's constitutional conservatism. But in administration Prussia was radical in her reforms. More important than her vast outlay on roads and her improvement of the postal system, was Altenstein's conduct of the Ministry of Education. The Pestalozzian method was introduced throughout the land; *realschulen* were started; the first Polytechnic was opened at Berlin in 1824; and within a period of four years four hundred elementary schools were founded in the Province of West Prussia alone.

Most significant of all was the extension to other German States of the tariff reforms which Maassen had commenced in 1818. The idea of a *Zollverein* or Customs' Union was not originally Prussian; it had been advocated during the early days of the Federal Diet by Friedrich List in his Augsburg *Zollvereinsblatt*. But the extension of the idea was left to Prussia; and in October, 1819, the first tariff-treaty was signed between Prussia and the petty sovereignty of Schwarzburg-Sondershausen. It was negotiated by Motz, then *Oberpräsident* of the Prussian province of Saxony, and after 1825 Prussian Minister of Finance, whose name is inseparably connected with the history of the *Zollverein*. Prussia's policy in this direction was odious to most of the German States; and at the Vienna Conference of 1820 pressure was vainly put upon the Prussian Government to abandon it. Berstett, the Baden Minister, thereupon invited Bavaria, Württemberg, Hesse-Cassel, Hesse-Darmstadt, and the Thuringian States to draw up a rival customs' treaty. The discussions at Darmstadt proved abortive, but the Duke of puny Anhalt-Köthen, whose

subjects largely lived on smuggling, initiated a tariff crusade against his powerful neighbour. Instigated by Adam Müller, the Austrian Consul-General at Leipzig, he denounced Prussia to the Federal Diet; and to make still more sure of Austrian support, he joined the Roman Catholic Church. But Austria had other things to do; and eventually in 1828 the Duke of Köthen was forced to follow the example of his smaller fellow-sovereigns, Bernburg, Schwarzburg-Rudolstadt, Saxe-Weimar, Schaumburg-Lippe, Dessau, and Mecklenburg-Schwerin, and make his fiscal peace with Prussia.

Meanwhile the south-German States continued their opposition; and in January, 1828, Bavaria and Württemberg concluded a customs' treaty of their own, to which their two tiny neighbours, Hohenzollern-Sigmaringen and Hohenzollern-Hechingen, soon acceded. In face of these two rival leagues the position of the middle-German States became important in the last degree; and, when Hesse-Darmstadt showed some disposition to come to terms with Prussia, Eichhorn and Motz—somewhat against Maassen's inclinations—induced their Government to make most liberal concessions. Hesse-Darmstadt was offered an equal voice with Prussia in determining the policy of the Zollverein, identity of fiscal privileges, independent execution of the tariff laws, and apportionment of the proceeds according to population. On this basis the treaty was concluded in February, 1828, for a period of six years. Saxony now took alarm, and in the following September negotiated a mid-German commercial union with Hesse-Cassel, Hanover, Brunswick, most of the Thuringian States, Hamburg, Bremen, and Frankfort. The confederates bound themselves for six years not to enter into any other Zollverein, and attempted to prevent that continuity of fiscal frontiers which Prussia sought. But the endeavour to build a fiscal barrier across the communications of the Prussian Zollverein failed from lack of means; and Motz seized the opportunity to make advances to the Württemberg-Bavarian League. His success exceeded his anticipations; and in May, 1829, an agreement was made between the northern and the southern Customs' Unions. They undertook to suspend until 1841 all customs on their mutual interchange of products, to establish duty-free roads between the two systems, and to enter into no separate treaty with their neighbours. This was only a customs' treaty (*Zollvertrag*), not a customs' union (*Zollverein*); but it was enough to frustrate the efforts of the mid-German League, and to afford reasonable prospect of a closer union in the future. Motz, who is mainly responsible for the wise liberality of Prussia's policy, was confident of its ultimate success and convinced of its supreme importance. The commercial unity of the German States would, he declared so early as 1829, inevitably lead to the accommodation and eventually to the unity of their political systems, to the military security of southern Germany through its union with Prussia, and to the restoration of a strong and free Germany under Prussia's protection.

Nor was it only by administration that the Prussian intellect fostered the growth of a German national consciousness. History, philosophy, and law, were never cultivated with more assiduity and success than in Prussia during the years of her political effacement; and Niebuhr, Ranke, Savigny, Hegel, and Alexander von Humboldt were rendering services which, though indirect, were no less essential than the foundation of the Zollverein to the cause of German greatness.

This slow and silent movement was interrupted by the cataclysm of 1830. The penalty of refusing to progress by constitutional concessions is progress by revolution. Metternich was fond of pointing out the difference between the historical English Constitution and a doctrinaire continental charter, but he refused to take those steps which had enabled England to dispense with written constitutions and declarations of the rights of man. Hence the French revolutions of 1830 and 1848 were followed by revolutions in Germany. The movements of the former year were, however, comparatively slight and local, and their chief result was the acquisition by some north-German States of that modicum of constitutional government which still flickered on in Württemberg and Bavaria.

In Brunswick the reckless violence of the young Duke Charles proved too much for the long-suffering of his subjects. In September, 1830, he was forced to abdicate in favour of his younger brother and a Constitution, and lived till 1873 in Paris. In Hesse-Cassel the shameless greed and immorality of the old Elector William produced a similar result; he was compelled to grant a Constitution drawn up by the Marburg professor, Sylvester Jordan, and to leave the government in the hands of his son, who had youth, if nothing else, to differentiate him from his father. In Saxony the nobles themselves rebelled against the rigid conservatism of the Minister, Einsiedel, set up Prince Frederick Augustus as co-Regent with his uncle King Antony, and introduced some modern features into the ridiculously ineffective system of Saxon Estates (September, 1831). In Hanover the régime of Count Münster came to an end with the death of George IV and an outbreak after the Paris revolution. Order was restored without much difficulty; and William IV, who was not averse from moderate Liberalism, consented in 1833 to the establishment of a Constitution, drafted by Dahlmann, but modified by aristocratic prejudice. Prussia escaped any serious trouble, partly because respect for the old King had developed into a real restraining force, and partly because the beneficent activity of the Government in internal administration reconciled the average citizen to the denial of self-government. With the accession of Motz to the Ministry of Finance in 1825 surpluses had begun to take the place of deficits; the population had increased by twenty-five per cent. in fifteen years; but owing mainly to financial and tariff reforms material prosperity had developed with still more rapid strides. The violence of repression had, moreover, gradually subsided, and at the worst, it was

only felt by few. The most intolerable evils of misgovernment were avoided; there was little religious persecution; taxation was economical; and justice was not denied in the every-day affairs of life.

It was not these local changes of monarchs and of constitutions which brought about the revival of Metternich's system in Germany, but the activity of revolutionists like those who had made, but had failed to profit by, the Parisian revolt. These were of the cosmopolitan type, who from now to 1848 took ever more the colour of "red internationals"; and a new note of alarm appears in Metternich's correspondence. "The issue at stake," he writes in 1833, "is the salvation of the first of all goods—property, the right of possession both in a material and a moral sense; the contest in reality lies between those who *have* and those who *wish to have*." This was one of the spectres which haunted Niebuhr—whom Bunsen compared with Burke—on his deathbed, and made him dread lest the least disturbance of established order would lead to "a South American state of things, revolution upon revolution, usurpation upon usurpation, and a universal running wild." The headquarters of this agitation in Germany was not unnaturally the Bavarian Palatinate on the left bank of the Rhine, which had for twenty years been incorporated with France and had become largely French in feeling; and the material which was not French was largely Polish. Here a sort of press-union was inaugurated by the journalists Wirth and Siebenpfeiffer, with a common fund for the indemnification of those who suffered imprisonment or fines under the press laws, and an elaborate organisation for the distribution of revolutionary publications. Relations were established with the *Burschenschaft*, which had been revived at Erlangen in 1827 and had spread to Jena and other Universities. Secret clubs were founded at Heidelberg and elsewhere; Börne and Heine placed their literary genius at the service of the movement, which was not, as in 1818, limited to academic circles; and for a year or two southern Germany seethed with revolutionary ferment. In Baden it produced tangible results under the rule of Leopold, the first prince of the Hochberg line; considerable freedom of the Press was granted, with popular participation in legislation and administration, and a real control of State finance. Elsewhere the agitation produced nothing more than demonstrations—like that at Hambach (May, 1832), where a motley gathering drank to Lafayette and resolved to proceed not merely by the methods of the press and platform, but by those of armed revolt—and reaction.

In the Hambach affair Metternich found the same satisfaction that he did in the Wartburg festival and Kotzebue's murder. The crisis demanded a repressive policy, and in that case he was indispensable. His earlier intervention had not been prevented by the moderation of the movements in northern Germany, but by the necessity of dealing first with the revolutions in Modena, Ferrara, and the Papal States, the insurrection in Poland, and the situation in the Netherlands.

The Belgian question had been particularly distasteful to Metternich because it had driven him for once from his one great stronghold, the imprescriptible rights of sovereigns. "The King of Holland," he had been forced to write, "must be compelled to say Yes or No" [to the disruption of his kingdom]. "If he says Yes, there is an end of the whole affair; if he says No, his consent must be dispensed with or set aside." But the affairs of Italy and Poland had not been without their compensations. Austria's success in Italy had once more vindicated her reputation as the destroyer of revolutions; and the Polish insurrection had helped to reestablish that union between the three Eastern Powers on which the success of his reactionary system so largely depended. Prussia had lately been very restive under the Austrian supremacy; and even Frederick William's brother-in-law, Prince Charles of Mecklenburg, had been heard to say that it would be no great loss if Austria left the Confederation. But so early as 1830 Metternich had negotiated with Nesselrode the *chiffon de Carlsbad*, which guaranteed the *status quo*, and formed the basis of the future understanding between Russia, Prussia, and Austria. Its principle was a repudiation of the idea, now advocated in the West, of non-intervention in the domestic affairs of foreign States. "His Imperial Majesty," wrote the Chancellor, "recognises it not merely as his right but as his duty to lend to every lawful authority attacked by the common enemy every kind of assistance which circumstances may permit him to employ"; and the complement of this maxim was his assertion that "the Powers on whom it devolves to watch over the interests of peace in Europe are not called upon to consider the inclinations or dislikes of particular regions."

Further conferences between the three Powers at Teplitz and Münchengrätz led to the Treaty of Berlin in 1833, by the secret clauses of which the Courts of Austria, Prussia, and Russia recognised "the right of every independent sovereign to summon to his assistance, whether in the internal or external difficulties of his country, any other independent sovereign whom he shall deem best able to assist him, and the right of the latter to grant or refuse such assistance according to his interest or convenience." They also declared that, "in a case where such assistance be given, no Power not invoked or summoned by the threatened State has the right to interfere, whether for the purpose of thwarting the assistance thus claimed and granted, or of acting in a contrary sense." Metternich was triumphant; "so long as the union between the three monarchs lasts," he wrote in 1835, "there will be a chance of safety for the world."

The adoption of these principles involved once more the effacement of Prussia and the repudiation of the part which Dahlmann, Ranke, Friedrich Gagern, and Paul Pfizer pressed upon her. Ancillon, a faithful friend of Austria, took Bernstorff's place as Foreign Minister in 1830; and, when Ranke in 1832 started his *Historisch-politische*

*Zeitschrift* with the object of awakening Prussian patriotism, the only result was to produce an opposition organ patronised by Wittgenstein, Kamptz, and other members of the Government. With Prussia's help the principles of the Triple Alliance were easily imposed upon the Germanic Federation; and on June 28, 1832, a month after the Hambach demonstration, the Diet unanimously adopted six articles—the number seems consecrated to reactionary causes—dictated by the Austrian Chancellor. While Metternich had previously denied the competence of the *Bund* to limit the rights of individual princes, he now denied the right of individual Parliaments to limit the powers or infringe the principles of the *Bund*. Hence the first Article imposed on every German sovereign the duty of rejecting every petition of his Estates impairing his sovereignty, which was guaranteed by the Federal Act. The second Article repudiated the right of the Estates to refuse to any German sovereign the requisite supplies for carrying on the government, or to use this threat to extort constitutional concessions; such conduct would justify the intervention of the *Bund*. The third Article prohibited any State legislation prejudicial to the objects of the *Bund* as interpreted by Metternich. The fourth established a permanent federal commission to examine all proposed State legislation and report to the Federation all such measures as threatened its interests or individual sovereign rights. The fifth bound individual States to protect the Federation from attack in the various representative assemblies; and the sixth asserted the right of the Federal Diet to determine whether State laws did or did not conflict with the principles of the Federation.

There was much sound Federal theory in these articles, but it was vitiated by the motive underlying it. It might suit Metternich to accept the Federal principle as a check upon Parliaments, and repudiate it as a check upon princes; but no permanent advantage could accrue to the Federation from so double-faced an interpretation of its fundamental idea. For the moment, however, the Diet adopted Metternich's views. Besides the six articles, it passed other repressive measures in July, 1832. All public meetings and revolutionary badges were prohibited; suspicious political characters were placed under surveillance; the edicts against the Universities were renewed; assurance was given of speedy assistance to sovereigns in case of need; the sale of German books printed abroad was subjected to special restrictions; Baden was forced to suspend its Liberal press laws; and a number of journals were suppressed.

The revolutionists hoped that these harsh measures would arouse discontent, and determined to strike another blow for liberty. A body of Poles was to march from Besançon, Frankfort was to be taken by surprise, the Diet to be broken up, the Federal treasury seized. The King of Würtemberg was to be compelled to head the national movement; and a provisional Government was to be formed of Rotteck, Welcker, Jordan, and other Liberal leaders. It was a crazy plot, and

was betrayed before the day of execution, though from sinister motives no measures were taken to prevent its coming to a head. The attempt on Frankfort was made on April 3, 1833, and not suppressed without loss of life. The affair was, of course, turned to account by Metternich. The universal conspiracy, which the Mainz commission had failed after many years' labour to reveal, had at last been galvanised into a feeble existence by governmental rigour; and the Frankfort conspirators were probably affiliated to the secret societies of which Mazzini was now the moving spirit. A general conspiracy needed as general a system of police as possible; and in June, 1833, at Metternich's instance, the Diet appointed a central commission to supervise the prosecutions in individual States, to collect results, and to concert preventive measures. The particularist sentiments of the various Governments somewhat impaired the efficiency of this plan; but instances enough of odious persecution occurred; and many of the Liberal leaders, whose names had been used by the Frankfort conspirators without their knowledge, were sentenced to long terms of imprisonment. A fresh series of ministerial conferences was held at Vienna in the spring of 1834, the results of which were kept secret for ten years owing to the hostility of France and England to this repressive policy. The principal suggestions appear to have been the appointment of five committees to act as probouleutic councils for the Diet, and the institution of courts of arbitration—to be selected by the sovereigns—to decide in legislative and financial disputes between the sovereigns and their Estates. The death of the Emperor Francis I on March 2, 1835—hastened, the Court pretended, by the proceedings of the Transylvanian Diet, which had become almost as intractable as the Hungarian—produced no change in Austria's policy, although under his successor, Ferdinand, Metternich had to share its direction with the Emperor himself, the Archduke Ludwig, and Count Kolowrat.

Reaction fortunately did not hinder the gradual transformation of the Prussian into a German Zollverein under the direction of Maassen, who succeeded Motz as Minister of Finance in 1830. The desertion of the mid-German commercial union by the Thuringian States in 1830 undermined its position; and Saxony began to make approaches to the Prusso-Bavarian system. The opposition of vested interests made its progress slow; and meanwhile, in August, 1831, Hesse-Cassel under its new Government came to terms with Prussia, despite the outcries of its confederates. In the same year Prussia induced Holland to suspend the heavy tolls levied on the products of the Zollverein passing down the Rhine. Bavaria was now brought into closer communion with the Prussian Zollverein; but, to achieve this great object, Prussia made concessions which departed to some extent from its original conception and converted the Zollverein into an almost national union. Its meetings were to be held at different centres, and not always, as

heretofore, at Berlin ; unanimity instead of a mere majority was to be requisite for alterations of the tariff ; and special treatment was accorded to Bavarian goods. The treaty was to last for eight years from January 1, 1834. Saxony was obliged to yield in May, 1834 ; and ten years later the Zollverein included practically the whole of Germany except the Austrian dominion, Hanover, Oldenburg, Mecklenburg, and the three Hanse cities. The area of the Zollverein then contained a population of twenty-five million souls ; and within ten years the value of its exports and imports increased from 249 to 385 million *thalers*, while the expenses of the collection fell from 44 to 16 millions. At last Germany was in a position to compete on equal terms with other nations, though it still seems to be open to dispute whether this result was mainly due to the tariff walls which were retained or to those which were removed. Politically, the completion of the Zollverein was an all-important victory for Prussia over Austria ; of the seventeen votes at the Diet only seven, complained Metternich, were independent of Prussian influence. The Zollverein was a menace to the *Bund* in that it sacrificed the looser union of the whole to the closer union of the part ; but, while the *Bund* under Austria's direction looked solely to the past, the Zollverein under Prussia's looked forward to the future. When in 1840 the aggressive attitude of Thiers produced a fear of war, and an answering outburst of German patriotism stimulated Schneckenburger's *Wacht am Rhein*, it was to Prussia that Germany trusted for defence.

The glory and popularity of this achievement were, however, marred by Prussia's attitude towards the constitutional crisis in Hanover, and by her treatment of the religious question on the Rhine. By a stroke of singular good luck for Great Britain and for Germany, the personal union between Great Britain and Hanover was severed at the death of William IV in 1837 ; and by the operation of the Salic law the German kingdom passed to Ernest Augustus, Duke of Cumberland, the fifth but eldest surviving son of George III. The new King, a Tory of the Tories, had taken a prominent part in opposing his brother William's government ; and perhaps in return for this compliment William IV had introduced the Liberal Constitution into Hanover without consulting the wishes of the heir-presumptive. No sooner had Ernest succeeded than he declared this Constitution null and void, and released his officials from the oath of fidelity they had sworn to its provisions. Financial necessities as well as Tory principles contributed to this step ; for Ernest was in the hands of the money-lenders, and wished to satisfy them from the State domains, which by the Constitution he was prohibited from treating as his private property. In his University of Göttingen alone was there any serious opposition ; seven professors, Dahlmann, Jacob and William Grimm, Gervinus, Ewald, W. Weber, C. Albrecht, all men of great distinction, protested on moral grounds against the repudiation of an oath. In December, 1837, they

were all deprived of their professorships, while Dahlmann, Jacob Grimm, and Gervinus, were expelled the country. A new Constitution was then arranged as a cloak for Ernest's absolutism; but this met with opposition in the towns, and an appeal was lodged before the Federal Diet. Bavaria, Württemberg, Baden, Hesse-Darmstadt, the Thuringian States, and the free cities, all voted in favour of the Hanoverian opposition; but Metternich once more secured Prussia's support for the principles of monarchical absolutism; and the Diet came to the remarkable decision that the Hanoverian Constitution of 1833 was invalid and that the King was justified in overthrowing it. Fortified with this verdict, Ernest in August, 1840, imposed a Constitution of his own; the legislative functions of the Assembly were reduced to the right of expressing opinions, its sittings were to be held in private, and Ministers were to be independent of its control. Last but not least, the State domains were to be recognised as the private property of the King. This outrageous affair seems for the first time to have stirred general indignation in Germany over a constitutional question; even the most respectable Conservatives were shocked; and it gave Liberals occasion for representing that no trust was to be put in princes and that the *Bund* was a national disgrace.

Still more troublesome to Prussia was the religious question. The problem forced upon her by the acquisition of some millions of Catholic subjects in the Rhine Province and Westphalia was not exactly novel, because Prussia had had to deal with Catholic subjects in Silesia. But her difficulties were increased, if not mainly created, by the rising tide of Ultramontane feeling, illustrated by the conversion to Rome of Haller, Friedrich Schlegel, and Adam Müller, by the failure of Wessenberg's attempt to free the German Catholic Church from Papal rule, by such utterances as Adam Müller's ascription of all the revolutionary tendencies of Germany to the original sin of the Reformation, and by the growing ecclesiasticism of men like Görres, who, wrote the Princess Metternich in 1834, "from being an abominable Jacobin has become one of the best men in the world." The chief disturbance arose over the question of mixed marriages, which were frequent in the west between immigrant Protestant bureaucrats and the Catholic daughters of the land. In these cases Prussian law gave the control over the children's education to the father, and forbade him to make any stipulations surrendering this right before marriage. The Roman Catholic Church on the other hand refused to recognise such marriages and prohibited her priests from assisting at the ceremony, unless the Protestant bridegroom gave an undertaking that his children should be brought up in the Roman Catholic faith. The Prussian Government at first attempted to negotiate with individual Bishops, but found that they were powerless and disinclined to act; for independent action of that kind would have been a long step towards that independent German Catholic Church which Hermes, Wessenberg, and many Catholics in Baden and Bavaria desired.

Resort was then had to Rome, and the conduct of the affair was left to Bunsen. The Pope in 1830 made some concessions, but the Brief in which they were embodied was so ambiguously worded that the Prussian Government declined to accept it as a solution of the controversy. At this juncture Pius VIII died, and with the election of Gregory XVI the Jesuits, who after their expulsion from Rome in 1820 had been admitted first to Austria and then to other parts of Germany, regained their influence in the Papal Curia. In 1832 Gregory, in a Brief to the Bavarian Bishops, prohibited what had hitherto been the Prussian practice; and Prussia, seeing no prospect of success at Rome, revived the negotiations with the Bishops under her authority. At length in 1834 a compromise was accepted at Berlin by von Spiegel, Archbishop of Cologne; but in the following year he died, and with extraordinary folly the Crown Prince secured the appointment of Freiherr von Droste-Vischering as his successor.

The new Archbishop had already signalled himself by waging war on Hermes' teaching, forbidding his theologians to attend the University of Bonn, and opposing the measures of the Prussian Government. He soon became the protagonist of the Ultramontane party; he refused consecration to all ecclesiastics who would not promise him unlimited obedience without appeal except to Rome, declared the laws of the State to be incompatible with the rights and privileges of the Church, and prohibited his clergy from countenancing mixed marriages without the promise that the children should be educated in the Roman Catholic faith. All efforts at accommodation failed; relations between Berlin and Rome grew strained; while in the Rhine Province the agitation reached a dangerous pitch. Misled by Bunsen's declaration that vigorous measures would alone make any impression on the Curia, the Prussian Government suddenly arrested the Archbishop of Cologne on November 10, 1837, and conveyed him out of his diocese, never to return. Bunsen was thereupon refused audience at Rome and compelled to leave his post. In three successive allocutions the Pope denounced the conduct of the Berlin Government. The Archbishop of Posen, Dunin, followed Vischering's example, and was in turn imprisoned; and, with the exception of the Bishop of Breslau, the Roman Catholic Bishops in the eastern provinces took the Roman side. The situation was more dangerous in the west, because the Rhinelanders had never completely reconciled themselves to Prussian rule. The clericals received support from Paris and from Munich; and Catholic Belgium dreamed of making a material conquest of the discontented province. The most serious symptom of all was perhaps the sympathy which Prussia's anti-popular tendencies secured to the opponents of the Government from thousands who had nothing else in common with the Ultramontane party.

Compared with this contest the difficulties which Prussia encountered in the Protestant Churches were slight. The union of the Reformed and

Lutheran Churches was an object dear to Frederick William's heart; and in this project he was assisted by the Berlin theologian Schleiermacher, the Lutheran historian Marheineke, and by Bishops Sack and Eylert. The movement spread in Baden and in Hesse; and Bunsen busied himself with drawing up a sort of German Book of Common Prayer. But rigid Lutherans refused to compromise the doctrine of consubstantiation; and the Reformed Churches objected to the Royal supremacy. The opposition was strengthened by a revolt of orthodox Lutheranism against the mystic pantheism of Schelling and the philosophic efforts of Schleiermacher to harmonise reason and religion; and, though the King professed to abhor any compulsion in the matter, the opponents of the union in Prussia were subjected to harsh treatment. The orthodox themselves invoked the secular arm against the rationalistic tendencies of Baur, of Strauss, whose *Life of Jesus* was published in 1835, and of the famous Tübingen school, and even against the milder heresies of the Halle professors, Gesenius and Wegscheider. But Altenstein confined himself to the promise that for the future only such men should be appointed to teach theology as acknowledged allegiance to the doctrines of the Church interpreted in the sense of the Augsburg Confession.

This was not a measure adequate to the growing divergences of religious faith in Germany. But the political importance of the questions was soon lost in the reviving insistence of the constitutional struggle. The outward signs were not yet numerous. Metternich and the Austrian system still seemed to be holding their own against the local discontents in Hungary and Transylvania; and in 1840 few would have prophesied a revolution in Vienna and the Chancellor's flight for safety to a constitutional country. But there was little faith in the stability of the thrones of Louis-Philippe and the Italian despots; and even in Germany itself the continuance of repression depended as much on Prussia as on Austria. Prussians felt for Frederick William something of the same respect that Englishmen felt for George III; and the personal desires of the former were as effective in delaying constitutional development as those of the latter in retarding Catholic Emancipation. When on June 7, 1840, the long reign of the monarch, who had survived Auerstädt and Jena, came to a close, it was felt that the beginning of a new era was at hand. Germany had repaired the material ravages of a generation of war and prepared the soil for a new intellectual harvest. The political system, which had suited that age, had waxed old like a garment, and the last efforts to patch up its rents were ending in failure.

## CHAPTER XII.

### LITERATURE IN GERMANY.

THERE is no political or social explanation of the phenomenally rapid development of German literature in the eighteenth century. In 1700 the German people, only slowly recovering from the ravages of the Thirty Years' War, were still in general at a very low ebb of intellectual and political life; and throughout the whole century they remained, as a corporate social organism, far behind France and England. Even the reigns of Frederick the Great in Prussia and of Joseph II in Austria, were, so far as the history of literature is concerned, stimulating episodes rather than epochs of preeminent achievement. In other words, the factors which were at work in raising German literature from insignificance to the leading position it occupied at the close of the century, were in great measure independent of political conditions.

The most obvious explanation of the phenomenon lies in the relative chronological position of German classical literature; we have here the exceptional case of a new literature growing up under the shadow of two greater literatures, and in a cosmopolitan age which, in matters of taste, knew no national boundaries. Germany rose to greatness with extraordinary rapidity on borrowed ideas; she sought out, first in French literature, then in English, what she was able to utilise for her own development, and built up her classical literature on the foundation thus acquired. In accordance with the needs of this process, the type of mind exemplified by Germany's intellectual leaders in the eighteenth century was of a peculiarly assimilative character; the eminence of men like Lessing and Herder, even of Goethe and Schiller, was not of that uncompromising original kind, which regards all that comes in its way either with sovereign indifference or as legitimate prey. These men became great partly by the conscientious study of models which they admired, and by the systematic absorption of ideas which had been handed down from their predecessors. It is this growth by imitation and assimilation which, in the first instance, explains how Germany arrived at so rich a poetic efflorescence amidst, on the whole, poverty-stricken intellectual conditions, how her high poetic achievement is to be reconciled with the uninspiring and even sordid provincialism of the nation.

At the beginning of the eighteenth century, German literature had virtually reached the standpoint of Boileau; the poets of the day, such as they were, were "court poets" according to the French ideas. Before long, however, the influence of English thought and literature found its way in—either directly by way of Hamburg, or indirectly through the agency of the Huguenot refugees, who were at this time opening up cosmopolitan paths across Holland and France. The first sign of returning vigour in German literature was the famous contention in 1740 between Johann Christoph Gottsched (1700-66), who had established himself as literary dictator in the metropolis of German taste, Leipzig, and the two Swiss reformers Johann Jakob Bodmer (1698-1783) and Johann Jakob Breitinger (1701-76). The controversy was more or less a repetition of the French *querelle des anciens et des modernes*; Gottsched representing the strictly classic principles of the French seventeenth century, Bodmer and Breitinger a more specialised and modern form of the doctrine championed by Perrault and his friends. But in one important particular the analogy breaks down: the German quarrel arose before there was any German literature to dispute about; it was a controversy about first principles, about the place of imagination in poetry, and the free exercise of genius. This precedence of theory to practice which is characteristic of every step forward in the German literature of the eighteenth century, is often quoted as a peculiar trait of the German mind; but it is incident to the assimilative growth of a literature. The quarrel of Leipzig and Zurich could not, however, have had more fruitful results, had it concerned German poets of the day, instead of a foreigner, Milton, whom Bodmer had a few years earlier introduced to the Germans in a clumsy prose translation. For from this quarrel dates the birth of modern German literature; the first practical issue of it is to be seen in the work of Lessing and Klopstock. Gottsched himself had not, it is true, the breadth of mind to benefit by his discomfiture, but the younger members of his party were willing, under the cogency of the Swiss arguments, to modify their opinions. Lessing owed to them his introduction to the literary life, and Klopstock was himself a contributor to their organ, the so-called *Bremer Beiträge*.

The position of Gotthold Ephraim Lessing (1729-81) in the movement of his century may be summed up by saying that he carried the *Aufklärung* in literature and criticism to its fullest development. In this respect his place is with the German "ancients" rather than with the "moderns," with Gottsched rather than with the Swiss; but his standpoint, thanks in great measure to the decisive victory of Bodmer and Breitinger, is so far in advance of Gottsched's that he appears as the bitterest antagonist of the last-named. With his marvellously balanced mind, Lessing was admirably fitted to reduce the intellectual chaos and unassimilated foreign ideas of his time to order; he gave the movement of German rationalism a broader basis than either Wolff or Gottsched

had dreamt of; he was a critical rationalist who had room in his system for the mystic pantheism of Spinoza and for a religious faith, and he was a classical critic who could judge without undue bias unclassical poets like the Klopstock of the *Messias*; he introduced to the German stage the *bürgcrliche Tragödie*, and, first of his nation, showed genuine understanding for the greatness of Shakespeare. But in all this Lessing did not for a moment sacrifice the fundamental tenets of rationalism and classicism. He took his standpoint on the dogmas of eighteenth century humanism, which regarded the history of the human race as a gradual progress towards perfection, an *Erziehung des Menschengeschlechtes*; if he proclaimed Shakespeare a greater poet than Corneille or Racine, it was because he grasped the continuity between Shakespeare and Sophocles, and held Shakespeare to be a more faithful observer of the spirit of Aristotle than were the French poets; and the opinion, which he shared with Winckelmann, that Greek sculpture was the *ne plus ultra* of art, was something wholly different from the narrow classic prejudices of the French seventeenth century.

As Lessing is thus virtually Gottsched's successor, so Friedrich Gottlieb Klopstock (1724–1803) is Bodmer's. The *Messias* (Cantos I–III, 1748) is the religious epic on which Bodmer set his hopes; it was Klopstock who justified in a German way those pleas for the rights of the imagination which the Swiss critics had borrowed from Addison and Muratori. Even more important, however, is Klopstock's share in the reawakening of the German lyric; the promise of the unhappy Günther, who died in 1723, and the beginnings of nature poetry to be found in the amorphous outpourings of Brockes, lead up unmistakably to Klopstock's *Odes*, which became the fountainhead of all that is best in the German lyric poetry of the century. Less easy is it to define the position of the third of the great "liberators" of modern German letters, Christoph Martin Wieland (1733–1813). He began as an imitator of Klopstock and a friend of Bodmer's, but all his riper work and influence belong to "classicism." He had, it must be admitted, little enough understanding for the true classic spirit, and he was wholly deficient in the high seriousness of Lessing or Winckelmann; but his light and often frivolous tone served as a wholesome antidote to the sentimental excesses of Klopstock and the later *Sturm und Drang*. Except in his early novels—*Agathon* (1766–7) is a landmark in the evolution of German fiction from the mediocre imitations of Richardson in the fifties and sixties to the typical classical novel, *Wilhelm Meister*—Wieland contributed little to the movement of his time and he left behind him few disciples.

A more important force than either Klopstock or Wieland in the development of German poetry was Johann Gottfried Herder (1744–1803). While Lessing brought the rationalistic and classic movement to its fullest perfection, and stretched the intellectual and poetic principles of

the Renaissance to their utmost limits, Herder entirely renounced the classic dogma; in his writings the ideas, which had germinated in Bodmer and had been put into practice by Klopstock, first took definite form as the literary creed of the future. To say "definite form" is perhaps incorrect, for Herder was one of the most inconsequent and nebulous thinkers of the eighteenth century; he was a pioneer without being himself aware of it. And yet none of his contemporaries had so many ideas of vital importance for the coming time as he. All that is best in the next hundred years of German intellectual history—and much that has made for progress in that of Europe as a whole—may be traced back to Herder's stimulating initiative. He, for instance, first clearly understood the principles of the organic evolution of national life; and, with the help of this conception, he revolutionised the methods of historical science, and defined the principles of modern aesthetics and literary criticism. In a higher degree than Lessing, Herder made clear the real nature of Shakespeare's genius and greatness; and in Strassburg he inspired the youthful Goethe with his own enthusiasm for the English poet, until Goethe felt—to use his own words—"like a blind man upon whom the power of sight had suddenly been conferred." Herder defined the conception of *Volk* as it had never been defined before, rediscovered and named the *Volkslied*, and formulated the idea of German nationalism, which he found reflected in the fabric of the Strassburg Minster. He was the pioneer of the *Sturm und Drang*, and a guide and teacher to whom even the Romanticists at the beginning of the nineteenth century looked up with respect.

*Sturm und Drang* is the name that a later generation gave to that wonderful ebullition of the German spirit which, foreshadowed by daring thinkers like Hamann and Gerstenberg—like Herder himself in his *Fragments* (1767)—burst forth in the year 1773 with Goethe's *Götz von Berlichingen*. It seemed as if the German intellect which for thirty years had been struggling ineffectually to free itself from the rules of Latin classicism, had here at last attained its object. The literary ideals of this period of fermenting genius allowed the poet, and especially the dramatic poet, an opportunity for less shackled expression than he had known in Germany since the century of the Reformation. Goethe was the acknowledged leader of the group, the exemplar of unfettered genius; but hardly less original, and certainly more immersed in the current, were his followers and contemporaries, the dramatists Lenz, Klinger, Heinrich Leopold Wagner, and Leisewitz. What this age meant for the history of the drama may be learned from a comparison of *Götz von Berlichingen* with Schiller's *Räuber*, which, appearing in 1781, influenced no less powerfully the later development of the movement. *Die Räuber* is inferior to Goethe's motley *Ritterdrama* in the broad outlook on human life; Schiller shows himself infinitely less conversant with the world, his judgment is more juvenile and less ripe;

but progress is to be discerned in the better-welded scenes and in the more dramatic grasp of character. The evolution of a national type of tragedy—and it may be added, of a national theatre—from the unreasoning Shakespeare-worship of the first members of the group, is one of the chief services Germany owes to her *Sturm und Drang*.

But this period also produced notable work in other fields. The *Sesenheimer Lieder* proved not only Goethe, but also Lenz, to be a lyric poet of a high order; and at this time there was in Göttingen a little band of singers who adapted the spirit of Klopstock to the needs of the new age; they, no less than Herder and Goethe in Strassburg, had discovered the secret of lyric power in the simple songs of the people. Goethe and his friends did not neglect or despise the *Volk*; they were too loyal disciples of Herder for that; but they were also too intent on giving voice to Titanic ideas, too enamoured of the *Raritätenkasten* view of life, to efface themselves in the essentially contemplative world of the peasant. In this respect the Göttingen *Dichterbund* (or *Hain*, a designation suggested by a poem of Klopstock's) supplemented them; many of the members of that circle, and notably its leader, Johann Heinrich Voss (1751-1826), had themselves sprung from the peasant class; they had, with few exceptions, lived the narrow life of the north-German countryman of the eighteenth century, and their poetry never lost touch with the soil. Thus their folksongs are less influenced by bookish traditions than Herder's, less even than Goethe's lyrics, in which at this time something of the Anacreontic artificiality of the earlier decade was still noticeable. It is to the Göttingen poets, and, above all, to that strange wayward genius, Gottfried August Bürger (1747-94), rather than to Goethe, that we owe the finest ballads of the epoch. Bürger's *Lenore* (1773), the best known and, on the whole, the finest example of this popular poetry, which arose in imitation of the English Percy ballads, drew, together with Goethe's *Werther*, the attention of Europe to the new movement.

In fiction the *Sturm und Drang* produced one great book, *Die Leiden des jungen Werthers* (1774); but this stands somewhat apart from the general literary movement in Germany. Compared with the lengthy family-novels, or with Wieland's *Agathon*, which preceded it, it obviously belongs to a different type of fiction, a type as far removed from what was then called a novel as the modern German *Novelle* is from the *Roman*. *Werther* profoundly influenced the development of the German national novel, but it is not, strictly speaking, itself a link in that development. In point of fact, the *Sturm und Drang* failed conspicuously in its search for a type of novel that was suited to its needs. It was no solution to the difficulty to deluge the didactic family romance with sentimentality, as did Johann Martin Miller in his *Siegwart* (1776); still less was anything attained by imbuing the older fiction with philosophy, as did Friedrich Heinrich Jacobi—the

Jacobi who had made of Goethe a life-long Spinozist—or Klinger in his later period; and the most vital novel of these years, Karl Philipp Moritz' *Anton Reiser* (1785), in which, adopting the methods of the Göttingen school, the author turned his own life into a novel of sentimental education, hardly crossed the boundary that separates autobiography from romance. The novelist who in this age wrote the most distinctive form of fiction was the Thuringian, Johann Jakob Wilhelm Heinse (1749-1803); he alone set about his task in what now seems the right way; that is to say, he took as his model not the formless imitations of the English family-novel, but the romances of Wieland, and infused into them the enthusiasm and sentimentalism of the new period. Heinse's best novel, *Ardinghella oder Die glückseligen Inseln* (1787), forms the connecting link between Wieland on the one hand and Jean Paul on the other; it is the forerunner of *Wilhelm Meister* and of the "artist novels" of the Romanticists.

In passing thus summarily in review the literature of this revolutionary movement, we cannot but feel disappointed that so brilliant and promising a decade should have left behind it so little of permanent value. For even *Götz von Berlichingen* and *Werther*, *Die Räuber* and *Kabale und Liebe*—monuments of genius though they be—remain the expression of a very definite epoch; they are not permanent and satisfying achievements such as appeal to the national mind in all its phases and in all its periods. They are read to-day less as masterpieces of German national literature than as the youthful creations of two great poets and as symptomatic phenomena of their time. The movement of *Sturm und Drang*, which Goethe had hailed in its first stage as an epoch of "*Deutschland emergierend*," failed to lay the foundation for a new and vigorous national literature; its strong dramatic beginnings dwindled away in shallow sentimental plays like Iffland's, or in blustering medieval dramas; its fiction degenerated rapidly into worthless sensational stories of sentiment and chivalry, of ruins and moonlight. The *Geniezeit* had but a small share in that movement towards classic achievement which is associated with the work of Goethe and Schiller in the last quarter of the eighteenth century. The question thus forces itself upon us: Why did this movement, which for a time seemed the development towards which Germany's best national life was striving, prove so barren, and why was it so short-lived?

The question is one which the historian of German literature has not often faced, and yet it is too important for the understanding of the classical period and the subsequent Romantic movement to be ignored. A possible explanation is that the *Sturm und Drang* was too exclusively destructive and negative in its tendencies; its plan of attack, the instruments of demolition which it brought to bear on the *Aufklärung*, were in the highest degree effective; and the earlier classicism of the eighteenth century found it difficult to resist the assault. Frederick

the Great's tract *De la littérature allemande* (1780) was easily laughed to scorn, and Lessing himself was summarily refuted when he attempted to protest. But not one of these young poets, not even Goethe and Schiller in their early years, stopped to consider how this outburst of national feeling in poetry might be turned to practical, constructive account. The *Sturm und Drang* in its youthful, irresponsible spontaneity, was content to be merely iconoclastic; it knew not and cared little whither it was driving. And it is after all very doubtful whether the movement, even if it had been planned and carried out with deliberation, could have achieved more lasting results as the expression of the German national spirit in poetry. The German revolutionists were as little able as was Rousseau in France to stem the triumphant progress of the *Aufklärung* towards the ideal of perfected humanism which finds its noblest expression in the classical poetry of Goethe and Schiller. The time was not yet ripe for a reversion to unrestrained individualism of thought and feeling.

The last outstanding work which still bears on it something of the stamp of the *Sturm und Drang* epoch is Schiller's drama *Don Carlos* (1787); in the same way, it might be said that the epoch of German classicism was opened by Goethe's *Iphigenie auf Tauris*, which appeared in the same year, although it had been conceived and written in prose at least ten years earlier. The transition in Goethe's life from *Sturm und Drang* to classicism is a chapter which still awaits exhaustive and conclusive treatment at the hands of the poet's biographers. Goethe's decisive break with the literary ideals of his youth was, in the first instance, occasioned by the change in his life: at the close of 1775 the Duke of Saxe-Weimar invited him to his Court, where before very long the poet became not only the intimate friend, but also the adviser and minister of his patron. The new conditions brought with them more varied responsibilities; they meant a less self-centred life than Goethe had led in Frankfort; he learned to look upon his own poetic production in a more objective and critical spirit. Works like *Die Geschwister*, *Iphigenie*, *Tasso*, are still "confessions," but in a less personal sense than *Götz von Berlichingen*, *Clavigo*, *Werther*, and *Stella* had been; the poet has succeeded in dissociating to a greater extent than before his personality from his poetry.

Goethe's journey to Italy in the years 1786-8 was the central event of his life; it formed the culmination of his first classical period, which must be clearly discriminated from the second period of classicism—that of *Hermann und Dorothea* and *Die natürliche Tochter*. In Italy, far removed from the atmosphere in which he had grown up, Goethe acquired for the first time that wonderful power of self-judgment which henceforward distinguishes him among the great poets of the world. It was not merely that he had left behind him the *Sturm und Drang* of his youth; but so objective did his standpoint become towards his early

masterpieces that he was able to revise them without bias, to complete *Egmont* (1788) and to add scenes to *Faust* (first published as a fragment in 1790). To Goethe Italy was a revelation of sunshine and colour; the months he spent there were given up to calm reflexion and unper-  
turbed optimism. In looking back, the contrast that presented itself to him was not one of differing literary or artistic principle, but of the serene outlook upon life as opposed to the unsatisfied cravings and melancholy brooding of the German poetry of the time. The serene greatness of the antique as interpreted by Winckelmann and its reflexion in the Italian art of the Renaissance, became in Goethe's mind not merely the art-canonical of a definite age, but an intellectual dogma of universal application. He arrived at no conscious decision—as in his later classical period—in favour of a classical as opposed to a Romantic or German art; he was only firmly convinced that a truly great art should express, above all things, tranquillity of soul. In *Torquato Tasso* (1790) we find the quintessence of Goethe's reflexions on his own life and mission as a poet; in *Wilhelm Meisters Lehrjahre* (1795–6), which had been begun in the early years at Weimar, his ripe conclusions on the great problems of life and art. This novel—and it is not often regarded under this aspect—is the immediate product, the fullest summary, of Goethe's Italian experiences; neither in form nor in substance is it a “classic” work, but it has in common with classic literature that calm optimism which henceforth Goethe prized above all else.

Schiller's poetic development in these years epitomised, no less clearly than Goethe's, the movement of the time. Born in 1759, he was ten years younger than Goethe, and his early dramas stood in a relation to the second half of the *Geniezeit* comparable to that in which Goethe's *Götz von Berlichingen* and *Werther* had stood to the first. He, too, soon felt the need of more satisfying ideals than those which had inspired *Die Räuber* and *Kabale und Liebe*; and, like Goethe, he in his turn was irresistibly attracted by the serenity of classicism. But it is significant for the mental character of the two poets that, whereas Goethe, in his first excursion into the classic field, *Iphigenie auf Tauris*, adapted to the needs of German poetry classic ideas drawn more or less directly from Greek poetry itself, Schiller solved the problem in a way more in keeping with the traditions of his century; in *Don Carlos* he turned his back on the restless drama of his youth and became a disciple of the French theatre. Goethe's reversion to classic form had been the natural result of his choosing a classic subject; Schiller allowed himself, on the other hand, to be influenced by the neoclassicism of the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries. The national characteristics of Greek literature, which appealed so strongly to Goethe and stimulated him to imitation, were acceptable to Schiller only in a generalised Latin form; and the fervour of Schiller's Hellenism, as it

is expressed in the wonderful philosophic lyrics of his Jena period, implies a mind less in sympathy with the Greek poets than with the rationalistic thinkers of the eighteenth century.

At every stage of his career Goethe impresses us with the independence and universality of his genius; he belongs to no one epoch, he commits himself to no single tendency of thought. In every movement in which he takes part he has the art of rising above the strife of the moment, and sifting out and utilising those elements which are of universal application and abiding worth. No poet ever belonged in the same full sense as Goethe to two centuries. Schiller, on the other hand, was essentially a poet and thinker of the age of "Enlightenment." The philosophy of rationalism had formed his chief mental training as a schoolboy, and he erected his own ethics and aesthetics on a basis, part of which he owed to Kant, part to Shaftesbury. He carried German aesthetics a stage further than Kant, but he did not, like Herder, attempt to revise the problem of the relations of the individual mind to the manifestations of beauty. Rationalistic, too, was his conception of history; and he wrote his own works *Der Abfall der vereinigten Niederlande* (1788) and *Der dreissigjährige Krieg* (1791-3) in the rhetorical style of the masters of the eighteenth century; he had little understanding for the new ideals of social evolution and the precise scientific methods which were adopted by the historians in the following age. In the same way, the optimistic ground-tone of his poetry harmonised with the best elements in eighteenth century classicism; he retained to the last that wide-hearted humanism and cosmopolitanism which were characteristic of the best thought in Europe before the French Revolution.

And yet, mutually antithetic as the standpoints of Goethe and Schiller were, time gradually brought about an understanding between the poets. The dissatisfaction which the older poet felt with the condition of German literature on his return from Italy led to the conviction that the only hope for its future lay in the complete abnegation of all that savoured of *Sturm und Drang*, of uncouth nationalism. Schiller, too, soon left behind him the crude utilitarianism of the *Aufklärung*; and a truer classicism began to take the place of the methods he had followed in *Don Carlos*. The real obstacle to an understanding lay, not in matters of literature, but in the attitude of each poet towards philosophy; Schiller, the idealist, had become a confirmed disciple of Kant and a champion of the new transcendentalism, while Goethe, the realist, whose starting-point had been Spinoza, looked with distrust on metaphysics as a useless key to the riddle of the universe. Irreconcilable as these standpoints were, the difficulty was surmounted by the discovery, which both poets made in 1794, that they were really at one as to the ultimate object of their striving. They were in essential agreement concerning the aims of a national art and literature, and were

both filled with the same lofty ideal of "perfect humanity"; only they had reached their conclusions by different processes. Schiller had solved the problem deductively, that is to say, he had set out from the "idea," while Goethe had proceeded inductively, basing his standpoint on nature and the actual facts of experience.

Apart from the correspondence of the two poets in these years, the work which gives us most insight into the nature of their relationship is Schiller's treatise, *Über naive und sentimentalische Dichtung*, which appeared in 1795. On the basis of that dualism, which the transcendental philosophy had introduced into every province of the intellectual life, Schiller conceived of literature as grouping itself round one or other of the two poles, the "naïve" and the "sentimental." Naïve was, according to him—and in this he was only following the views of his century on the subject—the poetry of the ancients; naïve, too, were poets of the modern world like Shakespeare and Goethe, whose attitude towards poetry was intuitive, immediate, unreflective. This dogma once accepted, the logical antithesis to the naïve was clearly the type of mind which reasons and reflects, the "sentimental" mind; and, according to Schiller, this type predominated in modern poetry. Such was the central idea round which the poet's philosophic theory of literature turned, and it may be regarded as fundamental for the whole classical *ars poetica*. Even more interesting and suggestive, however, are the subjective aspects of the treatise; *Über naive und sentimentalische Dichtung* is the key to the friendship of the two poets. It is Schiller's justification of a type of poet directly antithetic to that represented by the Greeks, Shakespeare, and Goethe—a sentimental or modern type of which he regarded himself, and rightly, as a characteristic example.

The friendship of Goethe and Schiller was thus based, not so much on mutual concessions, as on a common agreement that there were several ways of attaining the end both poets had in view; that it was possible to look at life and literature differently and yet be at one on the essential issue. It was hardly in the nature of things, however, that two men should live in such close intellectual companionship for eleven years and not each take on to some extent the colour of the other; this is to be seen most clearly in the gradual approximation of their views with regard to what is "classic" in poetry. If Goethe's second period of classicism differed so profoundly from that of *Iphigenie*, if he demanded still more emphatically the expression of the type, the perfect form and the impersonal note in literature—if he abandoned the more or less subjective warmth of *Tasso*, with its slightly veiled portraits, for the complete and almost repellent objectivity of *Die natürliche Tochter* and *Pandora*—if the typical figures of *Hermann und Dorothea* take the place of the individualised characters of *Wilhelm Meister*, and if the generalising methods with which *Faust* was continued form so abrupt a contrast to the personal note of the earlier fragments—all this was due, in some

measure at least, to the influence of his friend. On the other hand, the influence of Goethe on Schiller is even more marked. It was clearly Goethe who removed the metaphysical hindrances which in 1794 still separated Schiller from poetry; it was he who facilitated a return to the drama and taught Schiller to write ballads that have won a warm place in the nation's heart. It was, above all things, Goethe's naïve, plastic, unmetaphysical outlook upon life that revealed to Schiller the worth of reality and broadened his whole conception of humanity.

The friendship of Goethe and Schiller, that is to say the eleven years from 1794 to Schiller's death in 1805, represents the summit of German literary achievement, the culminating result in the long process of eighteenth century development towards classicism. As in all classical epochs, the dominant note of the time was one of conscious achievement; the men of the age were proud of having brought humanity and art "*so herrlich weit*," and they doubted—with the horrors of the French Revolution fresh in their memories—the possibility of the younger generation advancing beyond them. What was written by the great German poets in these years was a ripe, not a ripening, literature; the nation was no longer in the position of Goethe's *Iphigenia* in that unforgettable line,

*Das Land der Griechen mit der Seide suchend;*

the land of the Greeks was found; Hellas was in Weimar. This self-satisfied, conclusive character of the age is exemplified by its leading personalities—Goethe and Schiller, Kant and Wilhelm von Humboldt; and it is to be read out of all the great books that were written at that time. Goethe's *Wilhelm Meister*, for example, is the climax to which the fiction of the eighteenth century, since its first awakening to life under Richardson's stimulus, had steadily advanced; it is the most national of all German novels, and it became the model of the representative German fiction of the earlier nineteenth century. *Hermann und Dorothea* (1797), again, is perfect of its kind, harmonious, irreproachable; it is a classic poem, although its classicism is clearly different from that of Goethe's *Iphigenie*. In the earlier drama the poet had created complicated, individualised personages conceived by an essentially Germanic imagination without too careful a consideration for the classic canon; whereas in *Hermann und Dorothea* he has openly accepted the doctrine that perfect literature deals not with individuals, but with more or less abstractly constructed types. It is this generalisation—making the personages of the poem true not so much to themselves as to a whole class, selecting for treatment not peculiar or exceptional incidents, but events of universally human significance—that renders *Hermann und Dorothea* a classical poem, in comparison with which *Iphigenie* and *Tasso* still belong to a comparatively unclassic art. Indeed, we might even claim for Goethe's idyll the honour of

being the most perfect manifestation of German classicism. Final, too, although not in any exclusive sense classic, is *Faust*, which was revised and continued under Schiller's stimulus. The completed "First Part" was not published until 1808, three years after Schiller's death, the second part not until 1833.

When we return to Schiller's writings, we find in them similar "final" qualities. His treatise *On naïve and sentimental poetry* is virtually the last word on the subject of classical literary theory; his *Wallenstein* (1798-9) is the finest historical drama of the eighteenth century; and there is the same mellow quality in the classic ballads of 1798. None, it is true, of Schiller's later dramas touches quite so high a level as *Hermann und Dorothea* or *Faust*; but the reason is to be sought in the genius and temperament of the younger poet. On the one hand, the schism in Schiller's nature between what might be called the national needs and the cosmopolitan ideals of the century was more marked; and, on the other, Schiller's knowledge of Greek literature was wanting in that depth and sympathy which is characteristic of Goethe's. It was manifestly harder for him to discover his "form" than it was for Goethe; and there is in consequence something tentative and experimental about all the dramas of his last years. Not until 1804, the year of *Wilhelm Tell*, did he create a national historical drama which occupies a position in the poetry of the period analogous to that held by *Hermann und Dorothea*.

There is, however, another side to this picture of German classicism which is apt to be overlooked. We allow ourselves too readily to be dazzled by the achievements of Weimar, and forget that the general body of German literature at the turn of the century stood far below these models of classic excellence. Works like *Hermann und Dorothea*, *Wilhelm Meister*, and *Wilhelm Tell*, were not, after all, representative of the German epic, novel, and drama at this epoch; and the masterly ballads of Goethe and Schiller found no capable imitators among their contemporaries. The average literary production of the time is approximately represented by poems like Kosegarten's *Jucunde* (1808) and Tiege's didactic epic *Urania* (1801); the drama of the period, in spite of Schiller, lay mainly in the hands of belated representatives of the *Sturm und Drang*, of effective masters of stage-craft like August Wilhelm Iffland (1759-1814) or of playwrights who showed little respect for the dignity of poetry, like August von Kotzebue (1761-1819) and the rationalists of Berlin; lastly, the most popular German fiction of the classical age was not *Wilhelm Meister* but the voluminous writings of Jean Paul Friedrich Richter (1763-1825), who had more *Sturm und Drang* in his veins than Weimarian classicism. The floundering, confused, and formless novels which Richter wrote are more characteristic of a literature of decay and disintegration than of one of achievement. Not that he was deficient in genius of a higher sort—to find so kindly

and genial a humorist we have to go back to Sterne—but his gifts only threw into more glaring contrast the clumsiness of the vehicle by means of which he expressed himself. It would thus seem as if the class distinctions of the social life of the eighteenth century were also characteristic of its literature; there is the same wide gulf between the leaders of poetry and their followers as there was between the absolute rulers of the petty German States of the time and the subjects over whom they ruled. When we look into the actual facts of literary history more closely, we are forced to the conclusion that the general condition of German poetry at the zenith of the classical period was, if anything, less promising than in that age of *Sturm und Drang*, when an optimistic enthusiasm had inspired all forms of German literature.

This consideration is of importance, if we are to understand and justify the extraordinary outburst of Romanticism which at the very close of the eighteenth century disturbed the equanimity of German classicism. To realise what the Romantic revolt meant we must look beyond Goethe and Schiller, and study the lower manifestations of German poetry at this time; beneath the noble classicism associated with Weimar there lay appalling depths of cynical rationalism, which the *Xenien* of Goethe and Schiller (1796)—effective enough in their gibes against the coming men of the new movement—were powerless to destroy. Clearly the “time-spirit” looked at German classicism with other eyes than its great poets; and the future lay not here, but in a reversion to those subjective ideals, in which at all times the German spirit has sought healing and recovery from its wanderings into the alien world of Latin classicism. The new century belonged in the first instance, not to Schiller and not to the classic Goethe, but to the Romanticists.

The period of Romanticism stands in a relation to that of *Sturm und Drang* analogous to that in which Goethe's and Schiller's classicism stands to Lessing's; just as, owing to the intervening outburst of *Sturm und Drang*, the literature which centred in *Wallenstein* and *Hermann und Dorothea* was a fuller expression of the national life of the German people than *Minna von Barnhelm* and the poetry of the Frederician age, so now the Romantic movement showed how enormously the national spirit had benefited by the discipline of Weimar. German critics of the earlier half of the nineteenth century, and especially those who had come through the Hegelian school, found a difficulty in discriminating between the epoch known as *Sturm und Drang* and that of Romanticism. And it must be admitted that the points of similarity between the periods are more striking than the points of difference. Both movements stand out in sharp contrast to those which they superseded by virtue of their pronounced individualism; both claim the rights of poetry to adopt a purely subjective standpoint. They are at one in their contempt for rules and for regularity of form; they are determined opponents of

all kinds of boundaries and restrictions. Both claim the right to widen the domain of poetry beyond the limits imposed by the classic canon. But there were also profound differences between the epochs. The *Sturm und Drang* was, as has been shown, essentially destructive and negative; the Romantic School, on the other hand, was constructive and affirmative. It built up where the earlier movement had been content to tear down and destroy; it attacked the same problems, but with a different object and from a different standpoint.

Before attempting to formulate a definition of Romanticism, it is of importance to learn what meaning the Germans at that time attached to the word "romantic." This, however, is not easy; for even the Romantic School itself was not at one as to the use of the term. Friedrich Schlegel, who, of all the members of the first Romantic School, was most qualified to speak with authority, once informed his brother that he had written 125 pages of manuscript dealing with the meaning of the word "romantic"; and presumably he did not reach a satisfactory conclusion, as we hear no more of the essay. That a similar confusion reigned in the minds of his contemporaries everyone knows who has attempted to disentangle the mesh of Romantic criticism. Perhaps the most helpful aid to a definition is to consider the idea of "romantic" as an antithesis to "classic." The meaning which the Germans attached to the word "classic" remained tolerably constant throughout the century, Schiller's interpretation of it not differing materially from that of Gottsched. "Classic," however, must not be confused with "Greek"; for the attitude of the German mind to Greek art and poetry changed with every phase of the rapidly advancing intellectual development of the eighteenth century. The Germans did not, even in their least "classic" periods, admit any serious antithesis between German and Greek ideas. The heroes of the *Sturm und Drang* were all warm enthusiasts for Greek poetry. Werther's favourite book is Homer, Karl Moor finds his ideal heroes in Plutarch, and the most tumultuous German dramatists were as fervent admirers of Greek tragedy as Elias Schlegel and Lessing had been. Not only Winckelmann and Lessing, but Herder, Lenz, and the Strassburg Goethe, Voss and Bürger, Schiller and Goethe in their riper years, Hölderlin and Friedrich Schlegel, all loved Greek poetry and insisted on as close an approximation as was possible in the German tongue to the Greek spirit; but, needless to say, those writers differed widely in their attitude to the classic-romantic controversy. The antithesis "classic" and "romantic," about which so much was written in those days, is to be traced back to Schiller's famous Kantian antinomy of "naïve"—according to his view, the equivalent of "classic"—and "sentimental," which, after some modification, was regarded as synonymous with "romantic." But the Romanticists themselves were very far from accepting Schiller's distinction in its entirety; for they were as little disposed to exclude

*naiveté* from their own artistic creed as they were to see in classic art and poetry the only legitimate expression of that quality.

Romanticism—to attempt some manner of practical definition—was a revival of individualism, of a literature of personality, as opposed to the objective, theoretically grounded literature of classicism. It aimed at reconstructing the imaginative world on the basis of the “*ego*.” It repudiated all systems of law, of belief, of criticism, which were not based on and adapted to the needs of the individual. The Romanticists laid it down as the bounden duty of every man to think out afresh his relationship to God and the universe; they disliked nothing more than dogmas and rules, forced upon the individual by minds which were of necessity differently constituted from his. Such principles led, for instance, to a reconstruction of religion, and to its reestablishment on a basis of purely personal faith and of the immediate relationship of the soul to God; thus arose a new pantheism, akin to that of Spinoza and Jakob Böhme, in which one of the first articles was the spirituality of the universe, the presence of God in all things. In the domain of literature, the first task of Romanticism was to sweep away the boundaries which hindered the full expression of the individual. If a poet wished to express in his verse his feelings for nature, no Lessing was allowed to forbid the abuse of descriptive poetry; if he would call music or painting to his aid, he found no theoretical obstacles in his way. Above all things, “Romantic” meant that these young reformers were determined, to the best of their ability, to counteract that dissociation of poetry from life which is characteristic of every classic epoch. The new poets demanded the same right that the *Stürmer und Dränger* had demanded, to transfer their experiences and emotions to paper exactly as these phenomena presented themselves to them; in other words, literature, according to this school, became not the expression of a regularly defined literary creed, but the immediate reflexion of the soul and its relations to the outside world.

Such are some of the more salient features of the intellectual movement which opened the nineteenth century in Germany and dominated it for more than thirty years; but they afford, admittedly, no clear and satisfying definition of the scope and aims of the Romantic School. The literary historian is baffled by that elusive character of the Romantic ideas to which reference has already been made; it is almost impossible to say what—irrespective of the worth or worthlessness of the literature itself—was at any given moment vital to the movement. The progressive development of Romanticism is equally obscure. We are familiar with certain groups of writers in German literature, who are included in the category of Romantic; but we are still far from seeing the organic connexion between the groups, and understanding the life-history of the whole movement. It is not yet clear how analogous and simultaneous phenomena in other European literatures are to

be correlated ; we have no working hypothesis of the growth and decay of Romanticism, and are even at a loss to say what really had to grow and decay. Above all, we miss a satisfactory coordination of the two phases in German literature, which have now to be considered, known as the "Romantic School" and the "Heidelberg Romanticists." If the relations of these two important phases were understood, and the metamorphoses made clear which the Romantic ideas underwent between 1805 and 1813—years of extraordinary importance for German national life—the subsequent history of Romanticism would become a simple logical deduction.

The Romantic School, which may be said to have come into existence with the *Athenäum* published by the brothers Schlegel between 1798 and 1800, forms a self-contained phase in German literature. Chief among its members was Ludwig Tieck (1773-1853), who began his career as a bitter opponent of the insipid, unimaginative literature of the *Aufklärung*, endeavouring to rescue what was vital in the old *Sturm und Drang* from its deadening, materialistic grasp. It is questionable, however, whether Tieck, left to himself, would have been more than a negative force in the Romantic movement ; at best, he might have been the warm advocate and interpreter of those masters of foreign literatures whom the Romanticists took to their hearts, Shakespeare, Cervantes, Calderon. To use a familiar phrase of the time, he was a "talent" rather than a "genius." But he had the good fortune to become the intimate friend of the most original thinkers and poets of the school, Wilhelm Heinrich Wackenroder (1773-98) and Friedrich von Hardenberg, who was known to literature as Novalis (1772-1801) ; and under the stimulus of these two men he became a power of the first magnitude in Romantic poetry. Both these writers were frail and sickly, both were cut off by an early death before they had reached their thirtieth year ; but each in his own way threw out naïvely and unconsciously ideas which revolutionised the intellectual life of Germany. Wackenroder's *Herzensergiessungen eines kunstliebenden Klosterbruders* (1797) is the primary cell from which the whole Romantic movement in painting sprang, from the German circles in Rome and the Düsseldorf school down to that last efflorescence of Romantic painting, the pre-Raphaelite brotherhood in England. Here art was reinstated as a vehicle for religious feelings and spiritual aspirations ; it became the expression of the Divine in the human soul. Together with Wackenroder, Tieck gave voice to this new faith in the earliest of the purely Romantic novels, *Franz Sternbalds Wanderungen* (1798), in which the form of romance cultivated by Heinse is treated with the ethic seriousness of *Wilhelm Meister*. If Tieck now appears as a warm enthusiast for art, if a Romantic *milieu* of medieval colour and unearthly music takes the place of the sullen discontent and pessimistic realism of his first novel, *William Lovell* (1795-6), it is the gentle, unassuming friend of his school and college days to whom we owe the change.

Tieck's personal debt to Novalis, whom he met in 1799, a year after Wackenroder's death, is less conspicuous, although Novalis was the more gifted poet of the two; indeed, a more inspired poet, a more penetrating thinker, is not to be met with in the entire literature of this epoch. In Novalis' *Hymnen an die Nacht* (1800) the religious lyric of Romanticism touches its highest point; in his fragments of fiction, *Die Lehrlinge zu Sais*, and *Heinrich von Ofterdingen* (1802), we find the quintessence of that unworldly Romantic idealism which the Romantic School professed and tried to realise; here we have in its most concentrated form the poetry of the Middle Ages—not the real Middle Ages, for *Heinrich von Ofterdingen* is even less historically "real" than *Götz von Berlichingen* had been—but the Middle Ages as seen through the idealising mysticism of a Romantic faith, which spurned the boundaries between the real and the ideal, between past and present, poetry and prose.

The critical foundations of this new school of poetry, which Tieck and his friends inaugurated, were laid by the brothers August Wilhelm and Friedrich Schlegel (1767–1845 and 1772–1829). Both writers had written poetry, but without attaining any very conspicuous success. Friedrich is especially remembered as the author of a fragmentary novel, *Lucinde* (1799), which throws valuable light on the efforts of the school to carry into the province of practical ethics its iconoclastic ideas. No less than the authors of *Franz Sternbald*, Friedrich Schlegel was in Heinse's debt; here, too, although in a very different way, the latter's moral laxity was brought into the service of Romanticism. Unreadable now, Schlegel's novel left its mark on the development of that fiction of social problems which bulks so largely in the German literature of the later nineteenth century. The elder Schlegel, again, more than atoned for the cold metrical exercises of his lyric poetry by the magnificent translation of Shakespeare (1797–1810), which remains the one abiding literary achievement of the Romantic School. So far, however, as the history of Romanticism itself is concerned, both men were in the first instance critics; they were the founders of that Romantic criticism which rendered the attitude of the nineteenth century towards literary production profoundly different from that taken up by Lessing in the preceding century.

The fact has already been emphasised, that what distinguishes the Romantic movement from the classicism which it overcame is not that it moved in a new world, or chose as the themes of its poetry different things, but rather that it approached the same subjects and the same problems from a wholly original point of view. What, for instance, makes Wackenroder's art-theories so radically opposed to those of Moritz or even Goethe, is only the method of approach; *Franz Sternbald*, *Heinrich von Ofterdingen*, *Lucinde*, are novels about *milieus* not dissimilar from those in which *Ardinghello*, *Titan*, and *Wilhelm Meister*

move, but the method of treatment is new. In the same way, the critical work of the Schlegels may be compared with that of their predecessors. Friedrich Schlegel began his career as an enthusiastic apologist of the Greeks; his early essays form the theoretical complement to the writings of that most Greek spirit of the Romantic age, the Swabian, Friedrich Hölderlin (1770-1843). We have, however, only to place this Romantic Hellenism of Schlegel and Hölderlin beside that of Goethe and Schiller, to recognise the complete incompatibility of the two conceptions. Friedrich Schlegel saw in Greek literature just what Goethe and Schiller overlooked, and he attached but little importance to those elements in it which they singled out for imitation. Hölderlin's lyrics, the splendid prose dithyrambs of *Hyperion* (1797-9)—a novel which, for poetic intensity, deserves a place beside *Heinrich von Ofterdingen*—are permeated by the Greek spirit; but it is a Greek spirit free from the self-conscious rationalism or studious imitation to be found in *Die Götter Griechenlands* or *Pandora*. In other words, Romantic Hellenism endeavoured to get at the soul, the emotion underlying Greek manifestations of art, while that of the eighteenth century, from Winckelmann and Lessing to Schiller and Goethe, demanded rather the impersonal and objective reproduction of the Greek masterpieces.

The same irreconcilable attitude towards the preceding generation is to be seen in the critical doctrines of the brothers. Obviously, both had learned from Schiller; but they differed from him profoundly in their general outlook upon literature. Schiller, the heir of the *Aufklärung*, regarded poetry as the great theorists of classicism, from Boileau to Lessing, had regarded it—from a superior vantage-ground; he employed in his criticism the deductive and legislative method of his master Kant. The younger men, on the other hand, filled with a reverence for genius as a kind of "God-intoxication," demanded respect and humility on the part of the critic. The supreme function of criticism, according to the Schlegels, was not, as it had hitherto been, to sit in judgment, but to appreciate and "characterise." Men of strongly-marked personality themselves, they demanded for creative genius every privilege; in other words, they discarded the classical ideals of Goethe and Schiller, and went back to the freer principles of the *Sturm und Drang*; they reduced Herder's vague dreams and Lenz' unmeasured extravagance to the law and order of a well-weighed system. In no field of Romantic activity is the epoch-making character of the movement more clearly indicated than in its criticism.

It may be objected, however, that the Romantic School, regarded as an abiding factor in German literary history, is even less conspicuous than had been the *Sturm und Drang*; it might be argued that the one movement was quite as much a movement of broken endeavour as the other. Novalis' works are of high quality, but they

are only fragments; and Tieck's writings—not to mention Wackenroder's—have long ceased to be read even by cultured Germans. But the positive value of Romanticism is not to be measured by tangible results. We may owe to the movement no supremely great drama or romance, at most, perhaps, a handful of matchless lyrics; but we do owe to it ideas—ethical, social ideas, ideas in art and philosophy—of an extraordinarily suggestive character. The Romantic School produced the yeast which fermented the whole intellectual life, not merely of Germany, but, through Madame de Staél's *De l'Allemagne* and the later French *Ecole romantique*, that of Europe. The Romantic ideas were not restricted to the little band of men whose work has just been considered; they are to be seen permeating, by means of the influence of the Romantic theologian, Schleiermacher, the religious life of Germany, Catholic as well as Protestant; the philosophy of Fichte is essentially Romantic, and, in a still higher degree, that fervid gospel of the "world-soul" which was preached by Schelling.

The Romantic School, however, was short-lived; it was only a matter of a few years, or even months. Novalis died of consumption in 1801, and the little circle which had met together in Jena in 1798 was soon scattered; Friedrich Schlegel went to Vienna, Tieck, somewhat later, to Rome. The next group, in which Romantic ideas found concentrated expression, gathered round the University of Heidelberg in the years 1806 to 1808. Here, again, the men whose voices counted, were few in number—in the first instance only three, Clemens Brentano (1778–1842), Ludwig von Arnim (1781–1831), and Joseph von Görres (1776–1848). There was no talk of a "school," no formulating of principles, in Heidelberg, but the *Zeitung für Einsiedler* (1808) formed a bond not unlike that formed by the *Athenäum* in Berlin and Jena. A noticeable feature of this second phase of Romanticism is its apparent independence of the first; there is no question of these younger men being the docile pupils of the earlier Romanticists, and still less of their continuing the work begun by the latter. It would seem rather as if they purposely ignored the high poetic ideals of the Romantic School, and had gone back to the earlier, more primitive stage of the movement to be found in pioneers like Herder. A closer study of the Heidelberg writers shows, however, that the disparity between the two phases of Romanticism is more apparent than real, and that we have to deal with a clearly thought-out advance on the first phase, effected with the aid of the older *Sturm und Drang*. A brief comparison will make this relationship more apparent.

Tieck had in his early writings broken a lance for the old *Volksbücher*, which the unimaginative *Aufklärung* had spurned as fit only for childish, uncultured minds; but in practice Tieck regarded the *Volksbuch* rather as a source of poetic possibilities, as a framework on which to hang the rich creations of his Romantic imagination, than as an end in

itself. He loved the *Volksbuch* for what it could suggest, not for what it actually was; his own *Märchen* are decked out with an unreal poetic mysticism and rendered so piquant by that Romantic irony on which the school set store, that they cease to be *Volksmärchen*. The younger generation, on the other hand, proclaimed the worth of the popular literature in its original form; they preferred it—as is to be seen in Görres' *T'cutsche Volksbücher* (1807) and the *Kinder- und Hausmärchen* (1812-5) of the brothers Grimm—deprived of all the magic light and music with which Tieck and Novalis surrounded it. The same contrast is to be seen, if we compare the somewhat sparing lyrics of the first school with *Des Knaben Wunderhorn* (1805-8), that magnificent collection of folk-songs with which the Heidelberg poets enriched German literature. Armin and Brentano were in their day accused of having tampered with the originals of their *Volkslieder*, yet *Des Knaben Wunderhorn* is a faithful, if not always literal, reproduction of the lyric spirit of the people. Here, too, the spiritual idealism of the first school descends to earth, and a poetry of simple realism takes the place of purely imaginative flights. Lastly—to take still another example—there is an exactly analogous relation between the dreamy and wholly unhistorical medievalism of Novalis and the more or less definite historical outline of Armin's novels, and particularly of *Die Kronenwächter* (1817), which, like so many masterpieces of the fickle romantic temperament, has remained a fragment. Here are to be found the beginnings of a national form of German historical fiction, the development of which was unfortunately checked a few years later by a new force, which no nation in Europe was strong enough to resist—the influence of Sir Walter Scott.

In the drama alone did the Heidelberg writers fail to make any conspicuous advance on their immediate predecessors; they have nothing to place beside Schlegel's monumental translation of Shakespeare, and, when they tried to write original dramas, these were, like Brentano's *Die Gründung Prags* (1815), only echoes of the formless Romantic plays of Tieck. But, outside of all schools, the Romantic drama was making significant progress, and finding a way for itself between the epic fairy-plays of Tieck and the classic tragedy of Schiller. In the historical or pseudo-historical dramas of Zacharias Werner (1768-1823), for instance, a writer who has been somewhat harshly treated by the literary historian, we may detect an advance upon the *Octavianus* and *Genuvera* of Tieck, which has much in common with the reforms introduced by the Heidelberg poets into other forms of Romantic literature. The great dramatist of these years, however, was not Werner, but Heinrich von Kleist (1777-1811); and Kleist's drama, without being specifically or in any narrow sense Romantic, is strictly parallel to the literary movement in the second phase of Romanticism. Like the Heidelberg writers, he was in entire sympathy with the subjective principles of the *Sturm*

*und Drang*; his first drama, *Die Familie Schroffenstein* (1803), might have been a direct imitation of Klinger's restless tragedies, and there is more of the old *Ritterdrama* in *Das Käthchen von Heilbronn* (1810) than of Tieck. Kleist's own life was, on the other hand, too bitter a struggle with untoward circumstances for him to feel attracted by the unworldly idealism of the Romantic School. Both by temperament and education he was a realist; his masterly novel *Michael Kohlhaas* (1810) is in actuality and poetic strength superior to the best of Arnim's stories; and his graceful one-act comedy, *Der zerbrochne Krug* (1808), delights in the minute details of every-day life. Even in his relations to the antique, as seen in the passionate tragedy of revenge, *Penthesilea* (1808), his attitude towards the theme is—to use Schiller's term—"naïve," not, like Friedrich Schlegel's and Hölderlin's love of antiquity, "sentimental." Kleist's all too short life—he died by his own hand in 1811—culminates in the historical drama, *Prinz Friedrich von Homburg* and the tragedy of *Die Hermannschlacht* (neither published till 1821), in which the national and political aspiration of the German people is reflected as in no other German tragedy up to this time. Thus, although in the literal sense of the word, not a Romanticist, Kleist demonstrates in a very marked way the development of the movement towards realism and practical common sense.

The political spirit, which has just been mentioned as characteristic of *Die Hermannschlacht*, appears in its most pronounced form in the patriotic lyric, inspired by the national rising against Napoleon. Theodor Körner (1791-1813), Max von Schenkendorf (1783-1817), Ernst Moritz Arndt (1769-1860), the chief representatives of this lyric, were none of them poets of the first rank—an intense political poetry is rarely, when judged by the calmer aesthetic criteria of a later age, of a very high order—but, better perhaps than any other group of writers at this time, they show the metamorphosis which the Romantic spirit was undergoing. Taken all in all, this literary transformation was no less phenomenal than the political development of the German people; the short span of years between the birth of the Romantic School in 1798 and the battle of Leipzig in 1813, is in both these respects unique in the life-history of the German, and perhaps of any, people.

It was a long way from the unworldly, musical lyrics of Tieck or the personal outpourings of Novalis to the "*Gott der Eisen wachsen liess*" of 1813; from the poetic medievalism of Franz Sternbald's Italy, or of Heinrich von Osterdingen, wandering with his chorus-singing merchants to Augsburg, to the every-day realities of Seume's *Spaziergang nach Syrakus* (1803), or the practical political spirit of Arndt's *Geist der Zeit* (1806-18). The idle dreamers and idealists of Heinse, Goethe, Novalis, and Wackenroder, had given place to very real and active heroes, to men who were incited to action by the mighty figure of Napoleon; the *dolce far niente* of the early Romanticists, the contemplative, personal

poetry, the ecstasy of medieval Catholicism, all disappeared in the second phase of the movement, or were at least adapted to other and more utilitarian ends. The idealism of an art that altogether ignored the world of reality had given place to a poetry of the German *Volk* in the sense of Herder and Justus Möser ; the brilliant phantasmagory of medieval Catholicism had paled, not perhaps before Protestantism—the Heidelberg school was still for the most part Catholic in its tendencies—but at least before a common-sense view of religion, which contrasted with Schleiermacher's mystic spiritualism. And, although Fichte and Schelling still dominated philosophy, one must at least recognise in both thinkers, and more particularly in Fichte, whose *Reden an die deutsche Nation* (1808) helped no less than the songs of Körner and Arndt to awaken the German national consciousness, a tendency towards practical endeavour and national utilitarianism. The Romantic medieval world—a world as vague and undefined as the “Holy Roman Empire of the German Nation” itself—disappeared, one might say, with the last fiction of that Empire and gave place to a feeling the Germans had never known before in so intense and peculiar a sense—patriotism. At the same time a deep-seated and serious desire to know and understand the Middle Ages took its place; and from this desire arose the new sciences of medieval scholarship, law, and history, in which throughout the nineteenth century Germany has led the way. Karl Lachmann, the brothers Grimm, Savigny, Niebuhr, Ranke, are the great names in this new academic movement.

When the little Heidelberg group separated in 1808, its chief members, Arnim and Brentano, found their way to Berlin, where their later work was, to some extent, merged in that of the literary group dominated by the rather uninspired imagination of Friedrich de la Motte Fouqué (1777-1843), and Adelbert von Chamisso (1781-1838). Both in the novels of Fouqué and in the ballads of Chamisso there are frequent concessions to that uninspired homeliness of tone which, in all ages, has had a peculiar attraction for the German mind. In Berlin, however, there was a good enough soil for Romantic poetry; there were literary societies and “aesthetic teas” enough, which joined in the enthusiastic admiration of Goethe, an essential element in Berlin Romanticism; the old Frederician “enlightenment” was for the time forgotten in the wider intellectual ideals of the Prussian capital. To the Berlin circle, or at least to the north-German circle, belonged one great singer, the Silesian Joseph von Eichendorff (1788-1857), perhaps the greatest lyric poet of the whole Romantic movement. The lyric of Eichendorff is even still fresher, more “naïve,” more in harmony with the voices of nature than that of the Heidelberg circle; it bears additional testimony to the fact that under Romantic influence the German lyric was finding its way back to that elemental expression of sympathy between man and nature, which is characteristic of the early Minnesang. As a

novelist, Eichendorff illustrates what the members of the Heidelberg circle—if we except Brentano's youthful and immature romance *Godwi*—had not illustrated, the development of the “artist novel” under the new conditions; the equivalent of *Franz Sternbald* and *Heinrich von Ofterdingen* in the later Romantic period is Eichendorff's *Ahnung und Gegenwart* (1815), and—most concentrated and delightful of all—*Aus dem Leben eines Taugenichts* (1826). Here the real, every-day world has taken the place of the Middle Ages, and the natural magic of the forest has ousted the mystic supernaturalism of Tieck and Novalis. But in one respect Eichendorff remained a Romanticist of the old type; he was a faithful adherent of the Catholic Church, a fact which blinded him to the importance of the north-German Protestant spirit for the later developments of the movement.

Forebodings of Romantic decay are to be traced at an early stage; the theatrical effects of the so-called *Schicksalsdramatiker*, the curious delight in the oriental lyric, the influence of Byron in Germany, the cynical irony of Heine, are phenomena which emphasised the effeteness of Romanticism. Decay, too, is to be traced in the morbid, although powerful, fantasy of Ernst Theodor Wilhelm (Amadeus) Hoffmann (1776–1822), whose novels combine a fertility of imagination with a realism and a power of plastic reproduction never excelled by any German writer. Hoffmann's real greatness lies not in the weird horrors and daring fancies he conceived, but in his manner of reproducing them; he discovered what Arnim and so many of his contemporaries had sought for in vain, the art of telling a story simply and directly. And it was precisely this quality that made him one of the few creative artists of German Romanticism who influenced the literary movement of Europe.

The Romantic traditions continued to dominate literature in southern Germany long after disintegration had set in in the north. In Swabia a group of writers, several of whom were immediate disciples of the Heidelberg school, remained staunchly faithful to the Romantic ideals, and kept them alive all through the epoch of “Young Germany.” This was the true mission of Uhland and his friends, one of much more importance for the history of German poetry than the literature they produced. To them we owe it, for instance, that the traditional Romantic novel was not forgotten, and rose, a generation later, in Keller's *Der grüne Heinrich* to heights it had never touched before; it was Swabian influence that brought German literature back again so rapidly to the *Volk*, and inspired the sympathetic literature of peasant life from Auerbach to Anzengruber. The Swabians, too, were the real mediators between north-Germans like Theodor Storm and the early phases of Romanticism. Even Friedrich Hebbel looked up to Uhland as the inspirer and master of his early manhood.

Ludwig Uhland (1787–1862), the head and chief literary personality

of the group, was a lyric and ballad poet of exceptional gifts ; he adapted the ballad-form as it had been handed down from Goethe and Schiller, to the popular tone of the *Volkslied*, and introduced into it a characteristically Romantic note of medieval wonder ; he attempted to create a historical drama in accordance with the new creed ; he devoted himself to the study of the German Middle Ages with an ardour and zeal to which Arnim and Brentano could not pretend, and he published a collection of *Alte hoch- und niederdeutsche Volkslieder* (1844), which, as a literal reproduction of the popular tradition, is superior to the *Wunderhorn*. But, in spite of these merits, Uhland's attitude towards literature was in many respects that of the amateur who has other and weightier pursuits in life ; he was a university professor, and for a time a practical and even a leading politician. And what is true of Uhland was true in an even higher degree of his Swabian colleagues. All the members of the group, with the exception, perhaps, of the unhappy Wilhelm Waiblinger (1804-30), were only poets by the way ; this was forced upon them by the fact that literature, nowhere at that time a lucrative pursuit, was virtually impossible under the provincial conditions which prevailed in Württemberg. They were doctors, lawyers, professors, clergymen—Romanticists, who, in strange contrast to the earlier school, had nothing of what we now call Bohemianism in their blood. This explains perhaps a certain practical, matter-of-fact tone in their poetry, but it is also responsible for the provincial dilettantism which at times makes itself felt in even the most gifted of these poets.

The two men who were perhaps furthest removed from this reproach were Wilhelm Hauff (1802-27), whose career, cut short at the age of twenty-five, was full of such extraordinary promise, and Eduard Mörike (1804-75). Mörike has left one novel, *Maler Nolten* (1832), which is worthy of a place beside the best subjective novels of German Romanticism ; he has written a few short stories of the first rank, and, above all, a volume of lyrics, the intensity and unsophisticated simplicity of which justify us in regarding him as a lyric poet of the first rank. But his genius was cramped by the provincialism of Stuttgart ; and one feels that in a more liberal atmosphere, like that of Weimar, he might have risen to greater things.

In Austria, which was further removed from the Romantic focus, new elements make their appearance in the literary development. From the Romantic movement, which reached Vienna before that capital had time to forget the glamour of the age of Joseph II, the Austrians extracted what appealed to their temperament ; but they were far from accepting Romanticism as a whole. They listened with respectful attention to Schlegel's famous lectures on the drama (1809-11), applauded his enthusiasm for Shakespeare, and took specially to heart his words on the great Spanish dramatists. But Gottsched's classicism was still too near them ; they had, as a nation, participated too little in the classicism

of Weimar to see eye to eye with the Romanticists in Germany; and consequently much in Tieck's doctrine, and still more in that of Novalis, Wackenroder, and Friedrich Schlegel, meant nothing to them. The best in the Austrian literature of this time was peculiarly Austrian. Nikolaus Lenau (1802-50), for instance, obviously learned from Uhland and his friends; however, it was not through them that he became Austria's greatest modern singer, but by virtue of a pessimism, which circumstances outward and inward had stamped upon his supersensitive soul; his lyric coloured as it is by the melancholy landscape of the Hungarian *pusta*, expresses a despair no less intense than that of his Italian contemporary, Leopardi. Franz Grillparzer (1791-1872), again, Austria's chief dramatist, and one of the master-dramatists of the nineteenth century, had at Schlegel's feet learned to love Lope de Vega and imitate Calderon; but he saw the Spanish poets with Austrian, not Romantic, eyes, and introduced a Spanish element into German tragedy which the northern poets, with all their admiration for Calderon, could neither have understood nor approved of. It is manifestly unjust to regard Grillparzer, as has often been done, merely as a belated follower of Goethe and Schiller; he did not, it is true, break rudely with the classical poets, as Kleist before him and Hebbel after him did; but his drama is no less peculiarly his own. He gave his countrymen, in *König Ottokars Glück und Ende* (1825), a national historical tragedy; in *Des Meeres und der Liebe Wellen* (1831), *Der Traum ein Leben* (1834), and *Libussa* (published 1872), dramas of marvellous poetic beauty, filled with the quintessence of the Austrian national spirit; and he wrote in *Weh dem der lügt* (1838) a comedy which surpasses all that the Weimar epoch produced in this genre. Compared with Goethe and Schiller, Grillparzer thinks in a specifically modern way; and he was profoundly influenced by the great wave of pessimism which swept across Europe in the early decades of the nineteenth century.

Goethe was a contemporary of the whole of the vast Romantic movement. At the first glance the testimony to his relations with the Romantic circles and the Romantic literature is strangely at variance. On the one hand the old poet was unanimously accepted by the school itself as its leader and model; the brothers Schlegel learned more, as critics, from Schiller than from Goethe; but they were instinctively repelled by Schiller's attitude to their methods and theories, whereas for Goethe their respect and admiration never wavered. Tieck, again, passed through many phases of sympathies and antipathies, but he remained always constant to Goethe, from his delight as a child in *Götz* and *Werther* to the rapt Goethe-worship of the hero of his story *Der Mondsüchtige*; while Novalis, despite much that was unsympathetic to him in Goethe's work, saw in Goethe what he finely called "*den Statthalter der Poesie auf Erden*." The later Romanticists accepted Goethe almost as a matter of course; Arnim and Brentano dedicated

the first volume of *Des Knaben Wunderhorn* to him and received from him kindly and appreciative encouragement; and, as has already been mentioned, Goethe's name was the watchword of the many Berlin coteries which pinned their faith to Romanticism. This unreserved admiration of Goethe was one of the essential points in the Romantic credo.

That, however, was only the Romantic side of the question. On the other side we find that, in those very days when the principles of the new school were being enunciated in the *Athenäum*, Goethe was discussing in his correspondence with Schiller doctrines which formed the most uncompromising antithesis to those principles. Nowhere, indeed, is the sharp and even embittered conflict between Classicism and Romanticism more significantly expressed than in these letters; there is no question that the Romantic innovations were a thorn in the flesh of both Schiller and Goethe, when they formulated their demands for law and order in the world of art, and proclaimed with a zeal worthy of a Boileau or a Gottsched the crying need of an absolute criterion of good taste. If they insisted on what seems to-day the strangely one-sided and reactionary dogma, that the highest in modern literature is only attainable by the imitation of the Greek classics, it was because they saw in such imitation the only hope of salvation from the confused phantasmas of the Middle Ages, in which the Romanticists revelled. *Hermann und Dorothea* and *Pandora* were written as bulwarks against the Romantic barbarians; and Goethe's art review, *Die Propyläen* (1798-1800), was founded to counteract the spirit which finds its expression in the *Herzensergießungen eines kunstliebenden Klosterbruders*. Clearly, so far as such testimony is concerned, Goethe's opposition to the Romantic movement stands beyond question. Tieck and his friends might worship him as they would; Goethe's own criticism and creations in the years of his friendship with Schiller were the complete abnegation of Romanticism. He may have viewed the *Wunderhorn* with goodwill, but he was himself a denizen of the Europe before the French Revolution and had little sympathy with what seemed to him only the national Chauvinism—if we may use the word of a later age—of Germany's rising against Napoleon. And when his long life had almost reached its close, he uttered to Eckermann the significant and unambiguous words: "The Romantic I call the sick, the Classic the healthy."

But to infer from this that Goethe repudiated all that the new movement fought for and achieved, would be to ignore his many-sided character; it would be to forget a feature in Goethe's mind which has already been mentioned, and which distinguishes him from all his contemporaries without exception, that is, his complete independence of party and faction. There was undoubtedly much in the Romantic movement, especially in its early manifestations, of which Goethe could not approve, which he regarded as unhealthy, but Goethe was far too

liberally minded a critic to be oblivious to its vital significance for the new century. None of his contemporaries—not even the Romanticists themselves—saw so clearly as he just what was of abiding and inestimable worth in the Romantic ideas. And the proof of it is to be sought in the poet's extraordinarily varied activity during the last twenty-five years of his life; the ground-tone of Goethe's life in this epoch—an epoch that still awaits adequate treatment at the hands of Goethe's biographers—is assuredly in harmony with the best aspirations of Romanticism. It is impossible here to dwell on the importance of Goethe's scientific investigations for the theory which Darwin was to formulate a generation later, or even on the significance of his theory of colour; it would be equally impossible to do justice to the critical sympathies, which no classical-romantic controversy was allowed to warp; but one need have merely a superficial acquaintance with his writings on these subjects to see that they were in essential agreement with the wider aims of nineteenth century Romanticism. And it is no exaggeration to say that all his poetical creations in these years fitted without exception into the general scheme of a Romantic German literature. *Die Wahlverwandtschaften* (1809), for instance, bears ample testimony to what Goethe had learned in the school of classicism; it is planned with architectural symmetry, and each character and motive is viewed in the perspective of the whole; but, on the other hand, it treats one of those delicate psychological problems in which the Romanticists delighted, and it is written from a subjective and personal point of view, which the older classical critics would not have approved. Or, to take Goethe's autobiography, *Aus meinem Leben: Dichtung und Wahrheit* (1811-4)—none of his books was better fitted than this to be a corner-stone of the new Romantic literature; here the younger generation found portrayed with ripe literary art that young Romantic genius of Frankfort, Strassburg, and Wetzlar, whom each of them cherished in his heart as the ideal of the man of letters. *Wilhelm Meisters Wanderjahre* (1821-9)—fragmentary and disappointing be it compared with the *Lehrjahre*—is, in its attitude toward questions of social and individual ethics, above all to that problem of "renunciation" which had exerted so strong a fascination over the Romantic mind, a book entirely after the heart of the Romanticists. In the same way the splendid outburst of lyric poetry, *Der westöstliche Divan* (1819), opened up to German poetry a new oriental world when the Middle Ages had begun to lose their power to thrill. Lastly, the completed *Faust*, which has been already referred to, was an essentially Romantic product, and demonstrates perhaps more clearly than any other of Goethe's riper works the desire which dominated the last twenty years of his life, to attain a harmonious ideal of national poetry by the fusion of Classicism and Romanticism. Thus, to regard Goethe as an antagonist of the Romantic movement in German poetry

either implies a very narrow conception of the meaning of Romanticism, or it is unjust to one of the most catholic-minded of all the great poets of the world.

But, long before Goethe's death in 1832, the disintegration of Romanticism had set in; the philosophical movement of the time—just as in the later days of *Sturm und Drang*—was opposed to the Romantic outlook upon life; in other words, the rise of Hegelianism was fatal to it. In recent years Germany has been strangely silent on the subject of Hegel; there has been little attempt to view his philosophy from a modern standpoint, to understand why this extraordinarily potent thinker, who himself sprang from the heart of Romantic idealism, should have exerted so blighting an influence on the literature of Romanticism. Rightly understood, this phenomenon is perhaps the best proof of how intimately the literary movement was bound up with individualism. For notwithstanding his Romantic training, Hegel had an essentially synthetic type of mind; he was no less of a system-builder than Christian Wolff; his transcendentalism advanced by means of generalisations which recall the methods of Kant, and the centre of the world to him was not, as to Fichte or even Schelling, the individual man, but the human race. The individualism and subjectivity which was so vital to German Romanticism found little favour in the eyes of this master of metaphysic. Even so early as 1819 Germany was so completely bound by the spell of Hegelianism that she had no interest in a book which, a generation later, helped to dethrone Hegel and to reinstate the Romantic ideas—*Die Welt als Wille und Vorstellung*, by Arthur Schopenhauer.

While the Hegelian metaphysics was thus undermining Romanticism, the actual death-blow to the movement in Germany was given by a political event, the Revolution of July, 1830. This was the first convincing proof that the intellectual and political freedom which, since the Carlsbad Decrees, had been regarded by the advanced German theorists as an unrealisable dream of their more simple-minded countrymen, was after all within the realm of possibility; what France had done, Germany too might do. The Revolution in the streets of Paris was the signal for the young German writers of the day to throw themselves into politics, to devote themselves to social, economic, and political questions, to look at life nationally and socially, instead of, as hitherto, subjectively and personally. The men of the new generation—Heinrich Heine (1797-1856), whose *Buch der Lieder* (1827) and *Harzreise* (1826) had already spread like wild-fire over Germany: Karl Gutzkow (1811-78), whose first famous or rather notorious novel, *Wally die Zweiflerin* (1835), shows unmistakably its descent from Friedrich Schlegel's *Lucinde*; and the quick-witted, unromantic, Ludwig Börne (1786-1837)—had all begun in a somewhat half-hearted way in the train of Romanticism, but no sooner did the tidings of the July Revolution reach them than with one

accord they threw Romanticism to the winds as effete and out of date. A new trend was given to their intellectual life, and the possibility was opened up to them of a mission and a career in accordance with their tastes. Romanticism was not so much killed by the writers of "Young Germany," as neglected, pushed into the background, left to retiring, old-fashioned poets who laid no weight on being modern or "in the movement." And with Romanticism Goethe went also; indeed, the only elements of the rich literature of the earlier generation which were retained as something better than useless ballast, were those which could be brought into harmony with social and political problems. Jean Paul, for instance, stood high in favour as a kindly and sympathetic delineator of simple folk and a champion of the oppressed proletariat; Friedrich Schlegel was recognised as a pioneer in a kind of fiction dealing specially with the relations of the sexes and the emancipation of women—questions which, partly owing to the influence of French writers like George Sand, were of great interest to "Young Germany." Lastly, Schiller, rather than Goethe, the aristocratic hater of the mob, rose rapidly in favour; he appealed especially to the new generation as the poet of freedom and German patriotism, and as the classical justification of their own radical strivings.

The abandonment of the Romantic faith implied far-reaching changes in the kind of literature which Germany henceforth produced. The Young German School did not, like their predecessors, write for themselves alone; the enunciation of a subjective opinion or a personal experience was in their eyes of minor importance; the essential thing was that their opinions and sentiments should be acceptable to a wide circle of readers. For the first time in its history German literature took general and constant cognisance of the public; it not only wrote for the public, but it also wrote about the public. The German man of letters was forced into the rôle of journalist; and the best literature of the period, such as Börne's vivacious *Briefe aus Paris* (1830-3) and the incisive, witty criticism of Heine's prose writings, was journalism. The German novel, which twenty or thirty years before had been a mirror of unworldly idealism, a personal "confession," became branded with a purpose, and—for the Romantics had also written with ulterior aims—with a markedly practical, utilitarian, and missionary purpose; the new novel was a *Tendenzroman*. In the same way, the German drama, abandoning the medievalism and fairylore of Romanticism, became a channel for practical political ideas, or—like Gutzkow's *Uriel Acosta*—for the philosophic or pseudo-philosophic tendencies of the day.

From the point of view of the literary historian, the era in German letters which followed Goethe's death is a period of depression. Except for Heine, little that Young Germany wrote is readable to-day; and in Heine's case it is the wonderful lyrics of his still predominantly

Romantic vein that appeal to us, or his literary feuilletons, not the satire and cynicism which he employed so freely in the service of the Young German school. Heine, no less than Immermann and Platen, suffered under the transitional character of the age into which he was born ; his essentially unromantic intellectual outlook was mated with an imagination no less intensely Romantic than that of Novalis himself, and his whole life long he oscillated between these extremes. He wrote lyrics that hold a place with the very finest of Eichendorff's, and there are pages in his prose works which belong to the most brilliant that Young Germany produced ; but it was not given to him to reconcile the extremes, and the constant clashing of opposites resulted in a negative and scathing cynicism from which neither Romantic dreams nor Young German principles were safe.

But there is also a valuable side to the Young German epoch. It may not be the mission of the highest literature to descend, as these writers did, to the level and methods of daily journalism ; but it must at least be said of the Young German period that it marked a very important stage in the evolution of German journalism. For the first time the Press in Germany learned to assert itself beside that of France and England ; from this period dates the birth of the modern German newspaper as a serious social and political factor. The new point of view, that is to say, the endeavour to write always with an eye to the public, meant a change for the better in German prose style ; the German writer was forced to express himself attractively, he had not merely to satisfy himself as to clearness and lucidity ; he had to be clear and lucid to all men. Then again, great as was the loss to German poetry, when the Middle Ages were forgotten, or left to the universities to explore and expound, it was an enormous gain to the breadth and scope of German literature when the leading writers were at last prepared to treat problems and subjects from the every-day life of the German people. Lastly, the social aspects of the change must not be overlooked. Young Germany did more than the whole Romantic movement for the national education of the German people ; did more to make the Germans a politically thinking people ; and it took the first step towards preparing them for the responsibilities that fell to them when the German Empire was reconstructed after 1870.

## CHAPTER XIII.

### RUSSIA.

IN 1815 Russia reached the zenith of the rising orbit, in which as a European Power she had been moving during the century that had elapsed since Peter the Great. She had shown in the struggle with Napoleon immense endurance and tenacity, and, at the same time, she had acquired a moral ascendancy as the champion of liberty among the European nations. She had definitely established her western frontier, and had considerably extended her limits towards the east and south. Alexander I, in the course of his fifteen years' reign prior to 1815, had carried on more wars than any Russian monarch in the same space of time. Besides his struggle with the French under Napoleon, he had waged war with all his neighbours around him—China alone excepted: with Sweden, Poland, Prussia, Austria, Turkey, the tribes of the Caucasus, and Persia. Everywhere he was successful; he took Finland from Sweden, the grand duchy of Warsaw from Poland, the district of Bialystok from Prussia; from Austria the province of Tarnopol, from Turkey Bessarabia, from Persia Georgia, Dagestan, Imeretia, and Goria. Catharine II had left to her successor 18 million square kilometres of territory and 33 million inhabitants; in 1815 Russia occupied 20 million square kilometres of territory and had 45 million inhabitants. Such a sudden and remarkable expansion, however, brought in its train considerable burdens, the effects of which were apparent in all aspects of the internal life of Russia.

In the first year of the reign of Alexander I, according to the budget for 1802, confirmed in December, 1801, the estimated imperial revenues amounted to 77 millions, the expenditure to 79 million roubles (the rouble being then worth about three shillings sterling). In 1810, according to the computation of the Secretary of State, Michael Speranski, the revenues reached 127 millions and the expenditure 193 millions, showing a deficit of 66 millions; the internal State debt reached 577 millions, and the external debt 100 millions, making a total of 677 millions of roubles. The recent wars with Napoleon had thus brought about an enormous increase in the budget. The budget

estimates for 1814, drawn up by the Privy Council of Finance in November, 1813, contemplated a revenue of 312½ millions, and an expenditure of 405 millions, showing a nominal deficit of over 92 millions of roubles; the actual deficit, however, proved to be considerably larger, owing to the fictitious nature of many items in the estimated receipts. The estimates for 1815 balanced revenue and expenditure at the sum of 316 millions respectively. Of the estimated revenue the following were the principal items: the poll-tax and land-dues (*obrok*) collected from the Crown peasants, 74½ millions; the poll-tax from the peasants of private proprietors, 31½ millions; taxes levied on merchants, 11 millions; the poll-tax on the burgher-class and guilds, 6 millions; taxes paid by landed proprietors, not more than 2 millions; duties on *vodka* and other spirituous liquors, altogether 104½ millions; and customs on imports, 20 millions. Of the expenditure the principal items were: the Court, 13½ millions; the Army, 120 millions; the Fleet, 15 millions; the Ministry of Finance, 102½ millions; the Police, 7½ millions; and Education barely two millions. For the last year of the reign of Alexander I (1825), the budget estimates, confirmed by the Emperor in December, 1824, reached the total of 393 millions. In this total spirituous liquors figured for 121 millions, of which the 29 provinces of Great Russia contributed no less than 108 millions, and customs duties had increased to 48 millions. The chief items of expenditure were: the Court, 17½ millions; interest on the State Debt, 54 millions; the Army, 145 millions; the Fleet, 21½ millions (out of which 12½ went to the Baltic Fleet and 8 to the Black Sea Fleet); the Ministry of Finance, 88½ millions; the Ministry of the Interior, 15 millions (of which 8½ millions were for the Executive Department, i.e. the Police); and Education, 3½ millions.

The currency was in a deplorable state. In 1810 there had been in circulation gold to the amount of nearly 25 million roubles, silver 195, copper 98, and notes 577 millions—in all, paper and coined money amounting to 895 million roubles. In the following years of war the gold and silver were almost entirely withdrawn abroad; copper underwent an enormous appreciation in value—a *pood* of copper, which in Catharine's time was worth eight roubles, in 1815 cost 40 paper roubles; on the other hand, the amount of paper money issued reached, in 1815, 700 millions, and, towards the end of 1816, 836 millions of roubles. During the last war there had been a decline of three-fourths in the value of paper money, which practically meant the bankruptcy of the State; the paper rouble was reckoned from that time to be worth 25 kopecks in silver. In order to check its further depreciation, the issue of fresh paper money was stopped from 1817, and steps were taken to call in the notes to the extent of 30 millions annually; in the space of five years (1817-22) 240 millions of notes were, in fact, called in; but this operation had soon to be stopped, since, with the constant

deficit in the budget, it was affecting prejudicially the new State loans, inasmuch as the notes, bearing no interest, were being extinguished by the issue of bonds bearing interest at the rate of over 7 per cent. The rate of exchange of the paper rouble remained unaltered, at about 25 per cent.; and only long afterwards, in 1843, an adjustment of the paper currency took place by the issue of new notes exchangeable for silver, on the basis of the exchange of one new paper rouble for 3½ old.

The land army, the principal instrument of the country's supremacy, and the main object of the solicitude of the Government, swallowed up about a third part of the revenue and was a great drain on the strength of the nation. Military service lasted for 25 years, under conditions with respect to clothing, quarters, and, above all, food, that were almost intolerable; while an iron discipline was maintained, especially for the common soldier. During the period of incessant wars, 1805-15, it has been estimated that the Russian army had lost about 1,200,000 men, of whom, undoubtedly, only a small proportion fell on the field of battle, while the majority perished from sickness and other hardships of the campaigns. During those years 1½ millions of fresh recruits, not counting the Cossacks, were levied. In the year 1812 alone there were three levies of recruits: the first of two men out of every 500 men, women and children, the second of ten, and the third of eight, so that, in that single year, there were taken in all 20 recruits from every 500—which, in many localities that were already exhausted, amounted to the half, or more, of the whole male population between 18 and 35 years of age. Altogether, from 1812 to 1815, there were enrolled for the forces of the line over 900,000 recruits, not including the general war levy. Recruiting was carried on in time of peace just as in time of war, and in the most unsparing manner. If there was not a recruit fit for service in a village, a boy of twelve years of age would be taken in his place for one of the military orphanages. Criminals and vagrants were also enlisted for service, to the number of about 2500 annually. In some provinces as, for example, in the province of Astrakhan, there were districts where only women, children, old men, and cripples remained in the villages, since all the able-bodied males, who had not been impressed, had run away before the levy to the steppes or into Persia. Here and there, the country people offered an active resistance to the conscription, particularly in the Baltic provinces; in many cases, men mutilated themselves in order to avoid service. Of such "damaged" recruits there were over 15 per cent. at a levy made in one district of the province of Novgorod. Jews were originally exempted from military service, upon the payment of a large sum of money; but from 1827 they were included in the conscription. Desertions, in spite of very severe punishments, were frequent; it is computed that there were about 5000 deserters annually.

The military colonies were a terrible feature of the system. They were devised by the Emperor Alexander himself and introduced in 1810.

His intention was partly philanthropic—that the soldiers, in time of peace, should not be torn away from their families and occupations; but economy was also a motive, for the cost of supplying food and forage fell directly on the peasants, and the Treasury was thus relieved. Still more, this design, modelled on the Austrian military frontier colonies and the Swedish military settlements in Finland and carried out on a vast scale, was prompted by the desire of the Tsar to create for himself a gigantic Praetorian power, dependent on himself alone and entirely detached from the people. The first experiment was made at Klimowicze, in the province of Mohileff, whence all the peasants were forcibly removed to the province of Novorossisk, and a reserve battalion of the Ieletz regiment was settled in their place, the soldiers being provided with land, stock, and farm-buildings. Afterwards, in 1815, a second colony was established in the district of Visotsk, in the province of Novgorod, where a battalion of the Grenadier Guards was settled. This time, however, a new principle was adopted. Instead of removing the peasants, they were left and placed under the absolute control of the commander of the battalion; in fact, they were kept in a state of absolute bondage. The entire population of the place, without distinction of sex and age, was included in the roll of military colonists; children of the male sex were reckoned from their birth as belonging to the service, and girls as future wives for soldiers. In short, the military *régime* was imposed on everyone; the inhabitants of the district were deprived of their homes, families, customs, freedom, and of the most elementary rights. Steps were then taken to develop still further this oppressive system, under the direction of the trusted adviser and favourite of Alexander, General Alexis Arakcheieff, who, however, was not the originator, but merely the agent who carried out the Imperial idea. Under the ruthless and energetic control of Arakcheieff the military colonies made rapid progress. In the course of ten years they extended all over Russia, and in 1825 comprised nearly a third of the whole Russian army. They formed the separate corps of military colonies, which, during the last year of Alexander's reign, numbered 90 battalions of the colony of Novgorod, 36 battalions and 249 squadrons of the colonies of Kharkoff (Ukraine), Kherson, and Ekaterinoslaff, the burden of their maintenance being placed on the shoulders of over 400,000 peasants. It was Alexander's intention gradually to base the whole army on the system of colonies, but, fortunately, his death saved Russia from such a calamity.

During the whole of the time of peace after 1815, the Russian army was still maintained, as regards numbers, on the same footing as at the conclusion of the Napoleonic wars. Alexander closely adhered to the extraordinary principle which he had enunciated confidentially in 1816: "that Russia must always possess an army as numerous as the armies of Austria and Prussia combined." This principle could be easily

carried out, considering the long term of service usually required, as well as the levying of recruits under age. From 1815 to the end of the reign of Alexander, the army was maintained in an effective condition by only three levies of two recruits from each 500 souls, viz. in 1818, 1819, and 1824. In 1825, the effective army of Russia included (in round numbers) 500 generals, 18,000 other officers, and 730,000 soldiers of the line.

The Russian navy was reorganised in the time of Paul (1797), who took the title of Admiral-General, and showed a warm interest in naval affairs. It was composed of 12 ships of the line with 100 guns each, 36 with 74 guns, 12 with 66 guns, and, in addition, 45 frigates. This action of Paul was primarily directed against England; less activity was shown when Alexander came into power; for, from the beginning and during the greater part of his reign, he sought the support of England, paying special attention to the land-forces and not taking any great interest in the fleet. In 1817 the construction of steam vessels in Russia was first begun. At the end of 1825, the Russian navy was in the following position. The Baltic Fleet, for the most part in a very poor state, numbered 5 ships of the line, 10 frigates, and 15—20 smaller ships nominally fit for service; the Black Sea Fleet, which was in a relatively better condition, possessed the following vessels regarded as fit for service: 10 ships of the line, 6 frigates, 12 smaller vessels; the Caspian flotilla numbered 5 small war vessels and 6 transports; the entire Okhotsk, or Pacific, flotilla consisted of 7 transport vessels. Nicholas I, whose political views were hostile to Turkey and England and who was stimulated by the easy victory at Navarino (1827), directed special attention to the fleet and built a number of new war-ships. In 1830 the Baltic Fleet numbered 28 ships of the line and 17 frigates, the Black Sea Fleet 11 ships of the line and 8 frigates; however, the efficiency of the greater part of these vessels, particularly of the ships of the line, was more than doubtful; and the nautical skill of the crews, and especially of the officers, left much to be desired.

At the head of the administration stood nominally three directing bodies: the Council of State, the Senate and the Committee of Ministers. The Council of State, originally founded, in 1801, for legislative and judiciary purposes, but in 1804 restricted to legislation, was afterwards reformed according to the plan of Speranski (1810), and was intended to become the mainstay and pivot of the constitutional and monarchical reforms of the Empire. When all these fine projects were abandoned upon the fall of Speranski (in 1812), the Council of State remained the deliberating body in legislative affairs, but was occupied chiefly with purely academic work concerning the codification of the laws—a work which lasted for many years and proved expensive and almost totally valueless. The much-talked-of Commission for codifying

the laws, appointed in connexion with the Council of State in 1801—the tenth successive commission of the kind since 1700—which worked during a number of years under the direction of the ambitious intriguer Rosenkampff, did actually prepare three parts of the draft code of civil law (the law of persons, the law of things, and the law of obligations); but, in the end, this work came to a standstill when submitted to the Council of State, and was abandoned after 1815. While Alexander was in London, in the summer of 1814, Jeremy Bentham, whose works had previously been printed by Imperial command at St Petersburg in a Russian translation—with the omission of those sections which were considered too advanced in their views (as, for example, those directed against the Censorship of the Press)—applied in writing to the Emperor, as well as to Prince Adam Czartoryski, who accompanied him; offering to undertake the direction of the Russian work of codification without any recompense, but upon the condition that he should have power to work unhindered. Alexander replied in complimentary terms, asking for his “advice” but declining to give him such powers of direction, and sending him at the same time a valuable ring. Bentham sent back the ring to the Tsar with the sharp rejoinder: “I desire,” he wrote, “neither money nor authority, nor dignity, nor even your Imperial favour, but merely to be of some utility.” He refused therefore all participation in the fruitless work of the commission, that “comedy of weakness and hypocrisy.” Beyond this pretence of codification, the Council of State did not show at this time any sign of vitality and lost all influence in the direction of State affairs and internal politics.

The Senate, in its primary twofold character—administrative and judicial—ought, properly, to have become the Supreme Court of Appeal, as well as to have exercised, as “Governing Senate,” the chief supervision over the administration. Actually, however, in consequence of its gradual loss of prestige during all the previous reigns since Peter the Great, it was reduced under Alexander to a state of absolute impotence. The Senate of this time, being entirely dependent on its Procurator-General, that is, on the Minister of Justice, who represented the “Imperial eye,” was a mere nullity in a political sense and discharged its judicial functions very unsatisfactorily. It was then composed half of retired generals, and half of old, worn-out dignitaries, no longer fit for employment in the active service of the State. Both classes of Senators, with rare exceptions, discharged their duties with equal reluctance and ignorance of law and affairs. The Senators attended the meetings rarely and irregularly; often cases had to be tried in the presence of two Senators, or even of one. In consequence of their ignorance of the laws, the Senators were obliged to depend entirely on the reports of the secretaries; so that, actually, it was not the Court, but the official staff of the Senatorial Chancery, that decided cases, for

the most part of a civil nature, which not only were highly complicated owing to the lack of codification, but also offered opportunities for bribery by the parties interested. The number of cases left undecided for ten years or longer accumulated from year to year in an appalling manner. The Senate did not even adequately discharge its simplest and most important function, that of promulgating the laws; it delayed for years and, in one case, for fifteen years, the promulgation of the Imperial ukases. Moreover, owing to deficient organisation, the execution of the ukases issued by the Senate was delayed. The eight Departments and the General Assembly of the Senate issued between 1805 and 1819 more than five thousand ukases, which had not by 1822 received effect. The supervising activity of the Senate manifested itself chiefly in the Senatorial inspections made in the provinces, which were especially frequent in the first years after the establishment of peace, when the Tsar's intentions of reforming the abuses in the administration were still fresh. However, these inspections were generally conducted in a superficial manner; and the inspecting Senators, unacquainted with local conditions, never managed to reach the source of the abuses; at best, they resulted in the resignation of the Governor and the appointment of a new one, frequently worse than his predecessor.

The Committee of Ministers, established in 1802, was not, properly speaking, an independent body, but merely a channel for collectively submitting the reports of the Ministers to the sovereign. In 1805, together with the exceptional powers conferred upon it on account of the departure of the Emperor to take part in the campaign, this Committee acquired a new procedure, which it henceforth retained; and, in 1808, there was vested in it the right of exercising supreme police control in matters of public order, which included political matters. When the Tsar departed for the campaign of 1812, it was again reorganised, and was, moreover, reinforced by a permanent president, the heads of the departments of the Council of State, and the Military Governor of St Petersburg. Notwithstanding the increased number of its members, and its extended powers, the Committee of Ministers, during the period of peace after 1815, largely lost its importance; the Tsar reverted to the former system of receiving reports singly from each Minister and ceased to attend its meetings. The real significance of the Committee as an institution in which the chief authority was centralised thus disappeared, since the Ministers preferred to refer all important matters to the Tsar in private audience, without bringing them before the Committee. Hence this body became another large wheel in the central bureaucratic machine, working with great friction, and at considerable expense, without any real advantage to the State.

The Ministries, established in 1802, retained the organisation bestowed upon them by Speranski in 1811; Ministerial Councils, composed of the heads of the departments and the chief officials, were attached as

consultative bodies to each Minister. There were eight Ministries: Foreign Affairs, the Interior, War, Marine, Education, Finance, Justice, and Police; while the Board of Public Works and the State Control (Audit office) were placed on the same footing as these Ministries. The Administration of the Imperial Court, and the Department of Ecclesiastical Affairs, occupied a special position. In 1820 the Ministry of Police was combined with that of the Interior. The extent of the official powers vested in the various Ministries was more thoroughly defined in 1826, on principles which have been maintained, on the whole, down to the present day.

Among more than a score of Ministers holding office during the last years of the reign of Alexander and the first years of Nicholas I, with the single exception of Capodistrias, Minister of Foreign Affairs until 1822, there was not one possessed of really superior intelligence or force of character.

The provincial administration rested in the hands of the Governors, assisted in each case by special Councils and Courts. The police was under the direction of Chiefs of Police in the principal towns of the provinces, prefects in the district towns, and *ispravniks* (rural police captains) in the rural districts. Only the thirty-six central provinces, however, remained under this ordinary provincial administration; on the other hand, a considerably larger portion of territory in the more distant regions was divided into Governor-Generalships and Military Governorships, comprising the greater mass of the population, and often extending over several provinces. This system was maintained by Alexander from 1815 down to the end of his reign; and he was undoubtedly influenced therein by the idea, which he constantly entertained, of dividing up his huge Empire into a certain number of large and clearly defined autonomous units—an idea which was in close connexion with his constitutional aims for Russia and also with his original projects for expanding the kingdom of Poland by annexing to it some, at least, of the provinces of Lithuania.

After 1815 there were in existence twelve such Military Governorships or Governor-Generalships. Standing apart, in addition to the kingdom of Poland and the grand duchy of Finland, was the district of Bialystok, annexed in 1807, and only considerably later (in 1842) incorporated in the province of Grodno; also the military administration of the Caucasus, the region of the Don Cossacks, and, finally, the separate military administrations of St Petersburg and Moscow.

The administration of the whole Empire at this time was rotten, through and through. "Everything was corrupt, everything unjust, everything dishonest." Such was the forcible language in which the official Russian historian of the last ten years of the reign of Alexander I depicts the state of affairs. All the public posts, from the highest to the lowest, were filled by jobbery or sold. Of real qualifications, even

the most elementary, no account was taken ; there was no system of training, no system of tests ; any qualifications which a candidate might possess were those acquired by the discharge of subordinate duties in the public departments. It was looked upon as a matter of course that any candidate possessing influence, or the means of purchasing a post, was competent for any special service, administrative or judicial ; it was quite a usual thing, too, to pass, not only from one branch of the service to another, but from the military into the civil service and *vice versa*. Bribery was universal in all grades, and in all branches of the administration ; it was one of the main sources of livelihood for a huge army of officials, wretchedly paid, and thus forced by the State itself to take bribes. In fact, all the officials (only excepting, to some extent, the functionaries of the Ministry of Finance, relatively better though still very scantily remunerated) received salaries on which they were quite unable to subsist. Judicial officers were still paid, notwithstanding the increased cost of living and the depreciation in the value of money, according to the rate of salaries fixed in 1772. Thus the presidents of the Judicial Chambers, both civil and criminal, received a salary of 840 paper roubles annually, judges 600, judges of provincial Courts 300, and officials of the secretarial staffs from 20 to 100 roubles annually. The salaries of the administrative authorities were equally poor. Accordingly the temptation to extortion, fraud, and corruption became almost irresistible ; and, in view of the lack of any proper control, indictments for such misconduct became, in almost every case, a farce. Examples of every kind of malversation were set by the Governors, who were all-powerful in their own provinces, and directly dependent only on the Tsar : that is, practically dependent on no one.

The indirect revenues of the Governors, obtained by plundering the Treasury and public property, and especially by bribes extorted from the inhabitants of their respective provinces, were reckoned, on an average, at several hundred thousands of roubles annually. Some military Governors (as, for example, the notorious Governor of Volhynia, Komburlej) in a short time amassed millions. During the first few years after 1815, in consequence of a number of senatorial inspections, that were held in response to the complaints of the inhabitants, a number of Governors, convicted of disgraceful criminal abuses, were removed or sent to trial. All this, however, resulted in nothing, for their immediate successors were no better ; and thereafter, as a rule, the people, for fear of the Governors, refrained from making complaints. Particularly flagrant abuses took place in the administration of the *vodka* revenues, which were farmed out. The Governors, usually in the pay of the rich *vodka*-farmers, combined with them to make the people drink, and plundered the Treasury of a considerable portion of its revenues. To provide against the loss thus occasioned to the Treasury, the experiment was made, in 1819, of introducing a government monopoly in the central

provinces. From that time the Government itself took active steps to make the people drink ; government public-houses, and inns with billiards, music, and dancing, were everywhere established. The Minister of Finance, Kankrin, in a memorial submitted to Alexander, pointed out the necessity of "spreading the use of strong drink among the common people." However, the monopoly system, in the end, only led to the enrichment of the authorities charged with the administration of the monopoly ; the civil Governors, by means of substitutes, themselves kept the public-houses, and, at the same time, entered into secret agreements with the former *vodka*-farmers. The whole burden thus fell upon the public, who paid double the former price for villainous liquor. Ultimately (in 1827), the monopoly had to be given up, and the old system of farming out was restored.

The lower officials—the *ispravniks*, chiefs of police, town-prefects, and procurators, as well as the judicial authorities—following the example of their superiors, robbed and plundered the people unmercifully. There was no possibility of getting a civil case, in any Court, from the land-Courts up to the Senate, carried through without bribery. The prisons too were in a terrible state. Prisoners, without distinction of crime, or age or sex, were kept in cold, damp, overcrowded, underground cells ; they lived, for the most part, on public alms, for the funds for their support were commonly misappropriated by the prison authorities.

In 1818 two Quakers, William Allen and Grelle de Mobilier, arrived at St Petersburg with the object of visiting Russian prisons. Although it is evident that not everything was shown to them, yet they were so shocked with what they did see that, with the candour characteristic of their sect, they immediately communicated their experiences in person to Alexander. The Tsar listened to them sympathetically and offered prayers with them ; but the prison system remained unchanged.

More than two-thirds of the population of Russia at this period belonged to the Orthodox confession. At the end of Alexander's reign, in 1825, the Orthodox population (not including the army) amounted to 34 millions. The "white" (secular) clergy numbered 110,000, while the "black" (monastic) clergy included 5700 monks and lay-brothers, besides 5300 nuns. There were over 27,000 churches, among which were 450 cathedrals (*sobors*), and about 800 chapels. The monasteries numbered 377. The nunneries were 99 in number. There were 3 ecclesiastical academies, 39 seminaries, 128 district church-schools and 170 parish schools with 45,000 pupils. The funds for educational purposes in the hands of the Orthodox clergy amounted to 10,500,000 roubles, while the yearly expenditure for Church objects was about 900,000 roubles. Four Orthodox missions were carried on, viz. the Ossetian in the Caucasus, the Samoyede in the province of Archangel, the Siberian among the Buriats and Chukches, and the Pekin mission—

a particularly active one, which gave instruction in the Chinese and Manchurian languages, and also played a certain political role. The condition of the vast majority of the Orthodox clergy was deplorable, alike in moral, intellectual, and material respects. The parish clergy, composed of married priests, were overburdened with families and, being sunk in poverty and ignorance, were looked upon with contempt by the laity. It was only in comparatively recent times, viz. by an ukase of 1801, that corporal punishment for the parish priests was abolished, and later still, by an ukase of 1808, for their wives. Special administrative enactments were made, forbidding the "popes" to drink and brawl in public places, but these were of little use. Universal drunkenness prevailed among the secular clergy, and was not of rare occurrence among the monks, as is attested by many scandalous cases. In consequence of the low level of instruction in the academies and seminaries, only a few individuals were able, by their own efforts and private reading, to obtain any higher education, general and theological. In intelligence the "black" clergy were relatively superior; they were, moreover, powerful enough to protect against the secularising hand of the Government the immense wealth accumulated in the monasteries. The leading Church dignitaries sprang almost exclusively from their midst; but, for the most part, they were actuated by extreme and aggressive ambition and fanaticism.

The supreme ecclesiastical authority, the Synod, since its creation in 1721, had been in appearance, at least, entirely subject to the authority of the secular Government, and had been kept by it in the strictest discipline during the reigns of Catharine II and Paul; it did not cease, however, to aim secretly at becoming independent and, indeed, to exercise an influence on the actions of the Government. The chief representative of this tendency was the most influential man in the Synod, Seraphim, Archbishop of Tver (1814-9), afterwards (until 1821) of Moscow, finally Archbishop of St Petersburg and president of the Synod until 1843: a narrow, bigoted person, absolute and implacable, yet a profound politician in his own way. He employed as his tool the Archimandrite Photius, religious teacher at the School of Cadets, a young ascetic, who was wont to torture his body with sackcloth, flagellation, and fasting. In his strange autobiography this monk has described his hallucinations, temptations, and visions of demons. He was a man morbidly sensuous, ambitious, and cunning, and has been called, not without reason, the Russian "Torquemada." The most distinguished and purest figure in the Synod was Philaret, Archbishop of Jaroslaff, afterwards (from 1821) of Moscow, a man of high intellectual attainments and Liberal ideas, who was convinced of the necessity of the reform of the Church, but, at the same time, was devoid of influence. He was denounced by Photius as a "freemason," and charged by Seraphim as being of an "unorthodox"

and "Lutheran" tendency. The lay Procurator-General of the Synod, Prince Meshcherski (1817-33), was weak and indifferent, and unable to influence in any way the direction of the Synodal or Church affairs.

Alexander I., being well acquainted with the inner working of the Church in its ecclesiastical and social relations, had originally in view its fundamental and thorough reform. He intended to ameliorate the position of the "white" clergy, to do away with the exploiting of the parishioners by the priests, to place the latter upon a fixed salary paid by the State, and to raise their whole spiritual level. From 1814, the Government actually began to pay salaries, allowing to ecclesiastics holding the degree of Doctor of Divinity 500 roubles, of Master 350 roubles, and of Bachelor 250 roubles per annum. In 1812, with the support of the Tsar, a Bible Society, formed on the model of the British Bible Society, had been founded. This society rapidly developed, and its work met with great success; during the first nine years of its existence it printed 129 editions of the Bible in 675,000 copies. At the same time, a very important step was taken in the direction of bringing the Orthodox hierarchy under the special direction of the Government. By an Imperial manifesto of 1817, the administration of ecclesiastical affairs, which had hitherto been kept apart, was reformed and placed under the Ministry of Education; the Synod underwent reorganisation, and became directly subject to the authority of the Minister of Education, Prince Galitzin, who, according to the terms of the manifesto, "was henceforth to occupy the same leading position with respect to the Synod, as the Minister of Justice with respect to the Senate." It should be added that Alexander took a lively interest in the Orthodox sectarians, and personally sought the acquaintance of the most eminent sectarian leaders. At this time, too, the Tsar, who had previously been attracted towards religious mysticism by the famous Madame de Krüdener, made overtures to Rome, and appointed a permanent ambassador at the Holy See. In 1818 he concluded a Concordat with Pius VII, establishing the Primacy of Warsaw and introducing harmony into the relations of the two Churches in the archbishopric of Mohileff. It appears that the question of the Union of the Churches (which had been seriously mooted before in Paul's time) occupied, to some extent, the active but unstable mind of Alexander, although he was indeed far from a practical realisation of this difficult and delicate scheme. It was not long before he had to renounce even the modest enactments proposed with a view to regulating the affairs of the Orthodox Church.

The Synod, seeing cause to be alarmed by these enactments, and observing in them a menace to the whole existing ecclesiastical hierarchy, determined to defend itself and entered upon a struggle with the Government. Seraphim was the prime mover in this matter. For several years he had been secretly fomenting a counter-agitation among the reactionary members of the higher social circles. Ultimately, having

waited for a change in the Liberal sentiments of the Tsar, he struck a decisive blow at the right moment. Photius, who was employed by him for this purpose, obtained, in 1822, an audience from Alexander and managed, by means of some sort of strange influence, to bring him into such a state, that, completely subdued, he fell at Photius' feet, kissed his hands, and otherwise humbled himself before him. Thereupon the astute Archimandrite, in unctuous tones, denounced not only Galitzin, but the whole movement in favour of freedom of thought, the Bible Society, the secret societies, the Catholics, Lutherans, and mystics—describing them all as the enemies of the throne and the altar. Alexander, however, did not yield all at once; his suspicious nature subsequently gained, to some extent, the upper hand over the momentary influence of Photius. But, henceforth, he began to waver, and was, doubtless, in his heart much perturbed by the menacing outlook thus disclosed, never having forgotten that he had ascended the throne over the dead body of his murdered father. In May, 1824, Seraphim renewed the attack; at an audience, granted to him by the Tsar, he denounced Galitzin as the enemy of Orthodoxy and demanded his immediate dismissal. It was in vain that Alexander defended his Minister, whom he regarded “not as a subject but as a friend.” Seraphim remained unappeased; Arakcheieff supported him, and the Tsar had to give way. Galitzin was dismissed; and the reactionary Shishkoff took his place.

Prior to this, in consequence of the representations of Photius, an Imperial rescript dated August, 1822, had suppressed all the secret societies and the Masonic Lodges, to which even persons of the highest rank belonged; for instance, the Tsarevich—the Grand Duke Constantine Pavlovich. By an Imperial ukase of May, 1824, addressed to the Synod, the position which that body had occupied prior to 1817 was restored to it, until a separate Ministry of Ecclesiastical Affairs should be established; which, however, was never done. At the same time, in consequence of Seraphim's denunciation (in December, 1824) of the Bible Society as being “a daughter of the British Society,” a check was put upon its activity; but its formal suppression only took place after Alexander's death (1826). In the reign of Nicholas the Orthodox Church was able to commence again, on a large scale, the work of forced conversions, which had been interrupted since the death of Catharine II. Finally, owing to the abolition of the “Union” in Lithuania and Ruthenia, a million and a half of Uniates were forcibly converted in a body, and more than 2000 churches were taken from them. The triumph of the ecclesiastical reaction during the last years of the reign of Alexander I possessed the utmost significance for the future internal policy of Russia; and indirectly its effects were most disastrous to the kingdom of Poland and the subsequent shaping of Polish-Russian relations.

The principle that the State does not exist for the community, but

the community for the State, was during this period applied to Russia in the most arbitrary manner. The Russian people groaned under the burden of their recent great Imperial successes, their victories over the Western Powers, and their prestige in Europe. The main part of this burden was borne by the Russian peasantry, on whom the burden of the *vodka* taxes indirectly fell. The extent of the impositions to which they were subjected, in money and especially in kind, due to all kinds of abuses, was incalculable.

The serfdom of the Russian peasants, as sanctioned by the census revision of 1719 under Peter the Great, was placed on a firm basis by Elizabeth's ukases of 1742 and 1747 (relating to the selling of serfs as recruits) and of 1760 (relating to their deportation by the proprietors to Siberia), and the ukases issued by Catharine II in 1765 and 1767. The Partitions of Poland, which resulted in the parcelling out of the vast Polish domains together with the serfs dwelling on them, had also a disastrous effect on the lot of the Russian peasantry. Among the grants made by Catharine and Paul to their favourites, to officials, and to military officers, there were nearly a million of male serfs, i.e. about five millions of "souls"; of these a considerable part were Russian Crown peasants. The condition of the Crown peasants, formerly comparatively favourable, had undergone a change for the worse. At the Senatorial inspection of the province of Kazan in 1818, it appeared that the Crown peasants there had to pay, for that single year, illegal taxes to the extent of 400,000 roubles, and, in addition, bribes amounting to 200,000 roubles, without reckoning what was extorted from them in kind—in forced labour, vehicular transport, etc.

The condition of the peasants under private landlords was appalling. The proprietors, who were, in most instances, ruined, and had been obliged to sell the greater part of their serfs, endeavoured to keep up their income to the same level by extorting from those serfs remaining in their possession more forced labour and higher land-dues (*obrok*) per head; this *obrok* in some localities amounted (in 1816) to 135 roubles. The sale of the serfs by the proprietors was conducted in an arbitrary manner; for instance, the several members of a family were sold separately to different purchasers, as an opportunity occurred. According to the official tariff (adopted for the military colonies) the price of a boy one year old was 22 roubles, of a boy of ten years 300, of a youth of 18 years, or above that age, 1000. The rate for females was usually about two-thirds of the above. The enforcement in a most brutal form of the *jus primae noctis* was very widespread. The peasants of the smaller proprietors were subject to direct oppression at the hands of their masters; but those of the great nobles, who lived in St Petersburg, suffered not less severely at the hands of their stewards and tenants. They perished by hundreds in the factories established, at this period, to augment the incomes of these great landed proprietors.

They were also subjected to inhuman punishments, imprisoned in underground cellars, kept in chains, or flogged to death with the knout, by order of the master or his steward. A whole series of such crimes were brought to light by the Senatorial inspections, which took place after 1815, on the properties of the highest dignitaries of State—men who enjoyed in St Petersburg the reputation of statesmen and even of philanthropists, such as Tolstoi, Kochubei, Golovkin, Mordvinoff and others.

The most terrible oppressor of the people, however, was the Tsar's favourite, Arakcheieff. His mistress, a Ruthenian woman, Nastasia Minkin, exercised authority as his representative, and ruled with a rod of iron not only the military colonies under his control, but also his own extensive estates, and tortured women, in particular, with the most refined cruelty. She was ultimately stabbed by the brother of one of her victims. In revenge for this, Arakcheieff, to whom the Tsar gave a free hand in the matter, put to death, without any judicial enquiry, and after the most frightful tortures, not only the murderer, but also twenty-two innocent peasants, whom he suspected of complicity in the affair. They were flogged to death with the knout (1825). One of the noblest of Russian patriots (the Decembrist Bestuzheff) in a statement made in 1826, in which, amongst other things, he affirms that the proprietors "gave out their young hounds to be nursed at the breast by their peasant women," expressed his conviction that "the negroes on the American plantations were happier than the Russian private serfs."

The half measures adopted by Alexander I, with the object of improving the condition of the peasants, bore little fruit. The law of 1803 concerning "freeholders," which had allowed proprietors by way of contract to emancipate their serfs, whether singly or in whole villages, at the same time making over to them the land, produced scanty results; we find that during half a century (1803-55), not more than 384 proprietors took advantage of this law, liberating 116,000 serfs. The practice of making grants of land to serfs was first adopted by the Polish nobility of the district of Bialystok, immediately after its cession to Russia in 1807; it led, however, to a sharp rebuff from the Government. Speranski in 1810 had entertained the idea of placing restrictions upon serfdom; but his proposals were half-hearted and did not result in any legislative act. After 1815 this question occupied Alexander's attention: the more so, as in the kingdom of Poland he had now to deal with a peasantry, not actually owning land, yet emancipated from serfdom. The first ukase abolishing serfdom, that for the province of Esthonia (June 4, 1816), did not provide for allotments of land, but left the legal relations of the peasants and the proprietors to be fixed by mutual agreement; in 1817 the same ukase was extended to the province of Courland, and in 1819 to Livonia. At the beginning of 1818 a rescript was addressed to the Governor-General of Lithuania, instructing him to ascertain the opinions of the landowners upon the

abolition of serfdom; and, in consequence, the Polish nobility at the Minor Diet of Vilna in the same year adopted a scheme for the liberation of their serfs, appointing with that object a deputation to the Tsar.

This scheme was, indeed, disregarded by the authorities and was not carried into effect; but it led to the ukase of March 2, 1818, "for the province of Minsk and other provinces taken over from Poland," granting certain privileges to the peasants, such as the liberty to sell produce and the restriction of forced labour to the stated days. At the same time, at the beginning of 1818, before the departure of Alexander to attend the first Diet held at Warsaw, Arakcheieff, "that assassin of the Russian people," drew up, by special order of the Tsar, "a project for the emancipation of private peasants from the state of serfdom." This was to be effected by way of gradual purchase by the Treasury of these peasants along with the land. The carrying out of this project was left to a special Allotment Commission, which was to purchase the peasants along with the lands, at the standard rate of two *dessiatinas* per head; the net valuation of the *obrok* (land-dues), capitalised at five per cent., as well as of the lands, being fixed by local committees of the nobility, while the Treasury was to place at the disposal of this Commission a sum of five million roubles annually. A scheme, based on such principles, and entrusted to the valuations of the proprietors alone, together with the insignificant sum placed at the disposal of the Commission, could have no practical value; indeed, it soon was abandoned, just like the other more Liberal measures, which, at this period (1816-20), Alexander ordered to be framed, in order only in the end to cast them aside. Everything went on as before; the bondage of the Russian peasants was destined to remain unchanged for half a century longer, and their wretched condition to continue up to the present day.

Among the million and a half of persons belonging to the burgher class, it is reckoned that there were, at this time, about 100,000 merchants belonging to the Russian guilds. The internal trade of the country had its centre at the great fairs, especially the Makarieff Fair, afterwards removed to Nijni-Novgorod, where the annual turn-over amounted to several tens of millions of roubles. Large returns were also shown by the fairs at Romny and Irbit. After the example of the kingdom of Poland steps were taken to stimulate the various industries—particularly the textile industry for the requirements of the army; some progress also manifested itself in the iron industry, at the Demidoff and Berd ironworks. Great activity in this respect was shown by the Minister of the Interior, Kozodavleff, and the Minister of Finance, Kankrin. The system, however, depending on large subsidies granted indiscriminately and corruptly by the Government, became a source of numerous abuses, and in many cases led, not so much to the advancement of the industry, as to the squandering of large funds belonging to the Treasury. Foreign trade suffered greatly in consequence of the continual wars. In 1812 the

imports from abroad amounted in value to barely 22 millions of silver roubles, the exports to 37 millions; in 1814 the imports amounted to 28½ millions (including nearly four millions for expensive foreign wines), and the exports to 49 millions. From that time a fairly rapid increase took place; in 1817 there were imports of 42 millions and exports of 74 millions of silver roubles (50 per cent. of the exports being corn).

The hereditary nobility of Russia towards the end of this period was calculated at 140,000 families. Among them there were about 1500 proprietors of over 1000 serfs; and as the yearly income from each serf was reckoned, on an average, at 100 roubles, these proprietors were men of great wealth, possessing an income of over 100,000 roubles and, in many cases, of a million roubles or more. Besides these, there were over 2000 proprietors having more than 500 serfs and 17,000 who owned more than 200. Below this stratum of the higher nobility, who lived in affluence, there were about 120,000 (more than 80 per cent.) of poorer nobles, of whom more than one-third possessed, on an average, only eight serfs each, and thus lived in a state of penury. Moreover, even the large fortunes of the great families, in consequence of the reckless extravagance of the proprietors, the peculations of their stewards, and the universal robbery in the management of the estates, were, for the most part, greatly reduced. According to the authoritative opinion of a contemporary writer, fully nine-tenths of the fortunes of the nobles of the time had been squandered.

The relations of the nobles to the Government were ambiguous. On the one hand, they were dependent on the favour of the Government, they acquired important positions in its service, and were thus able to protect their interests in an economic sense. On the other hand they keenly felt the despotic tutelage exercised over them; they could not become reconciled to the breach made in their ranks, when the Government, by order of Peter the Great, introduced the official nobility of the eighth class of civil servants and of certain grades of officers in the army and navy; nor could they reconcile themselves to the preponderating influence acquired in the public service by Germans, who had been gaining ground during the reigns of three Tsars, nor, in general, to the ascendancy of the centralised bureaucracy. To these causes was attributable the antagonism towards the ruling House shown by the great families, among which were to be found some tracing their descent from Rurik, and thus of older blood than the Romanoffs themselves—an antagonism of long standing, hidden under a semblance of loyalty, yet none the less deeply rooted. There remained still fresh in their family traditions the memories of contests carried on with this Imperial House, even in recent times—from Peter's reign to that of Paul—bitter memories of the coercion they had so often experienced at its hands, and of ancestors bearing proud family names sent to the scaffold or to Siberia. All this created in the Russian nobility, especially in its higher ranks, tendencies disposing

them to regard favourably any manifestation directed against the existing régime.

The relations of the nobility to the community at large were similarly ambiguous. They were, indeed, through their administrative and official position, a powerful factor in causing the sufferings of the people. Yet, at the same time, among the best representatives of that nobility, there lurked the consciousness of their own responsibility for the unhappy social condition of their native country, and of their paramount obligations—a feeling of the greatness of the Russian people and of its wrongs ; they felt their own solidarity with the distressed masses. Such generous ideas were largely stimulated by the recent victorious campaigns in the West, by contact with the intellectual world of Europe, by the military occupation, lasting for several years, of the grand duchy of Warsaw, and by residence in France. The words of Napoleon, "*une armée dehors, c'est l'état qui voyage,*" were specially true of the corps of officers of the Russian army, formed almost exclusively from the nobility, who returned home after 1815 in an altered frame of mind, and with broader and more enlightened views.

The Russian nobility represented at this time almost the only cultured element in the country. Education in Russia stood very low. Attached to the Ministry of Education, which was formed in 1802 from the former School Commission, there existed in St Petersburg, from 1803, a Chief Board for Schools of which several distinguished Poles, Czartoryski, Potocki, and Plater, were members. This body developed a fruitful activity in the provinces seized from Poland, where flourished the Vilna University under Czartoryski as Curator, with ten gymnasia, and a large number of district and communal schools. In Russia proper, on the other hand, the work of education met with much hindrance. The Government scheme of 1802 for the establishment of elementary schools on the Government lands by the ecclesiastical authorities, and on private estates by the landed proprietors, under the supervision of the gymnasia, remained a dead letter ; and a later statute of 1828 concerning elementary instruction produced little real effect. The secondary schools, which were by no means numerous, provided a four years' course of instruction, and had, at most, eight teachers each ; afterwards the statute of 1828 prescribed for them a course of seven years and twelve teachers each, without, however, increasing their numbers. In the following years the violent reactionary policy of Nicholas in educational matters had a disastrous effect, especially on the secondary schools. As to the Universities, the comparatively liberal University statute of 1804, largely due to the efforts of Czartoryski, which had secured to the Universities autonomy and the free election of rectors and deans, with a comparatively wide range of instruction, was, during the last years of Alexander's reign, completely nullified by the reactionaries, who were then very suspicious of the academic youth ; following in this respect the example of

academic repression that was then being adopted in Germany. Finally, this enactment was repealed by the retrograde University statute of Nicholas I in 1835. By the reactionary Instructions of the Minister of Education, Galitzin, dated 1818, all the higher educational text-books were subjected to a strict supervision ; and the principle was laid down that lectures on philosophy, philology, history, and even those on natural science, medicine, and mathematics, should have as their principal aim, not mere abstract knowledge, but the furtherance of religious and political ends.

Ere long, there took place wholesale removals of professors suspected of irreligious or disloyal views; and the purification of University teaching was carried out in this spirit by means as radical as they were singular. Thus, for instance, at the University of Kazan, by order of the Curator, the anatomical requisites were confiscated and buried solemnly in consecrated ground. In general, the instruction given at the Russian Universities of this period (with the exception of Vilna and Dorpat) was still far below the standard of Western Europe. There was a lack of indispensable auxiliary institutions—of clinics, laboratories, even of libraries. In 1814 the Public Library of St Petersburg was opened to the public. It was formed entirely from the great Polish library of the Zaluski's, which had been illegally confiscated by Suvóroff, and removed, in 1795, from Warsaw to St Petersburg. It contained more than 150,000 volumes and 5000 manuscripts, almost exclusively Latin and Polish. On the other hand, the University of St Petersburg, founded in 1819 with 24 students, numbered, in 1822, not more than 40 students. Under such conditions, the more enlightened element in the community was, naturally, not the product of these oppressed and despised academic bodies, but was rather found among the best youth of the aristocracy, educated in the privileged establishments for pages and cadets or at home. Among these were men of the new order of ideas, more independent and progressive, not, indeed, possessing special scientific knowledge, but, on the other hand, breathing a fresh breath into literature, and strongly and sincerely animated by the desire of social and political reform. They supplied at this time the earliest representatives, in literature and public life, of Young Russia—eminent writers and active workers for freedom of thought, such as Griboyedoff, the celebrated author of social comedies, in which he unsparingly lashed his contemporaries, Bestuzheff, the editor of the *Polar Star*, the poets, Prince Viazemski, Baron Delvig, Küchelbecker, Ryleieff, and, finally, the most brilliant genius of Russian literature, Pushkin. Upon their impressionable minds, as yet insufficiently balanced and lacking independence, the most varied factors were at work—the lasting influences of the French Revolution and of Napoleon, together with the counter-movement in French politics and literature under the Restoration ; the cry for social emancipation in Germany, which was the

outcome of the recent struggles against French domination ; the powerful stimulus to freedom of thought and action given by Byron. The movement was also influenced by the Polish national spirit and by the literary development of Poland—by the songs and essays of Niemczevicz, by the Panslavonic ideas of Staszic, and above all, by the Young Polish Romanticism, embodied in the dominating personality of Mickievicz, who came into contact, during his residence in Odessa, Moscow, and St Petersburg (1825-9), with the most distinguished representatives of Young Russia.

The impulsive, self-sacrificing, and cultured youth belonging to the noble class in Russia entered at an early period upon the path of secret political organisation. So early as 1814, influenced undoubtedly by their contact with the Prussian army and the secret associations in it directed against Napoleon, they formed a society, composed chiefly of Russian officers and called the "Society of the Green Lamp," whose members contributed one-tenth of their income to the common funds. In 1816 it was reorganised and enlarged under the name of the "Society of Public Salvation." In it many officers of the Guards and of the General Staff took a prominent part. It appears that these first attempts at organisation were made with the knowledge of Alexander I, who was still at this period animated with Liberal ideas. Being occupied with his broad schemes for the emancipation of the peasants, the extension of the kingdom of Poland, and Greek independence, he was the more ready to seek support against the reactionary forces from the progressive elements of Young Russia, just as he looked with indulgence upon similar Polish patriotic organisations, and on the Greek *Hetairia*. By the natural course of events in such cases, the work of the secret societies in Russia entered upon an independent path, and they became more and more embittered against the Throne itself.

As a result of reforms in the society, there sprang up in 1818 the "Union of the Public Good," which numbered more than 200 members. On account of the rumours then prevalent of the intentions of Alexander with respect to the extension of the kingdom of Poland by the annexation of the Lithuanian provinces, some of the confederates (Yakushkin, Shakhovskoi) declared themselves in favour of a *coup d'état*, involving even the death of the Tsar. In 1820 a schism took place, and two separate societies were formed : the Northern Society, with its centre in St Petersburg, under the leadership of Nikita Muravieff and Nicholas Turgenieff, and, after 1823, of Ryleieff, adhering to the principles of a constitutional monarchy and opposed to the separation of Lithuania from the Empire ; and the Southern Society with its centre in Tulczyn, under the leadership of Colonel Paul Pestel, the author of the work *Russkaya Pravda* (Russian Code of Laws), which formulated a programme professing Republican ideas and including certain very limited

concessions for the Poles. Out of this party subsequently sprang the Radical section of the "United Slavs"; from it, also, in January, 1824, and January, 1825, was evolved the idea of an understanding with the secret societies in the kingdom of Poland. By these movements Slavophile and Panslavonic ideas were gradually developed and shaped. Pestel dreamt of a Slavonic federation extending from the Ural to the Adriatic; but among the large majority of the confederates, especially in Moscow and St Petersburg, a deep distrust of the Poles predominated. The distinguishing feature of these societies was that their members, though animated by ardour, courage and self-sacrifice, by the purest love for their country, and a generous desire for its emancipation, were, according to the just description of a Pole nearly allied to them (Alexander Kraievski), "a generation without fathers and sons," ahead of their contemporaries by nearly a century, having no support among the mass of the people and, consequently, no prospect of success. Devoid of any logical plan of action, they were destined to waste their energy in a single outbreak, depending altogether upon chance and hopeless in its prospects.

The grand duchy of Finland was acquired by Russia in 1808, and incorporated first of all by an Imperial manifesto of June, 1808. It was subsequently formally annexed by a constitutional manifesto of the Tsar of March 27, 1809, addressed to the Finnish people and to the Diet assembled at Borgö. Finland was thereby recognised as a separate political unit, legally constituted, bound to the Empire, and "retaining its fundamental rights and the constitution it had hitherto possessed, to be maintained in force, intact and without change." After the inclusion (1811) in the grand duchy of the province of Viborg (acquired in 1741 by Elizabeth), Finland, in 1825, contained about 370,000 square kilometres with a population of 1,300,000 inhabitants. It had two High Courts of Justice; afterwards a third was added at Viborg. The administration of the country was conducted primarily by a Governing Council (Council of Regency), which was replaced subsequently, by Imperial rescript of February, 1816, by the Finnish Senate, while the supreme control was vested in a Governor-General. There was, moreover (from 1810), a permanent Committee for Finnish affairs, composed of Finns, under the presidency of Baron Armfelt, which sat in St Petersburg; it acted as an intermediary body, in both legislative and administrative affairs, between the Senate and the Tsar as Grand Duke. Further, attached to the person of the sovereign, there was a special Secretary of State for Finnish affairs, an office held at this time by Baron Rehbinder.

In accordance with Imperial instructions of November, 1810, this functionary received direct from the Throne all rescripts affecting Finland. They were signed by the sovereign and counter-signed by

himself, and afterwards communicated by the Governor-General to the Senate. He was, moreover, under Imperial regulations of August, 1810, made formally independent of the Governor-General. The latter official was obliged (according to instructions of February, 1812) to draw up his addresses to the Senate in two languages, Swedish and Russian; in like manner, a secret rescript to the Governor-General, dated September, 1810, enjoined upon him to exercise supervision over the actions of the Senate. Swedish currency, both metal and paper, was left in circulation; but the taxes were levied in roubles. The Bank of Finland was established; funds to the extent of 1,000,000 roubles being supplied to it by Alexander, in the form of a 20 years' loan without interest. The prosperity of the country, under the skilfully conducted Finnish administration, increased rapidly; much was done for the improvement of the ways of communication by land and water, the draining and reclamation of marshes, the development of agriculture and trade, the establishing of mines for working iron ore, and the manufacture of steel. Education was treated with particular solicitude; great progress was made both in elementary and secondary education; a School of Cadets was founded in Frederikshamn, and the University was placed on an important footing. The distinguished lawyer Calonius, the independent philosophical writer Snellman, and, above all, Runeberg, the patriotic bard who sang of the struggles with Russia, gave splendid testimony to the vitality of Finnish culture. But over the grand duchy, which was thus developing itself so favourably, owing to the efforts which the Finnish people themselves were making on the basis of the constitutional autonomy guaranteed to them, there hung the continual dread of the invasion of their rights by the autocratic power of Russia.

During the first years after the annexation of Finland, when Alexander was engaged in the struggle with Napoleon, and was endeavouring to enter into an alliance with Sweden, being anxious even about the safety of St Petersburg, he several times confirmed the Legislative Guarantee of 1809, and extended it by the establishment of the Finnish Committee. He increased, too, the territory of the grand duchy, by restoring to it Old Finland (the province of Viborg); in short, he neglected nothing which might attach the Finnish people to him. At a later period, however, his policy underwent a change; the absolute monarch began to overshadow the constitutional Grand Duke, and the guaranteed Constitution was infringed. Two fundamental Swedish statutes, which were in force in Finland at the time of its conquest, formed properly part of this Constitution. These were the *Regerings-form* of August 21, 1772, and the Acts of Annexation and Guarantee of February 21 and April 3, 1789, sanctioned by Gustavus III. The principal clauses of these Acts expressly stipulated that official posts could be held only by inhabitants of the country professing the Lutheran faith; that the sovereign "could not sanction any new law,

or rescind any existing one, without the knowledge and consent of the Estates"; that "the Estates should have the right of supervising the use of the Treasury funds for the good and benefit of the country." Yet during the whole of this period the Diet was not once convoked; Russian officials of the Orthodox faith, both civil and military, were brought into the country; the financial administration was conducted entirely at the discretion of the Government, without any control on the part of the Diet; furthermore, Imperial rescripts of a legislative character were issued without the participation of the Diet. Thus, a rescript of Alexander I (1823) ordered the examination of all foreign books entering Finland, under the penalty of confiscation. This was in disregard of the Swedish Press Law, then in force, which excluded the censorship. Again, in the time of Nicholas I, the very stringent Russian censorship regulations of 1829 were enforced in Finland by Imperial decree; and a duty of 33½ per cent. was imposed upon Swedish books imported.

The change for the worse became more marked during the last two years of the reign of Alexander I. Previously, while Armfelt, who was a native of the country, and after him, Steinheil, who was by birth a German, were Governor-Generals of Finland, the Constitution, though infringed, had not been deliberately attacked. But, in August, 1823, Zakrevski was appointed as Governor-General, a man of suave manners, but a declared opponent of the separate autonomy of the grand duchy; and he at once began to aim at abolishing the Finnish institutions, and incorporating the country in the Empire. He began his work, while making a tour in the country during the summer of 1824, by stirring up dissatisfaction among the rural population against the Finnish aristocracy. Subsequently, in May, 1825, he sent to the Senate, directly, a series of proclamations in the Russian language, claiming the admission, as a matter of course, of persons of the Orthodox faith to official posts, and the right of the Governors to remove, at their own discretion, the local justices and crown bailiffs. The Senate, having held a secret meeting, submitted to Alexander a confidential address, complaining of the conduct of the Governor-General; but to this address, which was sent by couriers to Warsaw, where the Emperor was then attending the meetings of the Diet, no answer was received. After the death of Alexander in December, 1825, Zakrevski compelled the Senate and Finnish authorities to take the new oath of allegiance, according to the general terms in force for the Empire, without any mention of the separate constitutional rights of the grand duchy.

Nicholas I, upon assuming the government under extremely critical conditions, and being obliged to reckon at that moment not only with Finland, but also with Poland, repeated literally in his inaugural manifesto to the grand duchy of January, 1826, the guarantees of the manifesto of 1809 (merely substituting in the preamble "hereditary

possession" for "possession"); but he soon gave a practical proof that these guarantees were not to be literally respected; for, by a rescript of 1826, he extended to Finland the penalty of banishment to Siberia, and, by another of August, 1827, he formally declared persons of the Orthodox faith qualified to hold offices in the grand duchy. There could be no question of resistance, considering the defenceless state of the country. The Finnish army, or "Separate Finnish Corps," i.e. the national militia, was composed in 1825 of one regiment of riflemen, and two regiments of infantry, in all 3600 men, besides the battalion of the School of Cadets, 500 strong; these troops assembled once a year in the spring for six weeks' training. Under Nicholas I they were rearranged in two battalions—the Finnish battalion of Riflemen of the Life Guards and the Grenadier battalion of Riflemen—to the number of 3000 men only; and from that time they were kept on a permanent footing. This small armed force could not protect the liberties of their country; on the contrary, they were used to crush the liberties of others. By the express orders of Nicholas I the Finnish battalion of Riflemen of the Life Guards took part in the Polish campaign of 1831, and was obliged to fight against the Poles.

Alexander, in 1815, was 38 years old. His union with Elizabeth of Baden had produced no children; and his relations with his wife, which were equivalent to a secret separation by mutual accord, excluded the possibility of his having any offspring. The successor to the throne was the second brother of the Tsar, two years younger than he, the Tsarevich Constantine. He also was without children, and openly separated from his wife, Anna Feodorovna of Coburg, who had run away from him in 1801. The heir next in order was, therefore, the third brother, Nicholas, who was much younger than the others, having been born on July 6, 1796. He was, at the suggestion of the Tsar, betrothed in the autumn of 1815, to the Prussian Princess Charlotte who took the name of Alexandra Feodorovna. Their marriage took place at St Petersburg in July, 1817; and of this union was born, on April 29, 1818, a son, Alexander, afterwards the Emperor Alexander II. This event was doubly important; it had a decisive influence on the question of the succession to the throne, and it greatly contributed to the maintenance of a close dynastic connexion between Russia and Prussia during the greater part of the nineteenth century. Shortly afterwards, as a result of negotiations which had lasted for several years, Constantine, with approval of the Tsar, obtained a divorce by decree of the Synod in March, confirmed by Imperial manifesto in April, 1820, after which (in May) he married, at Warsaw, a Polish lady, to whom he had long been deeply attached, Joanna Grudzinska (Princess Lovicz). But of this marriage, also, he had no children.

There had already been a proposal to transfer the succession to

Nicholas, who, in July, 1819, was privately informed by Alexander of this project; but no definite steps were taken towards carrying it out until 1822 (January 26), when Constantine, by request of the Tsar, handed to him personally in St Petersburg a formal letter of renunciation, admitting "that he possessed neither the courage, nor the capacity, nor the strength needed by a ruler," and referring to the expression of a similar intention made by him in March, 1820, during the divorce proceedings. It seems, however, that he did this on condition that the whole matter should remain a secret between him and the Tsar, and that he attributed to the document a purely contingent character. There exist even certain indications that he gave his renunciation mainly in view of the abdication of Alexander himself, a step which, in his later years, the Tsar had contemplated. It is clear, moreover, that if the Tsar had been convinced that the renunciation was irrevocable, the immediate publication of the letter would have ensued, and an official notification of the transfer to Nicholas would have been made to the people.

Alexander, without the knowledge of Constantine, gave instructions for exact copies of the letter to be made; and he himself signed secretly (August 28, 1823) a manifesto, announcing the renunciation of Constantine and the right of Nicholas to succeed. These documents were then made up in four packets sealed with the Tsar's own seal, and with the superscription, in his own hand, "to be kept until required by me." The original was deposited in the Uspenski Cathedral in Moscow, and the copies with the Synod, the Senate, and the Council of State in St Petersburg. Of the contents of the packets he informed only three persons, viz. Philaret, Galitzin, and Arakcheieff; it appears, however, that Nicholas was apprised of the contents by one of them. Constantine probably knew nothing of what had taken place until the death of Alexander; and he did not yet regard the road to the throne as irrevocably closed to him.

Alexander in 1815, having victoriously terminated the struggle with Napoleon, had accomplished what had up to this time been the chief object of his life. During the next four years (1815-9), a fresh objective was afforded him by certain grandiose schemes of foreign and home policy, which he brought forward as part of a professedly Liberal policy. These were: the coercion of Turkey, and the furtherance of Greek aspirations; the territorial expansion of the kingdom of Poland; and the reorganisation of Russia in a spirit at once constitutional and federal—a spirit of reform and emancipation. The latter idea, which was first manifested in the Senatorial "inspections" and the projects concerning the Church and the peasantry, ultimately found expression in the instructions to frame a constitution for Russia, given by Alexander during his residence in Warsaw in 1818. The recipient of these instructions was the confidential agent attached to the Government of the kingdom of Poland, Novosiltsoff. The draft Constitution made by

Novosiltsoff for the Empire was modelled partly on the Constitution of the kingdom of Poland. It provided for the division of the Empire into ten autonomous provinces, each under a Viceroy, possessing their own national Diets of two Chambers, elected every three years. There was to be also a central Diet in St Petersburg, or in Moscow, convoked every five years. This scheme, in its rough draft, was sent to the Tsar at St Petersburg by Novosiltsoff through Prince Viazemski in the summer of 1819; in October of the same year, while Alexander was in Warsaw, it was discussed by him with the author. All this was done without the knowledge of Constantine. At the same time Novosiltsoff, at the bidding of the Tsar, compiled for him an extract of the Acts of the Polish-Lithuanian Union promulgated at Horodlo, in the time of Jagiello (1413), and at Piotrkov, in the time of King Alexander (1501), which, with other indications, pointed to the inclusion of Lithuania in the kingdom. Yet, at the very same time, Novosiltsoff drew up for the Tsar the outline of an arbitrary manifesto, which, concurrently with the granting of a Constitution to the Empire, was to suppress the kingdom of Poland, and transform it into one of the Viceregal provinces, depriving it of its separate Constitution, and changing the name "Polish army" to "western army." In this way there were evolved in the unstable mind of Alexander the most contradictory projects, none of which was destined to be realised.

This period (1819-20) was extremely critical for Alexander. In it he showed a departure from the fantastic, yet, on the whole, progressive views he had held during the first years of peace; a return to reactionary measures, accompanied by self-absorption, which finally led to his hopeless entanglement in the net of his own psychological and political inconsistencies. This change was brought about by a series of unfavourable events and influences. In March, 1819, Kotzebue was murdered; in August an insurrection of the military colonists in Chugueff took place, which was quelled only after much bloodshed. At the end of October the distinguished Russian historian Karamzin, an adversary not only of Polish independence, but of constitutional government and of the emancipation of the serfs, had a long conference at Tsarskoie Selo with the Tsar, earnestly warned him against the path he had chosen, and called upon him to return to the footsteps of Catharine II. In 1820 occurred the assassination of the Duke of Berry, and the revolutionary movements in Spain, Naples, and Portugal. Finally, while attending the Congress at Troppau in the autumn of the same year, Alexander received news of the insurrection of the Semenovski Regiment of the Guards, which had broken out in St Petersburg in October. This rising, albeit speedily quelled, gave a severe shock to the Tsar, though it had no political character, but was brought about by the ill-treatment of the rank and file by their colonel. The traditional use of the Russian Guards as an instrument of *coups d'état* made any

such outbreak a threatening reminder to the grandson of Peter III and the son of Paul.

Alexander had long been aware of the existence of secret societies in Russia and Poland; and originally, as has been said, he looked with some indulgence upon them. In 1821, after his return to St Petersburg from a long journey abroad, he received, on two separate occasions, information about the state of affairs among the confederates: first, in the form of a detailed report with the names of the conspirators and an account of their doings, from the Chief of the Staff of the Guards, General Benckendorff; and, next, a denunciation, also with full details, from the President of the Imperial Council, General Vasilchikoff. The Tsar, who, it seems, was already in possession of full details from another source, did not act upon either of these reports; he simply remarked to Vasilchikoff "*ce n'est pas à moi à sévir.*" However, he began, henceforth, to pay more heed to the reactionary voices; he complied with the demands of the Synod, made arrangements for the change in the succession, and even contemplated abdication. He gradually became morose and suspicious, as he felt himself more and more isolated, not only in Europe, but among his people and even in his own family. A "sphinx, full of riddles to the end of his days" (so the Russian poet Prince Viazemski describes him), a crowned Hamlet, but even more deeply rent than Hamlet by his own emotions, conscious of his own moral participation in the assassination of his father, and now, in turn, threatened with retaliation by the conspirators, he was oppressed by the knowledge of his helplessness at home, and of the fruitlessness of his policy abroad; from year to year he felt the ground giving way under and around him. In August, 1825, fresh and alarming disclosures reached him of a conspiracy in the army. He received these disclosures, however, quite calmly, and did not take any precautionary measures. In September of the same year he left St Petersburg for the last time and proceeded to Taganrog. Here his health suddenly gave way. The rumours, prevalent at the time, of poisoning or suicide were entirely devoid of foundation, according to the statement of his private physician, Sir James Wylie. It appears, however, that he would not allow himself to be treated; he refused the medicines prescribed for him and thus hastened his own end. He died at Taganrog on December 1, 1825.

The news of the death of Alexander reached Warsaw on the evening of December 7, 1825. It was sent to Constantine, as Emperor, in the form of a humble report by the Chief of the Staff of the Southern Army, Diebitsch. Constantine was unwilling to accept the crown before the letter, by which he had renounced his rights to the succession, had been declared invalid; and he even wrote to Nicholas expressing his intention of fulfilling the undertaking contained in it, but without giving a clear and decided statement on the point. While not assuming the reins of

government, he, nevertheless, refrained from administering the oath of allegiance in the name of Nicholas to the official authorities, and to the troops in the kingdom of Poland and Lithuania. The news of the death of the Tsar reached St Petersburg on December 9. The Minister of Justice, Lobanoff-Rostovski, as Procurator of the Senate, refused to open the packet deposited with the Senate, for, as he said, "*les morts n'ont point de volonté*"; in like manner, the packet deposited with the Synod was not opened; the Governor-General of St Petersburg, Miloradovich, who, as it appears, at that critical moment was taking the leading part in public affairs, declared himself definitely for Constantine; acting under pressure from Miloradovich, Nicholas himself took the oath of allegiance to Constantine; and it was thereupon also taken by the garrison of St Petersburg and the government officials.

However, at a meeting of the Council of State, Galitzin (doubtless not without an understanding with Nicholas) urged the opening of the secret packet, and the reading both of Constantine's letter and of the manifesto of Alexander. This was done, but, for the moment, nothing came of it. Moscow followed the example of St Petersburg; the packet deposited in the Uspenski Cathedral was not published, and the troops and authorities in Moscow likewise took the oath of allegiance to Constantine I—a course which was followed in Finland and the western provinces, including Vilna. Only in Grodno, owing to the express order of Constantine, the oath was not taken. In the meantime Constantine in Warsaw learned of the proceedings at the Council of State and the disclosure of his letter and, what was more important, of the manifesto of the deceased Tsar. His position as sovereign was thus, to a large extent, compromised, while at the same time he received disquieting information of the discovery of a conspiracy. Influenced by these events he finally decided to carry out his renunciation; on December 20, he sent an unconditional announcement thereof to Nicholas; this document reached St Petersburg on the evening of December 24. The accession of Nicholas I was then announced; and the interregnum of over three weeks at length came to an end.

Meantime the members of the secret societies, who had no detailed information about either the illness of Alexander, or the doubt as to the succession, were perplexed by the Tsar's death, and the complications regarding the succession which ensued. Finally, they resolved, although, at that time, they were not represented in large numbers in St Petersburg, to attempt a rising, profiting by the uncertainty of the situation and adopting, as their watchword, the rights of Constantine. This step, which they ventured upon, in spite of the advice of the more cautious members of their party, was taken principally under the influence of Ryleieff. Their intention was to force the Senate to issue a manifesto, convoking an assembly of national representatives

to discuss the disputed question of the succession, and to establish an interim Government, of which Speranski, a member of the Council of State, Admiral Mordvinoff, and the commander-in-chief of the army of the Caucasus, General Yermoloff, were to become members; to reduce the period of service for the rank and file of the army to 15 years; and to take steps for the emancipation of the serfs. For the moment of the insurrection Colonel Prince Sergius Trubetskoi was chosen dictator.

At the meeting, which took place during the night of Sunday to Monday, December 25-26, in the lodgings of Ryleieff, it was decided to begin the insurrection on the following day, being that which had been appointed for taking the oath to Nicholas. Accordingly, on the morning of the 26th, the Moscow regiment mutinied in its barracks, and having refused to take the oath marched out, under arms, to the Square of the Senate, shouting "Long live Constantine," some also shouting "Long live the Constitution," which not a few of the soldiers understood to be the name of the wife of Constantine. Afterwards a part of the regiment of the Grenadiers joined them, together with the crews of the war-vessels at St Petersburg. On the other hand, various regiments, on which they were relying, and especially the artillery, disappointed them. The leaders of the insurrection showed a complete lack of initiative, and kept the soldiers inactive in the Square in the cold and without food for seven hours. Trubetskoi did not issue any orders; and the common people maintained a passive attitude.

Meanwhile, Nicholas (who on the previous day had been warned by one of the confederates of the intended rising and was anxious to deal in a decisive manner with the rebels) managed to surround the insurgents, who did not in fact number above 3000 men, with a considerable force of the infantry, cavalry, and artillery, that still remained faithful to him. To his repeated calls upon them to disperse, the insurgents replied by a discharge of their weapons; and one of the first victims of the *mélée* was Miloradovich, the most prominent partisan of Constantine, who fell mortally wounded. Daylight was now beginning to wane, and the energy of the insurgents was becoming exhausted, even before the contest had become serious. Finally, after several unsuccessful charges by the cavalry, Nicholas ordered his troops to fire with grape-shot. After the first discharge of cannon the rebels dispersed; many persons, even among the bystanders, perished in consequence of the fire directed at the dense crowd from two sides of the Square at a short distance. Many, too, were killed while in flight, or drowned in the Neva. The number of victims cannot be calculated exactly; it must, however, have been considerable. The number usually given of 300 dead bodies is based upon the official report, which is untrustworthy. The same night nearly all the leaders were arrested and imprisoned in the Petropavlovsk fortress. Thus ended the unsuccessful attempt of the Decembrists.

When the news of these events in St Petersburg, which were solely the work of the Northern Society, reached the Southern Society, there proved to be in it a similar lack of preparation, organisation, and initiative; but a desperate effort was made by the three brothers Muravieff. On January 11, 1826, Licut.-Colonel Sergius Muravieff-Apostol, having induced the Chernigoff regiment of foot in Vasylkoff to revolt, led it from its camp to Bialotserkoff. Here, some days later, it was overtaken and surrounded by a superior force. After a short struggle, he was defeated and taken prisoner, severely wounded, along with his brother Matthew, the third brother, Hippolytus, having shot himself. By these easy, yet bloody, victories, Nicholas firmly established his power; and thereafter, the oath of allegiance to him was taken without resistance. On December 29, the oath was taken in Moscow, when the documents of 1822-3 preserved in the Uspenski Cathedral were brought out and read to the people.

Without further delay the new Tsar entered upon a course of the most stringent repression. On December 29, 1825, by a secret ukase, a Commission of Investigation was formed of seven (afterwards of ten) persons for examining over 200 prisoners and about 3000 witnesses. This examination was carried out secretly, by the use, and, indeed, abuse, of all the most refined inquisitorial methods, the prisoners being treated without mercy. They were alternately terrorised by threats of torture and deluded by promises of clemency. Moreover, in order to wring confessions from them, the most ingenious kinds of moral pressure were employed; for instance, Ryleieff was attacked through his love for his young wife and children, to whose house the Tsaritsa, during the examination, sent provisions and assurances of hope. Nicholas himself ordered the prisoners to be brought to him in chains, and examined them personally. A considerable number of the accused—with the exception of a few strong-willed spirits, like Yakushkin, Bestuzheff and others, who would not allow themselves to be either intimidated or cajoled—could not resist the methods of examination employed; and, either by weakness, or in the delusive belief that, by a candid declaration of their aims and intentions, they would best serve their country, they were led into making the fullest and most incriminating confessions. On the basis of such confessions the Commission of Investigation, on June 11, prepared its Report—a pitiless indictment—calculated not only to bring ruin on the prisoners, but to make them infamous in the eyes of the people. They were represented in it as being ordinary criminals and assassins; their intentions were grossly misrepresented; every incautious and hasty word was used against them. On the other hand, no notice was taken of their noble projects of reform, aiming at the equality of citizens before the law, the emancipation of the serfs, the publicity of Courts of justice, the reform of the Church and of the army, the abolition of the military colonies and of monopolies.

In the middle of June the High Court met to try the case of the Decembrists. This Court consisted of eighty members, from the Council of State, the Synod, and the Senate respectively, to whom were joined several military officers and Government officials. Their deliberations lasted from June 15 to July 23, being conducted with the strictest secrecy and exclusively on the basis of the Report of the Commission of Investigation, without any defence being allowed, and without any notification to the accused themselves, who were kept all the time in the Petropavlovsk fortress, in total ignorance that they were being tried. Sentence was pronounced on July 21; of the 121 persons accused, of whom 61 belonged to the Northern Society, 37 to the Southern Society, and 23 to the United Slavs, all were found guilty (among them being seven princes, two counts, three barons, two generals, twenty-three colonels and lieutenant-colonels). Five of them were sentenced to be hanged and quartered, thirty-one to be beheaded, and the remainder to be sent to Siberia. On the following day, Nicholas issued his confirmation of the sentence, showing, however, clemency in certain cases. Thus, the death penalty for the five principal offenders was allowed to stand, the Court being left to make the usual arrangements for their execution; but, in the case of the other thirty-one, he commuted the death penalty to hard labour for life in Siberia. He also alleviated the penalties of some of the others. On July 24, the Court proceeded as a body to the Petropavlovsk fortress; and there took place its first and last sitting in the presence of the prisoners, who only now learned that they had been tried and sentenced. The sentence was carried out in the early morning of July 25, 1826, on the Petropavlovsk Esplanade, the five principal convicts being hanged: Pestel, Ryleieff, Sergius Muravieff-Apostol, Michael Bestuzheff, and Kachovski. The object in view, that of terrorising the community, was attained.

Nicholas ordered a *précis* of the reforms devised by the Decembrists to be drawn up for his personal use. It appears that originally he had thoughts of introducing some at least of these reforms. Thus in 1826 he entrusted Speranski with the codification of the Russian laws. This work was completed in 1839 and took the form of a "Complete Code of Laws"; it proved, however, to be not so much a codification as a mere digest of the most varied administrative enactments. The Secret Committee, established in 1826 to examine into the position of the peasants, after long and fruitless labours did not make any progress with the question of emancipation, the solution of which fell to the lot of Nicholas' successor. On the other hand, much greater zeal was displayed in political repression; and, in 1826, Benckendorff, who had first brought to light the organisation of the secret societies, was appointed Chief of the *Gendarmerie*, as well as principal director of that new police institution, the notorious Third Section of the Tsar's own Chancellery, henceforth the most effective implement of political

espionage and oppression. However, the attention of Nicholas began to be directed more and more to questions of foreign policy: the war with Persia (1827-8), concluded by the Treaty of Peace at Turkmanchay (February 10, 1828), which gave to Russia the provinces of Nakhichevan and Erivan; the war with Turkey (1828-9), concluded by the Treaty of Peace at Adrianople (September 14, 1829), which resulted in the independence of Greece, and secured to Russia, besides the Asiatic possessions of Anapa, Achaltsik, Poti, etc., the right of free navigation in the Bosphorus and Dardanelles, the occupation of Moldavia and Wallachia, and a large pecuniary indemnity; finally, the war with the kingdom of Poland in 1831, which was terminated by the taking of Warsaw and the overthrow of the constitutional independence of that kingdom. By these triumphs the nation gained nothing; on the contrary it lost. It became deeper and deeper immersed in stagnation and disintegration. Warped and hindered in its normal development, it bore within it the germs of inevitable upheavals and future disasters.

## CHAPTER XIV.

### POLAND AND THE POLISH REVOLUTION.

By the downfall of Napoleon, Poland lost the chance, almost within her grasp, of recovering her independence. But the nation still displayed an inexhaustible vitality; the settlement of the eighteenth century had been set aside; and the necessity of a new solution of the Polish question was thus evident. That solution now rested in the hands of Russia. Russia had already, by the first three Partitions (1772-95), received about three-fourths of the territory, and more than half the population, of the Polish Republic; she now held in addition the grand duchy of Warsaw, which had been originally appropriated partly to Prussia and partly to Austria. She thus had in her hands, in all, almost nine-tenths of the whole of the original territory of Poland (1813-5).

In view of this, Alexander I desired to create a new kingdom of Poland under Russian supremacy, and to incorporate in it a large part of the Polish territory which was under his sway. But the statesmen at the Congress of Vienna, and especially Castlereagh, who took a prominent part in thwarting the Russian designs, did not understand the true historical and political aspect now presented by the Polish question. They failed to appreciate the true interests of Europe; they reverted to the settlement that Napoleon had overthrown; and, through fear of Russia, they vetoed the foundation of a new Poland. Russia was obliged to give up to Prussia nearly one-fourth of the grand duchy of Warsaw, as well as to consent to the separation of Cracow. Austria received back that part of Eastern Galicia which she had lost to Russia in 1809, *i.e.* the province of Tarnopol; Cracow, with the surrounding district, was declared a free city, with a special charter, under the joint protection of Russia, Austria, and Prussia. Prussia recovered the grand duchy of Posen; the remaining part of the grand duchy of Warsaw constituted the new kingdom of Poland, irrevocably bound to Russia by its constitution and by the hereditary rule of the new Kings of Poland. Alexander, some years before (in 1810), had urged Napoleon to enter into a special convention against the extension of the grand duchy of

Warsaw ; but now he expressly reserved to himself in the treaties and in the Final Act the right of making such additions to the Polish State as he might think fit. This reservation had in view the eventual annexation to the kingdom of Poland of at least a part of Lithuania. Taken in conjunction with the recent precedent of the annexation of old Finland to the grand duchy of Finland (1811), it was of great value in conciliating public opinion in the kingdom ; later, the disappointment of these hopes assisted to bring about the revolution of November. It was likewise stipulated at Vienna that the Polish territories handed over to Austria and Prussia should receive national representation and autonomous institutions of their own. Furthermore, guarantees were given that over the whole area of the former Republic, within the limits existing in 1772, there should be full freedom of navigation and trading, as well as unrestricted communication across the frontier. In these various clauses there was to be found undoubtedly an attempt to provide a new settlement of the Polish question ; but the cardinal blunder, that of dividing the Polish lands and the Polish people, was retained. The kingdom, thus weakened by reduction of territory, was deprived of all chance of permanently maintaining its constitutional independence as against the vast and autocratic Russian Empire. This aspect of Castlereagh's policy was clearly set forth in the English Parliament during the early debates on the Congress of Vienna (January 6, 1816) by George Ponsonby, whose forecast of the future proved singularly just.

In November, 1815, Alexander I made his state entry into Warsaw —the first state entry of a Russian monarch into the capital of Poland. His first task was to grant a Constitution. Out of the various schemes submitted to him, Alexander finally selected that drafted by Prince Adam Czartoryski. Considerable modifications, calculated to limit the independence of the kingdom, were, however, made in the draft by the hand of the Tsar himself, and others at the suggestion of Novosiltsoff, a Russian Senator, formerly a friend of Czartoryski, afterwards the most virulent and most dangerous enemy of the Poles and Poland. Alexander signed the final text of the Constitution on November 27, 1815.

The constitutional charter for the kingdom of Poland comprised 7 titles and 165 articles. In contradiction to the old Constitution of the grand duchy of Warsaw, the Roman Catholic religion was not recognised as the national religion, but placed on an equal footing with all other religions, save only that it enjoyed the special protection of the Government. The Crown of the kingdom was to be for ever hereditary in the Russian Imperial Family ; the person of the monarch was declared sacred and inviolable, and the government was vested in him ; to him belonged the right of confirming or rejecting the enactments of the Diet, as well as the right of convoking, dissolving, and adjourning it. A Viceroy, acting together with a Council of State, was to represent the sovereign in the Government. A Diet of two Chambers, to be convoked

every two years for a session of thirty days, was the legislative authority. The members of the Senate, to the number of not more than half of the members of the Lower Chamber, were to be appointed for life by the Crown. The Chamber of Deputies, composed of 77 members of the nobility and 51 deputies, was to be chosen for a term of six years by direct election under a restricted franchise. All noble landowners, registered as such in any provincial district, had a vote for the first-mentioned class of representatives; the other deputies were to be elected by the suffrages of (1) all owners of land paying taxes, (2) master workmen, manufacturers, and merchants, holding property of a certain rateable value, (3) parish priests and vicars, teachers, artists, and other members of the professional classes. The sittings of the Diet in both Chambers were to be public, the voting was to be open, and a simple majority was to be decisive; the actions of the Government were to be subject to the supervision of three Revising Committees of the Diet, formed for civil and criminal law, for administrative and constitutional law, and for finance.

The executive authority was vested in the Administrative Council, composed of the five Ministers of Finance, War, Education and Public Worship, Justice, Home Affairs and Police, and presided over, like the Council of State, by the Viceroy. The direction of foreign policy was to devolve upon the Russian Minister of Foreign Affairs in St Petersburg. However, a permanent diplomatic department, carrying on its own correspondence with the Russian embassies abroad, was attached to Grand Duke Constantine at Warsaw. A Secretary of State for the kingdom, attached to the sovereign in St Petersburg, was to act as intermediary between the Government of the kingdom and the Crown. The arms of the kingdom (in place of the plain white eagle adopted in the time of the duchy of Warsaw) were to be a white eagle on the breast of the Russian two-headed black eagle. The Polish army, established on a peace footing of about 30,000 men, was to retain its distinctive insignia and its national uniform. Only citizens of the kingdom were to be admitted to civil and military posts; the Polish language was to be exclusively employed in the administration, the law-courts, and the army. Personal liberty, freedom of religious belief, and freedom of the Press were guaranteed. Jews were, however, barred from the exercise of all civil functions, and were not allowed either to hold public posts or to take part in elections.

The Polish Constitution of 1815 thus became, in some respects, the most progressive and Liberal constitution in Europe. The electoral system, based on a uniform principle, with electoral districts of equal extent, and with a restricted register of voters, was far superior to the English electoral system before the Reform Bill. It was also more Liberal than that of the French *Charte* of 1814, which had a far higher voting qualification, both as regards property and age. The number of

voters in France, after the Restoration, was somewhat less than that in Poland about 1820; while the Polish population, excluding the Jews, was little more than one-tenth of the French. More important still, the Constitution of 1815 tended to perpetuate the Polish nationality, making, as it did, the Polish language the sole means of public communication, and confining to Polish citizens the exercise of public rights. But, in the final text of the Constitution, a series of vague and ambiguous phrases were purposely introduced, the sources of subsequent infraction of the rights conferred. Thus, instead of the old Polish formula "*neminem captivabimus nisi jure victum,*" was inserted "*neminem captivari permittemus.*" This left the power of illegal imprisonment and long detention in prison without trial as a prerogative of the sovereign and his Viceroy. Again, the "first budget" was left at the disposition of the sovereign, without a clear indication whether it was meant to be the budget for the first year only, or also for the following years; and thus, during the whole fifteen years' existence of the kingdom, not a single budget was submitted to the Diet for ratification. The Diets were to meet every two years; but the King had the right of adjourning them, and consequently, in place of seven Diets during the whole period of fifteen years, only four were held.

Moreover, the choice of persons to fill several most important posts was unfortunate. The post of Commander-in-Chief was given to the Grand Duke Constantine. Though a tyrant by nature and of violent character, his marriage with Princess Lovicz and his long residence in Poland somewhat softened him, and even made him, to some extent, conscious of his obligations towards the kingdom; yet withal, during the whole time of his rule, his influence tended to embitter relations. The Viceroy was General Zayonch, an old legionist and soldier of Napoleon, a man of great personal courage, but without character, and thoroughly servile to the Grand Duke. Czartoryski, whom public opinion had destined for the viceroyship, had incurred the private displeasure of Alexander, and was excluded from the Government proper. Large and undefined powers, including a seat in the Administrative Council, were bestowed upon Nicholas Novosiltsoff, the "evil spirit" of the kingdom of Poland. Novosiltsoff interfered in all affairs, and sent to St Petersburg, first to Alexander and afterwards to Nicholas, secret weekly reports, which were coloured by profound animosity not only towards Poland, but, speaking generally, towards every sentiment of nationality, progress, and freedom. The worst misfortunes which fell upon the country at this period, and on its best men, were all due to the intervention, and many of them to the initiative, of Novosiltsoff, whose name, branded by the national poet Mickievicz (one of his numerous victims), is fixed in the memory of the Polish people as the embodiment of the most insidious Russian bureaucratic oppression.

The kingdom of Poland was ultimately established within the

boundaries which it has retained to the present day. These included an area of about 127,000 square kilometres, barely one-sixth of the former Polish Republic. The population, which had greatly diminished in consequence of the recent wars, amounted, in 1815, to only 3,200,000, but afterwards rapidly increased, so that, in 1830, it amounted to 4,200,000. The kingdom was divided into eight provinces, viz. Masovia, Kalisz, Plock, Podlasia, Augustov, Lublin, Sandomir, and Cracow (the last name was retained to convey hopes of the recovery of that city), and into a like number of Roman Catholic dioceses, with an archbishopric at Warsaw, and one Greek-United diocese—that of Chelm. The Archbishop of Warsaw, by virtue of the Concordat of Alexander with Pius VII, signed in Rome on January 28, 1818, and the Papal Bulls of March and June, 1818, received the title of Primate of the kingdom of Poland. After the death of Archbishop Voronicz in 1829, the Russian Government, for several decades, left the archbishopric vacant, and, even down to the present day, has refused the title of Primate to the Archbishops.

Great activity was displayed in the sphere of public education. In 1816, a University was founded in Warsaw; it was gradually enlarged until it possessed faculties of theology, law, medicine, philosophy, science, and art. The students attending it soon reached the number of 800. In place of the Zaluski Library, removed to St Petersburg, a new and important library, with a large collection of engravings, was quickly formed; and special equipment, such as laboratories, was added. The following higher schools were established: schools for applied military science and forestry and a polytechnic in Warsaw, a school of mining in Kielce, a school of cadets in Kalisz, an institute for training elementary teachers in Lovicz, an ecclesiastical seminary for Evangelicals, and a Rabbi's school for Jews. Secondary education was further provided for in ten provincial and sixteen departmental schools, while the number of elementary town and country schools was increased to nearly 900.

Much was done, too, by the Home Department of the Government under the capable and resolute Minister Mostovski. An effort was made to promote various industries; and support was given, in particular, to the weaving industry, which henceforth became one of the principal factors in the prosperity of the kingdom. The direction of the mines was under the care of the famous patriot and writer Staszic, and steps were taken to develop the Olkusz mines. At a cost of several millions of florins<sup>1</sup> the city of Warsaw was embellished and enlarged; the old ramparts of Praga were removed; and a row of large public buildings was erected, which are occupied to this day as Government offices. Much was done for the making and repairing of the roads; and the improvement of the navigation of the rivers Vistula, Pilica, Nida, and Przemsza was taken in hand. The postal administration, which

<sup>1</sup> The Polish florin or *gulden* was worth at this time about 1s. 2d.

had hitherto been working at a loss, was put in proper order, and afterwards produced a considerable revenue. A subsidy was granted to the National Theatre; and an academy of music and elocution was founded. With the object of bringing the different classes of society more closely together, a decree was issued in 1817, facilitating the obtaining of patents of nobility. From this time forward, grants of nobility were constantly being announced in the *Gazette*, with the ultimate effect of eradicating the feeling that the nobility formed an exclusive class.

A danger to the kingdom, in this first period of its existence, was the deplorable state of its finances, resulting principally from the expenditure on the army. This expenditure, during the first two years (1815-7), was met by the Russian Treasury; but thereafter it fell on the finances of the kingdom. The cost of the army reached about 30 millions of florins annually, that is to say, about half of the entire budget; and in 1819 there was a deficit in the budget amounting to 19 millions. There was thus a danger that, under the pretext of the inability of the country to bear its expensive legislative institutions, Novosiltsoff would tempt Alexander to abolish the autonomous Constitution of the kingdom, so as to embrace Poland within the scheme, brought forward about this time, for granting a constitution to the whole Empire.

In the spring of 1818, Alexander entered Warsaw to open the first Diet of the kingdom. The ceremony took place on March 27 with great pomp. Alexander, having ascended the throne, read an eloquent speech in French, full of promises. "Your hopes and my wishes," he said, "are being realised. You have given me the opportunity of disclosing to my own country that which I have long been preparing for it, and which it will obtain, so soon as this important work can reach maturity. You have proved yourselves equal to your task. The results of your labours will teach me whether, true to my undertakings, I shall be able further to extend what I have already done for you." These solemn words made a powerful impression on those present, and were echoed throughout the kingdom, over the whole of Russia, and through Europe. They were taken to indicate the assurance of a constitution for Russia and of the annexation of Lithuania to the kingdom. We may regard this speech from the throne of 1818 as the culminating point of Alexander's Liberalism; henceforth reactionary tendencies were to prevail.

The deliberations of the Diet, animated by such a promising introduction, were at once important and favourable to the country's interest. A law was passed for making more summary the procedure in fixing the boundaries of private lands—a measure which was alike indispensable for keeping intact the national lands, and for enabling hypothecations to be satisfactorily made. A new and important law of mortgage was passed, which is in force to this day, and is a considerable improvement, both on the rules of the *Code Napoléon* and on the mortgage

system of Prussia. Further, a concise criminal code was drawn up—not free, however, from defects—modelled on the principles of French and Austrian law. The members of the Diet showed an admirable temper; although abundant cause for recriminations was given, not only by Novosiltsoff, in his role of informer and supervisor, but still more by the Grand Duke Constantine himself, who had, in 1816, by his unconstitutional conduct, obliged the Minister of War, Vielhorski, to resign, and, by his terrible military rigour, had caused a series of suicides among Polish officers. In a word, the Diet endeavoured to show not merely legislative zeal, but also its confidence in the Government, and to give proofs that it had fittingly appreciated the precious assurances contained in the speech from the throne.

Alexander closed the Diet on April 27, expressing his good-will in a second address, thanking the Diet for its labours and its conduct, promising his speedy return to Warsaw, and concluding with these auspicious words: “I abide by the execution of my intentions; what they are, you already know.” One positive step in the direction of fulfilling these intentions, so far as they concerned Lithuania, was made by the ukases of 1817 and 1819, extending the military authority of Constantine, as Commander-in-Chief of the Polish army, to five Lithuanian provinces. But, at the same time, disquieting signs of reaction were beginning to appear.

By a decree of the Viceroy of May, 1819, the censorship was introduced for newspapers and periodicals, and, by a decree of July of the same year, it was extended to all books published in the kingdom. This was a flagrant violation of the Constitution. In December of the same year not only was this violation sanctioned to the fullest extent, but restrictions upon personal liberty were also authorised, so far as the “urgency of the moment” might require. Henceforth a road was opened to administrative repression, according as the autocratic character of Constantine and the denunciations of Novosiltsoff might dictate, and regardless of the constitutional guarantees.

A tone of depression, though still not devoid of hope, pervaded the second Diet, which met in the autumn of 1820. Alexander was in a different mood, being affected by disquieting manifestations in central and western Europe, as well as in Russia. In his speech from the throne, at the opening of the Diet (September 13), he spoke warningly of the “evil spirit which was moving over Europe.” Still, he did not as yet withdraw his promises. “A few steps further,” he said, “and you will be at the goal of my hopes and yours.” He even, at this time, was busy elaborating in Warsaw secret projects, concerning both the Lithuanian union and the Russian Constitution, though, indeed, without much belief in their fulfilment. The proceedings of the Diet meanwhile were far from favourable to the Imperial wishes. Two important bills of the Government were rejected—a code of criminal procedure and a

statute for constituting the Senate. A very large number of petitions were presented, stating various grounds of complaint (*gravamina*) arising from the unconstitutional action of the Government. The leader of the Opposition, Vincent Niemojevski, attacked the actions of the Government in a most acrimonious manner: "*Stat magni nominis umbra,*" he said, not without reason, of the Constitution. Still, in the main, the Diet kept closely to the points at issue, and observed moderation in criticising the Government, altogether avoiding reference to the person of the sovereign. Ignoring this praiseworthy moderation, Alexander, in closing the deliberations (October 13), sternly rebuked the deputies, and found a convenient pretext for hinting the withdrawal of his previous promises. "You have delayed in its progress," he said, "the work of restoring your country. That heavy responsibility will rest upon you."

During the next five years the Polish Diet was not once convoked. The censorship, newly established under the direction of Novosiltsoff, began more and more to fetter the Press; and at the same time, owing to his influence, public education fell completely under the yoke of political reaction. This task was facilitated by the liberal-minded and patriotic Minister of Education and Public Worship, Stanislaus Potocki, who, by his harsh action, estranged the Catholic clergy. He closed 45 monasteries, 3 abbeys, and 11 seminaries, leaving still about 200 monasteries and 2000 monks. The Bishops, with Voroniecz at their head, thereupon submitted to Alexander a petition against Potocki, who was unpopular with them for various reasons, amongst others, as being the Grand Master of the Grand Orient Lodge of Free Masons at Warsaw. At this very time, Rome was taking steps against the secret societies, and especially against the *Carbonari*, who were excommunicated by a Papal Bull (September, 1821). In compliance with the Bishops' desire, Alexander confirmed a new statute for the Commission of Public Worship and Education (August 14, 1821). Potocki was dismissed, and his place was taken by Stanislaus Grabowski, who soon became a mere tool of Novosiltsoff, and governed the Ministry of Education in an obscurantist spirit. It is noteworthy that this movement on the part of the Roman Church at Warsaw was nearly contemporaneous with the attack on the Tsar made in St Petersburg by reactionary members of the Russian Church, led by Seraphim and Photius in the name of orthodoxy. Thus the Polish clergy, being in complete ignorance of this latter movement, played into the hands of their most dangerous enemies.

The exposure and repression of the local secret societies next occupied the attention of the Government. The beginning of these societies in Poland had even preceded its establishment as a kingdom, for they were in existence in 1814. They had their origin in part from the old Polish freemasonry, which had originally been dependent on the Grand

Lodge at Berlin, but had been reorganised during the existence of the grand duchy of Warsaw, a Polish Grand Lodge being formed in connexion with the Grand Lodge in Paris. In 1814 this movement of freemasonry was extended, by the efforts of Ludwig Plater, to the western provinces of Russia; and relations with the Grand Lodge in St Petersburg were established. When, in the autumn of 1814, there were fears of a general war breaking out on the Polish question between Russia, on the one hand, and Austria, England, and France, on the other, the idea of utilising, in case of necessity, the energies of the Polish people on behalf of Russia seems to have led both Alexander and Constantine (who was himself a member of a Masonic Lodge) to favour the development of the secret patriotic organisations; and the Tsar cherished hopes of creating a new Poland by their means. Under these circumstances was organised, in 1814, the "Society of True Poles." Afterwards from the Polish Freemasons originated the secret society of National Freemasonry. The principal founder and Grand Master was Valezy Lukasinski, a major of the 4th regiment of the line. The society adhered closely to the monarchical principle, and a bust of Alexander was placed in all its lodges, and when, subsequently, it was extended by Szczaniecki, adjutant of the famous General Dombrovski, to the grand duchy of Posen, in the Posen Lodges the bust of Frederick William III was taken down, and that of Alexander substituted. In 1819, Lukasinski, a man of great caution and self-sacrificing patriotism, drew up the statutes of this society; and at the beginning of the following year it was again transformed from freemasonry into an organisation similar to the *Carboneria*. At the same time, Lukasinski broke off direct connexion with Posen, in consequence, it must be supposed, of a hint received concerning the changed intentions of Alexander. But the movement, once started, could not be stopped; in April, 1821, General Uminski, one of the Posen Freemasons, arrived at Warsaw; and, under his influence and the pressure of opinion in the local Lodges, a new and well-organised secret society was founded at Bielany, near Warsaw (May 1, 1821). This society was entirely independent of the others, having as its aim to obtain, by the efforts of the people themselves, the independence of Poland; it took the title of the "Patriotic Society." The chief authority of the association was vested in a central committee under Lukasinski. The confederates divided themselves into seven provinces, comprising the kingdom of Poland, Lithuania, Volhynia, Posen, Galicia, and Cracow; and the Polish army formed the seventh province.

The number of members in 1822 was estimated at about 5000; but this estimate was certainly much exaggerated. It was not long, however, before the Government got an inkling of the doings of the society (April, 1822) through warnings from the Berlin police, as well as through the treachery of one of the members, Captain Karski. He had been sent to Paris in order to arrive at an understanding

with the French military societies (doubtless, also with La Fayette) and communicated everything he knew to Pozzo di Borgo, the Russian ambassador at Paris, and an implacable enemy of the Poles. Lukasinski and his companions were arrested, and, after more than two years' imprisonment, examined by a special and wholly unconstitutional Commission of Investigation, appointed by a decree of the Viceroy of July, 1822, and were afterwards handed over to a court-martial in January, 1824. They were found guilty and finally sentenced in August to hard labour in a fortress. Alexander, in confirming the sentence, reduced the penalty, as regards Lukasinski, to seven years; at the same time he granted an amnesty covering all acts prior to January 19, 1824, *i.e.* the date when Lukasinski was tried by court-martial. In this way any incriminating revelations as to the history of the societies were avoided. The noble-minded Lukasinski, notwithstanding the shortening of his sentence, upon the outbreak of the Revolution, was immured in the underground cells of the Schlüsselburg fortress, where he remained during nearly forty years. He died there in 1868, carrying the secret of the conspiracy with him to the grave.

Owing to the reticence of Lukasinski the Patriotic Society was able to carry on its work secretly under its new head, Krzyzanowski, Lieutenant-General of the Polish Guards. Branches of the society were formed extending in different directions, in Vilna, in Courland, and in the south-western provinces, especially in Volhynia. From Volhynia the news of its existence reached the Russian Southern Society, from which, in 1823, Muravieff-Apostol and Bestuzheff-Riumin made proposals for a mutual understanding. Conferences took place in 1824 and 1825 between Krzyzanowski, Muravieff, and Bestuzheff. Krzyzanowski conducted himself with great prudence. Upon the Russians demanding from him that there should be a common conspiracy, and asking for particulars of the Polish societies, he replied that he had no authorisation from them, and added that he was not curious to learn the details of the Russian societies. They asked for the views of the Poles respecting the form of government and urged the necessity of adopting the republican form. He answered that, according to his own conviction, Polish interests required a monarchical government. They intimated to him the intention of the Russian confederates to extirpate, in case of need, the ruling House, and demanded that the Poles, on their part, should get rid of Constantine. To this he answered that "never had Poles stained their hands with the blood of their monarchs." Finally, he refused to sign any written agreement.

While at this period, from all sides heavy clouds were collecting over the kingdom, a beneficial change was effected in its internal administration. In 1821, the energetic Prince Ksaverry Lubecki was placed at the head of the Ministry of Finance. Lubecki increased the revenues by a series of well-considered enactments, promptly carried out.

He collected considerable arrears (over 72 millions) and managed to make the budget show a satisfactory balance. In 1819 the general expenditure had amounted to over 74 millions, of which more than 30 millions were for the army. He got rid of a deficit of 20 millions and, after his ten years' administration, left the finances of the kingdom in a really flourishing state. To obtain such results Lubecki made use of harsh and even somewhat unscrupulous methods; hence he was not popular and was attacked in the Diet by the Opposition; but on the whole he rendered undoubted services to the country. Sustained by the positive successes of his financial administration, he alone could offer, in the defence of the kingdom, a stubborn resistance to Novosiltsoff, not only in the Administrative Council, but even before the sovereign himself; and this resistance he continued to the end with great skill, vigour, and success.

In the spring of 1825 Alexander came for the last time to Warsaw, to attend the third Diet. At the very time when the summonses announcing the convocation of the Diet were being issued, the Additional Act of February 13, 1825, suppressed the publicity of deliberations in the Diet, except during the formal Sessions at the opening and the closing of the Assembly. This was equivalent, in some measure, to a suppression of the Constitutional Charter itself. Besides this, a series of repressive measures were taken, with a view to preventing a repetition of the opposition to the Government manifested at the last Diet. Thus Niemojevski was forbidden to come to Warsaw; and the election in the province of Kalisz, for which he had been reelected deputy, was cancelled. That part of the royal palace which contained the hall of the Diet was surrounded by troops, and the place swarmed with Russian officials and spies. Alexander opened the Diet (on May 13) with a frigid speech, in which he only incidentally mentioned the Additional Act, and avoided all subjects of vital importance; he laid stress on the marked improvement in the material welfare of the country, and on the progress effected in its economic and, especially, its financial affairs; he dwelt also on the duty of placing entire confidence in the Government, and recommended the unreserved acceptance of its projects. The Diet, in effect, followed these admonitions; and laying aside all its just grievances waived its protest against the Additional Act, and abandoned the special address to the Throne asking for its annulment. It approved all the Government projects without any exception. Thus it passed, by a considerable majority in both Chambers, the first part of the Civil Code. It also passed a law concerning land-tenure, designed to regulate the relations of landlords and tenants, and to increase the number of the latter, as well as some supplementary enactments to the Criminal Code, and, finally, regulations for a Land Bank. This Bank was established on the initiative of Lubecki with a government subvention of 50 millions of florins, and was a valuable instrument for the promotion of agriculture,

then the chief source of the well-being of the country. The Land Bank has continued to flourish up to the present day, as the sole important legislative remnant from the times of the kingdom of Poland. Speaking generally, the Diet of 1825, mindful of the "heavy responsibility" laid upon it by the words of Alexander in his closing speech of 1820, made it a point of honour not to furnish the monarch with a pretext for withdrawing his promises. Alexander could not but recognise this in his closing address (June 13). "You have carried out," he said, "the expectations of your country and have justified my confidence. It will be my earnest desire to convince you what an influence your action will have on your future."

This assurance was destined never to be fulfilled. This speech was the last which Alexander ever addressed to a Diet of the kingdom of Poland, and the last expression of his vacillating advances to Liberalism and to the Polish people. His promises compared with his actions justify the caustic lines in which Byron summed up Alexander's character:

"The coxcomb Czar,  
The autocrat of waltzes and of war!  
As eager for a plaudit as a realm,  
And just as fit for flirting as the helm:  
Now half dissolving to a liberal thaw,  
But hardened back whene'er the morning's raw;  
With no objection to true liberty,  
Except that it would make the nations free.  
How nobly gave he back to Poles their Diet,  
Then told pugnacious Poland to be quiet."

On the following day (June 14, 1825) Alexander said good-bye for the last time to Warsaw and the kingdom of Poland. His death followed at Taganrog on December 1.

The accession of Nicholas, with the troubles which ensued and the attempt of the Decembrists, was destined to have a powerful effect on the kingdom of Poland. He declared, indeed, in a separate manifesto to the kingdom (December 25, 1825), that his reign would be a continuation of the rule of Alexander. "The institutions which he gave you will remain unchanged. I promise and swear before God that I will maintain the Act of Constitution and make every effort to ensure its being maintained." But, notwithstanding this, it soon became evident that the change of rule was to bring new dangers. Hostile relations soon arose between Constantine and Nicholas; while, at the same time, Constantine became more conscious of the responsibilities connected with his office after he had renounced the Imperial throne and made his younger brother his master. Nicholas, having definitely determined to abandon Alexander's scheme concerning the annexation of five Lithuanian provinces to the kingdom, at once set about the gradual Russification, not only of the civil administration in these provinces, but, in

particular, of the separate Lithuanian corps. This course gave rise to vehement disputes between the Tsar and the Grand Duke.

Again, though it had been proved that the Decembrists had connexions with the secret societies of the kingdom, Constantine was unwilling to proceed against these societies by methods of secret enquiry, which he thought likely to compromise the Polish army and embitter the relations between Poland and Russia. Nicholas, on the contrary, persisted. A large number of persons, with Krzyzanovski at their head, were arrested; an unconstitutional Commission of Investigation was appointed to collect evidence; and the entire organisation of the Patriotic Society was laid bare. The Commission reported on January 3, 1827; in consequence eight persons were indicted, including Krzyzanovski. Thereafter, by a Royal Decree (April 18, 1827) a Court of the Diet was formed, which commenced its sittings on June 15. Not being able to recognise the legality of the action of the unconstitutional Commission of Investigation, this Court appointed from among its members a new Board of Enquiry composed of five Senators, and meantime suspended proceedings.

Its own judicial sittings began on April 10, 1828, upon the conclusion of this investigation. Unlike the shameful methods of secret enquiry adopted against the Decembrists by the Court at St Petersburg, their sittings were conducted in a legal and straightforward manner, the accused being allowed every facility for their defence. The final judgment was issued on June 10, 1828. Krzyzanovski was sentenced to three years' imprisonment, others to milder penalties; while three persons were acquitted. These lenient sentences were contrary to the intention of Nicholas, who demanded the death penalty. They signified that the community at large was in sympathy with the aims of the secret societies. The President of the Court, Bielinski, submitted to the Tsar (June 30, 1828) a full report, drawn up by Czartoryski, giving the grounds for the sentences, and stating that the accused had rested their case primarily on the guarantees of the Final Act of the Congress of Vienna and, as regards the further extension of the territory of the kingdom, on the repeated promises of Alexander, confirmed by the ordinances introducing Polish institutions into the civil and military administration in a considerable part of Lithuania. Nicholas ordered (August 29, 1828) the Administrative Council and the Council of State to consider the sentences, and declare whether the Court of the Diet had not itself shown "a disposition to connive at criminal intentions." Lubecki now came forward in defence of the accused, the Court, and the country itself. He had recently rendered valuable service by establishing in 1828 the Bank of Poland. Thanks to his influence, the Administrative Council and the Council of State, notwithstanding certain legal reservations, supported in principle the decision of the Court. In the end, Nicholas, while censuring the Court, confirmed the sentences, which

were duly carried out (March 26, 1829). The whole incident was a prelude to the Revolution ; a deep antagonism between the nation and the Emperor had been disclosed.

The unfortunate course of the Turkish war had been a main factor in moving Nicholas to give way. The autumn campaign had been disastrous ; and Austrian-English intervention against Russia was feared. The Tsar wished to employ the Polish army, but Constantine successfully opposed this course. In this predicament, Nicholas sought by various means to remove the bad impression he had made, and to win the favour of the Poles. After the taking of Varna, he sent 12 captured Turkish guns to the arsenal at Warsaw as a present to the Polish army, recalling the fact that at Varna "400 years ago, King Ladislaus, one of his predecessors, perished in a glorious struggle." He ordered a chapel to be erected in Warsaw, at his own expense, to enshrine the heart of John Sobieski, the conqueror of the Turks.

After the conclusion of peace at Adrianople, he sent Turkish banners and standards to be hung up in the Cathedral of St John at Warsaw. Finally, having decided to fulfil the terms of the Constitution, he himself came to Warsaw (May 17, 1829) to celebrate his coronation. He took with him his son, the heir to the throne (afterwards Alexander II), who wore a Polish uniform, and spoke the Polish language well. The coronation took place on May 24. Nicholas put the crown on his own head, and took the sceptre and diadem from the hands of the Primate, Voronicz. He then knelt down and read in the French language the oath of the Constitution. He remained in Warsaw over a month, and showed great desire to conciliate the Polish officials, especially the military officers, to whom he presented his "son and colleague," assuring them that he was a good Pole. He went about the town without any escort, and, upon his departure, promised shortly to convoke the Diet.

On May 28, 1830, Nicholas opened the sittings of the fourth Diet with a lengthy and cordial speech from the throne ; he referred to his fulfilment of Article 45 of the Constitution by the recent coronation ; and he excused the tardy convoking of the Diet by reference to his difficulties at home and abroad. He mentioned the Turkish war, laying stress on the value of the Polish army, which he called "the vigilant vanguard confronting the enemies of the empire" (a hint to Austria); but he did not mention the Court of the Diet. By an eloquent silence he gave his hearers to understand that the question of extending the territory of the kingdom must be regarded as buried beyond recall. Money was voted for a monument to Alexander I, as the restorer of the kingdom ; but in the various commissions of the Diet the proceedings of the Government, not only in their administrative, but also in their constitutional, bearing, were subjected to severe criticism. Among the numerous petitions were requests for the annulment of the Additional Act, for the reprieve of Lukasinski, and others of a like nature. The short farewell address of

Nicholas, at the closing of the Diet (June 28), gave guarded expression to the discontent of the sovereign, who, while tendering his thanks to the Senate, passed over in silence the work of the Chamber of Deputies. On the following day the constitutional King left Warsaw, to return, after trampling under foot the Constitution of Poland, as autocrat of Russia.

The western provinces of the empire, annexed to Russia in consequence of the three Partitions 1772-95, together with the district of Bialystok united to Russia in 1807 (the territory known as the north-west and south-west region), comprised an area of over half a million square kilometres, with a population, at this time, of about 8 millions. This region, from 1815 to 1825, was, as regards administration, divided into two parts. The five contiguous provinces of Lithuania—Vilna, Grodno, Minsk, Volhynia, Podolia—and the district of Bialystok, were destined by Alexander to a closer unity with the kingdom of Poland; and in them the Polish element, in the civil, judicial, and military administration, was maintained, and, at first, even strengthened. The remaining three provinces of Vitebsk, Mohileff, and Kieff were destined to a more and more rapid incorporation into the empire; and in them that element was quickly removed, and its place taken by Russian elements. In these provinces not only the Military Governors, but also the Civil Governors, the Chiefs of Police, the Prefects in the towns, and speaking generally the subordinate officials, were all Russian.

The prospects of the first six Lithuanian administrative units becoming Polonised were, for a time, increased by the ukases of 1817 and 1819, which extended over them the authority of the Commander-in-Chief of the Polish army, not only in his military capacity but, to some extent, in civil matters. The officials received a uniform with a crimson collar similar to the Polish one. It was also intended to make the uniform of the officers and generals of the special Lithuanian corps similar to the Polish military dress. This corps was, prior to 1827, recruited exclusively from local levies, and thus entirely severed from the Russian troops proper, which were recruited from the various central provinces of the empire. However, so early as 1822, there were indications that Alexander had paused upon this path and was even retracing his steps. The University of Vilna, which, under the curatorship of Czartoryski and the rectorship of the distinguished mathematician, Jan Sniadecki, had not only made great internal progress, but had also taken an active part in promoting secondary and elementary school-teaching, became the object of the accusations of Novosiltsoff, who discovered that the members of this University were in communication with the secret societies of the kingdom. He was sent to Vilna in 1823 to investigate this matter, and stern repressive measures followed; of which, amongst others, Mickievicz was a victim; and Czartoryski was

obliged to resign his curatorship. More decided steps were taken in this direction when Nicholas I came into power. He at once took in hand the task of reducing to a dead level of uniformity all the institutions of the north-west and south-west region, with a view to the complete assimilation and absorption of these provinces. Accordingly the separate treatment of the Lithuanian provinces ceased. From 1827, in spite of the strong opposition of Constantine, Nicholas enforced his decision that, henceforth, the separate Lithuanian corps should draw recruits only from the provinces of Grodno, Minsk, and Volhynia, giving up to the army corps of central Russia the recruits from the provinces of Vilna and Podolia, and receiving in exchange recruits from the true Russian provinces of Pskoff and Tver. Similarly, Russians gradually replaced Poles in the civil administration. Finally, upon the failure of the Polish Revolution, the assimilation of the whole north-west and south-west region was rapidly and systematically carried through.

The Republic of Cracow, created by the Congress of Vienna, consisted of the town of Cracow, and its environs, with an area of about 1000 square kilometres, and a population of 95,000 inhabitants, of whom Cracow itself contained originally 23,000, but, by 1830, 35,000. The Republic received a separate Constitution guaranteed by Russia, Austria and Prussia. The government was vested in a Senate of twelve members, with a President. Alexander was able to secure the selection of a Russian partisan, Vodzicki, as President. The Assembly of Representatives met every year in December for a four weeks' sitting, to deliberate upon legislative questions. The Civil Code of Napoleon and the Austrian Criminal Code remained in force. The peasants sent delegates to the electoral colleges of the communes and were thus indirectly represented in the Assembly. This first guarded experiment of bestowing political rights on the Polish peasants was a fundamental innovation, when contrasted with provisions of the Constitution of the kingdom of Poland at that time, which excluded the peasants, as not being landowners, from all political rights. The provision was not in the original text of the Constitution of Cracow of 1815, and was first inserted in the extended Constitution of 1818. At that time Alexander was also occupied with the idea of endowing the peasants with land. The Jews in Cracow, on the other hand, were excluded from political rights.

Supervision was exercised over the government of the Republic by three permanent resident Commissioners from the three protecting Powers. In effect, the nobility and clergy, and the Cracow Senate, which was under their influence, gravitated towards Russia, and accepted the protection of Alexander and Nicholas. Ultimate union with the kingdom of Poland was their constant aspiration. To counteract this tendency, Austria and Prussia endeavoured to acquire a counterbalancing influence among the Cracow townspeople and in the Chamber of Deputies.

Frequent internal dissensions arose, alike between the aristocracy and the burghers, and between individuals, which had usually to be settled by a decision of the Commissioners. A dispute between the Chamber and the Senate at the first Diet of 1817 over the financial budget induced the three Powers to amend the Constitution, so as to avoid such conflict for the future. In Nicholas' time special attention was directed to Cracow, as affording support to the patriotic Polish movements, and as a hiding-place for the secret societies; thus, here also, political and police repression was introduced. A declaration of the three Residents (February 25, 1828) pronounced all the Acts of the last Chamber of Deputies to be null and void. On March 19, 1828, the Residents set up a Committee, with unlimited powers, composed of the Residents themselves and certain Senators devoted to Russia. Thenceforward the Constitution might be regarded as virtually abrogated. From the first the precarious existence of this ephemeral Republic had depended on the arbitrary action of the three Powers ; and its fortunes were intimately linked with those of the kingdom of Poland.

The Congress of Vienna took from Russia and restored to Austria the province of Tarnopol; but all that Austria had obtained by the Third Partition and part of what she took by the First—the provinces of Cracow, Sandomir, and Lublin, with the Zamosc district—were annexed to the new kingdom of Poland. Galicia, henceforth, comprised about 79,000 square kilometres, with a population which had increased about 1830 from 3,500,000 to 4,200,000. There were among them about 100,000 Protestants, and over 200,000 Jews, the remainder being, in almost equal proportions, Roman Catholics of purely Polish nationality, and Ruthenian Uniates. All this large province, forming at this period one-eighth of the whole of Austria, remained henceforth, in spite of all the constitutional guarantees of the Final Act of the Congress of Vienna, under the narrow and strongly centralised Austrian bureaucratic régime. By an Imperial Patent of Francis I (April 13, 1817) a Galician Diet of Estates was formed, which was intended to satisfy the obligations imposed by the Congress, but, in its essence, was only a return to the old ordinance of Joseph II and to the eighteenth century Galician "Diet of Postulates"; a pretence of representation, devoid of all legislative authority and even of moral and political weight. Four classes composed this Diet: the magnates and knights chosen from among the landed proprietors, possessing registered property of high value; the clergy, consisting of the higher dignitaries of the Catholic Church; and the burgher-class, composed of two deputies of the town of Lemberg, to whom subsequently was added the Rector of Lemberg University. Attached to the Diet was a permanent Department of the Estates, a body whose duties were to prepare preliminary reports and to supervise the incidence of taxation.

The Diet met annually in autumn, for the ostensible purpose of deliberation, but really only to hear the Imperial demands (Postulates), of which it was not allowed to change a single letter, and which were issued in print before being passed by the Diet. The petitions which the Galician Diet ventured to make, in a most humble form, were invariably ignored in Vienna. Indeed, during the whole of this period, the Diet was not even able to set up either a Land Bank, on the model of the similar institutions in Posen and Warsaw, or a medical faculty in the University of Lemberg, or to obtain a reduction in the taxes, or an abatement in the price of salt. Under the Austrian fiscal system the Galician farmer paid taxes 16 times higher than those paid in the kingdom of Poland. Monopolies of salt and tobacco were the principal sources of revenue. In the Lemberg University, reconstituted in 1817, lectures were delivered exclusively in Latin; subsequently, however, in the faculty of philosophy, German was substituted. As regards public education generally, the national Polish element was oppressed in every way, especially among the youth of the gymnasia. The censorship was directed towards the same end. Its regulations were most stringent, and even went so far as to exclude from print the word "Pole." The Germanising movement was extended also to the clergy of Galicia. The ecclesiastical seminaries of Lemberg, Przemysl, and Tarnov, had a staff of German professors; and the most capable Galician students were sent to the Government Institution for the secular clergy in Vienna.

The Government in Vienna had originally intended to bestow on Prince Ferdinand of Württemberg authority in Galicia resembling that of the Viceroys established by Russia and Prussia in the kingdom of Poland and in Posen; but his nomination was soon withdrawn, and the provinces were placed as before under the control of an ordinary Governor. The first Governor of Galicia was Hauer (1815-23), an uncompromising Viennese bureaucrat, who, during his eight years of office, carried out without sympathy or scruple his task of fiscal exaction, police repression, and Germanisation. His successor, Count Taaffe (1823-6), differed from him only in that he first conceived the idea of arousing the Ruthenian population and turning it against the Poles. This policy of exciting racial hatred for the ends of Government was to have, in later times, a far-reaching and disastrous effect upon the country. Prince Lobkowitz (1826-31) took a different line and made some efforts to conciliate the Polish population. These efforts were made especially at the time of the Turkish war of Nicholas (1828-9), when Austria, in concert with England, entertained for a time the thought of armed intervention against Russia, and was thus obliged to take into account the disposition of the Poles. Thus, after the coronation of Nicholas I in Warsaw, in anticipation of a Russian attempt to seize Galicia, the project was mooted in Vienna of incorporating Galicia in the kingdom of Hungary. Subsequently, however, in consequence of the Revolution of November,

1830, and the disappearance of all fears of Russian aggression, this idea was abandoned.

Out of the two departments of the grand duchy of Warsaw received by Prussia at the Congress of Vienna, viz. Posen and Bromberg, the grand duchy of Posen was constituted. This territory had an extent of about 30,000 square kilometres, with a population of about 1,100,000. In the Prussian Patent of Occupation (May 15, 1815) establishing the new grand duchy, the two districts of Chelm and Michalov, together with the town of Thorn, were detached from it and incorporated in the province of West Prussia. The proclamation of Frederick William III (May 15, 1815) assured to the inhabitants of the grand duchy the maintenance of their national customs, equal participation with the other provinces in the constitutional privileges guaranteed to the whole kingdom, the recognition of the Polish language along with the German in all public acts, and the admission of Poles to all public offices and dignities. Specific orders had been given a few days earlier that the chief legal officials and royal councillors were to be chosen from among the Poles. In carrying out this order general principles of legal and administrative organisation were laid down (July 12, 1815), by which the Polish language in Court procedure was to be maintained, with the sole exception that, in districts where German population preponderated, it should be permissible to draw up the Court protocols in German. A Pole, Prince Anton Radzivil, who was married to a Prussian Princess, was appointed Royal Viceroy in the grand duchy. He was to act as intermediary between the Crown and the people: "to communicate to the King the desires and needs of the Poles." The Governor (*Oberpräsident*) was Zerboni di Sposetti, formerly an inhabitant of the grand duchy of Warsaw, now a landed proprietor in Posen. He was a German, broad-minded, progressive, and a sincere well-wisher of the Poles.

After this fair beginning, the condition of affairs began to deteriorate. New regulations for the Posen judicature (February 9, 1817) introduced restrictions in favour of the Germans, which were gradually extended, especially in civil jurisdiction and in the district of Bromberg. Similarly, the Polish language began to be gradually displaced in the Secondary Schools in all classes down to the lowest; and the way was thus prepared for a slow Germanisation of the whole school system. On the other hand, the foundation of the Land Bank (1821) proved of great benefit to the country, as did subsequently (April 8, 1823) the grant to the peasants in Posen of land at a moderate rent, fixed by special Land Commissions. After all the other provincial Diets of the kingdom of Prussia had met, the Diet of Posen was at length convoked (1827). This Diet was composed of four nobles (Prince Thurn and Taxis, Prince Radzivil, Prince Sulkovski, Count Raczynski), twenty-two deputies of

the nobles, sixteen burgher and eight peasant deputies. To the petitions and complaints made by the Diet with regard to certain judicial and educational matters, the King returned a courteous but evasive reply. After the retirement of Zerboni (1825), his immediate successor, Baumann, set himself, as far as possible, to satisfy the public guarantees in favour of the Poles given by the Vienna Congress and the earlier royal enactments ; but the next Governor, Flottwell, from the moment he took up his official duties (1830), consistently aimed at the withdrawal of these guarantees in practice and the inauguration of a new era of Germanisation. That era finally arrived for the grand duchy of Posen upon the failure of the Polish Revolution and the overthrow of the kingdom established by the Congress of Vienna.

Immediately after the exposure of the Patriotic Society and the proceedings at the Court of the Diet, a new secret association sprang up in Warsaw, bearing the specific mark of a military conspiracy. This society, established by young men full of energy and zeal, was adapted for sudden and violent action. It was first started in 1828 in the Ensigns' School, under the leadership of the Instructor of that School, Peter Vysocki ; it was afterwards joined by several civilians and men of letters, and by a certain number of the students of the University of Warsaw. It was originally intended to give the signal for the rising during the Turkish war, which would undoubtedly have afforded it considerable chances of success. On the other hand some hot-blooded spirits wished the rising to be at the time of the Coronation (May, 1829) ; and afterwards there was a plan to provoke it during the meeting of the Diet (May, 1830). There were not, however, sufficient preparations ; there were neither capable leaders nor adequate organisation ; Vysocki, as well as his companions, although men of great courage, lacked, for the most part, intelligence, and were without weight in the country. Nevertheless, the movement was carried forward by its own momentum, for the country was pervaded by a deep feeling both of discontent and apprehension—of discontent, because it was becoming more and more convinced that there was no longer any prospect of the realisation of the promises of Alexander with regard to Lithuania ; of apprehension, because the Constitution was being daily violated, and, since the time of the Additional Act and the Court of the Diet, was threatened in its very existence. Notwithstanding this, the number of the conspirators increased but slowly ; the country could not readily make up its mind to enter upon a desperate struggle, in which it had to hazard its very life. The French Revolution of July, 1830, gave a powerful stimulus to the confederates, and decided the future of Poland. In October, 1830, seventy-seven officers of the garrison of Warsaw belonged to the movement ; and soon afterwards their number reached 200. On the other hand, the French Revolution also gave a stimulus to the

aggressive foreign policy of Nicholas I; and this concurrence of conspiracy with warlike movements at St Petersburg brought the Polish Revolution to a head.

Nicholas, upon hearing the news of the Paris Revolution of July, immediately prepared for war against France, with the expectation of getting Prussia to join him in the campaign. He at first thought of utilising the Polish army and the finances of the kingdom, and informed Constantine accordingly (August 18, 1830). On the same day he sent through the Secretary of State a confidential communication to Lubecki with an injunction to have funds ready both for mobilisation and for the campaign. Constantine answered the Tsar (August 25), declaring himself opposed to war and expressing his fear as to the result. Lubecki, greatly perturbed, yet unable to disregard the categorical instructions he had received, confined himself to a Report (September 3) showing the cash at his disposal and available for initial expenses. At the same time, Diebitsch, who was selected as Commander-in-Chief for the projected campaign, was despatched by Nicholas to Berlin (August 31) to induce Frederick William III to take up arms, and to adopt the plan of campaign elaborated by the Russian Minister of War, Chernysheff. The Prussian King was anxious, if possible, to avoid war, all the more because Austria and England had already recognised Louis-Philippe. He therefore returned an evasive answer, concentrating, at the same time, in case of need some of his troops on the Rhine. In the meantime, the secret warlike instructions of Nicholas to Constantine and Lubecki came to the knowledge of the Polish conspirators in Warsaw. Recognising the necessity of anticipating the war, which would involve the departure of the Polish army to the west, they communicated with La Fayette, from whom they received encouragement. They then addressed themselves to the most popular man in the kingdom, General Chlopicki, who had fought with distinction under Napoleon, but had retired into private life in consequence of a dispute with Constantine. Chlopicki, however, declined to place himself at the head of the intended revolution. Thus disappointed, and uncertain whether Nicholas would persist in his warlike intentions, the conspirators hesitated; and the rising, originally fixed for October 20, was postponed till the spring of the following year.

The outbreak of the revolution in Belgium confirmed the intentions of Nicholas to take the offensive. Diebitsch, in October, was again sent to Berlin on a most urgent mission to the King of Prussia, with instructions that, after coming to an understanding with Prussia, he was to return to Warsaw to take up the position of Commander-in-Chief. Nicholas, in a letter to him of November 13, fixed December 22 as the opening date for the French campaign. The Polish army and the separate Lithuanian corps were to form part of the vanguard. The news of these confidential communications, which were forcing an unwelcome

war upon Prussia, again reached the confederates in Warsaw, and decided them to hurry on the insurrection. Thus the efforts and intentions of Nicholas were suddenly paralysed; France was saved from danger; and Prussia was delivered from an awkward dilemma. After a meeting held in Warsaw in November at the lodgings of the popular professor and historian Lelevel, the outbreak of the insurrection was fixed for November 29, 1830.

On the evening of November 29 two separate attacks were made: one on the Belvedere Palace, where Constantine resided, and the other on the barracks of the Russian cavalry. Both attacks, however, proved unsuccessful. The assault on the Belvedere Palace was made by eighteen of the confederates (six ensigns and twelve University students), who, bursting in, killed the General on duty, and wounded two other persons, but failed to capture Constantine, who managed to hide himself. The assault on the Russian barracks was made by a hundred and sixty ensigns, under the leadership of Vysocki; but, overwhelmed by numbers, they abandoned the attempt, and ran through the city, calling upon the people to rise, but meeting with little response. In their excitement they killed several Polish generals whom they encountered in the street, and who either had a bad reputation in the service, or, although good patriots, had urged the confederates to desist from their schemes. At this stage, Constantine could easily have stifled the movement, for which neither the city nor the army was prepared. Constantine had at his disposal Lithuanian and Russian troops to the number of about 7000 men with 28 guns. His presence of mind deserted him, however; and he failed to take any decided action. His situation was difficult and his demeanour ambiguous. During the night of November 29-30 the Administrative Council met; and Czartoryski took part in the proceedings, having been aware of the preparations of the insurgents. Czartoryski and Lubecki were sent to Constantine, who was camping with the Russian troops outside the town gates. The Grand Duke, in answer to their enquiries, declared that he was maintaining a passive attitude, and that he left the pacification of the capital to the Poles themselves.

The Administrative Council endeavoured at first to keep within constitutional bounds. It issued (November 30) an address, in the name of Nicholas I, calling upon the people to remain quiet, and it entrusted the post of Commander-in-Chief of the Polish army to General Chlopicki. The latter, however, on hearing of the outbreak, remained in concealment, not wishing to take the lead. Meanwhile, the revolutionaries had a free hand, and seized the whole of Warsaw. Like a flash of lightning the movement spread over the whole country. On the following day (December 1) the Council, under the pressure of public opinion, was obliged to exceed the formal limits of legality, by removing from its midst certain unpopular members, and to strengthen its position, by appointing in their stead popular Deputies of the Diet. On December 2,

Czartoryski and Lubecki, with two Deputies of the Diet, Lelevel and Ostrovski, were again sent to Constantine. The two first-named expressed the wish that the Grand Duke should return to Warsaw; but the others, being more extreme in their views, declared themselves in favour of his withdrawal from the kingdom, together with the troops that were with him. The latter course was adopted; Constantine undertook to urge Nicholas to grant an amnesty to the insurgents, and promised not to take any military action without giving forty-eight hours' notice, nor to give orders to the Lithuanian corps to enter the kingdom. He refused, on the other hand, to intercede with the Emperor respecting the annexation of Lithuania. On the following day (December 3) he issued a proclamation, as Commander-in-Chief of the Polish army, authorising the troops to meet their compatriots. On the same day he departed, and, on December 12, crossed the frontier of the kingdom. In permitting this the revolutionaries had committed a grave blunder; they lost, in the person of the Grand Duke, a valuable hostage; they lost, moreover, troops among whom at least a large proportion of the Lithuanian rank and file and non-commissioned officers might easily have been persuaded to join the Polish army. These, having been allowed to depart, were destined to become the vanguard of the Russian army; and Russia retained the Lithuanian corps intact.

After the removal of the capable but unpopular Lubecki (who had at first thought of quelling the rebellion, but afterwards, upon seeing how it spread, took active steps to turn it to account), an Interim Government of the kingdom of Poland was formed (December 4) of seven persons, viz. Czartoryski, Kochanovski, Pac, Niemczevicz, Lelevel, Ostrovski, and Dembovski, while the entire control of the armed forces was bestowed upon Chlopicki.

Chlopicki, who had at last emerged from his concealment, declared himself Dictator (December 5) until the meeting of the Extraordinary Diet. Heads were assigned to the various Government Departments. The Dictator sent Colonel Vylezynski to St Petersburg with a report to Nicholas, while the superseded Government sent Lubecki and the deputy, Jezierski, on a similar mission (December 10). These missions should have enabled the Poles to gain time for arming and taking the offensive; but, on the contrary, as they were based on a delusive hope of an amicable agreement, they had the effect only of checking the Polish preparations, and giving time to the Russians. Chlopicki was an able soldier, but lacked the political talent requisite for a revolutionary leader. He was already sixty years of age, and having served under Napoleon, was accustomed only to regular warfare. He did not believe in the success of the insurrection, and considered it madness on the part of the Poles to hurl themselves against a Power to which even Napoleon himself had yielded. He placed his sole hope in negotiations, and never understood that Poland was at war with Russia.

The Polish forces were in all 29 battalions of infantry, 28,000 strong, 38 squadrons of cavalry, 7000 strong, and 106 guns. Further, with the ten years' period of service in force, the military authorities had at their immediate disposal effective reservists to the number of 20,000 (35,000 nominal). Considering the perfect organisation of the Polish army, it would have been possible, by taking energetic steps, to have raised almost at once an army of 80,000 men, without resorting to a general levy. In the Treasury there was, in ready money, a sum of 67 million florins. The budget for 1831, calculated for an army of 120,000 and amounting to 133 millions, was provided for without great difficulty. The weak point was the lack of field artillery; and there were no ordnance-works in the kingdom.

The Russians, on the other hand, notwithstanding the immense forces they nominally possessed, had but an insignificant fraction available, and that, too, quite unprepared. The Lithuanian corps of General Rosen amounted to 38,000 men; but these were scattered, and could not be assembled on the Brest-Bialystok line before the middle of December. Moreover, a part of their officers, especially of the lower grades, were Poles (about one-third of whom belonged to the patriotic societies) while the common soldiers were Lithuanians and White Russians. Corps I, composed of 33,000 men, was spread out between Mitau and Vilna, and could only be concentrated on Brest towards the middle of January; while the corps of Grenadiers, of 38,000 men, from Pskoff and Novgorod, could only be so concentrated by the beginning of February. Thus up to February, 1831, Nicholas could not command more than 110,000 men for the invasion of Poland. Corps II, composed of 24,000 men from the district of Orel and Chernigoff, as well as the Guards, numbering 24,000, from St Petersburg, could not be brought up before the middle of March. Chrzanovski, Lieutenant-Colonel of the Staff of the Polish army, who, in 1829, had been sent by Constantine to assist Diebitsch in the Turkish campaign, was well acquainted with the facts, and submitted to Chlopicki (December 7) a bold but the only practicable scheme of offensive action. He advised marching at once on Lithuania in full strength, and there breaking up and incorporating the Lithuanian corps, occupying Vilna and annihilating one by one the advancing corps of the Russians. This plan was, however, rejected by Chlopicki, as also was another one more modest in its scope, framed by the able Lieutenant-Colonel Prondzynski—that of offering a resistance, at once defensive and offensive, in accordance with Napoleon's tactics, on the fortified triangle formed by the fortresses of Warsaw (Praga), Modlin, and Sierock. In the end it was decided to act purely on the defensive, i.e. to await the enemy outside Warsaw itself, and then engage in a decisive battle, not so much with the hope of victory as of saving the military honour of the Polish army. This was the only plan to which Chlopicki's military genius could rise.

Meanwhile (December 18) the Extraordinary Diet met under the presidency of Ostrovski. It confirmed (December 20) the dictatorship of Chlopicki; but after the return of the envoys from St Petersburg (January 6) Chlopicki, in view of their report and Nicholas' obdurate attitude, resigned the dictatorship (January 17). The Diet assembled (January 19) and appointed Radzivil Commander-in-Chief; and, after hearing the report of Jezierski, solemnly announced the dethronement of Nicholas and the exclusion of the Romanoffs from the sovereignty of Poland (January 26). The act of dethronement was a double blunder; it tended to hasten the warlike action of Russia, and it rendered diplomatic intervention by the Powers more difficult, while it afforded no solution of the question of armed defence. A new executive body called the National Government was formed. Titles I and II, as well as Article 108 of the Constitution, were altered; and a new form of government, a kind of constitutional monarchy, was adopted, leaving the selection of a King to be made at a later date. During these deliberations, the Russians entered the kingdom, and the first battles were fought, for which indeed no sufficient preparations had yet been made. At the beginning of February there were ready on the Polish side four divisions of infantry, three divisions of cavalry, making altogether 45 battalions and 80 squadrons, or about 48,000 men and 136 guns, besides the division of General Dvernicki between the Vistula and the Pilica, 4000 National Guards in Warsaw, and various small bands of volunteers.

Nicholas I, on the evening of December 7, received in St Petersburg news of the Warsaw rising. He at once despatched in all directions orders to mobilise and signed two decrees (December 13), one appointing Diebitsch Commander-in-Chief of the Army which was to take the field against Poland, and the other declaring the provinces of Vitebsk, Grodno, Minsk, Volhynia, Podolia, and the district of Bialystok to be under martial law. He also issued a proclamation to the Poles (December 17) summoning them to submit, while he ordered the Polish army to leave Warsaw and assemble in Plock. He took advantage of the mission of Vylezynski, Lubecki, and Jezierski, to gain time; and, though taken by surprise, he acted with as much energy and resolution as in Warsaw they showed weakness and vacillation. Making every effort to hasten the military preparations, he managed by the beginning of February to collect on the Polish frontier all the available forces of the three nearest Russian corps.

On February 5 and 6, 1831, Diebitsch entered the kingdom at the head of 114,000 men and with 336 guns, and marched straight on Warsaw. After the first serious engagements, at Stoczek and Dobre (February 14), which proved favourable to the Poles, the final struggle commenced on the fields of Grochov near Warsaw (February 19), the first encounters gradually leading on to a pitched battle (February 25). A furious fight concentrated around the henceforth historic wood

(Olszynka), three times lost and retaken at the point of the bayonet by the Poles, in which the 4th regiment of infantry (Lukasinski's) greatly distinguished itself. Radzivil was nominally in command, but Chlopicki actually directed operations. The Poles finally gave way before the overwhelming numbers opposed to them ; but the success of Diebitsch was only tactical, not strategical, and was, moreover, only gained by a great sacrifice of men (fifteen thousand men on the Russian side and rather less on the Polish side being killed or wounded). This battle shook the belief in the military superiority of Russia, weakened Diebitsch's hopes of an easy victory, and considerably strengthened the feeling of the Polish troops as regards their own fighting capacity.

The result of the battle was not at first understood in Warsaw. There were fears of losing the capital ; the Diet, in alarm, passed the proposal (February 19–26) to form a Permanent Diet, authorised to meet, with a restricted number of members, at some place outside Warsaw, or else abroad. The day after the battle Skrzynecki was appointed Commander-in-Chief. This officer had distinguished himself at Grochov ; he had served formerly in the campaigns of Napoleon (1807, 1812–3) and was of great personal courage, but had no military talent ; he was, in fact, vacillating, lazy, and more inclined for the finesse of diplomacy than for warlike action. Attached to him, however, were two very competent men—viz. the precise and methodical Chrzanowski, as Chief of the Staff, and the clever and ambitious Prondzynski, as Quartermaster-General. Soon the favourable situation created for Poland by the battle of Grochov became apparent. Diebitsch found himself compelled under most unfavourable conditions to enter into winter quarters on the right bank of the Vistula ; and thus the Polish Staff had the opportunity of quietly setting about the reorganisation of the Polish army.

Rapidly and skilfully four divisions of infantry and two corps of cavalry were made available for service, with a division of cavalry reserves, altogether 51,000 men. In addition there were three corps of reserves more than 20,000 strong ; the garrisons and depots in Warsaw, Modlin, and Zamosc, numbering about 20,000 men, the National Guards of Warsaw 6000, and the volunteer bands in Plock and Augustov 3000—a total of about 100,000 men. This remarkable result afforded a clear proof of the mistakes made by Chlopicki, in neglecting the work of organisation, which would have been far easier three months sooner, when a large part of the country was still unoccupied by the enemy. Prondzynski now proposed to throw the whole effective army of 50,000 men on the Lithuanian corps, which was then scattered along the Brest road. This excellent idea after some delay was partially accepted by Skrzynecki (March 31), who took the field with 36,000 men and actually cut to pieces the Russian corps of General Rosen at Dembe Wielkie and Iganie ; but it was then too late. But for his defective arrangements, Skrzynecki

had the whole army of Diebitsch at his mercy; in fact, his successes ended here. This moment, the beginning of April, was the culminating point of the Revolution. It held both a moral and a strategical advantage; it was in a position to strike a decisive blow at the Russian army, and had thereby the prospect of bringing about the intervention of Europe. The blame for letting this moment pass rests chiefly on Skrzyniecki.

Meantime, in the Diet, important deliberations were in progress concerning the status of the peasants. It was a matter of the utmost significance to attract to the national movement the peasants, who had hitherto maintained an indifferent attitude. The proceedings of the former Grand Diet were called to mind, which, notwithstanding the opposition of Catharine II, passed (May, 1791) a resolution to give the peasants legal rights and protection, as well as the action of Kosciuszko, who, in beginning the insurrection of that time, proclaimed the emancipation of the Polish peasants (May, 1794). The land question was also considered; and the Government proposed to allot lands to the peasants on the national domains, and on private estates to make them rent-paying tenants. During the debates some members urged that an immediate general allotment should be made; it was necessary, however, to take into account the scruples of the nobility in the western provinces, who were not so advanced in their views as those in the kingdom of Poland. Ultimately, it was decided (April 18) to postpone a decision in this matter until the recovery of these provinces by the kingdom. These deliberations of the Diet attracted the attention of Nicholas, and caused him to issue an ukase (May 18, 1831), lightening the burdens of the peasants on the lands that had fallen into Government hands in the western provinces. Henceforth it became one of the principal objects of Russian policy to set the Polish peasantry against their nobility, by taking them under Government protection, and thus to break up the unity of the Polish people.

In consequence of the inaction of Skrzyniecki the military position of the Polish army became rapidly worse. A raid of Dvernicki into Volhynia with a detachment of 4000 men proved a failure. He was pursued by a superior force of Russians and obliged (April 27) to escape into Austrian territory, where his troops were disarmed. Prondzynski now submitted another bold plan, viz. to strike, between the rivers Narev and Bug, at the Russian Guards advancing under the Grand Duke Michael, to cut to pieces that corps, which numbered not more than 20,000 infantry and 7500 cavalry, with 80 guns, and then to take up a position on the Bug, thus cutting off Diebitsch's communications with the Empire and with Prussia. This plan was, after long hesitation, carried out by Skrzyniecki; but the delay and neglect of precaution proved fatal. On May 12, 36,000 infantry and 8000 cavalry, with 120 guns, marched out and actually overtook the Russian Guards (May 17);

but the attack was delayed until May 19. Thus the Russians were enabled to retreat beyond the Narev; and, in order to avoid inaction, a considerable body, amounting to 12,000 men of the Polish army, under General Gielgud, was detached and sent to Lithuania. This was a most unfortunate movement, for, in the meantime, Diebitsch, having been apprised of the expedition, hurried up with the main Russian forces of 40,000 men and 200 guns. Skrzynecki, weakened by the absence of the Lithuanian detachment, could now only muster 30,000 men and 90 guns to oppose the Russians. Under such conditions he accepted battle near Ostrolenka (May 26). Had he taken an energetic offensive while Diebitsch was crossing the Narev in pursuit of the retreating Polish troops, the result might have been different. As it was, he suffered a crushing defeat. Ostrolenka was the beginning of the end.

The Lithuanian expedition proved equally unfortunate. Gielgud, along with General Chlapovski, who was supporting him, was obliged, between July 13 and 15, to cross into Prussian territory, where the troops were disarmed. The failure of this expedition also enabled Paskevich, who had, in the meantime, been appointed (June 16) Commander-in-Chief of the Russian army, in the place of Diebitsch, to complete, with the active support of Prussia, his arrangements for a decisive march on Warsaw. Paskevich, having crossed the Vistula (July 16-21), moved forward with great caution, and after two weeks (August 1) reached Lovicz, having with him over 51,000 men and 300 guns. Meanwhile the Diet assembled at Warsaw (May 31) was deliberating aimlessly about the reform of the Government. After the defeat at Ostrolenka an attempt to reorganise the army was made; but it proceeded slowly, Skrzynecki being occupied with political intrigues and fruitless negotiations with Austria and France. At length (August 11) the chief command was taken from Skrzynecki and given to Dembinski, a general who had distinguished himself by his successful leadership of the solitary detachment that had been saved from the Lithuanian expedition. A popular turmoil broke out in Warsaw, leading to street riots (August 15-16), during which several persons suspected of treason were hanged. The radical "clubmen" aimed at the overthrow of the ruling "aristocrats," whom they accused, not without reason, of a lack of energy, but, undeservedly, of betraying the popular cause.

On August 17 the resignations of Czartoryski and three members of the Government were accepted. The ambitious General Krukowiecki, one of the secret instigators of the street riots, was made President. Krukowiecki gave the chief command to the old and incompetent Malachovski. The latter decided to await the enemy in the entrenchments of Warsaw, after having weakened his forces by despatching a body of 20,000 men and 40 guns to carry out a risky movement in the direction of Brest (August 20). Krukowiecki himself entered into

useless and equivocal negotiations with Paskevich. The latter, meanwhile, made his final preparations for storming Warsaw, having at his disposal about 78,000 men. The Poles had only 37,000 men and 130 guns to defend the city. The attack began on the morning of September 6 in the direction of the suburb of Vola, which the Russians took after a stubborn defence. On the following day the attack was renewed and in the evening the Russians had reached the Mokotov and Vola gates. The same night the Diet dismissed Krukowiecki; and, on the morning of September 8, Paskevich entered Warsaw. There were still under arms over 50,000 Poles under the new Commander-in-Chief, General Rybinski; but the Revolution was practically at an end. During the whole of September, indeed, hopeless encounters and vain negotiations with Paskevich were carried on; but the remnants of the Polish army rapidly melted away. At length, with only 20,000 men, Rybinski had to escape to Prussia, and there his forces were disarmed. Soon afterwards the fortress of Modlin (October 8), and finally Zamosc (October 21), surrendered. The whole country was now in the hands of Nicholas, and the constitutional kingdom of Poland had ceased to exist.

The Polish revolutionary party had, from the very first, applied to the European Powers, which had guaranteed the Polish kingdom at the Congress of Vienna, to assist them either by intervention, or, at least, by mediation. Missions were sent to Vienna, to Berlin, to Paris, and to London. Everywhere the Polish agents were received with apparent sympathy; but nowhere did they find genuine support. Prussia, from the very beginning of the struggle, had taken drastic measures to preclude any assistance reaching the Poles from the grand duchy of Posen; further, she departed from neutrality, not only by preventing, in every possible way, the Polish revolutionaries from communicating with western Europe, but also by supplying provisions and ammunition to the Russian troops, and allowing them to traverse Prussian territory. It seems certain, moreover, that Prussia had decided, in the event of the Russians suffering defeat, to enter the kingdom, and to occupy the whole of its north-west territory; for that purpose she had mobilised on the frontier two corps of 51,000 men and 144 guns. Indeed, for a time, when Poland gained an advantage over the Russians in April, 1831, Nicholas was disposed to agree to the cession to Prussia of the north-west part of the kingdom. Austria, meantime, played a double part. Metternich held secret conferences with the Polish envoy; and the Poles were deluded by the prospect of the Archduke Charles becoming a candidate for the Polish throne. Yet at the same time Nicholas was being informed by Austria of the plans and doings of the Poles; and the Governor of Galicia afforded help to the Russian army, although not so openly as Prussia in Posen. The attitude of France was equally equivocal; and La Fayette at the sittings of the Chamber of Deputies

in Paris (January 15 and 28 and March 18, 1831) in vain urged intervention in favour of Poland. The French Government, especially after Casimir Périer had formed his Ministry (March 10), gave evasive answers to the Polish agent, and, at the same time, intercepted his correspondence with the Revolutionary Government and communicated its contents to Nicholas, desiring, in this way, to dispose the Tsar in favour of the Orleans rule. In England, the new Whig Government only offered ineffective sympathy to the Polish requests for intervention. Lord Grey, absorbed in the question of electoral reform, had no desire to mix himself up in the Polish-Russian complications. Lord Palmerston, who had several interviews with the Polish agent, finally dismissed him with a definite refusal.

Only after the failure of the insurrection and in order to satisfy public opinion in France and England did the Governments in Paris and London venture to make representations at St Petersburg. These, however, were of a merely general character, referring to the guarantees for the independence of the kingdom of Poland given by Europe at the Congress of Vienna. Such belated representations, coming, as they did, after the complete triumph of Russia, had, as might have been foreseen, no effect. In answer to a despatch of Lord Palmerston to Lord Heytesbury, English ambassador at St Petersburg (November 23, 1831), with respect to the maintenance of the autonomy of the kingdom, a curt note, sent by the Russian Minister of Foreign Affairs, Count Nesselrode, to the Russian ambassador in London, Prince Lieven (January 3, 1832), denied England's right of intervention in Polish-Russian affairs, and made known the intention of Nicholas to disregard entirely the provisions of the Congress of Vienna concerning Poland. In fact, in September, 1831, an Interim Russian Government was established in Warsaw, under the presidency of Engel; and, in February, 1832, Paskevich was appointed Viceroy with unlimited powers, receiving, at the same time, the rank of Prince of Warsaw. In place of the Constitution, which was abrogated, a new Organic Statute was promulgated (February 14, 1832), containing a certain show of autonomy. This statute was, however, a mere pretence, for its principal clauses concerning autonomy were never carried into effect, and remained a dead letter. On the other hand, the Polish army was incorporated into the Russian army; all electoral institutions were abolished; all higher educational establishments in the country and all the leading government posts were filled by Russians; the Russian language was made compulsory in all higher administrative acts; the most rigorous oppression of the people was begun; and the Russification of the country made rapid strides. In short, during nearly a quarter of a century, under Paskevich as Viceroy, the work of crushing the political and national independence of the kingdom of Poland was uninterruptedly carried on.

## CHAPTER XV.

### THE ORLEANS MONARCHY.

THE signal for the Revolution of 1830, which after fifteen years drove the Bourbons once more into exile, had been given by the leaders of a party which was in no sense a popular one—peers of France appointed by the King, deputies elected by voters who were few in number, representatives of an aristocracy and above all of a landed aristocracy. When the 221, by their address in March, 1830, had caused the Polignac Ministry to dissolve and afterwards to issue the ordinances, it was against this Ministry that they declared war, not against the monarchy. To arbitrary authority they had opposed legality, and the *Charte* to the schemes of the Government.

The tumult in Paris on July 27, provoked by the appeal made by the journalists to the artisans and the youth of the Schools, took by surprise the Conservatives, who were lovers of order no less than of liberty. The rapid progress made by the Revolution on the following days among the populace of Paris was largely due to the hope of a national revenge upon the Powers who had imposed upon France the Bourbons and the Treaties of 1815, and was contrary to the desires of the Parliamentarians who had unwittingly let loose disorder.

On the morning of July 28 the struggle had begun between the royalist troops and the people, who under the leadership of Bonapartist officers had armed themselves and hastily erected barricades. Marmont, to whom had fallen the task of suppressing the insurrection with insufficient troops, directed two columns, one by the quays on the Seine, and another by the boulevards, towards the Hôtel de Ville and the Bastille. In the evening they were forced to retreat before the insurgents, whom they had been unable to dislodge from the districts of Saint-Antoine and Saint-Denis; and during the night they abandoned to them the Hôtel de Ville, in which a provisional democratic Government was installed. On the following day the people, inspired by the students of the Polytechnic who were in possession of the regions and barracks on the left bank

of the Seine, in their turn took the offensive against the Louvre and the Tuilleries, where the Duke of Ragusa with the Swiss Guards had organised their last resistance. At midday on July 29, just as on August 10, 1792, the people in arms gained possession of the royal residence; and the troops of Charles X evacuated Paris.

To understand the sequence of these events we must not look towards Saint-Cloud. The King and his Ministers had provoked the people, without providing themselves with the resources necessary for coercion. It was not until the last moment, despite the evidence, that they brought themselves to believe in the victory of the popular force. Blind mystics that they were, they had set their hopes upon some heaven-sent miracle to sustain their cause.

It was at Paris, first in certain meetings of the deputies and subsequently at the Palais Royal, that the struggle between law and disorder worked itself out. When the popular forces were first set in motion in Paris, on the evening of July 26, hardly any deputies were present in the capital but those of Paris, who were for the most part democrats and Republicans. They met at the house of one of their number, Laborde; among them were Labbey de Pompières, Mauguin, de Schonen, André de Puyraveau, Salverte. If it had depended only on them, declared enemies of the Bourbons as they were, the deputies would soon have made common cause with the people. Other representatives, such as Villemain, Guizot, and Sebastiani, alarmed at the project of a Republic which might restore the Convention, were opposed to any immediate decision. At their instance a meeting was summoned for the following day at the house of Casimir Périer, where, supported by their friends, who had hurried to Paris from the provinces, they found themselves in a majority and were able to give effect to their views. It was in vain that the Republican deputies, relying on the people who rose on July 27 and on July 28 offered a bloody resistance to the royal troops, attempted to arouse their colleagues against the monarchy. On July 28, at four o'clock, Guizot brought forward an address of fidelity to the King and the *Charte*. Casimir Périer urged the meeting to send a deputation to Marmont, offering to the King their submission and that of the insurgents in return for the revocation of the ordinances. And the same evening the Peers, assembled at the Luxembourg, made, on the motion of Semonville and Vitrolles, the same offer to Saint-Cloud. "We are mediators," Sebastiani said on that occasion. In this crisis, the deputies defended law and order against the insurrection no less than liberty against the Ministers.

In the evening of July 28 the deputies recognised that the Revolution was victorious in Paris. Then only did they abandon the monarchy which, after having aroused the people, had been unable to restrain them. They made their outward profession of obedience to the popular will and drew up a proclamation, to be posted on July 30, asserting the sovereignty

of the people. However, they continued to cherish the design of preventing the establishment of a democracy, which they judged to be incompatible with order at home and peace abroad. It was this design, realised some days subsequently, which gave to the Revolution of 1830 its character and its limits.

Perhaps this end would not have been gained so easily if certain deputies, Laffitte and the younger men of the *National*, Thiers and his friends, with peers of France, such as Talleyrand, had not been preparing and arranging in secret for the aid of a new monarchy under Louis-Philippe, another Bourbon, it is true, but a Bourbon of Liberal and national opinions. During the course of July 30 the idea of establishing a lieutenancy-general of the kingdom and entrusting it to the Duke of Orleans was mooted by the intimates of the Palais Royal, without their having as yet any exact knowledge of the intentions of the Prince to whom their appeal was made. The idea pleased all those—and they were the majority of the nation—who were alarmed at the prospect of a Republic, with the possibility of a return to the Terror and to war against Europe. It offered to the deputies the device which they were in search for avoiding democracy after having proclaimed the sovereignty of the people. In the evening of July 30, while the ringleaders of the intrigue were striving at Neuilly to win over Louis-Philippe and his family to their views, the agreement was being prepared at Laffitte's house which was destined on the morrow to put an end to the crisis.

On July 31 the deputies of the *Corps Légitif*, whom Charles X had wished to dismiss, reassembled in their ordinary meeting-place. In order not to give to this assembly the character of a legislative meeting, the public had been excluded from the gallery. It was, however, an act of legislation that was contemplated, and one of the highest importance. Laffitte presided, supported by Guizot, Villemain, Benjamin Constant, and Bérard. The President proposed that an address to the people should be drawn up; in spite of the efforts of the Republicans, Labbey de Pompières and Salverte, the drafting of this address was entrusted to the deputies mentioned above and voted at the same sitting by acclamation. It was true, as Salverte said, that "Paris had conquered the Bourbons and saved the cause of Liberty." But it was the deputies who, after having recognised the services of the people of Paris by empty compliments, decided to call to power the Duke of Orleans "in order to procure, in concert with him, the constitutional developments which the *Charte* required." To defeat the will of the people who had fought the fight, and in order to retain their constituent authority, the legislators, elected on a very restricted franchise, set up a new dynasty, which was in appearance popular in origin. "The King will respect our rights, for it is of us that he will hold his own."

In the course of the same day the Duke of Orleans, with great

courage, having accepted the lieutenant-generalship, went from the Palais Royal to the Hôtel de Ville, accompanied by the deputies, as if he were going to claim from the populace the investiture which should permit him to substitute his own power for that of the victorious democracy. The Republicans held their peace, for they were powerless. La Fayette himself, the Republican hero, publicly embraced the Duke at one of the windows of the Hôtel de Ville, thus associating with himself and his popularity a Bourbon who had fought at Jemmapes, and giving, perhaps unwittingly, to the deputies whom Charles X had repudiated the resources of a new dynasty for the fulfilment of their designs.

On August 1 La Fayette was confirmed by the Duke of Orleans in his command of the *Garde Nationale*. But the greatest share of power, in the ministries and counsels of the Lieutenant-General, belonged to the Liberals, those *doctrinaires* who had simultaneously triumphed over the monarchy and the people—to Casimir Périer, Guizot, Baron Louis, the Duc de Broglie, Pasquier, Molé, and the generals Gérard and Sebastiani. With the support of the Duke of Orleans, to whom they shortly afterwards offered the crown, they arrogated to themselves, like the Senators at the close of the Empire, constituent authority in order to establish the new *régime*. In the words of one of their number, Bérard, who took the initiative on August 6, and advised the Legislative Assembly to assume this authority, they invoked, to justify this usurpation, “the law of invincible and imperative necessity,” and asserted a “commission from their electors,” who were however very different from the people who had made the Revolution.

Strictly speaking, their work was not a constitution properly so called like that of the revolutionary assemblies, but rather a revision of the existing Constitution. Many of them, notably Guizot, who gave voice to their opinions, had entered upon the struggle simply in order to overthrow a Ministry, were satisfied with having made good their resistance to tyranny and revolution, and would have preferred the confirmation of the principles of the Charter in their entirety. But, as they did not dare to uphold the system of the Restoration unchanged, they made themselves the judges of the modifications which circumstances required. Without formulating a declaration of rights, as the men of 1789 had done, and as was vainly demanded on behalf of the victorious nation by the Republicans, Demarçay and Mauguin, they suppressed the monarchical preamble of the Charter granted in 1814, and took away from the defeated monarchy its right to make laws for the nation. In the same way, and for similar reasons, they abolished, in Article 14 of the Charter, the privilege granted to the King of making “ordinances for the safeguarding of the State.” They conferred upon the Chambers the right of initiating legislation. Moreover, in order to put an end to the intrigues of the “priest-party,” to the alliance between the throne and the altar, they declared that the Catholic religion should no longer

be the State religion, but merely the form of worship practised by the majority of the French people. Finally, with the intention of freeing thought as well as conscience, they decided upon the permanent suppression of the Government censorship over newspapers and books.

Thus it was that the Parliamentary representatives of the Restoration, skilful and successful mediators between the people whose help they had accepted in overthrowing a monarchy inimical to their rights, and a new monarchy whose help they had sought in refusing to the people the reward of victory, laid down on August 7, 1830, the laws which were destined for eighteen years to control the monarchy and the nation. They did indeed put forward a programme of legislation touching electoral rights, the liberty of the Press, the juries, and popular education, the organisation of the *Garde Nationale*, and the mode of nomination of peers of France, more democratic than that of the preceding *régime*. But they still reserved to themselves the right of choosing the hour and conditions in which they would carry into effect these promises, for as yet they were no more.

From its beginning, and even in its origin, the authority of the new King of France was established by strange means, and on a precarious footing. He was at one and the same time the choice of a Revolution and the instrument of reaction against that Revolution. He had received, as it were, a popular dictatorship at the hands of La Fayette, and from the *doctrinaires* an authority consonant with their aristocratic designs. The French had chosen him in order to realise by his aid their cherished hope of breaking with the Holy Alliance, the support and accomplice of the Bourbons. And his counsellors and partisans on the other hand expected him to bring about a reconciliation between revolutionary France and Europe, which was uneasy at the revival of a Republican propaganda.

The Prince, who had possibly desired and at any rate accepted this difficult part, was perhaps the only man who was at that time qualified to play it. To fulfil the expectations of him held by the people and by Parliament, he possessed qualities and resources rarely united to one another. Liberal by family tradition, by upbringing, and by temperament, Louis-Philippe came forward as a citizen-King who had fought at Jemmapes on the side of Revolution. His simplicity and geniality gave him the demeanour of a popular magistrate rather than of a King. And yet the experience which he had acquired by the age of 57, more particularly in exile, after witnessing the Terror, the bloody conflicts of parties, European war and its dangers, had made of him a man of order and of government, a lover of peace with his neighbours, resolved to maintain tranquillity at home. By virtue of his skill, his tact, and his determination, with the aid of his sister, Madame Adélaïde, who was thought to have urged him to accept the throne, Louis-Philippe was able to consolidate his precarious rule.

The first difficulty arose from the revolt of the Belgians against the King of Holland, in August and September, 1830. It was not, as the French believed, the events of July alone, which had brought to a head this conflict, prepared as it was by the national resistance of this Catholic people to the domination of the alien and Protestant House of Nassau. But at the time many of the French believed that they were bound to support a revolution which was daughter to their own; and this was sufficient to awaken in Paris Republican passions. Since the Convention, Republicanism and propagandism were two ideas closely associated in the minds of those who desired "movement"—democratic progress together with the glory of a great French mission in Europe—such men as La Fayette, Mauguin, Lamarque. Deceived by the result of the "glorious days of July," in relations with certain Belgians who were disposed to have recourse to France, de Celles, Gendebien, Mérodule, and de Broukère, they seized with ardour the moment of the Belgian declaration of independence, and the hostile coalition of the monarchs of Holland, Prussia, and Russia, and by the riots of October 18 and 19 loudly called upon the King to declare himself for the democracy. They demanded judgment upon those Ministers of Charles X who had signed the ordinances, to prepare the way, as the Convention had done by the execution of Louis XVI, for a declaration of war against the sovereigns and Ministers of the Holy Alliance.

In this crisis, alarming for Louis-Philippe, whose residence barely escaped the intrusion of the mutinous populace, the Conservatives, Broglie and Guizot, who advocated a system of violent repression which would at once have embroiled the King with the democrats, decided to resign. Louis-Philippe, with more tact and more courage, temporised. Supported by Laffitte and Sebastiani, he gave office to the men of "movement," retaining however sufficient authority to control their extravagance by means of a Minister of the Interior devoted to himself, Montalivet (November, 1830). He allowed these Ministers to define the promises which the Revolution had given to the democracy. Montalivet brought forward an electoral code which doubled the number of voters by reducing the property qualification, with some precautions against democracy in the great towns. His colleague, de Mérilhou, laid before the Chamber of Peers a scheme of public education which conformed to the wishes of the nation. But at the same time every indication of violence in the popular demands met with determined opposition from the King. When the rioters wished to force the Chamber of Peers to condemn to death the Ministers of Charles X (December 15–21, 1830), Louis-Philippe opposed a strenuous resistance. By virtue of their independence, the Peers were enabled to restrict the sentence to one of perpetual imprisonment. And, as La Fayette had seemed to employ his influence with the *Garde Nationale* to support the excesses of the Republican mob, the King caused his command to be suppressed by law (December 24).

The great merit of Louis-Philippe at this time was that he fore-stalled by a far-sighted initiative any action of the foreign Powers, avoided the consequent reaction in Paris, and thus checked at their source the popular passions which menaced order and the monarchy. In this task he succeeded, because he was from the outset prepared to regard such action as the essential condition of his authority. At the first news of the events of July the European Governments had taken threatening precautions. Metternich, on August 4, 1830, begged his master to summon a hasty meeting of Ministers at Vienna. "Italy," he said, "was endangered by revolutionary designs." He proposed to the Emperor Francis an agreement with other crowned heads which would have renewed against France the compact of Chaumont: "a difficult task," he said, "but one of supreme necessity." Two days afterwards at Carlsbad the Chancellor of Austria, together with Nesselrode, his colleague of Russia, affixed his signature to a project of alliance, "*le chiffon de Carlsbad*," which Prussia in her turn accepted. This measure of precaution seemed to be justified by the character of the Revolution which had overthrown the Bourbons. There is no doubt but that the combatants of July, the people of Paris and their leaders, the youth of the military Schools who supported their efforts, in raising the tricolour once again looked at least as much "towards the Rhine as towards Saint-Cloud." Having conquered the Bourbons, they could dream of further victories over the sovereigns of the Holy Alliance, which, as Edgar Quinet hoped, "would perchance awaken the echo of the triumphs of the Convention and of the Empire."

However, this impending coalition of continental Governments, as in the time of the first Revolution, was inspired not only by the motive of fear, but also in varying degrees by the calculations of ambition. While the King of Prussia announced to his Ministers his intention of remaining quiescent unless the French advanced to the Rhine, Metternich, for his part, was not displeased by the prospect of a French invasion of Italy which would permit him to subdue the Peninsula and its Princes at his discretion. Above all, the Tsar Nicholas, whose ambitions had been checked and excited by the Peace of Adrianople, and who had hoped to further them by means of an alliance concerted with Charles X, counted upon a quarrel between propagandist France and the rest of Europe in order to have, like his grandmother Catharine, "a free hand in the East."

When Louis-Philippe accepted the crown on July 31 he knew that, to establish his sovereignty in the place of the Republic which was mistress of Paris, he would have to resist alike the French propaganda and the challenges of European sovereigns. One of his first tasks had been the choice of envoys charged with the duty of carrying to foreign Courts promises of a pacific nature. He did not even wait for their departure to convey to the sovereigns his intentions, so early as the

middle of August, either by letters or by conversations with their agents in Paris. He hastened to inform Europe "that he had accepted the noble and difficult task of safeguarding the future of France and the repose of Europe from terrible calamities." If the insurrection at Brussels had not arisen to encourage the party of "movement" in Paris, if the European sovereigns had not wished for something more than assurances of peace before laying aside their hostility, this act of mediation, which was the first effort and almost the foundation of the Orleans monarchy, would have speedily achieved its end.

But to all the advances made by Louis-Philippe the Tsar replied so coldly on September 19, 1830, the new monarchy was recognised by him with so bad a grace and so tardily (January 8, 1831), and, finally, he was so clearly anxious to form at the Hague a coalition of the Great Powers against revolutionary Belgium, that the peace of Europe was still in danger from his ambitious designs. Louis-Philippe turned to England. She had shown herself well-disposed towards him from the beginning by her prompt recognition of his sovereignty (September 1). To arrive at an understanding, the French King, with full confidence in his own judgment, made choice of the man who at the Congress of Vienna had opposed to the ambitious projects of Russia and Prussia the plan of an English alliance—namely Talleyrand. At the embassy in London, where the Prince took up his duties on September 5, he became in truth, by means of a secret correspondence with the King, the Minister of Foreign Affairs, the principal Minister of the monarchy. With the Tory Ministry of Wellington and Aberdeen, kept in power by William IV, he established a friendly understanding which was for three years the solid instrument of the pacific policy of Louis-Philippe. Not that the Conservatives, accused as they often were by the Whigs of sympathising with Charles X, were in principle favourable to a French revolution, whose contagion and possible spread they feared. But they knew that with the new King French policy would continue to be pacific. And peace had been, ever since 1815, the principal desire of England; it was the ruling principle of this Tory Cabinet.

The enterprises of Russian policy in the East, aided as they were by the rising of Greece, whose fate was ultimately and with great difficulty decided by the Conference of London, were the cause of uneasiness in England. If the Tsar Nicholas wished for a disturbance, in order to open up still further the Balkans for his own advance and to partition Turkey, for opposite reasons it became the duty of England to neglect no means of averting or quenching all disputes in Europe. And of these disputes the most dangerous was the Belgian question, for it might precipitate a French invasion of Belgium, which it was an axiom of British policy to prevent.

Thus at this period the Cabinet in London had the same interests, since it had the same causes for fear, as the French Ministry. The

agreement proposed by Talleyrand was not a mere alliance between two Liberal countries. It was a necessary compact, since it was founded upon community of interests. It was easily concluded. Talleyrand left to England the honour of settling the Belgian question in London. He acknowledged with a good grace that England owed her support to the King of Holland, whose Belgian acquisitions she had in 1815 confirmed in exchange for his colonies. He did not attempt a lofty insistence upon the doctrine of non-intervention with which France met the designs of the eastern Powers. But on October 15, 1830, when by his concessions Talleyrand had reached an agreement with Lord Aberdeen, it was settled that there should be no European intervention between the Belgians and their King except for the purpose of peaceful mediation. On October 20 Austria and Prussia approved the plan of the Duke of Wellington, and Russia was forced to lay down her arms. And, in spite of the indignation and abuse of the aggressive Republican party in Paris, when the Conference, already assembled in London to deal with the Greek question, met on November 4, it appointed a council of arbitration "with the aim," as Talleyrand phrased it, "of maintaining peace."

The first decision passed by this council on December 20, 1830, forced upon the House of Nassau the relinquishment of its Belgian possessions, upon the crowned heads of Europe the recognition of a new and independent people, and upon this people themselves the necessity of making no further appeal to France, even for the sake of acquiring new territory, Breda, Maestricht, or Luxemburg. Such had been the result of the Franco-English alliance—a European peace which for the monarchy of July was the condition of tranquillity in the streets of Paris.

This was clearly seen when the news spread through France (December 1-15, 1830) of the Polish rising against the Tsar. "This," wrote a young Republican, Louis Blanc, "was a national festivity. The heroism of the Poles was celebrated in all the theatres. It was like a second Revolution of July." It was once more necessary for the Orleans dynasty to place a check upon La Fayette, who encouraged and preached the Republican propaganda. Discontented with the terms which Europe imposed upon them, and encouraged by the Polish revolt, which occupied in the East the sovereigns of Russia and of Prussia, the Belgians began to excite the Republican party in Paris against the King and Talleyrand. Finally the Italians at Modena and in the Romagna were organising themselves for an insurrection which the princes of the Bonaparte family were preparing with the aid of Mazzini and Menotti; as against Metternich, who was only too glad to be able to lay hands upon Italy, they too were counting upon the sympathies which they found in the democratic party at Paris, and even in the royal circle itself, in the eldest son of Louis-Philippe. The beginning of January, 1831, nearly saw a repetition of the Revolution of July, as

a result of these excitements from outside which stirred the passions of the Parisian populace. The Laffitte-Sebastiani Ministry no longer dared to oppose the propagandist fever which had seized the people. On January 5, 1831, they dreamed of invasion, and Talleyrand himself thought of the partition of Belgium. Riots broke out repeatedly in the capital for the purpose of defending Belgium or of saving Poland. The most formidable was that of February 14, when the populace and the students devastated the church of Saint-Germain l'Auxerrois and the palace of the Archbishop, and invaded the Palais de Justice. The Legitimist party urged them on to disorder in the hope of revenge upon the Orleans dynasty. "Our beloved prince," wrote Madame Adelaïde, "does not know which way to turn."

Louis-Philippe saved himself in this crisis, the most dangerous that he had yet encountered, by the methods which he had previously employed and chiefly by his alliance with England. In spite of his Ministers, he accepted the proposition made by Lord Palmerston at the Conference of London to neutralise Belgium (January 20, 1831) in order to prevent the intervention of the French and to impose conditions upon the Belgians; next he refused, on February 17, the Crown which the Congress of Brussels, to evade these conditions, offered on February 4 to his son, the Duke of Nemours. At the same time he selected and sent to the Tsar an ambassador, the Duc de Mortemart, to define clearly his attitude towards the rebellious Poles. Finally, in February, when the revolution had broken out at Bologna and at Modena, Louis-Philippe took the lead and resolutely insisted upon a French policy of neutrality in Italy; and, by withdrawing from Laffitte the means to promote any other policy, he forced him on March 9, 1831, to resign. The Republicans complained of this diplomatic system, this desertion of oppressed nations, which, according to them, reduced France to the rank of a secondary Power. It was in truth the personal work of the King; a skilful mediator between the French and Europe, he had little by little undermined the Republican designs. With peace assured abroad, the party of "movement" was robbed of its strength.

These months of crisis had been no less beneficial to the Conservatives than to the monarchy. Their return to power, at the beginning of 1831, with the conditions which they aspired to impose upon the French people, would never have been possible as the outcome of a revolution made by the people, "unless there had been from the first men in high place whose reputation was such as to put the malcontents on a wrong scent and to baffle public opinion—men like La Fayette, Dupont de l'Eure, and Laffitte. The leaders of the Republican party were under no misapprehension on that score." Such was the judgment of Louis Blanc. With a happier inspiration than that of the Parliamentary party, who would have compromised everything by premature repression, Louis-Philippe had himself laid the foundations of his monarchy.

When he called to power on March 13, 1831, together with Casimir Périer, the members of the victorious middle-class, he was quit of all obligation towards them, in respect of the somewhat precarious throne which they had obtained for his family. He had taken on himself the responsibility of solving the most difficult problems.

This was the beginning of that rule, dear to the Parliamentary party which had engaged in the struggle against the Ministers of Charles X, a rule of the "just mean" between democracy and Legitimism, in which authority lay with the Chambers elected by the well-to-do classes, and with the Ministers, who were chosen by the King but responsible to the Chambers. When he entered the Ministry, Casimir Périer was President of the Chamber. Assured of a majority as President of the Council, and thus strong enough to resist the King if need arose, he did not delay a month before making a frontal attack upon the Republican party.

The defect of this party at the time was that it relied upon recollections rather than upon principles. Doubtless the influence of the social school of Saint-Simon and his disciples Olinde Rodriguès and Bazard had been exercised since 1820 upon democrats such as Buchez, Carnot, and Pierre Leroux, upon the youth of the secret societies, and the "Lodges," such for example as the "Friends of Truth," ardent centres of the Republican propaganda under the Restoration. But this influence had been in the main confined to the enrolment of students specially chosen and few in number. The majority of the Republican party, men like Auguste and Victorin Fabre, and Armand Marrast, editors of the *Tribune*, Roche, the brothers Cavaignac, Marc Dufraisse, Trélat, and Garnier-Pagès, in order to secure concerted action, appealed to the memories of the Revolution; and, though certain among them, like the brothers Fabre, condemned the Terror as prejudicial to the Republic, the majority wished to take up history where the Convention left it at the time of universal suffrage and the glorious propaganda abroad. The "Society of Friends of the People," founded on July 30, 1830, who were reproached by Corcelles with not having any "guiding principle," had, as Heine said, "the smell of an old number, greasy, and thumbed, of the *Moniteur* of 1793." This was the case too with the "Society of the Rights of Man," for whom Robespierre's Declaration of Rights furnished a programme and almost a creed. Finally, since Buonarotti, a disciple of Babœuf, had returned to France and was preaching with the help of d'Argenson, Charles Teste, and Louis Blanc, a social revolution against the middle classes and the rich, a scheme which was well received in Republican circles, the democracy, through the fault of its leaders, aroused more fears than hopes. Instead of hopes for the future, it seemed to revive the memory of the evil days when France lacerated and exhausted herself in an unequal struggle against united Europe "Without knowing it," wrote Heine, "the Republicans are becoming as retrograde as the most ardent champions of the *ancien régime*."

Thenceforward it was easy for the Liberal-minded Conservatives, to whom Louis-Philippe had entrusted the power, to represent the parliamentary monarchy and middle-class Republic, wisely steered towards order, industry, and peace, as a Republic younger and more fruitful in promises, at any rate for certain classes of the nation—in the phrase of La Fayette, as “the best possible Republic.” In the early days of April, 1831, Casimir Périer declared that he “did not recognise as vested in insurgents the right to force the Government along the path of political innovations.” He gave his subordinates the order to suppress them at all costs, and he “intended to be obeyed.” To begin with, he indicted before the Court of Assizes of the Seine sixteen Republicans, accused of having attempted in the month of December to overthrow the monarchical Government. The jury acquitted them. But the procurators-general, supported by the Minister’s energy, did not relax their efforts. They prosecuted relentlessly the Republican journals and shortly afterwards the democratic societies. Little by little, insurrections, watched and suppressed, ceased; two attempts, made on July 14 and 28, failed. The courage of the active members of the *Montagnard* party was broken by the confident firmness of Périer. The frequency of their futile attacks increased their unpopularity; “fear,” said Carrel, “clung to the word Republic.”

During the same period Casimir Périer was striving with no less success against the partisans of the dynasty exiled by the Revolution. If the Carlists, as they were called, had been merely Conservatives attached to the principles of order and stability represented by the monarchy, they would have found it to their interest to acknowledge the error of Polignac and the extremists, which had cost Charles X his crown, and gone near to enthroning the democratic party. But either through loyalty, like Chateaubriand, or by a passion for revenge, like Genoude, the editor of the *Gazette de France*, their one aim was to prepare for yet another restoration of the *ancien régime*, by all possible means, even by those the most contrary to their doctrines. From August 10, 1830, they set themselves to outstrip the desires of the Republicans, by demanding liberty of the Press, of association, the free election of mayors, and even universal suffrage. The extremists, the very men who had scorned to sit in council with a regicide such as Grégoire, and who pursued Manuel with invectives, now felt no repugnance against making common cause with the admirers and apologists of the Convention. A temporary alliance, we may admit, but dangerous for these representatives of the Divine right who were masquerading as revolutionaries. They forgot that the Vendée had left memories no less horrible than the Convention, when in December they prepared to rouse that district. The Duchess of Berry, in the name of the Duke of Bordeaux, together with her friends the Duc des Cars, de Bourmont, and Saint-Priest, was actually endeavouring first in London, subsequently

in Italy, to organise a conspiracy which in the eyes of the French people was no better than the Republican risings. When on May 3, 1831, Casimir Périer called upon the electors to decide between the new monarchy and the old, he had no difficulty in obtaining from the enlarged electoral body a decisive pronouncement, the first since the days of July, which disarmed once and for all the forces of Legitimism. Some months afterwards he conceded to the nation the suppression of the hereditary peerage, that last stronghold in which the partisans of legitimate monarchy might have rallied to the defence of this cause, which had in fact been ruined by its own defenders (September 20-25, 1831).

In six months Casimir Périer had firmly established his authority over the Chamber, and the power of the Chamber itself over the sovereign and the country. He had translated into fact the programme which had been conceived fifteen years earlier under the Restoration by the *Doctrinaires* and the Liberal Conservatives. To the democracy, which was still in revolt at Lyons, carrying with it the *Garde Nationale*, he opposed the army under the command of the King's son, and the authority of the sovereign in whose name that army served. Against the irreconcilable partisans of the *ancien régime* on the other hand, and the ultramontane spirit, he armed himself with Liberalism. Facing as he did both ways at once, and endowed with a dignified stature and all the physical qualifications for power, he exercised a dictatorship, but a "dictatorship of Liberal tendency." He thus rallied to his side Dupin, that middle-class disciple of Voltaire, who was as great a lover of order as he was an enemy of the Jesuits; Guizot, to whom the spirit of insurrection and republican anarchy seemed the chief obstacle to liberty; Thiers, whose ambition for office, in this alliance with the party of resistance to revolution, might have been hampered by his revolutionary past. Thus was brought about the passing of the laws essential to the July *régime*. Montalivet, on October 24, 1831, tabled a proposal concerning primary education, which was the first draft of the scheme worked out by Guizot in 1833. The Minister of War, by means of conscription, reorganised the national army (March, 1832). The priests, to whom the Pope, by recalling the Nuncio, had given the word to break with the new monarchy, were certainly no longer harassed as in the early days of the Revolution, but they were kept under observation.

In short, obedient to the instructions of Talleyrand and of Louis-Philippe, Casimir Périer had worked simultaneously to restrain the ardours of the propagandist party, and to break the existing alliance between France and the revolutionary parties in Europe. His system was so entirely "that of peace" that he said to a friend in March, 1831, "When this effervescence of war subsides my task will be finished and I shall retire." It was thanks to him, that by the conventions of the 18 and the 24 Articles, Belgium definitely became neutral and independent (June 26—October 15, 1831). "The Revolution of July," he said,

"has not made a new France and a new Europe. It cannot ignore the necessity of adapting itself to one and the other." Hence, despite the sympathy felt by France for an unhappy nation, Poland was abandoned to the Russian armies, whom Austria and Prussia congratulated on their victory (September 7, 1831). If, in like manner, the Government refused its support and the help of the French volunteers to the Italian rebels, it was in order to prevent the sovereigns of the Peninsula from throwing themselves in their alarm into the arms of Austria, and thus enslaving themselves and their people at once. This refusal, however, to afford aid to such revolutions was combined with a very decided determination to resist any enterprise of self-aggrandisement on the part of the sovereigns. When the King of Holland, counting upon the support of Prussia, invaded Belgium, to destroy the new Belgian monarchy, Casimir Périer demanded from England the right to safeguard it by armed intervention (August, 1831). Later, when Pope Gregory XVI summoned the Austrian troops to the Legations in order to avoid necessary reforms, with like promptitude a French regiment was ordered to occupy Ancona (February 22, 1832), and remained there under the terms of a Convention dated April 16.

Abroad, as at home, the work accomplished by the Conservative Ministry under the direction of Casimir Périer was already considerable, when the harsh hand of death struck down the chief worker by cholera (May 16, 1832). Thiers compared his work to that of the Consulate succeeding the Directory. However, it was not finished, and it seemed as if it would be injured by the removal of its author. On the day fixed for the obsequies of General Lamarque, a leading Republican, dead also of cholera, the Republican party stirred up the people of Paris, who had been incited to revolt and to active propagandism by revolutionary refugees from foreign countries (June 5, 1832). At first the insurrectionary party was victorious; they raised barricades in the centre of Paris, and for the moment seemed to be masters of Paris as in the days of July. But the great difference between the *régime* overthrown in 1830 and that which succeeded it was immediately apparent; at the first threat Louis-Philippe hastened from Saint-Cloud to defend his throne and to support the resistance made by General Lobau. A month previously, on April 30, the Duchess of Berry, accompanied by certain faithful and indiscreet royalists, Bourmont, Kergorlay, and Brissac, had landed at Marseilles. Though she failed in her effort to raise the south of France to revolt, she collected near Nantes the chief men of the new Vendée on May 21, and forced the Government to declare a state of siege in four Departments. In the west, as in Paris, the Orleans monarchy, suddenly deprived of its principal Minister, seemed to have no resource left except the fidelity of its generals, Lobau and Solignac. Fortunately for it, Napoleon's heir, the Duke of Reichstadt, died of consumption at Vienna, July 22, 1832. The Bonapartist party, towards

which the French people were inclining, led astray by the Napoleonic legend assiduously propagated by memoirs, in the theatre, and by the popular prints of Raffet and Charlet—this party to which the Republicans themselves, forgetting the dictatorship in their love of glory, were drawing near—had no longer a head.

At this time there came about, between the founders of the July monarchy, a misunderstanding destined long to cloud its fortunes. Louis-Philippe knew in his heart that he had done more by his skill and diplomacy for the triumph of the new *régime* than the Conservatives, who, since March 13, had been claiming for themselves all the honour. It was with reluctance that he had submitted to the growing authority of Casimir Périer; and, King as he was by his own efforts, he was surprised to find a “viceroy” imposed upon him, as if he was himself incapable of ruling. On the other hand, before his death, the leader of the Cabinet of March 13 had several times designated Guizot as his successor. The pretensions of the *Doctrinaires*, to whom the people moreover bore no love, to establish themselves as rulers, to claim authority in the name of the Chamber, broke the alliance which they had formed with the Duke of Orleans after the days of July. For the four months from June to October, 1832, Louis-Philippe made every effort to avoid summoning Guizot and his friends to power. He entrusted the Government to men who had given him less cause for offence—Montalivet, Sebastiani—and himself kept the Presidency of the Council. The deputies of the party of resistance thereupon accused those Ministers of subservience and weakness.

The Legitimist conspiracies, which only ended in November, 1832, with the arrest of the Duchess of Berry, the reorganisation of the Republican party, which was establishing throughout the provinces sections of the *Société des Droits de l'Homme*, the trial of the followers of Saint-Simon, which, in August, 1832, made known to the terrified country their scheme of social reform, and lastly, abroad, a new attempt on the part of the King of Holland to reconquer Belgium (September, 1832), seemed to justify the reproaches of weakness which the friends of Périer hurled at the Ministers chosen by the King and powerless to support his monarchy.

During the month of September Louis-Philippe wavered between his prejudices and the conditions which the majority of the Parliament offered him. On October 11, after having tried to detach Dupin and Thiers himself from the Conservative party, he entrusted Marshal Soult, a former colleague of Casimir Périer, with the task of forming a Ministry composed partly of members of Périer's Cabinet, partly of political friends of this statesman more deeply committed than himself to the system of order and peace, with the Duc de Broglie as Minister of Foreign Affairs, Thiers as Minister of the Interior, Guizot, Minister of Public Education, and Humann, Minister of Finance. The *Doctrinaires* thus returned to office—a Ministry, as was said at the time, “of all the talents.”

Their initial act was one of a nature to flatter the national self-esteem. The Antwerp expedition, demanded by the King of Belgium and sanctioned by the English on November 14, established on a firm basis the safety and independence of the Belgian people. By this external manifestation of the fact that French sympathy and French power were at the service of right and liberty, the Ministry of October 11 reckoned that they had earned the right to suppress disorder and conspiracy at home. On November 7, disregarding the relations which the King was still maintaining with the Duchess of Berry, Thiers caused her to be arrested at Nantes, and confined her strictly in the prison of Blaye (November 14, 1832). Later he took advantage of the unexpected pregnancy of this princess, who was a widow, but married in secret to a Sicilian nobleman, and set her at liberty, when ridicule had rendered her no longer dangerous (June, 1833). Freed from trouble from the Bourbons, whose cause, as Chateaubriand fully recognised, was irrevocably lost, although the hopeless struggle was still maintained by the eloquent lawyer, Berryer, the Ministry of October 11 was able to make preparations for a decisive struggle against the Republican party.

At first they believed that they would triumph without effort. "Insurrection is dead," said Guizot in February, 1833, "the societies are dead, revolutionary propagandism is dead and the revolutionary spirit, and with them that blind spirit of war which seemed for a moment to have gained possession of the nation." The hour seemed to have arrived for them to cut at the root of the evil in order to destroy it for evermore. The successor of Casimir Périer in the department of Public Education brought forward a law upon primary education, which was passed on June 28, 1833. This law invited the Catholics in their own schools, which were thenceforward to be free, and even in the State schools, which were superintended by the parish priest and the Cantonal Commissions, to associate themselves with the officers of the State in the work of establishing "internal and social peace." According to his idea and that of the other Conservatives, "the hopes of religion, together with the enlightenment given by a system of instruction controlled by religious beliefs, would be the best means of arresting moral degeneration and the dangers to which the revolutionary classes, and, in consequence of class demands, the whole of society, were exposed." In order to give employment to the people and to alienate them from their leaders, Thiers urged the adoption of a great programme of public works at an expense of 100,000,000 *livres* spread over five years. "Thanks to the Chambers," said the *Débats*, the semi-official organ of the *Doctrinaires*, "the country is beginning to have faith in its future." Events quickly dispelled the illusion.

So early as the summer of 1833, whether owing to the proposal to fortify Paris put forward by Thiers, or to the anniversary of the days of

July, the leaders of the Republican party were beginning to make up their mind to a new effort of arms. In the sections of the *Société des Droits de l'Homme*, in which the Republican propaganda was continually being strengthened by the promise of social reforms acceptable to the working classes, the *Montagnards* were daily gaining greater influence. The Ministry indicted twenty-seven of these men, such men as Raspail, Kersausie, d'Argenson, and Charles Teste, those whose tendencies to socialism were most notorious, before the Court of Assizes (December 22, 1833). The jury acquitted them all. This was an encouragement for the leaders of Republican societies, Cavaignac, André de Puyraveau, Guinard, and Vigneret, who thought that the moment had come to unfurl their standard, and to rally France to their programme. In vain did Carrel, staunch convert as he was to the democratic republic, attempt in the *National* to show them the danger of a premature attack. At the end of the year 1833 the other organs of their party, the *Tribune* of Marrast, the *Populaire* of Cabet, published a manifesto of the Committee of Management of the *Société des Droits de l'Homme*, which set forth their hopes and their democratic claims, supported now as ever by the recollections of the Convention and of the rule of Robespierre.

This act of audacity came as a surprise to their opponents, the Conservatives of the middle-class, and before long turned to their advantage. The Ministry was moved by fear and by calculation to energetic measures of repression. Strikes were suppressed at Caen and at Le Mans, and treated as revolts. In order to crush the propaganda of the party, a law was passed which obliged the public criers, "armed heralds of revolt, peripatetic proclaimers of insurrection," to obtain a license from the prefects (February, 1834). This was the beginning of a series of laws of greater severity and efficacy passed by the deputies "in order to reassure and protect the mass of the population." The Keeper of the Seals, to meet the disturbances aroused by this programme, brought forward the project of a Bill to attack those Republican societies which were subdivided into sections of less than twenty members, the limit fixed by Article 291 of the penal code. Thenceforward it was to rank as a criminal offence, not to be tried by a jury but before the ordinary Courts, to join any society whether divided into sections or not, an offence which carried with it heavy penalties and imprisonment. This threatened law created lively emotion among the Republicans (March, 1834). Some among them, such as the editors of the *Tribune*, thought of meeting the challenge by insurrection. Others, such as Carrel, Garnier-Pagès, and Buonarotti himself, saw in it a trap to be avoided. The signal for action was given by the *Canuts*, the workmen at Lyons, who went on strike in defence of their trades-unions (February 14) and then took up arms on behalf of their comrades who were indicted on April 9, 1834. The employment of a military force was needed to bring about the triumph of the Government over the Lyons

mob, after a bloody struggle which lasted four days. The mob of Paris was in its turn on the verge of insurrection, when the Ministry ordered the arrest of 150 Republicans on April 12. The rising was restricted to the Saint-Merri quarter and crushed with rapidity and severity in the Rue Transnonain by the generals, who were led into battle by Thiers himself (April 14). At the same time it became known that the attempts made at Saint-Étienne, Marseilles, Clermont, Lunéville, and Belfort, sometimes with the complicity of petty officers in the army, had met with no greater success.

The danger with which this abortive conspiracy seemed to have threatened society and the monarchy soon gave the Conservatives the opportunity which they were seeking to crush the Republican faction. Laws of great severity were passed by Parliament against those who carried arms, and against the democratic journals. The Parliament itself, after the elections of May, 1834, proved to contain a majority more completely hostile to the Republic. With this majority the Ministry of October 11 believed themselves in the following year strong enough to initiate before the Chamber of Peers a great and famous indictment of Republicans. On May 5, 1835, 164 prisoners, defended by counsel chosen from among those leaders of their party who still had their liberty, Cavaignac, Marrast, Trélat, Michel de Bourges, Baune, Kersausie, Caussidière, were brought for trial from Sainte-Pélagie to the Luxembourg. The trial lasted until the beginning of the following year. In the interval the attempt of Fieschi on July 28 to assassinate the King and his sons, an isolated endeavour to recall the days of July, increased the popularity of the monarchy, justified all the measures taken to defend society, and helped towards the final downfall of the Republican party. Parliament passed sentence on the prisoners in the sight of an alarmed country and carried the laws of September, 1835, which recalled the measures of the ultra-Royalists under the Restoration against the press and juries. On that day, the *Doctrinaires* in their seat of power, believing themselves supreme, saw an orator rise to oppose them who had been little suspected of love for the democracy. Royer-Collard reproached them with "their cunning attack on liberty, their school of immorality." They did not heed him; and some months afterwards Armand Carrel, the Republican editor of the *National*, fell mortally wounded in a duel with Émile de Girardin, against whom he had fought in the cause of the liberty of the Press (July 22, 1836). "The Republican party," wrote Edgar Quinet, "is in its coffin with Carrel. It will rise again, but it must have time."

After six years of opportunist rule, maintained with difficulty, the Conservatives, men of high birth or standing possessed by Liberal ideas, might look with satisfaction upon their accomplished task—the frustration of the designs of the Legitimists who had threatened them with a violent reaction, the defeat of the hopes of the Republicans who had

fought for them in 1830 without reward, and, instead of a throne strong by right divine, a monarchy bound to reckon with the will of a people as whose representatives they posed. The prosperity of France served the interests, material and political, of the victorious party. The cultivation of the vine had in twenty years doubled its returns. The corn-harvest furnished a surplus for export. Agricultural methods were improving, particularly in the north and east; and the development of country roads facilitated exchange between producers and the towns. But this period is conspicuous mainly as the great epoch of a definite industrial transformation, supported by the improvement of public credit and of the banks. The consumption of coal which from 1815 increased from one million to four million tons, the employment of machines which were increased tenfold in number, and the beginning of railway construction, set capital in circulation and stimulated manufactures and commercial enterprise. It was not so much the middle-class with its frugality, its hostility to risk, its attachment to State security and public offices, as the leaders of the commercial class, such as the Périers, the Delesserts, who took part in this economic movement. Their receptions, more than those of the Court, set the tone to the capital. Moreover, with Guizot they had made of national education their instrument of power. The great problem in their eyes was, in the words of that Minister, "the government of minds." They entrusted the primary schools to the Church, that she might teach the people the lessons of submission and resignation. They demanded in return that the Church should cede to the University the monopoly of secondary and more advanced studies, namely those which were to form the minds of the commercial classes, their electors. In their desire to monopolise political power at the expense of the democracy and the Crown they were forced to adopt the methods of Napoleon.

This Government, strong as it appeared at the time, nevertheless had its weak points. Many deputies, who reprobated the riots and intrigues of the Republicans, were nevertheless uneasy about the programme of repression put forward by the Conservatives. From 1834 onwards there were visible, even in the majority, signs of hesitation which betrayed either fear of unpopularity, or a striving after popularity. These men, whether waverers or ambitious, formed what was called the Third Party; they included Charles Dupin, whom the Government had offended by neglecting to consult him, Passy and Sauzet, ardent friends of liberty, and Étienne, editor of the *Constitutionnel*. Louis-Philippe, more and more exasperated by the arrogance of his Ministers, encouraged insubordination in the members of the majority. There even arrived a moment when for three days he handed over the power to this Third Party (November 10, 1834). For these malcontents the test was unfortunate, almost ridiculous; neither by force of numbers nor talent could they replace the Conservatives.

Pitched battles in Parliament did not suit them. But as sharpshooters and in ambuscade they continued to be dangerous.

"To my mind," wrote in 1841, a politician who was faithful to the monarchy of 1830, "compared with the questions of foreign policy, all others which divide our party have but a secondary importance." Thanks to Louis-Philippe, in 1830 and 1831 the Conservatives had avoided the danger of the revolutionary propaganda; but they had not stifled those aspirations after glory which were as the breath of life to the French people in that period, and manifested themselves in an ever-growing attachment to the Imperial legend and interest in military affairs. These instincts were so strong that each party found itself obliged to reckon with them. The malcontents kept ceaseless watch upon the Ministry in expectation of the moment when they could accuse them of sacrificing the national dignity. Thiers celebrated in 1834 at the Academy the victories of Bonaparte; Louis-Philippe finished and opened the Arc de Triomphe, and consecrated the Palace of Versailles to all the glorious deeds of France, and made of it a Museum of the victories and conquests of the French. Like Chateaubriand in the Restoration period, the Conservatives were in their turn impelled to seek in a spirited and brilliant foreign policy the means of disarming their adversaries at home, and by a blaze of glory to gain pardon for their drastic measures of repression. It is sufficient to recall the fact that on one occasion (April 1, 1834) Broglie was abruptly overthrown for having granted to the United States the settlement of an indemnity which Napoleon himself had admitted to be equitable in principle. It is worth noting how carefully it was arranged that in most ministerial combinations the Presidency of the Council should be given to generals or officers of the Empire, the Dukes of Dalmatia, Bassano, Treviso, and Marshal Gérard. Nothing was more dangerous to the Conservative party than this policy of action, which the King was determined to control, and which ended in open dissension between King and Cabinet.

Since 1834 the struggle had been in preparation: the enterprises of Mehemet Ali against Turkey set it in motion. Russia, summoned by the Sultan to his assistance in his distress, and encouraged by Austria and Prussia, her accomplices, had succeeded in imposing by the Treaty of Unkiar Skelessi (July 8, 1833) her protectorate upon the Ottoman Empire. Broglie, both in his first Ministry and when he returned to office in March, 1835, declared openly that he was counting upon England to defend the position of France in the Levant. Everything in his conduct and his negotiations showed that he would prevent Russia, by arms if necessary, from developing her ambitions, and dissociate Europe from the encouraging attitude of Vienna and Berlin. Louis-Philippe, on the other hand, had imagined with the help of Talleyrand a different method of maintaining the *status quo*—a method at once pacific and subtle—an understanding with Metternich, towards

which he had been working since 1834. He was firmly resolved "not to allow Broglie to go too far." "I would sooner break up my ministerial council," he said on January 24, 1836, to the envoy of Sardinia. And the Duke fell from power for the second time, apparently in consequence of the action of the Third Party, dragging with him Guizot and the Ministry of October 11, the Conservative coalition (February 4). Many well-informed contemporaries attributed this result to the diplomacy of the King, which was at need as active and cunning against his own Ministers as in foreign affairs. It was in fact difficult to avoid a rupture, when a Minister could take upon himself to suppress on its way to the Tsar a royal letter which was too friendly, and when the King on his side at Paris carried on secret negotiations with Prince Apponyi, the envoy of Austria.

However, the Third Party, with the King's other instruments, Passy, Sauzet, and the financier Ganneron, the most obscure and most active of them all, were unequal as ever to the task of providing the Crown with a parliamentary Government. It was the defection of Thiers, always desired by Louis-Philippe and now at last obtained, that gave the King his advantage. The motives that prompted this defection still further illustrate the importance of foreign questions in these quarrels.

For four years there had been no stancher Conservative than Thiers, equally embittered as he was against the Duchess of Berry and against the Republicans, supporting in discussion and eagerly enforcing measures of severity and exceptional legislation. No man in the Cabinet of October 11 had supported with greater heat a policy of foreign action, a policy acceptable to the nation and consequently adapted to make it forget or tolerate a somewhat harsh system of repression at home. But, even in early days, perhaps on the advice of Talleyrand, his protector, Thiers had differed from Broglie and his friends on this question of foreign policy. He conceived resentment against England, who, after having proved herself a useful ally since 1830, had under Palmerston manifested since 1833 a desire to fetter rather than to assist France. Palmerston's efforts to turn to the exclusive advantage of English power the dynastic and constitutional troubles of Spain and Portugal—efforts at first discreet but subsequently made manifest by the Treaty of the Quadruple Alliance (May, 1834)—inspired Thiers, who was moreover ambitious to play the leading part, with the desire of bringing the English "*entente*" to an end, in order to assert beyond the Pyrenees the authority of France. While Broglie was conciliating England with the design of bringing her to oppose Russia and the Continental Powers, Thiers rejoiced to see Louis-Philippe estranged from her and drawing towards Austria. He was unable, indeed, in May, 1835, to obtain from the King, "who was resolved to crush twelve Chambers rather than to make war," the military intervention besought by the Ministers of Queen Isabel. But he attributed this check to the opposition

of his colleagues, Broglie and Guizot, who had failed to support him. Thenceforward he only awaited an opportunity to separate himself from them: and when the King offered him the post of Chief Minister (February 22, 1836) the coveted occasion seemed to have arrived. He hoped to continue his Conservative policy under the cover of brilliant action abroad. He accepted office: his mistake was almost at once apparent.

On one occasion, Thiers said to the King with a smile, "Sire, I am very subtle." "I am more so than you," Louis-Philippe replied, "for I do not say so." The understanding between the sovereign and his Minister, resolved as each was not to be led but to lead, could not be of long duration. At the very beginning, the King informed the Prussian Cabinet "that he hoped still further to strengthen his system — resistance at home to the revolutionary movement, and such moderation abroad as enforces respect for existing treaties, while avoiding all interference in the affairs of other States." On his side Thiers, from March 18, 1836, onward, protested to Palmerston against the Treaty of the Quadruple Alliance, and reserved to France her liberty of action as regards intervention in Spain. In July, 1836, he made preparations for this intervention; he increased the foreign legion which the Government had supplied to the Queen of Spain for use against the Carlists, and offered the services of a French general, Bugeaud or Clauzel, to command the royal army. "We intend to annihilate," he wrote to Sainte-Aulaire, "Don Carlos, the hero of Navarre." Without uttering a word, Louis-Philippe, aided by Montalivet, kept watch over the actions of his Minister. On August 24, 1836, having learnt that, by agreement with Thiers, General Lebeau, commander of the Foreign Legion, had announced that a French army would enter Spain, the King, without informing his Minister, had an official denial inserted in the *Moniteur*. Next, he demanded the dismissal of the recruits whom Thiers, without consulting him, had assembled at the foot of the Pyrenees. "The King does not desire intervention," the indignant Minister exclaimed. "We desire it, so I resign."

This energetic act of royal authority, contrary to the principles of parliamentary government, displaced a Ministry which had not suffered defeat in the Chambers, and made clear to the eyes of the country the bad relations which, since the death of Casimir Périer, had grown up between the monarchy and the Conservative deputies of the majority. The alliance which had been formed, in the days that followed the Revolution of July, between the Duke of Orleans, the leading *Doctrinaires*, and Thiers, had subsisted so long as the power which they had combined to seize appeared to be threatened; but now the problems, which bade fair to divide them, became more and more pressing. The Parliamentary party remembered that they had made a King and a constitution, but were apt to forget that without this King they could not have averted

a republic; they held that Louis-Philippe ought to reign and not to govern. The King, on the other hand, convinced that without his diplomacy and without his personal action the militant Republic would have triumphed, and impelled, by a sort of pride in his skill, to employ the same diplomacy towards his Ministers, aspired to govern while still keeping the advantage of non-responsibility. The *Doctrinaires*, and Thiers, first their ally, then their supplanter, like the ultra-Royalists of the Restoration, in their turn claimed the government in order to impose their will, their calculations as to national action abroad, upon the King whom they had implored to come to their aid against the Republican propaganda. Louis-Philippe, in order to maintain his system, was obliged to scheme against or get rid of the men who had dethroned Charles X for his benefit.

However, in this crisis, the decisive moment for the July monarchy, the allies of the Tuilleries and the Chamber attempted for some time to avoid a breach and to resume their life in common. The breach with Thiers brought the King back to Guizot, who perhaps regretted that six months earlier he had followed the Duc de Broglie into retirement. And Guizot, as a condition of his assistance, demanded the inclusion in the Ministry of three of his friends, men devoted to his person and opinions, Duchâtel in the Department of Finance, Gasparin at the Home Office, and Rémusat as Under-Secretary of State for Public Works. The condition imposed by the King and accepted at first by Guizot was that foreign affairs should be entrusted to a President of the Council, who was a complete stranger to the designs of the *Doctrinaire* party, devoted to the policy and submissive to the opinions of the King. His nominee was Count Molé.

This last attempt at an understanding was destined to endure only eight months, from September 6, 1836, to April 15, 1837. From the very first day Guizot resented his subordinate position in a Cabinet where his friends, the *Doctrinaires*, had all but a majority. His friends expressed their surprise. "What!" the Duc de Broglie wrote to him, "the principal man, the very core and mainspring of the Cabinet, is forced to hold the lowest place?" The almost immediate result was that Guizot, his adherents, and the party organs, affected to treat Molé as an upstart, rewarded beyond his merits by the success of his intrigues at the Tuilleries, and almost drove him to open warfare in defence of his dignity and legitimate influence. On the other hand Molé, who, since 1818, had been alienated from the *Doctrinaire* party, came to power, thanks to the King's confidence, with a programme far different from theirs. An official who, ever since the Empire, had contrived under all *régimes* to improve his own position, tactful and persuasive in language and bearing, he regulated his conduct rather by circumstances than by theories. Thus, since he observed that former Ministers, in order to continue the policy of active "resistance"

dear to the *Doctrinaires*, had had recourse to manifestations of force abroad which had been condemned by the King, he deemed it the simpler course to renounce this policy of repression. "The true spirit of government," he said, "consists in meeting circumstances as they present themselves, with a mind free from all prejudice arising from the past." Between this man of expedients, skilful and eloquent, and the *Doctrinaires*, there was almost as much difference as in 1823 between Villèle and the ultra-Royalists, enamoured as they too were at the time of repression at home and glory abroad. Guizot with his friends abandoned Molé at the end of March, 1837. The King maintained the confidence which he reposed in him.

Thus between Louis-Philippe, and, to quote the phrase of an Orleanist, Sainte-Aulaire, "these princes of the tribune, these great vassals of the representative régime, who believed that they had a prescriptive right to direct the affairs of the country, who were indignant that any-one dared to dispute the legitimacy of that right," there arose a breach of which this time the country could not be ignorant, and shortly afterwards open warfare of which it was summoned to be the arbiter. This war lasted exactly two years, while by force of will and talent Molé, supported by the King, whose policy he tenaciously defended, succeeded in maintaining himself in power with uncertain majorities. At this distance of time the work which this Minister accomplished with the King's support can be appraised and judged without reference to the daily contests in face of which it was performed. The study of this work is no less important in the history of French institutions than that of the conflicts between the Court and the Parliament.

"I have always been," said Molé to his friend Barante, "in favour of a truce, of a reconciliation between parties, when the right moment should arrive. On September 6 and still more on April 15, it became necessary at all costs to start afresh, to change the course, if I was to avoid being carried I knew not whither. That is what these inflexible spirits, swayed entirely by their prepossessions instead of looking facts in the face, have never been able to understand." After repression, reconciliation. What good was it to the new régime that they had obtained a decisive victory over the Republican and Legitimist parties in 1835, if the conquerors did not know how to give or to obtain the reward of victory—peace at home? Molé's programme had the merit of being at once far-sighted and opportune. Among the conquered parties a change was taking place at that time which turned their thoughts from their past and their resentments, and fixed their eyes upon the future.

The members of the Republican party, in prison and in exile, had reflected upon the causes of the check which they had sustained, and the acts of violence which had justified their opponents in using against them force and exceptional legislation. "For an attitude of protest, they

began to substitute an attitude of discussion." Ever since 1834, the lawyer Dupont, founder of the *Revue Républicaine*, had been engaged in substituting, for the tradition and methods of 1793, a carefully-considered doctrine which "should reassure the people while enlightening them." To define the democratic ideal—government by the people for the happiness of the people—the duties of the State and social aims, the question of wages and the conditions of work: this rather than acts of violence was in his eyes the proper goal for his party's efforts. This opinion was shared by Raspail and Kersausie, who said in the *Réformateur*, "An end to personal polemics, an end to social strife!" After the insurrection of April and the laws of September had confirmed their fears and the conclusion they had reached, this evolution became more marked. The *National*, under Carrel, and afterwards under Charles Thomas, devoted itself to the study of social and democratic questions. A literary organ, the *Nouvelle Minerve*, grouped together old and young Republicans alike for this propaganda by the force of ideas. Louis Blanc in the *Bon Sens* and the *Tribune des prolétaires*, Considérant in *La Phalange*, the organ lent to him by Fourier, popularised in 1836 the principles of the Republican and social school. In opposition to the middle-class society established under the first Empire, they brought forward thenceforth, instead of plots and surprises, the steady force of an ideal of social and political improvement.

No one was of more service to this ideal than Lamennais, after he had published in the preface of his *Troisièmes Mélanges* his declaration of adherence to the democratic party (1836). His book *Du Peuple*, written in 1837, by its talent and generous spirit had a far-reaching influence, penetrating even to artisan circles. "I address myself," he wrote, "to cold and philosophic reason. It seems to me that there is an entire world of truths to reveal. I believe that social science is far from possessing a complete theory, and that this theory, when it comes to completion, will be of great assistance towards future perfection. We are progressing towards a magnificent unity." This programme of hope and progress received from 1836 onwards the support of Victor Hugo, who in the *Presse* devoted himself to the study of social questions. George Sand became an enthusiastic Republican, together with Michel de Bourges and Pierre Leroux. Thenceforward in Republican circles there were no longer heard prophecies of war, appeals to the *Montagnard* movement, but hymns of hopefulness or of pity for the humble, counsels of wisdom and of reason. Moreover there were fewer Republicans, and more "democrats" or "radicals," more men like Arago, Dupont de l'Eure, and Lamartine, who were disposed to admit the possibility of a truce with a Government which should leave the tribune and the press free for the inculcation of their doctrines.

It was about the same period that the Legitimist party, which had been crushed by the defeat of the Duchess of Berry and humiliated by

her errors, transformed itself so as to become a great party of principles and of propagandism, no longer a group of embittered exiles, but of believers, active and full of dreams for the future. In this transformation the influence of Lamennais was as powerful as the lesson taught by the events of 1834. The assistance which he gave to the democrats was itself but the effect of the resistance which he at first encountered in gaining acceptance for his ideas among the defenders of the old order, among the priests of Rome and devout Frenchmen. He might have said, "Strike me, but listen." For he was attacked and listened to. He ceaselessly denounced the alliance between the Catholics, the true conservatives, champions of the order established by God, and courtier or *émigré* politicians, blind or interested partisans of a feeble dynasty soon to be swept away. Without, as he did, breaking with Rome, his disciples, Montalembert and Lacordaire, invited the youth of the Right, who had been misled by their talent and their zeal, to leave "the fatal whirlpool of politics in order to concern themselves for the future with the things of God alone." And, little by little, this band of young men, with Ozanam and the founders of the charitable societies of Saint-Vincent de Paul, with the principal writers of the *Correspondant* and the *Univers*, Carné, Champagny, Meaux, Foisset, resolutely broke up "the fatal alliance between throne and altar." They held the opinion expressed by Lacordaire so early as 1834: "I have the greatest respect for the old Royalist party, all the respect that one owes to a glorious veteran. But I do not rely on the veteran, because with his wooden leg he cannot keep step with the new generation." In the eloquent words of Montalembert, they asked themselves the question: whether they ought to isolate themselves from the France of July, to withdraw from active and public life, and only to take part in it to repudiate or hamper the Government, or whether they ought not rather to accept this Government as an accomplished fact, and to offer to the country such practical assistance as should further the fulfilment of their hopes and the realisation of their social and religious ideals.

To all these men, detached by their youth or their hopes, on the Right from the fatal methods of the *émigrés* and the extremists, on the Left from the excesses of the Terror or the Charbonnerie, a prudent Government could no longer oppose what had so long been called "resistance." Resistance to intrigues, to attempts of violence, was justified by the need of public order. Nothing could justify the futile repression of ideas and of free speech in a free country.

Molé turned to the Republicans; and, profiting by the occasion when the dynasty was being consolidated by the marriage of the Duke of Orleans with a princess of Mecklenburg, he offered them, not as a concession but as a gift suitable to the auspicious event, an amnesty which had often been demanded but hitherto refused by his predecessors (1837). The value of the gift was in proportion to the hardships which certain

among them, treated even in sickness, like Trélat, as prisoners of war, had undergone in the prisons of Clairvaux or of Doullens, and to the sufferings and destitution endured by more than one refugee in England or in Switzerland. The measure was also politic, for the sufferings of prisoners and exiles had been the chief incentive to rebellion and conspiracy.

Molé then turned once more to the men of the Right, the Catholics. One of his first acts was to reopen the church of Saint-Germain l'Auxerrois. Since the riots in which it had been sacked, this church had been closed by the Government as a punishment and as a warning, and lest the provocations of the Legitimists should once more arouse the people of Paris to violence. The crucifix was replaced in the Courts of Justice. Montalembert, on May 19, 1837, at the tribune of the Chamber, congratulated the Ministry upon the two great measures of reconciliation which redounded to their glory and to their benefit. He applauded "their amnesty to the Republicans no less than their conciliation of the Catholics." He invited his friends, Catholic rather than Royalist as they were, to recognise that an entirely new system had been inaugurated. He renounced the regrets and the hopes of the Legitimist party, and proclaimed his sympathetic adherence to the monarchy of July in order to obtain from it "an enlightened protection and impartial tolerance."

It is impossible to deny that the two years of this Ministry were years of internal peace. From 1837 to 1839 there was no Republican conspiracy save that of an Alsatian workman, a mystical schemer, named Aloysius Huber, and his friend, Steuble. "The Legitimist party," wrote the Duke of Orleans, when visiting the south, "is collapsing in every direction. The clergy are deserting it." The Government applied its energies to its rightful task, that of governing. It procured the passing, assisted rather, it is true, by the Chamber of Peers, rather than by that of the Deputies, who were still excited by the animosities of the parliamentary leaders, of laws of practical interest dealing with the extension of the jurisdiction of justices of the peace, the care of the insane, bankruptcies, and the powers of Departmental Councils (February to April, 1838). In 1837 this same Ministry set on foot a great and comprehensive project for a system of railroads. Confident in the economic future of the country, the "little Ministry," which the *Doctrinaires* treated with disdain, gave proof of greater foresight and courage than their adversaries; they proposed to the Chamber, which rejected it, a great State enterprise with a capital of a thousand millions. They appreciated and encouraged more than their predecessors or their opponents the needs and the progress of an industrious nation.

Since 1830 the budget of France had borne the burden of a debt of nearly a thousand million francs contracted during the first years of Orleans rule. This was now discharged; and, in spite of fresh expenses for the army and the schools, for which the ordinary resources sufficed,

there remained over for the nation a surplus of 80 millions, the fruit of its industry and thrift. Everywhere the great activity in business undertakings of all sorts, the increase in savings-bank deposits, and the improved yield of indirect imposts indicated the abundance of capital. Stock at 5 per cent. stood at nearly 20 francs above par, stock at 3 per cent. was not far below par. Relying on this credit and this affluence, the State gave out contracts for public works to the extent of nearly 300 millions—roads, bridges, canals, and harbours, encouragements of every sort to the national commerce whose prosperity struck all beholders. “Tranquillity is unbroken,” wrote an eyewitness, Barante, on May 16, 1838, “among the lower classes. They are more contented than they have been for fifty years.” “Is it your fault, or your skill?” wrote Royer-Collard to Molé, uneasy at this spectacle of a country which was thus ceasing to take any interest in politics. “A thousand causes, known or unknown, have led to this marvellous result. You have earned general esteem, together with the admiration of those who understand.”

Finally, it was this Ministry also which had the honour of successfully achieving what one politician, Jouffroy, called “the most important national undertaking,” namely the decisive establishment of France in Africa; “better than a colony,” he added, “an empire, an empire on the Mediterranean, two days’ journey from Toulon.”

When the Government of July had received from the Bourbons the almost accidental legacy of Algiers, in turning it to account, besides the difficulties inherent in the nature of every colonial enterprise, they had met with obstacles of two kinds: from opposition in England, where displeasure was excited by the prospect of a French settlement in the Mediterranean, and from French opinion, ill-disposed, either through ignorance or tradition, towards colonising expeditions. The problem was to instruct the French as to their true interests without alarming the susceptibilities of the English nation.

When General Clauzel, a determined partisan of the occupation of Algiers, declared that it would be to France what India was to England, the politicians, Talleyrand, Sebastiani, and Casimir Périer, urged the need of reticence, “in order to avoid arousing feelings in London which would disturb the mutual good understanding.” When, in March, 1833, Broglie declared that France was mistress of Algiers and would remain so, Talleyrand declared this language ill-timed, having regard to England, whose Minister Lord Grey was demanding evacuation on the ground of promises asserted to have been made by Polignac. Thus the colonisation had to be carried on, as it were, in secret, and in fact without the King’s venturing to take a part or to formulate a policy in the violent warfare waged, from 1831 onwards, in the Chambers and in the journals, between partisans and opponents of the scheme. For want of men and money the question remained undecided, so much so that in September, 1833, a parliamentary commission was sent out to decide the fate of

the enterprise; and at its departure for Algeria people were still able to believe in the abandonment of the colony.

This enquiry, however, was to initiate the first attempt at colonisation since the ruin of the colonial empire of the eighteenth century. The work of conquest and administration, begun with scanty resources around Algiers, from Bona and from Bougie, by Generals Clauzel (1830-1), Berthezène (1831), Savary and Voirol (1831-3), impressed and convinced the commissioners. Although their conclusions, published in the month of April, 1834, met with violent opposition from those deputies who were anxious not to weaken the situation of France upon the Rhine, or were convinced of France's unfitness for colonisation, Republicans, and men of the Right or the Third Party, men like Dupin, Passy, Jaubert, and Mauguin, yet the Government of Marshal Soult, without overtly adopting them, set itself to carry them into effect. The scheme was at first one of colonisation restricted to the littoral, and was set in motion by the decree of August 13, 1834, which established a Government of "French possessions in North Africa," with an *intendant*, magistrates, receivers of taxes, an indigenous army, and even schools and a college. In order to induce Parliament to accept this restricted scheme, Thiers and Guizot undertook to prevent all extension. As the conquest had been a military exploit, they united to overthrow Marshal Soult, who had replaced Broglie as leader of the Cabinet, and who was determined to appoint a general as Governor of the African possessions (July, 1834). However, the force of circumstances compelled them to send thither General Drouet d'Erlon.

This scheme of limited occupation was calculated perhaps to work well in France and to disarm intrigues and resentments in Parliament; but it left Algeria in suspense, and the Colonies exposed to the vengeance of the Arabs, who ever since 1832 had been rallying their forces around Abd-el-Kader in the province of Oran. The disaster of the French army at the Macta (June 26, 1835), which made the fortune of the Emir at the expense of General Trézel, was not the effect of an unfortunate attempt on the part of the French to extend their domain, but the result of a decisive effort on the part of Abd-el-Kader, encouraged by their inaction, to drive them into the sea. A regular war was necessary to repair the consequences of this pacific policy. On the morrow of the day on which the Opposition had demanded from the Ministry an explanation as to the excessive number of troops maintained in Africa, Marshal Clauzel was sent as Governor to Algeria with Bugeaud and the eldest son of the King. Of sheer necessity, as a result of successes which were always incomplete against an enemy who refused to be cast down by defeat—the victories of Clauzel (December 4, 1835) at Mascara and the Habra, at Tlemcen (January 13, 1836), and that of Bugeaud on the banks of the Sikkah (July, 1836)—the conquest of the interior of Algeria had to be undertaken, a costly achievement and one interrupted

by many surprises, such as those which happened to General d'Arlanges, massacres, and sudden attacks. In vain did Guizot struggle to hide the situation from Parliament, until February, 1836, and even after he returned to power in September. Thiers meanwhile had declared himself the apostle of Algerian colonisation, and had approved a system of absolute domination, the complete scheme of government proposed by Clauzel. The policy of obstinate concealment pursued by the Ministers led to the serious check which the Marshal sustained before Constantine (November 24, 1836), in consequence of an enterprise attempted with inadequate resources; and the full extent of the problem was at length made clear to the country.

To Molé belongs the credit of having worked out the solution, with a sense of proportion, a fine grasp of possibilities, a knowledge of men, which secured success. Between those theorists who aimed at limiting the colony to the coast, and those who followed Thiers and Clauzel in wishing to proceed at once to the conquest of the country, to rival Napoleon's Egyptian expedition, and to satisfy the desire of the country for glory and military achievements, the Ministry adopted a middle course. While General Bugeaud, in obedience to his orders to limit operations on the side of Oran, made over the interior of the province to Abd-el-Kader by the Treaty of the Tafna (June 1, 1837), all the other African generals, Valée, Perrégaux, Trézel, and the Duke of Nemours, united at the head of 15,000 men for an attack on Constantine. The taking of this town by assault cost Danrémont, the Governor-General, his life (October 12-13, 1837), but won for French domination an entire province, which was soon linked to that of Algiers by the occupation of Biban, or the Iron Gates.

This was no longer a restricted occupation, such as had long been promised to the intractable enemies of colonisation by hesitating and timid Ministers, content to regard the maintenance of French power in Algiers as a fault to be excused and forgiven. And, although the attack on Constantine was a glorious retribution, a great effort of conquest, it was not intended to cancel the Treaty of the Tafna, to initiate an unrestricted African war, to satisfy national aspirations by any great and hasty enterprises, or to revive with Thiers and the survivors of the Empire the Napoleonic traditions. The Government did better; it had calculated the importance and the cost of the undertaking; it approached the problem for the first time with prudence and resolution, and framed a policy and a system of colonisation. French Africa was thenceforward a reality.

Eventually it was to Marshal Valée, the conqueror of Constantine, that Molé entrusted the task of consolidating the results of his victory. Instead of conquering he was to organise. "I desire the French to restore Roman Africa. I will endeavour to found cities, to open ways of communication. The army shall no longer aimlessly scour the

provinces....I shall go slowly, but I will never retreat. Wherever, at my bidding, France sets her foot, I shall form lasting stations. The cities which already exist I shall develop." This proud declaration had the approval of the Minister; and the firmness of the Ministry in its turn triumphed over the opposition of a Parliament hitherto half-comprehending or half-instructed, and obtained (June, 1838) all the necessary credits. When, at the end of 1839, the crisis was provoked by the resentment of the Arabs, and their religious leader, Abd-el-Kader, made his last effort, the work achieved during two well-spent years of truce seemed to the French people precious enough to justify the sacrifices of men and money, which finally completed and crowned the conquest of Algeria.

Such were the results of the policy of internal pacification, aided by the maintenance of peace abroad. That peace Thiers had wished to break in August, 1836; Molé, summoned to succeed him, had helped the King to preserve it. Louis-Philippe, to facilitate his pacific task, had drawn near to Austria. While Metternich, with the help of Prussia, held in check the ambitions of Russia aroused by the Treaty of Unkiar Skelessi, and while the Tsar Nicholas, confronted by this opposition, "entrenched himself amid his ice," France, by refraining from intervention beyond the Pyrenees, defeated the schemes of Palmerston. Civil war pursued its course in Spain, without being complicated by a European war. Espartero put an end to the civil war (1837-8), which in Portugal also was subsiding in consequence of the triumph of the Radicals. The peninsula ceased to be the tourney-ground of European Powers, and France, whose abstention had brought about this improved state of affairs, herself secured the benefit; Palmerston was eluded, and the provocations of continental Courts ceased.

All round the French frontiers, irritating disputes were being settled according to the wishes of Louis-Philippe. It was at this time that Belgium became definitely independent. Ever since 1832 the King of Holland, obliged by the Anglo-French compact to submit to the loss of all that he had won in 1815, had been obstinately awaiting, with his army ready to march, the hour of revenge. He thought he had found his opportunity in 1838, when a misunderstanding arose which divided France and England. Suddenly, posing as one who submitted to the peaceful desires of the Dutch, he offered, what he had hitherto always refused, his recognition of Belgian independence. But he demanded the immediate evacuation of Luxemburg and of Limburg, which the Belgians had retained in spite of the Treaty of 1832, but with the consent of the Powers. In these circumstances the European Powers forgot the value set by the Belgian people upon these provinces, which had been associated from the beginning with their struggle for independence, the hope of retaining them which they had been allowed during six years to foster, and on the

other hand the obstinacy of the King of Holland in not accepting the decision of Europe. The Powers supported, almost with violence, the King's pretensions, at the risk of provoking anger and opposition at Brussels, and perhaps the fresh war on which Holland reckoned. Prussian troops occupied Luxemburg, while at the Conference of London, which met in the month of June, 1838, Palmerston demanded from the Belgians immediate submission.

Yet again France acted as mediator, relying no longer on England, who seemed willing to reopen the whole question, but upon King Leopold of Belgium, who was exposed to innumerable embarrassments. Aided by the diplomacy of Louis-Philippe and his Ministers, this sovereign, at the beginning of 1839, obtained from the Conference a reduction of the debt charged by the Treaty of 1822 on the revenues of Belgium, in exchange for the disputed provinces which he on his part induced his subjects to abandon. The settlement of April 19, 1839, made Belgium an independent State, and, though with reduced territories, freed the Belgians from the last vestiges of control by their neighbours. France peacefully consolidated the victory which she had won in the cause of liberty.

She obtained an analogous result in Italy: in order to force Louis-Philippe to withdraw his troops from Ancona, where they had been stationed ever since the Ministry of Casimir Périer, Metternich finally made up his mind in September, 1838, to withdraw the Austrian regiments which had been occupying the Legations since 1832. "The occupation of Ancona," said Molé to the Chambers, "has never been anything but a demonstration to prove that France would not permit any Power to obtain decisive preponderance in Italy." Austria retired; Italy was free up to the frontier of the provinces that had been assigned to Austria in 1815. The demonstration had no longer any object. It had had its effect. The Ministry recalled the troops from Ancona.

In Greece, while the English and the Russians, rivals for supremacy, were exciting against each other the rival parties of Mavrocordato and Metaxas, France continued to support the efforts of the new King Otto of Bavaria. Her policy gave valuable assistance to the Greek patriots of the middle class who were collecting round Colettis, the national Minister, with the desire of creating for their infant nation, by means of agricultural labour, trade, and education, resources and a life of its own, and securing to Greece a material and moral position in harmony with its independence and newly-acquired rank as one of the States of Europe.

Throughout the whole of Europe French diplomacy in 1839 succeeded in forcing upon individuals and States a peaceful settlement which maintained more surely than the assertion of a victorious Liberalism the equilibrium necessary for the free development of national energies. Molé could say on January 14, 1837, at the tribune

of the Chamber, "We detest absolute rule, and pity the nations who know their own strength so little as to submit to it." And yet he deserved the encomium of the Courts of Vienna, Berlin, and St Petersburg, that "the King of France had had no better Minister for seven years." He was pardoned, in virtue of the peace which he procured for Europe, for his sympathies with liberty. And he ought to have been pardoned in Paris, by virtue of the services rendered to the cause of free peoples, for the sacrifices which he made in the cause of European peace.

The Opposition, on the other hand, which had fiercely combated the Molé Ministry for two years, chose this very ground of peaceful policy for their main attack and overthrew him. It was all but fatal. The chief fault which could be imputed to Molé was that he had been summoned to power by Louis-Philippe at a moment when the Thiers Ministry, though in disagreement with the King as to the general trend of foreign policy, had not suffered a defeat in Parliament. The second accusation was that he had been retained at the expense of Guizot, who appeared in the eyes of all to be the true leader of the majority. At the critical moment, when the King opposed his will to that of the Parliamentary party, Molé came forward in politics as the obedient servant, as was even declared by some, the lackey of Louis-Philippe. The complete accord which grew up between them on all points of home and foreign policy, the praises which on every occasion were showered on Molé at the Tuileries, definitely attached this character to his Ministry. The war declared against him in the Chambers was aimed at the King and his "personal government." The struggle was primarily between the sovereign and the men who had in 1830 established him. One young *Doctrinaire*, Duvergier de Hauranne, did not hesitate to state as much in writing; while another older man with experience of the past, Bertin de Vaux, said to his friends in the *Journal des Débats*: "I have for you as much friendship as I had for Chateaubriand. But I will not follow you in opposition. I will not begin again to undermine the Government that I wish to found. Once is enough." He was right: it almost seemed that the 221 deputies were ready to take up once more against the monarchy of July the arms which they had borne against the Bourbons.

As a matter of fact, Louis-Philippe was not Charles X, nor was Molé Polignac. The personal policy of the King at home, in the form which it had assumed owing to the alienation of the leaders of the Parliamentary party, might appear to resemble the imperative will of the Bourbons. But, at bottom, Molé's efforts were rather exerted in favour of liberty, pacification, and conciliation. If the *Doctrinaires* reproached him with having surrendered to the Republicans, the men of the Left, from Thiers to Dupin and Odilon Barrot, were indignant at the concessions to the Catholics which Guizot and his friends approved. The obvious

inability of the different parties in Parliament to formulate the same criticisms against the Ministry and the King was the best proof that neither one nor the other was really imperilling the rights of the Chambers. The single aim of the Parliamentary party was to defeat and to bring to reason this obstinate King, who on October 3, 1837, authorised Molé to dissolve the Chambers in order to establish a new majority. The general election of November 4 did not, however, decide the issue.

Thiers, through the medium of the younger members of the two parties, Rémusat, Duvergier de Hauranne, and Jaubert, offered to the *Doctrinaires*, Guizot and Duchâtel, oblivion of their mutual quarrels and diverse aims, and an alliance. This understanding was in sight at the beginning of 1838; by the energy of Duvergier de Hauranne the more advanced group of the Left, the Third Party, the friends of Odilon Barrot and Dupin, were drawn in by the month of June. The treaty was sealed on January 18, 1839, on the occasion of the discussion of the Address. The understanding had become "the Coalition," a term of war appropriate to the strife of disappointed or unbridled ambitions. Formed as it was against the King, it attacked his special work, his system of foreign policy, firm without aggressiveness, pacific without feebleness. This ground of attack was the only one on which the two sections of the Coalition, the one more attached to order and the other to liberty, could sink their differences and unite. Should not all parties agree to defend the national honour if it was proved that the King through an exaggerated fear of war, and his Minister through servility, were sacrificing the dignity of France at the bidding of Europe or of the sovereigns? Thus without respite, in the press and at the tribune, Thiers, Guizot, even the Duc de Broglie, Villemain, Odilon Barrot, Duchâtel, Mauguin, on the Republican side, and Berryer on the Legitimist side, vied with each other in discovering the most startling proofs of this alleged betrayal.

If France advised the Belgians to evacuate Luxemburg in order to avoid a war which would again imperil their independence; if she set in Greece the example of abstaining from all intrigues which would have hindered the development of this country by its own efforts; if she evacuated Ancona with the satisfaction of seeing the Legations evacuated by Austria; if she broke her association with England so soon as England under Palmerston began to adopt an aggressive Liberal policy—all these were so many heads of the Parliamentary indictment against the King. What would really have been necessary to content them, what they meant by the maintenance of the national honour, was one of those manifestations of force abroad which Chateaubriand had urged in the time of the Restoration. By such means, after having reproached and combated the party of "movement" in 1830 and 1831, they now themselves hoped to win popularity.

Herein lay the danger of these attacks for the monarchy, from this time forward reduced to a single-handed contest against the passionate desire of the French to resume the great role which the armies of the Convention and the Empire had for some time played in Europe. In vain had Louis-Philippe flattered himself that by the conquests in Algeria he was offering a glorious compensation to the nation for the peace he imposed upon them. In vain too did he hope to content them by exhibiting in the Museum of Versailles the pageant of their military glory. Led astray by the Napoleonic legend which spread further day by day, enamoured of the heroic traditions of the Convention, moved by the brilliant feat of arms at Navarino, the French nation, especially the younger generation of every party, Orleanists, Legitimists like Berryer, Republicans like Louis Blanc, united in demanding a less reasonable Government, one that should show itself haughty and strong in the face of Europe even to the point of rashness.

Of all the battles which marked this embittered warfare between Molé's Cabinet and the Chambers, the most dramatic was the struggle provoked at the beginning of 1839 by the discussion of the Address to the King. It lasted for nearly a month in the two Chambers, from December 26, 1838, to January 19, 1839. It was an uninterrupted attack upon the Ministry, in which all the conspicuous talent of the Opposition, extreme Right and extreme Left alike, took part. Thiers spoke thirteen times, Guizot twelve. Molé fought his single-handed fight with obstinacy and skill. The angry feelings aroused by this resistance became more and more acute. Towards the end of the struggle, when Molé spoke of his fatigue, he was met with cries from the Opposition of "Die, dog," as if he had been a hunted criminal. However, he kept his head up to the end and won the day, but only by 13 votes, a narrow and precarious majority.

The last battle could not now be waged in Parliament, which was divided into two parties of almost equal strength, too much committed to the mutual struggle for it to be possible to bring about defections from either side. The opinion of Molé was that it must be waged before the nation, who would herself in the last instance act as arbiter of the contest. He persuaded the King to dissolve the Chamber on February 2, 1839, and to summon the electors for March 2. In response to the appeal of all the party leaders, united ostensibly against the Ministry but in reality against the monarchy, whose unconstitutional designs and concessions abroad were denounced in high-sounding manifestos by Thiers, Guizot, Odilon Barrot, Garnier-Pagès, and Berryer, the country seethed with resentment. All witnesses agree that no such electoral fever had been seen since 1830. How could France fail to be moved on hearing that all these deputies, strongly opposed as they had been after the days of July to all manifestation of French power and aspirations abroad, the founders of a monarchy expressly formed to their

own design to combat these tendencies, now confessed their error, and were denouncing a King who refused to follow them in this return to the spirit of propagandism and national pride? The verdict of France was in fact unmistakable; by a large majority the country declared in favour of the converted Parliamentary party against the King, and against the pacific policy to which he was wedded.

Thus, the defeat which the Coalition inflicted upon the Molé Ministry was all the more grave in that it was in fact inflicted by the nation itself on the Orleans monarchy. "The throne of July, a throne not raised by my hands, has been attacked, I will not say shaken," wrote Royer-Collard, the old master of the *Doctrinaires*, blaming the conduct of his disciples. And Béranger on his part said (March 28, 1839), "The Coalition has just struck a terrible blow at the throne; and the strange thing is that the monarchists have had the principal share in its abasement." Lamartine, one of Molé's few allies in this battle, the poet-statesman who had already proclaimed the dangers of the Napoleonic legend, declared later, in 1848, that this crisis was the prelude to the revolution of that year.

In fact, it did not injure the monarchy alone. The authority of Louis-Philippe had been the bond of union between two very different parties, the Restoration deputies, who had resigned themselves with difficulty to the fall of the legitimate monarchy, and the men of the *National*, Thiers, Laffitte, and Odilon Barrot, who were determined champions of the sovereignty of the people. When they came to seek other conditions of union, no longer to be found in the monarchy of their choice, but in a fighting coalition against the dynasty, the split came at once. The difference of their aims, the clashing of their ambitions, became apparent, and their impotence for common action was disclosed. This was the explanation of the ministerial interregnum which followed upon the fall of Molé, and lasted from March 8 to May 14, 1839. For two months Marshal Soult, whom Louis-Philippe had called to power in obedience to the people's will, was unable to form a Ministry, in face of the rival claims of statesmen who had united against the monarchy, but in other respects were fundamentally opposed to one another. "The Crown," Odilon Barrot, perhaps the most ardent of the opponents of Louis-Philippe, declared in public, "has conceded every point, material and personal. Thus it is not our institutions that have failed the country. It is the institutions which lack men." A striking observation was made by the Duchess of Dino, the niece of Talleyrand, and thus trained in a good school: "It is a tempered form of revolution, but it will not be that long." The monarchy of July seemed to be nearing its fall; and Europe began to ask if the King and those parties who were powerless to govern would not be forced to allow the nation to decide, not merely the destinies of a Ministry, but its own fate.

One last blunder on the part of the Republicans was to delay this

reckoning, and to repair the errors of the monarchists by opening for them a fresh lease of credit with the nation. In the extreme section of the democratic party were irreconcilable advocates of violent action and of propagandism by physical force: a Creole from Guadeloupe, Barbès, a man with the temperament of an apostle, a Socialist, and a Christian, zealous to the point of courting martyrdom; Blanqui, one of the combatants of July, resolved on class warfare; and Martin Bernard, a logician and an admirer of Robespierre. These men banded together after 1835 to reorganise the secret societies, and collected, in the artisan society of the "Seasons," the elements of a democratic insurrection ready at their call. The paralysis of government, which had followed the fall of Molé's Ministry, seemed to them, in spite of the contrary opinion held by the Republican leaders, the opportunity for revenge upon the middle class and the monarchy, enfeebled as they were by their differences. Uncertainty as to the future suspended industrial activity; and it seemed an easy task to rouse the unemployed to action. On April 4, when the Chamber, elected on March 2, met without a Ministry and without a royal speech, a tempestuous mob, with shouts and hisses, mocked the helpless Parliamentary party. The tumult was prolonged for three or four days in spite of numerous arrests. A month later, the evil still continuing, the rioters seemed assured of success. Blanqui believed it; on May 12 he called a meeting in the Rue Saint-Martin of the members of the "Seasons," distributed to them arms which had been seized at a gunsmith's, and attempted with them to occupy the Prefecture of Police and the Hôtel de Ville. Mere surprise at a disturbance which public opinion had believed impossible, allowed the insurrection to gain a momentary success. But by the evening of the same day the forces in the Rue Greneta had triumphed over the insurgents. Barbès was a prisoner, and Martin Bernard and Blanqui in flight.

On the very next day, Marshal Soult had managed to get together a list of Ministers to submit to the King. The Parliamentary party was harshly cured of its divisions by this threat of insurrection—divisions which were beyond doubt more dangerous than the insurrection itself to the rule by which, after all, they profited. Fear and self-interest led them, through terror of the people, back to the King. *Doctrinaire* deputies like Duchâtel and Villemain, partisans of Molé, like Cunin-Gridaine, members of the Left Centre, or third party, Passy and Dufaure, united in separating themselves from their leaders, Molé, Thiers, or Guizot, all too much compromised by their recent struggles, and offered themselves to Louis-Philippe without conditions (May 13, 1839). They accorded to him that almost uncontrolled direction of foreign policy, his assumption of which had been their chief complaint against him. The Coalition, aware of its mistakes, finally laid hostility aside. It formed with the King a new contract which, when closely examined, was not so advantageous as that of 1831. The share of the Crown, which they

had desired to reduce to nothing, was thenceforth more desirable than their own.

However, it was not within the power of the King, nor of his Ministers, nor of their majority, to calm so quickly the passions which had been aroused in the country by the pacific policy of Louis-Philippe, and the boastful appeals of the deputies and their journals: that fever of national pride so easy to provoke, so difficult to allay. It had needed two years to appease the "movement" of 1830, whose memories were revived by the "movement" of 1839. And, just as in 1831, a great European dispute arose to complicate the situation.

It was not this time, as with the Belgian question, an affair which England, in pursuit of a policy of peace, could help the King of France to settle. It was no question of a people to set free, of a mission for propagandist France to fulfil. Palmerston, and, still more than he, Ponsonby, his agent at Constantinople, had encouraged the Sultan Mahmud to declare war upon the Viceroy of Egypt, Mehemet Ali (June 24, 1839). Palmerston's conviction was that, if the Turks took revenge on this too powerful vassal, England would gain an opportunity for cancelling the Treaty of Unkiar Skelessi, which was too favourable to Russia. Thus, it was England who provoked this crisis in the East.

Can it be that Louis-Philippe and his Minister Soult, of whom Palmerston said at this time, "he is a treasure," did not perceive at the first glance the real intentions of England against the Viceroy? Or was it not rather that they were tempted to obtain by an understanding with England a position in the East which should make the nation forget the resentments aroused by the Coalition, and the policy of peace at all costs with which the monarchy had been reproached? They took, at any rate, a foremost part in diplomatic action definitely hostile to Russia. The note of July 27, 1839, which was drawn up after the defeat of the Turks at Nezib by the French ambassador to the Porte, Admiral Roussin, and which placed Turkey under the protection of Europe, was "a European Convention intended to replace the Treaty of Unkiar Skelessi." "The true object of the agreement was to restrain Russia, and to force her to handle affairs in the East as a matter of common interest," wrote Marshal Soult, proud of his leading part in this diplomatic victory.

The awakening was rude and painful. Russia, against whom alone the note of July had been aimed by France, offered in revenge to join Palmerston in using that note as a weapon against the Pasha of Egypt. Could not its phrase, the maintenance of the integrity of the Ottoman Empire, cover the recapture from Mehemet Ali of Egypt and Syria, regions torn from that Empire? However, in order not to push matters too far, the English Cabinet and the Whig leaders Holland and Russell consented on October 14 not to make further demands upon the Pasha of Egypt, provided that he withdrew his victorious armies from Syria.

Louis-Philippe, for his part, could not at first bring himself to consent even to this. For eight years past Mehemet Ali's good fortune had appeared to the French, dupes of a curious illusion and nurtured upon the Napoleonic legend, as a sudden and glorious revival of conquering France. They grew warm on behalf of the Pasha of Egypt, the conqueror who was at times as harsh to the Egyptians as to his enemies, the intractable opponent of Greek liberty in 1827 and later of Belgian independence. Since Mehemet Ali, with the assistance of Frenchmen, had taken up the work of civilisation and conquest sketched out by Napoleon in Egypt, he appeared, to the men of the Left especially, as a kind of Liberal Bonaparte, "a new man," as Louis Blanc said, "a son of his works, the chosen man of modern revolutions." Hatred of England, that tradition of the Revolution and of the Empire, ran high in democratic circles at the end of 1839. Now that his system of pacification was once more called in question, the King of the French had no other course open to him than to summon to the Ministry Thiers, who had proclaimed loudly to the country "as a matter of great patriotic interest, a great question of the national honour," the obligation to defend Egypt and Mehemet Ali (March 1, 1840). The aims of Louis-Philippe, however, were the same as when he had summoned to power the Laffitte Ministry in November, 1831. He merely gave, as he then did, a pledge, an apparent satisfaction, to the "party of movement"; but he reserved to himself, in his own words, the right "of not unmuzzling the tiger," when he should have gained the time necessary for calming the passions of the populace. The manoeuvre was once more destined to succeed: at the end of 1840 Thiers resigned and France, by accepting the Convention of the Straits, bowed to the judgment of Europe given against Mehemet Ali. The Orleans Monarchy, assured, for a fresh period almost equal in length to the first, of peace abroad, and of the support at home of the Conservative deputies, who with Guizot repented of their former campaigns, had successfully weathered a crisis as formidable for France as for the monarchy itself.

Men of letters and writers have never played so great a part in the political life of France as during this period. From 1830 to 1840 they were the sole and undisputed guides of the country which was governed even after the revision of the Charter by a leisured and cultivated middle-class: ministers, ambassadors, deputies, controversialists, or orators, they divided their time between public activity and their literary works, which were also for the most part a form of political action.

In the first rank is Guizot, historian and philosopher, whose erudite researches are always subordinated to his views on the development of humanity and of France, as set forth in his studies on *The Revolution in England* (1828), on *Civilisation in Europe and in France* (1830), and *Washington*. Near to him comes one whose part in politics began

much later, though he was occupied from 1823 to 1825 in discovering the theory of democracy, in order to apply it to French society—Alexis de Tocqueville, magistrate and deputy, author of *Democracy in America*, which almost marked an epoch. Then followed the narrative historians : Thiers, famous at thirty years of age (1827) for his *History of the French Revolution*, who added to the early successes of a brilliant political career by the reputation achieved by his historical work on the *Consulate and the Empire* (1840-8); his friend Mignet, more than once his associate in active politics, Keeper of the Archives and ambassador, who passed from his *French Revolution* (1824) to the study, by aid of documents, of the *Spanish Succession* (1836) and showed the full range of his research in his *Notices and Historical Memoirs*; then Henri Martin, who began in 1827 the *History of France* in twenty volumes; and Augustin Thierry, who diligently traced the origin of the French middle-class.

Beside the historians stand the critics and historians of literature. Villemain, whose lectures in 1828 were considered as intellectual events, deputy and peer of France, and twice member of the Ministry, as well as permanent secretary of the French Academy under the monarchy of July, developed, in accordance with the teaching of Madame de Staël who inspired him, the idea that "literature is the expression of society," and was himself a type of the writers of his time. Of the same class, also, were Saint-Marc Girardin, and later Nisard; in philosophy Victor Cousin began to exercise in the University and over French thought a sort of leadership which at first justified itself by the extended range of its enquiries, but became by degrees narrow and rigid by the habit of authority and its abuse for political ends: Jouffroy, his pupil and friend, at one time as orator and journalist absorbed in the affairs of France, at another engaged in passionate and painful researches into the destinies of the human soul. Eloquence was the distinctive note of all these men; moving in a society of which their speech was the inspiration and the rule, they were too apt, when carried away by their own eloquence and success, to believe that the July monarchy could be set as an ideal before the nation; they were even ready to impose it upon the nation. They forgot what the Revolution of 1830 had done for the thought and literature of France.

The great poetic impulse, which, beginning with Chateaubriand, had under the Restoration given to France a harvest of masterpieces, seemed at first threatened by the fall of the monarchy and the triumph of Liberalism. "All these poets of the old monarchy and of Catholicism, Chateaubriand, Lamennais, Lamartine, Hugo, and Vigny, are like birds whose tree has been felled, and who know not where to perch." Chateaubriand withdrew to the *salon* of Madame Récamier, to write and to read there his *Mémoires d'outre tombe*. Retreat was not possible to his disciples at the moment when they were greeted by the smiles of victory in the contest waged by Romanticism against the Classical School. When

the Revolution of July broke out, Victor Hugo had just "made in the theatre his insurrection and his barricades." It seemed to all these young writers, who had already entered into their heritage of glory, that liberty, proclaimed upon the ruins of the monarchy which they had celebrated, offered them, nay rather imposed upon them, the task of instructing and guiding the nation. In the preface to the *Feuilles d'Automne* (1830) Victor Hugo sketched for himself this programme. He reasserted it in the *Chants du Crépuscule* (1835), and still more emphatically in *Rayons et les Ombres* (1840), where the poet depicted himself as the star of the people. But it was chiefly by his dramatic works, at the apogee of the Romantic drama, "of that drama," he said, "which is of necessity democratic"—in *Marion Delorme* (1831), *Le roi s'amuse* (1832), *Lucrece Borgia*, *Marie Tudor* (1833), *Angelo* (1835), and *Ruy Blas* (1838)—that Victor Hugo gained the ascendancy which he held over the public and his fellow-writers. Lamartine, on the other hand, who had preceded him in glory and in the cult of the monarchy, sought a career in actual politics. In *Jocelyn* (1836), the *Chute d'un Ange* (1838), and the *Recueilllements poétiques* (1839), he remained a poet, though he had abandoned the self-revelation of lyric verse, in order to attempt a mighty epic on human destiny; but so early as 1832 he confessed that he was "too full of political ideas to write verses," and in 1837 he said farewell to poetry in order to become an orator, a leader of men, and eventually President and Head of the French democracy.

Alfred de Vigny, more than ever a poet in his solitude, shut himself off from his fellow-men: surrendering himself to the devouring passion of discovering on their behalf and revealing to them in symbolical poems of austere beauty, and in poignant dramas like *Chatterton* (1835), the secret of their sufferings and of their destinies.

There was certainly a wide gulf between these aspirations and the middle-class society that governed in the name of Louis-Philippe and contented itself with the ideal of power and wealth which its leaders proposed to it or procured for it. The impulse of the Romantic School, victorious as it was, seemed to dash itself against this rock in vain. In the early years following the Revolution of July, with Victor Hugo as leader of the chorus, who seemed to have succeeded Chateaubriand, Romantic literature still produced numerous masterpieces: among novels there were *Notre Dame de Paris* (1831), in which Victor Hugo recalled to life the Middle Ages; the tales of adventure of Alexandre Dumas; the lyrical confessions of one of Rousseau's most illustrious pupils, George Sand, *Indiana*, *Lélia*, *Valentine* (1832-3), *Mauprat* (1837); in drama, the plays of Victor Hugo and Alfred de Vigny, and those of Dumas, no less celebrated at the time, *Antony* (1831), the *Tour de Nesle*, *Charles VII* (1832), *Kean* (1836), *Mlle de Belle Isle* (1839); and finally in history, the beginning of the greatest effort after light, poetry, and truth, which has been consecrated to the study of France, the first volumes of the *History*

of France by Michelet, that noble attempt to reflect a nation's life by the aid of science (1833-43).

But in other works, and with other writers, the great opposition between the *régime* of July and the wishes of the younger generation of literary men was apparent in the anathemas hurled at the apologists of this *régime*, Guizot and Villemain, and the cries of anger and disillusionment of the younger men. "The generation, which succeeded to literary life after 1830, has had a youth of deplorable sadness," Maxime du Camp wrote later; and Flaubert at twenty years of age raised the same complaint. Alfred de Musset was the chief spokesman of this feeling: from his *Confession d'un Enfant du Siècle* (1836) and his *Nuits* (1835-40) to his exquisite dramatic works, which are also in their way a confession. Balzac was the avenger of the younger generation, when in his unrestrained romanticism he used the novel to depict the *bourgeoisie* of July, laborious, servile, desirous of riches and power, amassing wealth by commerce and industry, and found among them the types for his *Comédie Humaine*, "taking hold upon contemporary society," as Victor Hugo said, "and robbing some of their illusions, others of their hope." Finally of this "generation so full of promise in 1830, and so undeceived," Sainte-Beuve made himself the historian, after having written in 1834 his novel *Volupté*. To understand this period and its uncertainties we must read again his articles published in 1833 on *La Littérature de ce temps-ci*, those in 1840 and 1843, *Dix ans après en littérature*, and his *Chroniques parisiennes*. "While the positive party of the century," he wrote, "pursues its progress in industry and material advancement, the so-called spiritual party is unable to counteract it. It is a magnificent rout, a forced retreat of all the talents." And Sainte-Beuve shared in this rout; he went to Lausanne to write the *Histoire de Port-Royal*, sought for success abroad, consoled himself for the present by the study of the past, wherein he was to find employment for his rare gifts of observation of human souls, and to become the foremost critic of his time.

Thus in all departments, poetry, drama, romance, critical history, parliamentary or religious eloquence, the magnificent literary activity, the true Renaissance of French intellect which had conferred glory upon the Restoration, pursued its course. It became, however, more difficult to recognise its direction and tendency in the conflict of rival influences, literary, social, and political, among which each was trying to find his path, and endeavouring to predict or to influence the future in his own way. By the Revolution of 1830, literature had been mixed up more than ever with party struggles; in the *régime* of July it found no firm or sufficient foothold.

## CHAPTER XVI.

### THE LOW COUNTRIES.

FEW of the oppressed nationalities had suffered more under the stern yoke of Napoleon than the Dutch, but the old spirit of independence had not been crushed out. Exactly a month after the overthrow of the conqueror at Leipzig, risings took place at Amsterdam, November 15 and 16, and at the Hague, November 17, 1813, against the foreign domination. The French garrison was weak and unable to offer any effectual resistance; the French officials were driven out and the symbols of French authority destroyed. A declaration of independence was publicly made at the Hague, November 21; and a provisional Government under Gisbert Charles van Hoogendorp and van der Duyn van Maasdam was set up in the name of the Prince of Orange. The Prince, who had been an exile for eighteen years, landed, November 30, at Scheveningen, and was received by the entire population with joyous acclamations. On the following day at Amsterdam, he received the offer of the sovereignty of the land, and accepted it under the style of William I, Sovereign Prince of the Netherlands. The assumption of the title William I, instead of William VI, while recalling the name of William the Liberator, marked a new departure. It signified that the old Republic, with its cumbrous and unworkable system of government, its Stadholders, and burgher-regents, was for ever swept away. The words *Oranje boven* (up with Orange) were on every one's lips, no longer as a party cry, but as the expression of national trust in the representative of the famous House, which had played so great a part in the country's history; and sovereign powers were conferred upon the Prince under the sole condition that he should in due course promulgate a free Constitution.

William Frederick of Nassau-Dietz was a man not unworthy of the confidence reposed in him; and his personality exercised a great influence upon the whole course of events recorded in this chapter. Endowed with a clear understanding and considerable ability, he had, during an exile in which he had learnt and suffered much, received an excellent training. His mind was richly stored with knowledge of many kinds; and he had more particularly an intimate acquaintance with the history and laws of his country. He was an unwearied worker; and to such a

point did he carry his love of examining all the details of public business with his own eyes that he mistrusted others. But this close attention to details often made him lose sight of main issues ; and he was rather a great administrator than a great statesman. He had moreover a firm belief in his own powers of insight and of judgment, and was in consequence obstinate in his adherence to the opinions he formed, and easily irritated by opposition. Simple in his habits, a burgher and man of business rather than a soldier, keenly interested in commercial and industrial matters, frugal, easily accessible, he was a genuine Hollander. But the very qualities which won for him the love of his subjects in the northern Netherlands were to be hindrances to him, as will be seen later, in his real efforts to acquire the confidence and affection of the people of the Belgian provinces, over whom by the will of the Great Powers he was soon to be called upon to rule.

William, in accordance with the condition under which he had assumed the sovereignty, at once appointed (December 21) a Commission to draw up a Fundamental Law (*Grond-wet*). There were fourteen Commissioners—six for Holland, two for Gelderland, and one each for Zeeland, Utrecht, Overyssel, Friesland, Groningen, and North Brabant. Their president, van Hoogendorp, was the author of the provisional draft, which formed the basis for discussion. Their labours were completed by February 14, 1814. The Fundamental Law was now presented for the approval of six hundred notables selected by the Government. This body of notables, summoned to meet at Amsterdam, March 28, approved the proposed Law by 448 votes to 26. The Fundamental Law thus adopted consisted of 146 articles. Its principal provisions may be summarised thus :—The succession to the sovereignty was to be hereditary by right of primogeniture ; in the hands of the sovereign were placed the executive and a considerable legislative power, the power of peace and war, the control over finance, and the administration of fleets and armies. The old sovereign rights of provinces and municipalities were transferred in their entirety to the Sovereign Prince, nothing being left to them but the administration of local affairs. The rights of the people were guaranteed by the creation of a representative assembly, bearing the time-honoured name of the States General, and consisting of 55 members nominated for three years by the provincial States. The States General possessed, like the Sovereign, the power to initiate legislation and a veto ; and to them all extraordinary expenditure had annually to be submitted. The Judiciary was made independent ; and equal rights were guaranteed to the members of all religious persuasions. The entire care of public instruction was given to the Government. There was no responsible Ministry, no jury, no liberty of the Press. It will thus be seen that the authority possessed by the Sovereign under the Fundamental Law of 1814 was to a large extent autocratic.

This erection of the old Republic of the United Provinces into a

unified State under the sovereignty of the Prince of Orange had not merely been received with entire approval by the Allied monarchs, but had suggested to them the creation of a larger Netherland State, which might serve as an effective barrier to French ambition in north-western Europe. The idea of a union of the entire Low Countries was, on the initiative of Lord Castlereagh, first considered at Chaumont (February, 1814), and assumed practical shape in the Treaty of Paris (May 30). Article 6 of that treaty contains the provision : " Holland placed under the sovereignty of the House of Orange shall receive an increase of territory." What this meant is made clear in a secret article annexed to the treaty:—"the establishment of a just equilibrium in Europe demanding that Holland be constituted so as to be in a position to maintain its independence by its own resources, the countries comprised between the sea, the frontiers of France as defined by the present treaty, and the Meuse, shall be united in perpetuity to Holland." The suggestion that the Belgic provinces were to be added to Holland as "*un accroissement de territoire*" was, to say the least, impolitic, and could not fail to give rise to needless irritation.

The next step was taken at the Conference of London, June 20, 1814, when the representatives of the Allied sovereigns drew up what are known as the Eight Articles. They were not made public until a year later, but they were submitted to the Prince of Orange, who, on July 21, in his capacity of Sovereign Prince, accepted them. These momentous Eight Articles, which defined the conditions of the proposed union between the northern and southern Netherlands, run as follows:—1. The union shall be intimate and complete, so that the two countries shall form only a single State, to be governed by the Fundamental Law already established in Holland, which by mutual consent shall be modified according to the circumstances. 2. There shall be no change in those articles of the Fundamental Law, which assure to all religious cults equal protection and privileges, and guarantee the admissibility of all citizens, whatever be their religious creed, to public offices and dignities. 3. The Belgian provinces shall be in a fitting manner represented in the States General, whose sittings, in time of peace, shall be held by turns in a Dutch and a Belgian town. 4. All the inhabitants of the Netherlands thus having equal constitutional rights, they shall have equal claim to all commercial and other rights of which their circumstances allow, without any hindrance or obstruction being imposed on any to the profit of others. 5. Immediately after the union the provinces and towns of Belgium shall be admitted to the commerce and navigation of the Colonies of Holland upon the same footing as the Dutch provinces and towns. 6. The debts contracted on the one side by the Dutch, and on the other side by the Belgian provinces shall be charged to the public chest of the Netherlands. 7. The expenses requisite for the building and maintenance of the frontier fortresses of

the new State shall be borne by the public chest as concerning the security and independence of all the provinces of the whole nation. 8. The cost of the making and upkeep of the dykes shall be at the charges of the districts more directly interested, except in the case of an extraordinary disaster.

These articles were accompanied by a Protocol, dated June 21, in which the Allied Powers explain the reasons for their action. In this document they assert that they desire to consult equally the particular interests of both Holland and Belgium, with the view of bringing about the most perfect amalgamation (*amalgame*) between the two countries, and that they are acting in respect of Belgium in virtue of their right of conquest. They invite the Prince of Orange to give his formal sanction to the union, to designate a provisional Governor-General of Belgium, and to take steps in a liberal spirit of conciliation to bring about the amalgamation desired.

The project of union, as set forth in the Eight Articles, was largely the product of British diplomacy, working in secret accord with the Prince of Orange. The thoroughness of the understanding between the British and Dutch Governments was evident from the terms of the Convention of London concluded between Castlereagh and Fagel (August 13). By this treaty Great Britain restored to Holland her Colonies that had been occupied since 1803 with the important exceptions of the Cape of Good Hope, and of the Guiana Colonies, Essequibo, Berbice, and Demerara. The cession of these possessions was the price paid for Great Britain's help in the accomplishment of the union with Belgium. Holland had likewise to assent to the assumption by the new State of the heavy burden of restoring the fortresses along the French frontier, which had been dismantled by Joseph II. The goodwill of Great Britain, however, was conclusively shown by her offer to contribute £3,000,000 towards the cost of the fortifications.

It will have been seen that the Belgic provinces had, on the ground that the French had been expelled from this territory by the Allied forces, been treated by the Great Powers throughout these transactions as a conquered country whose destinies they could decide at will. The Austrian Government had no desire to recover an outlying dependency exposed to French attack. It sought compensation elsewhere, and was quite ready to support the proposal for the union of the northern and southern Netherlands under the rule of the Prince of Orange. Pending the negotiations, a provisional Government had been established at Brussels, at the head of which was placed the Austrian Baron von Vincent, as Commissary of the Allied Powers (May 5). On August 1, the Sovereign Prince, after his acceptance of the Eight Articles of London, took over the government in the place of Vincent, pending the final decision of the Congress of Vienna upon the boundaries and political status of his new dominions. Many difficulties arose, and the decision

was still far off, when the news of the return (March 8, 1815) of Napoleon from Elba fell like a thunderbolt on the ears of the wrangling diplomats. On March 16, William issued a proclamation, in which he assumed the title of William I, King of the Netherlands and Duke of Luxemburg, and called upon all his subjects to unite in defending their common fatherland against the threatened danger. The step met with general approval both in Holland and Belgium; the foreign Powers did not delay to accept the accomplished fact; and, on May 23, the new kingdom was officially recognised. The invasion of Belgium by Napoleon (June 15) gave the Dutch and Belgian troops the opportunity of fighting side by side at Quatre Bras and Waterloo under the command of the Prince of Orange. The youthful heir to the new throne distinguished himself greatly by his conduct and courage, and was wounded at Waterloo. Thus was the union cemented by blood shed in defence of the common national independence; and the way was made smoother for the settlement of the difficulties which confronted the King in the task of bringing about the "amalgamation" of north and south.

These difficulties were very real and very great. The incorporation of a country containing 3,400,000 inhabitants—by way of "increase of territory"—with another whose population amounted to barely 2,000,000 was on the face of it certain to arouse the suspicion and resentment of the larger community. This would have been the case, even had Belgium felt drawn towards Holland by the bonds of a common language and political traditions, of religious sympathies, or even of material interests. The northern Netherlands looked back upon two centuries of vigorous independence, made glorious by rare displays of national energy and achievement. The southern provinces during these centuries had had no history of their own. They had passed from the rule of one distant foreign sovereign to another, and had been assigned by the Treaty of Westphalia (1648) to the Spanish, by the Treaty of Utrecht (1713) to the Austrian, Habsburgs "*pour servir de barrière aux Provinces-Unies*" against French attacks. Such a retrospect could scarcely fail to make the Dutchman regard the Belgian as, politically, his inferior.

In speaking thus it must, however, not be forgotten that the term "Belgian," used for convenience to signify an inhabitant of the southern Netherlands, does not connote a people of common origin and language. The population of the Belgic provinces is sharply divided into two portions—Flemish and Walloon. The Flemish—in Flanders and the greater part of Brabant, forming about two-thirds of the whole—speak a language differing little from Dutch; and they are in the main of the same stock as the Zeelander and the Hollander, though with a larger Celtic admixture. The Walloons—in Hainault, Namur, Liége—are mainly of Celtic race and use a Romance dialect akin to French. In 1815, however, the differences between Fleming and Walloon were to a large extent concealed beneath a veneer of French culture and French manners.

Among the upper and commercial classes no language but French was ever spoken; and, in their dislike to Dutch supremacy, the Flemish Belgians took a kind of patriotic pride in their borrowed speech, and for a time relegated their native tongue to the level of a rustic *patois*. Nevertheless, the advantages to the Flemings and Brabanters of the opening of the Scheldt to free navigation were so great that a short time would in all probability have been sufficient to create a real feeling of common nationality between them and their close kinsmen across the Dutch frontier, had it not been for the divergence of their religious faith.

In the southern Netherlands, and especially in Flanders, the policy pursued so remorselessly by Philip II and Alva had fully effected its purpose; and after two centuries and a half Belgium remained devotedly attached to the doctrines of the Catholic Church. In the northern Netherlands, on the other hand, though a Catholic minority was tolerated, the character both of the people and the Government had since the days of William the Silent been moulded by adherence to the sternest doctrines of Calvinism. To fuse two populations dominated by such opposite and irreconcilable principles was a task presenting almost insurmountable difficulties. In the north the nobles had long since, and the Protestant clergy little by little, lost all controlling political power; but in the south it was very different; here the priesthood wielded immense influence and used it fearlessly and with astute skill, and could rely upon the support of a strongly clerical nobility. There was no less striking a contrast between Holland and Belgium in the sources of their national well-being and prosperity. The Dutch were a seafaring and commercial people, dwelling in a land for the most part artificially reclaimed from the ocean, with poor soil and no natural products, and depending upon imports for the supply of the necessities of life. The Belgians before the Union had no sea-ports, but their country was fertile and rich in mineral wealth, and they had thriven as a nation of farmers and manufacturers. This clashing of material interests was, however, as has been already shown, mitigated through the advantages which industrial Belgium would enjoy under the terms of the Union by the freeing of the Scheldt to shipping, the revival of Antwerp as a port, and liberty of access to the Dutch colonial possessions.

The effective union of the northern and southern provinces may be taken to date from the proclamation of March 16, 1815, by which the Prince of Orange assumed the title of William I, King of the Netherlands. The new King, after his recognition by the Allied Powers, lost no time in carrying out the modification of the *Grond-wet* of Holland stipulated by the Conference of London. He appointed a Commission (April 22), again under the presidency of van Hoogendorp, consisting of twelve Dutchmen and twelve Belgians. Catholics and Protestants had equal representation; and the members were carefully chosen, of varied experience and capacity, from different schools of political opinion. The

Commissioners had many thorny questions to deal with, and the debates were warm and lively. But the members approached their task in a genuinely conciliatory spirit and with an honest desire to bring it to a satisfactory issue. No change was made in the direction of limiting the powers granted to the King under the Fundamental Law of 1814. On the contrary, the influence of the Crown was increased by the creation of a States General of two Chambers—the First Chamber to consist of not more than 60 members appointed for life by the King, the Second of 110 representatives elected by the provincial States. With an irresponsible Ministry, a First Chamber of royal nominees, and a Second Chamber which had the right to reject, but not to amend, legislative proposals, and whose control over the ordinary budget was only exercised decennially, the executive authority in the new kingdom was virtually placed in the hands of William I. On two questions of primary importance only—that of the representation of the two countries in the Second Chamber of the States General, and that of the equal rights of all forms of religious belief before the law—did the Dutch and Belgian Commissioners find themselves in fundamental antagonism.

The principle of religious equality had been one of the conditions laid down by the Conference of London, and, in spite of the opposition of the Catholic hierarchy, obtained almost perforce the assent of the majority of the Commissioners. The representation question, on the other hand, bristled with difficulties and was practically incapable of a satisfactory solution. The Belgians, under the leadership of Gendebien, urged that the representation should be proportionate to the populations of the two countries. The Hollanders on their part claimed at least equality, on the ground that the northern Netherlands had for two centuries formed an independent sovereign State into which by the decision of the Powers the southern provinces were being incorporated as an increase of territory; and they pointed to their possession of populous colonial territories beyond the seas. As neither of the two nationalities was willing to concede a preponderance to the other, there was but one possible way of surmounting the difficulty—equality.

On July 18, 1815, a royal proclamation announced that the Commission had finished its labours, and that the Fundamental Law would forthwith be submitted to the representatives of the people for their sanction. At the same time the Eight Articles of London, which had hitherto been kept secret, were published. The Dutch States General by a unanimous vote approved the new Constitution (August 8). The result was very different when the Belgian notables met at Brussels, August 18. There were 1323 present out of 1603 who had been summoned; and, to the astonishment and vexation of the King, the Fundamental Law was rejected by a majority of 269. William found himself placed in an awkward dilemma, and he extricated himself by a *coup de main* that was as bold as it was equivocal. He determined

that the 280 notables, who had been summoned, but had not appeared, should be reckoned as voting for approval. He also declared the grounds—*i.e.* objection to religious equality—on which 126 votes had been given for rejection to be invalid, as conflicting with the conditions laid down by the Conference of London, and directed these votes to be added to the “ayes.” In this arbitrary fashion he was able to declare that the Fundamental Law had been approved by a majority of 263. These impolitic and high-handed proceedings were not likely to commend the new Law to the Belgian people.

On September 26, King William made his solemn entry into Brussels; and on the following day in the presence of the States General he publicly took the oath to maintain the Constitution. By this act the union of Holland and Belgium was finally achieved; and the kingdom of the Netherlands began its legal and administrative existence (September 27, 1815). The boundaries of the new State, which now officially came into being, had been determined by the Congress of Vienna (May 31), and comprised the old Republic of the United Provinces and the former Austrian Netherlands, together with the prince-bishopric of Liége and various smaller districts. The King received Luxemburg, erected into a grand duchy (June 8), in exchange for his ancestral Nassau domains, Dillenburg, Siegen, Dietz, and Hadamar, and thus severed his connexion with the lands which had been the cradle of his race. At the second Peace of Paris (November 20, 1815), the duchy of Bouillon and the districts of Marienbourg and Philippeville were transferred from France to the Netherlands. A further rectification of frontier with Rhenish Prussia was effected by supplementary treaties in the following year (June 26 and October 7, 1816).

It is not necessary to follow in continuous order the events of the fifteen years during which the ill-starred union between Holland and Belgium subsisted; and it seems better to trace out the grievances and causes of estrangement, which finally issued in the revolution of 1830. But, before doing so, it must in justice be pointed out that it was a period during which, under the personal care of the King, Belgium made great advances in material prosperity. The means of communication by road and canal were greatly improved. The mineral resources of the country were developed. Flourishing iron, wool, and cotton manufactures were established. Liége, Ghent, Verviers, and other places, became thriving industrial centres; and, owing to the extensive colonial and foreign markets thrown open by the Dutch connexion, the volume of Belgian trade kept growing year by year. The southern provinces had thus from the material point of view every reason to be satisfied with the results of the Union; and there can be but little doubt that, by the exercise of wise and conciliatory statesmanship, the friction which was certain to attend the compulsory fusion of two peoples might have been greatly diminished, so that in process of time Belgian and Hollander

might have been taught to recognise that the political and commercial advantages of Union were worth the sacrifices and the concessions required from each for the common good. But this was not to be.

Of the causes, which tended to alienation, the following demand a brief notice: political and administrative inequalities; religious differences; the language question; finance; the question of the Press.

Mention has already been made of the strong protest raised by the Belgian Commissioners to that article of the Fundamental Law which assigned to Holland with its 2,000,000 inhabitants the same representation in the Second Chamber of the States General as to Belgium with a population of 3,400,000. As a matter of fact, on questions affecting diversely the interests of north and south, the deputies voted together by nationalities; and generally the scale was turned in favour of the Dutch by the adhesion of a few Belgian officials dependent on the Government. Thus two most obnoxious imposts were forced upon the Belgians (July 21, 1821) by a majority of 55 votes, two of which were Belgian, against a purely Belgian minority of 51. On another occasion the annual budget (April 28, 1827) was approved by a majority consisting of 49 Dutch and 4 Belgians. It had been settled by Article 98 of the Fundamental Law that the States General should meet alternately in a northern and a southern city. This was in practice never carried out. All the Ministries remained at the Hague; and the chief administrative and all the military establishments had their seat in Holland. Of the seven Ministers of State in 1816 one only was a Belgian, Duc d'Ursel, who filled the post of Minister of Public Works and Waterways. In 1830 there were still six Dutch Ministers out of seven. Out of 39 diplomatists 30 were Dutch. In the civil departments the nationalities were thus represented: Home—117 Dutch, 11 Belgians; Finance—59 Dutch, 5 Belgians; War—102 Dutch, 3 Belgians. The disproportion in those discharging high military duties was, if possible, even greater. All the nine directors of the great military establishments were Dutch. Out of 43 staff officers eight were Belgians; only one Belgian was to be found among 43 field officers of artillery; of 23 field officers of engineers not one was Belgian. One of the last grievances before the Revolt was the fixing of the Court of Appeal at the Hague by a decree dated June 21, 1830, although the Belgian appeals outnumbered the Dutch in the proportion of 5 to 1.

Articles 190-193 of the Fundamental Law, giving all religious creeds a position of equality before the law, and making all the King's subjects without distinction of religious belief eligible to all dignities and offices, aroused the bitter hostility of the ultra-Catholic party in Belgium. Foremost among these was Maurice de Broglie, Bishop of Ghent, a man of fervent zeal but of fiery and obstinate temperament. He was the real author of a protest addressed by the heads of dioceses to the King against any infraction of the inviolable prerogatives of the

Catholic Church in the southern Netherlands; and on August 2, 1815, the Bishop of Ghent himself issued an *instruction pastorale* to his own diocese, in which he forbade the notables under his jurisdiction to vote for a Fundamental Law containing articles opposed to the inalienable rights of the Catholic Church. After the King's proclamation of August 24, declaring the Constitution accepted, the Bishop published a *jugement doctrinal*, in which the taking of the oath to the new Constitution was spoken of as an act of treason to the dearest interests of religion. This action of the Belgian prelates met with the approval of the Pope, who declined (May, 1817) to sanction the nomination of Count de Méan to the archbishopric of Malines, until he explained that he understood the oath to imply only that equal protection was given to persons of all religious creeds in civil matters. To take the oath "*dans le sens de M. de Méan*" became henceforth a common practice with the Catholic recalcitrants. The defiant attitude of the Bishop of Ghent led to his being summoned before the Court of Assizes at Brussels. He refused to admit the competency of the Court, took refuge in France, and was condemned for contumacy, October 9, 1817. The action of the Government in affixing a copy of the sentence of banishment to a post between two common thieves set in the pillory in the public market-place of Ghent was a highly impolitic act of vengeance. Moreover it availed nothing. The absent prelate continued to rule his diocese through his Vicar-General; and his pastoral letters from Paris met with the willing obedience of the faithful. The Vicar-General was in his turn brought before the Court in 1821, but was acquitted. Fortunately the Chair of St Peter was at that time occupied by a Pope of moderate views. Pius VII discountenanced the violent counsels of the extreme Catholic party, and used his influence on the side of peace.

The interest of the King in the promotion of higher education led to further friction in 1825. He even ventured by a royal decree (July 11) to enact that every candidate for the priesthood, before being admitted to an episcopal seminary, must pass through a two years' course at the *Collegium Philosophicum* that he had founded at the University of Louvain. Another decree (August 11) forbade study at foreign Universities under pain of being shut out from all clerical or civil offices. The object of this was to prevent candidates from seeking their education in Jesuit colleges abroad. These regulations gave the greatest offence to the clerical party and were bitterly opposed by them. The Government, however, had the support of many Belgian Liberals, foremost among them Dotrengé and Reyphins; and the measure met with the support of a considerable majority in the representative Chamber of the States General. Some of the more intemperate of the clericals were prosecuted. With the desire of conciliation, the King entered into negotiations with the Vatican for the arrangement of a

Concordat on the lines of that concluded in France by Napoleon. The agreement was apparently successfully carried out by the diplomacy of the Count de Celles; and in June, 1827, the Concordat was published. By Article 3, instead of five bishoprics in Belgium, eight were to be established in the Netherlands, and the Pope conceded to the King the right of objecting to the names of any candidates of which he disapproved. On the other hand, the two years' course at the *Collegium Philosophicum* was made optional. The concession made in Article 3 was looked upon by the King as a real triumph. Unfortunately the Pope, in his allocution announcing the conclusion of the Concordat, omitted entirely the all-important clause, and in regard to the education of the candidates declared that it was to be in accordance with the prescriptions of the Bishops, who would act in obedience to instructions from Rome. The Government immediately sent a confidential letter to all the Governors of provinces directing them to adjourn the execution of the Concordat. A well-meant effort at conciliation thus ended in failure.

There is nothing which more contributes to a sense of national unity than the use of a common language. It has already been pointed out that the language spoken by some two-thirds of the southern Dutch differed very little from Dutch. The aim of the King from the first, an aim entirely to be commended, was to foster the use of what he named "the national tongue." In this he had the sympathy of the majority of the inhabitants of the Flemish-speaking districts. William's temper, however, was not one to brook delay, or to shrink from arbitrary measures. When the kingdom of the Netherlands came into being, he found that French had been the official tongue of the Belgic provinces during the period of French supremacy, and had been for even a longer time the language ordinarily used by the Government. Many of the well-to-do classes, even in Flanders and Brabant, were entirely ignorant of their native idiom. One of the early acts of William (October, 1814) had been to issue a decree legalising the use of both French and Dutch. In 1819 (September 15) the knowledge of Dutch was made obligatory for admission to all public offices and employments. Finally (October 26, 1822) Dutch was recognised as the national language and made official. Such an arbitrary enforcement upon all Belgians of the tongue of Holland was naturally looked upon as an outward mark of Dutch supremacy and was accordingly strongly resented, especially by the Walloons, to whom the so-called "national language" was a foreign dialect, and by the Belgian advocates. In 1829 the feeling aroused compelled the Government to make concessions; but it was then too late.

By Article 6 of the Protocol of Union the burden was laid upon Belgium of bearing half the national debt of Holland. In 1815 the total debt of the northern Netherlands amounted to two milliards

of florins ; that of the former Austrian Netherlands to 32 millions only. The Dutch Republic, when it fell under French dominion, had passed through a period of misfortune and was crippled by a vast mass of accumulated indebtedness. Such was its financial condition that Napoleon in 1810 had boldly suppressed by decree two-thirds of the debt. William, however, on attaining to power, had felt himself in honour bound not to repudiate the obligations of the State. He had resuscitated the suppressed portion and had divided the debt into 800,000,000 fl. active debt and 1200,000,000 fl. deferred : the latter by a complicated arrangement was to be transformed gradually into active debt by annual drawings. The Dutch deficit in 1814 was 16,000,000 fl. ; in 1815, owing to the Waterloo campaign, it rose to 40,000,000 fl. The Belgians naturally felt aggrieved at being called upon to saddle themselves with a load of debt for which they were in no way responsible. As a compensation, the prospect of wider markets and free intercourse and traffic with the rich colonial possessions of the Dutch was held out to them. But in 1825 a rebellion broke out in Java, which proved very formidable and led to a large expenditure of money ; and the colonial budget, which at first had helped the national finances, came to be an additional drain upon them. There was a constant and growing deficit, which had to be met by a succession of loans and increase of taxation ; and, as the Fundamental Law, by making the voting of the ordinary budget decennial, had virtually placed the control of finance in the hands of the King, on him fell in no small measure the blame for the unsatisfactory state of affairs.

William was indeed placed in a most difficult position ; money had to be raised to meet the deficits ; and unfortunately the measures he adopted more than any other cause of grievance tended to embitter the feelings of the Belgians against the Dutch. Unable to discover means to make both ends meet, the Government in 1821 hit upon two imposts, known as the *mouture* or *gemaal*, and the *abbatage* or *geslacht*. The *mouture* was a tax upon ground corn ; the *abbatage* upon the carcases of beasts : in other words, they were taxes upon bread and butchers' meat. Two more odious and impolitic taxes it is impossible to conceive. The *mouture* brought in 5,500,000 fl., which was wrung chiefly from the poorest classes of the community, and fell with particular hardship on the Belgians, whose chief sustenance was bread. The Dutch consumed more potatoes and vegetables, and not nearly so much bread as their southern fellow-subjects. The produce of the *abbatage* tax was but 2,500,000 fl. ; and it was just as obnoxious in principle as the other. It did not strike so directly at the very poor ; but all classes felt its pressure and resented it ; and both taxes were equally unpopular in Belgium.

How unanimously they were condemned by public opinion in that country may be gauged by an analysis of the division in the Second

Chamber of the States General (July 21, 1821) by which the taxes were sanctioned. In the majority of 55 there were but two Belgians, the minority of 51 consisting entirely of southern representatives. It is indeed strange that any Government could have been so impolitic as to defy such an expression of Belgian aversion from their proposals. It was not, however, until 1829 that the objectionable imposts were abolished. The vote of July 21, 1821, led to a permanent deepening of the cleavage between north and south. From this time the Belgian deputies, led by the orators Dotrengé and Reyphins, systematically and on principle opposed the Hollander Government and seized every opportunity for hampering its action. With equally determined unanimity the Dutch ranged themselves in a solid phalanx, as a Ministerial party; and the autocratic influence of the King was able to command the adherence of a number of Belgians just sufficient to turn the scale in a close division between two parties so evenly balanced. In such circumstances the fusion of the two nationalities was year by year further removed from realisation.

No attempt was made to carry out Article 227 of the Fundamental Law, which guaranteed the freedom of the Press. On the contrary, in this, as in the matter of judicial inviolability, the arbitrary will of the King rode rough-shod over the enactments of the Constitution, which he had himself called into being and had sworn to maintain. A royal *arrêté* of extreme severity had been issued on April 20, 1815, in view of the dangers with which the Netherlands were menaced by the return of Napoleon. By it all persons found guilty of disseminating news or intelligence likely to injure the State or disturb the public peace were liable to be condemned to a number of serious penalties—exposure in the pillory, branding, loss of civic rights, imprisonment from one to six years, and fines ranging from 100 to 10,000 francs. These punishments were to be inflicted without a jury by the sentence of an extraordinary Court of nine judges, all of them holding office at the King's pleasure. Such a decree, if enforced for a strictly limited period, and so long as the public safety was threatened, was justifiable; to maintain it after the crisis was past and in the face of Article 227 of the Fundamental Law was absolutely indefensible.

Nevertheless in 1817, by the authority of this decree of April 20, 1815, the Abbé de Foere was summoned before the Court for having published articles in the *Spectateur Belge* upholding the *jugement doctrinal* and the attitude of the Bishop of Ghent. He was condemned to two years' imprisonment; and the printer, Corneille de Moor, was fined and mulcted in costs. In 1818 (February 18), on the proposal of the Government, a law was passed, which, while slightly modifying the procedure of the temporary decree, gave the sanction of the States General to its provisions and penalties in a permanent form. Thus the Press was muzzled, for the law was systematically and vigorously enforced. In

1819 much popular indignation was aroused by the prosecution of a writer named van der Straeten for the publication of a volume in which he had reflected upon the conduct of the Government. He was sentenced to a penalty of 3000 francs. The fine was paid by public subscription. The determined action of the authorities, though it led to the disappearance of some Opposition journals and the punishment of others, did not intimidate the hostile critics of the administration. In defiance of edicts and of prosecution, a bitter warfare continued to be carried on against "the Dutch Government" by a number of clever and pungent writers, who found sympathetic readers far and wide in the Belgic provinces and gave voice to the general feeling of unrest and discontent.

One of the most striking results of the growing estrangement between north and south through the various causes recounted above was the coalition in 1828 of the Belgian Catholics and Liberals on the common platform of redress of grievances and defence of civil and religious liberty. The population of Belgium was almost entirely Catholic; but it was divided during the period of the Union with Holland, as it is still, into two irreconcilable parties, the ultra-Catholics or Clericals, and the Liberals, consisting of men imbued more or less with the principles and ideas of the French Revolution. These parties, though their representatives in the States General voted together in the support of Belgian interests against Hollander domination, were in reality mutually hostile and jealous; and the King, by a statesmanlike policy of conciliation, might have won over the Belgian Liberals to aid him in his struggle with Clerical intolerance. William, however, pursued his own well-meaning but arbitrary course, without paying any regard to the susceptibilities of his Belgian subjects, whether Catholics or Liberals; and the year 1828 saw the formation of the *Union*, an association founded to secure the harmonious action of both parties in defence of liberty of worship, liberty of instruction, and liberty of the Press.

Towards the end of 1828 the unrest in Belgium began to grow acute, and took the form of an agitation for redress of grievances. Petitions were sent in by the provincial States of Hainault, Liége, and Namur, praying for the repeal of the obnoxious *mouture* and *abbatage* taxes. They met with an unfavourable reception. These were matters not of provincial, but of national, concern. The provincial petitions were therefore replaced by others on a national scale. All classes of people in every part of the country took part in the agitation. The signatories comprised nobles and ecclesiastics, merchants and advocates, town artisans and country peasants. Within a short period a monster petition was presented, signed by 70,000 persons. A series of other petitions speedily poured into the Second Chamber. The Government was irritated rather than moved by these demonstrations. The King, in May and June, 1829, made a royal progress through a number of Belgian towns; and the

personal regard for him, which still subsisted, secured for him everywhere a popular welcome. The applause, which greeted him in the streets, misled him, however, into a serious indiscretion. In a speech at Liège (June) he referred to the "pretended grievances" of the petitions, and spoke of the conduct of their promoters as "infamous"—"*une conduite infâme.*" It was an unfortunate phrase, which rankled in men's minds. In Flanders, in parody of the Beggars of 1566, a mock order of "infamy" was instituted with a medal bearing the inscription "*fidèles jusqu'à l'infamie.*"

The petition movement was accompanied by vigorous action on the part of the Belgian representatives in the Second Chamber, and by daring criticism of and attacks upon the Government in the Press. The Belgian deputy, de Broukère, brought forward (December 3, 1829) a motion for the abolition of the decree of 1815. It was rejected by the unanimous vote of the Hollanders, aided by seven Belgians. On December 11 a royal Message was sent to the States General which caused no small sensation. In it the opposition to the Government in Belgium was described as the work of a few political agitators, and a new law replacing the decree of 1815 for restraining the excesses of the Press was announced. But, while certain concessions were promised in regard to the use of the national language, education, and taxes, a responsible ministry was refused and the principle of monarchical absolutism laid down uncompromisingly. "We have never desired to exercise our rights in an unlimited manner, but, of our own motion (*de notre propre mouvement*) we have always restricted them." This was followed on the very next day by a circular from the Minister of Justice, van Maanen, calling upon all subordinate civil officials to give in their adherence within 24 hours to the principles laid down in the royal Message. From this date van Maanen became a special object of reprobation to the Belgian publicists and pamphlet-writers.

The effects of the attitude of the King were quickly seen. The decennial budget came on for discussion at the end of December. "*Point de redressement de griefs, point d'argent*" became the rallying-cry of the Belgian deputies. The decennial budget of ways and means was rejected by 55 to 52, although that of expenditure had been accepted by 61 to 46. The Minister was obliged to propose a new budget to provide the ways and means for one year only, from which he had withdrawn the obnoxious *mouture*. This was passed by a unanimous vote. The anger of the King at this unexpected check led him to take unwise and unworthy action. A royal decree (January 8, 1830) deprived six deputies who had voted in the majority of their posts and salaries. William was at this time feeling deeply incensed by the continuous and bitter attacks of the Belgian Press, which undoubtedly to a man of his character and temperament appeared not only unjustified, but unjustifiable. Such indeed was the unmeasured violence of the language

used to stir up popular passions against the Government that it was almost impossible to leave it unnoticed.

The offending journalists were chiefly young advocates. Foremost among them were de Potter and Gendebien in *Le Belge*; Ducpétiaux, de Potter, van de Weyer, and Nothomb in the *Courrier des Pays-Bas*; Barthels in *Le Catholique* of Ghent; Lebeau and Rogier in *Le Politique* of Liége. In November, 1829, a particularly furious onslaught in the columns of the Liberal organ, the *Courrier des Pays-Bas*, contained the words: "Jusqu'ici on a traqué les Jésuites; bafouons, honnissons, poursuivons les ministériels." These were from the pen of Louis de Potter and led to his prosecution. He was condemned to eighteen months' imprisonment and a fine of 1000 florins. But he was not silenced; and from his prison he carried on a campaign of pamphlets. He was looked upon as a patriot-martyr by his fellow-countrymen; and all his writings were devoured eagerly and tended to increase the growing excitement of men's minds.

The most daring of all the publications of de Potter was his *Lettre de Démophile au Roi* containing a pungent criticism of the Message of December 11. "No, Sire, you are not the master of the Belgians, as people would have you believe, you are only the first among them; you are not the master of the State, you are its head, the most elevated of its functionaries." Such words as these were a direct challenge to the King's claim to unlimited authority, and as such they were accepted. The climax was reached by the publication (January 31, 1830) in seventeen journals at once of a project, set on foot by de Potter, for a national subscription to indemnify the deputies who had been deprived of their posts and salaries because of their voting against the budget. The correspondence of de Potter with his friend Tielemans, former editor of the *Belge* and the *Courrier des Pays-Bas*, and at that time Referendary in the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, was seized and published; and proceedings were instituted against de Potter and Tielemans, and also against Barthels, editor, and de Nève, printer, of the *Catholique*. All were condemned (April, 1830), and were sentenced to banishment, de Potter for eight years; Tielemans and Barthels for seven years; de Nève for five years.

Not content with prosecution, the Government determined to counteract these attacks of the Press by the establishment at Brussels of a Ministerial organ, the *National*. It was a wise resolve, and, had it been wisely conducted, might have produced good fruit; but, with a perverseness which might almost be regarded as a kind of political insanity, a certain Libri-Bagnano was selected as editor. No more unfitting choice could have been made, for Libri-Bagnano, though a very clever writer and polemical controversialist, was an Italian by extraction, who in France had twice been sentenced to hard labour for forgery. His editorship of the *National* was conducted in a manner

which added fuel to the flames. His declaration "that the Belgians ought to be muzzled like dogs" was looked upon as reflecting the opinion of the hated Minister of Justice, van Maanen; and the names of both men became objects of public execration. Nothing could exceed the general indignation, when it was discovered that Libri-Bagnano had received from the Government for his services no less than 85,000 florins from a public fund, known as the "million of industry."

Thus passed the first six months of 1830, with a growing feeling in the north as well as the south that the attempt to fuse the two peoples into one nationality had proved a hopeless failure and was no longer desirable. Few, however, even among the extreme anti-Dutch partisans in Belgium, dreamt as yet of disruption. Loyalty to the dynasty was widespread; and their aim was administrative separation under one Crown. The great strides made by Belgian industries and trade under the personal fostering care of William I had won for the House of Orange the allegiance of the mercantile, manufacturing, and artisan classes in some of the large towns, notably in Ghent and Antwerp. The Dutch indeed were jealous of the rapid material progress made by the southern provinces, and resented the protective duties, which were maintained to the advantage of the Belgian manufacturers, but to the hindrance of their own sea-borne commerce and carrying-trade. The inhabitants of Amsterdam and Rotterdam, in particular, saw with envious eyes the rapid rise of Antwerp at their expense to a prosperity scarcely exceeded in the thriving days of Charles V. Timely concessions in regard to their more crying grievances would have gone far to reconcile the great majority of Belgians to the Dutch connexion; and there were signs in the spring of 1830 that King William was in a more yielding mood. Royal decrees were issued, May 27 and June 4, which modified the regulations regarding public instruction and the use of the Dutch language. The momentary satisfaction given by these tardy concessions disappeared, however, when by a subsequent decree (June 21) the King established the Supreme Court of Appeal at the Hague. It was clear, moreover, from the retention of van Maanen in the Ministry and of Libri-Bagnano as editor of the *National*, that his Majesty had no real intention of yielding to the pressure of Belgian public opinion.

At this critical stage came the days of July and the rising of Paris, which overthrew the throne of the Bourbons. The news excited extraordinary interest at Brussels, but was followed by no revolutionary demonstrations. On the contrary, the Belgian capital was celebrating in festal fashion the holding of an exhibition of national industry. The King himself and the Princes paid a hurried visit, and had no reason to complain of the character of their reception. The intention was to close the festivities by a grand pyrotechnic display on August 23, and general illuminations in honour of the King's 59th birthday on the 24th. Nevertheless there were many premonitory symptoms of a coming storm.

Leaflets were found scattered broadcast containing the words: "le 23 Août : feu d'artifice ; le 24 Août : anniversaire du Roi ; le 25 Août : révolution." Inscriptions on the walls denounced the Dutch, van Maanen, and Libri-Bagnano. The civil Governor of the province, Baron van der Fosse, and the local officials, were not ignorant that incendiary agencies were at work among the people; but no steps were taken for securing the maintenance of the public peace.

The King, despite the warnings that reached his ears, did not deem it necessary to strengthen the hands of the authorities by remaining in person at Brussels, and actually refused to sanction an increase of the garrison at the request of General Bylandt, the military Governor of Brabant. The total number of troops cantoned in the city only amounted to 1800 infantry, 260 horse, and 6 field pieces of artillery. The excitement of the public was far from being allayed by the action of the city corporation. Under the pretext of bad weather, the fireworks and illuminations were countermanded. This act of weakness caused much disappointment, for the night was fine. It was equally weak to permit on the 25th the first performance of an opera of Scribe and Auber, *La Muette de Portici*, which had been previously prohibited. This opera treated of the Neapolitan uprising under Masaniello against Spanish rule; and its revolutionary sentiments and appeals to popular passion were eminently fitted at that juncture to inflame men's minds. The theatre was crowded; and the performance roused the audience to a frenzied state of patriotic ardour. The infection spread into the streets, which were thronged; and a terrible riot was the issue.

In no city of Europe at that time were so many political refugees from every nation to be found as in Brussels; and to such as these a revolutionary outbreak was as the breath of their nostrils. The rioters rushed to the offices of the *National* and the residence of van Maanen. These were pillaged and burnt; and attacks were likewise made on the dwellings of the director of police and the provincial Governor, and on several manufactories. Disorder and anarchy reigned supreme during the night, unchecked by any demonstration of force on the part of the authorities. The small pickets of troops on duty were ignominiously driven away or compelled to surrender, while the main body was withdrawn to the upper part of the city and piled arms in front of the Royal Palace. This extraordinary supineness on the part of General Bylandt and Major-General Wauthier, the City Commandant, is quite inexplicable. The troops at their disposal were picked men; and with a little resolution the streets might have been cleared, and possibly the whole issue of events changed. On the following day, the 26th, the tumultuary outbreak assumed a more national and patriotic character. The old Brabançon flag was raised, and the Royal insignia were torn down from many buildings. Finding the military forces of no avail, the nobility, merchants, and municipal authorities, met together

and took steps to provide for the public security. An appeal was made for volunteers; and a burgher-guard was organised and placed under the command of Baron d'Hoogvorst. It was divided into sections to patrol the different quarters of the town; and order was restored, though not without bloodshed. On the 28th an assembly of notables was held at the Hôtel de Ville; and a deputation of five was appointed, foremost among them Alexander de Gendebien and Felix, Count de Mérode, to present to the King a respectful and loyal address, asking him to take into consideration the just grievances which had given rise to the present crisis, and to convoke the States General.

The King, on the receipt of the news of the riot, was much moved, but was undecided how to act. His pride made him unwilling to grant concessions or to dismiss van Maanen at the demand of a riotous mob; and, despite the appeal of the Prince of Orange in favour of conciliatory measures, he would only consent to the Prince visiting Brussels, not armed with full powers to deal with the situation, but merely on a mission of enquiry. The Prince and his younger brother, Prince Frederick, set out at once, reaching Antwerp on the 29th and Vilvorde, where a considerable body of troops was encamped, on the 31st. Here Prince Frederick took over the command of the military forces in Belgium; and the Prince of Orange, after receiving a deputation from Brussels headed by General d'Hoogvorst, agreed to proceed to the capital unaccompanied, except by his personal staff. He made his entry on September 1, through serried masses of the burgher-guards and through streets filled with unfriendly crowds. Not a single cry of welcome met his ears, but on the contrary from time to time shouts of "Down with van Maanen—Down with the Dutch!"

Conferences which lasted for three days (September 1-3) effected no good result. The Prince himself was popular in Brussels, and there was as yet no pronounced movement for a change of dynasty; but he had no powers to do more than promise that he would represent the wishes of the people to his father, and his mission was a failure. He took upon himself, however, to order the royal troops to quit Brussels; and on his departure the city found itself for the time being confided to the care of its own citizens. Such an act, though intended to be conciliatory, was looked upon rather as a sign of weakness in the face of armed insurrection against the royal authority. Meanwhile the King at last met the demands for redress of grievances by the dismissal of van Maanen (September 3) and the summoning of a special session of the States General for the 13th. But it was too late. A body of Liégeois, four hundred strong, headed by Charles Rogier, with many other provincials and foreigners had entered Brussels, all determined to push matters to extremities. The King's proclamation, when published on the 7th, was torn down by the mob. For some days a struggle went on between the moderate and the revolutionary parties within the town.

A Committee of Public Safety had been appointed, consisting of eight members: Gendebien, Rouppe, van de Weyer, Count Felix de Mérode, the Prince of Ligne, the Duc d'Ursel, Baron de Sécus, and Ferdinand Meeus, a banker. Of these the first three were Liberals, the others Moderates; but Ligne, Ursel, and Sécus declined to take any active part in the proceedings. The revolutionary party, headed by Charles Rogier and Ducpétiaux, made repeated attempts to proclaim a provisional Government, but were thwarted by the firm attitude of the Committee, and of the two Barons d'Hoogvorst (Emanuel and Joseph), who possessed great influence with the respectable and well-to-do classes. The despatches of Thomas Cartwright, the first secretary of the British Legation at the Hague, who had been sent to Brussels to make a confidential report of the state of affairs in that capital, offer a first-hand and most vivid description of all the phases of this interval of doubt and struggle. Writing on September 19, he states: "The Committee of Public Safety as yet maintains its ground, and firmly resists the projects of the Liberals to proclaim a provisional Government; but the Moderate party is so undermined, it is very probable the present fabric will fall within 48 hours."

His foreboding was correct. On the 20th the Hôtel de Ville was seized by the populace; the burgher-guard was compelled to lay down its arms; and the Committee of Public Safety thenceforth disappeared. Many members of the upper class fled from the town, where the Liégeois and other revolutionary bands, headed by the most violent of the Liberal leaders, Ducpétiaux, Rogier, and Pletinckx, were now masters. During this precious time, when decided action on the part of the King—such as a frank declaration of his intention to redress grievances accompanied by the promise of an amnesty—might, in the opinion of Cartwright, have saved the situation—the States General had met. The King's speech, with its firmly expressed determination to maintain law and order and not to yield to faction, only stirred up to greater fury the passions of the Brussels mob, who burnt copies of it publicly in the streets. Two questions had been submitted by his Majesty to the consideration of the States General: whether experience had shown the necessity for a modification of the national institutions; and, whether the relations between the two parts of the kingdom should be altered? On September 29, by 50 votes to 44, and 55 to 43, both questions were answered by the Second Chamber in the affirmative. But, while deputies were deliberating at the Hague, decisive events had been occurring at Brussels.

The news that the extreme faction had gained the upper hand in the Belgian capital caused the Dutch Government to take immediate action. Orders were sent to Prince Frederick at Vilvorde to enter the city with his army and protect property. The Prince had under his orders about 10,000 men, and on September 23 the troops advanced at daybreak

and penetrated as far as the park ; but the streets beyond had been barricaded, and a desperate resistance was offered by the armed populace under the command of Pletinckx and other energetic leaders, among them Ducpétiaux, Grégoire, and Everard. Bullets rained upon the soldiery from every window and roof, and they suffered considerable losses. For three days almost without cessation the contest continued, with little result save that the troops rather lost than gained ground. At last in the night of the 26th Prince Frederick withdrew his men from the town.

This decisive check was irreparable, and its effect upon men's minds instantaneous. On the following day a provisional Government was established at the Hôtel de Ville, which comprised among its members Gendebien, Rogier, van de Weyer, Emanuel d'Hoogvorst, and Felix de Mérode. A few days later it received an important addition in the person of the exiled Louis de Potter, who returned in triumph to Brussels. Writing on September 28, Thomas Cartwright reports : "All parties have united, and this rebellion has now become a national question. The Moderates and better-disposed inhabitants, who ten days since were actually begging for the entry of the troops, from the moment they saw the efforts of the armed populace were to be successful, and that the army would be repulsed, joined the cause, declared themselves, and they are all now identified with the Liberals, and form but one party and have but one object, to drive the troops back to Holland. This is their cry ; and every moment confirms me more in the opinion that a general rising cannot be prevented."

Prince Frederick led his army into Antwerp on October 2. In a little more than a fortnight every other town had declared for the national cause; and the royal garrisons—the Belgian contingents siding with their compatriots—either surrendered or withdrew. On October 4 the provisional Government declared the Belgian provinces to be an independent State, and summoned a National Congress. The very same day King William made a last attempt to preserve the southern Netherlands for the House of Nassau. The Prince of Orange was sent to Antwerp to take over in the King's name the government of Belgium, and carry out a policy of conciliation. The Prince, however, found himself in an impossible position ; his efforts to put himself at the head of the revolution met with no response ; and on October 24 he found it necessary to escape from his embarrassments by returning to Holland. His departure was followed by a tumultuary attack upon the Dutch troops, as by the order of General Chassé they were retiring from the town to the citadel ; and a number of them lost their lives. By way of reprisal (October 27) the town was bombarded from the citadel and the gun-boats in the river—an act which increased the growing bitterness of feeling between Dutch and Belgians, and deepened the desire of both peoples for a political separation, which should be final and complete.

The National Congress, which consisted of 200 members directly

elected by all Belgian citizens above 25 years of age, met at Brussels on November 10. On November 18, by a unanimous vote, Belgium was declared to be an independent State. Opinions were divided as to the form of government; but the monarchists were in a large majority. After some stirring debates the assembly by 174 votes to 13 decided (November 22) for a monarchy, and two days later, by a preponderance of opinion only slightly less pronounced (161 to 28), declared the House of Orange-Nassau for ever excluded from the throne. The moderation displayed by the Congress was strongly distasteful to men holding extreme democratic views, like Louis de Potter, who resigned his post in the provisional Government, and returned to France. The task of drawing up a Constitution occupied some months; but the new Fundamental Law was completed and promulgated on February 7, 1831. By its provisions the executive power was assigned to an hereditary King, who was to govern through Ministers appointed by himself, but responsible to a legislative body consisting of two Chambers. The independence of the judiciary, and the liberty of the Press, of worship, education, association, and petition, were carefully guarded. It was, in fact, the aim of the Congress to set up a constitutional monarchy and parliamentary institutions modelled upon those of England.

While the Congress at Brussels was thus occupied, the affairs of Belgium had been an object of solicitude to the Great Powers. The kingdom of the Netherlands had in 1814 been created by Austria, Great Britain, Prussia, and Russia, as a bulwark against French ambition. King William had on October 5 informed all the signatories of the Articles of London of the serious state of things in the Belgic provinces, and had called upon them to assist by force of arms in the restoration of order. But the Europe of 1830 was no longer the Europe of 1814; and William was disappointed in his hopes of regaining by a European mandate his lost authority in the southern Netherlands. England and France had already come to an understanding to act together in the interests of peace; and on their proposal it was arranged that the plenipotentiaries of the Five Powers—France being now represented in the Concert—should meet in conference at London to deliberate upon the situation. They met on November 4; and by their mediation an armistice was accepted by Holland and Belgium, pending the decision of the Powers as to the future relations of the two countries. France was favourable to the Belgian cause; Great Britain not unfriendly, so long as precautions were taken against the aggrandisement of France; Austria and Russia were, from the end of November, too much occupied with the Polish Revolution to desire any armed intervention in the Netherlands. Prussia alone would have taken action on behalf of the King of Holland, so closely connected with the Prussian royal House, but was overborne by the determination of the two western Powers to seek a peaceable solution of the difficulties.

On December 20, to the chagrin of King William, the Conference accepted in principle the independence of Belgium, and the dissolution of the kingdom of the Netherlands. This preliminary step was followed by the promulgation on January 20 and 27 of two Protocols. In the first the conditions of separation were set out. To Holland was assigned the boundary of 1790. The rest of the Netherlands, save the grand duchy of Luxemburg assigned to the House of Nassau, were to form the new Belgian State, which was to be perpetually "neutral" under the guarantee of the Powers. By the second the proportion of the joint debt to be borne by Belgium was assessed at sixteen parts in thirty-one; and it was declared that no King of the Belgians should be recognised, unless he assented to the conditions of the two Protocols, and was in other ways acceptable to the Powers.

These conditions were far from palatable to the National Congress at Brussels. The Belgians had set their hearts upon the inclusion of Luxemburg, Maestricht, and Dutch Flanders within their territory, and had already determined to proceed to the choice of a King without consultation with anyone. The Protocols were received with indignant resentment. By 163 votes to 9 the Congress protested (February 1) against the assignment of Luxemburg to the King of Holland, and two days later by the election of the Duke of Nemours, the second son of Louis-Philippe, declared their preference for a close dynastic connexion with France, although it was known that European diplomacy would not assent to any member of the reigning families of any of the Great Powers, and least of all to a French prince, being seated upon the Belgian throne. This was no hurried vote. The names of several candidates for the kingship had been freely discussed since the previous November. Of these, two speedily stood out—Duke Augustus of Leuchtenberg, son of Eugène Beauharnais, and Louis de Nemours, the cadet of the House of Orleans—the one the representative of the Napoleonic tradition, the other of the principles of the monarchy of July.

On the day of election (February 3) Nemours obtained 97 votes, Leuchtenberg 74, and Archduke Charles 21. The result was gratifying to Louis-Philippe, rather from the rejection by the Congress of the candidature of the Bonapartist Duke, than because of the election of his son. The French King had previously warned the Belgians that he could not imperil his good understanding with England and run the risk of European complications by sanctioning the candidature of the Duke of Nemours, and he now in his son's name declined the proffered crown. He had really no option but refusal, unless he were prepared to uphold an Orleanist monarchy in Belgium by force of arms; for the Conference lost no time (February 7) in signifying that it could not recognise the Duke of Nemours as King. A period of unrest followed, during which the Orange partisans were active in fomenting plots at Antwerp, Ghent, and other places; and, though the election of Baron Surlet de

Chokier as Regent (February 24) strengthened the executive power, which was able without difficulty to put down disturbance and maintain the public peace, it was felt that, if the independence of Belgium was to be assured, speedy action must be taken in the choice of a King acceptable to the Powers. For King William was astutely watching the trend of events; and, while biding his time, he had thought it politic to put himself on good terms with the Conference, by accepting (February 18) the conditions set forth in the Protocols of January 20 and 27.

It was at this time that the candidature of Prince Leopold of Saxe-Coburg began to be seriously considered. The most active part in pressing the matter to a definite issue was taken by Lebeau, the Minister of Foreign Affairs in the new Belgian Government; his predecessor, van de Weyer, was actually the first to bring forward the name of the Saxon prince. Having carefully sounded the dispositions of the English and French Governments on the subject, Lebeau was able to report to the Regent and to the Congress that the candidature of this Prince, while acceptable to Great Britain, would not be opposed by King Louis-Philippe. Finally four commissioners were despatched to London to lay before Prince Leopold the state of affairs in Belgium, and to make him the offer of the Crown, subject to ratification by the Congress. The commissioners were likewise instructed to seek, through the Prince's mediation, should he be willing to be a candidate for the throne, some modification of the Protocols.

After many negotiations and discussions, both the objects of this mission were accomplished. On June 4 Leopold was elected King of the Belgians by 152 votes against 43; and the efforts of the new King and the Belgian commissioners resulted in the substitution by the Conference of the preliminaries of peace between Holland and Belgium, known as the 18 Articles (June 24), for the Protocols of January 20 and 27, which a later Protocol of April 17 had declared to be "fundamental and irrevocable." Important concessions were made to Belgium: that the question of the boundaries in Luxemburg and at Maestricht should be reopened and dealt with in a separate negotiation; and that the debt assigned to Belgium should be that which she bore at the date of union, together with a portion of that incurred since 1815. The preliminary treaty received the signatures of the plenipotentiaries of the Five Powers on June 26; and on the same day Leopold wrote to the Regent to say that, so soon as the conditions contained in the 18 Articles, to which he was definitely bound, were accepted by the Congress, he would feel that all the difficulties which had stood in the way of his acceptance of the Crown were removed, and that he would be ready to sail at once for Belgium. On July 9, after stormy debates, Congress by 126 votes to 70 ratified the 18 Articles; on July 17 the King-elect entered Belgium. He was everywhere enthusiastically welcomed. The ceremony of taking the oath to the Constitution took place publicly at Brussels, July 21, in

the Place Royale in the presence of the Regent, the Ministers, and a vast crowd of people, amidst every demonstration of national rejoicing.

The new reign was, however, in its opening stages to be beset with difficulties; and it was fortunate for the Belgians that they possessed in their King a man of character, sagacity, courage, and discretion. Leopold of Saxe-Coburg had by his marriage with Princess Charlotte Augusta, the short-lived heiress to the throne of England, and his subsequent long residence in that country, acquired an intimate knowledge of international politics, and a wide experience of men and things, and was conspicuous among his contemporaries for the breadth of his views, and his cosmopolitan sympathies. A ruler with these qualifications was well-fitted to guide the destinies of a nascent State through its days of storm and stress. But the rejoicings at his enthronement, and the satisfaction at the modification of the Protocols of January 20 and 27, were doomed to be short-lived.

Amid the general enthusiasm the possibility that the King of Holland might refuse his assent to any cession of territory was wholly disregarded. If he would not yield he must be coerced; "the Prince [Leopold] has declared it, and he will, if need be, make war, to obtain Luxemburg and Maestricht"—said the Minister Lebeau in the debate in Congress. But William, who had collected a powerful army on the frontier, was in no yielding mood. He expressed himself (July 12) deeply aggrieved that the Powers should have gone back upon their solemn declaration that the conditions of peace between Holland and Belgium as set forth in the Protocols of January were "irrevocable," and he announced that he should regard as an enemy anyone who accepted the Crown of Belgium on any other conditions. Despite the warning of the Powers (July 25) that a renewal of hostilities would not be permitted, the King, with a politic boldness justified by the event, was resolved to convince Europe that the Dutch nation was strong enough to maintain its rights single-handed. The easy triumph of the revolution in September and October, 1830, had induced a feeling of contempt for the power and prowess of Holland. William had the whole-hearted support of his people in his determination to teach the Belgians a lesson and to abase their pride.

The Prince of Orange, invested with the supreme command by a royal Decree of July 29, placed himself at the head of a well-equipped field force of 36,000 men with 72 guns, and on August 2 crossed the frontier. The Belgians were unprepared for the onset. In numbers they were perhaps not inferior to their opponents, but they were badly organised, and at the beginning of August their main army, consisting of some 25,000 men, was divided into two corps—the army of the Scheldt under de Tieken de Terhove, and that of the Meuse under Nicolas Daine. The Prince of Orange proved that he had not served his apprenticeship in arms under Wellington in vain. He threw himself into the

gap between the two Belgian corps, which were able to offer no effectual resistance. The corps of Tieken was forced back from post to post; that of Daine retreated rapidly and in the utmost disorder upon Liége. Leopold himself joined Tieken, and did all that man could do by courage and example to stem the Dutch advance upon the capital. At Louvain (August 12) he made a last stand against overwhelming odds, and repeatedly exposed his life; but it was all in vain, and Louvain had to be abandoned. The situation is thus described by Lebeau in a letter to van de Weyer (August 11): "The army of General Daine is completely routed without having fought.....Belgium, it must be owned, has no regular army; it is an armed mob and nothing more. We have no real military capacity; we have no want of muscle and individual courage, but very great want of an organising head."

At Louvain, however, the brilliant campaign, which had inflicted so terrible a humiliation in the very first weeks of its existence upon the Belgian kingdom and its sovereign, came to an end. With the sanction of the Powers, and at the invitation (which had been withheld as long as possible) of King Leopold and his Ministers, a strong French army under Marshal Gérard entered Belgium, and advanced towards Louvain. But the Dutch had accomplished their task, and had no intention of engaging in hostilities with France. By the mediation of Sir Robert Adair an armistice was concluded; and it was agreed that the Prince of Orange should evacuate the Belgian territory. The Dutch army recrossed the frontier (August 20); and their retirement was speedily followed by that of the French.

The Conference met again at London; in the words of Nothomb, despatched on a confidential mission to London, "the 18 Articles had perished at Louvain"; and Belgium paid for its defeat. On October 15 the Conference published, in 24 Articles, a new treaty of separation, which was declared to be final and irrevocable. By the 24 Articles Maestricht was assigned to Holland, and the western portion only of Luxemburg was granted to Belgium, and this in exchange for certain districts of Limburg. The charges for the debt were fixed in a manner disadvantageous to Belgium; and the freedom of navigation in the Scheldt was hampered by the payment of dues to Holland. Hard as these conditions were, Leopold saw plainly that the existence of Belgium as an independent State was at stake and that they must be accepted. His threat to abdicate, if the assent of Congress were refused, had the desired result. The 24 Articles were ratified by the Chamber of Representatives by 59 votes to 38; in the Senate by 35 votes to 8. The treaty was signed in London (November 15). The kingdom of Belgium was thus formally recognised by the plenipotentiaries and its independence guaranteed. The actual ratification by the different Powers was delayed for various reasons. That of England and France was given on January 31, 1832; that of Austria and Prussia on April 18, lastly that of Russia on May 4.

The settlement with Holland was however not yet attained. Before the Ten Days' Campaign King William had refused to accept the 18 Articles; and now his striking military successes had rendered him more obdurate than before. He hoped to obtain more advantageous terms than were offered in the 24 Articles; and he refused to sign them or to evacuate the citadel of Antwerp or other places that he occupied within the frontiers assigned to Belgium. Finding that he was not to be moved from his resolution, the Powers determined to use coercion; and to England and France was deputed the task of driving the Dutch from Belgian territory. The joint fleets of those Powers blockaded the coast of Holland, and, in particular, the mouth of the Scheldt; and a French army of 60,000 men under Marshal Gérard marched upon Antwerp (November, 1832). The siege lasted from November 30 to December 22, when the Dutch garrison under General Chassé, after a brave defence, capitulated. For some little time longer the blockade continued, to the great injury of Dutch trade; and the King felt himself compelled to make overtures for peace. By the Convention of London (May 21, 1833) it was agreed that, pending the drawing up of a definitive treaty, there should be no renewal of hostilities with Belgium, and that navigation on the Scheldt and Meuse should be entirely free and open. William, however, obstinately refused to recognise the independence of Belgium under the conditions of the 24 Articles; and the Convention of London was really nothing more than a maintenance of the *status quo*, Belgium remaining as before in possession of Luxemburg (except the fortress) and of Limburg without Maestricht. The navigation of the Scheldt was still subject to dues paid to Holland, while that of the Meuse was regulated by a special convention signed at Zonhoven in Limburg, November 18, 1833.

For a period of well-nigh five years, no steps were taken to disturb the *status quo* or to convert the Convention of May 21, 1833, into a definitive treaty. The King of Holland had refused to sign the 24 Articles; but, in agreeing to the Convention, he had undertaken as a preliminary to a final settlement of the territorial question to obtain the assent of the Germanic Diet and the agnates of the House of Nassau to the proposed exchange of the Walloon portion of Luxemburg for a portion of Limburg. Year after year passed by, but this assent was not produced; the Conference did not meet; and the whole of Luxemburg without the fortress and of Limburg except Maestricht were treated as integral parts of the Belgian kingdom. The people of the two provinces were quite contented with their lot, and cheerfully paid their taxes; and, when certain overtures that were made in October, 1836, by King William to Lord Palmerston for the reopening of the negotiations of 1833 proved abortive, public opinion in Brussels began to look upon the possession of Luxemburg and Limburg as permanently sanctioned. The new kingdom of Belgium found itself able to get on

exceedingly well without any formal treaty with or recognition from Holland, and no longer troubled itself about the matter.

But it was otherwise with the Dutch people. They had given the King their hearty and practically united support in 1831 and 1833; but with the lapse of years their views began to change. They saw Belgium prospering and in quiet possession of territories which the Powers in Conference had assigned to Holland; and the burden of maintaining a large force under arms in readiness for emergencies pressed more and more heavily upon them. Dislike of these extraordinary charges grew stronger each year both in the country and in the States General. At last even the proud and obstinate spirit of the King felt that the time had come to yield to the force of circumstances. But William saw clearly that the 24 Articles of 1831 offered far more advantageous conditions of peace than were likely to be obtained by a continuation of the negotiations of 1833; and on March 14, 1838, he gave instructions to his envoy in London, Dedel, to inform Lord Palmerston that he gave his adherence to the conditions of separation which the Five Powers in their note of October 15, 1831, had declared to be final and irrevocable, and was ready to sign the treaty of the 24 Articles.

This unexpected step caused the greatest emotion in Belgium. The thought that in 1838 they should be called upon to make the territorial cessions to the Dutch in Luxemburg and Limburg, which had been imposed upon them in 1831 in the hour of their defeat, aroused a feeling of universal indignation. The strongest efforts were made to influence the Powers to make the conditions of the treaty more favourable to Belgium. It was represented that the refusal of King William to sign the treaty of 1831, and the subsequent negotiations of 1833, in which he had taken part, had rendered the 24 Articles null and no longer binding. But the Conference showed itself inflexible, and insisted on the carrying out of that part of the treaty which related to the territorial settlement. On one point only did the efforts of the Belgian Government succeed in securing a revision of the terms of 1831 in their favour. The annual charge of 8,400,000 fl. placed upon Belgium on account of its share in the debt was lowered and fixed at 5,000,000 fl. The treaty was signed in London, May 19, 1839. By this treaty the kingdom of Belgium at last, after eight years of negotiations and diplomatic bickerings, finally took its place, under the guarantee of the five Great Powers, as an independent but neutral State in the European family of nations. There still remained many details to be arranged between Holland and Belgium concerning the frontiers, the free navigation of the Scheldt and Meuse, and finance; but all was settled amicably, and a final treaty between the two countries was signed at the Hague, November 5, 1842, when their relations were permanently placed upon a friendly footing.

## CHAPTER XVII.

### MEHEMET ALI.

THE Eastern Question, obscured for the while by the more immediate perils to European peace caused by the revolutions of 1830, so soon as these perils were past, emerged again to trouble the chanceries with yet acuter developments. Of its many episodes one had been closed by the establishment of an independent Greece under the aegis of the three Powers; but the Question itself remained, patent to all the world, since the Treaty of Adrianople had revealed the “mouldering empire” of the Ottomans lying at the mercy of an all-devouring Russia, able now—as it seemed—to exploit its weakness for her own ends. This was the outstanding fact of the situation, determining the attitude of the Powers for years to come, and not least strangely that of Russia itself. For the understanding of the somewhat obscure workings of European diplomacy during the ten years’ crisis provoked by the revolt of Mehemet Ali against the Porte, it is necessary to know something of the international interests involved, of the views of those responsible for the policy of the several Powers engaged, and of the external influences by which their policy tended to be modified.

Alone of the Great Powers, Great Britain, Navarino notwithstanding, seemed to maintain unbroken the tradition of her policy in the East: that of upholding the integrity of Turkey as a barrier against Russian designs on India. The Peace of Adrianople and its consequences had made this policy all the more urgent; since Russia, with new prestige, was intriguing in Persia, stretching out feelers through Armenia and Kurdistan and so far south as Baghdad, and threatening to cut off the trade-route to India by the Euphrates valley just when the invention of steam power had given to this route a new prospective value for British commerce. Of the other Powers traditionally friendly to Turkey, France, since Napoleon’s expedition to Egypt, had developed ambitions on the Mediterranean coast of Africa, little consistent with the integrity of the Ottoman empire and culminating in the conquest of Algiers. Austria, whose zeal in support of the Sultan’s legitimate authority had, after all, been no more than the sudden outcome of the establishment of

Russian influence on the Lower Danube, was showing a disposition to second the Tsar's ambitions in the East, unaccountable to those who were as yet ignorant of the new direction given to Russian policy after 1829. It was this ignorance that made the diplomatic discussions of the years that followed so largely a game of cross questions and crooked answers. The two western Powers, cut off by their Liberalism from the Tsar's august confidence, interpreted Russian activities in the East by what they knew of the traditional policy of Peter the Great and Catharine. The establishment of Russia on the Black Sea littoral, pushed forward with every fresh victory of her arms, made it inevitable that she should aim at holding the key to the only gate by which her commerce and her fleets could pass from the Euxine to the outside world. The conquest of Constantinople, which would have upset the whole balance of power in the Mediterranean, seemed to be not only a natural ambition but, as Lord Ponsonby pointed out, "the duty" of the Tsar.

Yet it was precisely when the ambitions of the Tsar's predecessors seemed on the point of realisation, that Russia deliberately turned aside from them. At the close of 1829, the Emperor Nicholas had appointed a committee of statesmen to enquire into the attitude to be taken by Russia in the event of a break-up of the Turkish empire; and discussion had revealed the dangers and inconveniences to be expected from any final collapse of the Ottoman power in Europe. Of these an international Congress, in which the interests of Russia would be subordinated to those of Europe, seemed the least. On the other hand, in the event of war, Russia might gain a few provinces; but she would risk the creation of strong States in southern Europe and the consequent loss of that steady influence over her weak neighbours which was the surest safeguard of her interests. The committee, therefore, reported in favour of the preservation of the Ottoman empire; the Emperor Nicholas, however reluctantly, accepted their verdict; and the maintenance of the *status quo* in southern Europe became for the next few years the basis of Russian policy.

Had this attitude been frankly explained to the other Powers interested in the Eastern Question, it might have set bounds to a whole sea of troubles. Unhappily the immediate issues were complicated to an unusual degree by the general European situation. Austria, in sympathy with the attitude of the Emperor Nicholas toward the revolutionary spirit, was admitted to his counsels—a fact which explained the otherwise inexplicable attitude she assumed during the crisis which culminated in the Treaty of Unkiar Skelessi. Towards the Liberal Powers the Emperor maintained a haughty reserve, which afterwards went so far as to allow them to remain under the false impression that, by the secret Convention of Münchengrätz (September 18, 1833), he had arranged with Austria for an eventual partition of the Ottoman empire. A situation already sufficiently difficult was thus rendered yet more

delicate ; and Great Britain, not unreasonably, saw in the patent fact of Russian preponderance at Constantinople the penultimate stage in the process which would end by placing Russia formally in possession of the gates of the Black Sea. Such, broadly speaking, was the international situation, when, in the autumn of 1831, the news reached Constantinople of the revolt of Mehemet Ali, Pasha of Egypt, and of the invasion of Syria by his son Ibrahim at the head of a disciplined and well-appointed army.

Like Ali of Janina, whose adventurous career had come to an end ten years before, Mehemet Ali was an Albanian ; a native of Kavala, a small sea-port on the frontier of Thrace and Macedonia, where his father was an Aga, or yeoman farmer. Born in 1769, he lived in his native town as a petty official and trader in tobacco until, in 1798, Napoleon's expedition to Egypt gave him his opportunity. He took service as second in command of a regiment of Albanian Bashi-Bazuks recruited in his neighbourhood, went to Egypt, and at Aboukir, on July 25, 1799, was driven into the sea with the routed Turks. Saved from drowning by the gig of the British admiral, Sir Sidney Smith, he returned to Egypt in 1801, this time in command of his regiment, and on May 9 won distinction by heading a bold cavalry charge at the battle of Rahmanieh. In the troublous years that followed, Mehemet Ali, leader of a compact body of Albanian clansmen, was in a position to make the most of the many possibilities opened to his ambition in the struggle for power between the Mamelukes and the representatives of the Porte. In 1803 he cast in his lot with the former ; in the following year he turned against them and declared his loyalty to the Sultan ; a year later, the sheikhs of Cairo, weary of the perennial anarchy, elected him Pasha ; and in 1806, after due delay, a firman of the Sultan confirmed their choice. The disastrous British expedition of 1807 followed ; and, while at Constantinople the prestige of the Sultan was being weakened by the series of revolutions which in 1808 brought Mahmud II to the throne, that of Mehemet Ali was enhanced by the exhibition at Cairo of a captive British force and an avenue of posts decorated with the heads of British slain. The situation revealed to the astute Albanian a boundless vista of possibilities. In spite of his recent victory, his experience of war with European troops had proved to him the superiority of European methods ; and, as the first step towards the empire of which he already dreamed, he determined to create for himself an army and a fleet on the European model. The beginning of the fleet was made in 1808, with the aid of French officers and engineers. In 1811 the massacre of the Mamelukes removed the last peril to Mehemet Ali's ascendancy in Egypt, while the foundations of his empire beyond were laid by the war against the Wahabis and the conquest of the holy cities of Mecca and Medina. Progress at first was slow. The Wahabi war dragged on till 1818, when Ibrahim, the Pasha's son, who in 1816 had

driven the remnant of the Mamelukes into Nubia, was sent to end it. This done, the Pasha turned his attention southward to the vast country watered by the Upper Nile. In 1820 the oasis of Siwa was subdued; in 1823 were laid the foundations of Khartoum.

Meanwhile, in order to secure the funds necessary for his vast plans, Mehemet Ali had devised that bizarre system of state socialism which, while it made his initial success possible, led ultimately to the failure of his schemes. The beginning had been made so early as 1808, when, on the pretext of restoring the system established by Selim I at the time of the Ottoman conquest in 1517, he abolished all private ownership of land and made the former freeholders of Egypt his own tenants. The gratifying financial results of this expedient led to further experiments of a kindred nature, till in a few years' time there was not an article of prime necessity in the country that had not become a monopoly of the Government. Besides his efforts to exploit for his own use the native industries, Mehemet Ali endeavoured to introduce others; and in 1822 a beginning was made with the establishment of manufactories under government control in the Delta. At the same time the army was undergoing a thorough reorganisation under the French Colonel Sèze, known in Islam as Suleiman Pasha. The true nature and tendency of these "reforms" were long hidden from the world, dazzled by the novel spectacle of a Turkish Pasha posing as the enlightened patron of modern progress. Only those most intimately acquainted with the actual conditions in Egypt were aware of the fundamental weakness of a system built up on a false economic basis, of which the first outcome had been to convert a nation of free cultivators into a nation of serfs. When, in the crisis of the war of Greek independence, Sultan Mahmud appealed for help to his powerful Vali, men drew from the contrast between Egyptian efficiency and Turkish incompetence a moral which the sequel was, in large measure, to belie.

It was only with reluctance that Mahmud in 1822 had bestowed upon Mehemet Ali the pashalik of Crete. The Sultan's whole policy had been directed, with success, to crushing the various forces within the empire, whether the Janissaries or too powerful Viceroys, which hampered the omnipotence of the central power. Nothing but stern necessity would have induced him to add to the threatening authority of Mehemet Ali. Besides the Morea, the pashaliks of Syria and Damascus—objects of ambition to every Egyptian ruler from time immemorial—were to have been the Pasha's reward. The intervention of the Powers had cheated Mehemet Ali of his reward, so far as Greece was concerned; the failure of the Egyptian arms in face of this intervention gave the Sultan the excuse for withholding the rest. Every motive now spurred the Pasha to revolt: disappointed ambition, and the instinct of self-preservation. In the spring of 1831 the rebellious Pashas, Hussein of Bosnia and Mustafa of Skutari, had been

crushed by the Sultan's forces under Reshid ; the Sultan hated the upstart whose power overshadowed his own, and was surrounded by the personal enemies of the Pasha of Egypt, notably by Khusrev, the Seraskier or commander-in-chief, who, as Pasha of Egypt, had been outwitted and humiliated by Mehemet Ali in 1803. Mehemet Ali felt that his own turn would come next, so soon as the reform of the Ottoman army should give a reasonable prospect of overthrowing him. He determined to forestall the danger. On November 1, 1831, a force of 9000 Egyptian infantry and 2000 cavalry invaded Syria and met at Jaffa the fleet under Ibrahim as commander-in-chief. Siege was at once laid to the fortress of St Jean d'Acre.

Such was the news which greeted Sir Stratford Canning when, in April, 1832, he arrived at Constantinople to arrange the final settlement between the Ottoman empire and the new kingdom of Greece. The scope and meaning of the Pasha's action were not as yet clear ; Ibrahim was delayed by the stubborn resistance of Acre ; and meanwhile the air was full of the wildest rumours. The *Moniteur Ottoman* spoke of a plot of the Pasha to claim the Khalifate in collusion with the Shereef of Mecca, and denounced the sacrilegious ambition of this upstart. Mehemet Ali, on the other hand, disclaimed any disloyal intentions ; his immediate aim was to chastise the ex-slave Abdullah, Pasha of Acre, who had dared to harbour the refugees from Egypt whom his "reforms" had driven out, and Khusrev who had aided and abetted in the refusal to surrender them ; his ulterior aim was to secure the fulfilment of the Sultan's promises in respect of Syria and Damascus. As for Mahmud, he refused to listen to any suggestion for coming to terms ; but he was hampered by continued unrest in Albania and Bosnia, by the weight of his unpaid debt to Russia, and by his resentment at the enforced concessions to Greece which made him for a moment listen to the suggestions of those who bade him yield all, so as to secure peace in Islam and turn a united front of defiance to Europe. Meanwhile Mehemet Ali held the command of the sea, the efforts of the Ottoman Government to replace the fleet destroyed at Navarino breaking down on the old difficulty of finding efficient crews. Nor were Turkish military preparations much more advanced ; and, before the Ottoman troops had begun their march, Ibrahim had occupied Gaza and Jerusalem as well as Jaffa. It was not till April 19 that Hussein Pasha, the commander-in-chief, left Constantinople with the cavalry ; not till the third week in May that the Sultan's hesitations were ended and the ban of outlawry launched against Mehemet Ali. Some ten days later (May 27), Acre was stormed by Ibrahim's Arabs ; and on June 15 Damascus opened its gates to him.

The conditions under which the Egyptian commander was able to follow up his initial successes without delay were due as much to his political acumen as to his military genius. As he advanced northwards, the

Lebanon, with its warlike tribes of Christians and Druses, lay on his left flank, the Syrian desert, with its nomad Arabs, on his right. Had these remained faithful to the Sultan, the rapid march of the Egyptian would have been impossible; even the hostility of the more peaceable Syrian cultivators of the plains would have seriously hampered his progress. Ibrahim had known how to conciliate all these conflicting elements, united only in their common hatred of the dominant Turk. The Emir Beshir, chief of the Lebanon, was won over, and his tribesmen reinforced the Egyptian army or garrisoned the conquered towns; the Christians were gained by a promise of equal rights, as an earnest of which Christian governors were appointed in the coast cities; the peasants welcomed the deliverer who promised to relieve them of the intolerable oppression of Ottoman misrule; lastly, the Arabs, in more or less chronic revolt against the Porte, actively sympathised with an invasion which had assumed the character of an Arab movement against the Turks. Under these circumstances Ibrahim could press forward without misgiving. Within a month of the capture of Damascus he met and defeated the Turkish advance-guard, under Mehemet, Pasha of Aleppo, at Homs, a hundred miles to the northward (July 9), and again, two days later, at Hamah (July 11). The army of Hussein, panic-stricken at the news, fled northwards in disorder. At Aleppo the Ottoman commander collected the scattered battalions and led them to Alexandretta, where the Turkish fleet lay at anchor. But Ibrahim, as usual, was swift to follow up his victory; on July 17, after a series of forced marches, he entered Aleppo; on July 29 he came up with Hussein himself, strongly posted in the pass of Beilan near the sea. Once more the Egyptian arms were completely victorious; all Syria was lost to the Sultan; and the vanguard of the Egyptian army, under Abbas, the future Khedive, was free to pass the mountains and occupy Adana in Asia Minor.

The news of these crushing defeats struck the Seraglio with consternation. Sultan Mahmud was under no illusion as to his own intense unpopularity, and the corresponding enthusiasm of all classes of his subjects for the hated Mehemet Ali. In effect, the Sultan's policy had illustrated once more the danger of half-measures. Such changes as he had hitherto introduced had irritated the fanatical temper of his people, without any corresponding improvement in their material condition. The Mussulman world resented with growing murmurs the intrusion of European ideas which, since 1829, seemed to symbolise the state of vassalage towards Russia into which the Sultan had fallen; and the Khalif was hated as a traitor to Islam. Mehemet Ali had thus the advantage of a twofold prestige: to Europe he posed as the pioneer of modern civilisation in the East, to the Mussulman world as the champion of Islam against the infidel Khalif. Had there been no question but that of a duel between the Sultan and the Pasha, the issue,

in the opinion of those most competent to judge, could not have been doubtful.

In these straits Sultan Mahmud humbled his pride, to seek help from the Powers. But here again he was in a situation of extreme difficulty. Russia, indeed, was prompt in offering assistance; but, save at the last extremity, the Sultan refused to enter into an engagement which would rivet yet more firmly the bonds of his vassalage to the Tsar. Austria, for the time, was but the faithful handmaid of Russia. France, the ancient ally of the Porte, had become, since the conquest of Algiers, against which the Sultan had never ceased to protest, scarcely less suspect than Russia. Great Britain alone remained, and to her Mahmud turned; on August 9, Stratford Canning wrote to Palmerston that he had received from the Ottoman Government direct proposals for a formal alliance. In Canning's view, this was the only way to keep Turkey out of the arms of Russia, who had already shown her hand by withdrawing her consular agent from Egypt. Canning was himself on the eve of his return home; but, four months later, in a letter dated from Paris on December 19, he urged Palmerston to a formal alliance, and suggested a settlement, the general outlines of which anticipated that of 1841. Palmerston, however, was unwilling to venture on a policy so bold and so uncertain in its results. He did not share Canning's belief in the revived power of a reformed Turkey; he held that an isolated intervention of Great Britain would mortally offend not only Russia, but France, and that in France Mehemet Ali, resenting his disappointed ambitions, would find a support which would render him doubly dangerous.

Meanwhile, however, the progress of events in Asia Minor was forcing the Sultan to a very different decision. During the autumn of 1832 he had despatched against Ibrahim the army which, under Reshid Pasha, had been pacifying Albania. The hostile forces met at Konieh on December 21; and once more the Ottomans were routed. The news of this crowning disaster, coincident as it was with the arrival of Count Muravieff on a special mission from the Tsar, brought matters at Constantinople to a head. Russia renewed her offers: a squadron of five sail of the line and four frigates would be placed at once at the Sultan's disposal for the protection of Constantinople; Russian troops would be brought by sea for the same purpose, while reinforcements would march southward from Silistria, still in Russian occupation. For a while, the Porte hesitated to accept the perilous succour. Halil Pasha was despatched to Alexandria to tempt Mehemet Ali to come to terms; a Turkish agent was sent to Ibrahim at Konieh. This mission was reinforced by a letter from Varennes, the French *chargé d'affaires*, who at the request of the Reis Effendi wrote to Ibrahim announcing the intention of the Porte to call in the aid of Russia in case of his advance; a French frigate from Smyrna carried to Alexandria the news of Muravieff's mission and its significance. Muravieff himself followed and, in an interview with

Mehemet Ali, announced to the victorious Pasha the Russian Emperor's immutable hatred of "rebels"; while Count Prokesch-Osten demanded explanations on behalf of the Austrian Government. While Mehemet Ali was protesting to the Powers the loyalty of his intentions, Ibrahim replied to the representatives of France and Great Britain that, as a soldier, his duty was but to obey his father's instructions. These were to push on with all despatch. News reached Mahmud that the Egyptians had advanced to Afium-Karahissar and Kiutayeh; whence Ibrahim, true to the spirit of this loyal rebellion, wrote to ask the Sultan's permission to advance to Brusa. The situation was now desperate. Ibrahim was at the head of 50,000 regular troops and as many irregulars, flushed with victory and in excellent condition. The Ottoman army survived only as a scattered and demoralised rabble. Before Muravieff returned from his mission to Alexandria, the Sultan had determined to take what seemed the lesser of two risks; and, at the beginning of February, 1833, a formal demand was made for the naval and military assistance of Russia. "A drowning man," said the Seraskier-Pasha, "clings to a serpent."

The representatives of Great Britain and France redoubled their efforts to secure a reversal of this fatal step. The Ottoman Government, tossed between conflicting fears, and torn by divided counsels, promised now one thing, now another. The Russian envoy was requested to suspend the departure of the Russian troops; and the Reis Effendi promised that, if Ibrahim would obey the admonitions of the Powers, Turkey would dispense altogether with the assistance of Russia. But, while the other Powers were threatening and promising, Russia had made all her preparations to act; and, on February 20, a Russian squadron entered the Bosphorus.

In view of this situation it became imperative for the objecting Powers to take some definite step; and, with the full concurrence of Mandeville, the British *charge d'affaires*, the new French ambassador, Admiral Roussin, who had arrived on February 17, signed an agreement by which he engaged, on behalf of his Government, that Mehemet Ali should accept the terms offered by the Sultan, the Porte undertaking to invite the Russians to quit the Bosphorus and to renounce the idea of calling in foreign aid. At the same time Frederick Pisani, dragoman to the British embassy, was despatched to Ibrahim, to urge upon him the necessity of suspending his advance, pending the outcome of this new negotiation.

A month or more of suspense followed. In spite of the polite request for their departure, the Russian ships remained in the Bosphorus, detained by contrary winds; and, by the time the wind had changed, the political conditions had changed also. The Emperor Nicholas heard with indignation the news of the Franco-Turkish agreement, and sent orders for the Russian fleet to remain in the Bosphorus until Ibrahim should have repassed the Taurus mountains. Ibrahim, on the other hand, though he

drew back to Kiutayeh, showed no disposition to relax his hold on Anatolia, which was overrun by his agents and his troops. Lastly, the outcome of the French mission to Mehemet Ali was the scornful rejection of the Sultan's terms. He had been offered the districts of Acre, Naplous, Jerusalem, and Tripoli, magnified into "pashaliks" for the purposes of the negotiation. He complained that he had been betrayed by France, and refused to be satisfied with anything less than his full demands: the pashaliks of Syria, Adana, Itcheli, Aleppo, and Damascus, with the sea-ports of Seleskeh and Alaia. Ibrahim was instructed to continue his advance, if, within five days of the return of the Ottoman envoy, Reshid Bey, to Constantinople, a favourable answer had not been received.

In this emergency, both the English and French representatives pressed the Porte to make some concessions; and Reshid Bey was sent at once to Ibrahim with the Sultan's offer to yield Syria, Aleppo, and Damascus. Adana and the sea-ports, which would have established the Egyptian navy in perilous proximity to the Straits, were still withheld. This was at the end of March; within a week, on April 5, a second division of the Russian fleet arrived off Constantinople, and 6000 Russian troops were landed under General Ungebauer on the Asiatic shore of the Bosphorus.

The presence of this force at once became the determining factor in the situation. The Porte plucked up courage, and proposed to Admiral Roussin to withdraw the offer of Aleppo and Damascus. But Great Britain and France had now been forced into a position where they had to figure as the supporters of the Pasha against the Sultan; for them the question must be settled at any cost, so as to secure the withdrawal of the Russians at the earliest possible moment. Roussin therefore refused to risk a breakdown of the negotiations by any serious modification of the terms proposed. On the other hand, the presence of the Russians on the Bosphorus, and the threat of General Rosen, the Governor of Georgia, to occupy Trebizond and Erzeroum, induced Ibrahim to yield; on April 8 the preliminary "Convention of Kiutayeh," granting Adana as well as Syria, was concluded; and the Egyptian retreat began. But on April 16, when Ibrahim received the list of official appointments issued in the Sultan's name, in which, though Mehemet Ali's nomination to the other pashaliks was announced, Adana was expressly reserved by the Sultan, he at once arrested his march.

On April 22 the Russians encamped at Bekos were reinforced by the arrival of some six or seven thousand additional troops; and on the 27th the whole force was reviewed by the Sultan in person. The presence of this new army, curiously enough, worked in Ibrahim's favour. The Egyptian occupation of Asia Minor had cut off from Constantinople its usual source of supplies; there was dearth in the capital, which the presence of the Russians threatened to convert into a famine; and the Sultan found himself compelled to bend his pride to a last concession,

in order to avert disaster. On May 3 a firman announced the appointment of Ibrahim as *Mouhassil*, or collector of the crown revenue, in Adana. The Egyptian, in deference to the Sultan's feelings, was content to waive the style of Pasha, while asserting his intention of exercising, under whatever title, the full prerogatives of sovereign power.

Peace was thus restored between the Sultan and his rebellious vassal; but when, on May 1, Lord Ponsonby, the new British ambassador, at length arrived at Constantinople, he found the situation still extremely critical. The western Powers had, in fact, in their fear of Russian aggression, played into Russia's hands, by forcing the Sultan to a settlement which he felt as a humiliation. They had fed him with promises and protestations of friendship; but their squadrons, which might so easily have swept the Egyptians from the sea, now that they had appeared in the Archipelago, had for their objective the Dardanelles and Constantinople, and seemed to the Sultan but a new force for the coercion of his will under the pretence of protecting his interests. Prince Orloff, who arrived on May 4 as the Tsar's representative, had little difficulty in persuading the Seraglio that its safety depended upon the good-will of Russia; at his instance the request of the French admiral for permission to pass the Straits was refused; if need were, he declared that Russia would join her arms with those of Turkey to resist the pretensions of France and Great Britain; in any case, in accordance with the Tsar's will, the Russian force would remain at the Sultan's disposal until Ibrahim should have withdrawn beyond the Taurus mountains. "It is manifest," wrote Ponsonby on May 22, "that the Porte stands in the relation of vassal to the Russian Government," adding that he believed that an agreement had been come to between Austria and Russia for the partition of Turkey. In any case, all the signs pointed to some sinister design on the part of the Tsar's Government. Though the conclusion of peace had been known at St Petersburg since April 29, preparations for the despatch of further Russian troops continued at Odessa; the strengthening of the fortifications of the Dardanelles was hurried on under the direction of Russian engineers; and, though Orloff's suggestion to garrison them with Russian troops was rejected, the significance of the work was accentuated by the permission given to six of the Tsar's war-vessels to pass the Straits.

The meaning of all this was soon clear. By the middle of June it became known that a treaty was being negotiated between Russia and Turkey within the walls of the Seraglio and without the participation of the Council of the Empire. On June 25 the arrival was announced of the British squadron, under Sir Pulteney Malcolm, in the Bay of Tenedos; but, on Orloff's assurance that his action was due to its being a point of honour not to appear to be coerced by France, the admiral was directed to weigh anchor for a cruise, pending further developments.

The Russians now began their withdrawal ; on July 9 the troops were embarked and, next day, the Russian fleet was reported as passing the narrows to the Black Sea with a fair wind. Before this happened, however, a treaty of offensive and defensive alliance between Russia and Turkey had been signed, on July 8, 1833, at the palace of Unkiar Skelessi.

The public articles of the Treaty of Unkiar Skelessi stipulated for no more than mutual aid and succour between the contracting parties in case of need ; but by an additional secret article it was arranged that Russia should waive her rights to assistance in men and money under the treaty in return for an undertaking of the Porte to close the Dardanelles to the war-ships of all nations "*au besoin*." In the ambiguity of this last phrase lay the whole sinister significance of the treaty. Without it the secret article was but a meaningless repetition of the Treaty of 1809, to which Great Britain with the other Powers had subscribed. But that it was not without meaning the whole attitude of the Russian and Ottoman Governments made abundantly clear. The British ambassador could obtain none but garbled versions, till the Reis Effendi, whose patriotism revolted at the humiliating surrender of the Sultan, supplied an authentic copy "at the risk of his head." A little pressure now extracted from the Seraskier-Pasha that "*au besoin*" could only mean "at the demand of Russia." In face of this admission, the contention of Count Nesselrode that the closure of the Dardanelles constituted "no new engagement," and that "no maritime Power could complain of being deprived of a right which Russia had not established as an exception in her own favour," carried little weight. His boast that the treaty "legalised the armed intervention of Russia" in the Ottoman empire showed that he realised its significance ; to the maritime Powers it seemed equally clear that the treaty, if made effective, would prove an obstacle to any interference on their part.

During the years that succeeded the signature of the Treaty of Unkiar Skelessi the relation established by it between Russia and the Ottoman Government was a dominant factor in the international situation as well as in the affairs of the Turkish empire. The news of the conclusion of the treaty was received in France and England with immense excitement. Palmerston declared that, so far as Great Britain was concerned, it had no existence ; and identical notes, protesting against its terms, were handed in at St Petersburg by the British and French ambassadors. At the same time, at the suggestion of Ponsonby, instructions were sent to the Admiral commanding the British squadron stationed in the Bay of Vourla, for eventual cooperation with the French fleet, should a renewal of the war with Mehemet Ali lead to Russian intervention. In the actual temper of the Sultan such a contingency seemed by no means remote. In Mahmud's breast overmastering hatred of Mehemet Ali had obscured every other consideration. He knew that the Russian

alliance was odious to every class of his subjects ; he knew that, even among his Ministers, plots were afoot for bringing the Pasha of Egypt to Constantinople in order to shake off the infidel yoke. In the protection of Russia he saw the sole guarantee of his safety and of his ultimate revenge. To the dragoman of the British embassy he poured out the bitterness of his heart, contrasting the selfishness of his self-styled friends with the generosity of his hereditary enemy. If he had thrown himself into the arms of Russia it was because Great Britain had refused to help him in his need ; if she desired to win his trust, let her, like Russia, prove her good-will by more than friendly words. For all the influence they had in the Seraglio, the British and French ambassadors might as well have left Constantinople ; and the Seraglio was for the present the Government of Turkey. Mahmud remained shut up in his palace, accessible only to Orloff, and to those of his servants who for their private ends were in the Russian interest. After weeks of effort, Lord Ponsonby could find no other channel for conveying the views and the warnings of Great Britain to the Sultan's ear than Abdy Bey, the Court jester. It was clear that the ambassador had not exaggerated when he said that Turkey had become the vassal of Russia ; equally clear, so it seemed, that Russia intended to use this vassalage to oust from the empire any influence but her own. A single detail may serve to illustrate this. While the messengers of the Russian embassy were supplied, on the road from the capital to Adrianople, with relays of horses by the Ottoman Government, those of the British embassy were forced to cover the whole distance without a change.

A situation at any time intolerable was rendered yet more serious by the growing rivalry of Great Britain and Russia in Central Asia, which about this time was beginning to excite the anxious attention of the chanceries. The expansion of the Tsar's empire eastward at the expense of the semi-barbarous tribes of Central Asia was, indeed, as inevitable as the similar expansion of the Company's *Raj* in India, and equally little the result of any far-sighted policy of conquest. In spite of the rivalry of Russian and British agents in Persia and Mesopotamia no acute questions had as yet arisen ; but men had none the less begun to ask what would happen when the advancing tides should meet. Palmerston himself perceived that here was a problem whose issues might eventually overshadow the narrower question of the Near East, and remarked to the Russian *chargé d'affaires* that the peace of Asia would be assured at the moment when Russia and Great Britain could come to a clear understanding. But the path to such an understanding was blocked for Great Britain by the Treaty of Unkiar Skelessi, for Russia by the Emperor Nicholas' resentment at the unholy alliance between the "legitimate" Government of England and the revolutionary monarchy of Louis-Philippe. The estrangement due to the attitude of the western Powers in the Belgian Question had been increased by the

Reform Bill of 1832, by consenting to which King William IV had, in the Tsar's opinion, "thrown his crown into the gutter." In March, 1832, Nicholas had proposed to Prussia a league of the three eastern monarchies for the support of "Divine Right" against the two Powers which had "the courage to profess aloud rebellion and the overthrow of all stability." In September, 1833, the Emperors of Russia and Austria, and the Crown Prince of Prussia, met at Münchengrätz and there cemented a new "Holy Alliance," which was embodied in the formal Convention signed at Berlin on October 15. By a Convention signed at Münchengrätz it was also agreed that the three Powers should combine, not to partition, but to maintain the integrity of, the Ottoman empire; and by separate articles the contracting Powers undertook to oppose any combination threatening the sovereign power of the Sultan, either by a change of dynasty or by the extension of the rule of Mehemet Ali over the European provinces. Finally, in the event of the failure of their efforts to uphold the Ottoman Power, Russia and Austria agreed to act in perfect accord in any settlement of the reversion. In this Convention there was nothing that could not have been, with excellent effect, communicated to France and Great Britain. But, in spite of Metternich's advice, the Emperor Nicholas preferred to shroud the transaction in a dangerous mystery, rather than communicate its terms to the two Powers whom he chose to regard as for the time being outside the European Concert.

The accession to office of Sir Robert Peel, in December, 1834, first paved the way for a better understanding. The Duke of Wellington, now Secretary for Foreign Affairs, was a *persona grata* at St Petersburg; and, though he too insisted that the Treaty of Unkiar Skelessi stood in the way of any satisfactory agreement upon the Eastern Question, the relations of the two Powers were sensibly modified for the better. The Tsar, though he refused to abrogate the Treaty, consented to have it shelved among the Russian archives "as an interesting and honourable historical relic"; and, on March 16, 1835, the Duke wrote to Lord Ponsonby, countermanding the instructions of Palmerston for the eventual action of the British naval commander in the Levant.

The Tory Government was short-lived; and, though the general election of 1835 belied the alarmist views as to the probable effect of Reform, for the present no lasting change in the relations between Russia and England ensued. In April Palmerston returned to the Foreign Office, and between him, "the Jacobin" and the protector of "oppressed nationalities," and the Government of Nicholas I, the possibility of any mutual confidence seemed remote. In the aspect of affairs in the East, indeed, there seemed little enough to invite it. To Lord Ponsonby, ignorant of the agreement of Münchengrätz, the intention of Russia to absorb Turkey seemed obvious. Rightly or wrongly, he attributed to the intrigues of Russian agents the

perpetual unrest in the Ottoman Court and empire by which the Porte was kept weak and dependent. Russia had helped the Sultan against Mehemet Ali; she was now (he thought) inciting Mehemet Ali against the Sultan, in order to rivet yet more firmly the fetters of her "protection." To Russian agents were due the grievances of which British merchants made reiterated complaints, and the obstacles which both the Porte and Mehemet Ali put in the way of the British expedition despatched under Colonel Francis Chesney in 1835, to endeavour to establish a new mail-route to India by steamers on the Euphrates. Most serious of all, to Russian intrigues was ascribed the attack made in 1838 by Persia upon Herat, which seemed to veil the first active aggression of Russia in the direction of the Indian frontier. To this last rumour the Emperor Nicholas thought it worth while to give a personal denial. Russia, he affirmed, aimed only at securing her legitimate share of the trade of Central Asia, hitherto monopolised by Great Britain, and might in her turn justly complain of the intrigues of British agents in the border khanates and of the presence on Persian soil of a British force.

However pregnant the situation in the East may have been with future trouble, it, nevertheless, suggested no danger so immediate as to prevent Russia and England from coming to an understanding, should circumstances make it on both sides desirable. For Nicholas the moment came when the loosening of the tie of the *entente* between France and England gave him the long-desired opportunity of breaking, by modifying his attitude in the Eastern Question, the hated alliance of the western Powers. In May, 1839, he paved the way by sending the Tsarevich, afterwards the Emperor Alexander II, on a visit to England. His handsome presence and amiable manners appealed to the English people; and the Emperor took advantage of the good impression made in England by this visit to send over Baron Brunnow to attempt a settlement of all outstanding questions, now complicated by the renewal of the war between the Sultan and Mehemet Ali (April, 1839).

The Convention of Kiutayeh had never been considered by either of the contracting parties as establishing a permanent settlement. The very form of the concessions made by Sultan Mahmud was significant of his intention to reverse them on the earliest opportunity. Mehemet Ali held the pashaliks which constituted his empire by the ordinary tenure, subject to annual renewal; he knew that he would at once be deprived of them, and of his life, so soon as this should be in the Sultan's power, and that what he had won by the sword he must keep by the sword. The Russian squadron had scarcely left the Bosphorus, after the signing of the Treaty of Unkiar Skelessi, before rumours were rife as to the Sultan's intention of taking advantage of the promise of eventual Russian aid to renew the war with Mehemet Ali. Every embarrassment

of the Pasha was eagerly noted at Constantinople; Mahmud was with difficulty restrained from sending his fleet to the assistance of the rebellious Cretans; and Reshid Pasha, with the Sultan's connivance, from his command in Anatolia fomented the rapidly-growing resentment of the Syrians at the Egyptian rule. Mehemet Ali, for his part, was credited with stirring up the formidable insurrection that broke out in Albania, and intriguing at Constantinople for the deposition of Mahmud and the proclamation of his son.

It was not, however, till the spring of 1834, when the discontent of the Syrians had issued in wide-spread revolt, that the crisis became acute. The cause of the revolt is not far to seek. So long as Ibrahim, whom the Syrians had welcomed as a deliverer, had obvious need of their good-will, they had had little cause to complain of his rule. Some, indeed, of his reforms survived: the equality of all religions before the law, and the system of government by which a *divan*, or council, consisting of Mussulmans and Christians, was established in every town, subject to the *divan meshura* at Acre, which acted as a Court of Appeal, received the revenues, appointed public officers, and reported to the Great Divan of Egypt. So far the non-Mussulman population had no cause to complain of a system which had effectually removed its sufferings and established general security. But in Syria, as in Egypt, the military exigencies of Mehemet Ali's position vitiated the whole system. A powerful army and a great revenue to support it were the conditions of his security. To obtain money, Ibrahim introduced the system of monopolies; to obtain soldiers, he had recourse to conscription. Not only silk, the staple industry of the Lebanon, but almost all the necessaries of life, down to vegetables and the gardens in which they were grown, were subjected to Government monopolies and farmed to the highest bidder; while the ruthless system of conscription, which neither spared the wild clans of the Lebanon nor the free Arabs of the desert, completed the impoverishment of the country by tearing the peasants from their fields at harvest-time and leaving the crops to rot.

The first to revolt were the Turks, resentful of the loss of their ancient privileged position. Saida, Aleppo, Damascus, Nazareth, in turn defied the Pasha. The Samaritans, and the Fellah Arabs of the Haouran and Decapolis followed suit. For a while Ibrahim was hard pressed, especially when the Druses, who had helped to crush the revolt in Damascus, turned against him. Mehemet Ali himself had to come to the assistance of his son, before, in August, his authority could be restored. But, though the revolt had been drowned in blood, the prestige of the Pasha as a deliverer from oppression was irrevocably gone; the mild system of the first months was changed; military governors replaced the Christian princes in the towns; and the whole country was flooded with troops.

On the first news of the insurgent successes Mahmud struggled, like a

hound straining at the leash, to break the diplomatic bonds that prevented him from hurrying to their assistance. He protested that it was his duty as Sultan to go to the help of his subjects when oppressed by one of his servants. Even when, to his great wrath, Russia refused to support him, in the event of his being the aggressor, he pressed on the preparations for war. He ordered Reshid to advance on Orfa, a fortress commanding the pass into Anatolia, which Mehemet Ali had improperly retained in his hands; thence he could sound the temper of the Syrians, with a view to a further advance on Damascus. To the ambassadors of Great Britain and France he urged, through the Prince of Samos, that Mehemet Ali had violated his engagements by refusing to surrender Orfa and withholding his tribute, and suggested that the Powers should aid him to force back the Pasha within the limits of Egypt and the pashalik of Acre. For months the crisis remained more or less acute. Mehemet Ali refused to pay money which he knew would be used in raising an army to attack him, or to surrender a fortress which protected the gate of Syria against an Ottoman invasion. He threatened that, should the Turkish fleet appear to the south of Rhodes, he would attack it and at the same time throw off his allegiance. In October he sounded Great Britain, France, and Austria, as to the possibility of their recognising his independence, and took the first step toward the assertion of his wider claims by describing himself as Viceroy in his correspondence with the Porte. It needed all the diplomacy of the Powers, with threats directed now to one side now to the other, to keep the peace. These were so far successful that, on December 14, Lord Ponsonby reported that there was no longer any cause to fear hostilities.

This optimism was short-lived. So early as January 21, 1835, another despatch declared war to be imminent. The Ottoman fleet was being prepared for action; in Syria the unrest continued, and culminated, in the early spring, in a series of revolts and massacres. In May the Turkish fleet was coasting off Syria, while that of Mehemet Ali lay ready for action in Suda Bay. A fresh revolt in Albania, so opportune as to lead once more to a suspicion of Mehemet Ali's instigation, alone postponed the renewal of the war. That this was delayed for fully three years longer was due to the attitude of the Powers, who made it clear that their sympathies would not be with the aggressor. Even Russia, on whom Sultan Mahmud mainly relied, was unwilling to risk what she had already gained by plunging into an enterprise of which the issue was uncertain. She had moreover her own troubles in Poland and the Caucasus, and was impoverished by a famine; while, in the event of any change in her attitude, Austria might prove but a doubtful ally. Great Britain and France, meanwhile, acted cordially together, holding a common language, and making it clear to the Porte that, were their advice neglected, they would not go to war to save the Sultan from the consequences of his own folly. In the event of the Ottoman empire

breaking up in such circumstances, wrote Palmerston, Great Britain would "look to other combinations" for preserving the security of Europe.

By such means a precarious peace was preserved for a year or two longer, both sides meanwhile preparing their forces and manœuvring for the sympathy of Europe. At last, early in 1838, it was clear that a crisis was once more approaching. In March the Egyptians suffered a severe defeat at the hands of the Arabs of the Haouran; and, though the Porte agreed to keep quiet, it hurried on its naval and military preparations. Mehemet Ali, indeed, seemed anxious to precipitate the inevitable conflict, before the new national militia, which Mahmud had been organising with the aid of Moltke and other German officers, should have become too formidable a fighting force. He had yet other motives for provoking a crisis. Great Britain, whose trade had suffered owing to the Pasha's system of monopolies, was negotiating with the Porte a commercial treaty extending to the whole empire, by which that system would have been destroyed. Mehemet Ali's counter-move was again to threaten to proclaim himself independent. This would have been to strike at the root of the Sultan's power, by depriving him nominally as well as actually of his tenure of the holy cities, on which his claim to the Khalifate was largely based. But, if the Pasha had hoped by this presumption to stir the Porte to an act of aggression, he was for the time disappointed. The commercial treaty with Great Britain was signed on August 16, 1838, by the Sultan, the more readily since he knew that it dealt a shrewd blow to his enemy. Months of suspense followed, of anxious negotiation among the Powers, of preparation on both sides for war, which both felt to be inevitable, though both shrank from striking the first blow. In such a game of fence Mahmud was no match for Mehemet Ali. Palmerston had warned him, in his downright way, of the consequences, should he be responsible for breaking the peace: Great Britain would aid him, were he attacked by Mehemet Ali; but, should he be the aggressor, she would leave him to a fate which could scarcely be doubtful. The Sultan's accumulated passion had, however, placed him beyond the control of any argument but that of hate; the hand of death was upon him, and he was determined at all hazards at least to attempt to revenge himself upon his enemy before he died. "I would rather die," he exclaimed, "or become the slave of Russia, than spare my rebellious vassal." The Ottoman army, under Hafiz Pasha, had been massed at Bir, on the Euphrates, opposite the ruins of ancient Babylon. On April 21, 1839, by the Sultan's orders, it crossed the stream and invaded Syria.

The news of this aggression set the diplomatic world buzzing like a hive of agitated bees. Envoys hurried to Cairo and to Constantinople, to urge the necessity for suspending operations. Mehemet Ali, since his enemy had placed himself hopelessly in the wrong, could afford to assume

a scrupulously correct attitude; but, before his messengers could reach Ibrahim, the end had come. On June 23, the Turks concentrated at Nezib; and Ibrahim, next day, thinking his position menaced, attacked them. The result was an Egyptian victory more complete than any in the campaign of 1832. The Ottoman camp, with all the artillery and 15,000 prisoners, remained in the hands of the conqueror. The road to Constantinople once more lay open to Ibrahim, who pressed on the defiles of the Taurus, and there halted, pending the development of the diplomatic situation. For Sultan Mahmud had not lived to hear of this crowning disaster, the news of which reached Constantinople as he lay unconscious on his death-bed. He died early on July 1, leaving his empire to Abd-ul-Mejid, a lad of sixteen. Simultaneously, the crushing news was brought to the capital, that Ahmed Pasha, the Ottoman admiral, had sailed to Alexandria and there, on the pretext that Khusrev and the other Ministers of the dying Sultan were sold to Russia, had handed over the fleet to Mehemet Ali.

The Ottoman empire now seemed hopelessly doomed; but the advisers of the new Sultan decided to attempt a direct appeal to Mehemet Ali. In the name of Abd-ul-Mejid the Grand Vizier wrote to the Pasha enlarging on his master's desire to avoid the effusion of further Mussulman blood, promising him pardon for his offences against the late Sultan, together with the highest personal honour it was possible for him to bestow, and a settlement based on a grant of the hereditary pashalik of Egypt to Mehemet Ali himself and of the government of Syria to Ibrahim—the latter to be restored to the Sultan in the event of Ibrahim succeeding to Egypt on his father's death. To these overtures Mehemet Ali returned a diplomatic reply. They represented, indeed, far less in the way of concession than he had counted on receiving; but he knew that he must depend ultimately on the good-will of one or more of the Powers, and that this could only be gained by studied moderation. Moreover, if the Treaty of Unkiar Skelessi were ever to be more than "an interesting historical relic," the time had now obviously come for its practical application. The attitude of Russia was for the moment doubtful. She was not averse from an independent agreement between the Pasha and the Porte, which would relieve her from her obligations under the Treaty of Unkiar Skelessi, and at the same time would not deprive her of her preponderant position at Constantinople, untrammelled by any concert with the other Powers. But this was precisely what the other Powers wished to avoid. While commanding the conciliatory attitude of the Porte, Marshal Soult therefore wrote to deprecate any negotiations on its part with Mehemet Ali save through the good offices of its allies; and Palmerston wrote strongly to the same effect. As to any possible attempt on the part of Russia to interfere under the Treaty of Unkiar Skelessi, in the event of the Russian fleet entering the Bosphorus, the British ambassador was to demand that the British fleet should be allowed to do the same.

Meanwhile, however, the crisis was beginning to reveal considerable shifting of opinion within the councils of the Great Powers. Austria, now that the revolutionary ferment of 1830 had died down, had no longer pressing need of the Tsar's support in Europe, and was beginning to revert to her traditional policy of suspicious opposition to Russia in the East. This tendency, which had been evidenced for some time by the more cordial relations of the Austrian internuncio at Constantinople with the ambassadors of the Maritime Powers, had not been lost upon the Emperor Nicholas; and when, therefore, Metternich supported Palmerston's proposal for a Conference to be called at Vienna, the Tsar refused to be a party to it. Such a Conference, he said, could only be directed against Russia, which would run the risk of finding herself isolated in it. At the same time he declared that he was ready to consider himself bound by all the articles of the Convention of Münchenergrätz and to act in concert with Austria in the settlement of the affairs of Turkey. But, though the idea of a Conference was thus rejected, all the Powers were at least agreed as to the necessity for gaining time by presenting a united front at Constantinople; and on July 27 the ambassadors of Great Britain, France, Austria, Russia, and Prussia, presented to the Porte a joint Note. "The undersigned," it ran, "have this morning received from their respective Governments instructions, in virtue of which they have the honour to inform the Sublime Porte that an agreement on the Eastern Question has been reached between the Five Great Powers, and to urge it to suspend all definite decision made without their concurrence, pending the effect of their interest in its welfare."

In a despatch to Palmerston of the same date, Ponsonby noted the excellent effect produced by this common action in strengthening the Porte in its determination to resist the demands of Mehemet Ali, and thus opening the way to the realisation of the aims of British policy. Palmerston himself fully gauged the importance of impressing the Sultan's Government with the unanimity of the Powers, and, on August 1, in a despatch to the ambassador, insisted on this point, reporting "an almost entire identity of opinion between the Five Cabinets," while at the same time urging that it was "of great importance that in any step to be taken at Constantinople, or in any communication which is to be made by the representatives of the Five Powers, those representatives should act not only simultaneously in point of time, but *identically in point of manner*." The need for this was the more urgent, since the solemn announcement of an agreement between the Five Powers had only been rendered possible by the fact that they had not as yet clearly defined their several views as to the ultimate settlement; though it might fairly be taken as an earnest of their intention to effect this settlement in concert. It was this element of uncertainty that contributed mainly to the misunderstandings which culminated in the breach between France and England.

Hitherto the western Powers had acted cordially in concert. Both had consistently opposed the preponderance of Russia in the Ottoman empire; both saw in the policy of placing Turkey under the protection of the European Concert the best means of retrieving the situation. But here their agreement ceased. Palmerston believed that the Ottoman empire would never be secure until "the desert had been placed between" Mehemet Ali and the Sultan; and his whole policy was directed to pressing the Pasha back once more within the frontiers of Egypt. French opinion, on the other hand, was greatly excited in favour of Mehemet Ali, on whom the mantle of Napoleon seemed to have fallen, and who might prove a valuable ally of France against the sea-power of Great Britain in the Mediterranean. In this divergence of view the Emperor Nicholas saw his opportunity. In coming to a good understanding with England he was well aware that he could sacrifice none of Russia's real advantage in the East. Her influence at Constantinople was due to causes altogether outside the Treaty of Unkiar Skelessi—to her geographical position, and to the Orthodox population in the Turkish dominions, which looked to her for protection. The Treaty itself represented no more than a snatch victory due to the circumstances of the moment, "honourable" indeed to Russia, but hardly of any practical value, since any attempt to translate its terms into action would expose her to the risk of war with united Europe. To surrender it therefore, as the price for the rupture of the Liberal alliance of the western Powers, seemed no great sacrifice.

Baron Brunnow was, therefore, sent to London with instructions to approach Palmerston with offers so magnanimous that, if his report is to be believed, they struck the British Minister, hitherto the Tsar's most uncompromising opponent, "with surprise and admiration." The Emperor stated that he was prepared to accept the views of Great Britain on the Turco-Egyptian Question; to allow the Treaty of Unkiar Skelessi to lapse; and to act henceforth in Turkey only in concert with the other Powers; finally, in return for an international agreement closing the Dardanelles to the war-ships of all nations, to extend the same principle to the Bosphorus, which Russia would undertake only to enter, should the defence of the Ottoman empire demand it, as the mandatory of Europe. The Russian ambassador was further instructed to arrange a coalition of the Great Powers for the settlement of the Egyptian Question; and in this coalition the Tsar was willing that France, for political reasons, should be included, though he stated his personal desire for her exclusion.

The Tsar's overtures to Great Britain had been in part due to his suspicions of Austria. Metternich, however, though annoyed by the breakdown of the idea of a Conference—over which he would have presided—accepted the situation, and, early in August, informed the Russian Government that Austria was determined to hold to the spirit

of the Treaty of Münchenthal, and to act in concert with Russia on the Eastern Question. Prussia, as usual, followed the lead of Austria. It remained to be seen what attitude France would take up. By adhering to the other Powers in presenting the joint Note to the Porte she had committed herself to a concert with them; the logical and proper sequel to this would have been for her to accept in principle whatever policy the majority might decide upon, while obtaining for her *protégé* Mehemet Ali the best possible terms. The alternative was to have placed herself outside the Concert altogether by her own act, so soon as she became aware that the differences between her views and those of the other Powers were fundamental and insuperable. Neither of these courses was adopted; though it was soon abundantly clear that in favouring the Egyptian view France was completely isolated. The Emperor Nicholas had from the first declared that the proper objective for a naval demonstration was not Constantinople, but Alexandria; and in this he was in complete agreement with Palmerston. General Sebastiani, who had arrived in London as French ambassador about the same time as Brunnow, wrote, on September 5, to Marshal Soult that Palmerston would hear of no settlement that should leave Mehemet Ali in a position to renew his attacks on the Porte. As the result of weeks of negotiation, Palmerston, who was sincerely anxious to preserve the Anglo-French *entente*, proposed a compromise which represented the limit of possible concession; and, on October 3, Sebastiani wrote that the British Government was willing to allow Mehemet Ali to receive the hereditary pashalik of Egypt, together with that of Acre, excluding the fortress and town. Had the French Government accepted the logic of the situation, France might have been spared a serious humiliation and Mehemet Ali would have garnered at least some of the harvest of his gigantic efforts. But public opinion in France continued violently opposed to the idea of depriving the Pasha of any of the fruits of his victories; and Soult shared the erroneous popular estimate of the invincibility of Mehemet Ali and Ibrahim. Sebastiani, accordingly, was instructed to press for further concessions. Palmerston's reply was to withdraw those already made; and, when the French ambassador advanced yet further propositions, these were received "with a polite but icy silence."

Early in 1840 Sebastiani was replaced as ambassador to the Court of St James' by Guizot, a more pronounced partisan of Mehemet Ali, but at the same time a *persona grata* in London, by reason of his great reputation and his many ties with English life and thought. Palmerston, for his part, was prepared to meet the fresh advances half-way. "England," he said, "is willing to go on, but not to stand still with France"; and he promised to make the utmost possible concessions to the French demands on behalf of the Pasha. Unfortunately, before Guizot arrived in London, the Cabinet of Marshal Soult had been defeated, and resigned on February 29. Next day Thiers was commissioned to form a Government.

The new Minister was an even more ardent supporter of the claims of Mehemet Ali than his predecessor, and, in order to secure his position, under yet greater necessity of humouring public opinion; and Guizot fully grasped the extreme difficulty of the mission on which he was despatched. He was, he said, in the position of being unable either to offer or to accept anything. Palmerston had all along insisted on the probable necessity for an eventual coercion of Mehemet Ali, and had even declared, so early as September, 1839, that, in the event of all the Five Powers not being able to join in such a policy, Great Britain would be prepared "to act in concert with a less number than four"; the French Government had been equally obstinate in refusing assent to any measures for depriving the Pasha of Syria.

It was necessary therefore for Guizot to walk warily. He began by approaching the Austrian and Prussian ambassadors, whom he found more amenable to his arguments than Palmerston; and, after two months of negotiation, a compromise was suggested that seemed to present a solution of the difficulty. On May 5 Baron Neumann, on behalf of the Austrian Government, formally proposed to Palmerston that his former offer should be somewhat extended, so as to meet the views of France; Mehemet Ali was to receive, besides Egypt, the pashalik of Acre as far as the frontiers of Tripoli and Damascus, including the town of St Jean d'Acre. Before this proposal was made, Palmerston had made yet another effort "to prove our anxiety to conceal nothing from France, and to carry France along with us," and, in concert with the other three Powers, had formally proposed to convene a Conference of all Five at London to settle the whole Turco-Egyptian Question. This overture Thiers had rejected, on the ground that, in the probable event of the four Powers deciding on coercive measures against Mehemet Ali, France would refuse to be a party to them, and that such refusal would render her separation from the other Powers more marked than if no Conference of the Five had taken place. In spite of this uncompromising attitude, Palmerston was willing to give every possible pledge of his anxiety to keep on good terms with France; and on May 7, in an interview with Guizot, he signified his acceptance, though with obvious reluctance, of the Austrian proposal.

Guizot's able diplomacy was rendered vain by the intractable temper of Thiers. On May 11, 1840, he replied to the ambassador's despatch announcing the result of the negotiations, that France could never accept on the Pasha's behalf the idea of a partition of Syria. In coming to this decision he disclaimed any selfish motives on the part of his Government. But Mehemet Ali, he urged, would never listen to such a proposal, the very enunciation of which would drive him to continue his arrested march over the Taurus and "set light to the powder." As for the idea of coercion, the allied fleet might reduce a few coast-towns, but could never drive the Pasha out of Syria.

After this declaration, which reads oddly enough in the light of subsequent events, any further negotiation between France and Great Britain would have seemed idle ; and, if Thiers believed so firmly in the invincibility of the Pasha, he should have broken with the Concert and ranged France openly on his side. Unfortunately for his own reputation and the prestige of France, he took no such straightforward course ; and, before long, circumstances came to the knowledge of the British Government which seemed to point to the fact that he was merely protracting the negotiations at London in the hope of securing an independent settlement in accordance with French views. The opportunity for this was given at this juncture by a change in the situation at Constantinople. Khusrev Pasha, the Grand Vizier, had been dismissed ; and Mehemet Ali hailed the fall of his inveterate enemy as removing the main obstacle to a reconciliation with the Sultan. He proposed to Cochelet, the French consul-general at Alexandria, to make advances to the Porte and, as an earnest of his peaceful intentions, to begin by sending back the Ottoman fleet, "not doubting," so the consul-general's despatch ran, "that this spontaneous action on his part would lead to a *direct* and amicable arrangement of the Turco-Egyptian Question." On June 21, his envoy, Sami Bey, actually arrived at Constantinople, ostensibly to congratulate the Sultan on the birth of his daughter, really, with the aid of French influence, now all-powerful at the Porte, to pave the way for a settlement. The despatch of the French consul-general was forwarded to Guizot on June 30, Thiers adding : "This condition of affairs argues strongly in favour of postponing any decision in London. I have written to Alexandria and Constantinople to counsel moderation on both sides ; but I have been careful to forbid the agents to enter on their own account, and as a French undertaking, on a negotiation of which the avowed aim is a direct arrangement. If such an enterprise is imputed to us, you will be in a position to deny it."

It is clear that, in spite of the somewhat disingenuous disclaimer contained in the last paragraph, this action of Thiers was a violation of the spirit, if not of the letter, of the agreement implied in the joint Note of July 27, 1839. His proper course would have been to have at once communicated Mehemet Ali's proposal to Palmerston, in order to concert with the other Powers measures to meet the new situation revealed by it. As it was, the discovery of what seemed an underhand intrigue on the part of the French Government produced on the Powers exactly the effect which Thiers had foreseen and deprecated. "They have seen in this," wrote Guizot on July 11, "or at least they believe themselves entitled to see in it, an action long concerted between the Pasha and France, who has long been preparing it at Alexandria as at Constantinople. They consider the act of Mehemet Ali and its success as involving, first, the ruin of the Note of July 27, 1839, and of the common action of the Five Powers ; secondly, the complete individual triumph

of France at Alexandria and Constantinople." This was certainly the view of Palmerston, who believed that the cause of France's dilatory tactics was now revealed. His reply was prompt. On July 17, he read to Guizot a long memorandum, in which he announced that the four Powers, in consequence of the refusal of France to share their views, had been reluctantly forced to conclude with the Ottoman Porte a Convention for the settlement of the affairs of the Levant, without the concurrence of the French Government. At the same time he expressed the hope that, since France had often reiterated that she had no objection to the arrangements which the four Powers wished Mehemet Ali to accept, provided he should consent to them, she would not oppose the measures which they, in concert with the Sultan, might judge necessary in order to secure that consent; and, finally, that this "partial and temporary disagreement" would do nothing to disturb the relations of sincere friendship which he wished to see preserved between the two countries.

For a while it seemed as though this pious wish were not to be realised. The news of the "mortal affront" to the honour of France, as Guizot termed it in the first moment of chagrin, was received in Paris with immense excitement. The whole of the press was clamorous for war, and Thiers himself exclaimed that the alliance with Great Britain was shattered. Under his direction the country was filled with warlike preparations. Palmerston watched these demonstrations with an equal mind. France, he argued, was no longer the France of Napoleon; the rule of a military caste, which depended for its wealth on the plunder of Europe, was one thing; that of the *bourgeois* class, drawing a comfortable income from *rentes*, another. The bellicose tone of Thiers' public utterances was in fact intended mainly to satisfy the *amour-propre* of the French public. His language to Guizot, who remained in London, revealed a more circumspect temper. "Be careful," he wrote on July 21, "while allowing our just resentment to be felt, to avoid a peremptory tone. We must take up our position and view the future with *sang-froid*. The King is very calm; we are as calm as he. Without noise, we will make preparations more solid than apparent. We will make them apparent should the situation demand it." In view of the extreme delicacy of the situation, both parties were indeed careful to diminish the risk of a violent rupture by studious moderation. The French Government instructed its admiral in the Levant to avoid all misunderstanding with those of the allied fleets; and Palmerston, for his part, undertook that no blockade of Egyptian ports should be declared; that, should the Sultan exercise his right of blockading his subject's harbours, the Allies would take no share in any such blockade; and that the rights of neutrals should be strictly protected.

The Convention of London, of which the draft had been prepared by Palmerston so early as the previous January, but of which the first

definite knowledge was conveyed to the French ambassador in the interview of July 17, was signed on July 15. By this instrument it was agreed that, the Sultan having come to a complete understanding with the signatory Powers as to the terms to be granted to Mehemet Ali, the High Contracting Parties were to unite their forces, if necessary, in order to compel the Pasha of Egypt to accept the settlement, and, in the event of his continuing his march on Constantinople, to protect the capital and the Straits against him, continuing their joint occupation so long as the Sultan should judge necessary. Care was taken to make it clear that this cooperation in the protection of Constantinople and the Straits was accorded at the express invitation of the Sultan, and only applicable to the special case defined in the treaty. As to the terms of settlement, it was arranged by separate articles that, in the event of Mehemet Ali yielding within ten days, he should receive the hereditary pashalik of Egypt together with the administration for life of southern Syria, with the title of Pasha of Acre and the command of the fortress of St Jean d'Acre. If at the end of ten days he should remain obdurate, the Sultan's offer of Syria and Acre would be withdrawn; and if at the close of yet another ten days he were still defiant, the Sultan would hold himself at liberty to withdraw the whole offer and take such measures as his own interests and the counsels of his allies might suggest to him. By a *protocole réservé* of the same date it was agreed that the Convention should be put in force without awaiting the exchange of ratifications. Finally, by a Protocol signed at London on September 5 and communicated to Guizot on the 17th, the Allied Powers formally disclaimed any intention of deriving separate advantages from their intervention.

Meanwhile the action of the Allies under the Convention had begun. On August 11, Sir Charles Napier had appeared off Beirut and summoned Suleiman Pasha to evacuate the town and Syria. As yet, however, no shot had been actually fired; and the French Government pressed Mehemet Ali to moderate his terms. On September 17 Thiers wrote to Guizot that the Pasha would accept the hereditary pashalik of Egypt and that of Syria for Ibrahim for life. Palmerston, however, would hear of no modification of the terms of the Convention of July 15. In any case it would have been too late to avert hostilities. On September 11, Napier bombarded Beirut and landed an Ottoman force to operate against Ibrahim in Syria. Four days later the Sultan, who had broken off all negotiations with Mehemet Ali's envoy on the first news of the revolt in Syria, which had taken place in August, declared Mehemet Ali deposed and nominated his successor, on the ground that the term allowed by the additional articles of the Convention had expired. At Alexandria, on September 23, the consuls of the four Powers notified to the Pasha their own removal and at the same time the approaching arrival of the Sultan's sentence. "Mehemet Ali received them and their notification of his own deposition with great *sang-froid*, observing

that such denunciations were nothing new to him; that this was the fourth, and that he hoped to get over it as well as he had done the other three, with the help of God and the Prophet."

The pious confidence implied in the last phrase was doubtless reinforced by a not unnatural expectation of French support. The news of the events in the East had created intense excitement at Paris. An extraordinary meeting of the Ministry was held; and, on October 8, instructions were sent to Guizot to inform the British Government that France would never tolerate the execution of the Sultan's ban of deposition. Palmerston, realising the gravity of the situation, instructed Ponsonby to press upon the Sultan, in the event of Mehemet Ali's speedy submission, not only to withdraw the sentence of deposition, but to confer on him the hereditary pashalik. But this was not enough to satisfy French opinion, which saw in the Convention of July a new coalition directed against France. Thiers talked at large of reviving the glories of 1793, placing France at the head of the Revolution, sweeping away the flimsy barriers of the treaties of 1815, and advancing the French frontiers once more to the Rhine. Military preparations were hurried on, and for a while war seemed inevitable. The Emperor Nicholas, who had been using the crisis to draw closer the ties of a good understanding between Great Britain and Russia, of his own accord offered to send a squadron to the assistance of the British in the event of their being attacked by France.

At the last moment, however, Louis-Philippe shrank from the appeal to arms, the probable consequences of which Lord Melbourne had been careful to point out to him through Leopold, King of the Belgians. The new Chambers had been summoned for October 28; and Thiers had prepared a speech from the Throne which would have been practically a gage of defiance to Europe. "France," it declared, "which has not been the first to expose the world to the fortune of arms, must hold herself ready to act on the day when she believes the balance of the world to be seriously menaced." This was language which Louis-Philippe felt himself unable to use. On October 21, accordingly, Thiers and his colleagues resigned; and a new Cabinet was formed under Marshal Soult, with Guizot as Foreign Minister. The new Chambers met on November 5; and the King's speech, which, under a cloud of brave phrases, was evidently intended to cover a retreat, raised a hurricane of protest in the country and in the Parliament. Out of the chaos of criticism, accusation, and personal recrimination, only one clear fact emerged: that nobody wanted a war which everyone felt to involve risks out of all proportion to the contingent benefits. The address on the Egyptian Question proposed by the Government was carried on December 4; and peace was assured.

This result was aided by the unexpectedly rapid collapse of Mehemet Ali's power. The French had reckoned on his being able to keep the

Allies in check, at least till France should be in a position to interfere, if she decided to do so, with a decisive result. But their belief in his invincibility and their admiration for him as the champion of French enlightenment against Ottoman barbarism had alike received some rude shocks, before the fall of Thiers definitely marked the abandonment of a warlike policy. The combined squadrons of Great Britain, Austria, and Turkey, had hardly appeared off Beirut in August, before all Syria rose in a passion of revolt against the tyranny of Ibrahim. On October 3 Beirut fell; and Ibrahim, cut off from his communications by sea and surrounded on all sides by a hostile population, began a hurried retreat southwards. On November 3 Acre surrendered to the allied fleet. The fate of Egypt itself seemed to tremble in the balance, opening up a fresh vista of possible international complications.

The critical situation was ended by the prompt action of Admiral Napier. On November 25, he appeared with part of his squadron before Alexandria, and, partly by persuasion, partly by threats of force, induced Mehemet Ali to sign a Convention in which he promised to submit, and to restore the Ottoman fleet so soon as the Powers should guarantee him the hereditary pashalik of Egypt. At the same time an envoy was despatched on a British ship with orders to Ibrahim to evacuate Syria. At Constantinople the news of the Convention, by which Mehemet Ali had been guaranteed against the Sultan's vengeance just when this promised to be complete, was received with very mixed feelings. But Palmerston had ratified the Admiral's action; the other Powers had adhered to it; and on January 10, 1841, a joint Note was presented by the four ambassadors to the Sultan, recommending the bestowal upon Mehemet Ali of the hereditary governorship of Egypt. On the Porte endeavouring to procrastinate, a Memorandum followed on the 30th, in which the Powers, while inviting the Sultan "to show himself generous" to Mehemet Ali, explained that, in taking this action, "they were not conscious of advising a course out of harmony with the sovereignty and legitimate rights of the Sultan, or contrary to the duties imposed on the Pasha of Egypt as a subject appointed by His Highness to govern a province of the Ottoman empire." This principle was elaborated in the firman, issued on February 13, by which the Sultan conferred on Mehemet Ali and his heirs by direct descent the pashalik of Egypt. Care was taken to define the limits of the powers thus delegated: the Pashas of Egypt were to take rank on equal terms with the other viziers of the empire; all laws made for the Ottoman empire were to have force in Egypt, which was also to be bound by all treaties concluded between the Sultan and foreign Powers; taxes were to be collected in the Sultan's name, and a fourth of the revenue was to be paid into the treasury at Constantinople; finally, the number of troops maintained by the Pasha in time of peace was not to exceed 18,000, and these were to form an integral portion of the

imperial Ottoman army. By a second firman, dated February 13, 1841, Mehemet Ali was likewise invested with the government for life of Nubia, Darfour, Khordofan, and Sennaar, with their dependencies.

The solemn promulgation of the firmans at Alexandria, on June 10, 1841, marked the close of this perilous phase of the Egyptian Question. Mehemet Ali, now an old man, and soon destined to lose those keen powers of intellect which had carried him so far, passes off the stage of history. As regards the general diplomatic situation, however, there remained one step to be taken before the whole incident could be considered satisfactorily closed. This was to apply a salve to the wounded *amour-propre* of France and draw her once more within the European Concert. Fortunately this was a problem not difficult of solution. The proposal of Guizot, which had the support of Metternich, to place the Ottoman empire under the guarantee of the Five Powers, was indeed rejected by Palmerston as too obviously aimed at Russia. But it was agreed between the Allied Powers and France that, the differences between the Sultan and Mehemet Ali being satisfactorily settled, the four signatory Powers of the Convention of July 15 should sign an Act recording the "closure" of the incident, and that in this instrument mention should be made of the opportunity "of consecrating in the most formal manner the respect due to the ancient rule of the Ottoman empire, by virtue of which vessels of war belonging to foreign Powers have always been forbidden to enter the straits of the Dardanelles and the Bosphorus." To this separate Act, known as that of "the Straits," France was to be invited by the Sultan to adhere. This course was accordingly followed. The "*Protocole de Clôture*" was signed by the four Powers on July 10, 1841. Three days later, on July 13, the "*Protocole des Détroits*," pledging the Powers to respect the principle proclaimed by the Sultan with regard to the passage of ships of war, was signed by all Five Powers.

This Convention, which was renewed in 1879, was regarded by Russian statesmen at the time as a triumph for their diplomacy, since it appeared to secure for Russia all the advantages of the secret articles of the Treaty of Unkiar Skelessi. The unsoundness of this view was proved by the events of 1854, when the existence of the Protocol did not prevent the fleets of France and Great Britain from passing into the Black Sea; it might have been suspected from the absence of any pledge on the part of the signatory Powers to enforce the principle which they undertook to "respect." Whatever its essential weakness, however, the immediate moral effect of the Protocol was certainly great. Not only had the Anglo-Russian *entente* of 1839 become, for the moment, an effective understanding, full of possibilities unhappily not destined to be realised; but the principle of the Concert of Europe had been reaffirmed, the breach between the Eastern and Western Powers had been, for the time at least, healed; and, in the words of Count Nesselrode, "the federative system of the European States had been reestablished on its old basis."

## CHAPTER XVIII.

### GREAT BRITAIN.

(1815-32.)

THE triumphant close of a war, waged by an enemy with the view of reforming or overturning the existing frame of things, might well have ensured to England a long period of political reaction. Devotion to King and Church might well have been strengthened; acquiescence in the control of government by aristocratic landowners might have been assured; the recognition of old prescriptive rights and traditions might have been universally acknowledged. But none of these results followed. Within seventeen years every one of these old traditions and institutions had been criticised, shaken, or remoulded, and the greatest constitutional change of the last two centuries had been accomplished in direct defiance of representatives of the old order. The cause of these extraordinary changes is to be found in the Industrial Revolution, which had created a class of rich merchants and capitalists. These owed everything to their own individual enterprise and nothing to the aid of the Government, and were naturally induced, by their increase of wealth and power, to demand more influence in politics. It is obvious that their influence, together with the growth of wealth and political self-consciousness in the middle-class, would compel the readjustment of the existing relations between Church and State, between land and capital, and would involve extensions of political privilege and concessions of religious equality. Such tendencies and changes are therefore to be seen throughout the four epochs, into which the period (1815-32) naturally falls.

In the first epoch (1815-22) the universal popular distress temporarily induces the middle classes to unite with the old aristocracy against Radicalism, and postpones the development of their influence. In the second epoch (1822-7) the extensive financial and legislative reforms of Huskisson and Canning reveal the influence of that middle-class of which those statesmen were members. In the third epoch (1828-30) Wellington vainly struggles to support the landed interest and the old governmental system, and is forced eventually to yield. In the fourth epoch (1830-2) is to be discerned the complete triumph of the middle classes, who overthrow the old aristocratic predominance and secure for

themselves a preponderant political influence. Thus the period has an underlying unity, for it exhibits throughout the struggle of the middle classes to reform the old institutions in their own favour. The economic and social transformations originated by the industrial revolution bring about a transference of political power and an alteration in the balance of the Constitution.

The Government in 1815 had for its chief members: Castlereagh, as leader in the Commons, Eldon as Lord Chancellor, Liverpool as Premier, and Vansittart at the Exchequer. The first two appear to have dictated the policy of the Cabinet. Their general aim was professedly to carry out the policy of Pitt, but the policy of Pitt after, and not before, 1793. The French Revolution had engendered a fear, almost a hatred, of all experimental or remedial legislation; and the wave of reaction had not spent its force. Eldon was the Walpole of a new era, imploring the country to enjoy the blessings of peace and of order. To secure the stability of the State, not to provide for its growth, was, in his view, the true end and object of all statesmanship. Castlereagh deferred too much to Eldon in this policy of excessive caution and timidity. For this reason, therefore, the years 1815-22 were singularly barren in legislative or administrative achievement. The movement in favour of state education was checked; and, though sinecures were cut down, fresh pensions were created. No adequate attempt was made by the Ministers to draw up factory or combination laws, to reform the criminal code or the poor laws. In finance, at a moment which demanded the most drastic legislative remedies, the only real reform proceeded from a committee, whose chairman was a private member.

Distracted as it was by internal weakness and divisions, the Opposition was unable to exert effective pressure on the Government. Lords Lansdowne, Grey, and Grenville, their leaders in the Lords, differed in their opinions on fundamental points. Tierney, the official leader in the Commons, was a good speaker, but unacceptable to the aristocrats as a representative of the commercial classes, and destitute of skill in party management. The main body of the Whigs in the Commons was disheartened; several sections, such as those led by Bankes and Grattan, were quite independent. The Grenvillite Whigs, led in the Commons by Wynn, seceded in 1818, and openly joined the Tories in 1822. Cochrane and Burdett headed the few Radicals, and helped, by their violent denunciations and extravagant language, to bring into discredit the Whig party, to which they owed indeed no allegiance, but with which they were sometimes confounded. But for the energy and oratory of one man, the Opposition might have had but little influence. The greatness of Henry Brougham was indeed purely intellectual, for his vanity and instability often led him into amazing extravagances. Yet, though doing little to unite his party, he had immense influence in forming not only their opinions, but those of the Government and the nation. His unrivalled industry

and knowledge enabled him to survey every department of domestic and foreign policy. Exercising an almost complete tyranny over the *Edinburgh Review* (for which he wrote innumerable articles), he was enabled to mould to his views the official organ of Whig opinion. Against the greatest debater and almost the greatest orator of his time, the platitudes of Vansittart and Castlereagh availed nothing. It was not till Canning entered the Ministry in June, 1816, that a defender was found with gifts of eloquence and learning sufficient, on occasion, to reduce even the great Whig orator to silence.

Early in 1816 Vansittart brought forward his first peace budget, and at once revealed that he had no comprehensive scheme for averting the imminent prospect of general distress and failure. His principal proposal was to convert the ten per cent. property or income-tax into a five per cent. tax. Brougham denounced the iniquity of retaining the tax at all, on the ground that, having been imposed for the war, it ought to be withdrawn at its close. At last the scheme was wholly rejected; and Brougham, finding the House in a fit of hysterical joy, carried a childish resolution for the destruction of all records relating to the hated tax. Though the Government had thus received a severe defeat, though Castlereagh and Vansittart had both declared the retention of the tax essential to the maintenance of the nation's credit and power, they showed no disposition to resign. They even yielded yet further, and abolished the extra or war-duty of 2s. on every bushel of malt. This concession was intended to please the country gentlemen, and cost the Exchequer nearly three millions. When remonstrance was made, Castle-reagh coolly remarked that this loss made no difference, as the Government would in any case have to arrange for a large loan. These utterances and actions show that the Ministry were so accustomed to the recklessness of war expenditure, that even the warning signs of universal distress could not impress upon them the need of the most rigid economy.

The burden of the largest debt ever as yet incurred by any nation, and the reaction of exhaustion after the sustained effort of war, combined to produce a terrible crisis. The days of rejoicing and the nights of illumination were scarce ended, when men began to find that disasters follow upon peace as well as upon war. The sudden close of a long war dislocated commerce and industry, alike in their widest extent and in their minutest detail. The trades created or enlarged by the war were the first to suffer. A sudden cessation of demand caused great distress among gunmakers, braziers, and workers in steel and iron, among contractors, clothiers, and tanners. Half-a-million of men—once soldiers, sailors, or camp-followers—suddenly found themselves without employment. Landlords and farmers experienced a sudden and enormous depression in their prices, which had been artificially stimulated by the Continental System. The increasingly rapid introduction of labour-

saving machinery—especially that of power-weaving—was impoverishing the handloom weavers, destroying by-industries, and causing widespread distress and displacement of labour within special areas. The landlords had profited by the increased stringency of the corn law, and the capitalists by the abolition of the income-tax. Many of both classes also drew part of their income from interest on the debt. The poorer classes, taxed to pay the interest on the debt and to make good the deficit from the abolition of the income-tax, had, of course, no opportunity to benefit therefrom. Thus the inequitable assessment of taxation tended to benefit the rich, and to lay the burden of the debt on the classes least able to bear it. Certain special circumstances contributed, together with these more general causes, to render distress general and acute during the years 1815-6. The year 1816 produced a very bad harvest; many farmers gave notice to quit, farms went out of cultivation, and in some parishes half of the inhabitants were supported from the rates. The reduction of the price of iron by one-half caused widespread distress in manufacturing districts. The misery of the poor was extreme; and industrial reacted upon agricultural depression.

The unsympathetic attitude of the Government aggravated the consequences of this universal misery. The labourers, ascribing their distress to the landlords and capitalists, proceeded to burn the ricks of the one and to destroy the machinery of the other. The Luddite riots have been described as the most formidable of all outbreaks against the introduction of new machinery. In reality they appear to have originated in wage disputes with employers, and were actually directed against machinery which had long been in use. Whatever their origin, the Luddite riots were numerous and formidable in the big cities of the Midlands during 1816-7. Bread riots were also frequent and widespread in the towns. The distress of the people was the opportunity of the demagogues; and the flame of popular indignation was steadily fanned by a small knot of Radicals, who naturally used the prevailing distress as an argument for the necessity of their sweeping proposals. Some of these men were visionary and sincere, others unprincipled and self-seeking; but all were united in the violence of their denunciation and abuse. The different sections of the so-called Radicals are easy to distinguish. There were the Owenites and Spencean philanthropists, the members of the Hampden Clubs, and the followers of Cobbett, Hunt, and Thistlewood. The followers of Owen and Spence were the precursors of socialism; but their ideas were vague, dreamy, impracticable, and harmless. The Hampden Clubs, created in 1815 by Major Cartwright to work for the securing of universal suffrage, were equally innocuous. The more efficient forces of the agitation were directed by Cobbett, Hunt, and Thistlewood.

In general, Cobbett is important rather as representing temporary gusts and short-lived outbursts of popular opinion, than as developing

any consistent plan of social or political improvement. He seems to have never cared much about Parliamentary Reform. No man was guilty of more amazing inconsistencies or extravagant absurdities. But the immense and decisive influence exerted by him upon the movements and events of 1816-7 can hardly be denied. During these years Hazlitt's epigram, that Cobbett formed a Fourth Estate in himself, was almost literally true. At the end of 1816 Cobbett suddenly reduced the price of his famous paper, *The Weekly Political Register*, from one shilling and a halfpenny to twopence. The effect was prodigious; for the first time the lower classes had within their reach a journal, conducted not only by a man of the people, but by one who was a writer of genius in his irregular way. The vigour of his style drew the attention of the upper classes, that of his opinions commanded the enthusiasm of the lower. By a single stroke Cobbett had enormously increased the power of the Press. His wild remedies, such as the immediate withdrawal of all paper-money, and of all interest on the National Debt, and the destruction of British foreign commerce in order to bring the labourer back to the land, were calculated to fill the propertied classes with groundless reasons for alarm, and to commend themselves to those driven half-mad with hunger and distress.

Hunt was a powerful mob-orator, but was far inferior in influence to Cobbett, and from his emptiness and vanity a mere tool in the hands of others. The real leaders of the Radical party were a group of obscure and somewhat desperate characters, of whom Thistlewood and the two Watsons were the chief. Their ostensible programme resembled that of Cartwright, and included annual Parliaments, the ballot, payment of members, and universal suffrage. But darker rumours were afloat; it was said that the Radicals planned to fire the London barracks and to march on the Tower. On November 15, 1816, they held a meeting at Spa Fields, which was broken up by the police. On December 2 they met again, and inflammatory speeches were made; the younger Watson led the crowd into the City, where a gunsmith's shop was stormed and a bystander wounded. The mob was soon dispersed, and the ringleaders were arrested. As this outbreak synchronised with bread and machinery riots in other districts, the propertied classes at once connected the three kinds of disturbance, and regarded them as evidence of a carefully-planned simultaneous rising. In February, 1817, the alarm was enhanced by an attack on the Regent, whose coach-window was shattered by a shot or stone on his return from opening Parliament.

Secret committees of both Houses were at once appointed to consider the state of the nation. The reports which they presented were of a most alarming character. They dwelt upon the dangerous and revolutionary tendencies of the Spencean philanthropists and the Union clubs, both of which societies were—as is now known—of a perfectly harmless, if slightly extravagant, character. The committees

were to some extent successful in producing evidence of wild or revolutionary opinions, but had almost nothing on which to base their belief in designs for the active and immediate use of force on the part of the Radicals. The Spa Fields riot was the one fact on which they could rely; and even here evidence of treasonable design rested on the sole testimony of one Castle, a hired informer of infamous character. Both committees concurred in attributing to the Radicals designs for an immediate and general insurrection, whose object was "a total overthrow of all existing establishments, and a division of the landed and extinction of the funded property of the country." The reports ended by pronouncing the existing laws inadequate to deal with the situation. On February 24 Castlereagh introduced Bills entrusting the Government with extraordinary powers, and suspending the Habeas Corpus Act. A Seditious Meetings Bill was passed, requiring licenses to be obtained from the magistrates for the holding of meetings, lectures, and debates on whatever subject. Early in March Sidmouth, the Home Secretary, issued a circular to the Lords-Lieutenant, drawing their attention to the circulation of blasphemous and seditious literature, and recommending magistrates to apprehend persons charged with publishing or writing such libels. The code of repressive legislation was completed by this attack on the freedom of opinion and of the Press.

Before the Seditious Meetings Bill had passed into law, the Ministry was thrown into great alarm by accounts of two meetings held in Manchester on March 3 and 10. A mob assembled there to protest against the repressive measures of the Government, and proposed to march on London and lay their grievances before the Regent. As each petitioner carried with him a blanket, those who set out on this march were called Blanketeers. Ringleaders were arrested on warrants from Sidmouth; dragoons and yeomanry scattered or turned back some of their followers; cold and exposure disposed of the rest. After this utter failure to impress the capital, the northern Radicals turned their attention to making demonstrations in their own particular districts. Under pressure from the local magistrates, the Home Secretary again issued warrants of arrest, which resulted in the capture and imprisonment of various ringleaders. This action caused the failure of several projected meetings, but did not prevent serious riots at Derby and Huddersfield. At Derby the rioters killed a man, but afterwards surrendered quietly to the yeomanry. Thus was easily suppressed the sole riot, of the series beginning with the Spa Fields meeting, which seemed likely to have dangerous consequences. But the Government relaxed none of its severity, and again set its secret committees to work. On the production of further alarming reports, the suspension of the Habeas Corpus Act—which would have ceased with the session—was extended until March 1, 1818. Since that date the Habeas Corpus Act has never been suspended in England.

The Ministry seem to have been induced to take this momentous step by a real belief in the existence of plans for a universal insurrection as evidenced by the late riots. The juries, before whom the accused came, certainly did not concur in this view. Watson and other Spa Fields rioters were discharged ; some score of persons, charged with high treason, were acquitted in the north. The Government succeeded only in the conviction and execution of three of the Derby rioters, whose guilt was clear and obvious. The trials of journalists and writers went still more unfortunately for the Government. Two obscure writers—Wooler and Hone—were acquitted amid general acclamations, though in the last case Chief Justice Ellenborough used means of very doubtful propriety in order to secure a conviction. The results of these legal proceedings certainly go far to discredit the evidence on which the Government relied. In times of danger a Minister may have to act at once, depending upon sources of information which he would not accept upon other occasions. But the evidence of Castle and Oliver, the witnesses chiefly responsible for the measures taken by Parliament in February and June, 1817, respectively, was most dubious in the one case and gravely suspect in the other. It was widely believed at the time that the Government had deliberately stimulated the conspiracy through its agents. This view is untenable ; but Sidmouth and Castlereagh undoubtedly showed themselves somewhat eager and credulous, so that the trade of informer became profitable and every motive was supplied for exaggerating the danger. Both Oliver and Castle admitted having fomented the plots they professed to discover, just as in 1820 another government spy admitted that he had encouraged the Thistlewood conspiracy. All the evidence goes to show that, even if plots had been hatched by a few desperate men, the theory of a general conspiracy was utterly baseless.

The Ministry justified themselves by alleging the danger of contagion from France, by quoting the example of Pitt, and by recalling the precedents of 1794. Proofs of French influence were to be found in the fact that some of the rioters had forged pikes, assumed the red cap of Liberty, or displayed the tricolour. But in 1794 the French were urging the English people to dethrone their tyrants, and preparing an army to aid them in the task. In 1817 there was no European war and no French Revolution ; in point of fact, order was being restored in Europe and in France by the sternest means, and the danger feared was imaginary. Moreover, whatever be the view held of the justice or necessity of his measures, Pitt undoubtedly had overwhelming support from popular opinion. In 1817 large parliamentary majorities supported Castlereagh ; but the public feeling of the nation as a whole was, if not actually hostile, at least divided and uncertain. Not Jacobin theories, but economic and social facts, were the real causes of disturbance in 1817. And, though much distress could not have been averted, the

Government certainly showed itself momentarily more ready to devise repressive than remedial measures. Their real motive lay in the fact that they were supported in the main by the propertied classes, irrespective of party or political opinion. Grenville and a large section of the Whigs declared their whole-hearted adhesion to the Government's measures. Even men like Tierney, Brougham, and Mackintosh, who criticised the evidence of crime, and pleaded for less severity of punishment, declared their belief in the gravity of the crisis and disclaimed any connexion with the "deluded Radicals."

The consequences of this attitude were very serious, for the aim of the Radicals, which had been to separate the people from allegiance to either of the two official parties, was thus fulfilled. It was now really possible, with some show of plausibility, to argue that neither Whig nor Tory party had any political principles, and that their only differences were about office, pensions, and jobs. It could hardly be denied that they had united to refuse all concessions to helplessness and misery, and that the rich exercised, to the disadvantage of the poor, those very rights of combination which were declared illegal for working-men. It is this feeling which explains the extraordinary violence of the pamphlets of the time, of the utterances of Hobhouse, Cobbett, or Hunt, and of the passionate lyrics in which Byron and Shelley exhibited Castlereagh and Eldon for the ridicule and detestation of mankind. The influence of Byron in particular became enormous, though less in guiding than in exciting public opinion. The movement towards dissatisfaction with all existing institutions, towards vague unrest or mad anger, was immensely strengthened by the influence of a great writer in whom the spirit of revolt was incarnate.

The year 1817 was remarkable for the abundance of its harvest, and with economic prosperity political disturbance gradually subsided. Though the agitations had almost ceased, the Government insisted on pressing to a conclusion the third prosecution of Hone. Of all the repressive measures of this Government their attack upon the Press is least easy to justify. It is perhaps hard to draw the line between the expression of violent opinion and incitement to violent action. But it is absurd to suppose that many of the five hundred writers, who suffered more or less severe penalties in the period 1809–22, were actively engaged in promoting rebellion or conspiracy. In the case of Hone, as in some others, the Government's action was most impolitic, and exalted an obscure and scurrilous journalist to the dignity of a hero and a martyr. Hone was accused of blasphemy, but covered the Government with ridicule, by quoting from Canning's *Anti-Jacobin* in defence of his own works. Parliament met during the flush of popular indignation against the Government, which followed upon his triumphant acquittal. The Ministers at once proceeded to pass an Act, indemnifying them for measures taken during the suspension of the *Habeas Corpus* Act. Fresh

secret committees (almost identical in composition with the previous committees) again presented reports. The majority in both Houses, relying on the statements of committees, which virtually reported on themselves, passed the Bill into law.

The Ministry then adopted a strange measure. In spite of the need for economy, a million pounds were granted for the purpose of building new churches for the Establishment, apparently in the belief that irreligion had been a prime cause of Radical outbreaks in 1816-7. But even more practical measures could hardly have done much to mitigate the effects of the bad harvests and industrial depression which marked the year 1819, and produced an almost exact repetition of the political discontents and the governmental repressions of 1816-7. The increasing agitation for reform culminated in a gigantic meeting, held at Manchester on August 16, 1819. Fifty thousand persons assembled to listen to the eloquence of Hunt; and banners were displayed bearing the mottoes, "Equal Representation or Death," "Liberty or Death." The magistrates became terrified, attempted to arrest Hunt, and finally ordered the yeomanry to charge the crowd. The result was the "Manchester Massacre" or "Battle of Peterloo," in which one man was killed and some forty were wounded or otherwise injured. The Ministry, within a day of receiving the news, despatched a letter signed by the Regent, approving the action of the magistrates. This ludicrous haste to commend the magistrates for the use of violence, before it was clear whether it had been employed wisely and in accordance with the law, did much to discredit the Ministry.

Parliament now met, and the Government proceeded to the passage of the notorious "Six Acts." These formed a new edition, revised and enlarged, of the temporary measures of 1817. It was not thought needful again to suspend Habeas Corpus; but Acts, and not circulars, now empowered magistrates to seize arms, and to prevent the publication of seditious and blasphemous libels. Another Act extended the Stamp-duty to all pamphlets, and thus made it impossible for Cobbett to issue his "Twopenny Trash." The most important of all the Acts restricted the right of assembly. It confined public meetings in parishes to the ordinary parochial meetings or to those summoned by five magistrates, in corporate towns to those summoned by the Mayor, in counties to those summoned by the Lord-Lieutenant. The power to grant the assemblage of large meetings was practically placed in the hands of the wealthy upper-class, at the discretion of magistrates or Lords-Lieutenant. It would be difficult to secure assemblages of any kind in unincorporated towns, such as Wolverhampton, Sheffield, Birmingham, and Manchester. The hardship in the case of the last two towns was extreme; for, as they returned no members to the Commons, they had no legal means of making their grievances or distresses known to Parliament. Lord Holland recorded a protest in the Lords, that the laws already existent

were sufficient to prevent confusion arising in popular meetings; that the powers entrusted to the magistrates were liable to abuse; and that sweeping restrictions were extended to the whole kingdom, on account of disturbances confined to particular districts. Lastly, he used the strong argument, that large meetings acted as "a vent, comparatively innoxious, of that ill-humour and discontent which, if suppressed, might seek refuge in secret cabals and conspiracies." This put the new attitude of the Whigs with force and clearness. They had regarded the measures of 1817–8 as immediate and temporary remedies for specific evils. They now feared that the Government advocated force, as a general method of dealing with all popular movements and opinions. Hence arose the vigour and unanimity with which they now opposed the Six Acts.

Just after the Bills became law two extraordinary events occurred. Thistlewood, forbidden to address meetings or declare opinions, sought other means for the satisfaction of his anger and discontent. With the assistance of a government spy, he hatched a monstrous plot to murder the whole Cabinet. It was discovered on February 23, 1820; and he and other conspirators were executed. Atrocious as were their crimes, their dying utterances are really pathetic. They are those of men utterly unable to understand the severity of their rulers, and goaded to their crimes by a belief in the malign intentions of the Government. This event went far to support Lord Holland's contention, that the suppression of open meetings led to the creation of secret conspiracies. A second event, however, worked for the justification of the Government. On April 2 a riotous mob assembled near Glasgow and was dispersed by arms. The "Battle of Bonnymuir" was a Scotch version of the "Battle of Peterloo," and was the last disturbance for ten years serious enough to give any justification to the governmental policy. But the repressive policy had succeeded, and Radicals were temporarily silenced. The reasons were not far to seek; Hobhouse, Carlisle, and "Orator" Hunt were in prison. Lord Fitzwilliam had been dismissed from his lord-lieutenancy for allowing a meeting to be held to protest against the conduct of the magistrates at Peterloo. Cobbett had fled to America, influenced in about equal proportions by fear of arrest for debt and fear of persecution by the authorities. At the election of 1818, despite every effort of Government and borough-mongers, popular influences had reduced the ministerial majority by thirty or forty; at the dissolution of 1820 but very little impression was made. The popular movement was crushed, only to reappear in ten years, when it supported and made resistless the great movement for Parliamentary Reform.

It might have been thought that the only political result from the death of a King, who had ruled in nothing but name for ten years, would have been to compel a dissolution. In fact, the mere change of title, occurring on January 29, 1820, produced a crisis which shook the throne, all but

overturned the Ministry, and profoundly agitated the people. The announcement that the new King, George IV, contemplated a divorce from Queen Caroline, on the ground of her misconduct and adultery, produced universal indignation. Since his profligacy was open and notorious, his action was viewed, with some justice, as hypocritical and violent. In point of fact, the charges against the Queen, though not proved, rested on very strong circumstantial evidence. But to the public she was an injured woman, whose cause they chivalrously espoused. To the politicians her trial was largely a move in the political game, enabling the Whigs to harass the King for his cavalier treatment of them during the negotiations of 1811-2. A Divorce Bill was introduced into the Lords, which Lord Brougham, the Queen's official defender, opposed with splendid eloquence. During these proceedings he reached the culminating point of his fame. It was largely owing to his efforts that the majority in its favour sank to nine upon the third reading. Ministers thereupon decided that they would not proceed with the Bill. This triumph enabled the Whigs to regain the confidence of the people, who hailed this decision with transports of delight.

Other results of the trial were no less important. For the last time a measure was brought forward as the direct result of the personal influence of the sovereign; almost for the first time a measure, advocated by both King and Ministry, was abandoned owing to the violence of popular agitation. At the very moment when the Government appeared to have suppressed all popular demonstrations, the popular influence upon Parliament was manifested in unmistakable fashion. Nor did this influence cease. During the sessions of 1821-2 the Government was driven, by equally pronounced expressions of popular opinion, to make immense reductions of expenditure. The unpopularity of the Government continually increased and its fall seemed inevitable, when Castlereagh died by his own hand on August 9, 1822. In point of fact, the period of five years, for which the Ministry was yet to survive, proved the most important and the most popular of its existence.

In spite of royal opposition, the Foreign Office and the lead in the Commons were offered to Canning. He had resigned office in 1820, in order to dissociate himself from any measures against the Queen. He now accepted the whole heritage of Castlereagh. With the death of George III and Castlereagh all men felt that an epoch had closed, and that the triumph of extreme or Eldonian Toryism was ended. Castlereagh had appeared to be the disciple of Pitt after 1793, the Pitt who suspended Habeas Corpus and gagged the Press. Canning seemed a truer disciple, and recalled the memory of the Pitt who reformed our finance and promoted our commerce. Though he had supported the Six Acts, Canning was penetrated with the consciousness that speedy and drastic remedies must be applied to the evils of the time. He was convinced of the danger of delaying and the need of anticipating reforms, and he at

last found others to share his opinions. In 1815 more than three-fourths of the Cabinet were peers; in 1822 nearly half sat in the Lower House, of which Canning was the leader. New changes had placed two devoted followers of his in the Cabinet: Huskisson, the greatest practical financier of the age, at the Board of Trade; Robinson at the Exchequer. Sidmouth, Canning's old opponent, left the Ministry; Liverpool promised Canning his hearty support in his new projects. Thus Canning was able to give immediate and practical effect to a more Liberal domestic policy.

Castlereagh, without any real grasp of finance, had been suspicious of, or indifferent to, financial reforms; Canning had a firm general grasp of financial problems and a resolve to expedite their settlement. Castlereagh had allowed no one except himself to introduce important domestic measures. Thus legislation had been retarded by his inability to combine, with the Foreign Office and the leadership of the Commons, a comprehension of every suggested domestic reform. The less exacting though not less industrious Canning wisely contented himself with a general supervision and encouragement. But the efforts of Canning and his friends were not the only motive force. A new spirit of mildness and benevolence had grown up; an eagerness to reform abuses and remove evils was everywhere prevalent. From the emancipation of Catholics to the emancipation of slaves, from the abolition of obsolete duties to the abolition of the death penalty for the pettiest crimes, from the first legislative attempts at preventing cruelty to dumb animals to the first assaults on the sacred code of game-laws, the influence of a larger tolerance and sympathy is everywhere apparent. Wealthy men of the upper middle-class, such as Zachary Macaulay, the first Sir Robert Peel, and Sir James Mackintosh, had the chief hand in promoting this legislation. The ideas of the middle classes were not always practical and not seldom interested; but the clash of their opinions with those of the landed class generally worked, during these years, for the interests of the people as a whole. Canning and Huskisson thoroughly understood the middle classes, and together created a popular interest in finance and legislation, similar to that which Canning had aroused in foreign policy. Between 1815 and 1822, such reforms as were accomplished resulted almost wholly from private member legislation; and the Opposition exhausted their vocabularies in denunciation and abuse of the Government. Between 1822 and 1827, Ministers were found adopting the suggestions and encouraging the motions of individual members; and the Opposition not infrequently praised and supported Government proposals. The result was an outburst of reforming activity, proceeding on the model of Pitt's legislation between 1784 and 1793, but far surpassing it in effect and importance.

The legislation of this period may be considered under the aspect of legal and judicial reforms, social legislation, and the changes in colonial, commercial, and industrial policy. After frequent correspondence and

consultation with Brougham, Mackintosh, and Bentham, the father of all law reform, Peel introduced his measures. Aided by a magnanimous support from the Opposition, he thoroughly revised and humanised the criminal code, abolishing the penalty of death for many petty crimes. He attacked the old and wasteful system of needlessly multiplying courts and offices, and prepared the way for a reform of Chancery, and for an introduction of uniform procedure in the Courts of Common Law. Peel crowned his work by substituting for the old and incompetent watchmen a thoroughly new and efficient police force.

In social as distinguished from legal reforms less progress was made. The terrible extravagances and abuses of the old poor-law remained; but the laws defining the relations between labour and capital were revised. Laws forbidding the export of machinery and the emigration of labourers could only be framed in one interest. They were constantly evaded in practice, and served only as degrading reminders to the workmen of the inequality existing between them and their employers. They were accordingly abolished amid universal satisfaction. Other difficulties still remained. Owing to the laws against combination, a man attending a peaceful meeting of fellow-workers was at any time liable to a prosecution for conspiracy. The extreme of tyranny was succeeded by the extreme of liberty, and all combinations whatsoever were legalised by an Act for the repeal of the Combination Laws, passed hastily through Parliament in 1824. Various disturbances and riots compelled Huskisson to revise this Act in 1825. A new Act prohibited certain kinds of meetings, and gave the magistrates summary jurisdiction in the case of threats being used on the part of either workman or employer. This compromise continued to regulate all the relations of capital and labour for more than a generation.

The spirit of these reforms might be described as the adjustment of old institutions and policies to new and unforeseen demands and necessities. The abuses which had crept in during almost a quarter of a century of reaction and repression were insensibly removed; and so much of the old principles was retained as suited the needs of an age and a country more scientific and commercial. This spirit is to be discerned in the new colonial and financial policy with even more clearness than in legal reforms or in social legislation. Despite the lesson of America, England had done little to modify the old colonial system. In 1819 Goulburn officially declared our colonial system to be that England retained a complete monopoly of the trade of her Colonies in return for affording them protection and defence. In the complete reversal of this policy, undertaken by Huskisson and Canning during 1822-3, the first object of attack was the Navigation Laws. The first of these laws allowed the produce of Europe to come to England only in British ships, or in the ships of the country producing the goods. The second permitted the goods of Asia, Africa, and America to be imported into England only

in British bottoms. An immense colonial shipping sprang up under cover of this word, which was interpreted as covering both English and colonial vessels. Franklin himself had testified to the immense benefit which the American Colonies had thus derived under the Navigation Laws. But with this important and some other less significant exceptions, the British Colonies had been subject to an entire and rigid exclusion from commercial intercourse with foreign countries.

When the United States ceased to be British, they found that their shipping was as much damaged as it had once been encouraged by the Navigation Acts. They therefore proceeded to elaborate a Navigation Law of their own against England. The ships of each nation were thereby forced to accomplish half of each voyage empty, and the consumer had to pay the cost of freight twice over. In view of this absurdity, both nations agreed to a relaxation of restrictions in 1814. Other events and other nations were working to make that relaxation complete, final, and universal. The trade of Spanish America, so long reserved to the mother-country, was flung open to the world, and Brazil and San Domingo also opened their ports. These opportunities created or increased the mercantile marine of Portugal, Prussia, and the Netherlands. All these countries promptly imitated the successful example of the States, and raised their dues against British vessels. England therefore found herself maintaining a commercial monopoly, likely to damage the interests and to sap the loyalty of her Colonies. During 1820-1 Wallace, as Vice-President of the Board of Trade, had done something to relax the Navigation Laws. Further measures were taken in 1823; and Huskisson fully developed and explained his policy in his great speech of March 21, 1825. Foreign countries were to be allowed direct trade with our Colonies, subject only to the old principle of the Navigation Laws, that the cargo must be the product of the country to which the ship belonged. On these terms European as well as American States were admitted to as free a trade with English Colonies, as they enjoyed with Ireland or Jersey. But, as in those cases, there was an entire and absolute reservation of all intercourse between the mother-country and her Colonies. Foreign countries were informed that the intercolonial trade and the trade between England and (for example) the West Indies were to be treated as if they were a coasting-trade between Gravesend and Brightlingsea. Moderate duties were placed on the importation of foreign goods into colonial markets, where it seemed needful to give some protection to similar English products.

These actual changes were in themselves moderate; but the reversal of a policy nearly two hundred years old rendered further alterations inevitable in the future. The new policy stood midway between two extremes, between the ideas of Goulburn and the ultra-Tories and those of Bentham and the ultra-Radicals. The former valued the Colonies only in so far as they served the interests of the mother-country; the

others denounced them as the cause of a good deal of corruption and of all wars. A balance was now struck. Huskisson and Canning hastened to disavow Goulburn's lately proclaimed maxim, that the interests of the dependency should be made subservient to those of the mother-country. England admitted that the development of the Colonies had been cramped, and prepared herself to relax vexatious restrictions by measures which benefited them more obviously than the mother-country. Some intention was indeed shown to favour the home trader in colonial tariffs, but a very great differentiation of duties was made in favour of colonial as against foreign imports. This was especially the case with the Corn Laws, which were greatly relaxed in favour of colonial corn. The supreme control of trade policy within the Empire was retained by the mother-country; but the interests of the Colonies were fully and explicitly recognised, and the new arrangements were made, in the main, for their benefit. Emigration to the Colonies was actively and systematically encouraged and subsidised. Huskisson declared that the interests of England and her Colonies were one, and that whatever tended to increase the prosperity of the one must tend likewise eventually to increase that of the other.

The breakdown of the old exclusive restrictions brought considerable financial gains but still greater moral effects. Hitherto the trade of the Colonies had been regarded as existing largely for the benefit of the English merchant, the patronage as an exclusive field for the aristocracy. A deaf and dumb peer drew a salary for governing Barbados; a countess extracted a thousand pounds for a sinecure in Trinidad; Charles Greville drew three thousand a year for being secretary to the Governor of Jamaica, on which island he never set foot. Such was the old colonial system, commercially exclusive and politically corrupt. Little or nothing was done to remedy one type of grievance; but the new economic policy, for the first time, convinced the Colonies that the mother-country cared for their interests. The result was a development and strengthening of the sentiments of unity and loyalty, a consequence foreseen and intended by Canning and Huskisson, and the chief motive which had moved them to action.

Before Huskisson had accepted the Presidency of the Board of Trade, the old and vexed currency question had been settled. Though statistics show that in 1817-8 cash payments could have been resumed with safety, Vansittart had remained immovable. At length public opinion forced him to yield; and a Bank Committee, of which Peel was chairman and Huskisson the guiding spirit, was appointed to consider the question in 1819. Their report, favourable to the resumption of cash payments, was adopted by Parliament. Gold became the sole standard of value, and the currency was settled on a firm and lasting basis. Thus, before Huskisson began his reforms, one great cause of fluctuation and distress had been removed.

The first object of attack was the Sinking Fund. Vansittart had contrived to convert a real surplus into an annual deficit, by setting aside five millions yearly to accumulate at compound interest for the redemption of the debt. As the surplus never reached five millions, Vansittart had been reduced to the absurdity of making up the balance by borrowing money, on which of course he had to pay interest. In 1823 Robinson, as Chancellor of the Exchequer, abandoned this extravagant and wasteful practice, by announcing that, in future, payments to the Sinking Fund would only be made from the annual surplus. Though in some financial measures, as in the reform of the Sinking Fund, the voice was sometimes that of Robinson, the hand is always that of Huskisson. This is proved by a famous memorandum, which he addressed to Lord Liverpool in 1819, in which all his most celebrated financial measures are clearly foreshadowed.

The conditions of taxation and of the tariff next engaged the attention of Huskisson. Taxes had been imposed at haphazard on almost every article of luxury or necessity, with the object of producing a revenue for war purposes. Many unproductive taxes were now abolished; others were revised or more equally assessed. The tariff had been slowly built up during the preceding century, and contained many obsolete or illogical prohibitions. Thus rape-cake was imported duty free, but a prohibitive duty excluded rape-seed, so that the existing tariff forbade the importation of the raw material and encouraged that of the finished article. The import of raw silk and the export of wool were each of them prohibited, so that Englishmen could not send their woollens to foreign markets, or manufacture silk goods at a profit for the home market. Bounties were so arranged as to encourage the old and perishing, to the disadvantage of the new and flourishing trades. Again, the excise was very heavy, and often levied on those very articles upon which bounties were given. Prohibitive duties fell with impartial severity, alike upon buttons and pig-iron, upon catgut and unworked copper, upon raw leather and mummies.

Huskisson was for his time an advanced free-trader, holding that prohibitions and bounties stimulated mediocrity and destroyed inventive power, and that initiative and energy were best developed by the destruction of monopolies and by freedom of competition. He therefore abolished many bounties and provided for the gradual extinction of the rest. With regard to the tariff, his principle was to give a slight protection to English as against foreign manufactures, but to admit raw materials as freely as possible. Duties on foreign manufactures, which had varied from 180 per cent. to 40 per cent., were cut down to between 30 and 15 per cent. The import duties on raw materials were immensely reduced or entirely swept away. As already stated, the Navigation Laws were amended and relaxed, and placed on a basis of reciprocity. Contemporaries saw the effect of all these measures in the unexampled

prosperity of 1824. In 1814 the official valuation of our exports (a dubious but still an instructive estimate) stood at some forty-five million pounds; in 1820 it had fallen to thirty-eight; in 1824 it rose to forty-eight and three-quarter millions. Huskisson's reforms had had immense influence, most of all in extinguishing the enormous amount of smuggling, which the inordinately high tariffs had encouraged and even necessitated. In many other ways Huskisson's wise measures had tended to increase the country's prosperity, by the removal of obsolete and absurd abuses or restrictions, by the codification of Customs Law, and by the relaxation of the Navigation Laws. But the unexampled prosperity of 1824 was not wholly, or even perhaps largely, due to governmental measures. The whole continent of America was now open to commercial intercourse; and the trade of Europe, checked or strangled by lack of capital and by war, had again revived. England, situated between the two continents whose trade had been restored and whose intercourse was being now first developed, acted as the clearing-house and port of call for both. Thus the great industrial revolution, which had enabled England to endure the strain of the Napoleonic struggle, was succeeded and consummated by an equally great commercial revolution, which enabled her to pay the cost of it.

A reaction followed close upon prosperity, as if to reveal the hidden influences and unseen laws, against which no Government could provide or contend. The resumption of cash payments had caused the rates of discount to fall and prices to rise, and hence had encouraged enterprise. An inordinate passion for speculation set in; numberless joint-stock banks and other companies were formed; even level-headed business men invested in the wildest schemes. The public began by patronising relatively sober companies formed for developing pearl fisheries off the coast of Columbia or cutting Panama canals. They proceeded to more imaginative projects, for extracting oil from flower-seeds, and inventing perpetual motion. Never had there been such reckless speculation since the days of the South Sea Bubble. Huskisson, Canning, and Liverpool all openly deprecated these mad enterprises, and pointed out the consequences of such unreasoning speculations. By the spring of 1825 the price of shares had become so high that a great commercial crisis was, in any case, inevitable. Other reasons intensified the disaster, such as the fact that some of the American Republics were suffering political convulsions and threatening to repudiate their debts. Whatever the causes, psychological and economic, stocks and securities suddenly fell with a rush; and on December 25 a great crisis began. The Directors of the Bank of England were reduced to the smallest possible amount of bullion, and vainly solicited the Government for permission to suspend cash payments. They managed to afford some relief by issuing one-pound notes and making advances on stock. But no measures, taken at that hour, could have availed to avert the gigantic disaster. Almost

every bank in the country had to stand a run; and seventy-seven of them failed in the process. The crash was unexampled; some of the oldest banks in the country had suspended payment; thousands of speculators had been ruined. It was only very slowly that financial credit recovered. To guard against such evils in the future, the Government proceeded to the abolition of one-pound notes in England, and thus forced the country banks to watch the supply of gold, and imposed upon them caution in their issues of paper. The direct share of the Government in alleviating the distress was small. Yet the sound basis on which Huskisson had placed the finances undoubtedly had an influence in limiting the extent and duration of the crisis. All his measures had been aided by the advice and support of Canning, whose influence in the Cabinet alone enabled them to be formed into law, and whose brilliant oratory in the Commons defended Huskisson against the embittered attacks of his enemies.

The starting-point of the struggle, which raged between the squire and the capitalist, between land and commerce, during the years 1825-46, is the Corn Law of 1815. To understand it is therefore to have the key to the whole controversy. That Act forbade foreign corn to be imported, until the price in England should rise to 80s. per quarter. It attempted in the first place to give immediate temporary relief to those landlords who had unduly extended their areas of cultivation, because of the unnatural stimulation of prices during the war, and who had suffered terribly from the collapse in prices immediately after it. The Act was also framed, partly to give some permanent protection to the landed interest, partly with the wider and more national object of making the country self-sufficient in war-time. It had therefore a direct economic and an indirect political end. In 1822 there was terrible agricultural distress, and some inconsiderable amendments were made in the Corn Laws. By 1826 circumstances had greatly changed since 1815. Only one-third of the population now worked on the land; commercial and capitalistic interests were stronger and more articulate. These considerations counted for much with Canning and Huskisson, who believed the future prosperity of England to depend not on agriculture but on commerce. They were also influenced by the fact that, as the Corn Laws were the most noticeable part of the English tariff, foreign countries always refused to make concessions in commercial treaties on the ground that our corn duties showed no sign of reduction. In 1826 the scantiness of the harvest caused terrible distress; and the Government, acting on their own responsibility, at once placed the foreign corn (kept in bond until the price should rise to the required rate) on the open market. One motion was carried to this effect in Parliament, and another for importing 500,000 additional quarters to relieve the existing misery.

The landed interest had a majority in Parliament, but a dissolution was at hand; and even Squire Western and his friends shrank from defying public opinion. In thus yielding they imagined that they had made only a temporary concession to immediate necessities. In reality the reverse was true. As there was no country in Europe where the labourer held less land, the English labourer was more interested in the price of corn as consumer than as producer. The restrictions on import were such that the accident of a bad harvest in England must cause great suffering, and the profit from the enhanced prices would go eventually into the landlords' pockets. By temporarily relaxing the Corn Laws the landed interest had admitted the hardship imposed by the existing laws upon the mass of the population. Hence it became easy to argue that a desire to retain the existing Corn Laws could only be indulged at the expense of the community as a whole.

Huskisson and Canning were about to introduce an amendment to the Corn Laws when, on February 17, 1827, Lord Liverpool was smitten with a paralytic stroke, which irreparably destroyed his mental faculties. When this became known there ensued a scene of intrigue and dissension in the Ministry to which there is no parallel in nineteenth-century history. The truth is that the ultra-Tory and the Canningite sections of the Cabinet were and had long been utterly at variance with one another. The masterful and imperious Canning had recently forced the Ministry into measures, both in domestic and foreign policy, with which many of his colleagues did not agree. As Palmerston wittily declared, the real Opposition sat on the Treasury Bench.

When Canning was at length chosen as Premier by the King, six of his colleagues resigned, as they all declared, from personal not party differences. This defence may fairly be made for Wellington, Eldon, and Peel, but not for the rest. If Canning was to retain office, a coalition with the Whigs was essential. The Opposition had, during the later years, given an example of disinterestedness and moderation almost unique in the annals of party warfare. Some few Whigs now held aloof and looked suspicious; and Lord Grey savagely attacked Canning in the Lords. But the main body threw in their lot with the new Premier; and the Commons saw Brougham and Canning sitting side by side on the Treasury Bench, and defending each other from attack. Tierney accepted office as Master of the Mint; and the Duke of Clarence, who had Whig sympathies, became Lord High Admiral. Robinson, Chancellor of the Exchequer under Liverpool, was sent to lead the House of Lords with the title of Viscount Goderich; and the new Ministry was thus complete.

The new Corn Law was carried in the Commons by Canning on March 6. By the time it reached the Lords, the new Ministry was completed, and party passions were aroused. The Bill introduced a sliding-scale of duty, varying with the price of corn in England, that is with the abundance or otherwise of the home harvest. Wellington,

misunderstanding a loosely-worded alternative suggestion sent him by Huskisson, carried an amendment to the effect that foreign corn should not be taken out of bond till the price reached 66s. per quarter. This was to wreck the whole principle of the sliding-scale and, though no one seems to have noticed this, it was unconstitutional because the Peers cannot amend money-bills. Canning made a true comment when he said that Wellington had defeated the whole purpose of the Bill, and a bitter one, when he described the Duke as an instrument in the hands of the landed interest. All he could do was to promise to bring in a new Bill next session, in which, as is now known, he designed to fix the price at which foreign corn could be imported at 50s. per quarter. He indicated in public, and boldly announced in private, that only a thorough revision of the Corn Laws could avert the coming struggle between industrial and agricultural interests. The session ended in July, and on August 8 Canning died.

The period when Canning led the Commons, as compared with that immediately preceding it, seemed to contemporaries an age of gold succeeding to one of iron. Such a comparison, though by no means just to Castlereagh, had in it considerable truth. But Canning's ideas were beginning to conflict with the spirit of the times; and they would in the time to come have tended towards reaction. Progressive in everything else, he was utterly hostile to Reform, foreseeing, as no one else did, that it would lead inevitably to democracy. When forming his Coalition Ministry, Canning had boldly announced that he would oppose any project of Parliamentary Reform to the end of his life. Yet that question was now becoming superior in importance even to the revision of the Corn Laws, Catholic Emancipation, or those general projects of administrative reform which Canning advocated. Circumstances were rendering Parliamentary Reform inevitable and all-important; and Canning's alliance with the Whigs could only have served to retard it. The tragedy of his death and the dazzling qualities of his genius have blinded historians to the fact that on the vital question of the next few years he was unprogressive. And therefore, while his world-wide influence in foreign policy, and his great achievements in progressive legislation are acknowledged, it can hardly be pronounced that, on the side of domestic policy, the death of this extraordinary man was inopportune either for his country or his fame.

To hold together and reconcile his strangely-assorted coalition had taxed the genius of Canning; it proved a task to which his mediocre successor was unequal. Lamentably weak, whether as orator, administrator, or chief of a Cabinet, Goderich resigned office in January, 1828, securing the distinction of being the only modern Premier who has never faced Parliament. So sudden was the close of a Ministry which had cost such pains to construct. The result of the coalition had, however, had at least one effect, that of making the old Tory party thoroughly unpopular. This was now seen when Wellington, at the

King's command, formed a new Government. It was supported by the whole force of the landed interest, and by the whole prejudice of the militant Protestants. It lasted but three years and fell unregretted. The Liberal tone, which Wellington eventually adopted, was forced on him against his will by popular pressure. This is proved by the fact that, though he included Huskisson, Palmerston, and other Canningites in his Ministry, he took a very early opportunity of getting rid of them. The reasons inducing him to take this course could hardly have weighed with him, had he thought their views to be in real harmony with his own. As a consequence the Canningites permanently joined the Whigs; and the Tory Government was soon driven by events into legislative activity. Early in 1828 Lord John Russell carried a motion for the Repeal of the Test and Corporation Acts; and a Bill founded on it became law. The Government had at first shown signs of opposing the Bill, but at length accepted it. Owing to the Act of Indemnity which was annually passed these Acts caused no practical harm; but the removal of theoretical grievances now placed Dissenters of all kinds on a legal equality with members of the Established Church. The significance of this measure, as marking the influence of the middle classes and the tendency towards Reform, is not easy to exaggerate.

It was the prelude to a far more important and far-reaching measure. The history of the Catholic Relief Bill, which became law in April, 1829, is given elsewhere in full. It is only needful here to note its indirect effects upon English politics. Wellington stands in history as the last representative of the older Toryism, as the supreme champion of that old order which perished with 1832. Such was certainly not the opinion of his own party in 1829. To many of these he seemed a traitor, who had abandoned and betrayed their party and principles. He and Peel had always been the most formidable opponents of Catholic Emancipation; yet, when in power, they used their authority to carry that very measure, which they had so often declared would effect the ruin of their country. The ultra-Tories now feared that wealthy Catholics might buy up rotten boroughs, and secure representation in the Commons. Hence the ultra-Protestant Marquis of Blandford actually brought in a motion for Parliamentary Reform in February, 1830, and, by a masterpiece of irony, found himself seconded by O'Connell himself, the great champion of Catholic Emancipation. Wellington might have disregarded the intense unpopularity of the Ministry throughout the country, but he could not withstand this distrust and division within his own party. Moreover, for the first time since the death of Fox, the Whigs were thoroughly united in the Commons under the leadership of Althorp—"honest Jack." To complete Wellington's misfortunes, George IV died on June 26. He was succeeded by his brother William IV, who was an advocate of Reform and a friend of the Whigs. The dissolution, required by the demise of the Crown, increased the numbers of the Whigs, and on

November 13 a motion was carried against the Government. On November 16 Wellington resigned the seals; and the King commissioned Lord Grey to form a Ministry. Grey agreed, on the express understanding that a measure for Parliamentary Reform should be adopted by the new Ministry, and submitted to the Commons. Reform, so long the plaything of irresponsible politicians, had at length been formally adopted by one of the orthodox and historic parties in the State.

The greatest movement of this period in our domestic history, the movement towards Parliamentary Reform, was vitally and profoundly affected by the parallel movements of political thought. The greatest, or at any rate the most celebrated, of contemporary political thinkers was undoubtedly Bentham. When every deduction is made, there is still room for astonishment at the extent and variety of his achievements. The philosopher, who elaborated a new political system, devised a new plan for icehouses, revised the whole criminal law, and constructed a new scheme for building and managing prisons, insisted upon the abstract importance of England adopting universal suffrage, and upon the practical necessity of her polling-booths being furnished with a ballot-box of his own special design. This mingling of the general and the particular, this grasp at once of principle and of detail, together with an unsurpassed power of destructive criticism, gave him his wonderful influence in his own time. Posterity has been impressed less by his doctrines or thought than by his method. This method, which he called the scientific, would be more correctly termed the practical; for to Bentham science meant only accurate empiricism. To judge all things by their practical utility was certainly a means of demonstrating many profound errors; and it is because of the establishment of this method and standard that posterity has recognised his real claim to greatness.

A description of the intellectual evolution of Bentham also explains a gradual mental development in many contemporary Englishmen. Bentham started by a profound dissatisfaction with Blackstone, who had held up the British Constitution as the perfection of human wisdom. In his *Fragment on Government* (1776) Bentham mercilessly attacked Blackstone, pointing out the defects and corruptions of our constitutional machinery. But, if contemptuous of English institutions, he was equally averse from the ideas of the French revolutionists, and he criticised the "Rights of Man" with a severity which made his strictures on Blackstone seem mild. Till about 1800 Bentham was, on his own confession, something of a Tory, and desirous only of improving the old Constitution by gradual and moderate reforms. But his relations with Shelburne and Pitt, Camden and Loughborough, and with George III himself, gradually began to alter his views. These governors of the country showed unaccountable reluctance to adopt schemes which Bentham thought he

had proved to be necessary and right. As every philosopher is largely influenced by circumstance and environment when forming the principles of his system, it is possible that Bentham might have continued to defend the old order, had Pitt been a little more polite, or King George one degree more compliant. As it was, seeking to account for their coldness and indifference, he was driven to the hypothesis that the governors sought, not the good of the governed, but their own advantage. From this view the transition to a completely Radical system was natural, easy, and indeed inevitable. It is first seen in his famous *Catechism of Parliamentary Reform*, which was written in 1809 and published in 1817. He there demonstrated, in characteristic fashion, that our existing system was thoroughly bad, that misgovernment caused most evils, and that the institution of democracy would remedy most abuses. He preferred induction to deduction, facts to theories, reason to sentiment, the teachings of science to the impulses of nature. But he had at length come to accept the very principles which he had once criticised with such merciless skill. Though the road by which he had travelled had been different and more circuitous, the goal which he had reached was the same as that of the French revolutionists.

The formula adopted by Bentham was brought to him indirectly through Helvétius and directly through Priestley, a fact which in itself illustrates how Bentham fitted French theories into a scientific setting. Helvétius impressed him with a contempt for precedent and tradition, and with a belief that the vices of a people were revealed in its legislation. He also taught him that the average man acted entirely from motives of self-interest or selfish impulses. Helvétius had thus supplied Bentham with a conception of man; it remained for Priestley to give him a conception of government. In Priestley's *Essay on Government* (1768) Bentham found "the sacred truth," that "the greatest happiness of the greatest number is the foundation of morals and legislation." These various ideas comprise the whole Benthamite formula, except the assumption, common to other thinkers of that age, that individual selfishness produces collective happiness. Bentham borrowed much of his logical method from Hume, many of his ideas on crime and punishment from Beccaria; but the rapturous terms in which he speaks of Helvétius and Priestley leave no doubt as to the real origin of his views.

Bentham declared the end of all government to be utility, or the good of the governed. This formula was by no means new; but it had been obscured by the mystic atmosphere of reverence and tradition which hung round medieval institutions and was not absent from Holy Alliance manifestos. In this formula everything was included, and by it everything was to be tried. Every existing English institution—Crown, Church, Courts of Justice, Parliament, Executive—were tested by it and found wanting. The Constitution was "lawyer-ridden" and "aristocracy-ridden"; and government was in the hands of a minority.

This minority, influenced as all minorities must be by self-interest, naturally sought to keep to itself the profits and power of government. As every one of the governors had an interest in maintaining corruption, the State must be entirely controlled by "sinister interests." The King was Corruptor-General; the aristocracy and members of Parliament sought the profits of their own positions from exclusive motives of self-interest. Any extension of the British territory, empire, or government, naturally increased such opportunities. The first step to reform was, not to put the people in complete power, but to restrict the sphere of government. The first requisites of reform were therefore the destruction of patronage, the abolition of duties and customs, and the abandonment of all our over-sea dependencies. Bentham differs from almost all other democratic philosophers in having absolutely no trust in the people. A reform of Parliamentary representation was necessary only because the sinister interests, which controlled everything, would naturally object to reforming themselves by cutting down their own profits. Where every man sought power for his own self-interest, no section of the nation could have an interest in pure government except one—the majority. If the majority were in power, it must pursue the satisfaction and happiness of itself; and the identity of interest thus established between governors and governed must secure the greatest happiness of the greatest number.

This reasoning held in it some obvious flaws. It assumed an average man, whose intellect and passions everywhere induced him to seek the same ends, irrespective of circumstances or environment. The majority of the people, whether in England, China, or Peru, consisted of a uniform mass pursuing the same ends, and influenced by the same desires. But the majority might split up into groups; and each group, thus split off, might seek its own interests or have its own views of happiness; or, again, some of the majority might mistake their real interests, or disregard them through prejudice, passion, or self-sacrifice. In any of these cases, of which all were quite possible and even probable, Bentham's system was reduced to an absurdity. He declared, it is true, that in practice he would accept triennial instead of annual Parliaments, and household for universal suffrage. He also, when over eighty years of age, retracted his opinions about emancipating the Colonies, and desired to retain the unity of the empire unimpaired. But the wisdom of these practical admissions demonstrated the incompleteness of his theoretical system. His principles, if true, were immediately practical and universally applicable; to admit such important exceptions was to destroy the real basis of his system and philosophy.

Here indeed is to be discerned the fundamental error of all his thought, an inability to perceive that his first principles were too narrow and slight for the superstructure imposed upon them. His system could not explain everything, because it omitted to allow for so much. He

professed to base his philosophy on experience, but said that history was only of use to teach us the folly of our ancestors. He scoffed at theorists who neglected facts, but himself omitted to consider sentiments and prejudices, which are in themselves some of the most important of political facts. Declaring that self-interest governed all men, he sought to grind rogues honest by reason, and to destroy crime by legislation. He worked out schemes for codifying the law to the minutest detail; yet his system could not have debarred the interpretation of the judges from modifying even its essentials. He perfected his constitutional reforms to the smallest item; but his machinery would not have prevented the influence of caucus or wirepullers from nullifying the principles themselves. With limitless scorn for other constitutional theorists, his own theory was in some respects as unreal, and fully as mechanical, as that of Blackstone himself. His political reasoning rested on a faulty psychology, an erroneous conception of sociology, and a very inadequate system of ethics. Yet, despite all these defects, progressive and practical reformers throughout the world owe almost more to him than to any other man. And his new statement of the old definition, that the end of government was the good of the governed, has in theory at least found universal acceptance.

As Bentham himself never wrote a single or succinct treatise on politics, James Mill undertook to explain the Benthamite political theories to the world. This attempt was made in his famous *Essay on Government* (1820) and his articles in the *Westminster Review* (a magazine started in 1824 as the organ of philosophic Radicalism). He resembled his master in acuteness and industry, but had a juster view of ethics, psychology, and history. Otherwise, he was at once more systematic and more dull, more violent but less truly critical, more dogmatic and uncompromising in statement, less practical and more precise in his applications. Where Bentham had made only vague suggestions or specific applications, Mill laid down universal propositions and deduced exact results. After contending that democracy was the only security for continued good government, he proceeded to apply his ideas to the existing British Constitution. After denouncing the aristocracy, in terms compared with which even Bentham's criticisms were gentle, he ended by the most rigid insistence upon complete freedom of Parliament and the Press, the ballot, and universal suffrage; though it is said that Mill, like Bentham, would have accepted household suffrage as an instalment.

There was nothing strange or new in the various suggestions of Reform made by Mill or Bentham. In 1780 the Duke of Richmond had brought forward in the Lords a motion for annual Parliaments and universal suffrage. So early as 1777 Major Cartwright began advocating the same cause in pamphlets and public addresses. But these and other reformers, such as "Citizen" Stanhope and Jebb, had attracted attention only by their eccentricities, and had made little impression on

the educated public. The presentation of Radicalism by Bentham and Mill attracted the philosophic by its logical completeness, the eager by its uncompromising boldness, the practical by its appeal to facts and reason. Mill was the populariser and preacher of the Benthamite philosophy, which inspired that remarkable body of politicians, the "Philosophic Radicals." Bentham was timid and shy in society; Mill was aggressive and bold, and speedily created the school of Philosophic Radicalism. The chief thinkers who came under his influence were Malthus, Grote, Ricardo, McCulloch, and Austin; and of these Malthus alone rivalled Bentham in immediate fame. Though attacked with the utmost violence, his theories sank deep into the heart of the people and profoundly affected contemporary thought. Malthus called attention to the ever-present burden of want, while Bentham appeared to provide practical remedies by which improved conditions could be assured. The combined force of this appeal was almost resistless; and during the great agitations of 1817-9, and the disturbances of 1826-32, the principles of Bentham were loudly asserted. The wild demands for annual Parliaments and universal suffrage were strengthened and rationalised by the arguments of Bentham. His rigid formulae and passionless appeals to reason were placed in the forefront of the agitation and inscribed upon the banners of Radicalism. The writer who advocated democracy because of his profound distrust in the people became the man in whom the people placed most confidence. The philosopher whose face not one man in ten thousand had seen became at length a prophet, with an audience which Cobbett soon began to envy, and a following which Hunt could not surpass.

All the great popular agitators of the time ended by passing their tributes to the greatness of Bentham. In 1817 Bentham wrote to Cobbett, asking him to print the *Catechism of Parliamentary Reform*, "as the celebrity of your name, compared with the obscurity of my own," would ensure its wide circulation. Cobbett had no sooner complied with this request than he found his own celebrity surpassed. Hunt, O'Connell, and Hobhouse avowed themselves the enthusiastic disciples of Bentham. The revision of the Criminal Code by the democratic Romilly and the Tory Peel, the legal reforms of the Whig Brougham—all owed much to Bentham. The action taken by Lord Durham (Lambton) in introducing new principles into our colonial policy can only be mentioned; his influence on the Reform Bill will subsequently be traced; but in each case he was deeply influenced by Benthamite ideas.

A more rigid practical disciple of Bentham was Francis Place, a man of the humblest origin, who owed his success in life to his own vigour and resource. His own experience impelled him to adopt the Benthamite formula, that man owed everything to his own individual energy or self-interest. Place set to work to popularise Benthamite conceptions

and to organise a political machinery for this purpose. It has sometimes been contended that Place is one of the suppressed characters of our internal history, a mole of politics, whose subterranean efforts were the real cause of all popular legislation between 1824-32. That he was the chief cause of the repeal of the Combination Laws (1824) seems probable. That his sole influence did much to determine the elections at Westminster, which constituency became the cradle of Parliamentary Reform, is certain. Beyond that his influence was perhaps hardly so great as is sometimes imagined. Burdett, Cobbett, and Hunt did more to enflame popular agitation throughout the country. But in London itself Place had immense influence; and his tailor's shop at Charing Cross was the headquarters of Radicalism. So early as 1807 he began an assault upon the democratic constituency of Westminster, which had always been a stronghold of the Whigs. Place furnished the first great example of an electoral caucus, organising committees and diffusing information with such effect, that the Radical candidate, Sir Francis Burdett, headed the poll.

Long before the dawn of Radicalism proposals of Parliamentary Reform had on several occasions been made to the two Houses. In 1745 Sir Francis Dashwood proposed such a motion; in 1766 Lord Chatham denounced the corruption and venality of the boroughs. In 1770 Chatham declared for triennial Parliaments and proposed adding a third member to the counties, to counteract the influence of corrupt boroughs. In 1776 Wilkes proposed a motion, which contained all the leading principles of Parliamentary Reform adopted during the next fifty years. During the years 1782-5 the younger Pitt brought forward motions for Reform without success. The example of the French Revolution frightened everyone, and induced the majority of Englishmen to cling to the old system. Consequently the Reform motions, proposed by Charles Grey during the years 1793-7, were rejected by enormous majorities. All these proposals, with the possible exception of that of Wilkes, were made by politicians who were supported by some section of the Tory or Whig parties. Burdett was the first to dissociate himself absolutely from the two historic parties, and to propose Reform from a Radical standpoint. The Benthamites never wearied of denouncing the half-measures and timid compromises of the Whigs. James Mill called them shufflers and cowards; Place defeated their candidates at Westminster. The Radicals instinctively foresaw that the Whigs, rather than themselves, would secure political benefits from the discredit into which Bentham's merciless criticisms, and the popular agitations, had thrown the Tory Government. Burdett's first motion was in 1809; and in 1810 he spoke on a motion for Reform. Grey was now in the Lords; his enthusiasm for Reform had cooled, and his support of these proposals was wavering and qualified. The Grenvillite section of the Whig party was utterly opposed to Reform; and Lord

Holland declared in 1817 that Reform formed no part of the Whig party programme. In 1819 Burdett brought forward a motion for Reform in a series of famous resolutions, which were clearly inspired by Bentham. He was opposed by the youthful Lord John Russell and a minority of Whigs, on the ground that the changes proposed were wild and visionary. But in this same year Russell brought forward motions for the disfranchisement of corrupt boroughs, and for the transference to large unrepresented towns of the franchises so forfeited. Thus, at the moment when Reform seemed to have become an exclusively Radical question, it was revived by a section of the Whig party in a moderate and reasonable form.

The attitude of the Tory party towards the great question of Parliamentary Reform was the same during the Radical agitation of 1817-21, as in the years 1821-32 which marked the gradual acceptance of Reform by the Whig party. It has often been thought that the political views of the Tories were based wholly on reactionary prejudice and upon blind hatred of innovation; and that their creed was that of *laissez-faire*, with the principles and justifications of such a policy withdrawn. Yet, just at this time, Coleridge in the *Friend*, first published in 1809, republished with additions in 1818, was laying a philosophic basis for Tory views, which proved a surer foundation for the conservation of society than any which even Burke had supplied. Coleridge indeed was mystical and unintelligible to most contemporaries, and his influence was not apparent until many years later, when it induced John Stuart Mill to modify and restate the Utilitarian philosophy. But Canning, who adapted Burke to suit the needs of a new age, gave in his speeches something of a philosophic exposition of Tory principles, and something of an intellectual argument against Reform. The essence of true liberty was that it should be limited, balanced, and graduated. Thus the rights of minorities, of corporations, and of vested interests should be respected, as they were extremely useful in securing liberty. Every class depended upon the one above it; and the existing ties and relations between class and class not only ensured liberty to the individual, but stability to the government. The great danger to England was the growth of the industrial masses, for large city populations were liable to become mobs and rabbles, selfish in prejudices, ungovernable in passions, and entirely at the mercy of unscrupulous demagogues. The old securities had been the dependence of servants upon their masters, the allegiance of the tenant to the squire, the respect and tradition which made the lower classes admit the gentry to be their natural leaders. But these old ties were every day loosened; the old privileges were rapidly disappearing; the old traditions were fast fading. Only one security still existed—the system of parliamentary representation. The peculiar diversity of the franchise in different constituencies guarded the State from the excesses of a blind or headstrong majority.

Liberty would only be endangered when uniformity of rights and privileges (that is a democratic or universal suffrage), prevailed. Thus the rotten boroughs, with their limited and restricted numbers of voters, were actually the safeguards of order. To yield to Reform was to destroy the last bulwark, to remove the last plank between the Constitution and the boundless flood of democracy. On this point all Tories were agreed, Canning with Eldon, and Peel with Wellington; and, as is now to be seen, their unyielding obstinacy had the most momentous consequences, not only for the Tory party but for the country as a whole.

During the years 1820-30 Lord John Russell brought forward a series of exceedingly moderate motions on Reform. In 1821 he carried a proposal to disfranchise the notoriously corrupt borough of Grampound, and to transfer its members to Leeds. The Lords granted the disfranchisement, but assigned the two members not to Leeds, but to Yorkshire county; and the Commons agreed. In 1826-7 Russell brought forward similar motions, with reference to the boroughs of East Retford and Penryn, which had been convicted of corruption. He proposed to transfer the franchise of the one to Birmingham, of the other to Manchester. Eventually the Lords refused to disfranchise either borough. All these proposals were reasonable and moderate; and, in the opinion of competent contemporary observers, timely concession to them would have averted the very much larger and more sweeping measures of 1832. The reason why the Tories resisted even these modest demands has already been given. Concession with them was not a question of expediency but of principle; and to yield in one point was therefore to surrender that principle. The rigid and unbending hostility displayed by the Tory party towards Reform was the main cause of their complete discomfiture in 1832.

Though Lord John Russell possessed the undivided support of an influential section of the Whig party, and the good-will of the whole of it, the official adoption of Reform by the Whig party was still to come. During the years 1820-30 the Whig political creed was gradually elaborated, and shown to differ profoundly from that of the "Philosophical" Radicals. Mackintosh was the first distinguished Whig to attack them; and Brougham kept up a constant fire upon them in the *Edinburgh Review*. But the great assault was delivered by Macaulay in that journal during the years 1829-30. His articles, if somewhat ill-considered and undignified in their violence, certainly did not equal James Mill's abuse of the Whigs in general, or of Mackintosh in particular. Though inferior both to Bentham and to Mill in the higher ranges of thought, he undoubtedly exposed the inadequacy of their principles. He demonstrated, with characteristic vigour of style and wealth of illustration, that the principle of self-interest did not govern all human affairs. He proved also, at least to his own satisfaction, that Mill's political views were historically false and would be practically

dangerous. After this destructive criticism Macaulay advanced the definite and positive view, that universal suffrage would be a revolution hazardous for England, but that an extension of political power to the middle classes would be a reform alike safe, moderate, and final. It is not easy to exaggerate the importance of this conclusion, which indeed was one speedily to be forced both on the Whigs and on the nation. Pushed to its logical outcome, it meant a complete change in the balance of political and social forces and implied nothing less than a revolution. But it was a view admirably suited to the new forces and conditions of the time, to the decaying power of land and rank, and to the increasing influence of wealth and commerce.

The announcement and adoption of Macaulay's conclusion marks the ultimate success of the Benthamites as destructive critics, and their immediate failure as constructive politicians. Few even of the Tories now dared to speak of the existing system as that "matchless Constitution," which they had once so slavishly adored. The fetish-worship of the Constitution, inaugurated by Blackstone, had been destroyed for ever by Bentham. Whigs admitted the justice and force of his criticisms as readily as the Radicals themselves, though they denied the practical value of his suggested reforms. Whereas Bentham would have distributed votes to the whole of the unrepresented classes, Macaulay would restrict them to the middle class. Where Bentham would have given a vote to every man, Macaulay would give it to every shopkeeper. Popular agitations still brought the names of Bentham and of Radical Reform before the world; but Parliamentary Reform was now in the hands of the Whig party. The Whig landlords dropped their aristocratic prejudices, the Whig capitalists their democratic or Benthamite leanings. The leaders of the party were men of position or wealth, ill-disposed to listen to sweeping or revolutionary proposals. Their most influential supporters were men who had property to lose and vested interests to consider, and were therefore disinclined for extravagance or violence. The middle classes were resolved to have some representation at any cost; but their most ambitious hopes did not reach beyond a household suffrage. For a time their allegiance had wavered between Whig and Tory. Canning and Huskisson had appealed to them by a policy of financial reform and economy. The Whigs had gone one step further, by their eager advocacy of Catholic Emancipation and repeal of the Test Acts. On Reform they had indeed often wavered, but the hopelessly adverse attitude of the Tories towards that question at length convinced the middle classes that their only hope lay with the Whigs.

The alliance of Whig peers and landowners with Leeds wool-merchants and Manchester cotton-princes was at length consummated by the events of the year 1830. General exasperation was felt when Lord John Russell's proposals for the enfranchisement of Birmingham, Leeds, and Manchester, were summarily rejected in the Commons.

A more intense indignation was awakened by Wellington's reply to Earl Grey in the Lords. Questioned as to whether he intended to bring in a Reform Bill, the Duke responded by a direct denial. But he foolishly went on to allege that the legislature and system of representation deservedly possessed the confidence of the country. At the very moment when even bigoted defenders of the old system excused it only on the ground that it worked better in practice than appearance, Wellington suddenly lavished upon it eulogies which Blackstone himself could hardly have excelled. Few speeches have ever had a greater effect than this one, though the effect was exactly the reverse of the speaker's intention. A storm of popular indignation, apparently as unexpected as it was effective, arose, swept the Tory Ministry from office, and placed the Whigs in power. Earl Grey, who headed the new Ministry, had often wavered and hesitated on the question of Parliamentary Reform. But at this great crisis of its fate his attitude was admirably firm. He accepted office only on the direct understanding that Reform should be made a Cabinet measure, and that a Bill on the subject should be introduced, as soon as possible, into the Commons.

All the new Ministers were agreed as to the necessity of Reform, but all differed as to the extent of the concessions desirable. Palmerston, Melbourne, and Goderich, like true Canningites, desired only the minimum of change. Brougham and Grey advocated a partial, Althorp and Lambton a sweeping, disfranchisement of the rotten boroughs. Grey believed in quinquennial, Lambton in triennial, Parliaments; Lambton and Althorp were for the ballot, Grey and Brougham were against it. Brougham and Althorp were for granting a household suffrage in all borough constituencies; the Cabinet, as a whole, insisted that the suffrage should only be given to householders paying £20 rent. Finally a committee of four was appointed to prepare a scheme of Reform. It consisted of Lambton (now Lord Durham) and Sir James Graham, both Cabinet Ministers, and of Lord John Russell and Lord Duncannon, both members of the Administration.

The condition of the boroughs, which the Committee began to examine, was in itself the most eloquent argument for Reform. Roughly speaking, there were four classes of boroughs—nomination boroughs, rotten boroughs, boroughs where the franchise was considerable but not excessive, and boroughs where the franchise was, comparatively speaking, democratic. Nomination boroughs were those in which the patron had an absolute right to choose his own candidate. One such constituency was an uninhabited green mound, another a ruined wall, a third was submarine. Having purchased the freehold of the constituency, the patron could still return his candidate, even if his constituency had ceased to be inhabited, or as in the last case had actually disappeared from the earth. Such anomalies gave rise to the irresistible popular

arguments so wittily characterised by Bagehot: "Mr Canning was an eloquent man, but even he could not say that a decaying tree-stump was the people." In theory this system was utterly indefensible; in practice it had some slight advantages. Canning and Burke, Sheridan and Brougham, had all sat for nomination boroughs, whose patrons imposed no restrictions and exacted no guarantees. But even in these cases a moral obligation existed; and the nominee was usually subservient to his patron. A common defence for nomination boroughs was that poor but talented men were introduced into Parliament without the expense or tedium of election, and thus enabled to devote their undivided energies to the national service. But there were evils enough to counterbalance these dubious advantages. So long indeed as a nomination borough remained in the hands of a patron, corruption was impossible; but whenever such a borough passed from the control of its patron evil practices began. It was advertised in the papers, shamelessly offered for sale in public, and knocked down to the highest bidder; the evils of corrupt influence again ceased with the conclusion of the bargain. So high-minded and democratic a politician as Romilly calmly advocated the purchase of a nomination borough, as the best means of securing a seat and avoiding direct and continuous bribery.

If defenders of the nomination system appealed to its practice to defend its theory, defenders of the rotten boroughs found it more convenient to reverse the process. It is sometimes difficult to draw an absolute line between rotten and nomination boroughs. But in general the patron had an absolute proprietary right in the nomination borough; in the rotten borough he could only establish his control by direct influence or by direct bribery. At every election the Treasury agents did a regular business in rotten boroughs, buying some for the Government, selling others, attempting to influence yet more. When such practices were, so to speak, officially recognised, it is easy to see to what extent similar practices would be pushed by private individuals. The system was illustrated at its worst in 1829. On the defeat of his nominee for Newark, the Duke of Newcastle ascertained the names of all the hostile voters who held land or property from him, and promptly expelled every one of them from his tenancy. When remonstrance was made at this political persecution, the Duke replied, "Have I not the right to do what I like with my own?" The Duke, who had forced his previous nominee to resign for a difference of opinion, now thought it right to punish the electors for differing from him as to the choice of their representative. This case may have been extreme and unusual, but it proves how little check there was on the powers exercised by individuals in such boroughs over voters and representatives alike.

Public opinion and some slight legislative reforms had done something to check the worst evils. Accounts of borough elections under Castlereagh and Liverpool certainly appear to indicate an improvement

since the days of Pitt. But the evils were still enormous. It is certain that direct bribes were received by the majority of electors in most rotten boroughs. In some cases the practice was so systematised, that electors, immediately after recording their votes, proceeded to the agent's office, and drew the sum promised beforehand as the price. The men of Grampound used brazenly to proclaim that their votes were worth £300 each at elections. Of the amount of influence, as distinct from direct money-payments, exerted upon electors, it is impossible to give any real conception. The case of Newark illustrates possibilities ; it is known that landlords frequently offered to raise the rents of recalcitrant voters, and that corporations sometimes threatened to issue orders of impressment on their bodies. Every kind of pressure, direct and indirect, seems to have been put upon the elector. The prolonged excitement of the polls, often extending to a fortnight, encouraged disturbance and increased bribery, and promoted tippling at the rival beerhouses hired by the candidates, where the free and independent electors ate and drank to their hearts' content. A borough election was an orgy of bribery, rioting, and drunkenness. But the profoundest evils of rotten boroughs did not lie in their corruption, great though it was, but, as in the case of nomination boroughs, in the more subtle attack on political morality, and in the low standard of public conduct which the system promoted.

In the third class of boroughs, such as Liverpool, where the electorate, though restricted, was numerous, it is known that a certain amount of direct bribery and of undue influence was exercised ; but, compared with rotten boroughs, their electoral purity was great. On the other hand, the class of practically democratic boroughs was comparatively small. Here the franchise sometimes depended on payment of poor or church rate, sometimes it extended to every householder ; the "potwalloper" qualified by cooking his meals in a pot within the borough limits. In each case virtual democracy existed. Bentham and his friends were fond of adducing Westminster, the most famous of these popular constituencies, as an instance to prove that democracy could not only choose distinguished men, but could elect them amid scenes of comparative purity and tranquillity. This seems to have been true enough in this one case ; but it is very doubtful whether other democratic constituencies were equally well-behaved.

In 1770 Lord Chatham had proposed to add a third member to each county to counterbalance the corruption of boroughs, on the express ground that the county freeholders were more independent than borough voters. If, as seems clear from contemporary accounts, the borough elections had improved since the days of Pitt, it would seem that the county elections had declined since the days of Chatham. It was certainly harder to influence or to bribe county voters ; but influence was often exerted by the great landed proprietors with effect and success.

Fox, who had every opportunity for knowing, declared that up till 1780 one of the members for Yorkshire had always been elected in Lord Rockingham's dining-room. After that date direct bribery was often used at the Yorkshire county elections, when the Rockinghams, Fitzwilliams, and Harewoods, squandered vast sums on behalf of their respective nominees. If this was the case in Yorkshire, where the number of electors was large, the standard of electoral purity in other counties, where the number of electors was small, must have been comparatively low. The persistent decay of small freeholders, which was especially rapid after 1815, still further tended to depress that standard; for it is obvious that a diminution in the numbers of electors would mean an increase in the opportunities of corruption. Still there was always a possibility that these freeholders would cast off their quasi-feudal allegiance to the old county families, and would elect independent members. This was notably seen in the election of 1830, when popular feeling was so excited that of eighty-two county members only twenty were Tories. As the Whig and Tory parties were fairly balanced after that election in the Commons as a whole, the significance of the popular influence in the county elections is clear.

The general abuses of representation existing in England were exaggerated and intensified in Scotland and Ireland. Though a measure of 1819 had reformed some abuses in a few boroughs of Scotland, it would have been difficult to say whether its boroughs or its counties were the more corrupt or had the smaller electorates in 1832. In general the borough elections were still controlled by the town councils, which were cooptative, and thus, as it were, self-elected and hereditary bodies. The county franchise was so exceedingly restricted that, in one famous election for Bute county, the single elector returned himself to Parliament with due solemnity. In general the Scotch county elections were entirely in the hands of a few patrons. It was a well-known saying in the time of Pitt that Scotland was prostrate at the feet of Dundas. The statement, absurd as it sounded, was probably correct. But if it had been said that Scotland was prostrate before less than four thousand electors, and less than one hundred and fifty patrons, the prosaic and unadorned truth would have been stated. By her Reform Bill of 1832 Scotland received fifty-three instead of forty-five members, thirty for the counties, the rest for the cities. In each case a uniform franchise was fixed; for the counties, freeholders with property bringing in £10 a year and certain classes of leaseholders were qualified; for the boroughs, £10 householders. Whatever the effects of this settlement, and they were by no means all good, they were a vast improvement on the previously existing system, which had been little better than a mockery of representation.

Though the state of the Irish representation was in general even worse than the Scotch, there were some notable exceptions to the rule.

Ireland had one hundred members, who were returned by a few thousand electors, a number considerably less in proportion than even the scanty electorate of Scotland. The control at these Irish elections was also concentrated in fewer hands, for it was almost entirely wielded by fifty or sixty landowners. In the boroughs their influence was supreme; but in counties it was not quite always triumphant. Castlereagh, when standing for county Down in the popular interest, was successful against every influence, official, hereditary, and economic. On another and far more famous occasion, in 1828, O'Connell was returned for county Clare, in spite of every exertion of neighbouring landlords and a distant Government, and despite the fact that, as a Catholic, he was unable to sit. This particular election had a most important political effect, for it opened the eyes of the Protestant landlords to the dangers of independence in native Irish freeholders. Accordingly the Irish landlords forced the Government to add to the Catholic Relief Bill of 1829 a supplementary Act disfranchising 40s. freeholders in Ireland and raising the qualification for county electors to £10. This is the only case, since the days of Henry VI, in which an Act restricting and not extending the franchise of a whole country has passed the House of Commons. The Irish Reform Act gave the franchise to the £10 householder in the Irish boroughs, and increased the total number of Irish members to 105. Though it removed many abuses, it was not so successful as the Scotch, because it retained the provision disfranchising all freeholders holding property of less than £10 annual value. The defence can be made, that this arrangement was part of a general scheme, applied universally and impartially, to render the electoral qualifications of the three countries of an equal and uniform type. But it is improbable that this passion for uniformity would have been indulged to the detriment of the Protestant interest.

The evils of Irish and Scotch representation were so direct and enormous that drastic and extensive reforms were obviously required. But an examination of the facts of English representation by no means revealed the same extent or universality of abuse. In Ireland and Scotland a monotonous record of bribery and undue influence was revealed in both boroughs and counties. In England the record was not so plain. The general impression was one of diversity; and legislation was the more difficult because the existence of corruptions and abuses was less easy to ascertain. It is improbable that the Reform Committee had any better evidence upon which to base their conclusions, than the vast mass of information accessible to the modern historian. That evidence gives no general picture of the actual amount of influence and bribery employed at any general election at any particular time. It is naturally imperfect, as no patrons were ever likely to reveal or admit the full extent of their influence. But there is not only an imperfection, there is a conflict, of evidence. In 1793 Charles Grey stated in the Commons

that 354 English and Scotch members of Parliament were returned by the Treasury and 197 patrons; in the same year the Society of Friends of the People declared that it could prove that 357 members were returned by 154 patrons. When such discrepancies could exist in estimates made during the same year, it is better to pass from these conjectures to admitted facts as to the numbers of electors at given places, and the relation of representation to population. The number of members returned by towns with less than 100 electors was about 200; and of these some 50 were returned by nomination boroughs with no electors at all. Lancashire had a million inhabitants, Dorset one-sixth of that number; but Dorset had 9 members, and Lancashire 19. A more monstrous discrepancy was seen in the case of Cornwall, which returned one member less than the whole of Scotland, though the Scotch population was eight times as great as the Cornish. It seems probable—and the estimate is, if anything, too large—that about 200 members, or less than one-third of the House, were returned by genuinely independent constituencies.

With these facts before them, Durham and his colleagues laboured at their project of Reform. The great evil that seems to have impressed them was the restricted, unequal, and utterly miscellaneous character of the franchise. With this question all the three principles, which they outlined as the basis of reform, were connected. These principles were, the disfranchisement of decayed boroughs, the enfranchisement of large and wealthy unrepresented towns, and the substitution of some uniform type of borough franchise for the haphazard and heterogeneous arrangements existing. On the first subject, the disfranchisement of decayed boroughs, their attitude was somewhat lacking in depth and insight. They seem to have considered the nomination boroughs as obsolete and absurd, and therefore decided to sweep them away. They directed the fury of their attack against the nomination system rather than upon the far more objectionable rotten boroughs. Their second principle, that of enfranchising new, wealthy, and rising towns, exhibits the true objects and purpose of the Whigs. They desired not to abolish the old representative system, but to improve and strengthen it with fresh elements. They desired the landed class to retain considerable power, but wished also to extend power to property and wealth, and to "include all the intelligence and respectability of the independent class." Their third principle, that of establishing a uniform franchise, was expressed in their proposal, that a £20 household franchise should be fixed for all boroughs. A fourth important principle, intended to give a more popular character to the Constitution, was outlined in the proposal that the duration of Parliament should be fixed at five, not seven, years. The Committee closed their Report to the Cabinet by declaring their opinion that the projected reforms "would inspire all classes with a conviction that their rights and privileges were at length secured and

duly consolidated." This assertion shows that the real reason why the Reform Committee advocated such extensive reforms was their belief that they would permanently satisfy everyone.

All the limitations and the excellences of the Whig Reformers are apparent in these few phrases; their strong common sense in proposing a large measure of reform, their sincere desire to extend the franchise to the middle class, their inability to perceive that there were other classes beneath that class which deserved consideration. The Reform Committee declared that the unrepresented classes would view, with complacency, "the security and consolidation of their rights and privileges." But this security meant to the poorer classes total exclusion from the suffrage. The Whig action was, however, in harmony with their philosophy. Macaulay had opposed his logic of the necessity of enfranchising the middle class to Bentham's logic of the necessity of enfranchising all adult males. The Reform Committee preferred to put the less revolutionary theory into practice. And when their scheme is fairly considered there is every room for astonishment, not at the limitations, but at the extensiveness, of the reforms proposed. As Durham was chairman of the Committee, as he had been much influenced by Bentham, and is known to have held more popular views than any of the others, it is probable that he was mainly responsible for the bold and far-reaching character of the scheme. It is at least certain that he was always jealous of the fame acquired by Lord John Russell in connexion with the Reform Bill, and thought his own share in the movement most unjustly disregarded. When Russell made his famous speech introducing the first Reform Bill, he embodied in it the substance of the Reform Committee's Report. If Durham was mainly responsible for this Report, his jealousy requires no further explanation. If this view be correct, and it is confirmed by his unpublished papers, Lord Durham revolutionised, not only the colonial, but the internal, policy of Great Britain; for few will deny that the Report of 1831 had as great an effect upon the future of England as the other Report of 1838 had on the future of Canada and our colonial empire.

The Report of the Reform Committee was laid before the Cabinet and the King during the month of January, 1831. It is believed that the lists of boroughs to be disfranchised and enfranchised were passed with but little alteration or comment. The suggestion for limiting the duration of Parliament to five years was rejected; but, perhaps as some consolation, the borough-franchise was extended from the £20 to the £10 householder. In the main, the provisions and recommendations of the Committee were adopted. Lord Althorp, the leader of the Lower House, was equally conspicuous for a transparent honesty of purpose and character, and for a simple consciousness of his own defects. He now chivalrously insisted that the

young Lord John Russell, who had already done so much to identify the Whig party with Reform, should, though not in the Cabinet, have the credit of introducing the great measure. On March 1, 1831, he accordingly rose to expound the scheme. The secret had been carefully kept; and few speeches in the Commons ever so excited the attention, none certainly ever so aroused the astonishment, of the audience. Supporters and opponents alike were astounded at the vastness and extent of the contemplated reforms. Even Hobhouse, listening with surprise and delight as the scheme slowly unfolded itself, did not think that it could, by any possibility, ever become the law of the land. Russell finished his speech by reading out schedules of the towns to be disfranchised and enfranchised; and the mention of each name was interrupted by loud jeers, rude comments, and wild bursts of ironical laughter. Had Burdett or Hobhouse solemnly proposed the immediate establishment of some Benthamite Utopia, the House could hardly have received the scheme with more ridicule and contempt. Observers noted with surprise that Peel, almost alone of the Opposition, looked serious and angry. Perhaps this great master of parliamentary tactics already foresaw that the sheer, downright boldness of the scheme might win for it the support of the country.

For seven nights the debates went on; but the Ministry triumphed, and leave was given to bring in the Bill. By the time the Bill came up for the second reading, its outlines and purpose had become clearer; forces were marshalled; the moderates and indifferents were beginning to take sides. It was thought that the Ministry would be defeated, but on March 21, amid almost indescribable excitement, the second reading was carried by a majority of one. Hats flew in the air, arms were raised in defiance, cheers and shouts resounded, and members pressed to shake the triumphant Althorp and Russell by the hand. Macaulay has given a wonderful description of this famous scene: the baffled Tories standing sullenly apart, Peel with his jaw fallen, Twiss with a face like that of a damned soul, and Herries like Judas taking his necktie off for the last operation. A scene at once more memorable and more violent was soon to be enacted. In April an amendment was carried against the Bill in committee; and Ministers thereupon offered the King the alternatives of a dissolution or of their own resignation.

For a time the King firmly refused to listen to the appeals of the Cabinet for a dissolution. Lord Brougham has given a romantic account of the interviews of the King with Earl Grey and himself, in which it of course appears that his own arguments decided the King to yield. The real motives of the King's decision to grant a dissolution appear to have been partly his own reforming zeal, partly his strong personal attachment to Grey, Holland, and Duncannon. No time was to be lost, for Lord Wharncliffe was moving an address against a

dissolution in the Lords, which would have been disastrous if carried. On April 22 the royal coach was hastily summoned, and the King came down to dissolve Parliament in person. On the morning of the 22nd reports of a dissolution were already rumoured ; and, when they became certain, an indescribable uproar arose on both sides of the House, only to be paralleled in the stormy sessions of the Long Parliament. The extent of excitement may be judged from the fact that Peel, usually so calm and dignified, lost all self-control and stormed unceasingly. Burdett gesticulated and shouted wildly ; almost every member of the House was on his feet and shouting ; the Speaker was helpless ; Althorp alone stood unmoved. While the uproar was at its height, Black Rod entered and summoned the Commons to the throne-room. But the stormy scene was not yet over. The roaring of the guns, which announced that the King was coming down to dissolve Parliament, had interrupted the last moments of debate. Sir Henry Hardinge now shouted to the Ministers, that the next time they heard the guns "they will be shotted, and take off some of your heads." In the Lords almost wilder scenes, if possible, had taken place. Lord Brougham, amid clamorous uproar, had declared that the Opposition in the Commons had infringed the Constitution by stopping supplies. When the Lords heard the guns they realised that their violence, artfully stimulated by Brougham, had made it too late to carry the Address. The Marquis of Londonderry, his voice failing from passion, shook his fist at the Duke of Richmond. Lord Tankerville told Hobhouse that "the Lords would, without scruple, have voted off the Ministers' heads that day." The Tory lords had more reason than had their party in the Commons for exhibiting their fury and despair. Almost every peer controlled or had interests in boroughs ; and they realised that the end of the system was at hand. In the moment of excitement they probably cared little for the wealth of which they would thus be deprived. But to lose at a stroke such influence, such power, such control, was agony and torture to men of old and proud ancestral lines.

The dissolution was accomplished, and the Ministry were now face to face with the people. Paradoxical as the statement may appear, the Whigs had until then had no real conception of the strength of the national feeling upon Reform. They were aware of the sentiments of the middle class, but they were amazed, almost frightened, by the exhibition of popular feeling in their favour at the election of 1831. Elemental forces seemed to have been unloosed which they felt themselves unable to control. Causes, both external and domestic, remote and immediate, had gradually been working to produce this overwhelming impression. In 1830 an almost bloodless revolution had taken place in France, which had expelled the arbitrary King Charles X and established the *bourgeois* and popular monarch Louis-Philippe. Englishmen, hitherto terrified by any kind of violent innovation, now perceived that even

French revolutions might be, not horrors of anarchy and blood, but models of reasonableness and tranquillity. The effect upon English public opinion, and especially on the middle class, is not easy to exaggerate.

But, though continental sympathies and movements had much fortified the demand for Reform, internal causes operated even more powerfully towards that end. The years 1830-1 witnessed bad harvests and universal depression of trade. Unemployed artisans and starving rustics were induced, by the general distress, to believe in the Reform Bill as a panacea for every ill. There was a steady growth of political organisations outside Parliament, of which all were formed with the object of putting pressure upon the Government to obtain Parliamentary Reform in one shape or another. The most famous of all these was the Birmingham Political Union, which included both middle and lower classes, and which was founded and directed by Thomas Attwood. Journeymen tradesmen, and even ordinary workmen, formed clubs for the same purpose in every considerable town. While the Reform Bill was being prepared, it was a matter of considerable doubt what the attitude of these various clubs towards the Government would be. An associated meeting of all the important London unions and clubs took place at the Crown and Anchor on March 4, 1831. The discussion turned on the necessity and desirability of Reform; and the Government was severely criticised by Place and others. Hobhouse successfully opposed this attack upon the Government, pointing out that to obstruct them was to ruin the whole cause. He carried, with general acclamations, a resolution not to embarrass the Ministers. Thus Place and the ultra-Radicals were defeated; and one great popular meeting had passed a resolution to support the Government. The Reform Committee had showed great acuteness in perceiving that an extensive scheme might be satisfactory or acceptable even to extremists. The practical Place, and even it is said the rigid Mill, at length accepted household suffrage, as a preliminary instalment.

The Cabinet and the nation had succeeded in surprising each other; the people were amazed at the liberality of the Ministers; the Ministers were astonished at their own popularity. The people had hardly ceased expressing their delight at the concessions, when they learned the defeat of the men who had made them. The dramatic circumstances of the dissolution increased the popular excitement, and added to the reputation of the Ministry. There can be no question whatever that popular influences had much to do with the return of the Whigs with a hugely increased majority. The year 1784, when Pitt and the King triumphed over the Whigs, had been one proof—the year 1832, when Grey and the King triumphed over the Tories, was a second and more striking one—that even corruption and rotten boroughs could not resist overwhelming pressure. It must be admitted that the means taken to secure victory

were often most unscrupulous. The name and influence of the King were freely used on the Whig side. Vast mobs, wearing Reform colours and waving banners, accompanied electors to the polls, threatening them with violence if they did not vote for Reform. In the face of these new and unexpected demonstrations the Tory borough-mongers and wire-pullers lost their heads. Timid men voted for Reform; moderates absented themselves from the polls; and seats, which had been under Tory influence for decades, triumphantly returned Whig candidates. Disappointed Tory candidates might very well enquire what was the use of reforming a system, in which manifestations of popular feeling could be so effective and overwhelming. The very completeness of the victory actually furnished an argument against the necessity of Reform.

In June, 1831, the returning Ministers, finding themselves supported by a majority of over one hundred, immediately introduced a second Reform Bill. Lord John Russell warned the Tories against opposing it too bitterly, as "it was impossible for the whisper of a faction to prevail against the voice of a nation." This somewhat revolutionary utterance shows how deeply the manifestations of popular enthusiasm had affected even so moderate and reasonable a statesman as Russell. The new Bill was carried by sweeping majorities in the Commons; but on October 8 it was thrown out by a majority of 41 in the Lords. Till then the agitation had been peaceful; demonstrations and riots in all parts of the country now expressed the deep indignation of the people. Nottingham Castle was burnt down; at Bristol the Tory candidate was assaulted; and the gaol and the Mansion House were fired by an incendiary mob. The clubs everywhere sprang up into new life; and on October 19 Sir Francis Burdett took the chair at a meeting of confederated Unions, where the plan of a National Union was sketched. Both Ministers and King were much alarmed by these exhibitions of popular fury and determination. Proclamations were issued to repress disorder, and to suppress certain political Unions by name.

In December Parliament met, and the third Reform Bill was introduced into the Commons. The final form of the Bill was considerably altered from the original Report of the Committee. The number of nomination boroughs totally disfranchised was now fixed at 56, leaving 111 new seats. In this arrangement there was no real alteration, but the number of rotten boroughs, from which one member was to be taken, was reduced from the original 46 to 30. Two members were likewise taken from Weymouth and Melcombe Regis; and thus 143 seats in all were left free for distribution. Sixty-five members were added to the counties; two members each were assigned to Manchester, Leeds, Birmingham, and 19 other large towns; and one member each to 21 considerable towns, hitherto entirely unrepresented. The arrangements for the county franchise underwent considerable change, for copyholders and leaseholders were now admitted to the franchise as well as 40s.

freeholders. By a clause, which the Marquis of Chandos had carried in amendment to the second Bill, the county franchise was likewise conferred on tenants-at-will paying £50 a year. This was a considerable strengthening to the landed interest. In the third Reform Bill the Chandos clause was allowed to stand in deference to the Tory Opposition. The refusal to reduce the numbers of the House, in accordance with the original scheme, enabled a larger number of towns to be enfranchised than had at first been contemplated. The third Reform Bill passed the Commons in March, 1832, but its second reading was carried in the Lords by a bare majority of nine.

The Cabinet had long been occupied with the question of overcoming the opposition of the Lords. So early as September, 1831, the project of creating Peers had been suggested, certainly by Macaulay, perhaps by Brougham, and had been strongly supported by Durham and Graham. It was so strongly opposed by the King that Grey in November vainly approached the moderate Tories. In the first two months of 1832 the majority of the Cabinet were strongly in favour of creating Peers. But during the Easter recess, when it was obvious that the Bill could not survive the committee stage in the Lords, the anxiety of Ministers became almost insupportable. Althorp removed his pistols from his bedroom, lest he should shoot himself; Brougham fell ill; Grey seems to have repented of ever having introduced Reform. Both Brougham and Grey took fright, wavered, and appeared to be against the creation of Peers. Melbourne, Russell, Palmerston, and the Duke of Richmond, who had all along been against this step, profited by the momentary weakness of the Premier and the Lord Chancellor, to urge that action so bold could not be taken without a decided majority in its favour in the Cabinet. But the hesitation of Brougham and Grey was overcome by the firmness of other Ministers more resolutely pledged to the Bill than themselves. In February, 1832, Hobhouse had joined the Ministry as Secretary-at-War, on receiving an assurance from Lord Althorp that the Reform Bill should be carried substantially intact. Hobhouse now declared that he would resign if the Ministry shirked their task; and Althorp stated that, in this case, his pledge to Hobhouse would enforce his own resignation. Durham, though Grey's son-in-law, was more violent and emphatic than either, and repeatedly declared his intention of resigning. Macaulay had declared the character of Althorp to be the sole stay of the Ministry; both Durham and Hobhouse had great popular reputations. Earl Grey saw that the resignations of these men would inevitably break up the Government. The Prime Minister and the Lord Chancellor at length recovered their firmness; and on May 8, two days after the Lords had finally thrown out the Bill in committee, the Cabinet sent a minute to the King, unanimously recommending the creation of Peers. The King, whose enthusiasm for Reform had been cooled by popular agitation, declined the proposals, but accepted the resignations, of the Ministers.

He then sent for Wellington and Lyndhurst, who agreed to form a Ministry and prepare a moderate measure of Reform.

But the time for such a measure had gone by ; Peel, Goulburn, and Croker absolutely declined to have anything to do with the attempt. The Duke had to select Sutton (the Speaker) for Secretary of State, and Alexander Baring for the Exchequer. On May 9 a resolution in favour of the late Ministry was carried by the Commons ; and the popular support of them was evidenced in a thousand ways. The danger that working and middle classes would disagree had vanished with the defeat of the Reform Bill by the Peers. Amid indescribable enthusiasm "Orator" Hunt had at length declared for Reform ; Attwood's Birmingham Union announced that its members would refuse to pay taxes unless the Bill passed ; and this example was followed by many other associations in large towns. Place and other extremists even began to organise something like military resistance to the Government. On May 12 London awoke to find its streets placarded with the following advice : "To stop the Duke, go for gold !" Place had suggested a run upon the Bank of England and a commercial crisis, in order to make the Ministry impossible. It may be doubted if this stroke had the importance its author attributed to it, but it certainly typifies the violence of popular feeling. The danger was real, the popular agitation extreme ; and, if neither rebellion nor revolution were at hand, they were at least within sight.

Popular violence penetrated into the Commons itself, where every parliamentary canon of taste and decorum was outraged. Baring and Sutton were howled down when they rose to speak, and attacked as furiously by Peel and Goulburn as by the Whigs themselves. As a statesman, Wellington seldom recognised the popular or the expedient, but he was capable of perceiving the impossible. On May 15 he gave up his hopeless task and recommended the King to recall Lord Grey. The returning Whigs, who now regarded their Reform proposals as a pledge made by them to the people, declined to modify the Bill in deference to royal suggestion. Sir Herbert Taylor, the King's secretary, therefore suggested to Wellington, on royal authority, that all difficulties would be removed if a sufficient number of Peers dropped their opposition to the Bill. The Duke agreed to withdraw enough Peers to secure the passage of the Bill. But the seceding Peers, in announcing their intended withdrawal, used language of such mingled violence and obscurity, that it was actually uncertain whether they would not in the end oppose the Bill. Faced by this difficulty, the Cabinet again recommended the creation of Peers ; and the King reluctantly yielded. But, while Grey and Brougham were drawing up lists of eldest sons, and of collateral heirs of childless noblemen, they suddenly found that the extremity, to which they were so unwillingly forced, was avoided. The King's instructions had done their work ; and the Duke's influence

ensured the passage of the Bill. It was hurried through the committee stage and third reading, and received the royal assent on June 7. A revolution which had at one time threatened an appeal to the very last of constitutional resources, and at another had seemed to presage rebellion, had been accomplished in as peaceful a manner as could well have been expected from so great and so far-reaching a change. A measure, vitally affecting the interests of the landed class, and permanently altering the balance of the Constitution, had passed the Upper House in open defiance of its resolute opposition. The triumph of the Whigs was hailed with indescribable enthusiasm throughout the country; even the school-children marched about in their playgrounds, shouting "The Reform Bill has passed!"

It is easier to explain the precise effect of the specific provisions than to trace the broader and wider results of the Reform Bill. According to the extravagance of Whig assertions and popular hopes, the Reform Bill was to abolish party and corruption, to pay off the National Debt, to restore the primitive purity of the Saxon Constitution, and to establish a golden age of peace and order. In reality the Reform Bill, whilst accomplishing much good by what it made possible and inevitable in the future, did little to destroy some of the evils which it attacked. It was reactionary, in so far as it abolished the democratic franchise in English boroughs and raised the electoral qualification in Irish counties; it was in some respects ineffective, in so far as it sought to check bribery and corruption. The comparatively mild treatment meted out to the rotten boroughs was a grave error. The electorates were larger indeed, but the old corrupt political organisations remained; the old voters, accustomed to bribery, transmitted their lesson to the new ones. Accordingly party wire-pullers employed their old evil methods upon a larger scale in attempting to handle the mass of new voters. The result therefore was that, in some electorates, bribery actually increased after 1832. On the other hand various measures—such as the shortening of polls, and other provisions for expediting elections—destroyed some of the worst abuses of the old system. Though bribery at elections did not cease, at least the right to return members for boroughs ceased to be sold by auction. The Whig failure to perceive that the abolition of nomination boroughs would promote evil practices in certain rotten boroughs was a defect of detail rather than of principle. It was a paradoxical consequence of a large and sweeping measure, which dealt a heavy and real blow to political corruption.

The avowed object of the Whigs was to balance property and population, and so produce a mixed system of representation. By extending the franchise, they made concessions to numbers; by confining it to the £10 householder in the boroughs, they made concessions to property. They thus hoped to produce a just balance in the Constitution

between land and capital, rank and wealth, property and numbers. But, if they intended to enfranchise the shopkeeper, they had no intention of enfranchising the working-man. They appear to have desired, above all things, to avoid any tendency towards democracy or universal suffrage. If these were their views, their attitude toward the nomination boroughs was short-sighted. To abolish the nomination boroughs did not greatly lessen corruption ; at best it removed a curiosity rather than a blemish, at the worst it deprived the State of a very valuable means of checking democracy.

The passage of the Reform Bill had some curious results in developing and strengthening the popular element. Both Russell and Durham seemed to declare the Tories wrong in opposing Reform, less because Reform was demonstrably right than because the Tories were in a hopeless minority. They had used expressions which seemed to assert the blind tyranny of the majority and the supremacy of force. It can hardly be denied that the pressure which they exerted on Parliament from without was in some respects unconstitutional. In a sense the Reform Bill was a mandate from the people ; and in a sense the Whigs so considered it. Yet, though thus availing themselves of the popular forces, the Whigs in some cases abolished the democratic franchise, and refused to consider the representation of the lower classes as possible. These circumstances do much to account for the later unpopularity of the Whigs, and for the rise of Chartism. But, though appearing to neglect the demands of the people as a whole, the Whigs in reality imparted an irresistible popular trend to the Constitution. The dignity and superiority of the Upper House had received a severe shock. It seemed to many contemporaries that, though the House of Lords might continue to exist, its power would wither to nothing. This was not the fact ; but the great lesson, that in the case of a conflict between the people and the Lords the Upper House must yield, has never been forgotten. At every stage of the whole proceedings, popular feeling commented upon, or encouraged the passage of, the Bill. However much either party might refuse to grant representation to the people in the future, neither was ever likely to forget the strength and advantage of popular support.

The Revolution of 1688 was completed by the Revolution of 1832. By the first change power was transferred from the King to the landed class ; by the second the landed class was forced to extend its privileges to the commercial and industrial middle classes. The first change was largely political ; the second could not have been accomplished, unless social and industrial revolutions had preceded and occasioned the political. After 1688 the representatives of the parties contending for power had consisted for the most part of the landed interest ; after 1832 the Whig landowners made common cause with the commercial interest, and admitted a whole new class to a share of political representation. For

this reason, no doubt, Russell, Durham, Grey, and Macaulay, all declared that the settlement would be lasting. The Reform Committee had closed their report by announcing their belief that "the present would be a permanent settlement." It is possible that they did not mean permanent in the sense of final or eternal; but it is difficult to resist the suggestion that the true reason of the Whig acquiescence in such extensive reforms was the belief that the changes would satisfy the people for considerably more than one generation. The single class which obtained power in 1688 retained it for a century and a half; the two classes now sharing political privileges might perhaps also retain them for a long period. The Whigs forgot that the overthrow of the old order was so complete, the changes in themselves so great and sweeping, as to necessitate further reforms. They forgot also that the class newly admitted to power might have less affinity with themselves than with the unprivileged classes beneath them. The change the Whigs had accomplished was indeed greater than they had imagined. For two centuries and a half Parliamentary representation had been untouched, and to touch it was to break the charm. At once the Constitution became a part of the State machinery, as open to criticism and as capable of improvement as the army or the customs tariff. It was not only that the Whigs had introduced a change; they had introduced the principle of change, and applied it to a part of the Constitution hitherto held sacred. Eldon had said that it was not worth while to sacrifice the certain stability of the State to the vague possibility of future improvement. Canning and Huskisson had shown the possibility of scientific legislation; the Whigs showed the possibility of improvement by scientific reorganisation of constitutional machinery, and proved that organic change might actually increase the efficiency, popularity, and stability of the Government. After such an achievement a new era in politics opened.

The Reform Bill was the culminating point of a period of steady progress. During the disturbances of 1815-9 the Habeas Corpus Act was suspended; during the very serious riots of 1830-2 it was found needless, and would have been thought disgraceful, to resort to so extreme a measure. From 1815 to 1819 the right of assemblage for political purposes was practically denied; in 1832, though specific meetings were dispersed and particular associations suppressed, the general rights of assembly were freely admitted. In 1815 the Combination Laws rendered any workman attending a meeting of fellow-workers liable to arrest for conspiracy; during 1824-5 the rights of combination were specifically acknowledged. From 1815 to 1819 journalists were frequently prosecuted and imprisoned for their writings; governmental prosecutions had not ceased in 1832, but comparative freedom of the Press was at length established. At the beginning of

this period, criminals were hanged for a hundred petty offences ; at its close, the Criminal Code had become infinitely milder and more humane. Tests had irritated Nonconformists, disabilities and prohibitions had oppressed Roman Catholics, in 1815 ; before 1832, all these disabilities were alike abolished and swept away. Concessions to civil and religious liberty had been accompanied by financial reforms of the most extensive character. In 1815 the civil service was extremely inefficient and the pension list scandalously extravagant ; by 1832 an extensive reform and revision of both had taken place. In 1815 taxes and tariffs were of the most inequitable and antiquated character ; by 1832 both had been so improved and placed on so scientific a basis that there had been a resultant gain of millions to the Exchequer. In 1815 the Colonies were exploited for the benefit of the mother-country ; by 1825 the new economic policy had radically modified the old conception of relations between England and her dependencies. Last, and in some ways most significant of all, the Corn Law of 1815, which had benefited the landed class and the agricultural interest, was amended during 1826-7 so as to relieve the capitalist class and the industrial masses. No Parliament, consisting largely of landed proprietors, would have passed so many measures, indirectly or directly injurious to their interests, except under overwhelming pressure from without. The dynamic force, the driving power, of legislation had been the influence of the middle class, which had steadily increased throughout the period. Popular influences altered the character, and increased the extent, of the Reform Bill, but middle-class opinion was the deciding factor in its initiation. That great measure was therefore not so sudden and sweeping a revolution as many contemporaries imagined, but the result of a long series of changes, which had preceded and occasioned this culminating triumph. Too great dissimilarity between the political institutions and social and economic influences in the State had produced disturbance and unrest during the whole period. Ten years of progressive legislation, culminating in a great constitutional change, contributed to remove political grievances and to allay social discontent.

## CHAPTER XIX.

### CATHOLIC EMANCIPATION.

AFTER full allowance has been made for the historical circumstances which produced them, the penal laws of England and Ireland, as they stood before 1778, can only be read with amazement and indignation. "I must do it justice," wrote Burke of the Irish code; "it was a complete system, full of coherence and consistency, well digested and well composed in all its parts. It was a machine of wise and elaborate contrivance, and as well fitted for the oppression, impoverishment, and degradation of a people, and the debasement in them of human nature itself, as ever proceeded from the perverted ingenuity of man." In its aims and character the English code was not much less atrocious. The two systems differed chiefly in the magnitude of their consequences. That of England proscribed an insignificant minority, numbering less than 70,000 souls and diminishing in every decade. That of Ireland degraded five-sevenths of the population; and, by giving a monopoly of political power, landed influence, the professions, the public service, to an insolent oligarchy, kept alive from one generation to another the fires of racial and religious hatred. Had this legislation dated entirely from the sixteenth century, the conservatism which upheld it in the age of Burke and Fox, of Charlemont and Grattan, would be less remarkable. Antiquity lends colour to the worst injustices. But those enactments which in practice weighed most heavily upon the Catholic were in England partly, and in Ireland wholly, the outcome of so recent an event as the "glorious" Revolution.

If all the penal laws which stood upon the statute-books of both countries had been rigidly enforced, the English Catholics would have been extirpated and those of Ireland goaded once more to rebellion. But, as the Jacobite peril grew more remote, as the political insignificance of the Papacy became more apparent, and as the spirit of rationalism, with its contempt for theological differences, obtained a wider influence on society, the lot of the Catholic was ameliorated by degrees. He was protected by the good-will of Protestant neighbours and the special pleading of friendly lawyers. But it was still upon sufferance that he

enjoyed some of the most necessary rights of citizenship. Whether he avoided Protestant malice by seclusion from society or accepted with servile alacrity the advances of those who should have been regarded as his equals, he stood continually exposed to dangers which could not be foreseen or forestalled; he saw the avenues to political or professional distinction as completely closed against him as if he had been an alien. To enumerate all the risks and disabilities to which his faith exposed him would be no easy matter. In this place we can only indicate the chief rules of English and Irish law which touched him in the exercise of his religion or in his civic rights.

The law of England made it high treason for any priest or Jesuit to remain three days in the kingdom without taking the oath of supremacy. It was also high treason for any Catholic, priest or layman, to effect a conversion; and for any Protestant to be so converted. These rules, it is true, existed chiefly *in terrorem*. But a more recent Act (of 1700) offered £100 for the discovery of any priest who presumed to exercise his sacred functions, and subjected him to perpetual imprisonment. Under George I and George II this Act was not infrequently applied. Under George III the judges, following the example of Lord Mansfield, usually contrived to defeat the informers by treating the evidence which they produced as insufficient. But in 1767 a certain Father Malony was convicted at Croydon on the charge of saying mass; and some years elapsed before the Government found the moral courage to release him. To hear mass was also, in English law, an offence punishable with one year's imprisonment and a fine of 200 marks (£133. 6s. 8d.). But these penalties, which only the superior Courts could enforce, were less formidable to the Catholic than the power which the justices of the peace possessed of fining him for non-attendance at his parish church. This power was exercised, in some localities, so late as 1782, and exposed the poorer class of Catholics to the most serious hardships.

The law of Ireland, if literally interpreted, was even more severe to priests and their congregations. Any Catholic Bishop found in Ireland was liable to be imprisoned for twelve months and subsequently deported. As no priest might enter Ireland from abroad, the intention obviously was to extinguish the Irish priesthood by preventing new ordinations in the country or outside it. An Act of 1697 went still further, by decreeing the expulsion of all Catholic priests whatever. But this outrageous measure could not be executed; by later Acts, of 1704 and 1709, parish priests were permitted, after registering their names and places of abode, to officiate in that parish alone for which they were registered. Even then the oath of abjuration, which few priests were prepared to take, might be administered at any moment. In the south and west few magistrates were bold enough to molest a priest, whether registered or not. But it was a common practice among Irish priests, so late as 1778, to go about the country in disguise.

The more timid, if living in a Protestant neighbourhood or under the eyes of the Government, preferred not to show themselves abroad in daylight. The Irish Bench was less indulgent than that of England to the priesthood. Orange judges too often conspired with Orange juries to enforce laws which had lost all justification.

As regarded education there was little difference between the Irish and the English law. Both prohibited the Papist from acting as a tutor or a schoolmaster; both disabled the children of Papists, if they had received a foreign education, from inheriting, purchasing, or enjoying any form of property, and from maintaining any suit at law. Notwithstanding the law the wealthier Catholics of both countries kept tutors of their own religion, or sent their daughters to foreign convents, and their sons to the colleges which existed for the benefit of English-speaking students at Louvain, Douai, Lille, Antwerp, Tournai, Saint Omer, and Salamanca. In Ireland there were hedge-schools, kept by Catholic masters, which maintained a precarious existence; and these afforded the only education which was open to the poorer of the Catholic middle class. In England the children of this class depended entirely upon occasional instruction from the priests. The law against Catholic schools seems to have been more strictly enforced, both in England and in Ireland, than those against priests and places of worship. Before the period of the Relief Acts no secondary school for Catholics appears to have been openly maintained; whereas, even in England, a few chapels for public worship existed in London and provincial towns so early as the period of the Gordon riots.

The disabilities of the Catholic laity were such as chiefly affected the upper classes. No Catholic could hold a commission in the army or navy; or be a magistrate; or sit in Parliament; or exercise the franchise; or hold a corporate or public office; or enter the legal or teaching professions; or be admitted to a university. So far as concerned the professions and the armed forces, the English practice was more tolerant than the law. An annual Indemnity Act was regularly passed after 1745 to protect naval and military officers who had omitted to take the statutory tests. Originally framed for the relief of Dissenters, this act enabled Catholics to rise in the services as high as their superiors might think fit. In like manner, though without statutory assistance, some Catholics maintained a precarious footing as solicitors and conveyancers. In Ireland the Protestant ascendancy took greater pains to enforce the exclusion of the Catholic from all lucrative or honourable employments. Many an Irishman, placed in a dilemma between his religion and his worldly prospects, apostatised in order to qualify for the legal profession.

In neither kingdom could the less ambitious Catholic, who merely desired to live in peace on his estate, feel perfectly secure. The legal penalties of recusancy were ruinous. By English law the recusant was

liable to a monthly fine of £20, or to forfeit two-thirds of his estate. A married woman, in the same case, was liable to forfeit two-thirds of her jointure or dower, and might be kept in prison during the continuance of her marriage, unless her husband would ransom her by a monthly fine of £10, or by surrendering one-third of his estate. The brand of recusancy could be inflicted by any two justices administering the oath of supremacy at any time they pleased. An obstinate recusant could be compelled, after conviction by four justices, to quit the realm. Apart from these dangers, only to be apprehended in times of exceptional excitement, the English Catholic was variously penalised. He paid a double land-tax; he was incapacitated from taking lands by purchase, inheritance, devise, limitation, reversion, or remainder. These latter disabilities could be evaded with the help of Protestant trustees; but, as all trusts and uses for the benefit of recusants were void in law, a fraudulent trustee was completely master of the situation. The Catholic was, moreover, disabled from owning a horse worth more than £5, from keeping arms, from appearing at Court, from travelling to a distance of more than five miles from home, from living in London when he had any other place of residence.

In Ireland the disabilities were substantially the same, with the addition of some to which the English law happily afforded no parallel. In Ireland a Protestant who married a Papist wife incurred exclusion from Parliament, from the franchise, from civil and military office; and the laws against priests who celebrated a mixed marriage were zealously enforced. Not content with making the two religions separate castes, the law attacked the peace of Catholics in their domestic relations. Under the Gavelling Act of 1704, and a supplementary measure of 1709, the sons of a Papist were entitled to inherit their father's lands in equal shares, unless one of them was a Protestant; in which case he might claim the whole, and, pending his father's death, might reduce his father to the position of a life-tenant, and claim a statutory maintenance. Similarly the wife of a Papist was entitled, upon being converted, to a statutory jointure. Such measures were bound to produce disloyalty; it is only surprising that the Jacobitism of the Irish Catholics remained a mere sentiment, which evaporated at the first sign of approaching Relief. But the fact is, that the bolder spirits had been drawn off to the French, the Austrian, and the Spanish services. Those who remained at home had never learned to combine for any purpose, and from long proscription gradually sank into an apathy which was the worst result of the exclusive system.

The agitation for Relief has a complicated history. The English and Irish movements were mutually independent in their origin; and, though frequently connected, were always distinct in character and methods. Furthermore, each movement passes through two widely different phases. There is a pre-Revolutionary phase, ending in both

countries with the year 1793; and this is followed by a phase which may be called Revolutionary, since it was inspired by the dogma of natural equality, and served as a prelude to that astonishing series of legislative reforms which remodelled the constitution of the United Kingdom. The year 1793, in which Revolutionary France commenced the war against all sovereigns on behalf of all peoples, is also the year of Hobart's Act in Ireland, and in England of the measure extending to the Scottish Catholics the benefits of Mitford's Act (1791). In 1793 was concluded the struggle for equality of private rights—a struggle in which the priesthood were interested alike with all classes of the Catholic laity. Catholic demands had not indeed stopped short at private rights. Hobart's Act, which conceded the magistracy and the franchise, already struck the keynote of a noisier agitation for political power and privilege. But the magistracy and the franchise were demanded and conceded as guarantees of private rights, and in the hope that they would strengthen the conservative influences on which the Protestant ascendancy depended for existence. A generation elapsed, before the Irish peasant and his leaders realised the value of the franchise as a weapon of offence; by that time the Revolutionary phase had not only commenced, but was actually nearing a conclusion.

The sudden emergence of the peasant in 1826 has done more than anything else to conceal the essential difference of the two phases. It is hard to realise that the Bill of 1829, which was won by the lowest classes of the Catholic body, had little or no connexion with their immediate interests. They had a great stake in the first phase of the movement; but, partly from sheer ignorance and apathy, partly for want of the franchise, they had left their social superiors to fight single-handed for equality of private rights. After 1793 it was chiefly a question of satisfying the ambitions of an aristocracy and a professional class. The strongest appeals of the agitators were those which touched the sentiments of nationality, of abstract justice, of religious brotherhood. There was indeed much talk of agrarian legislation, of repeal, of national independence. But it was vague talk; and the motives which weighed with the peasant audiences of O'Connell were motives of sentiment. Emancipation became a burning question immediately after a period of severe distress in Ireland; but the famine years were not the cause of its being carried; it offered no solution for the most deep-seated maladies of the country. The great paradox of the Catholic movement is that, while in the first instance we find a class working for the interest of the whole body, the situation is gradually reversed, and the many are set in motion for the advantage of the few.

It follows from what we have said that the movement in its second phase must be mainly regarded as an episode of Irish history. When it became necessary to use the weapons of intimidation, the English Catholics fell at once into the background. They were, as Burke said,

numerous enough to be persecuted, not sufficiently numerous to be feared. And after 1793 intimidation gradually became the only weapon that promised good results. Arguments had been exhausted on both sides; and, in Ireland at least, the party whom the Catholics had to convert were thinking more of their own vested interests than of the natural rights of their opponents. But in the first phase of the movement it was otherwise. The Catholics had faith in reason; and the Protestants affected, if they did not feel, respect for it. The agitation was therefore comparatively pacific; and the English Catholics, who had begun it, succeeded in keeping their lead from first to last. Their initial move was made in 1719, when, at the suggestion of Secretary Craggs, they appointed a committee of four peers and four other gentlemen to treat with the Whigs for some measure of Relief. But these negotiations proved abortive. The Ministry demanded that the committee should move the Pope to retract the indult by which he had empowered the Pretender to fill up vacant Irish sees. The committee shrank from interference with the Pope's prerogative, and also suspected a trap to involve them in the penalties of a *praemunire*. Their caution was attributed to Stewart sympathies; and so late as 1745 the loyalty of the English Catholics was grievously suspected. Charles Edward's appearance in Scotland at once produced an Order in Council to enforce the penal laws; and a certain number of priests were brought to trial.

For nearly thirty years from that event the English Catholics endured in silence. Their hopes revived again when the Quebec Act (1774), endowing their Church in Canada, passed through Parliament almost unopposed. It was a sign that religious bigotry no longer dominated the legislature; and of George III, strangely enough, they felt secure, owing to his intimate relations with the Duke of Norfolk. In 1778, therefore, they formed a second committee for the purpose of petitioning; except for a short interval after the Gordon riots they appear to have been continuously represented by such a body from 1778 till the passing of Mitford's Act in 1791. New committees were once or twice elected, but were uniformly aristocratic in their composition. The hierarchy was not represented on them till 1787, and then only by three coopted members; a circumstance to which we may attribute both the good-will of successive Ministries and the equally remarkable reluctance of the Catholic Bishops to make any concessions which would help the movement.

The results of this first English movement were the Acts of 1778 and 1791. The first, though moved by a private member, Sir George Savile, had the informal support of the Government. The second, which would have come much earlier but for the alarm excited by the Gordon riots, was the outcome of a long negotiation with Pitt. It was drafted by Charles Butler, the secretary of the committee, and was revised by the Chancellor, Lord Thurlow, before being placed in the hands of

John Freeman Mitford, its reputed author. It is evident that few leading politicians felt disposed to challenge the Catholic demands, which were in fact extremely modest. The Savile Act only removed some proprietary disabilities, and those clauses in the Act of 1700 which affected priests, Jesuits, and schoolmasters. These benefits were made conditional upon the abjuration of the House of Stewart, and the disclaiming of some tenets popularly attributed to the Catholics, as, for instance, that excommunicated princes may be lawfully deposed. In 1791 the committee obtained less than they had asked of Pitt; but their original petition was merely for the repeal of the recusancy laws, for the right of entering the army, the navy, and the legal profession, and for the franchise. They actually obtained the first of these demands and admission to the bar; also toleration for their schools and public worship. These concessions may be regarded as extensive, considering that the English Catholics had no arguments to urge, except those of humanity and reason. It was not worth the while of any political party to bid for their support. But for this very reason their cause came to a standstill in 1791.

At this juncture the English committee succumbed to internal dissensions. These arose in the first instance from the terms in which the lay members had framed the disclaiming oath of the Mitford Act. They were accused by the Vicars Apostolic of tampering with matters of ecclesiastical discipline; and, although the Vicars had their way in the matter of the oath, the feud survived the passing of the Act, and was proclaimed to the world by the formation of a Cisalpine Club (1792), of which the members were pledged "to resist any ecclesiastical interference which may militate against the freedom of English Catholics." In such circumstances it was impossible to agitate with effect for further measures of Relief.

Meanwhile a Catholic movement had begun in Ireland. This also was the creation of laymen; but it had so far avoided coming into conflict with the hierarchy, and it was more fortunate in its leaders. The Catholic landowners of Ireland were as cautious and as deferential to the Government as their English brethren. Until 1782 they could not afford to be otherwise, since the Gavelling Act might at any moment be employed to destroy their wealth and consequence. After the repeal of that Act there still remained their inordinate pride of caste, which exclusion from power had only aggravated, to prevent them from coming forward as the leaders of any popular agitation. Left to their own resources, they could have done little for their fellow-Catholics. But in Ireland, and particularly in Dublin, there existed a wealthy and growing class of Catholic traders. These men initiated the movement for Relief; and, although they called in the aristocracy to their assistance, they were the life and soul of the Irish movement from its beginning to the end of its first phase. They were powerfully assisted by certain of

the gentry ; in particular by Charles O'Conor, the author of one of the earliest treatises on the penal laws, by John Curry, the historian of the Civil Wars, and by Thomas Wyse, a squire and manufacturer of Waterford. These three came into the movement about 1756. They found already existing in Dublin a mercantile committee which had been formed to provide for the defence of poor Catholics when prosecuted under the penal laws ; and they induced this committee to assume the more comprehensive character of an association for remedying Catholic grievances. In 1760 Wyse procured the adoption of a scheme by which the counties and chief towns of Ireland were to send delegates to the Association. The provinces responded coldly to the invitation, and the representative idea, which was to be so fruitful in the future, was temporarily abandoned in 1763.

But the Dublin Association survived, and ten years later induced a number of the Catholic peers and gentlemen to join their body. Lord Kenmare was the most prominent of these recruits, and performed the duties of chairman from 1773 to 1791. Under his guidance the movement, proceeding on the same lines as that in England, achieved two considerable successes in the Acts of 1778 and 1782, which swept away the most serious of the proprietary disabilities and permitted the establishment of Catholic schools. But the Kenmarites and the merchants shortly fell to blows upon the question of their future policy. The landed interest were reluctant to put pressure upon the Government, and ultimately, under the influence of the panic which the French Revolution had excited amongst all men of property, pledged themselves by the so-called Contentment address (December, 1791) to leave the date and the manner of Relief in the hands of Parliament.

The address was followed by a temporary schism. In 1792 the Kenmarites gave way, upon finding that the general sentiment of the Catholics was against them, and that obstinacy would entail a total loss of their old influence. But their repentance came too late. They rejoined the committee, only to find that the direction of policy had passed into other hands. In the troublous times which followed the reunion the Kenmarites played a secondary though a creditable part. Without in any way deserting the cause of their religion, they maintained friendly relations with successive Lords-Lieutenant, and by doing so saved the Catholics from being regarded in official circles as a mere rabble controlled by obscure agitators. But, if the Kenmarites had been left to work alone, the concessions of 1792 and 1793 would never have been obtained. Their confidence in the good-will of Pitt's Administration may not have been entirely mistaken ; but it was certainly exaggerated. The mercantile body showed a sounder common-sense, when it resolved to play upon the apprehensions of the Government.

The management of this audacious scheme devolved upon a respectable Dublin merchant, by name John Keogh, who was certainly one

of the most remarkable Irishmen of his age. Uneducated and of insignificant appearance, with no charm of manner and with no oratorical power, he dominated the Catholic Association entirely through his reputation as a man of business and a negotiator. A shrewdness which often degenerated into cunning, a native caution which always kept him on the safe side of the law, and an ambition which was satisfied with the substance without the show of power, were his most salient characteristics. Between 1791 and 1793 it seemed not unlikely that he would anticipate the career of O'Connell as a demagogue; for in these years the Association revived Wyse's plan of a convention which should represent the Catholics of every part of Ireland. This so-called Back-lane Parliament, containing delegates from all the counties and forty-two towns, actually came into existence during the agitation which preceded Hobart's Act, and created considerable uneasiness in official minds by its obvious desire to imitate the Dungannon Convention of 1782. But the idea of the Back-lane Parliament emanated from two of Keogh's auxiliaries, Myles Keon and Wolfe Tone. Keogh allowed the convention to dissolve after Hobart's Act was passed. He may have done so in anticipation of the Convention Act, which passed later in the same session; but it should not have been difficult to evade this measure as it was evaded by O'Connell. Keogh preferred to work through the old Dublin committee; and it says much for his practical ability that he won for this organisation the trust and support of the provincial Catholics.

He extended his influence outside the capital partly with the aid of the priests, and partly by a judicious use of the Press. But he also found more dubious allies in the Society of the United Irishmen, with whose disloyal designs he must have been acquainted from an early date. The alliance was closest in 1792 and 1793, when Wolfe Tone, the founder of the United Irishmen, was acting as the under-secretary of the Catholic committee. Until 1793 no secret was made of the alliance. The wrongs of the Catholics figured in the manifestos of the United Irishmen. Simon Butler, the chairman of the latter, published a pamphlet exposing the penal laws, which was officially sanctioned by his own body; and he received a formal vote of thanks on this account from the Catholics. Keogh himself never became a member of the United Irishmen, and refused to let the committee be implicated in their plans. While informers denounced him to the Government as a Jacobin of the deepest dye, Wolfe Tone was loudly complaining of Keogh's cowardice and treachery.

But Keogh was perfectly willing to use the Republican organisation as a cat's paw for the Catholics. After the passing of the Hobart Act he made a feint of parting company with the Republicans. Wolfe Tone received an honourable *congé* from the Catholic service; and Keogh issued a proclamation warning the Catholics "against any attempts

of pretended friends or declared enemies to drive them into violence." But it is doubtful whether he was as loyal in his actions as his words. Some leading members of his committee joined the United Irishmen; William James MacNeven, who had been the Catholic chairman, and Richard McCormick, who had been secretary, were actually included in the secret Directory of Five. They strained every nerve to involve the Catholics in the rebellion of '98; and, although Keogh was against proceeding to this extremity, he was certainly willing to frighten the Government with the possibility of a general Catholic defection. He did not break with MacNeven and McCormick; he is said to have joined with the latter in coercing priests who were disposed to preach against rebellion; and it is certain that he used his influence to prevent Catholics from enlisting in the yeomanry, the only Irish force upon which the Government placed much reliance. In the end the Ministry were forced to negotiate with him. Under the influence of promises from Cornwallis and Castlereagh, he forbore to agitate against the Union, although his committee had announced, after the dismissal of Fitzwilliam, that they would never barter the independence of their country to secure Emancipation. Perhaps the Rebellion had opened Keogh's eyes to the true nature of the anarchic forces with which he had coquetted. It is at least remarkable that, after the Union, he joined forces with his old rivals the Kenmarites, now under the leadership of Lord Fingal, and adopted the policy of patient expectation which he had so contemptuously rejected in 1791.

New issues and new methods came into the field when the Catholic cause was taken up by the Catholic lawyers. The Irish bar formed an aristocracy of talent to which the whole nation looked up with respect. Here were to be found the best orators and the ablest men of affairs in the country; here also were those who felt most keenly the surviving disabilities of Catholics. The Catholic barrister found himself excluded from all the prizes of his profession. He could not be a judge or a law-officer. He could not hope for a political career of the kind which was open to his Protestant competitors. Apart from the general causes which had thrust their class to the front in the American and French Revolutions, it was only natural that the Catholic lawyers should take the lead in the second phase of the Emancipation movement. It was about 1805 that the lawyers became prominent in Catholic assemblies; and from the first they possessed two exceptionally able representatives in Dennis Scully and Daniel O'Connell.

The former was morally and physically a second Keogh: as homely in appearance, and if possible more adept in the art of intrigue. Scully spoke seldom and spoke badly. He was incapable of appealing to elevated motives, or of pursuing a straightforward policy. Only the well-informed were aware of the influence which he exercised behind the scenes. O'Connell was of a different stamp. Boisterous, robust,

loud-voiced, and voluble, overflowing with a humour which was exactly suited to the taste of Irish audiences, he had already made a reputation as a public speaker. His remarkable faculty of influencing individuals and organising masses had not yet declared itself. He counted for more upon the platform than in the secret committees of his party. But his was the first voice to be raised in favour of a bolder agitation. He turned the tide of Catholic feeling against Keogh and Fingal, though it was Scully who succeeded to the leadership upon their deposition. Thenceforward he and Scully worked in harmony; but with every year O'Connell figured more prominently in the public eye; and Catholic policy came in a few years to mean his policy.

Nature and training had in fact combined to make him the type of the rising generation in his party. Born in 1775, he was among the first to profit by the opening of the Irish bar. He was also one of the last who felt the effects of the old penal laws. The scion of an old Catholic family in county Kerry, he learned his alphabet from the master of a hedge-school, and his catechism from a non-abjuring priest who had been prosecuted for the offence of saying mass. He was born late enough to benefit by the law tolerating Catholic schools, but not so late that he could finish his education without resorting to a foreign college. He had studied for two years at Saint Omer and Douai, and had imbibed the usual lessons of such a training—an exaggerated reverence for the hierarchy and an equally exaggerated aversion from the principles of the French Revolution. An agitator by temperament, he nevertheless retained to his dying day some traces of the conservative temper which was engrained in the Catholicism of continental Europe. For the rest, he had studied law in the English Inns of Court, and in doing so had contracted a profound mistrust of Englishmen. "Nations have no sense of justice," he is reported to have said in later life, "and the English less than others."

On his return to Ireland he joined the United Irishmen, with one of whose directors, Richard Bennett, he had contracted a close friendship. But the year 1798 found him peacefully engaged in making his *début* at the Irish bar. When the Rebellion broke out, he thought it advisable to leave Dublin and spend the summer in his Kerry home; but there is no evidence to connect him with treasonable designs. If he had dabbled in them, he was now converted; "the United Irishmen taught me," he says, "that all work for Ireland must be done honestly and above board." In the year of Emmet's rising he turned out for active service with the lawyer corps; nor could he ever speak of that unfortunate enthusiast without impatience. His comment upon Emmet's plans was to the effect that no political change is worth a drop of human blood.

This is eminently characteristic. There was no element of heroic recklessness in O'Connell's composition. Yet he was in his own way

enthusiastic. For good and evil an Irishman, he shared the nationalist aspirations of Wolfe Tone and Einmet, though he reprobated the idea of a resort to violence. Repeal and Emancipation presented themselves as twin problems to his mind. If he put Emancipation in the first place, that was only because he deemed it the more immediately practicable of the two objects, and foresaw that the religious would smooth the way for the political agitation. After the Union, as before it, he indignantly repudiated the idea of accepting Emancipation as an equivalent for the loss of independence. It would be absurd to doubt that his nationalist and religious sentiments were intensified by personal ambition. No man more thoroughly enjoyed the sense of power, or was more frankly gratified to find himself the cynosure of every eye. Still it must be recorded in his favour, that for many years he taxed his energies and impaired his fortune to promote a cause from which it was by no means certain that he would reap a proportionate reward. His nature, if not of the most refined order, was eminently uncalculating, frank, and generous.

The immediate question on which he defeated Keogh and Lord Fingal was that of petitioning Parliament. Pitt had returned to office in 1804 under a pledge not to press the Catholic claims while the King lived; and the older Catholics were for waiting Pitt's good time. But Scully and O'Connell insisted that England's necessity should be Ireland's opportunity; no time could be so favourable for petitioning as one at which Irish recruits were urgently needed for the English forces. They carried their point; and a petition was prepared which Pitt as a matter of form was invited to present. He offered to the Irish deputation which visited him a strange compromise. He said that he had no objection to any of his friends presenting the petition and would see that none of them opposed it; but his own public support he could not give. The Catholics, suspecting a plot to burke the petition, preferred to place it in the hands of Fox and Grenville, to the no small irritation of the ministerialists. It was foredoomed to failure; but, as the first to be argued before the Imperial Parliament, it excited considerable interest, and induced Grattan to break the silence which he had observed since the Union. He was heard with respectful interest; but the petition was rejected in the Commons by the immense majority of 336 to 124. Grattan himself owned that the times were unpropitious; and the Whigs, when they entered office in the following year, pressed the Irish Catholics to show patience. Again O'Connell triumphed over the moderates, and persuaded an "aggregate" (or mass) meeting to vote for a new petition (February, 1807). But Grattan declined to move the petition; in March the Whig Ministry was turned out for refusing to pledge themselves against the Catholic claims; and Keogh induced the Association to rescind their previous resolution. For the next two years the movement languished. The petition of 1808 was

presented only for form's sake; the Convention Act seemed to preclude the feasibility of appealing to a wider audience than the House of Commons.

In 1809 the horizon brightened. Now for the first time the Irish Catholics were approached by their English brethren with proposals for cooperation. Although numerically weak, the English body brought into the common stock a knowledge of English party politics which was extremely useful in future agitations. They were also well led by a central committee which had temporarily settled the disputes of Ultramontanes and Cisalpines. Charles Butler, their secretary, impressed upon Scully the desirability of organising the Irish body in like manner. The result was that a Dublin meeting voted the establishment of a new committee, to comprise all who had served on previous committees and all the Catholic peers of Ireland. Keogh, O'Connell, and Lord Fingal, appeared on the platform in the unfamiliar character of allies, while Scully in the background shaped the resolutions and set the new committee to work.

The characteristic feature of the new campaign was the desire of the committee to widen the Association. In 1810 it was resolved to establish affiliated local committees; and on January 1, 1811, the central executive boldly defied the Convention Act by issuing a circular which invited the Catholics of every county to elect ten managers who might cooperate with the existing committee in preparing a new petition. A saving clause, to the effect that these managers should not be considered as delegates or representatives, merely emphasised the intended evasion of the law. The counties promptly responded to the circular; and in due course the representatives who were to be no representatives appeared in Dublin. The Castle authorities at once took up the challenge. They had already ordered the arrest of those who participated in the elections, more as a sign of their disapproval than with the intention of literally executing the threat, which would indeed have been impossible. But in December they dispersed two successive meetings of the new convention at the Fishamble Street theatre; and immediately afterwards secured a verdict against a certain Kirwan who had been concerned in the elections.

Lord Fingal and the aristocratic members of the convention, while protesting against the decision of the judges, decided that they could not expose themselves to the charge of wilful illegality. They retired from the convention on the understanding that no further prosecutions should be instituted. O'Connell, however, kept a certain number of the delegates together as "a non-representative Board," which continued to deliberate and to summon meetings through the year 1812. The proceedings were closely watched by the Government, who would have welcomed any excuse for suppressing what they regarded as a knot of potential conspirators. But the informers could only report that the speakers of the Board

habitually referred in slighting terms to the Ministry and to the Prince Regent, whom the Catholics regarded with some reason as a traitor to their interest. It was finally decided to treat the Board with contempt.

To the other misfortunes of the Catholic cause was now added that of internal dissension. In 1813 the question of the Veto suddenly emerged, raising the same issues which had nearly wrecked the English Committee in 1792. The Veto had been a favourite scheme with Pitt. In the negotiations which preceded the Union he had enquired whether, in the event of Emancipation being conceded, the Irish Catholics would allow the Crown a negative control over the nomination of their Bishops. The proposal was sweetened with an offer of a state provision for the Catholic clergy; and a committee of the Irish Bishops signified their willingness to accept both the endowment and the Veto (1799). But a little later the Holy See, on being consulted by the English Vicars Apostolic, discountenanced the idea of accepting a state provision, though at the same time it pronounced the Veto to be an admissible arrangement.

In consequence the Parliamentary friends of the Catholics retained upon their programme that part of Pitt's programme which was designed to protect the State, but abandoned the other, which was to have compensated the hierarchy for their partial loss of independence. To do them justice, these statesmen believed that they were acting with the approval of the hierarchy. They had been assured by Dr Milner, the accredited agent of the Irish Bishops and the most influential of the Vicars Apostolic, that no objection would be raised to the Veto; and it was on the strength of these assurances that, in the Catholic debates of 1808, the Veto was offered as a concession to Tory apprehensions. Unfortunately the Emancipationists took no pains to spare the susceptibilities of their clients. "The Catholics," said Ponsonby, "have considered among themselves, and they have determined to make their superior clergy subject to the Crown." If his deliberate intention had been to wound the Bishops in the tenderest place, he could hardly have found words better fitted for that purpose. Milner repudiated his engagements; the Irish Bishops repudiated Milner; and the advocates of the Veto stormed against both the agent and the principals. Soon the Irish Catholics fell apart in conflicting camps of Vetoists and No-Security men. The latter, among whom O'Connell took the lead, asked whether the independence of the national Church was to be betrayed by the ambition of the Irish layman. The argument struck a responsive chord in the mind of the masses; and the Catholic Board reluctantly followed O'Connell's lead.

Already in 1810 these dissensions were notorious, and had increased the difficulty of parliamentary agitation. Speaking on the Catholic question in that year, Grattan was forced to own that he could no longer hold out the offer of the Veto. The admission added strength

to the Tory case; it was argued that the Catholics did not know what they wanted, and could not be treated as a coherent body with which a bargain could be struck. In 1813, when the House of Commons had begun to doubt whether it was not essential to concede demands which had so long divided parties and made the formation of a vigorous Cabinet impossible, the question of the Veto again proved a stumbling-block.

The Bill which Grattan now produced was one which anticipated the concessions of 1829. It proposed to give the franchise to the English Catholics, to admit those of both countries to Parliament, and to throw open all lay corporations and all offices, whether civil or military, with some few exceptions. Those who desired to benefit by the Act, and all Catholic priests exercising spiritual functions, were to take a special oath. It was also provided that no alien might be appointed as a Catholic Bishop in Great Britain or Ireland. But there was no mention of the Veto; the susceptibilities of the Irish Bishops were spared. It would have been well if the English friends of the Catholics had consented to follow Grattan's lead. But Canning and Castlereagh decided that the Veto was essential; and Grattan, rather than lose their assistance, allowed them to amend the Bill.

Their amendments, it is true, gave to the Veto the least objectionable form that could be devised. Both in confirming the election of Bishops and in granting the *regium exequatur* for the delivery of papal letters, the Crown was to be guided by Committees of the Catholic Peers; and Ireland was to be allowed a separate Committee. But these palliatives failed to satisfy the clergy and their congregations. The Irish Bishops again repudiated the Veto; and again O'Connell induced his Board to approve the conduct of the Bishops. Peel, the ablest of the Tory debaters, made the dissatisfaction of the Irish Catholics his chief argument against the Bill; and it produced such effect that, in the committee stage, his friend Speaker Abbot successfully carried an amendment to exclude the Catholics from Parliament. The Bill was at once withdrawn by its supporters; and the triumph of the Tories was partially justified by the language in which O'Connell welcomed the event. He told his audiences that he thanked God the Bill was gone. He taunted the Vetoists as men who discounted their consciences and obtained money by their professions of piety.

In this attitude he stood almost alone among the prominent laymen of his side. Lord Fingal and Sir Edward Bellew declined to hold any communications with the Board. Richard Lalor Sheil, the most accomplished and eloquent orator of the Board, brought all his wit and logic to the support of the Vetoists. The English Catholics complained that those of Ireland were in the thrall of a hierarchy which aimed at absolute power in both countries. Grattan declined to present the next petition of the Board. But the Bishops and O'Connell were prepared, if necessary, to face the displeasure of the Holy See itself in the support

of their decision. During the absence of Pius VII from Rome the English Vicars Apostolic consulted his representative, Quarantotti, the vice-prefect of the Propaganda, on the subject of the obnoxious Bill. He replied, in virtue of his plenary powers, that the proposed securities were unexceptionable, and that the Bill ought to be thankfully accepted if it could be passed in the future. The Irish Bishops appealed from Quarantotti to the Pope, who referred the whole question to the Cardinals. That august body, while condemning the *regium exequatur*, followed Quarantotti in approving the Veto; and their decision was duly transmitted to Ireland by Cardinal Litta. But the Bishops defied the Cardinals; and their lay supporters boasted that, on this point, not even a papal Bull would compel the Irish Catholics to obedience. O'Connell openly asserted that Cardinal Consalvi had sold the Irish Church to the English Government, and that the Pope and the Cardinal were foreigners who could not understand the intricacies of Irish questions.

Amid these noisy recriminations the Catholic movement appeared to be at the last gasp. O'Connell seriously thought of changing his tactics, and of heading a movement for the reform of Parliament or the repeal of the Union, or both at once. The question which he had hoped to make a bond of union seemed to have become a bar to any common action. But the moment that he allowed his intention to transpire, the Government bestirred itself to new measures of repression. The *Dublin Evening Post*, the most influential of the Catholic newspapers, was attacked in the person of the proprietor, Magee, on account of a libellous tirade against the Duke of Richmond's policy. O'Connell, who was retained for the defence, showed more spirit than prudence in his pleading. On the pretext that the truth of his client's article must be considered, he spoke for four hours on the subject of English policy toward Ireland and heaped vituperation upon the Government in terms that far exceeded the virulence of the libel which formed his text. This outburst merely exposed Magee to a severer sentence. The Catholic Press was silenced; and the Board was proclaimed in 1814 with the approbation of Grattan and most moderate Irishmen.

O'Connell saved the Board from absolute extinction. A few of the members continued to meet informally as his guests at a house which he hired for the purpose in Capel Street. But the shadow of the Veto cast a chill over their proceedings. It seemed scarcely worth while to evade the Convention Act while there was so little prospect of uniting the Catholics in a common policy. The agitation survived only among the frequenters of a few "Catholic" coffee-houses, in which, according to the spies who visited them, nothing was to be heard but talk of Reform, Repeal, and O'Connell's "levelling system." The poorer classes were to a man for O'Connell and the Bishops. But in Parliament the cause had few supporters except Vetoists, who were not ill-pleased

at a defeat the whole blame of which could be laid on their opponents. Petitions were still presented; by Grattan and Plunket jointly, in 1815 and 1819; after the former's death, by Plunket alone. In 1821 Plunket revived the Bill of eight years before, and carried it through all its stages in the Lower House, which was now only anxious to have done with the question. But the Veto clauses were left in the Bill; for which reason Catholic petitions were presented against it in the course of the debates. Plunket replied with a lofty denunciation of religious bigotry; and O'Connell returned the compliment by describing Plunket's Bill as "more penal and persecuting than any or all the statutes passed in the most bigoted period of Queen Anne or of the first two Georges." The Lords not unnaturally declined to accept a measure of Catholic Relief which was thus described by Catholics. That the Commons would deprive the Lords of their excuse by sending up a new Bill for unconditional Relief seemed in the last degree unlikely. The Parliamentary Emancipationists were now brought, like the Board, to an *impasse*.

O'Connell's persistent refusal of a compromise has been censured by good judges. Yet it would be unfair to tax him with an ill-conditioned eagerness to humiliate Parliament, to extort by force the relief which might have been obtained through peaceful methods. His object was not to injure England, but to unite Ireland. For this purpose he relied upon agitation; but in 1821 he was ready to substitute a political for the religious watchword, to agitate for Reform and let Emancipation wait for the birth of a new representative system. He could not have accepted the Veto without alienating the Bishops, the priests, and all the more ignorant Catholics. Emancipation, if obtained at this cost, would be worse than useless to the Irish people; it would have left them permanently divided in three factions instead of two. The policy which O'Connell pursued, though often defended in language which was gratuitously offensive and unjust to those who differed from it, was sounder from a national point of view than the Vetoist alternative which at first sight appeared to have an overwhelming weight of argument in its favour.

His faith in the soundness of his decision was severely tried between 1814 and 1823. When Peel was residing in Ireland as Chief Secretary (1812-8), he could boast that he had "almost forgotten" the question of Relief. He asked Parliament to turn from so barren a subject to the more useful work of legislating against agrarian crime, and from 1814 onwards applied the medicine of coercion to disturbed districts. For the practical object which he had in view, his reforms were excellent; a special constabulary, stipendiary magistrates, statutory power to proclaim centres of agrarian crime, the choice of better magistrates and better sheriffs. Regarding the Catholic leaders as a set of factious demagogues, he used without scruple the most doubtful

weapons in the official armoury to strengthen the Protestant ascendancy. His correspondence at this time reveals to us glimpses of a subsidised press, of Irish boroughs managed in the Tory interest, of patronage systematically employed to buy support. Though his language on the subject of Emancipation was less violent than that of the older generation of his party, the Catholics were right in regarding him as the most formidable opponent of their cause. But his system outlived his term of office, which came to an end simply because he grew sick of the sordid methods by which alone the ascendancy could be maintained.

The visit of George IV to Ireland (1821) produced, as it was intended to produce, a number of false hopes. The Catholics celebrated the event with Conciliation dinners, at which they and Orangemen of consequence exchanged embraces. O'Connell is said to have presented the King at his departure with a laurel wreath, kneeling as he did so in the surf; there is better warrant for the temporary existence of a Royal Georgian Club, founded by the Liberator and intended to dine six times a year in token of a nation's gratitude. Lord Liverpool maintained the illusion by sending out Lord Wellesley as Viceroy and conferring the office of Attorney-General on Plunket. But simultaneously Goulburn, an able and bigoted supporter of the ascendancy, received the Chief Secretaryship. There was in fact to be a semblance of compromise without an iota of concession. Perceiving at last how they had been duped, and at the same time deprived by coercion of the ordinary means of attacking the Government, the Catholics abandoned themselves to despondency. "At the beginning of 1823," says Sheil, "an entire cessation of Catholic meetings had taken place. We sat down like galley-slaves in a calm."

These reverses were not altogether unmerited. O'Connell and the Vetoists alike had been more concerned to promote a political campaign than to discover remedies for the worst evils of their country. It was left for the English Parliament to probe the economic situation. The committees that sat to collect evidence on this subject in 1824 and 1825 opened questions which Irish orators had touched superficially or not at all. It was proved that the secret societies and the agrarian outrages, which had rendered it necessary since the Union to keep Ireland almost continuously under a coercive régime, were due to rack-rents, to the tyranny of tithe-proctors and middlemen, to the habitual absence of the great proprietors, to the cowardice and want of public spirit which characterised the squireen class. The committees reported that the wages of hired labour stood in Ireland at a half or a third of the English rate; that the demand for labour was small and stationary, while the numbers seeking employment had increased and were increasing; that thousands were in search of work which not one in ten could hope to obtain. They found that, in this state of things, the peasantry chiefly depended for food upon potato patches of which the

rents, owing to reckless competition, ranged as high as £10 an acre; that these holdings were continually being subdivided to such a point that the produce, even in good years, barely sufficed to keep the tenant and his family from starvation. Witnesses from every part of the south and west quoted harrowing instances of a poverty which they saw no hope of relieving, while the population continued to increase and to be dependent on the land for a livelihood. It was necessary to encourage the investment of private capital in Irish industries; to drive the people into new employments by means of restrictions upon sub-letting; and, until these employments developed, to encourage emigration as a counsel of despair. But capital would not migrate to Ireland while agrarian crime defied repression. The difficulty of repression was due to the general mistrust and hatred of all constituted authorities. Witness after witness was asked to state whether the religious question had any real connexion with the distress which had been described. The answers gave the impression that Emancipation would do nothing for the peasant, unless it were accompanied by the reduction or abolition of tithe.

This, however, was only half, and the less important half, of the truth. The resentment of the peasantry against the law and the landlords, against drivers, proctors, and middlemen, was exacerbated by religious feuds. The confiscations of the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries had saddled the Catholic masses with Protestant landlords; the police, the magistrates, the laws themselves, were regarded as the instruments of Protestant tyranny. There were prophecies in circulation, under the names of Pastorini and Columbkill and McAuliffe, which predicted the speedy expulsion of all Protestants from Ireland. The Ribbon Societies, though primarily agrarian in their objects, admitted no Protestant to membership and lived in a state of constant feud with the Orange clubs, from which all Catholics were similarly excluded. In some of the Rock Societies the neophytes took an oath "to fight knee-deep in Orange blood for the restoration and continuation of the long-promised liberty to the Catholic Church." No general conspiracy of Catholics existed. It was doubtful whether the Rock and Ribbon Societies received orders from central executives; it was certain that such orders, if received, were but imperfectly obeyed. The better class of priests denounced all secret societies. The Catholic Board habitually warned the people against recourse to lawless violence. Middle-class Catholics saw in the agitation an assault upon the principle of private property, and were no less eager than the Protestants for vigorous repression. Still the agrarian movement remained in many respects a religious movement, into the vortex of which the new generation of priests, drawn from peasant homes and educated at Maynooth, were gradually being drawn. These men were too nearly on the same level with their flocks to act as a restraining influence. If they identified themselves with the spirit of revolt, they had before them the prospect of unbounded popularity; if they resisted

that spirit, they ran the risk of losing fees and stipends, or, still worse, of being treated as pariahs and traitors.

The people could not be helped, while they continued to look askance at every overture from Government. The surest way of gaining their confidence was to concede Emancipation immediately and without conditions. This would at once dispel the worst suspicions. It would give the Irish Catholics a confidence in the Imperial legislature which Grattan's Parliament had never won from them. It would diminish the outcry for separation of the two countries. It would add the coping-stone to the policy which had produced the Union; it would lay the foundation of a more prosperous era in Irish history. By yielding in the question of Relief, England would gain the opportunity of offering immediately and freely what O'Connell's party could only present as a goal to be reached by a long and painful struggle. But England's refusal to seize the opportunity is O'Connell's justification. Before the Committees began to sit, the Ministry and Parliament had already decided to cut the Gordian knot by a new Insurrection Act (1822). The famine of the same year was alleviated by the generosity of English subscribers and by a Parliamentary grant. Half a million was thus raised for the benefit of the distressed—a conclusive proof that the goodwill of England was genuine and active. But neither in the famine year, nor when maturer enquiries had made it possible to frame comprehensive measures of Relief, did English legislators show themselves disposed to attack the problem as a whole. The Act of 1823, which introduced permissive commutation of tithes, was valuable as an instalment of reform; but it was the last word of the Liverpool Administration on the subject of Irish reform.

It was therefore no mere accident that the famine year became the starting-point of a new agitation which, unlike those of the past, assumed a genuinely national aspect. In the face of this great calamity the Vetoists and anti-Vetoists made common cause once more. Sheil, the Vetoist leader, made a complete surrender of his previous policy. He agreed with O'Connell to treat the Relief movement merely as a step towards larger aims, and to accept Relief only in that unqualified form which would unite the peasant and the priest in sympathy with the politician. Other means having failed, the priest and the peasant must be called in to fight the battle of the nation. The new programme originated with O'Connell. He imparted it to Sheil early in 1823; and without much delay they agreed upon their plan of action. On April 25 they persuaded a meeting of Dublin Catholics to vote the establishment of a new Association, "a body of confidential friends to whom the people of Ireland could look for counsel." The first reported meeting of the new Association was held on May 12; on Saturday, May 24, the rules suggested by O'Connell were finally adopted, and the agitation was launched upon its course.

The essence of the new policy may be stated as association without illegality, and agitation without physical force. It was necessary to evade the laws, but easy for a lawyer of O'Connell's experience to do so. The chief obstacle was still the Convention Act; another Act of 1823, which was directed primarily against the administering of unlawful oaths, had also to be taken into account. Both were frustrated by making the Association public in its procedure and non-representative in its composition. Any man, whether Protestant or Catholic, might enrol himself as a member by paying a subscription of one guinea. The meetings, held weekly upon Saturday afternoon, were thrown open to reporters; the minutes and the list of members were kept in constant readiness to be inspected by anyone who asked for them. The object of the meetings was to prepare petitions and to collect evidence as to the grievances of Irish Catholics. The first petition, which was drawn by Sheil, received approval on June 14 and was presented to Parliament in the same month. But the difficulty was to sustain the enthusiasm of the members. At the outset the Association enrolled some fifty or sixty members, and decided that ten should constitute a quorum. But it often happened that a quorum failed to appear; on February 21, 1824, was passed the significant resolution "that in future the chair be taken at any time between the hours of three and five o'clock as soon as ten members be present"—an amendment of the original rule under which the meeting adjourned at half-past three if no quorum had yet appeared. O'Connell, who was indefatigable in attendance, would sometimes go out into the streets and bring back with him any Catholic acquaintance whom he could find, in order to complete the quorum. On one occasion, only eight members having presented themselves, he descended into the bookseller's shop over which the meetings were held, and impressed two Maynooth students who were total strangers to him.

These students deserve a niche in history; it was their attendance which enabled a meeting (described in the minutes as "numerous and respectable") to vote the institution of a Catholic Rent (Feb. 4, 1824). The idea had originated with Lord Kenmare in 1785; and an attempt to apply it in 1812 had been one of the reasons which led to the proclamation of the Board. But it had never yet been presented in so popular a form as that which it now received. O'Connell proposed that every Catholic, even the poorest, should be invited to subscribe at least a penny a month, or a shilling a year. The fund, he said, would amply suffice to promote the objects of the Association; and it would demonstrate that the people were behind the movement.

The success of the scheme showed that O'Connell understood his countrymen. The towns took the lead in levying the Rent, and from first to last contributed about two-thirds of the sums collected. But the country followed the example of the towns with unmistakable enthusiasm; and the most backward districts showed an unexpected power of

improvising the necessary organisation. The ordinary procedure was to convoke a parish meeting under the presidency of the priest. Resolutions approving of the Rent were passed; a secretary, a treasurer, and collectors were then appointed. In October, 1824, the Rent was coming in at the rate of £350 a week; by the end of the year this rate was doubled. The contributions of individuals were often far from voluntary. The collectors, when they dared, employed threatening language. The priests denounced defaulters in the chapels. Those who still held out became the victims of mysterious outrages. In some cases the element of comedy was not wanting. "I knew an instance," says a police magistrate, "which was officially reported to me. The priest at the altar demanded the Catholic Rent and demanded a subscription at the doors of the chapel. It was refused, and he was considerably irritated at this, and I believe that he went so far as to use his horsewhip to them that did refuse him, and there was a considerable disturbance about it; but since that circumstance the thing has gone on, and the money has been paid, I believe."

In the expenditure of the Rent the Association adopted the budget suggested by O'Connell. For Parliamentary expenses a sum of £5000 was voted; for subsidising or, as opponents put it, for corrupting the Press of both countries, £15,000; a like sum was to be spent in procuring legal redress for Catholics oppressed by Protestants; £5000 were appropriated to the education of the Catholic poor, and £5000 to train priests for the benefit of emigrants settled in America. Select committees were appointed to deal with the various branches of expenditure. But the Association continued to debate in public on every project and every grievance. It openly copied the procedure of the House of Commons; and the debates resembled those of a national Parliament, with the difference that there was no Opposition. Any person could obtain admission by paying a shilling at the door; and the oratory of the leaders was carefully adapted to the taste of these chance auditors and to the populace out of doors who read the proceedings in the newspapers.

The debates could not be called seditious; the Government, though it habitually sent reporters to take shorthand notes, could discern no pretext for prosecutions. But, as the numbers of the Association grew, the character of the body changed for the worse. The peers and landowners, who had acted as a moderating influence, rarely attended, and when they did so failed to control the debates. Sheil, O'Connell, Lawless, Aeneas McDonnell, Purcell O'Gorman, and a few kindred spirits formed a species of cabinet, delivered the most important speeches, and framed the resolutions. The same men were the life and soul of the "aggregate meetings," which assembled periodically to endorse the policy of the Association, but with which the Association was not formally connected. The Government began to take alarm. The Viceroy told the Cabinet that

the economic situation was improving, that the proclaimed districts were subsiding into a state of order, and that the Association was chiefly to blame for whatever discontent survived. The Cabinet told the House of Commons that such a body, existing mainly to burlesque the proceedings of the Imperial Parliament, was an outrage on the Constitution; that the chief business of the Association was to pervert the course of justice, and that any man who paid a farthing to the Rent ought to be incapacitated from serving as a juror.

On February 10, 1825, Goulburn asked the House of Commons for leave to introduce a Bill in restraint of the excesses of Irish associations. The Bill was allowed to pass, since the friends of the Catholics hoped that it would smooth the way for an Emancipation measure which was being prepared by Sir Francis Burdett. Goulburn's Act did not mention the Catholics by name. But it forbade societies acting for the redress of grievances in Church or State, or for the prosecution or defence of causes at law, to hold meetings of more than fourteen days' duration, or to collect or receive money, or to appoint executive committees of a permanent character. So long as this Act remained in force (and it was to hold good for three years) the Catholic Association as then constituted could be rigorously suppressed. The Association had petitioned against the passing of the Act; and Brougham had moved that the bearers of the petition should be heard at the bar. But the petition was rejected and the hearing refused. O'Connell and his fellow-deputies were forced to sit as spectators, though in a place of honour, while the fate of their body was debated between Protestant friends and enemies. They took the blow quietly. The Association, which founded great hopes on Burdett's Bill, dissolved itself before the Goulburn Act came into force, boasting in a valedictory address to the nation that Relief was now secured through its exertions.

But the Association had underrated the courage of the Upper House. The Lords had never abated their hostility to the political claims of Roman Catholics. In 1822 they had thrown out Canning's Bill for admitting the Catholic peers to take their seats. In 1823 and 1824 they had refused the franchise to the English Catholics. Nothing short of intimidation was likely to extort their assent to the full Emancipation which Burdett proposed. In the House of Commons all went well. Plunket, Canning, and Palmerston lent their powerful assistance to Burdett. The Tories were half-consoled by the offer of supplementary measures giving a state provision to the Irish hierarchy and disfranchising the 40s. freeholders, who formed the majority of the Irish electorate, and were predominantly Catholic. O'Connell had signified his adhesion to these "Wings," so that they could not be used, like the Veto in the past, to disunite the Emancipationists. Only Peel found anything of consequence to say against the Bill itself; and his vague anxieties for "the Protestant Establishment in Church and State"

had grown stale by repetition. The Bill passed the Commons. But the majority (248 votes to 227) was so small that the Lords did not allow the debate in their House to proceed beyond the second reading. They were encouraged by the attitude of the Duke of York, the heir-presumptive, who had already announced from his place in the House that he would defend the Coronation oath and the Established Church, "whatever might be his station in life, so help him God!" The Orange party made the Duke a standing toast and printed his speech in letters of gold, as though it were a charter confirming their political monopoly for yet another reign.

Their rejoicings were premature. O'Connell had never placed implicit faith in Parliament. He had already devised the ways and means of making Goulburn's Act a dead letter. The most moderate of his followers now admitted that they no longer owed a blind obedience to the law. As soon as Parliament was prorogued and stricter legislation impossible, a new Catholic Association rose phoenix-like from the ashes of its predecessor. Goulburn's Act could not touch a society formed for religious or charitable purposes, or for the advancement of science, or for the improvement of agriculture and commerce. These therefore were taken as the ostensible aims of the new society. The founders announced that a new Catholic Rent would be raised "for the purposes of the Association so far as not prohibited by law"; and that the political agitation would be continued by fourteen-day meetings which, as the Act required, would be entirely unconnected with the Association. The audacity of this challenge to the Government provoked extraordinary enthusiasm among the lower classes. O'Connell and Sheil went on mission through the south and west, addressing vast audiences in terms as violent as the letter of the law permitted. The boisterous vituperation of the one, the shrill rhetoric of the other, roused an excitement which caused the Government none the less alarm because it seemed for the moment to be completely under control.

But the general election of 1826 provided the masses with an outlet for passions which were after all more noisy than intense. While in England the Corn Laws attracted almost as much attention as Relief, in Ireland all other questions than Relief fell into the background wherever the forty-shilling freeholders showed a spark of independence. Despite the Act of 1793, there were few cases in which any Catholics had been able to qualify for the borough franchise. In many of the counties they held a majority upon the register; but hitherto they had been sent like cattle to the poll, under strict orders from their landlords. O'Connell himself, as lately as 1825, had despaired of winning their support. It was an unexpected triumph for the Association when the experiment of attacking the Protestant stronghold of Waterford proved successful.

The Beresfords had for a long time regarded this constituency as their private property; and the head of the House, the Marquis of

Waterford, had spared no pains or money on this occasion to secure the return of his brother, Lord George Beresford. But the Catholic campaign was well organised ; in every barony there was a branch committee closely connected with a central committee which sat in the county town. The priests were honorary members of the baronial committees and proved themselves unrivalled canvassers ; Villiers Stuart, the candidate of the Association, had been fortunate enough to procure the services of O'Connell as his election counsel. A tour which O'Connell made through the county completed the rout of the Beresford interest. Parish by parish, the tenants of the Marquis poured into Waterford and registered their votes against his brother. They made their entry in procession, bearing the banners of their respective baronies. Four thousand soldiers had been brought into the neighbourhood as a precaution ; but there was no semblance of disorder. The butchers of Waterford took upon themselves the duty of policing the multitude. Armed with white wands, they patrolled the streets in bands of six, and any voter found out of doors after eleven o'clock was summarily conducted to his bed. Not the least dramatic incident of the contest was the nomination of O'Connell by the patriarch of the Beresford tenantry. It was merely a device to give O'Connell the right of speaking from the hustings ; and after an eloquent oration he retired in favour of Villiers Stuart. But for a moment friends and opponents alike believed that their votes were to be actually solicited for a Catholic candidate. It was no doubt this episode which suggested O'Connell's later candidature for Clare. The result at Waterford was never in doubt ; and on the fifth day of the polling Lord George Beresford withdrew. The Catholic victory was followed by others in Louth, Westmeath, Monaghan, and Armagh ; amongst which that of Louth attracted most attention, because the candidate of the Association, a retired barrister of no wealth or distinction, overthrew the united interests of the Jocelyns and Fosters.

The results of the general election gave a marked impetus to the activity of the Association. O'Connell diverted a large proportion of the Rent to the purpose of assisting Catholic freeholders who had suffered eviction for their votes. To make the collection more efficient, he procured in every parish the election of Catholic churchwardens, who, besides collecting the Rent, disseminated the news contained in the *Weekly Register* of the Association. He also endeavoured to win over the Bishops by offering them a large subsidy towards maintaining a society for national education ; but this offer was declined. The Bishops were more clear-sighted than the priests, and had no intention of becoming the tools of agitation.

The newly elected House of Commons not unnaturally resolved to show that it was proof against intimidation ; it threw out the Catholic motion at the commencement of the session (March 5, 1827), and in the following year rejected a petition which had been signed by the

congregations of 1500 chapels. The ministerial changes of 1828 distinctly strengthened this reaction. Canning, when he succeeded Lord Liverpool (April, 1827), asked the Catholics to give him time. But the King had selected Canning without the faintest intention of allowing him to carry Emancipation; and Canning's death (August) left the premiership to Lord Goderich, who was powerless for good or evil. The Wellington Ministry, which was formed early in 1828, included a certain number of the Canningites, and professed to treat Emancipation as an open question. But this course had been taken merely on the ground that an efficient Ministry could not be formed on any other terms. The Canningites found themselves ill at ease under Wellington and Peel, who on their side gladly embraced the first excuse for parting company with Huskisson and his supporters.

Peel, the Duke's right-hand man, stood exactly in the same position towards the Catholics as when he had been Chief Secretary. He felt on the subject more strongly even than the Duke; and not solely for the reason that he stood more deeply pledged. In Peel's opinion, to emancipate the Catholics was to give the signal for the separation of the two countries and for a civil war in Ireland. He believed that an honest despotism, which would refuse to yield an inch, would be the ideal government for Ireland. But he had little hope of bringing the House of Commons over to his view of the situation. The hope vanished altogether when the Commons, having forgotten their resentment against O'Connell's tactics, adopted, though only by six votes, a motion for a committee on the Catholic claims. It was not a defeat for the Ministry which professed an open mind. But it was a defeat for Peel, who had spoken against Burdett's motion; nor was he consoled when the House of Lords threw out a similar motion by a majority of 44. For he could not hope to fight the Irish agitators without coercive powers. The Insurrection Act had lapsed; Goulburn's Act was on the point of lapsing; while the Commons remained in their present frame of mind, neither Act could be renewed. And there was little hope that the Commons would change their views. Already Peel saw surrender impending as a necessity of the near future. The chief doubt in his mind was whether he would make the surrender in person or would retire, leaving the Duke to bear the weight of Tory discontent.

At this point an unexpected reverse made it imperative that the surrender should come quickly. The Clare election completed the work which the House of Commons had begun. This famous contest arose out of the Ministerial changes necessitated by the breach between the Duke and the Canningites. When Charles Grant vacated the Board of Trade, it was offered to Vesey Fitzgerald, one of the members for Clare. Fitzgerald was in favour of Emancipation; his family influence in the constituency was great; and it never occurred to Ministers that his reelection might be successfully opposed. They forgot that the Association bore Fitzgerald

a grudge for supporting the Goulburn Act, and had long ago resolved to unseat him at the earliest opportunity. Great, therefore, was the surprise when they learned that Clare would be contested; greater still, when it was announced that O'Connell would be the rival candidate. That a Catholic could be legally nominated had been shown at Waterford; that votes given for a professing Catholic were valid, and that he could be legally returned, was a new discovery even to experts in election law. No professing Catholic had been returned since the Revolution. To put forward O'Connell as a candidate was an inspiration which came to his friends at the last moment, after all efforts to find a Protestant candidate had failed. O'Connell himself shrank at first from making the experiment. But his supporters would not allow him to withdraw. Within ten days the sum of £28,000 was subscribed for his expenses.

Money, however, played a secondary part in the struggle. Had money been the decisive consideration, Fitzgerald might have had any sum for the asking. The gentlemen of his own county subscribed £4000 to help him, and would readily have doubled their subscriptions. But the priests and the Catholic orators were masters of the situation. They set to work without delay; and their united exhortations prevailed with the most timid of the forty-shilling freeholders. O'Connell, reaching Ennis at three o'clock in the morning of the nomination day, found the whole body of the inhabitants astir to do him honour. On the first day of the polling the parish priests marched into Ennis at the head of their parishioners. Each man wore a green favour; each parish marched together under a green banner. Word had been given from the altars of the chapels that the whole male population between 15 and 80 years of age should go to Ennis. The order was so well obeyed that some parts of the county wore, in the polling week, the aspect of a desert. Competent witnesses averred that between forty and fifty thousand persons were collected in the county town. They were marshalled under officers, to whose commands they showed unhesitating obedience. At night those who could find no lodging bivouacked in an orderly manner on the fair-ground. O'Connell's committee supplied them with rations, which were doled out by the priests. Spirits were forbidden; and the publicans announced that they would not sell a drop of whiskey while the election lasted.

At night, while the Catholic leaders feasted in the inns, the rank and file went soberly to bed. If any murmured, they were coerced by a force of volunteer police. During the daytime the crowds were alternately harangued by the politicians and the priests. A priest was stationed at every approach to the town, that he might preach to the passers-by. Priests also stood in the polling-booths to see what electors would dare "to vote against God"; the more extreme announced that they would never administer the last rites of the Church to those who forsook her in this time of need.

Pressure and intimidation were not, however, the monopoly of the Catholics. Protestant landlords threatened a general eviction of those freeholders who voted for O'Connell. One Vandeleur attempted to defeat the priests by driving to the poll at the head of his own tenants, from whom however he was dexterously separated by the mob. Several of Fitzgerald's friends did their best to force a duel upon any orator whom they found particularly dangerous to their cause. But in the end the peasants polled almost to a man for O'Connell, while the gentry and the substantial freeholders were equally unanimous for Fitzgerald. The latter retired before the last day of the polling; and the sheriff, after taking legal advice, signed the return, with a note stating that O'Connell openly professed himself a Catholic. The electors dispersed in the same order and with the same military discipline which they had observed at their arrival. Intense excitement pervaded the country; and the effects of the ill-will between Protestant and Catholic were seen in a system of exclusive dealing, under which the Catholics avoided so far as possible all business relations with Protestant tradesmen and farmers. But criminal outrages remained conspicuously rare. Evidently the same machinery which had decided the election was being employed to restrain the peasantry from breaches of the law.

How long the Catholic leaders would abide by their determination to avoid violence, and how long they would be able to enforce their wishes, were questions eagerly discussed in Ireland during the remainder of the year. The police reports from the south and west were not unsatisfactory, so far as concerned agrarian crime and riots. On the other hand political agitation was noted as prevailing almost everywhere. The Protestants were forming Brunswick Clubs; the Catholics were meeting in their chapels; the tension between the two religions was extreme, even in parts of the country where amicable relations had hitherto subsisted. The Catholics denounced the Brunswickers as oppressors and assassins, but in their own notices and speeches employed language not a whit less inflammatory than that with which they reproached their opponents.

The two storm-centres were Monaghan and Tipperary. The former county was convulsed by a feud between Protestant and Catholic which might at almost any moment lead to civil war among the lower classes. In the month of September John Lawless undertook to make a tour through Monaghan, in the character of a delegate from the Association. His progress was accompanied by a Catholic rabble, recruited from the adjacent counties and numbering, if police reports may be believed, from fifteen to twenty thousand. After spending some days at Carrickmacross in the composition and delivery of the most violent harangues, he announced his intention of proceeding on the 23rd to Ballybay. The Protestants of Ballybay, firmly believing that the town would be burned over their heads, appealed for help to their fellow-Protestants in

the surrounding country. Early on the morning of the 23rd the streets of Ballybay were lined by four or five thousand Orangemen, armed with guns, swords, and other weapons, and prepared to resist by force the entry of the Catholic procession. Fortunately, the general commanding the district persuaded the Orangemen to remain quiet while he rode off to expostulate with Lawless. A compromise was arranged, Lawless holding his meeting at a chapel which stood a mile outside the town. His followers, though deeply chagrined by their leader's "cowardice," were content to parade the neighbouring hills with shouts of victory, and dispersed quietly towards evening.

In Tipperary the situation was different; the Protestants were numerically insignificant; and Roman Catholic demonstrations were fruitless except as a menace to the Government. All the greater therefore was the political significance of the so-called Reconciliation meetings which took place in the summer and autumn at Clonmel, Fethard, Killanaule, Cashel, Roscrea, Nenagh, Tipperary. The organisers professed that their sole object was to heal the meaningless feuds of local factions which, under such names as "Hens" and "Magpies," "Shanavests" and "Caravats," "Padeen Gars" and "Moll Doyles," had from time immemorial disturbed the peace of the south. The real purpose, however, was to show the strength and discipline of the Catholic body. Processions of farmers and peasants, some mounted but the majority on foot, paraded the streets after mass with drums and fifes at their head; they marched by files or in ranks of threes with company-leaders and banners; some of the horsemen wore hussar uniforms of green and white; all were decked with green ribbons, scarves, or handkerchiefs. The numbers were not great, if mere spectators were left out of account—in the most imposing processions from fifteen to seventeen hundred took part—and the meetings passed off quietly in every case. Soldiers treated them with contempt; the officer who attended to watch the proceedings at Clonmel, where the greatest of these demonstrations took place, reported that twenty good dragoons would have dispersed the procession without difficulty.

At the same time it could not be denied that these meetings increased in frequency and in numbers; that the example of Tipperary was beginning to be imitated throughout the south-west; and that all these demonstrations were in touch with the central Association, whose lightest command would be implicitly obeyed. Lord Anglesey wrote to England that it would soon be necessary, at all hazards, to break up these gatherings, since they had begun to attract the criminal classes and to excite alarm amongst the respectable of every denomination. On the other hand the law-officers reported that, while such meetings were probably illegal and might be dispersed by force, the inevitable consequence would be that the Catholics would raise legal actions and would secure favourable verdicts from any Irish jury. Nothing could be done

without new coercive legislation; for the Government had no longer the advantage of an Insurrection Act or even of the Goulburn Act. But how was it to be expected that a House of Commons already committed to Emancipation would support a policy of repression which had only become necessary because Emancipation had been refused by the House of Lords?

Meanwhile the Association pursued its triumphant course. Immediately after the Clare election the weekly Rent rose to the unprecedented figure of £2704; and, though it soon resumed more normal proportions, there was no longer any fear of pecuniary difficulties. The war-chest being full, the Association resolved to put up Catholic candidates for every county at the next general election. Liberal clubs were accordingly founded in many counties with instructions to canvass and prepare a register of the Catholic electorate; to facilitate the work, a branch club was to be set up in every parish. It was further resolved to require from every Catholic candidate a pledge that he would oppose the Ministry on every division until Emancipation should be granted. The popular excitement was fostered by proclamations which spoke of the police and magistracy as conniving at the crimes of Protestants, accused Protestant jurymen of systematic perjury, and characterised the Liberal clubs as "fortresses to which the oppressed may fly for protection." On September 26, when the Reconciliation meetings had already accomplished their purpose of alarming the Government, O'Connell issued in the name of the Association an appeal to the men of Tipperary to desist from these assemblies. His circular was read to the congregations in the chapels, and was immediately obeyed.

But the orators continued to allow themselves the licence which they denied to their followers, denouncing the Government on every possible pretext, even on the ground that it did nothing to repress political excitement. "The Minister," said Sheil, "sits as if two gladiators were crossing their swords for his recreation. The Cabinet seems to be little better than a box in an amphitheatre, from whence His Majesty's Ministers may survey the business of blood." Throughout these months, while the highest Irish officials were no less in the dark as to the Government's intentions than were the general public, Sheil, O'Connell, and their friends flitted like stormy petrels from one part of the country to another, addressing now their supporters and now, at no small peril to their safety, whatever gatherings of Orangemen they encountered.

All kinds of conjectures were abroad as to the intentions of the Government; and the words of every public man were watched with breathless interest. In August, a speech delivered at Derry by George Dawson, Peel's brother-in-law and a member of the Ministry, struck Ulster Protestants with consternation. Speaking to a gathering of Orangemen, this former champion of the restrictive system sang his palinode with no uncertain sound, telling his amazed and angry audience that the

Association could no longer be resisted. At first it was supposed that he spoke with authority. Then the whisper spread that his colleagues were furious with him; but it remained uncertain whether they regarded him as a traitor to their cause, or merely as indiscreet. Archbishop Curtis, the Catholic Primate of Ireland, had the courage to approach the Duke of Wellington by letter, begging him to give way. The Duke replied in oracular language, that, if the question could be buried in oblivion for a time, he did not despair of applying a satisfactory remedy to the situation. Lord Anglesey, whose Catholic sympathies were well known, was invited by Curtis to explain the meaning of the Prime Minister. The Viceroy replied, expressing his disappointment that Emancipation was to be deferred, but exhorting the Catholics to propitiate the Duke; and gave Curtis to understand that Emancipation could not be delayed. The letter, marked private and confidential, was naturally allowed by its recipient to fall into the hands of the journalists. For the moment it seemed to be an official and decisive announcement of policy. But then came the news that Lord Anglesey had been recalled on account of his too public expression of sympathy for the Emancipationists. Men knew not what to believe.

The fact was that the Ministers had been for some months past prepared to accept the inevitable. Already on August 1 the Duke had asked the King's leave to consider the Catholic question and had stated with unanswerable force the reasons which made it imperative that leave should be granted. Ireland was on the brink of rebellion; the House of Commons was in sympathy with the Irish demands. A general election would not change the views of the English element in the Lower House; but it would mean the return of avowed Catholics from every county in three provinces of Ireland. The Tories might resign or they might pass Emancipation; but, if they resigned, no Cabinet strong enough to coerce the Lords could possibly be formed. By August 3 the Cabinet had agreed that they would not resign. Even Peel consented to remain, although he would gladly have withdrawn to avoid supporting a measure which he had hitherto opposed on every possible occasion. Opposition or even neutrality upon his part, so the Duke assured him, would wreck the Ministry and the Bill; there is little doubt that the Duke reasoned correctly. The strangest feature of the situation is not the capitulation of the Tories, but the profound mystery in which they veiled their future policy long after it had been settled. The fact was that they mistrusted the King and feared the Tory Lords. George IV was capable of betraying any promise which he had time to weigh before it took effect. It was therefore undesirable to expose him to the reproaches of the Eldon party during the months which had to elapse before Parliament could meet and legislate. True, he would be obliged to give way in the last resort; but before doing so he might irreparably injure the prestige of the Crown by public resistance to the Commons

and his Ministers. As for the Lords, forewarned they would also be forearmed ; and the Duke, like the experienced strategist he was, meant to carry their last defences by surprise before they could take counsel with the King or one another.

But the reasons which dictated secrecy might seem also to call for rapid action. The refusal of the Ministry to call an autumn session cannot be explained by any doubts upon their part. Already, in the month of August, they had begun to discuss the details of their Bill. Probably it was the King who had insisted on delay, in the hope that the Irish situation might improve before Parliament assembled. The main object of the Duke and Peel, in their correspondence with the King at this time, was certainly to convince him that concessions could no longer be avoided. On September 27 Peel wrote that all the disposable forces in Great Britain had been stationed within easy reach of Ireland, and that the Lord Lieutenant had discretionary powers to summon the whole of them to his assistance. On October 14 Wellington, though he confessed that he saw no immediate cause to fear rebellion, warned his master that a general combination of the discontented Irish, to refuse the payment of tithes or rent, was well within the bounds of possibility. The Ministers at home were in fact no less convinced than Lord Anglesey of the necessity for coming to terms ; and the dismissal of that popular Viceroy was due to personal reasons. Anglesey had lectured the Duke in his despatches ; he had publicly reflected upon the party which the Cabinet represented. He was showing more civility to Catholic Peers than the King thought decent, and in fact was generally suspected of courting popularity at the expense of his colleagues and the Crown. It was important to convince the King and the Tories out of doors that the Cabinet were not conceding Emancipation merely because a Viceroy of Liberal sympathies had told them that it must be done.

The Bill, which assumed its final shape in January, 1829, was chiefly the work of Peel and the Duke. They started from the principle that, in respect of civil rights, the Roman Catholics should be put upon a footing of equality with all other classes ; but that certain offices and positions of trust should be excepted by name. In its final form the Act provided that no Roman Catholic should hold the offices of Guardian or Justice of the United Kingdom, of Lord Lieutenant or Lord Deputy in Ireland, of Lord High Chancellor, Lord Keeper, or Lord Commissioner of the Great Seal in either kingdom ; nor any office in the Established Churches of England, Ireland, and Scotland, in the ecclesiastical Courts, in cathedrals, or collegiate, or ecclesiastical foundations, in the Universities, or in the Colleges of Eton, Westminster, or Winchester, or any college or school within the realm. The question of securities gave rise to long discussions. The Veto was abandoned on the ground that it would entail the recognition of the Roman Catholic religion as partially established ; but Ministers probably reflected that Emancipation

accompanied by the Veto would do little to appease Irish discontent. Clauses for the endowment of the Roman Catholic clergy were cut out at the eleventh hour in deference to the wishes of the English Church. Peel's original desire had been to limit the number of seats in the House of Commons which might be held by Roman Catholics ; but on this point he was overruled by Wellington. Both however agreed that it was advisable to bring in a supplementary Bill disfranchising the Irish forty-shilling freeholder. In all these points the Cabinet rapidly agreed to the decisions of the two leading Ministers.

The King's Speech at the opening of Parliament (February 5) announced that a Bill would be introduced to suppress the Catholic Association, and that the laws affecting Roman Catholics would be subsequently brought under consideration. Simultaneously Peel announced to his Oxford constituents that, having decided to support Emancipation, he placed his resignation in their hands. The party of the Church at once raised the cry of treason ; but the surrender of the Ministry had been foreseen by the moderates of all parties, and even among extremists produced more indignation than surprise. A Bill suppressing the Association was introduced on the 10th. Advocated by Peel as the indispensable preliminary to Emancipation, this measure passed both Houses with little discussion. Before it became law the Association voluntarily dissolved, in spite of protests from O'Connell. He was chagrined that the organisation upon which he had counted for help in the campaigns of the future should be disbanded at the first victory. But the moderates were against him, and in this hour of rejoicing the moderates were in a majority. It was then announced that on March 3 Peel would move for a committee on the Catholic question.

At this point, when everything seemed settled, the King made a last stand for the principles of "his revered and excellent father." The Bill, he suddenly announced to his Ministers, involved a change in the Oath of Supremacy to which he could never consent. At noon on the day preceding that fixed for the Catholic motion the Cabinet presented their ultimatum through the Duke, the Lord Chancellor, and Peel. The King talked wildly for six hours, refreshing himself with brandy as he proceeded. At the end of the interview the deputation, who had scarcely been allowed to speak a word, announced the resignation of the Ministry and withdrew. Late in the evening, when they were expecting to hear that a new Cabinet had been formed on Protestant principles, they received instead the royal permission to proceed with the Bill.

Next day Peel presented his apology and his case for the Bill to an attentive House. He disliked Emancipation as much as ever. But the current of political opinion both in England and Ireland left him no alternative save to submit. This question could no longer be permitted to set the House of Lords against the Commons, Ministers against their colleagues, and Ireland against England. Upon the altar

of necessity he was prepared to sacrifice his own convictions and his party ties. For himself he remained a Protestant; he feared the effect of admitting Roman Catholics to share in the working of a Protestant Constitution. But, since Protestants had ceased to be unanimous in defending the policy of exclusion, since even those of Ireland had presented a monster petition in favour of Catholic Relief, what course remained for Protestant Ministers except to surrender with a good grace? It might be said that he and his colleagues should have left their opponents to assume the responsibility of this new departure. But the existing Cabinet had felt it their duty to undertake a work which it was doubtful whether any other group of politicians would be able to complete as satisfactorily, or, indeed, to complete at all.

Seldom has a political surrender been so frankly acknowledged or so ably defended. That the surrender was a necessity could not be disputed, even at that time, save by those whom religious or political bias had rendered blind to the plain facts of the Irish situation. Whether Peel and Wellington did wisely in undertaking to carry a measure of which they personally disapproved was, on the contrary, a question hotly debated; but those who censured them did so without full knowledge of the difficulties to be apprehended from the King and the Lords. Only the combined influence of Peel and the Duke could overcome these difficulties. The modern critic of their conduct will be less disposed to blame them for their change of front than for the obstinacy with which they had fought a losing battle, and for the ungracious manner in which they at last gave way to the argument of force.

The Bill, after being read the first time without opposition, passed the second reading by 353 votes to 180, went through committee without any substantial alteration, and on the third reading was carried by 320 votes to 132. Petitions poured in against it; and Lord Eldon shed tears in the Upper House as he prophesied the impending downfall of the British Empire. But the Lords had altered their convictions or lacked the courage to continue the fight. In less than a fortnight they had allowed the Bill to pass through all its stages. On April 13 it received the royal assent.

In spite of its sweeping character, it left many causes of friction behind. The disfranchisement of the forty-shilling freeholders (numbering over 190,000), could not fail to strike Irishmen as an act of party vengeance. Peel had expressed a hope that his Emancipation scheme would heal the feud between the Irish landlord and the Irish tenant; but a stranger method of promoting reconciliation has surely never been devised. A pettier affront to the Catholics was the refusal to let O'Connell's election count as valid. After two nights' debate the Commons were induced by the Ministry to decide that he must take the oath which had been in force at the time of his return. He appeared in the House, read the oath, and refused to take it; whereupon a new writ

for Clare was issued. He was of course reelected; but the slight was one which his countrymen resented, if he did not. His treatment and that of the freeholders kept alive the Catholic complaint of injustice, and exacerbated the agitation, which began shortly afterwards, for the removal of their remaining disabilities.

These were not altogether trivial. Some of the rights conceded by the Act of 1829 could only be exercised by those who took a special form of oath. The Act also imposed restrictions upon Jesuits and the members of monastic Orders which were none the less offensive for being allowed to remain a dead letter. It required the registration of all priests and Catholic places of worship. It left Roman Catholic foundations for charitable and religious purposes still subject to the law of superstitious uses, from which they were only in part relieved by an Act of 1832. Marriages of Catholics celebrated by their own priests were only recognised at law in 1838. The Acts of 1844 and 1846 were necessary to sweep away a mass of minor restrictions and obsolete penalties. It was reserved to a later generation to make Catholics free of the great Universities. And it must be remembered that the social and political disabilities which legislation had created could not be altogether removed by the mere repeal of the obnoxious statutes. From the Irish Administration, from British constituencies, from high political office, the Catholics were still excluded with but few exceptions; and although there is much force in the contention that their long ostracism from public life had left them unfitted for responsible positions, it cannot be denied that theological animosities increased the difficulties in the path of ambitious Catholics and were habitually regarded by such men as the chief obstacle to their advancement.

These, however, are facts which belong to the social history of a later period; and the consideration of them would carry us far beyond the end of the movement which we have been engaged in studying. The main point at issue in 1829 was not the levelling of distinctions created by theological prejudice, for the theological arguments against Emancipation were already exploded when Grattan moved his first great Bill. Rather it was a trial of strength between the Irish electorate and the Imperial legislature; between a voluntary combination of individuals and the Executive; between the agitator and the constituted Government. It opened a new stage in the relations of the two countries by showing Irish politicians the point at which the armour of England could be pierced. It gave Ireland the hope of Repeal; it inspired England with the determination to resist any change in the relations of the two countries which might give a wider scope to the ambitions and the influence of agitators working hand in hand with the priests of a still suspected creed.

## CHAPTER XX.

### GREAT BRITAIN AND IRELAND.

(1832-41.)

THE election of the first Reformed Parliament was anticipated with alarm by the Tories and with confidence by the Whigs. The disturbances that had been freely prophesied did not occur; and Grey expressed lively satisfaction at the success with which his newly-launched bark was navigating the rapids. The numerical result was equally favourable to the authors of the Bill, who found themselves confronted by not more than 150 declared opponents. The only familiar figure missing was Croker, who refused to offer himself as a candidate for the Reformed Parliament, and who for the rest of his life maintained his attitude of contemptuous aloofness, despite the example and the banter of his political associates. Though extreme Tories made the most of the fact that a prizefighter (Gully) was elected, the return of Grote, Jeffrey, Macaulay, Molesworth, Bulwer Lytton, Gladstone, Lord Mahon, and other distinguished men, falsified the prediction that an extended electorate would confine its favours to men of mediocre ability and low social station.

The election reduced the Tory party for a time to political insignificance. Half its numbers fell on the field of battle; and Peel seized the first opportunity of declaring that he accepted the situation created by the Reform Bill. The change was reflected in the adoption of the name "Conservative"—an invention of Croker's—as an alternative designation of the party and its principles. Before 1832 the party had consisted almost exclusively of landowners. It now received a considerable infusion of traders and manufacturers, who had little in common with the Toryism of Eldon and Sidmouth. On the other hand the older Toryism remained strongly entrenched in the Upper House, where even Wellington was not Tory enough to satisfy the Buckinghams and the Londonderrys. Of this old Tory section Lyndhurst rapidly became the spokesman.

If the Tory party was weakened by internal divisions, the victorious Whigs were in similar plight. Though Althorp, Russell, Durham, Poulett Scrope, and Duncannon, were almost wholly free from the

traditional Whig distrust of the people, they were outnumbered in the Cabinet; and the Grey Ministry was essentially Whig. A body of men, however, stronger in the constituencies than in the House, regarded the Reform Bill as nothing more than the first of a series of measures designed to sweep away the power and privileges of the territorial aristocracy which had governed England since the Revolution. This party, of which Fonblanque was the spokesman in the Press and of which Joseph Hume had long been the leading spirit, was reinforced in the new Parliament by influential demagogues like Cobbett and Attwood and by recruits of higher social rank and intellectual calibre, such as Grote, Molesworth, and Roebuck, trained for the most part in the school of Bentham and in close touch with the elder and younger Mill and with Francis Place. The Radicals maintained an attitude of complete independence towards the Ministry, and formed the chief visible embodiment of the new spirit that had entered the House. A second group of independent members was formed by O'Connell and his followers. Though the Whigs had supported him on Catholic Emancipation and he had loyally aided them to carry Parliamentary Reform, he stood for much that they could not accept; and, while usually willing to aid them in repelling a Tory attack, he was ready to oppose them should their Irish policy meet with his disapproval. Thus the new House consisted of an enormous Whig majority and a small Tory Opposition, with the two groups of Radicals and O'Connellites, each about 30 strong, standing aloof from the historic parties. The history of the second half of the Grey Administration is the record of a three-cornered fight in which the Radicals and the Irish, though often acting on different principles, were found in frequent combination against the joint forces of Whigs and Tories; for the latter, well aware of their inability to form an alternative Government, felt it their duty to save the Whigs from their Radical allies. Thus the political situation, which the overwhelming Whig victory appeared to render comparatively simple, was in reality exceedingly complex and portended a condition of unstable equilibrium.

The feud broke out at once, when the House met in 1833. The Radicals objected to a Tory Speaker; and their disagreement with the Government was further emphasised in the debates on Ireland into which the House immediately plunged. The Cabinet had a very difficult problem before them. English Whigs were disappointed that Emancipation had not pacified Ireland; but the administration had not been improved and deeply-felt grievances remained unredressed. Four years after Emancipation and forty years after the great measure of 1793, no Roman Catholic judge or stipendiary magistrate had been appointed; the towns were in the hands of corrupt and bigoted corporations; and the High Sheriffs, Grand Jurors, and officers of police, were largely Orangemen. The Irish Reform Bill was a bitter disappointment,

adding only five members instead of the 73 demanded by O'Connell as the share due to a growing population ; and the great measure of national education introduced by Stanley, creating elementary schools throughout the country with combined secular and separate religious instruction, was accepted without enthusiasm. The commutation of tithe desired by Grattan and Pitt was still unaccomplished ; and the peasant, made aware of the power of combination and feeling the impost more heavily as the increase of population led to the further subdivision of holdings, resisted collection by force. The Whiteboys reappeared, murders were committed, and sanguinary encounters with the constabulary took place. In a series of Cabinet meetings in the autumn of 1832, the Viceroy, Anglesey, who had returned to Ireland in 1830 as a member of Grey's Ministry, advised that the settlement of the tithe question, the reform of the Church, and the introduction of a Poor Law, should precede any measure of coercion ; while Stanley, the Irish Secretary, insisted that coercion should precede or accompany relief, and presented the Cabinet with a Peace Preservation Act and a Church Temporalities Act. The former was so stringent that Althorp was only prevented from resigning by the information that Grey would follow his example. The Bills were slightly modified ; and the Cabinet met the new Parliament with an apparently united front.

When the debate on the Address was over, Althorp rose to explain the Government's proposals with regard to the Irish Church. Of a population of eight millions, not more than one-tenth belonged to the State Church, the annual income of which amounted to over £750,000, exclusive of £60,000 from Church cess. Out of this enormous sum, the 22 Bishops received £150,000. Althorp proposed to deduct from the bishoprics, chapters, and richer benefices, a sum sufficient to cancel the cess ; to abolish ten bishoprics, and to apply their incomes to such purposes as Parliament should determine. The old Tories and the High Churchmen were aghast ; and Keble denounced the suppression of bishoprics in a sermon which Newman afterwards described as the starting-point of the Oxford movement. On the other hand, Wellington supported the second reading ; Peel delivered a temporising speech ; and O'Connell expressed his cordial satisfaction. The healing effect of the measure was cancelled three days later, when Grey introduced the most stringent Coercion Bill that Parliament had witnessed since the Six Acts. The Lord Lieutenant was empowered to suppress all meetings and to declare any county to be in a state of disturbance ; while it was rendered penal for the inhabitants of suspected districts to be out of doors between sunset and sunrise. Since such provisions might be nullified by the refusal of juries to convict, offenders in disturbed districts were now to be tried by court-martial. The measure passed the Lords almost without discussion ; but it was hotly denounced by O'Connell and Sheil ; and Althorp allowed his own dislike of its provisions to

appear. The fate of the Bill was in doubt, when Stanley rose and, in perhaps the greatest oratorical effort of his life, won back the wavering House by a lurid picture of outrage and robbery and carried the measure almost without amendment. O'Connell denounced him as "Scorpion Stanley"; and Fonblanque dubbed him in bitterness "Secretary at War with Ireland."

The Ministry now turned to their remedial measure; but a section of the Cabinet disliked the diversion of the revenues of the suppressed bishoprics; and the omission of the clause was moved and carried by Stanley, under pretext of smoothing the passage of the Bill through the Upper House. O'Connell and the Radicals loudly complained that its chief merit had disappeared; but, even thus lightened, the measure was nearly shipwrecked in the Lords. Though the Irish Bills were carried, they had strained the Ministry almost to breaking-point; and Durham, unable to work harmoniously with Grey, disgusted at Stanley's despotic sway in the Cabinet, and tortured by disease and family troubles, immediately resigned. It was generally felt that the position of the Government was very insecure. The Prime Minister attempted to strengthen his position by transferring Stanley from Ireland to the Colonial Office, where work of an equally exacting but more fruitful character was awaiting him.

The growth of the humanitarian spirit, combined with the new outburst of reforming zeal, rendered it almost certain that the great work of the Whig Ministry of 1807 would be completed by its successor. The evils of slavery were as terrible as those of the slave-trade; but its abolition appeared an even more formidable task. It would be a forcible interference with property; and it might lead to a terrible insurrection and possibly ruin England's wealthiest colonies. On the other hand, the trade of the West Indies was now less than half what it had been during the war; and the social and political influence of the planters had in consequence diminished. Wilberforce had felt the task to be beyond his strength; but in 1821 he persuaded Thomas Fowell Buxton to assume the leadership of a new crusade. The new leader commenced his apostolate by mastering the facts collected for him by Zachary Macaulay and other veterans; and in 1823 he demanded the general abolition of slavery. Canning replied by resolutions promising the alleviation of its hardships; but the Assembly of Jamaica told Parliament to mind its own business, while in Barbados an attack on the missionaries followed the receipt of the despatch. In Demerara the slaves, believing that they had been set free, refused to work, and were treated like rebels. The insolence and ferocity of the planters provoked a storm of indignation in England; but the restrictions imposed on their power accomplished little for lack of supervision.

In 1830 Brougham's powerful voice boldly demanded abolition; and, when in 1831 Buxton pressed the matter on the attention of Ministers,

Althorp emancipated the slaves who were the property of the Crown. Jamaica negroes, believing that all slaves were to be freed, refused to work, and attacked a number of plantations. The insurrection was speedily quelled, and the Government granted compensation to the planters; but the need for a decision became more and more urgent, since the declining prosperity of the colonies, and still more the rapid decrease in the number of slaves, made the planters exact harder work from their chattels. In the following year Buxton secured 136 votes for an abolitionist resolution. The vote was a surprise to Althorp, who remarked: "that division has settled the slavery question; the Government will take it up." On his appointment to the Colonial Office in 1833, Stanley introduced a measure for the abolition of slavery, on lines suggested by James Stephen, counsel to the Colonial Department. The Bill proposed the immediate emancipation of children under six, and for all over that age a transitional state, the slaves being apprenticed to their masters for twelve years and obliged to give three-quarters of their time in return for food and clothing, special magistrates being appointed, with power to flog them on their refusal to work. A loan of 15 millions was to be made to the colonists; and moral and religious training was to prepare the negroes for their release. In committee the period of apprenticeship was reduced to seven years; and the hostility of the planters was disarmed by substituting a gift of 20 millions for a loan of 15. When the moment of emancipation arrived, on August 1, 1834, fears of insurrection and disorder proved to be groundless. Buxton's goal was reached; but he continued to hold a watching brief for the natives, and created the Aborigines Protection Society to aid him in his task.

The same fruitful session witnessed the first sustained effort to deal with another equally urgent problem. The enormous increase of population ensured a plentiful supply of child labour; and, when one died from overwork, insanitary conditions, or cruelty, a dozen were ready to fill its place. The working day was seldom less than twelve hours. Neither party was anxious to grapple with the task, the Tories from dislike of change, the Whigs from their belief that political economy forbade any interference with the conditions of labour. Thus the championship of the children fell to men outside the inner circle of party leaders, who rejected the current Ricardian individualism and had no belief in the efficacy of purely political remedies. The most powerful defender of these views in the Press was Southey; but the actual work of propaganda was undertaken by Michael Thomas Sadler, the member for Leeds, Richard Oastler, soon known as the "Factory King," and Joseph Rayner Stephens, a Wesleyan minister, who were before long joined by Lord Ashley, and John Fielden, a cotton manufacturer. In 1831, when Sadler introduced a Bill to limit the working day of young persons under eighteen to ten hours, the question was referred to a Select Committee.

The report made legislation a necessity; and in 1833 a Bill was introduced by Ashley, who had accepted the position of Parliamentary spokesman of the movement when Sadler lost his seat at the general election. The measure forbade employment under nine years, limited the working day of those under eighteen to ten hours, and provided for the appointment of inspectors and the education of the children. To carry the manufacturers with him, Althorp limited the application of the ten hours' clause to children under thirteen, and, when Ashley gave up the Bill in disgust, adopted it as a Government measure, altering it once more to secure an eight hours' day for children under thirteen, but allowing twelve hours a day or sixty-nine hours a week till the age of eighteen. In this modified form, the first important Factory Act was placed on the statute-book.

The new Parliament had thus in its first session abolished slavery, reduced the Irish Establishment, and regulated the labour of factory children, in addition to terminating the monopoly of the East India Company and revising the Bank Charter; but the measures of the Government had raised up enemies on every side, while its Coercion Bill had provoked the Radicals and Irish to fierce hostility. Its weakness was increased by the unpopularity of its finance. Althorp had hitherto met deficits by reducing expenditure; but the newly enfranchised electors of the towns clamoured for the extinction of the tax on houses, while the country gentlemen demanded the repeal of the duties on malt. The reductions proposed in the budget of 1833 satisfied no one; and a proposal to halve the duty on malt was carried against the Government; but, when the repeal of the house-tax was also demanded, Althorp pointed out that the deficiency resulting from the removal of these two taxes would have to be met by a general tax on property, and in this way secured the retention of both. Nevertheless, the refusal to remove the assessed taxes led to great indignation in the towns. The Government perceived its unpopularity; and Althorp reduced the house and window tax, promising to repeal the former as soon as possible. At this moment the trade of the country began to recover from the depression which had lasted since 1826; but agriculture had no share in the rising tide of prosperity. It was to the removal of one of the causes of rural distress that the session of 1834 was to be devoted.

In 1832, at the suggestion of Hyde Villiers, a brother of Clarendon, the future Foreign Secretary, a commission of enquiry into the Poor Law was appointed, the chief members of which were Blomfield, the indefatigable Bishop of London, Nassau Senior, one of the first of living economists, and Sturges Bourne, the chairman of a committee which had sat on the same question in 1817, to whom Chadwick, a disciple of Bentham, introduced to Senior by Mill, was added in 1833. At Brougham's suggestion, the commission was divided into a central board and itinerant commissioners, the latter to be chosen by the former. Reports on every

part of England and Wales were received early in 1833 ; but so voluminous was the material that the report of the commissioners was not ready till 1834. The picture it revealed was of startling gravity. The Elizabethan Poor Law had worked fairly well till the great French war, when high prices and low wages led to the adoption of the allowance system, which supplemented earnings by a parish dole. Whole parishes thus became pauperised ; and the rates increased by leaps and bounds. A premium was put on early and thriftless marriages by extra doles for the wife and each additional child, while a mother usually received two shillings a week for her illegitimate offspring. The system was not more disastrous to the wages and self-respect of the labourer than to the landed classes and the farmers, who began to sink under the terrible burden of the rates. In one parish the rates had risen in thirty years from £18 to £367 ; the tenants had given up their farms, the clergyman his glebe and tithe ; of 139 inhabitants 104 were paupers. The commissioners were unanimous, that, if such a state of things continued, the country would soon be bankrupt. The committee of 1817 had uttered a specific warning as to the disastrous effects of the existing system, and demanded a responsible and elected local authority ; but its recommendations left the causes of the disease untouched.

The report of the commissioners now cut at the root of the evil by recommending the abolition of outdoor relief, the establishment of a workhouse test, the alteration of the Law of Settlement, and the creation of a central board, with power to unite parishes in unions and supervise the entire system. The justices were sharply censured ; and it was contended that these enormous evils were only rendered possible by the utter want of central control. "The great source of abuse," they declared, "is the outdoor relief afforded to the able-bodied in kind or money"; and they recommended that after a given date no out-relief, except medical aid, should be given to any able-bodied man. The report was almost exclusively the work of Nassau Senior and Chadwick ; the literary arrangement of the report was Senior's ; the administrative changes were the work of Chadwick. Parishes were to be grouped according to administrative and geographical convenience, the enlargement of the unit of administration being designed to secure economy in contracts, diminution in the number of officials, and a better classification of paupers. A new authority, consisting of guardians elected by the ratepayers, was to replace the overseers and the justices ; and the actual work of relief was to be undertaken by paid relieving officers, appointed by the Guardians. Finally, a Central Board of three was to sit in London, which should issue regulations, receive all reports, and audit the accounts of every union, disallowing any improper expenditure. The scheme adopted many principles which Bentham had incorporated in his Constitutional Code, such as central control, reports, the formation of areas without regard to tradition, the

payment of executive officers, and the election of the local authority by the ratepayers.

The commissioners presented the Cabinet with a complete scheme, which was warmly championed by Althorp and Brougham. A Bill was introduced by Althorp in April, 1834. The report had done its work; and the second reading was carried almost unanimously. The measure was discussed at enormous length in committee and passed the Lords with a few slight amendments, both Peel and Wellington, as well as the Benthamite Radicals, such as Grote and Joseph Hume, lending it their support. It was opposed by the *Times* and excited a storm of popular indignation; but its effects were felt almost at once—the cost of relief, which had averaged nearly seven millions in the preceding five years, falling to four and a half millions in the five years following. To Nicholls, who accepted a seat on the Board, and Chadwick, who became its first secretary, were chiefly due the rapid extension of the new Act throughout the country, and the elaborate regulations issued for the guidance of the local authorities. Though its adoption entailed a considerable amount of suffering, it is probable that any less drastic measure would have failed to arrest the rapid demoralisation of the people.

The reform of the Poor Law was the last great achievement of the Grey Ministry. Its principal difficulty throughout had been Ireland; and Ireland was the cause of its fall. The attempts to remedy the tithe grievance by voluntary or compulsory commutation had failed; and in 1833 the arrears had amounted to over a million pounds. This sum Stanley's successor, Edward John Littleton, advanced to the tithe-owners on the security of the arrears which the Irish Government was empowered to collect, proposing at the same time to commute tithe into a land-tax payable to the State. In the debate on the second reading Stanley used language which appeared to Russell to pledge the Government to maintain the revenues of the Church unimpaired. Russell thereupon rose and asserted his belief that the revenues were larger than were needed, and that the surplus should be appropriated to other objects. His words drew from Stanley the historic note to Graham, "Johnny has upset the coach." Littleton tried to save the situation by declaring that the question was not before the House; but a crisis was precipitated by a motion pledging the House to appropriate the surplus. An attempt was made by Grey to postpone the difficulty by appointing a commission of enquiry into the resources and needs of the Irish Church; but Stanley regarded the question as one of principle; and on the eve of the discussion Stanley, Graham, Ripon, and Richmond resigned. Grey lost his nerve and was anxious to retire; and Althorp grasped eagerly at the opportunity of escaping from the official life that he abhorred; but Brougham and other members of the Cabinet dissuaded the leaders from resigning, and the vacant offices were quickly filled. The Government

gained in homogeneity by the change, but lost in weight in Parliament and in the country. Stanley was beyond comparison the most brilliant debater in the House of Commons; and his success in 1833 had caused Russell to prophesy that he would succeed Althorp, and Melbourne to pronounce that he would be the next Whig premier and might hold office as long as Walpole. His high birth and bearing, his imperious temper, and his impassioned eloquence, fascinated the House; but he was never at home with the Whigs, and had grown to be as conservative as and far more clerical than Peel. Writing thirty-five years later on the death of Lord Derby, Russell declared that, though he lived to be thrice Prime Minister, his career had reached its highest point in 1833. The "Rupert of debate" was a host in himself; but his friend Graham, who had proved himself an excellent administrator at the Admiralty, was also a serious loss. Ripon and Richmond had taken little part in the work of the Cabinet and were scarcely missed.

The Ministry, thus patched up, proceeded with their work. The Coercion Bill of 1833 expired with the session; and Littleton believed that O'Connell might be induced to let the Tithe Bill pass in return for dropping the power of the Lord Lieutenant of prohibiting public meetings. It was true that Wellesley had recently asked the Cabinet to retain it; but Brougham, an intimate friend, urged Littleton to request him to withdraw his demand. Next day the Cabinet decided to retain the clauses; but three days later Grey learned from Wellesley (who had succeeded Anglesey in 1833) that he could govern without them. By the same post Littleton received a favourable answer from Dublin, and gained Althorp's sanction to see O'Connell and persuade him to withdraw his opposition to a Whig candidate in an election then pending, on the assurance that the Coercion Act would be modified. O'Connell at once urged his friends to support the Whig candidate. Meanwhile Grey learned from Wellesley that he had changed his ground, owing to representations from home. Grey now indignantly determined to retain the obnoxious clauses, in which Althorp, in order to prevent the Premier from resigning, reluctantly concurred. Littleton had to inform O'Connell that the policy of the Government had changed; and on the introduction of the Bill O'Connell in disgust revealed his transactions with the Irish Secretary to the House. Littleton at once resigned; and three days later Althorp declared his position in regard to the Coercion Act intolerable. Grey refused to remain in office without him, and sent his own resignation with that of Althorp to the King. He was an aristocrat to the core, and had never felt himself entirely at home in the new world which he had done so much to create. Since the Reform Bill he had taken a far larger part in foreign than in domestic affairs; and his colleagues and the party had advanced beyond him. He was more than seventy years old and had begun to feel the burden of age.

His character, moreover, was anxious and desponding; and early in the year he was only prevented from resigning on a question of foreign policy by the most urgent entreaties. A month before his resignation, he told Creevey that he had lost his sleep and was harassed to death, and Creevey prophesied that he would never meet another session as Premier. For a time he felt deeply wounded by the conduct of his colleagues; and Lady Grey and other members of his family spoke with indignation of Brougham as the cause of his downfall; but he quickly regained his tranquillity at Howick. The fallen Premier, however, became more and more antagonistic to the policy of his old colleagues, while his horror of Radicalism and of O'Connell grew into a mania. His letters to Princess Lieven reflect his gradual loss of interest in public affairs and the gloom which gathered round the closing years of one of the most honest though by no means one of the greatest of English statesmen.

The King believed that the opportunity had now come for carrying out his favourite plan of a coalition; and in sending for Melbourne he expressed a wish that such a Ministry might be formed. Melbourne refused to enter on a hopeless task; and the King with a bad grace resigned himself to another purely Whig Ministry, in which Althorp, at the entreaty of the whole party, returned to his old position. Brougham afterwards asserted that he recommended Melbourne to the King; and Durham declared him to be the only possible leader, since he was the only man of whom nobody would be jealous. He had had a political experience of nearly thirty years, of which twenty-three were spent in the House of Commons. Though a convinced Whig, he had accepted office as Irish Secretary under Canning in 1827, and became Home Secretary when Grey formed his Government in 1830. His administration had been marked by unexpected vigour; but he was never an enthusiast for the Reform Bill, and entertained a whole-hearted contempt for the Radical programme. Though somewhat less conservative than Grey, he was far less advanced than Russell; but in all matters of religious liberty and equality he was singularly liberal. He expected little from legislation, and wholly lacked the feeling which animates the born reformer that abuses should be attacked and removed with the least possible delay. When a reform was suggested his first inclination was to ask: Why can't you let it alone? This attitude of apparent indifference, his *pococurante* air, as Stockmar called it, was in part assumed; but it was not in his nature to throw himself unreservedly into the political struggles of the moment. "It does not much matter what we say," he once remarked in Cabinet, "but we must all say the same thing." Without being indolent, he did not believe that anything was worth a great deal of trouble. The wreck of his home and happiness, again, made the ups and downs of public life appear relatively insignificant; and Greville's charming pictures of the literary evenings at Holland House show that

he possessed the key to a world where the discordant sounds of party strife were unable to enter. His exuberant vitality and raciness were not more marked than the vein of thoughtfulness and melancholy, his boisterous heartiness not more characteristic than his tenderness and general scepticism. In a well-known passage in the *Letters to Archdeacon Singleton* (ii), Sydney Smith satirises his friend's assumption of reckless indifference and "accuses" him of high and noble purposes. "By sceptical observers," wrote Fonblanque, "he has been taken for a trifler, for no better reason than that he trifles so well; but who in the next breath reasons more acutely or brings readier or ampler knowledge to bear on any question that arises?" He hated the affectation of greater knowledge or virtue than men actually possessed, and indeed underrated the better motives of mankind; but his devil-may-care manner concealed a deep anxiety to find and follow the right. The appointment aroused great interest, and Greville records that everyone was wondering "how Melbourne would do."

The first announcement of the Ministry was that the clauses of the Coercion Act which had led to the fall of Grey would be dropped; and, thus lightened, the Act was continued for a year. The recess was to prove not less eventful than the session just concluded. The Lord Chancellor, Brougham, determined to make a political tour in Scotland, and at the same time to take part in a banquet to be given to Lord Grey in Edinburgh. His journey was like a royal progress; and his speeches were filled with eulogies of the King, the Ministry, and himself. The tour finished at Edinburgh, where Brougham startled his hearers by condemning the hasty spirits who were in such a hurry to go on a voyage of discovery to unknown regions that they would not wait to see whether the compass was on board. The allusion was perhaps to Durham, who was present, and who promptly retorted that he was one of those who saw with regret every hour which passed over the existence of recognised and unreformed abuses. The controversy was continued by speech and pen; but Brougham's conduct throughout the tour was universally reprobated. The King spoke of him as an itinerant mountebank, and now formed the resolution of dismissing the Ministry when a pretext should arise.

The opportunity occurred in November, when Lord Spencer's death removed Althorp to the Upper House, and gave the signal for his final retirement from public life. He used to say that nature intended him for a grazier, but that men insisted on making him a statesman. He was genuinely Liberal; but he was no speaker, and there were a score of men in the party of more brilliant gifts. His ascendancy was due not to mental but to moral qualities. His word was better than another man's bond; and his absolute straightforwardness won him the confidence of the House in a degree unparalleled before or since. He had, moreover, piloted the Reform Bill and the new Poor

Law through the House with real knowledge and ability, and his removal opened the question as to how his place should be filled. It was decided by the Cabinet that the Premier should recommend Russell for the leadership of the House; but, when Spencer's death was hourly expected, Melbourne had written to the King apprehending "the most serious difficulty and embarrassment"; and when the news arrived, he wrote again, declaring that, "as the Government was mainly founded on the personal weight and influence of Lord Althorp in the House of Commons, and that foundation was now withdrawn," he proposed to take his Majesty's pleasure as to whether other arrangements should be made for carrying on the government, adding an entreaty that no personal considerations should prevent him from taking any measures he thought necessary or seeking other advice. The King replied that he would be glad to see him; and the next day Melbourne journeyed to Brighton. The King protested that Lord John would make "a wretched figure" in debate, when opposed to Peel and Stanley, and added that Russell was pledged to encroachments on the Church, which he was determined to resist. He further expressed his disapproval of the recent conduct of the Chancellor. On the following morning the Premier received a letter, dismissing the Ministry on the ground that its general weight and consideration were so much diminished that its tenure had become too precarious to proceed. The final audience with the King was cordial; and Melbourne returned to London carrying a summons to Wellington. The same evening he saw Palmerston and Brougham, the latter of whom, though pledged to secrecy, at once informed the *Times*, which next morning concluded its account of the King's action with the words: "The Queen has done it all." When the Duke reached Brighton, he pointed out the danger of thus dismissing a Ministry with a large majority, but promised his aid, advising the King to send for Peel, who was spending the recess with his family in Italy. A messenger was at once despatched to Rome, and the Duke was named First Lord and Secretary of State till his return. The King, indignant at the insult to the Queen, came up to town and insisted on the immediate resignation of the Ministers.

There had been no such step since the dismissal of Grenville in 1807; and the King would not have ventured on it but for the resignations which had occurred a few months before and the growing unpopularity of the Government. His defence, drawn up and sent to Peel a few weeks later, asserted that he quite expected the Premier to announce his resignation at Brighton; and the letters already quoted show that the King only did what his Minister had invited him to do. Moreover, in a letter to Grey, written immediately after his audiences, Melbourne himself declared that he was in no way surprised at the decision, and could not entirely condemn it; and Grey took the same view. But the King's action, though consistent with the principles of the English

Constitution, was inconsistent with its practice ; and the stroke by which he believed that he would rid himself of the Whig Ministry gave it new strength and prolonged its life for six years.

While the nation was discussing the dismissal of the Ministry and the royal courier was on his way to Rome, the whole power and patronage of the State were in the hands of Wellington. The Duke, however, took no steps that would bind the hands of Peel, who, by travelling night and day, reached London early in December, rather more than three weeks after the crisis. Peel afterwards stated, in his memoir on the incident, that he greatly doubted its wisdom, and only accepted office in order to spare the King humiliation. He at once invited Stanley and Graham to join the Ministry ; but they replied that they had been too recently in antagonism, adding that they would be of greater assistance as independent supporters. Thus thwarted, he was compelled to fall back on the old Tory Ministry. With Stanley and Graham it is possible that he might have been able to maintain himself; without them his attempt was doomed to failure. Taking the Exchequer himself, and confirming Lyndhurst in the Chancellorship, he placed Wellington and Aberdeen at the Foreign and Colonial Offices respectively, while subordinate posts were entrusted to Gladstone and Sidney Herbert. The powerful support of the *Times* was secured by negotiations between Lyndhurst and the editor, Barnes. The first task of the new Ministers was to hear and approve a letter which the Premier had written to his constituents, explaining the policy of the new Government. The Tamworth Manifesto, as it came to be called, reminded the country of his own claims to the title of Reformer. He had reformed the currency and the criminal code, and he was prepared to consider the reform of municipal corporations. He had supported the abolition of Church rates, and the relief of Dissenters in regard to the celebration of marriages. He was willing to open the Universities, and he desired to commute the tithes of the English Church. Though its immediate effect was not very great, the document is of outstanding importance as marking the substitution of a rational conservatism for the pure negations of the old Tory party. At the dissolution which followed, Peel scored numerous successes in the counties, but gained no foothold in the towns ; and the Opposition retained a substantial majority.

The old Houses of Parliament, which had witnessed the debates of two centuries, had been destroyed by fire during the recess ; and the new House met in temporary premises. The struggle at once began with the election of a Speaker, the Opposition proposing and carrying a Whig by a majority of ten. Peel took his defeat calmly ; but the Whigs next carried an amendment to the Address deplored the recent dissolution. A third rebuff was incurred on the appointment to the embassy at St Petersburg of Londonderry, the brother of Castlereagh and the inheritor of his political ideas. Peel was extricated from

disaster by Londonderry's voluntary withdrawal; but the episode damaged the Government in the House and the country. The Premier now proceeded to his programme and explained his plan of dealing with Dissenters' marriages and with Irish and English tithes; but the Opposition denied his right to remain in office without a majority. An address to the Crown to grant a charter of incorporation to London University was carried, though the matter was under the consideration of the Privy Council. The defeat led to rumours of resignation; but Peel introduced his Irish Tithe Bill, which differed little from Littleton's plan of the previous year. The Whigs could not oppose their own proposals; but they refused to accept a Bill which did not appropriate the surplus revenues of the Irish Church. After prolonged debate, Russell's resolution was carried by 33; and after two more defeats on the same question Peel resigned. He had already played his trump card by dissolving; and he felt that there was real danger of foreign Powers taking advantage of the weakness of the Ministry. The King did not realise the gravity of these continual defeats; and Malmesbury records the rumour that he had threatened to abdicate and retire to Holland if the Ministry fell; but Peel was inexorable. He had fought a losing battle on ground not chosen by himself; and his Hundred Days had won the admiration of his opponents as well as of the country. The sovereign's impatience had arrested the Conservative reaction; but the ability, courage, and resource of the defeated Minister convinced the nation that it had a statesman of the first rank in reserve.

The King was deeply mortified by the turn of events, and applied for advice to Grey, who urged him to summon Melbourne and Lansdowne. A coalition was once again suggested, and again declared impossible; and Melbourne returned to office. There were, however, three important differences in the character and Parliamentary position of the new Government. In the first place, Brougham was no longer Chancellor. The intrigue with Wellesley had left a deep impression on Melbourne's mind; and the tour in Scotland had made Brougham impossible. He had broken up the Grey Ministry, and his conduct had been one of the principal causes of the fall of its successor. While Peel was still in office, Melbourne wrote to Grey: "I will have nothing more to do with Brougham. The reasons are two—his whole character and his whole conduct." His exclusion was a surprise to nobody but himself. Despite his immense services with tongue and pen to the Whig party, he had ruined his position by his capricious conduct, his ungovernable temper, and his colossal egotism. The *Times* had hinted that he was mad; and the conviction was shared by many less hostile judges. The letters to Brougham, in which the Premier subsequently explained and defended his action, constitute one of the most scathing indictments ever brought against an English statesman; but few will deny that every word was justified.

The second difference was the rise of Lord John Russell to a position equalling, if not rivalling, that of the Prime Minister. He had gained prestige by his services to Parliamentary Reform; but it was not till Stanley and Althorp were removed that the world knew the fertility of resource, the debating power, and the capacity for affairs which lurked within the diminutive person of "the widow's mite." Entering upon his duties as leader of the Opposition on the dismissal of the Whigs, Russell surprised both friends and foes by his ability during the stormy weeks of Peel's Administration, and compelled Grey and other doubting critics to confess themselves mistaken. For the next six years Russell was not only the one commanding figure on the Treasury bench, but the chief director of the domestic policy of the Government.

A third difference was the relation between the Whigs and O'Connell. Grey declared him to be an unprincipled ruffian who engaged in politics for his own ends; and Melbourne's dislike of him was scarcely less pronounced. Yet the new Ministry had no more faithful supporter than the Irish leader, and indeed was only kept in office by his influence. The violence of his language passed all bounds; and, when he described Alvanley as a bloated buffoon and Disraeli as a lineal descendant of the impenitent thief, men of all parties shrank from him in disgust. But though unmeasured in speech, O'Connell was moderate and opportunist in action, and always preferred half a loaf to no bread. Russell, again, had visited Ireland, was an intimate friend of the poet Moore, and was entirely free from the unreasoning fear of the Irish entertained by his former and his present chief. The compact, however, originated in an accident during Peel's Ministry. The desire to overturn the Government, which was common to all sections of the Opposition, led Russell to invite his supporters to meet him at Lichfield House. Without Russell's knowledge an English member sent a bundle of invitations to O'Connell, with a request that he would send them to his supporters. O'Connell at once wrote to Russell, undertaking to avoid all contentious matters till Peel was overthrown. Russell was at first alarmed at this unsolicited advance, and was only dissuaded by his colleague Duncannon, a warm friend of O'Connell, from sending a cold answer; but the parties worked loyally together, and, at a dinner to Russell, O'Connell publicly acknowledged him as his leader. The King's objections prevented the offer to him of high office; but he was generally consulted with reference to Irish appointments. Though Melbourne could declare that he was in no way pledged to O'Connell, there was a tacit understanding between him and Russell that the repeal agitation should be shelved, and that the Whigs should abstain from coercion and introduce remedial legislation.

The King took no pains to conceal his hostility to the new Ministry; and his rudeness was incredible. He graciously informed Melbourne that he believed him to be as conservative as himself; but his dislike to Russell and some of his colleagues was so extreme

that the Premier was forced to remonstrate, and obtained an apology. Though relations of ordinary politeness were gradually restored, almost every Government proposal found the King a troublesome opponent. The session of 1835 was nevertheless redeemed from barrenness by the passing of a measure scarcely less important than the Reform Bill. Most of the boroughs then enfranchised possessed no municipal institutions; but the government of the old boroughs, scarcely two of which were the same, was full of abuses. The petitions for reform were so numerous that Althorp had appointed a commission of enquiry. The final report, which appeared in 1835, put the question clearly before the country. Municipal institutions arose out of the committee to which the town had entrusted its common business; but the existing charters, granted for the most part by the Tudors and the Stewarts, rendered the governing group independent of the main body of the burgesses, the councils being nearly always chosen by self-election. The corporations limited the number of freemen; and wealth or favour became the conditions of entry. In Portsmouth, for instance, in a population of 46,000, only 102 were freemen. Despite the loss of their political monopoly by the Reform Bill, freemen still possessed in some cases an exclusive claim to certain charities or to exemption from the borough tolls. But even freemen rarely shared in the government of the borough. In small boroughs the mayor usually possessed almost the sole authority, and sometimes administered the entire revenues. In most boroughs there were local civil Courts; and in the larger there were municipal magistrates, usually members of the Council and chosen by it. But the magistrates were often illiterate; and, though in criminal cases they were sometimes assisted by a Recorder, he was not necessarily a lawyer, and often left his work to the town-clerk. In many cases local Acts had conferred powers for lighting, draining, police, and similar purposes, on trustees or commissioners appointed *ad hoc*, and independent of the municipality. Municipal elections, in the rare cases where they were held, were a farce, the corporate offices a prize, the mayor often a tyrant. The report revealed the utter breakdown of administrative efficiency, and concluded by recommending a thorough reform.

Reform was first achieved in Scotland, where a Commission had undertaken the work of investigation several years earlier. The Bill founded on the report of the English commissioners was introduced by Russell and applied to 178 boroughs. The commissioners had investigated 285 towns, of which 246 possessed municipal powers. Of these London was reserved for special treatment; and 67 were omitted as too small. The Government wisely determined not to complicate their task by any elaborate scheme for the removal of territorial anomalies, the boundary of the Parliamentary borough being usually taken as the boundary of the municipality. All charters, privileges, and customs were swept away. The governing body was to consist of a mayor and

council, the councillors being elected by residents who had paid rates for three years. Meetings were to be public and the accounts to be audited yearly. The pecuniary rights of existing freemen were to be preserved till their death and not renewed, while the charity estates were to be managed by a committee of the burgesses. Justice was to be separated from administration, magistrates being appointed by the Crown as in the counties. A Recorder was to be nominated by the Crown for quarter-session boroughs from among barristers of five years' standing, and to be paid by the borough. The sanction of the Treasury was made necessary for the raising of loans and the sale of municipal property. The Improvement Commissioners, where such existed, were continued, though before very long they almost universally transferred their powers to the corporation. Peel favoured a large measure of reform; and the Bill was read a second time without a division and passed through committee with little friction. His influence, however, did not extend to the Upper House. The Lords insisted that counsel should be heard in support of a petition against the Bill, and also that the House should receive evidence; but the evidence merely served to confirm the commissioners' report. A few Peers desired to throw out the Bill; but Lyndhurst promised to transform the measure in committee. The promise was kept; and the Lords decided to preserve for ever all the rights of freemen, to impose a high property qualification for councillors, of whom a quarter should be elected for life, and to continue the powers of the existing justices for life. The sweeping changes irritated the country, which approved the Bill, and brought the Houses into sharp collision. Peel in vain begged Wellington to moderate Lyndhurst, who replied, with an oath: "What is Peel to me?" Russell refused to admit aldermen elected for life, but agreed to a limited number to be elected by councillors for six years; refused the Lords' qualification for councillors, but offered a substitute; accepted the amendment preserving the Parliamentary franchise for freemen; but denied them exemption from tolls. Other changes were resisted, and Peel supported Russell's stand. The chief decisions of the Commons were at length accepted by the Lords; and a reform of the first magnitude was placed on the statute-book.

The session of 1836 was largely devoted to Ireland. The Orange Lodges, which had come into existence shortly before the Union, had spread over the country and were introduced into Great Britain and even into the army. At this moment the Duke of Cumberland, of whom Wellington declared that his amusement was mischief, was Grand Master; and there were some 1500 Lodges in Ireland, with about 150,000 members, and a smaller though still considerable number in Great Britain. Initiation was accompanied by an oath which pledged the members to active service at the call of the Grand Master. The Duke found a zealous agent in Colonel Fairman, the Grand Secretary and

Treasurer, whose duty it was to travel through the country and establish Lodges. At the end of 1835 Joseph Hume demanded and obtained a Parliamentary Committee of Enquiry. The debate showed that the Duke had signed warrants for the formation of Lodges in the army, though his predecessor, the Duke of York, had expressly forbidden them. When the Duke made no reply, an address was carried censuring the formation of army Lodges; and a circular was issued ordering the trial by court-martial of any soldier belonging to such a Lodge. The Committee collected a quantity of incriminating information, and believed themselves to have traced a plot to set the Duke on the English throne, though the Duke declined to give evidence and Fairman refused to produce the records. It was resolved to prosecute the heads of the movement; and, when Parliament met, Hume and Molesworth moved an address for the removal of any official, civil or military, who was an Orangeman or who attended the meetings of an Orange Lodge or any other secret political club. In a speech of astonishing boldness Molesworth described the offenders as titled criminals and demanded their transportation. The proposal was too sweeping to be adopted; and Russell persuaded the House to leave the King to take measures for the discouragement of the Lodges. The King replied that he would do so; and the Orange Lodges were everywhere broken up.

One great burden was thus removed from Ireland; but the effort to remove another met with stubborn resistance. Irish municipalities were afflicted with the same evils as the English, with the added injustice that Catholics were almost everywhere excluded from the corporations. Though Peel declared that Ireland was not ripe for local government, a Bill on the English model passed the Commons; but the Lords feared that the reformed corporations would be completely dominated by Catholics, and therefore, while willing to dissolve the existing bodies, declined to substitute others. Substantial concessions were made; but the Lords refused all compromise, and the Bill was withdrawn. A renewed attempt to pass the Tithe Bill met with a similar fate.

The discussion of Irish tithes had led English agriculturists to protest against their own burdens. Peel had only been prevented by his fall from introducing a Bill under which tithes could be voluntarily commuted in every parish for a perpetual corn rent, as they had already been commuted for a fixed payment in hundreds of parishes under the authority of private Acts. In the session of 1836 the Whigs introduced a Bill encouraging a voluntary arrangement, the tithe being commuted for a money payment of between 60 and 75 per cent. of its nominal gross value, which was to be computed according to the average value of wheat, barley, and oats during the preceding seven years. The measure passed without difficulty, and within a few years payment of tithe in kind ceased in England.

The difficult question of Dissenters' marriages was next settled.

Since the Act of 1753 marriage had been a religious ceremony which could only be legally performed, except in the case of Jews and Quakers, by a clergyman, who kept the parish register in which all baptisms, marriages, and burials, were entered by him. To the Unitarian the declaration of belief in the Trinity was blasphemy; and attempts had been made to secure its omission from the marriage service. A proposal by Russell in 1834 to enable Dissenters to marry in their own chapels after publishing the banns in the parish church of course proved unacceptable; and Peel brought forward the bold suggestion of civil marriages, retaining only the registration by a clergyman. Peel's measure fell with him; and Russell now proposed that a registrar should be appointed for each union, reporting to a central registry in each county, which in turn should forward details to a Registrar-General in London. Banns were retained; but, as an alternative, names might remain on inspection for twenty-one days. The Bill thus gradually evolved was carried without difficulty, and a grievance was removed.

A third useful measure was passed in the same session. Paper and advertisements were taxed; and the newspaper itself paid a heavy duty. The high stamp encouraged the production of unstamped papers, all the more that the vendors, not the printers, were liable to punishment. Under the Grey Ministry nearly five hundred persons were thus punished; and the imprisonment of ignorant men and children created a strong feeling against the law. The Society for the Diffusion of Useful Knowledge, of which Brougham was chairman and Althorp, Russell, Denman, and other Whigs, were members, could have accomplished little if it had observed the law. Its publications were undertaken by Charles Knight; and the immense success of the *Penny Magazine* and *Penny Cyclopaedia* revealed the possibilities of cheap and good literature. The open evasion of the law by these and similar publications, while other offenders were being prosecuted and imprisoned, made a change inevitable. The proposal to repeal or reduce the Stamp Acts was met in 1834 and 1835 by the reply that the revenue could not afford the change; but in 1836 a large surplus allowed of a reduction from fourpence to a penny, while the excise on paper was also reduced.

A fourth achievement of the session was the foundation of the Ecclesiastical Commission. A committee of enquiry into financial and other questions affecting the Church had been appointed by Grey and another by Peel, of both of which Blomfield, Bishop of London, was the moving spirit. Their recommendations were hotly opposed by Phillpotts, Bishop of Exeter, in the House of Lords, and in Sydney Smith's *Letters to Archdeacon Singleton*, in which his exquisite wit was for once employed to support illiberal reasoning. But the Ecclesiastical Commission became a permanent statutory body, in which the surplus revenues of the Church were vested; and during 1836 and the following years Russell at its instigation carried Bills combining old sees, creating new ones, diminishing

pluralities, and equalising episcopal incomes. Its wide financial control has been, on the whole, exercised with conspicuous success.

The session of 1837 was exceedingly barren. The Government reintroduced the Irish Municipal Bill without success; and some of the Ministers spoke of resignation. But at this moment their fortunes were improved by the death of the sovereign. The King's virtues were highly extolled by Wellington, Grey, and Melbourne. But Fonblanche declared that his best epitaph would be, "He passed the Reform Bill," since the praise he then earned was all the praise to which he was entitled. He was anxious to do what seemed to him right; but he was thoroughly mediocre and lacked the education necessary to fit him for his position. He was utterly without dignity, and manifested such eccentricity and morbid irritability that, as Greville bluntly records, many believed him to be "cracked." His tactlessness was remarkable; and his habit of delivering impromptu speeches on every opportunity, filled with tirades against the French or the Duchess of Kent or some other foe, made him a general laughing-stock. The King was seen at his best in his own family, for he was devoted to his wife and a kind father to his natural children.

The new sovereign, now eighteen years old, was the daughter of the Duke of Kent, fourth son of George III. Though heir-presumptive since 1830, she had lived a retired life at Kensington, owing to the violent feud between the Duchess and the King. She was devoted to her mother and to her governess, the Baroness Lehzen, while her uncle Leopold had taken the place of a father till his accession to the throne of Belgium in 1831, and was still her chief adviser. When she attained her majority, Leopold sent his trusted friend Stockmar, who had known England for twenty years, to begin her political education; but within a month the Princess found herself on the throne. The impression created by the mingled dignity and modesty of the young Queen was highly favourable; and a feeling of personal loyalty unknown and indeed impossible under her immediate predecessors became general. The first result of the Queen's accession was the separation of England and Hanover, the throne of which passed to the Duke of Cumberland. A second was the rearrangement of the Civil List, from which it was decided to remove every charge not directly connected with the support of the Crown. Her uncles and grandfather had surrendered all the Crown lands except the duchies of Lancaster and Cornwall; and a select committee recommended a sum of £385,000 exclusive of the duchies, £10,000 more than the net personal income of William IV. Though attempts to reduce the estimate received little support, it was determined to limit the creation of new pensions for deserving claimants to an annual sum of £1200 supplied by the Treasury.

The substitution of a friendly for a hostile sovereign was a welcome change to the Ministry. The difficult private secretary question was solved

by Melbourne undertaking the post ; and a friendship was commenced between the Queen and him which brought unclouded happiness to both. The Prime Minister was the Queen's constant companion, at work with her in the morning, riding with her in the afternoon, dining and playing chess with her in the evening, and by a great effort guarding his language. "I have no doubt he is passionately fond of her," wrote Greville in his diary, "as he might be of his daughter if he had one, and the more because he is a man with a capacity for loving without having anything in the world to love." The Queen repaid him with filial affection and showed herself an apt though precociously self-reliant pupil. It was a tribute to Melbourne's character that even Tories like the diarist Raikes were convinced that he would not abuse his position. The only direction in which his conduct gave offence was his advice that she should choose her chief lady attendants from the relations of the Ministers. The Duchess of Kent continued to live with her daughter, but to her great annoyance was entirely excluded from business. Stockmar, on the other hand, remained in close attendance for the first year of the reign. Though Palmerston called him the most disinterested man he ever met, and Melbourne entirely approved his confidential position at Court, the public was suspicious of "the German Baron," who, indeed, was inclined to emphasise the monarchical power and besought the young sovereign not to be "a nodding mandarin."

While the Government had gained at Court, its position in Parliament was weakened by the general election which the change of sovereign necessitated. The Irish supporters of the Government profited by the election ; but the Radicals returned in diminished numbers, and became for some years an almost negligible quantity. Though no other section of the House contained so much ability, they had never been able to influence affairs as much as they had hoped. They had no leader, though there were at least four men worthy of the post. Grote's maiden speech on the ballot seemed to mark him out for the place ; but he was somewhat too academic. Roebuck was by far the best debater, and his *Pamphlets for the People* had given him a great position in the country ; but he lacked judgment, had a rasping tongue, and was difficult to work with. Joseph Hume was the most experienced man in the party, but was unable to make an intelligible speech, and was not thought sufficiently hostile to the Whigs. Sir William Molesworth combined the culture of Grote with the energy of Roebuck, and proved his zeal for the cause by establishing the *London Review* and founding the Reform Club ; but the older men did not care to follow one scarcely out of his teens. Cobbett and Attwood had proved the truth of Canning's dictum, "Firebrands, when they touch the floor of the House, hiss and expire," and were out of the question. There was equally little unanimity in regard to opinion. Since the resignation of Grey the Radicals had taken a less prominent part in the life of the House. In

1836 Charles Buller remarked one night to Grote, " You and I will soon be left to tell Molesworth "; and Macaulay, on his return from India, discovered that the Radical party consisted of " Grote and his wife." In the Queen's first Parliament the party almost ceased to exist. Roebuck lost his seat for Bath ; and Grote returned to his *History of Greece*, declaring that it was not worth his while to continue to defend Whig conservatism against Tory conservatism. Many years later Mill declared in his *Autobiography* that too much had been expected of the Radicals by himself and others, since their lot fell in the time of inevitable reaction after the excitement of the Reform Bill. Their task indeed was not to carry measures through Parliament but to prepare the country for them. Their programme contained free trade, compulsory education, extension of the suffrage, Irish disestablishment, the ballot, allotments, reform of the game laws, abolition of flogging in the army, and much else that has found its way on to the statute-book. Thus, though the parliamentary record of the " Philosophical Radicals " appeared disappointing, their work was no more wasted than that of other pioneers.

The first task of 1838 was to provide Ireland with a Poor Law. Several committees had sat since the Union ; and in 1833 Althorp appointed another, of which Archbishop Whately was chairman, which pursued enquiries for three years. Interim reports, appearing in 1835 and 1836, revealed a terrible condition of poverty, confirmed a few years later by the Devon Commission. Labourers received 2s. 6d. a week ; and the peasants lived on a plot of land too small to produce potatoes for the whole year, and were thus driven to seek work in England during the harvest. The final report suggested that relief should be confined to the infirm, to those too old or too young to work, and to casual destitution. They further proposed that bogs should be reclaimed, waste lands cultivated, agricultural schools founded, and public works undertaken, while wholesale emigration should be attempted. These recommendations were criticised with such severity by Cornwall Lewis that it was determined to ignore them and to adopt the English system — a policy strongly urged by Nicholls, one of the three English commissioners, after two official visits to Ireland. Nicholls declared that eighty or a hundred workhouses, erected at a cost of £700,000, would suffice. A Bill founded on his suggestions passed without difficulty ; and Nicholls was sent over to administer it. The number of workhouses required and the total cost proved greater than he had anticipated ; and his task was rendered more difficult by O'Connell's disapproval of the system ; but the work was completed and was to prove its value in the fiery ordeal of the famine. At the same time the tithe question was settled by converting the tithe-composition into a rent-charge of 70 per cent. of the nominal value of the tithe, abandoning the claim to the repayment of the advances and voting a quarter of a million to the extinction of arrears.

The Government was earnestly attempting to help Ireland by legislation ; but it conferred a still greater boon by its administration. The Viceroy, Lord Mulgrave (1835), loyally endeavoured to hold the scales even between landlord and tenant, Catholic and Protestant, and went so far as to ask O'Connell to dinner at the Castle. He was ably seconded by Lord Morpeth, the Chief Secretary ; but the ruling spirit of the administration was the Under Secretary. At the time of his appointment in 1835 Thomas Drummond was already a well-known man. His invention of the Drummond light led to his introduction to Brougham, who in 1832 selected him as the chairman of the Boundary Commission for delimiting the new political areas. He had subsequently served as private secretary to Althorp, and he was known to the Whig leaders as a man of rare force and originality. His first task was to suppress the two political societies by which Ireland was infested. That Ribbonism would never completely disappear without legislative changes Drummond knew well ; but by making the law respected he persuaded the peasants to give evidence and the juries to convict, and greatly reduced the number of serious outrages. The Orangemen were still more powerful ; and, though the Lodges, as has been related, were dissolved in 1836, the Orange spirit remained. Drummond proceeded to grapple with it by substituting stipendiary magistrates for the local justices, and by appointing a considerable number of Catholics to posts of authority. Above all, he organised an efficient police force, composed indifferently of Catholics and Protestants. Neither police nor soldiers were any longer despatched to assist in the collection of tithes ; and, when the Tipperary magistrates implored the Government to employ coercive measures against agrarian outrage, Drummond answered, in a sentence which has become classical, that property has its duties as well as its rights, and that such crimes were chiefly due to the neglect of those duties. O'Connell, who was for the first and last time on excellent terms with the Executive, suspended his agitation for repeal ; and Plunket declared that he had never known Ireland so tranquil. For such a result Father Mathew's temperance crusade claims part of the merit. The period of good-will was brought to an end by Drummond's untimely death in 1840 ; but his five years' rule had shown how much could be done by firm and sympathetic administration.

The later years of the Whig Government were disturbed by grave troubles in the colonies. The Jamaica planters had never forgiven emancipation ; and the negroes who were apprenticed to bad masters were treated with greater cruelty than when they were slaves. Ugly stories were also told of the atrocities of foreign slave-traders, who threw their cargo overboard when too closely pressed by a British cruiser. The matter was taken up by Brougham ; and the discussion made it clear that the system of giving a bounty on every slave recovered encouraged the search ships to wait till the living cargo was

taken on board. A tonnage bounty on captured slave-vessels was therefore substituted; and the Government, though leaving the apprenticeship system to continue until 1840, as originally fixed, urged the planters to conciliate their critics by releasing their apprentices before that date. More than 120,000 were thus released; and Jamaica agreed to shorten the period by two years. A Bill to regulate the Jamaica prisons, however, was denounced as a violation of its rights by the Assembly, which as a protest suspended its meetings. The Government resolved to suspend the Constitution for five years; but, ten Radicals voting against the Ministry, the majority fell to five and the Whigs resigned. The Queen burst into tears when Russell brought the news; but, after consulting Lord Spencer, she sent for Wellington, who advised her to summon Peel. She expressed a wish that there should be no dissolution; and Peel assured her that he had no such intention at present. In two days the Cabinet was formed, Stanley and Graham, who had long since crossed over to the Conservative benches, readily accepting office. After showing the Queen the list at a second interview, Peel remarked that it would be necessary to make some changes in the household. His intention was to remove two or three of the relations of the outgoing Ministers; but he failed to make his meaning clear. The conversation ended without any arrangement being reached; and, directly Peel had gone, the Queen wrote a passionate letter to Melbourne, saying that Peel wanted to rob her of her friends and had treated her like a girl. The next day he received a note in which the Queen refused her consent to the removal of the ladies of the bedchamber on the ground that it was contrary to precedent and repugnant to her feelings. Peel at once resigned his commission; and Melbourne consented to resume office. The three parties concerned in the incident, which has become known as the Bedchamber Plot, must divide the blame. Peel's mistake was in not taking pains to make clear the strictly limited scope of his proposal. The Queen lost her self-control and acted too hurriedly; indeed she confessed her regret some years later to Russell, and added, "It was entirely my own foolishness." Finally the Whig leaders acted unconstitutionally by giving advice to the Crown after they had left office. It must be admitted, however, that their position was singularly difficult. Their first instinct had been to advise the Queen to renew her negotiations with Peel; but she was "so warm and almost transported" that they resolved to support her. Spencer declared that as gentlemen they must stand by her; and Grey, after some hesitation, arrived at the same conclusion. Though Peel acted within his rights, he evinced a singular lack of tact; and the feeling of the country was on the side of the Queen.

The Whigs returned to office, but henceforth they reigned without governing. "Nobody thinks I want to stay, do they?" asked Melbourne; and indeed nobody thought so. Macaulay entered the Ministry in place

of Howick ; but, more than ever, Russell was left to bear the burden, and he moved to the Colonial Office as the place where the fire was hottest. Sydney Smith, who had humorously declared that Russell would without hesitation take the command of the Channel Fleet or operate for stone, now confessed that while any other member of the Cabinet might resign without being missed, the Whig Government would be dissolved five minutes after Russell's departure. Even in these circumstances two measures of the utmost importance were passed in the session of 1839. The Whigs had created a system of national education in Ireland in 1832 ; and in 1833, at the instigation of Brougham, they voted £10,000 a year to each of the two great English societies. In 1837 Brougham introduced a Bill to establish an Education Board in London ; and in 1839 Russell proposed that a committee of the Privy Council should act as a central board and distribute the Government grant, which was raised to £30,000. The measure was violently attacked by the Conservatives, and the majorities sank to five and two ; while in the Lords the Archbishop of Canterbury moved and carried a series of resolutions denouncing the scheme. By the aid of Blomfield, however, a real friend of education, a compromise was arranged by which the Privy Council's inspectors should be approved by the Bishops and present their reports to the Bishop of the Diocese as well as to the Privy Council. With these modifications the Bill was passed ; and the supervision of education was added to the duties of the State. The second achievement was the creation of the penny post. The postage of a letter varied with the distance, in some cases exceeding a shilling ; the post-boxes were closed at seven o'clock, and there was only one mail in the day. To these and other abuses attention was called in 1837 in a pamphlet entitled *Post Office Reform*, in which the author, Rowland Hill, showed that, though population and wealth were increasing, the postal revenue was declining. With the rapid development of railways which was now taking place, distance made little difference to the cost of carrying a letter ; and a low uniform rate was suggested. Hitherto the clerks had to estimate the postage of every letter, and the postman had to collect the sum on delivery ; but by prepayment and a uniform rate these labours and delays would be avoided. The scheme was debated in both Houses ; and the Government decided to introduce penny postage at the beginning of the following year, members of Parliament at the same time surrendering their privilege of receiving and sending letters post-free. The revenue fell by a million in the first year ; but the direct loss was quickly reduced by an increase of correspondence, while the indirect gain to the country was incalculable.

In the session of 1840, which witnessed the death of Lord Holland, the anxieties of Ministers were incessant. Palmerston's Eastern policy, which nearly caused a split in the Cabinet, brought war with France within sight, while at home Chartist grew into a national menace.

The greater part of the session was occupied with a case of privilege. It had been decided in 1835 to allow the sale of Parliamentary papers; and in the same year a Bill was passed to appoint inspectors of prisons. Their first report casually mentioned that a book which they had found in Newgate, published by Stockdale, was indecent. Stockdale at once brought an action against Hansard, the Government publisher; and, though the jury declared the book to be indecent, the Chief Justice ruled that Parliament could not shield its publisher from the penalties of libel. The House replied by resolving that in matters of privilege no Court could intervene. Four more actions were brought by Stockdale against the unfortunate Hansard; and finally Parliament, wearied with the indignities of the strife, passed a law protecting all persons employed in the production of Parliamentary papers. In the same session the Irish Municipal Bill, now introduced for the sixth time, was presented in a form so attenuated that it disarmed the opposition of the House of Lords. Irish towns were to be divided into three classes, the governing bodies of the large towns being elected by householders rated at £10 a year, and the Viceroy being empowered to concede a charter on the application of a majority of residents rated at £8 and upwards. A further achievement was the settlement of the question of election committees. The Government had felt too weak to grapple with the question; but Peel now introduced and carried a scheme authorising the Speaker to appoint a general committee of elections, which should choose the members of the several special election committees.

In 1841 the humiliating drama reached its close. Prosperity had declined since 1837, and the recurring deficits had been met by additions to existing taxes; but in 1841 the deficit was the greatest that the Whigs had known, no steps having been taken to balance the decline of the Post Office revenue. The situation turned the thoughts of Russell towards Free Trade. The Corn Laws had been constantly attacked by Hume, Villiers, and other Radicals; and in 1836 an association had been founded in London to work for their repeal. Two years later a similar body had been created in Manchester, which was soon joined by Cobden and Bright, who systematically set to work to convert the country. The budget proposed the reduction of the duty on foreign sugar, Russell adding that he intended to substitute a fixed duty of eight shillings on wheat for the existing scale. The sugar clause was defeated by 36; but the Government refused to resign till it had explained its Free Trade proposals. Peel at once proposed a vote of want of confidence and carried it by one, whereupon the Government dissolved Parliament. The country was weary of the Whigs; and the effect of Russell's tardy conversion to Free Trade was neutralised by Melbourne's well-known adherence to Protection. The newly-elected Parliament at once declared its want of confidence in the Government by the substantial majority of ninety-one; and Melbourne's Administration resigned. The Whigs had

governed England for eleven years. They had spent their force, and Peel was ready to take their place.

The accession of the Conservatives to power was facilitated by the fact that the Queen was no longer without an adviser. Early in 1840 she was married to Prince Albert, second son of the Duke of Saxe-Coburg-Gotha. The people were anxious that she should marry; but her choice was not universally approved. It was said that the Prince was too young; and certain Tories whispered that he was a Papist or an infidel as well as a Radical. Nor were the necessary arrangements concluded without friction. The Queen's wish to make him King Consort was refused, and an income of £30,000 was substituted by Parliament for the £50,000 suggested by Melbourne. A third rebuff occurred when a clause giving him precedence after the Queen was shipwrecked by the opposition of the Duke of Cumberland; and a fourth when Melbourne declined to allow the Prince to choose his own private secretary. The Prince Consort immediately became the chief political adviser of the Queen. When the fall of the Whigs was imminent, the Prince, with the full cognisance of Melbourne, informed Peel that the three principal Whig ladies would resign on a change of Government if Peel expressed such a wish to the Queen. Peel replied that it would be better if the ladies resigned of their own accord; and the problem of 1839 was thus amicably settled.

While the party struggle raged at Westminster, the working-classes, throughout the country and especially in the north, had been passing through a time of exceptional suffering. The good harvests and the general hopefulness that filled the air immediately after the Reform Bill soon gave place to a series of lean years and to a conviction among the working-classes that far-reaching political changes were needed to lift them out of their slough of distress. Several independent currents of discontent combined to form a very threatening movement.

Chartism, in its narrower sense, was an outburst of Radicalism consequent upon the discovery by the people that they had only exchanged the domination of the upper classes for that of the middle; but in its broader meaning it was also the expression of their discontent with their economic condition—a new name, as Carlyle remarked, for a thing which had had many names. The growth of manufactures, which added to the wealth of the manufacturers and the country, seemed to increase the degradation of the workers. The survey of Dr Gaskell in 1833, the speeches of Ashley, Fielden, and Oastler, and the evidence of the Parliamentary Committees, amply confirm the terrible and familiar pictures of *Sybil* and *Mary Barton*. Chadwick had not yet begun his great reforms in sanitation; fever was endemic in the noisome alleys and cellars; and men worked long hours for a pittance, or sat idle at home, ousted by the competition of their own children. At this time of social despair Owen's ideas began to permeate the working-

classes. Factory legislation was at most a palliative; but the antagonism of interest between masters and men could be overcome by the workers themselves controlling the productive processes of the country. The Owenite propaganda began seriously in 1834, and was welcomed by the worker as a revelation.

Owen's teaching found the readiest acceptance in the Trade Unions. Since 1829 the idea of a unanimous and irresistible organisation had flitted through the minds of working-men. In 1833 Owen and Fielden declared for the plan, the latter urging a general strike for an eight hours' day; and in 1834 was launched the Grand National Consolidated Trades' Union, which counted before long half a million members. Before any joint action had been taken, many masters dismissed all of their employees who belonged to the Union. The rapid growth of the organisation and its extension to agricultural districts thoroughly scared the ruling classes; and an obsolete Act, passed in 1797 to cope with the Mutiny of the Nore, was revived against six Dorsetshire labourers for administering oaths on the admission of members. Though no outrage or intimidation was alleged, the men were condemned to seven years' transportation. The sentence was hotly attacked in Parliament by the Radicals; petitions poured in; and a monster procession, organised by the Trades' Unions and estimated by the *Times* at 30,000, marched to Whitehall, where Melbourne refused to see them. The labourers were allowed to return after two years; but the federation was paralysed by the blow, and rapidly fell to pieces. The ultimate cause of the Chartist movement was the misery of the working-classes; its proximate cause was the Poor Law of 1834. The choice now lay between starvation and the workhouse. Horrible tales, like that of *Oliver Twist*, were circulated of the wanton cruelty to which inmates of workhouses were subjected, and the formation of each new union in the north was hotly resisted. The feature of the new system which aroused the most passionate resentment was the separation of the sexes; and huge audiences were lashed to madness by stories of the agonised parting of aged couples on the threshold of the worker's prison. The crusade was led by Stephens, who thrilled vast crowds by his passionate oratory, and exhorted them to demand by force the repeal of the hated law, which was only passed for five years. The good harvests of 1835-6 prevented the full effects of the new law being immediately felt; but the rise in the price of corn which began in 1837 turned dissatisfaction into uproar, and made an explosion inevitable.

Owen, Oastler, and Stephens did not believe in political remedies; but the crowds that they addressed soon passed beyond their instructors. In 1836 a Working Man's Association was founded in London by James Robert Black, an American friend of Place and an enthusiast for popular education. The Secretary was Lovett; and Hetherington, Cleave, Watson, and Vincent were amongst the members. The society quickly

passed out of its purely educational stage, and drew up articles declaring its independence of Whigs and Tories, and urging working-men to combine for securing equal political rights. The Association grew rapidly, and in February, 1837, held a meeting at the Crown and Anchor, to organise a petition to Parliament for universal suffrage, annual Parliaments, equal electoral districts, removal of property qualification, the ballot, and payment of members. These were the famous Six Points; and a further meeting was held in June to form an association to secure them. The demands of the Charter, as O'Connell named it, had been the commonplaces of reformers for two generations; and several of them were supported by the "Philosophical Radicals" in Parliament. Branches of the Association were founded in the provinces; lectures were given by Vincent and Cleave; and manifestos were issued by Lovett. The movement received a notable impetus from Russell's declaration in the autumn of 1837 that the Government regarded the Reform Bill as final. A few days later Fergus O'Connor began to publish the *Northern Star*, the great Chartist organ, at Leeds.

The Charter was published in May, 1838. The standard was raised, but a leader was lacking. Lovett and Hetherington had not sufficient prestige to head a national movement; and Fergus O'Connor was hardly known in the south. Attwood, the founder of the Birmingham Political Union, was hardly a Chartist at all; but his failure to convert Parliament to his currency proposals led him to support plans of further reform. He therefore revived the Birmingham Union, and suggested a national convention, a national petition, and a national strike if the petition were refused. O'Connor, who had founded an organisation in the north to work for universal franchise in order to repeal the Poor Law, promised to follow Attwood. Stephens, though caring nothing for the Charter, threw in his lot with the movement, but was arrested at the end of 1838. The National Convention met in London in February, 1839. The Working Man's Association had given the name and programme; but the movement soon passed out of its control. When violent methods were suggested, the Birmingham delegates, who mostly belonged to the middle class, retired in protest; and the movement became dominated by the so-called "physical force party." The Convention felt itself in danger in London, and moved to Birmingham, where a disturbance was caused by the unwise interference of the police; and Lovett and other leaders were imprisoned. A week later the House debated and refused the national petition, which had been introduced by Attwood. The action of Parliament led thousands in despair to join the physical force party, and a few bold spirits determined to rise, in the belief that a single victory would again rally the masses to the cause. It was arranged that the town of Newport, where Frost, a Chartist leader, resided, should be seized one day in November; but the plot was betrayed, the converging parties failed to meet, and an attack

on a hotel commanding the road was beaten off with loss. The rebels dispersed; Frost and his colleagues were convicted of treason; the National Convention was dissolved; and the first chapter of the Chartist movement came to an end.

The complete failure of Chartism was primarily due to disunion and lack of definiteness. In the absence of a controlling mind, its leaders were not agreed as to whether it should be a strictly constitutional movement or whether it should rely on force. Nor was there any clear notion what should be done after the Charter had been yielded, except to repeal the new Poor Law and to establish a 'Ten Hours' day. It was widely imagined that Chartism was a Socialist movement; and many were convinced that it stood for an attack on property and the repudiation of the National Debt. Such a belief was entirely erroneous. Though thousands of Chartists had at one time or other been under the influence of Owen, Owenism and Chartism were radically different. Owen was no democrat, and he believed that his reforms could be obtained without any serious political changes. In the next place, though there were doubtless advocates of violent expropriation and repudiation in the Chartist ranks, such proposals found no support with the leaders. The error arose chiefly through a misconception of the views of Bronterre O'Brien, the thinker or, as O'Connor called him, the schoolmaster of the movement. O'Brien believed that most of the evils of the workers arose from the private ownership of land, and adopted the principle of nationalisation from the followers of Thomas Spence, but he was in favour of a fair and peaceable transfer. Again, he proposed, not the repudiation of the National Debt, but the repayment of the capital. Moreover, these views formed no part of the official programme; and nationalisation was expressly condemned by O'Connor, who favoured a rival scheme of small tenancies. The final cause of the downfall of Chartism was the attitude of its leaders towards the Corn Laws. Their abolition had been demanded as frequently and almost as violently at the mass meetings as that of the Poor Law; but, when the League began its work, the Chartists held aloof. They suspected it as a middle-class movement, all the more since its leaders had supported the Poor Law and were the avowed opponents of factory legislation. They believed too that the success of the League would serve to increase the power of the employers and capitalists, and strengthen industry at the expense of agriculture. But, though the attitude of the Chartist leaders is intelligible, it was fatal to the continuance and extension of their influence. Progress follows the line of least resistance; and it was a true instinct that led men to support the demand for cheap food rather than to await the uncertain bounties of a completely democratised State.

## CHAPTER XXI.

### CANADA.

THE Peace of Paris (1763) did not strike that decisive blow at the maritime and commercial position of France which Pitt desired, but it brought to an end in favour of England the long struggle for the possession of North America. The settlements on the St Lawrence, the trading-stations amongst the lakes and streams of the interior, Acadia and the islands of Cape Breton and St John, almost all the laborious results of a century and a half of colony-building and empire-planning on the part of France, were now transferred, or guaranteed afresh, to the Crown of Great Britain. So far as their trade was concerned, these acquisitions were of little value. But the interests of the American Colonies in the removal of the French power from their neighbourhood, and the future advantages likely to be derived by England from an almost undisputed authority over the whole continent, provided sufficiently strong grounds for their retention.

To introduce into the British Empire a French people, forming a compact society and remembering a great history, was a problem new in our colonial experience. At the moment, however, Ministers saw in Canada only a part of a British America, of small importance in itself, but destined soon to be occupied by British immigrants. They therefore thought the wisest policy would be to assimilate its character, laws, and institutions, as quickly as possible to those of the remainder of the empire; and they announced their intentions in the Proclamation of 1763. By this the old French Colony was dismembered. Labrador and Anticosti were placed under the Government of Newfoundland; Cape Breton and St John under that of Nova Scotia. The province of Quebec was created, with boundaries, on the east at the St John's river, and on the west at a line connecting Lakes Nipissing and St Francis, the inland regions being provisionally reserved for the Indians and the fur-trade. Military administration gave way to a Governor with a nominated Council, and with power to summon an assembly when circumstances permitted. The introduction of English law was ordered; and English merchants and settlers were invited to enter the country.

Nothing was said of religion ; liberty of conscience had been guaranteed by the Peace. All this constituted the usual colonial *régime*, conferred by the same proclamation on the Floridas and Grenada, yet calculated to break up the old political and social framework of Canada, and so to render it homogeneous with the other societies across the Atlantic.

Within a few years the situation in America, which had suggested the policy of Anglicising the new conquest, wore a different aspect. Ominous signs were on the horizon. Few Englishmen had settled in the province of Quebec; and the threatened changes deeply troubled the French. Despatches from the Governor told of "disorders and divisions," of greedy and oppressive officials, of arrogant immigrants, of the uncertainty and maladministration of the law, of the possibilities of racial strife, and of the failure of the Government to win the confidence of the influential classes, the nobility, and the clergy. The movement of events in the old Colonies, making it necessary to ensure the loyalty of the French, quickened the appeal of justice. In 1774, Lord North, who had been conducting a long enquiry into the conditions of Canada, produced his Quebec Act. Its object was to satisfy the desires of the new subjects by guaranteeing to them their traditional customs and institutions, and, at the same time, to rebuff the ambitions of the Americans, by enlarging the province of Quebec, through the addition of the country between the Ohio and the Mississippi, to its former dimensions. The measure marks a very important stage in the growth of Canada. Its first end was achieved—the nationality of the conquered people was secured from attack, and the province received the character which it was to retain. From this time onward the jealous but natural care of the French for the maintenance of their distinctive inheritance has given rise to many of the peculiar problems, both economic and political, which have marked the changing phases of Canadian history.

A clamour of disapproval was raised by the older Colonies and by the English settlers in Quebec. Virginia, Pennsylvania, and New York saw their *Hinterland* taken from them ; the English settlers encountered the disappointment of expectations reasonable and unreasonable. By the recognition of the Roman Catholic faith and the retention of the French civil law the new Constitution discouraged British immigration ; while by vesting a power absolute, save for the right of taxation, in a Governor and a Council without an assembly, and by omitting the Habeas Corpus Act and trial by jury in civil cases, it deprived the English of those rights of self-government and that security of person and property to which they felt by birth entitled. But worse than their irritation were the difficulties resulting from the outbreak of the American War, which rendered the initiation of a new political system far from easy. The unsuccessful appeal of Congress to the French to rebel was followed, in 1775-6, by a dangerous invasion of Canada,

frustrated, after the capture of Montreal, by the conspicuous daring and resource of Governor Carleton. To meet their difficulties, both Carleton and Haldimand (his successor) were driven to arbitrary actions, which provoked a well-founded, if sometimes perverse, opposition. Fortunately, suspicion of the Americans and the influence of the nobility and clergy kept the French peasantry loyal, even when their mother-country joined in the struggle. This is some evidence, perhaps, that they had no longer serious grievances or apprehensions. Conquest had but little disturbed their life. They had been found an uneducated, unprogressive, contented people, and so they had been left. Nothing was done for them, or for any other class; but none saw itself threatened with the loss of ancient rights or the imposition of new burdens. Hence the material gains of peace after endless wars, of reviving agriculture, of trade increasing with the removal of monopoly, were balanced against the sentimental loss, and helped to secure an unenthusiastic acquiescence in British rule.

But the American Revolution, in its influence on Canadian history, was to prove far more than a searching trial of British policy towards the French. It induced a migration from the United States with which English colonisation on the St Lawrence, and any colonisation in the interior of the country, virtually commenced, and which made Canada the home of two nations. The cessions of the Peace (1783) ended the colony's long connexion with the favoured Ohio valley, established to the south of it a foreign State, and thus, owing to the stern limitations which nature imposed on the north, dictated as the only possible direction of expansion a straight march westwards. A narrow belt of fertile land, encumbered with dense forests, and ending sharply to the north of Lake Superior in an apparently uninhabitable wilderness, was all that, after 1783, seemed left of America for British settlement. Moreover, the illiberal colonial policy, now, for a time, adopted by the mother-country, in part as a result of the war, found in Canada its principal victim, and must share the responsibility for that unceasing political restlessness which characterised the life and threatened the progress of the country for nearly half a century.

In 1778 some exiles from the old Colonies arrived in Canada, and were stationed round Lake St Peter above Montreal. But Nova Scotia, being nearer, and offering, as it was thought, fewer difficulties and better opportunities to the immigrant, received the great influx of "Loyalists" that followed the conclusion of peace. Some 25,000 people settled on the St John's river, round the Bay of Chaleurs, and in Cape Breton Isle. At the same time, by overland routes, a movement began into the valley of the St Lawrence; and soon a population of 10,000 was established along the line of the river from Montreal to the shores of Lake Erie. To those who left their homes during the struggle the name of United Empire Loyalists was given, and

towards their losses the Imperial Government made a considerable grant; for no satisfaction could be obtained from their exhausted and embittered countrymen. The migration did not cease at once. Till the end of the century there was a dribbling of "late Loyalists" across the border.

Very important in its influence on the history of Canada was the character of the men who thus first bore the standard of British colonisation into the western forests. They were not pioneering spirits who, had they remained in their own States, would have led an advance across the Ohio. Some were disbanded soldiers, but the majority consisted of professional men, clergy of the English Church, officials, and merchants, attached to law and order, and to the practices and institutions of civilised life. Many came destitute, all came poor, prepared indeed to suffer hardships as they had formerly been to make heroic sacrifices, but, save in temper of mind, little fitted to open again the battle for existence in the wilds of an almost unknown country. They brought with them what they prized more than all material comfort, an ardent loyalty to the British connexion and their conservative principles. It must constantly be kept in mind that the English provinces were settled by men who were seeking, not to exploit a new land, but to maintain certain ideas of politics and society. Such an immigration promised to Canada a stable political development, but not rapid economic progress.

The whole question of the government of the Colony had now to be reopened. In 1784 Nova Scotia was divided; and the part which lay west of the isthmus was formed into the province of New Brunswick, and given a constitution similar to that conferred on the whole in 1758. Quebec provided a far more difficult problem. The legal confusion, which still continued, and the absence of representative institutions, were grievances demanding a remedy; while the relations of the two peoples, who, though occupying different parts of the country, intermingled in its cities, needed some permanent adjustment. To Pitt it seemed that "clashing interests" prevented the amalgamation of both in one State. His policy, therefore, as laid down in the Constitutional Act of 1791, was to separate French from English by dividing the old province of Quebec, at a line following for the most part the course of the river Ottawa, into the two provinces of Upper and Lower Canada, and so to ensure to the French in Lower Canada the preservation of their nationality. At the same time he conferred on each of the new provinces thus formed a constitution resembling that of Great Britain; and, by the reservation of a certain proportion of the Crown lands, made provision in each for a Protestant Church establishment. Convincing as this course of action seemed, it was really a tremendous experiment; and once more the chief lines of Canadian history diverge from a common point.

The succeeding twenty years proved uneventful. Each province had now a Governor, a Legislative Council nominated by the Crown, and an Assembly elected by the people. In Upper Canada the pioneers—increased in numbers to 70,000 by 1806 through the coming of “late Loyalists,” Irishmen, and Highlanders—were learning the nature of their new country, clearing land, cutting roads, founding villages, and bringing up children in regions where schools and churches were still non-existent. Of the grim and lonely battle with nature fought in this heroic age the details must be left to the imagination. Here and there the transition to ordered settlement was slowly made; but politics and social pursuits were necessarily neglected. To the first meeting of the Council and Assembly, summoned at harvest-time, only seven out of the twenty-one members found leisure to come. In the maritime provinces a better-known country, with access to the sea and a variety of occupation, rendered the initial struggles perhaps less severe. In Nova Scotia fishing and agriculture, in New Brunswick lumbering, occupied the principal attention of the inhabitants. Halifax and St John, moreover, were becoming social and commercial centres, not, of course, to be compared with Quebec or Montreal, but more active and important than Kingston and Niagara, the only towns as yet rising amongst the scattered settlements of Upper Canada. As for the French, they had long enjoyed the conditions of an organised society. Save where British and American settlers were making homes in the eastern townships their province was no longer confronted with the problems that lie on the threshold of colonisation. Yet troubles of a different kind disturbed its peace. The end of Pitt’s policy, so far as it involved the separation of the two races, was never attained, and seems almost to have been forgotten. Englishmen entered Lower Canada, and by superior energy monopolised its commerce. The French, fearing for their nationality, drew together; and an opposition of interests and feeling began steadily to divide the two peoples.

Thus, at the beginning of the century, the Colony as a whole had no unity. It lacked not only common nationality and a single government, but also adequate means of communication and the habit of much commercial intercourse between its different parts. As yet there was no recognition of general interests, nor any sense of a common life. The American War of 1812-4 came as a rough but, in some ways, a salutary interruption of this course of development. Its history is elsewhere narrated in this work. It meant more for Canada than the suffering and loss which it inflicted on the Upper province; for it necessitated united action, and awakened the Canadians to their first conception of a national patriotism. It directed, too, the attention of the mother-country towards her vast possessions across the Atlantic, at the very time when she believed herself suffering from economic evils to be alleviated only by a large emigration. This seemed to promise well for a Colony whose resources were principally agricultural, and whose chief need was men

with the patience and energy to become cultivators of the soil. Yet, in the competition that now ensued between Canada and the United States for the stream of labour that began to flow from Europe to the new lands, it became increasingly evident that the majority of immigrants preferred the States. Of those who entered the British provinces at least half passed either immediately, or very soon, to the other side of the border; and there was even an exodus of native inhabitants. The warmer climate of the United States, their rapidly growing prosperity, and their industrial life, were in part the cause of this; but much must also be attributed to the disturbed political and social condition of Canada, and to the manner in which the settlement of the country was being carried out. "Without forethought, preparation, method, or system of any kind"—thus Lord Durham summed up, in 1838, his opinion of the emigration to Canada during the century, contrasting with the inaction of the mother-country and the Colony the greater energy and foresight exhibited by the United States. His criticism of the way in which the land had been distributed was equally severe. For the errors committed the whole responsibility rested with the home Government. Rightly feeling that in an agricultural colony land should be easily obtainable, it adopted at first a system of free grants without attempting sales. Unfortunately its good intentions were defeated by the practices of its officials; and the most reckless profusion resulted. The limitations on the size of free grants were evaded, and the conditions attending them generally violated. In 1838 the provinces were found to have disposed of the greater part of their surveyed lands on a system that had brought almost no profit, and in a manner that had tended to retard most seriously their prospects of progress. In Upper Canada not one-tenth of the grants were even occupied; in Lower Canada nineteen-twentieths remained perfectly wild. Unreclaimed land, consisting of clergy reserves or of blocks in the hands of speculators, everywhere intervened between cultivated parts, and rendered contiguous settlement and the creation of efficient routes of communication impossible. When, after the Act of Union (1840), the matter was transferred to the provincial assemblies, it was perceived that a great opportunity had been lost; for, by that time, the Americans had passed through the eastern forests of the continent on to the western prairie, with which the timbered lands of Canada could not compete.

A few of the immigrants during this period were Americans of strong republican sentiments; but the majority were from Great Britain—weavers from Scotch towns, agriculturists from the Highlands, and many Irish and English whom economic changes had reduced to poverty. Some the Imperial Government had assisted in various ways. Others were sent over by the Poor Law Guardians. Many had been attracted by the energetic policy of the great Land Companies; and several successful settlements had been carried out under the direction of notable

persons such as Galt, Talbot, and the Earl of Selkirk. Probably more than half of the new-comers entered the Upper province, where, between 1806 and 1841, the population rose from 70,000 to 455,000. Elsewhere the rate of growth was less rapid. In the maritime provinces during the same period there was an increase from 110,000 to about 400,000; in Lower Canada from 160,000, in 1791, to 625,000 (of whom perhaps a quarter were British) in 1841. Such an immigration meant the introduction of a fresh element into the population of Canada; and it was the work of the formative period, which we are considering, to unite the Loyalists, with their conservative ideas, and these new men, of a different class and in many cases entertaining the views of English Liberals, in the social and economic order of a young and growing nation. This did not prove easy, for a deep-seated unrest was disturbing the life of Canada. Its causes require some analysis.

Though in no two provinces were the conditions the same, everywhere the nature of the political system was at the root of the trouble. The mother-country had not yet satisfactorily solved the problem of colonial government. It did not seem possible for a colonial Governor to be at the same time the servant of the Crown and of his own legislative body. Hence, while the British Constitution had been transplanted in form to Canada, that principle which makes it workable, the responsibility of the Executive to the majority in the Lower House, had been omitted. A considerable part of the colonial revenue was raised under Imperial Acts, and this was placed at the disposal of the Governor and his Council; so that the people had no efficient control of their rulers, who continued to manage public affairs, whether they enjoyed the confidence of their provincial assembly or not. Moreover, depending for their positions on the approval of the Colonial Office, they transferred thither the settlement of all matters of any importance, though it was too far off to be properly cognisant of conditions in the country, and also, unfortunately, for a long period was out of sympathy with the aspirations of the Canadians. Slowly the provinces came to see that, while the forms of self-government had been conceded to them, the reality had been denied, and that representative institutions had been created without "the necessary privileges" of representative bodies, with the result that every legislative assembly in the colony embarked on a struggle with its Executive for what it felt to be its proper place in the Constitution. Though from 1826 onwards the mother-country followed a policy increasingly liberal, and readily redressed all grievances, she could not bring herself to take the great step of granting to the colonists the control of their own affairs.

In Upper Canada permanent power fell into the hands of a section of the Loyalists, which came to be designated the "Family Compact," though its bonds of union were party interests and social sympathies rather than personal connexions. This strong alliance controlled the

Executive and Legislative Councils, and sometimes secured a majority in the Assembly. It appropriated large portions of the public domain, and filled the offices of Government and the high places of the legal profession with its adherents. It maintained the illiberal political system, and supported the claims of the English clergy to the reserved lands. An opposition party grew up with its strength in the elected House, working for a reform of the government, and for a more progressive policy in the development of the province. The situation of Lower Canada was also peculiar. There the two peoples had drifted completely apart. United by no common religion or literature, they could not understand each other. Marriage unions between French and English, at first frequent, had become gradually very rare; and social intercourse had ceased. No passionate enmity showed itself; but a complete and sullen separateness extended from the highest to the lowest classes. "I expected," wrote Lord Durham in 1838, "to find a contest between a Government and a people. I found two nations warring in the bosom of a single State." Such was the fatal issue which differences of race, aggravated by the opposition of interest between a commercial and an agricultural people, and by the unwisdom of Governors who failed to win the confidence of the French, had at last produced. Moreover the political struggle had been absorbed into this more dangerous racial strife, with the result that the executive Government, supported by the opinion of the British inhabitants, was arrayed against the Lower House, which possessed the sympathies of the whole French population.

In both provinces the Assembly had aimed first at securing entire control of the revenue. When, in 1832, the Colonial Office virtually yielded this, the Assembly of Upper Canada voted a permanent civil list, but did not relax its efforts to secure the responsibility of Ministers. In Lower Canada, however, a civil list was still refused; and the struggle was continued with such bitterness that the whole administration was jeopardised. The Imperial Government tried conciliation, and sent over commissioners to enquire into the state of the province, but declined to give way to the demand for an elective Legislative Council. This refusal, expressed in Lord John Russell's resolutions of 1836, was the signal for an outbreak in Lower Canada early in the following year. Arms were taken up in the Richelieu district; but the movement was never formidable, and was quickly suppressed. Meanwhile, in Upper Canada, the Governor, Sir Francis Bond Head, precipitated a crisis by representing at the election of 1836 the issue between the reforming party and the Government as that of allegiance to the mother-country. Defeated by this manœuvre at the polls, William Lyon Mackenzie, who led the Opposition, proceeded to organise rebellion. His march on Toronto failed; and the rising was put down without the aid of regular troops, though filibustering expeditions of American adventurers and Canadian fugitives from across the border continued for some time. In both provinces the

resort to arms proved a mistaken step, and failed to command general sympathy. The needs of the situation did not justify it; and neither Mackenzie nor Papineau, the leader of the French, carried more than a fraction of his party with him in his last moves. There was no widespread desire to sever the connexion with Great Britain.

Nevertheless, the strife of races in one province, and the strife of parties in the other, had developed a state of irritation so intolerable that it was little wonder if short-sighted men hurried to desperate remedies. Realising the extreme gravity of the situation, Lord Melbourne's Cabinet despatched the Earl of Durham as High Commissioner and Governor-General to redress the grievances in the Canadas; and, following the advice of his memorable Report, which made intelligible the evils from which the colony was suffering, presented to Parliament, in 1840, "An Act to reunite the provinces of Upper and Lower Canada and for the government of Canada." This measure gave to the united provinces an elective Assembly, consisting of forty-two members from each, and a nominated Legislative Council. The principle of ministerial responsibility to the Lower House was asserted at the first meeting of the new Assembly, and recognised during the next few years in all the provinces; and to the Governments of the Colony the entire management of its domestic concerns was gradually transferred. Taken with the concessions that preceded it and those that followed as a corollary, the Act of 1840 marks the beginning of a new era in British colonial history. From this time Great Britain has been less anxious to ensure her authority over her dependencies than to carry forward the policy then first outlined—to build them into strong States by conceding to them self-government, by uniting their races, and by confederating contiguous geographical areas. Though the Act contributed much to allay the troubles in the Canadas, it was only a stage on the road towards their complete and final settlement. By bringing the two peoples together in almost equal numbers it removed any opportunity for the domination of one over the other; but it did not teach them sympathy and cooperation, and the working of the new political system was far from satisfactory. Everything could not be done at once; but the results of this first step slowly made it clear that all the provinces of British North America needed to be united for the sake of their common interests, and, at the same time, that the local concerns of each were best removed from the general control.

The agitations of these years exacted their price in a sacrifice of material progress. The inevitable period of difficulty which attends the beginnings of settlement was unduly prolonged, when circumstances made the form of government, and not the work of colonisation, the principal concern of the people. Yet it is not to the political troubles but to the geography of the country that we must look for the chief causes affecting the rate of its development. Though nature had endowed Canada with

valuable resources, they were not of an attractive order, nor easily exploited without patience and wise policy. No precious metals as yet drew population. The hope of the colony lay in agriculture and in the production of raw materials for export. Unfortunately its forest-covered lands were not easily brought under cultivation, nor was it really happy in the class of immigrants which it secured for the purpose. This was the more important, because to the new-comers fell the work of founding settlements, and not of merely filling up the interspaces of a growing society. Commerce, resting principally on agriculture, was slow to expand, though, owing in some measure to the encouragements of the imperial fiscal system, its basis had been broadened beyond the historic fur-trade of the preceding centuries. After the American War commercial relations with the West Indies had been established; and, early in the nineteenth century, the mother-country, by granting a differential advantage to colonial wheat and timber entering her ports, had endeavoured to stimulate Canada's productive powers in these directions. The surplus of wheat varied from year to year; but the export of timber soon attained considerable importance. General economic conditions did not yet favour the foundation of industries. Such as there were, with the exception of distilling, grew up out of the foreign trade, and consisted in the sawing of timber, the milling of grain, the drying and pickling of fish, and the manufacture of potash and pearlash.

For the encouragement of settlement and commerce the opening of communications between the different parts of the Colony, and between all parts and the sea, was a vital matter. As colonisation had followed the course of the St Lawrence, the principal work to be done was the improvement of the river navigation. This was a large undertaking, and demanded united action on the part of the two chief provinces and considerable expenditure. But the Canadas were neither united nor rich. General schemes for the development of the country were beyond the conception and power of the little Governments of a divided Colony. In Lower Canada the policy of the French was to encourage agriculture rather than commerce, and to devote their spare revenue to the small works required in rural districts. The Upper province attacked big difficulties, and did serious work in the cutting of the Rideau, Cornwall, and Welland Canals; but it could not reap the full advantage of its efforts so long as Lower Canada failed to remove the obstacles to navigation east of Montreal. Moreover the division of the Colony had left Upper Canada without a seaport; and, to increase its revenue from customs duties, it required the consent of the other province, which was not easy to obtain. Hence the construction of proper main and local thoroughfares was neglected for want of money, with the result that the various settled parts, divided from each other, with little exchange of products or intercourse of ideas, developed on separate lines, and acquired distinct interests and character. Nevertheless, in these years the outlines

were marked out of those great works which have given to Canada a series of waterways unparalleled on any other continent.

The state of education throughout the Colony reflected the conditions of its life. In Lower Canada the majority of the peasants still grew up woefully ignorant. For the higher classes there was an abundant provision of college instruction under clerical control. Upper Canada was in some ways less well provided for. The Assembly had begun the establishment of a public elementary system; but, though the people were far from indifferent, State action was paralysed by the political trouble, by the agitation of the question of the clergy reserves, and difficulties between the denominations. Private enterprise, in spite of great obstacles, had done much; but the common schools were still too few in number, and sadly inefficient both as regarded buildings, teachers, and system. Yet here, and in the maritime provinces, where educational progress had been more rapid, institutions providing the means of higher instruction had already been founded.

Thus, at the epoch where our narrative pauses, Canada was but just emerging from her early troubles. Economically and socially the country was backward in its development. The signs of its youth were still evident. It had lacked that unity of action, wisdom of policy, and enterprising ambition in its people which had done so much for the United States. The struggle with nature had been severe; and many circumstances had combined to aggravate the hard conditions. Some of its difficulties had arisen because the mother-country thought that the life and institutions of an old land could be transported to a new; and, half unconsciously, throughout these years the Canadians had been struggling for the necessary social and political elasticity and freedom of a young community. That battle was now almost over. Between the clouds that still remained glimpses of a brighter future could be discerned. Through bitter experiences Canada had been seeking, and had at last found, a form of government which was to guarantee for many years to come the independence of a colony within the unity of an empire. It was a great work to have achieved, and perhaps a necessary preliminary to the greater work of building a nation from many divided societies, and developing the ample resources of a vast and little-known land.

## CHAPTER XXII.

### THE REVOLUTION IN ENGLISH POETRY AND FICTION.

By the Revolution of 1688 a constitutional balance was struck between a number of active principles which for nearly a century had been striving for mastery in the English body politic. After three generations of struggle between the Crown and the Parliament, the prerogative of the former, without being specifically retrenched, had been practically limited by the Bill of Rights. The ancient feudal system had finally lapsed with the Act for abolishing military tenures; nevertheless feudalism remained a social influence, and the nobility and gentry still exercised in their several neighbourhoods much of the authority to which they had been accustomed in the Middle Ages. A bitter experience of the tyranny, occasioned both by Presbyterian rule and the attempt to restore the Roman Catholic religion, had taught the country finally to acquiesce in the *via media* of the Anglican Church, fortified in its supremacy by the operation of the Test Acts.

In the period that immediately followed the English Revolution, literature, and in particular poetry, faithfully reflecting the spiritual movement in society, exhibited analogous lines of compromise. Throughout the seventeenth century there was strong rivalry between the medieval or romantic tradition of poetry, which had spontaneously directed invention since the time of Chaucer, and the more regular principles of taste derived from the revival of classical learning. During the first half of the century the poets who followed either of these two streams of artistic development worked according to their own will, without interfering with each other's practice; romantic caprice and "metaphysical" fancy more than held their own. But after the Restoration criticism began to formulate itself. Dryden, in numerous prefaces, reasoned about the proprieties of style in the various branches of his art. His example was followed by Addison, in *The Spectator*, and by Pope, in his *Essay on Criticism*; and, as no critic appeared in defence of either the "romantic" or the "metaphysical" tradition, the weight of public opinion gradually inclined to the side of classical correctness. The romantic element was by no means eliminated from the English imagination, but it was for the time being depressed, in the same proportion as medieval influences declined in the sphere of politics. In

the period between the Revolution of 1688 and the middle of the eighteenth century, the movement of the classical Renaissance, which since the middle of the fifteenth century had been spreading northward from Italy, bore down all opposition in English taste.

But, though respect for classical tradition became the guiding principle of the English poets of the post-Revolution period, the authority of Greek and Latin example never established itself so absolutely in this country as in Italy or France. In England the classicalism of the Renaissance was opposed by two strong counter-currents—the national taste of the aristocracy, now the rulers of the country, and the steady persistence with which the chief English poets adhered to the principle of continuity in the development of their native language. While the revival of learning had in England, as in every other part of Europe, been mainly promoted by the patronage of princes and nobles, it had here adapted itself to the genius of free institutions, and had been employed in the service of living interests. Attempts to turn language into an instrument for distinguishing the manners of the Court or of the noble caste from those of the vulgar met with only temporary success; and, from the reign of Elizabeth till the Revolution, a steady disposition is visible among the greater poets to base their style on the normal development of the English tongue.

The leading characteristics of the poetry produced after the Revolution were, as regards matter, an always increasing volume of ethical thought, whether satiric or didactic, and, as regards form, a great predominance either of the rhyming heroic couplet or of heroic blank verse, before which metres every other mode of poetical expression tended to disappear. The lyrical form, so frequent in the seventeenth century, is in the first half of the eighteenth century seldom employed. An obvious explanation of this change of style offers itself in the fact that the minds of men were now chiefly occupied with the social settlement necessary after a revolution both in politics and taste, so that reason became the governing principle in the arts of expression, rather than that imaginative caprice which prevailed while the Revolution itself was in the pangs of delivery. By a directly parallel movement the correct and lucid expression of intelligible thought came to be accounted the chief merit in the art of poetry, in place of the invention of far-fetched metaphors characteristic of the "metaphysical" school in the seventeenth century. Pope, Parnell, Johnson, and Goldsmith, among those who used the heroic couplet, Thomson and Akenside, among those who wrote in blank verse, were the chief representatives of what has been justly called the "classical age" of English poetry. Young, the author of *Night Thoughts*, wrote with success in both metres.

About the middle of the eighteenth century the tide turned. The compromise aimed at in the English Revolution had been secured; and

full liberty of expression was now allowed to those medieval elements in the life of the nation which had been suppressed so long as there appeared to be a danger of their interfering with the constitutional settlement. Many men of imagination, now that civil liberty was safely established, looked back with regret on the variety and picturesqueness of the old feudal *régime*. Joseph Warton, a good scholar and critic, declared that the ethical movement in poetry had gone too far, and that a revival of lyric enthusiasm should be the aim of all lovers of the art. Thomas Warton, his brother, in his *Observations on the Faëry Queen*, directed the imagination of his countrymen to the older forms of English poetry; and, somewhat later in the century, Thomas Percy (afterwards Bishop of Dromore), by the publication of his *Reliques of Ancient English Poetry*, revived the public interest in medieval minstrelsy. The rather grotesque experiments of Horace Walpole in Gothic architecture and romance prepared the way for the novels of Beckford, Mrs Radcliffe, and "Monk" Lewis, which themselves formed a middle stage of fiction on the way to the Waverley Novels. Proceeding along the lines suggested by the Wartons, Collins and Gray struck a distinctive note of lyric poetry; and the latter, by his *Fatal Sisters* and *Descent of Odin*, opened a fresh field of poetical exploration in the remains of Scandinavian mythology. Almost at the same time Macpherson, with his pretended translation of Ossian, sounded the first note of Celtic revivalism; and, not long afterwards, the Rowley forgeries of Chatterton gave an impulse to the medieval reaction which was making way under the guidance of Thomas Warton.

All these literary tendencies fell in with religious and political movements in the heart of society, on the Continent as well as in England. Through the whole of the seventeenth century the opinions of the Deists continued to assert themselves in the neighbourhood of Geneva; and in the first half of the eighteenth century these received a philosophical extension in the works of Rousseau. An opposition between the institutions of society and the self-consciousness of the individual began to find expression in European literature, a feeling closely allied with the love of Nature and solitude of which Rousseau was the first articulate apostle. Such sentiments helped to strengthen the democratic movement which, since the days of Calvin, had found its main base in Genevan Protestantism; and a constant reciprocal intercourse was kept up through this channel between Continental and English society. Books like Thomson's *Seasons*, Pope's *Essay on Man*, Young's *Night Thoughts*, and Richardson's novels, enjoyed wide popularity in Switzerland, France, and Germany; Macpherson's *Ossian* produced a much greater effect on the Continent than at home. On the other hand, the influence of Rousseau's philosophy is plainly manifest in the poetry and character of Shenstone; while Wesley's field-preaching in England seems to have been the result of his intercourse with the German Moravians.

But, however freely democratic ideas were admitted from without,

and medieval ideas were allowed to react within the English Constitution, this liberty of thought did little to shake the firm hold which in the sphere of politics aristocratic rule had obtained on the Government, and, in the sphere of taste, the principles of the Renaissance had fixed on the imagination of cultivated society. Gray and Collins were sensitive to the new romantic influences in the air; but the forms in which they gave expression to their feelings were strictly classic. Watts, Charles Wesley, and, above all, Cowper, while impelled by the spiritual forces operating outside the doctrine and ritual of the Established Church, never failed, in expressing their religious emotions, to maintain over language and metre the masculine control which they had learned from the study of Greek and Roman models. Hence, in most of those who may be specially called the liberalising poets of the eighteenth century, there was no abrupt severance of the continuity of tradition; while, in the great expansion of imaginative feeling caused by the French Revolution, varied and long-established practice in metrical composition afforded a basis from which the poets who were directly inspired by that movement could readily attempt a new departure. The history of the revolution in poetry and fiction may conveniently be treated under the following heads: the effect of the French Revolution on the classical traditions paramount during the eighteenth century; the effect of the democratic movement on poetic sentiment and diction; the Lake School; the growth of Romanticism; the aesthetic reaction in the language and rhythms of English poetry.

At no period of English literature was poetry at a lower ebb than in the years immediately preceding the meeting of the States General in France. The exhaustion of the imaginative movement of the Classical Renaissance was indicated by the disappearance of almost everything in the shape of poetic invention. Album poetry and didactic verse of the most trivial kind were the classes of composition mostly in vogue. Coteries of authors, meeting for the purpose of mutual admiration, flourished; the most notorious of them being a society in which a trio of poetasters—Robert Merry (1755–98), Mrs Robinson (1758–1800), and Mrs Cowley (1743–1809)—made public love to each other in a paper called *The World*, under the names of Della Crusca, Laura Maria, and Anna Matilda. After a while, the impostures of these people were exposed and crushed by William Gifford's (1756–1826) imitation of Persius, *The Baviad and Mæviad*.

Vapidity in the matter of poetry was emphasised by a corresponding display of classical forms. Abstraction, impersonation, inversion, and the abundant use of Pagan mythology revived all the affectations of external classicism that had been ridiculed by Addison. Of this extravagance the most striking example is to be found in *The Botanic Garden* of Erasmus Darwin (1731–1802), a man of scientific genius,

who used verse for the purely decorative purpose of illustrating his physical observations. His leading idea was to personify the forces of nature under the forms of Greek polytheism, while at the same time he accentuated all the prominent characteristics of the English heroic couplet which had been first developed in Pope's translation of the *Iliad*. The effect of this excessive classicism on diction and rhythm is illustrated in the following extract from Darwin's poem :

Pervade, pellucid forms, their cold retreat !  
Ray from bright orbs your viewless floods of heat !  
From earth's deep wastes electric torrents pour,  
Or shed from heaven the scintillating shower !  
Pierce the dull root, relax its fibre trains,  
Thaw the thick blood that lingers in its veins !  
Melt with warm breath the fragrant gums that bind  
Th' expanding foliage in its scaly rind !  
And, as in air the laughing leaflets play,  
And turn their shining bosoms to the day,  
Nymphs ! with sweet smile, each opening flower invite,  
And on its damask eyelids pour the light !

The general result of such mannerism was to turn metrical composition in the heroic couplet, which during the classical age had almost secured a monopoly in poetry, into what Cowper calls "a mere mechanic art." But the sanguinary excesses of the French Revolution, arousing antagonistic passions in the heart of English society, reacted with bracing effect on taste; and the necessity of combating subversive ideas stimulated all writers of poetry who adhered to the old traditions to animate their satire with political fire. One of the happiest monuments of this conservative spirit survives in the excellent satire of the *Anti-Jacobin*, in which Canning, Frere, and their associates, exerted their powers to ridicule alike the morality and the taste of the writers who appeared to be influenced by the new revolutionary ideals. Another production of some merit though more pretension, devoted to the defence of old traditions and the denunciation of French principles, was *The Pursuits of Literature*, a poem written by Thomas Mathias (1754-1835), in which Dr Priestley, Erasmus Darwin, and William Godwin, are all brought under the lash of the satirist.

The brilliant and stirring action of the time exercised also a reviving influence on the lyric genius of the country. Under its inspiration Campbell (1777-1844) wrote his very fine stanzas entitled *Hohen-linden*, while the enthusiasm of patriotic pride found utterance in his Odes, *Battle of the Baltic* and *Ye Mariners of England*. But perhaps the operation of the spirit of the age on the traditional classic style is most noticeable in the poetry of Crabbe (1754-1832), the character of whose genius had disclosed itself in *The Village* even before the beginning of the French Revolution. With scarcely any sense of beauty, and with a defective taste, Crabbe had an imaginative insight

into the depths of human nature. His own experience of life taught him to despise "mechanic echoes of the Mantuan song," the sham classic pastoralism under which the poets of the early part of the eighteenth century had veiled the frequent wretchedness of the English rural labourer. He used the ethic mode of the heroic couplet employed by Pope, and afterwards developed by Johnson and Goldsmith, as an instrument for describing the actual condition of the poor; and his *Parish Register*, his *Borough*, and his *Tales*, entitle him to the praise bestowed upon him by Byron as "Nature's sternest painter, yet her best."

Meantime the great advance of the democratic spirit in the British nation is clearly illustrated by the vernacular poetry of Scotland. This spirit assumed various external forms. In the first place, a strong centrifugal tendency in the constitution of the body politic made its appearance. Ever since the Union between England and Scotland a large party in the latter kingdom had deliberately emphasised the separate interests of the two countries; and this disposition of the Scottish people soon reflected itself in poetry. It is particularly manifest in the poems of Allan Ramsay (1685–1758), who encouraged the sentiment of particularism by the use of the Scottish dialect in his poems, and by building a theatre in Edinburgh for the performance of Scotch plays. The latter proceeding tended to produce a revolutionary moral movement in society, bringing, as it did, poetical liberty into conflict with ecclesiastical public opinion, to which the stage, with all belonging to it, was an abomination. The strict and metaphysical form of Scottish theology provoked rebellion in men of strong natural instincts; and this stimulated the poet to express the feelings of nature in the simplest modes of lyrical diction. "Scots songs" became immensely popular, particularly in the form which they received from the genius of Robert Fergusson (1750–74). An ardent Jacobite, and an enemy to all kinds of religious hypocrisy, Fergusson delighted to express his dislike of England, his love of old Scottish customs and superstitions, and his convivial impulses, in the national dialect, finding for it an admirable metrical vehicle in the *rime couée (caudata)*, which had taken root in poetry at a very early date in the history of Scotland<sup>1</sup>. He had received, like all his contemporaries of the same class, a training in Greek and Latin literature, which he turned to excellent account when writing in his native dialect. Most of his Scottish poems are of a light and humorous order; and he never soars to the regions of pathos and sublimity characteristic of his successor and imitator, Robert Burns (1759–96). Burns, carrying on the particularist tradition, which had descended to him, with a sentimental Jacobitism, from Ramsay and Fergusson, gave

<sup>1</sup> In this system the stanza concludes with a line of fewer syllables than the lines immediately preceding it rhyming with a previous line of the same number of syllables.

this feeling perhaps its finest form of expression in his *Scots, wha hae wi' Wallace bled*. His enthusiasm for liberty led him, though he was in government employ, to sympathise with the beginnings of the French Revolution; but this cosmopolitan tendency was strongly counteracted by his patriotic instincts, and by his apprehension of foreign invasion. On the other hand, the democratic ideas of the time, embodied in the French revolutionary phrase of "fraternity and equality," often find utterance in Burns' verse, the best example being perhaps furnished by the fine song, *Is there for honest poverty*, with its burden "For a' that and a' that."

Not less characteristic are the poems in which Burns gives utterance to his natural impulses in opposition to the Calvinistic theology of the Scottish Kirk. Fergusson, entertaining the same sentiments, had confined himself to playing practical jokes on the loose-living professors of the doctrine of "election," without ever venturing to attack them in his verse. Burns, however, whose ardent temperament and irregularities of conduct more than once brought him into open collision with Kirk authority, avenged his own injuries by the bitterest satire on his ecclesiastical judges. In his *Twa Herds*, *Holy Willie's Prayer*, and *The Kirk's Alarm*, he pours forth the volume of feeling which for three generations had been gathering among his countrymen in violent rebellion against the social tyranny of Presbyterianism.

But it was not so much the matter of Burns' verse as the complete propriety of its poetic form, which won for him the unique place he holds in the affections of his countrymen. He never sought after originality, much less eccentricity, of individual expression. The essential excellence of his poetry lies in its thoroughly representative character. When he aimed at effects in the "classical" style of eighteenth-century diction, he was generally unsuccessful; scarcely one of his compositions in ordinary English is other than commonplace. On the other hand, peasant as he was, he possessed the refinement of genius, and had an incomparable instinct as to the right way of handling the time-honoured songs of the people. In most of his vernacular lyrics the suggestion of the words or the tune may be found in the melodies of often nameless composers that had been for generations literally floating in the air. The genius and originality of Burns shine in giving a new turn to an old sentiment, in finding a current meaning for a traditional phrase, in putting the stamp of universal experience on idioms which, but for him, might have perished in local and particular obscurity. The versatility he shows in adapting the Scottish tongue to various metrical purposes is marvellous, ranging from satires and epistles in *rime couée*, full of words in common use, and written in the most colloquial idiom, to brilliant humorous narrative like *Tam o' Shanter*, and again from this to songs of exquisite sweetness, such as *Mary Morrison*, in which the polished language is just tempered to the required Doric simplicity.

by a slight admixture of dialect. In all of them is manifest the embodied force of democracy, breaking through the half-literary, half-aristocratic conventions of language, which the continuous practice of many generations had established as the standard of English poetry.

Far different was the effect produced by the French Revolution on the taste of the more highly educated classes in England. Throughout the eighteenth century the principle which had given elevation and enthusiasm to the thoughts of these classes was civil liberty. As the natural consequence of party conflict, the affairs of the country had always a tendency to aimless drifting; but in political emergencies representative men—William III, Walpole, and the two Pitts—never failed to appear and to steer the vessel of the State on a constitutional course. Guided by an analogous critical influence, the English poets and prose-writers since the Revolution in their own country had continued to develop the language on the lines that had been followed by their predecessors in the three preceding generations. The stress of the French Revolution threatened to break down all the boundaries of constitutional tradition both in government and art. By it the hereditary doctrines embodied in the Declaration of Right were extended into sympathy with the perfectly abstract principles of liberty proclaimed by the French philosophers as the Rights of Man; and, by an analogous intellectual movement, the freedom of invention, which had always been claimed as their birthright by English poets, in opposition to the supposed Aristotelian "rules," was now transformed into a metaphysical theory, which demanded for the individual imagination liberty to dispense with rules of every kind.

The poets by whom the new principles of art, as well as of politics, were first philosophically defended were known as the Lake School. Technically, indeed, the term "school" is hardly applicable to them, for the three leading writers who were classed under the name differed among themselves in the most striking manner as regards their thought and style. But they were united by certain fundamental agreements. All of them were in sympathy with the early principles and aspirations of the French Revolution, and in active opposition to the national policy of the English Government; all of them at a later period changed their views and became vehement anti-Jacobins; and, lastly, all of them, severing themselves, in theory, from the principle of historic continuity, by which the diction and versification of English poetry had hitherto been determined, proceeded, for the most part, upon the lines suggested by individual impulse. They were thus equally removed in practice from the aristocratic, classical school of Pope and his followers, and from the democratic, romantic school of Ramsay, Fergusson, and Burns.

The eldest of the three, and the first pioneer of the new departure in poetry, was William Wordsworth (1770–1850). Bred in the society

of Cumberland "statesmen," he was secluded during his childhood and youth from all contact with city life, and, in the Arcadian isolation of lake and mountain scenery, habituated himself to an impassioned observation of the moods of external Nature and of his own mind. The imaginative tendencies thus formed in him were strengthened by his literary studies at Cambridge; and, after he had taken his degree, a tour in France inclined him to a strong sympathy with the abstract principles of the French Revolution. On his return to England he engaged in a political controversy with Richard Watson, Bishop of Llandaff, in which he appeared as an advocate for some of the doctrines of Tom Paine. At the same time he published a volume of poems, chiefly characterised by an attempt to express an enthusiastic love of Nature in the conventional diction of the heroic couplet. Soon afterwards, in his *Female Vagrant*, he employed the Spenser stanza as a vehicle for describing the common objects and experiences in which his imagination was interested. But it is evident that, finding these elaborate and artificial metres unsuited to his purpose, he became more and more disposed to look for his instrument in the simplicity of the ballad metre, and to free himself in longer compositions from the trammels of rhyme. In 1795 he made the acquaintance of Coleridge; and the two almost immediately formed an alliance which exercised on the genius of each a reciprocal influence, ultimately destined to react on the public taste. The firstfruits of their cooperation were *Lyrical Ballads*, published in 1798, the character of which is thus described by Coleridge:

"The thought suggested itself—to which of us I do not recollect—that a series of poems might be composed of two sorts. In the one the incidents and agents were to be in, in part at least, supernatural; and the excellence aimed at was to consist in the interesting of the affections by the dramatic truth of such emotions as would naturally accompany such situations, supposing them real. And real in this sense they have been to every human being who, from whatever source of delusion, has at any time believed himself under supernatural agency. For the second class, subjects were to be chosen from ordinary life; the characters and incidents were to be such as will be found in every village and its vicinity where there is a meditative and feeling mind to seek after them, or to notice them when they present themselves." (*Biographia Literaria*, Vol. II, Chap. 1.)

The first class was represented by Coleridge's *Ancient Mariner*; the larger part of the volume being made up of poems by Wordsworth, written in his new ballad manner, mixed with others in a more elevated style of blank verse. Neither attempt was at first received with much favour by the reading public. Wordsworth was inclined to attribute the ill-success of the volume to the appearance in it of *The Ancient Mariner*. Coleridge, with more justice, ascribed it to the over-simple style of some of Wordsworth's poems, which offered an obvious mark for critical

ridicule. In 1800 a second edition of *Lyrical Ballads* was issued, accompanied by a preface, wherein Wordsworth offered a philosophical defence of his poetical practice, both as regards conception and expression, and seemed to argue that his were the only principles on which true poetry could be composed. The somewhat arrogant motive of his reasoning was indicated with particular emphasis in his theory of poetical diction : "The first volume of these poems," he said, "has been already submitted to general perusal. It was published as an experiment which I hoped might be of some use to ascertain how far, by fitting to metrical arrangement a selection of the real language of men in a state of vivid sensation, that sort of pleasure and that quantity of pleasure may be imparted which a poet may rationally endeavour to impart." At the same time he endeavoured to prove that poets of established reputation had imparted pleasure by irrational means, and declared that, if his reasoning were right, men would have to revise their opinion as to the merits of the greatest writers of verse. On the question of poetical diction Coleridge was completely at issue with Wordsworth, and the difference between them led the former to the reasoned system put forward in *Biographia Literaria* as the philosophical basis of all poetical composition.

Samuel Taylor Coleridge (1772–1834) had by far the greatest natural genius of those who composed the Lake School. Distinguished for powers of discursive eloquence in conversation perhaps beyond any man since the time of Socrates, he could bring an array of arguments, images, and emotions to bear with intense conviction upon any subject that for the moment excited his enthusiasm. But he was wanting in the moral force and resolution required to bring his manifold intuitions to a practical result. His mind was full of title-pages ; he saw in a moment of inspiration the contents of a book, which he imagined himself to be writing, but of which not a page ever appeared. He sometimes thought out a whole system of apparently connected metaphysics, only to acknowledge, when it was reduced to form, that it had no basis of reality. Hence he could not compare with Wordsworth—inferior as the latter was to him as a philosophical critic—in the influence he exercised on the course of English poetry.

He agreed with his friend in the principle of cutting loose from all historical continuity in the practice of the art ; since for history and fact he cared nothing. He agreed with him also in making the mind of the individual poet the centre of all poetical production. "The Imagination," he says, "I consider either as primary or secondary. The primary Imagination I hold to be the living power and prime agent of all human perception, and as a repetition in the finite mind of the eternal act of creation in the infinite I AM. The secondary Imagination I consider as an echo of the former, coexisting with the conscious will, yet still as identical with the primary in the kind of its agency, and

differing only in degree and in the mode of its operation. It dissolves, diffuses, dissipates, in order to re-create: or, when this process is rendered impossible, yet still at all events it struggles to idealise and to unify. It is essentially vital, even as all objects (as objects) are essentially fixed and dead."

Something of the same kind had already been said by Schiller and Schelling in Germany; and Coleridge, working on the views of the latter, constructed a theory of the association of ideas, to form a philosophical basis for that peculiar analytical exercise of the imagination which Wordsworth and he alike regarded as its proper function in poetry. Had their philosophy been founded on universal truth, new rules of practice might have been deduced from it; for, when the design of *Lyrical Ballads* was framed, both poets were enthusiastic believers in the principles advocated by the apostles of the French Revolution. But, when the time came to reduce their conceptions to form, it was evident that the ideas of poetical expression, embodied, on the one hand, in lyrics like *Alice Fell*, and, on the other, in poems like *The Ancient Mariner*, were to each other as opposite poles. Wordsworth, on his side, had no conception of poetry regarded as an art. Restricting his view of it entirely to the ideas existing in the mind of the individual poet, he defined it as "the spontaneous overflow of powerful emotion." And, holding that the true principles of poetical expression lay in the close imitation of the language actually used by men in a state of excitement, he thought that this could be observed in its most perfect, because its most simple form, in the idioms of the peasantry.

Coleridge, on the contrary, a man endowed with the finest perceptions of artistic propriety, saw that the system of Wordsworth broke down both in theory and practice. In an admirable chapter of his *Biographia Literaria* (Vol. II, Chap. 5), he showed that metre is an essential element in the expression of poetic thought; that the use of metre entails a peculiar arrangement of words; that the kind of language in use among the peasantry is quite unsuitable for the higher purposes of poetry; and that, when Wordsworth himself wrote in a really poetical manner, he discarded his own principles. But, though he criticised so destructively the philosophy of his friend, he made no attempt to organise any artistic system of his own. Satisfied with defining the sense in which he held the poet to be a creator, according to his theory of association, he left the subject with the dogma that poetry, as being the utterance of the true poet, was "the best words in the best places."

The fundamentally weak point in the poetical philosophy of both Coleridge and Wordsworth was the ignoring of an historically-minded audience, as an essential condition in the art of metrical composition. They started on their career with the belief that human society was about to be regenerated by the French Revolution, but they were also fully

persuaded that the Revolution would proceed according to their own ideas of it. Each held that the poet was, above all things, an inspired prophet, who could discover truths to which mankind in general were blind, and by the strength of imagination could place objects before the world in a new and true light. They therefore considered themselves entitled to dispense with the lessons of experience, and with historic continuity as a principle of action alike in politics and art. By degrees their eyes were opened to the tyrannic tendencies of the Revolutionary movement, which, when perceived, made them eager to burn the idols they had hitherto adored. Their desertion naturally exasperated their old allies; and party prejudice, quite as much as critical antipathy, blinded a large portion of the nation to the merits of their poetical experiments. The *Edinburgh Review*, in particular, as the organ of the Whigs, was emphatic in its denunciation of their artistic principles.

When the passion of partisanship on either side subsided, it was seen that the great achievement of Wordsworth was his enlargement of the domain of poetry. This had, before his time, been, as a rule, limited by forms devoted to the representation, in some shape, of the active life of men and manners; Wordsworth, by his impassioned feeling, embraced in the art the contemplation of the still life of external Nature. The character of his poetical genius is best described in his own noble lines:

Such was the Boy—but for the growing Youth  
What soul was his when, from the naked top  
Of some bold headland, he beheld the sun  
Rise up, and bathe the world in light! He looked—  
Ocean and earth, the solid frame of earth,  
And Ocean's liquid mass, beneath him lay  
In gladness and deep joy. The clouds were touched,  
And in their silent faces did he read  
Unutterable love. Sound needed none,  
Nor any voice of joy: his spirit drank  
The spectacle! sensation, soul, and form,  
All melted into him: they swallowed up  
His animal being; in them did he live,  
And by them did he live: they were his life.

To find metrical forms for the expression of feelings like these was not easy; nor indeed was Wordsworth largely gifted with artistic invention. In his longer poems, where he adopts a narrative or dramatic manner, his style almost instinctively falls into prose; his real poetical successes consist in his appropriation, for his own purposes, of vehicles like the Ode, the Sonnet, or some well-established stanza, which enable him to communicate to the reader lofty yet intelligible thoughts in the pure and noble English of which he was master. When he is writing about himself, or about common objects, in *The Prelude* and *The Excursion*, he seems never to be aware whether a thought, as he expresses it, will strike the reader as bald, trivial, or absurd: he is convinced that

everything he says, as being “the spontaneous overflow of powerful emotion,” must be worth saying in metre. But in compositions like *Laodamia*, the *Ode on Immortality*, and the finer Sonnets, in which the thought has been carefully selected and assimilated, before being expressed, the maxim of Horace is fully justified,

*Cui lecta potenter erit res  
Nec facundia deseret hunc nec lucidus ordo.*

The genius of Coleridge was of an altogether opposite kind. He has informed us that the part assigned to him in *Lyrical Ballads* was to produce poems of which the incidents and agents were to be “supernatural.” But the compositions to which these words seem to point, *The Ancient Mariner*, *Christabel*, *Kubla Khan*, *Love*, *The Pains of Sleep*, and the like, are not so much “supernatural” in scope and motive, as contrary to the usual order of nature; the aim of the poet being to link together detached images in metrical words, and in such a manner as to produce that effect of paradoxical reality experienced in dreams. No poet was ever so well qualified to accomplish this task as Coleridge. His vivid imagination, intensified by his habit of opium-eating, had made him acquainted with the “truths of emotion,” familiar to “every human being, who from whatever source of delusion, has at any time believed himself under supernatural agency.” His fine powers of invention enabled him to communicate these sensations to the reader by his skilful employment of the abrupt manner of the ancient ballads, which raises in the imagination an idea of wonder and mystery, quite different from that produced by the regular order of epic narrative. The more conventional compositions in which he seeks to embody the reasoned results of his philosophy—though many of them, such as *France* and the *Hymn in the Vale of Chamouni*, are nobly poetical—are much less characteristic of the man than *tours de force* like *The Ancient Mariner* or *Christabel*, and show the influence of Wordsworth on his imagination. He had a keen sense of humour which exhibits itself in his parodies of the sonnets of Lloyd, Lamb, and himself, as representing the new school of affected simplicity.

Robert Southey (1774–1843) was associated with Coleridge and Wordsworth in early sympathy with the principles of the French Revolution. He made the acquaintance of Coleridge in 1792, when he was an undergraduate at Balliol, and, accepting the Unitarian views of the latter, joined with him in framing a scheme of “pantisocracy.” His early poems, *Wat Tyler*, *Joan of Arc*, and *The Fall of Robespierre*, are all strongly coloured with republican sentiment. He abandoned sooner than his friends the Revolutionary cause, and in 1806 accepted a government pension. In 1813 he was made Poet Laureate, after the post had been offered to Scott, who declined it. This political defection was thrown in his teeth in 1821, when, having written a poem in English

hexameters on the death of George III, entitled *The Vision of Judgment*, in the preface to which he alluded to Byron and Shelley as the "Satanic school," the Laureate was assailed by Byron in his famous satire of the same name, and was reminded of his youthful sympathies with the Revolution, illustrated in his *Wat Tyler*, which had been surreptitiously published in 1817.

Southey's theories as to the art of poetry are less subversive than those of Wordsworth. He was above all things a student; and his imaginative efforts were for the most part devoted to enlarging the boundaries of poetry by excursions into the realms of literature. In the preface to his collected works in 1837 he described the character of his poetical genius as follows: "When I add, what has been the greatest of all advantages, that I have passed more than half my life in retirement, conversing with books rather than men, constantly and unwearingly engaged in literary pursuits, communing with my own heart, and taking that course which upon mature reflection seemed best to myself, I have said everything necessary to account for the characteristics of my poetry, whatever they may be."

This seclusion from society, which seemed to Southey a qualification for the composition of good poetry, was in the judgment of others rather a drawback. Byron's lines on the Lake School are suggestive:

You, gentlemen, by dint of long seclusion  
From better company, have kept your own  
At Keswick, and by long continued fusion  
Of one another's minds, at last are grown  
To deem, as a most logical conclusion,  
That poesy has wreaths for you alone.

And it is obvious that Southey's determination to follow his own line, without considering the expectations of his readers, is answerable for that frigidity and defect of human interest which petrify his long quasi-epics. His scheme of a series of heroic poems, embodying the essence of the principal mythologies of the world, was formed after reading Picart's *Religious Ceremonies*. *Thalaba* and *Madoc*, its firstfruits, are too cold and abstract to be interesting; but the notes by which they are accompanied are attractive in their wide and curious learning. *The Curse of Kehama* is superior in structure to these poems, the conclusion of it—suggested by Beckford's *Vathek*—being really dramatic, and the movement of the verse at once stately and flexible. The style of Southey's ballads is marked by the homeliness and triviality which lower the character of too much of Wordsworth's poetry. Some of his characteristics as a poet are reflected in the *Gebir* and *Hellenica* of his friend Walter Savage Landor (1775–1864), who, viewing all modern things through the medium of classical literature, failed to inspire his poetry with the movement of actual life, and the coldness of whose verse is emphasised by its striking contrast with the animation

of his *Imaginary Conversations*, which show an admirable power of entering into the thoughts and characters of the interlocutors.

Half a generation passed away before the effects of Wordsworth's and Coleridge's theory and practice in the art of poetry became apparent. Their views had little influence with the leaders of organised society. Living remote from the centre of affairs, in secluded places like Nether Stowey or the English Lakes, they could make their ideas felt only through enterprising publishers or in the columns of newspapers. They were associated in the minds of the reading public with an unpopular and unpatriotic party. Opposed to them were all the powers of fashionable society, political interest, and literary culture. But, while their voices seemed to be those of men crying in the wilderness, their cause was being secretly aided by cosmopolitan forces which had long established a base in the heart of society, and continued to exercise a dissolving influence on the general fabric of opinion and belief. Prominent among these forces was the reaction in favour of medievalism, which had made great progress since the time of the two Wartons. Percy's *Reliques*, Macpherson's *Ossian*, Chatterton's Rowley forgeries, had all allied themselves with the sentimental appreciation of the more primitive types of social emotion; and Horace Walpole's experiments in Gothic architecture had revived, in an external form, the taste for the antique. The same dilettante critic had also with his *Castle of Otranto* opened the flood-gates of supernaturalism in fiction. In another direction, romantic and sentimental ideas kept pouring in from Germany. The dramatic tastes represented in some of the plays of Kotzebue and in *The Robbers* of Schiller were received with much favour in the theatres; while German spectralism, illustrated in Bürger's famous ballad of *Lenore*, inspired a whole army of English imitators, of whom the most successful was Matthew Gregory Lewis (1775–1818), best known as author of *The Monk*. Most powerful of all, as proceeding from the source of the highest genius, was the sentimental theorising of Rousseau, which, falling in with the self-secluding, semi-monastic instincts of the time, seemed to offer a philosophic starting-point to all who chafed at the restraints of traditional law and order. These varied influences, working together, combined to produce in society an atmosphere of Romance, which inspired the national imagination with the ideas outwardly embodied in the poetry of Byron and Shelley.

These poets possessed all the qualifications that were wanting to Coleridge and Wordsworth for promoting the cause of the Revolution from the interior of society. As the representatives, immediate or prospective, of the noble and gentle families of England, they could speak for the governing classes, and their poetry claimed a hearing from the public which was denied to those who spoke merely from the position of men of letters. Byron (1788–1824) in particular was possessed of the

gifts and station required to draw to himself the attention of his countrymen. The descendant of a long line of noble ancestors, vigorous if lawless in character, he succeeded when a boy to a great position and to an impoverished estate. His own temperament, intensely morbid, was rendered more so by the injudicious treatment of it by his mother, who, after her husband had wasted all her fortune, was left a widow when her son was only three years old. At the age of thirteen he was sent to Harrow, a school at that time largely recruited from the sons of the Whig aristocracy, and noted for the lawlessness of its scholars. Here he distinguished himself by his pugnacity, and was the leader in two rebellions. In his eighteenth year he entered Trinity College, Cambridge, where his habits were equally turbulent; though he qualified himself for his M.A. degree in 1808. In 1807 he published his first volume of poems, with the title *Hours of Idleness*. His verses, crude in feeling and workmanship, were coloured with the romantic sentimentalism and introspection then fashionable. But they showed a passionate sensibility, and were far from deserving the contemptuous notice bestowed on them by the *Edinburgh Review* in March, 1808. This criticism called into play the active and satiric side of Byron's genius; and his vigorous retaliation on his critics in *English Bards and Scotch Reviewers* was received by the public with interest and favour. In 1809 he left England to travel for two years on the Continent, during which time he wrote the first two cantos of *Childe Harold's Pilgrimage*. These he published with reluctance, having himself but a poor opinion of them; and it was with real surprise that, after their appearance, he awoke—to use his own words—one morning and found himself famous. The glimpse of Childe Harold's character given in the first canto, combined with the poetic descriptions and meditative reflections inspired by his wide wanderings, exactly hit the taste of an aristocratic society, devoured by *ennui*, which recognised in the sentiment of the self-banished Childe a lively image of its own suppressed opinions. *The Giaour* and *The Bride of Abydos* published in 1813, and followed in 1814 by *The Corsair* and *Lara*, added to the reputation Byron had already acquired as the orator of romantic feeling.

But in 1816 the whole character of his genius was altered by his domestic misfortunes. He had married in the previous year; and his daughter, Augusta Ada, had just been born to him, when his wife resolved to leave him. The reason of her action has never been fully explained, but it seems probable that her husband's morbid habits had caused her to believe him mad. On the other hand the malignant scandal of society raised a public outcry against his character, which became more virulent after the appearance of *The Siege of Corinth* and *Parisina*. Perceiving himself to be regarded as a moral outcast, he left England in 1816 and never revisited it. The effect on his genius was twofold. When he became famous his satiric passion had subsided, and his introspective

temper was satisfied with reproducing its romanticism in forms such as the figure of Lara, suggested by the fictions of Mrs Radcliffe. In the third canto of *Childe Harold*, published in 1816, and in *Manfred*, which appeared in 1817, the expression of his self-consciousness became doubly intense; but his satiric genius was also roused to vengeance against the society which had expelled him; and in *Don Juan* (1819) and *The Vision of Judgment* (1822), he turned upon his moral censors with the same reckless energy he had displayed in his boyish satire against his Scotch reviewers. His fiery and rebellious career was brought to a manly conclusion at Missolonghi in 1824, as he was taking a leading part in the war for the liberation of Greece.

The genius of Percy Bysshe Shelley (1792–1822) offers in many respects a striking contrast to that of his friend and fellow-poet. Like Byron he was born of an ancient family; and the marks of race displayed themselves in his refined and patrician features. But in him aristocratic distinction had developed into a singularity which approached to madness. From an early age he devoured romances, and, inspired by his love of chemical experiments and by the revolutionary theories of the time, began to dream of the unlimited powers of human nature. At Eton his peculiar tastes secluded him from the public life of the school; at Oxford his wild political enthusiasm brought him under the notice of the authorities of his college, and led to the severe measure of his expulsion. While the imagination of Byron, nurtured in a social atmosphere of supernatural fiction, and brooding over his own destiny, caused him to project his personality into a hundred shapes, Shelley's fancy was absorbed in the idealisation of the human race. He had formed a conception of society founded on the theories put forward by William Godwin (1756–1836) in his *Political Justice*; and his mind was peopled with shadows evoked from the books he read, for which he was constantly seeking anti-types in the world without him. Byron conceived his imaginary actions in the deeds of various kinds of rebels and outlaws, suggested by his own character and circumstances, and strongly coloured with sentiments familiar to all his readers. Shelley created a visionary world, in which he himself was always a leading actor, but the forms of which existed only in his own consciousness. "You talk Utopian," as he makes Byron say to him in *Julian and Maddalo*. In his eagerness to propagate his political enthusiasms he resembled Coleridge; but he was devoid of the humour which enabled the latter to realise the causes of the failure of his journalistic schemes. Completely ignorant of the nature of mankind, and passionately sincere in his own convictions, Shelley was in the habit of investing his most common-place acquaintances with ideal attributes, as in *Epipsychedion*, and of regarding them as demons when they came short of his expectations. At the same time his consistent endeavours to put his theories into practice brought him frequently into collision either with the laws

or the customs of his country. This perpetual conflict with society exaggerated in his mind the ideas of pessimism on which his philosophy rested. He imagined evil to have gained the supreme power in the world, and held that the first duty of man was to aid the suppressed principle of good to overthrow tyranny, by subverting all existing authority and established opinion.

A character so single-minded and quixotic was more fitted, with all its genius, to shock than to convert society. Shelley's opinions reacted on the style of his poetry. He used epic and dramatic forms to embody his political ideas; but in his representation of human affairs his readers found none of the conditions which centuries of great poetical tradition had led them to expect. While their fancy was dazzled with a succession of sublime images, a poem like *The Revolt of Islam* presented them with no intelligible order of ideal action, and no character whose motives and behaviour could win their sympathetic admiration. They were forced to trust themselves entirely to the conduct of the poet's capricious imagination, and to accustom themselves to the company and conversation of the disembodied spirits to whom he introduced them. Even in his *Prometheus Unbound*, where the subject, with sound judgment, is associated with ideas made familiar by a drama so famous as the *Prometheus Vinctus*, the revolutionary idea, embodied in the person of Prometheus, fades after the first act, and all distinctness of form and order dies away into vaporous landscapes and mystical choruses. Landor's graphic description of Coleridge's poetical style, "bright colours without form, sublimely void," applies with equal or greater justice to the style of Shelley. The excellence of his poetry is concentrated in himself: it is essentially lyric. When he lighted on a subject which connected him by human sympathy with his readers,—such as the ideal description of himself in *Prince Athanase*; or when he expressed in verse his own griefs, hopes, aspirations, and despondencies,—as in *Adonais*, the *Ode to the Skylark*, and *To the West Wind*, the *Lines written among the Euganean Hills*, or those composed *In Dejection at Naples*,—he touched chords of unique beauty; but he is, as a rule, powerless to represent the objects required to arouse pity, terror, or indignation. In the single exception, *The Cenci*, which is written with admirable self-restraint, and the characters of which are distinctly conceived, the poet himself says that he deliberately avoided poetical ornament, concentrating his efforts on a vivid realisation of actual events; at the same time the subject of the play was too horrible for representation on the stage.

The poetry both of Byron and Shelley was revolutionary, but not in the same sense as that of Wordsworth. The latter, like Coleridge, sympathised at the outset with the principles of the French Revolution, because he did not foresee the effect they would produce. He thought that they could be assimilated, without disturbing the religious and moral basis of society, which, however, he hoped might be reconstructed

on the lines of his own imagination. Hence the analytic process which, with the approval of Coleridge, he assigns to poetic imagination, placing its chief duty in discovering to the world the nature of common objects in their true, that is, their poetic, relations. In Byron and Shelley, on the other hand, imagination performs its time-honoured creative functions in a new way. Byron creates entirely out of his own individuality, Shelley out of his philosophical fancy; both of them, like the old poets, carry the imagination of the reader into an ideal world. In this respect at least they were conservative. Byron was never tired of ridiculing the experiments of the Lake School from the traditional point of view; and Shelley in *Peter Bell the Third* satirises Wordsworth's attempts at poetical creation by means of imaginative analysis.

In another respect the poetical practice of Byron and Shelley was far more conservative than Wordsworth's theory of the art. Their diction was completely removed from the language of prose, and in different degrees was founded on the metrical example of their predecessors. The style of Byron in particular was essentially an extension and amplification of the principles of Dryden and Pope; that is to say, it was grounded upon the colloquial usage of educated society refined by literary selection. Familiar with the conversation of men and women in the most aristocratic walks of life, he employed all their idioms with fine audacity, in various established metres, as his purpose required. He wrote with equal facility in the heroic couplet, blank verse, Spenser stanza, and *ottava rima*. His style, often careless, tawdry, obscure, is never affected; when he is writing under the inspiration of strong feeling it is animated by a tremendous force and directness, unapproached by any of his contemporaries, or indeed by any other poet. Shelley's style, less nervous, is far more spiritual and refined. To him the lines of Drayton on Marlowe seem to apply with special force, as one who,

Bathed in the Thespian springs,  
Had in him the bright translunary things  
That the first poets had; his raptures were  
All air and fire, which made his verses clear;  
For that fine madness still he did retain,  
Which rightly should possess a poet's brain.

He moves in his far-off sphere with all the swiftness and ease of a disembodied spirit. Never attempting condensation and comparison, he builds his aerial imagery, as it rises in his mind, out of an apparently boundless vocabulary, which seems to adapt itself instinctively to all the windings of his thought. But he uses the established metres of his country; and, in the larger part of his verse, iambic or trochaic rhythms are adequate vehicles for the remotest flights of his fancy. In two characteristic passages he has described his own aim in metrical composition. In the preface to *The Cenci*, he says that he has written "without an over-fastidious and learned choice of words. In this respect

I entirely agree with those modern critics who assert that, in order to move men to true sympathy, we must use the familiar language of men; and that our great ancestors, the ancient English poets, are the writers a study of whom might incite us to do that for our own age which they have done for theirs. But it must be the real language of men in general, and not that of any particular class to whose society the writer happens to belong."

And again, in the preface to *The Revolt of Islam*, in which he has stamped his own individuality on the Spenser stanza, he says: "I have sought to avoid the imitation of any style of language or versification peculiar to the original minds of which it is the character, designing that, even if what I have produced be worthless, it should still be properly my own. I have simply clothed my thoughts in what appeared to me the most obvious and appropriate language. A person familiar with nature, and with the most celebrated productions of the human mind, can scarcely err in following the instinct, with respect to selection of language, produced by that familiarity."

With the name of Byron is naturally associated that of his biographer, Thomas Moore (1779–1852). Moore stands to Byron and Shelley, in the group of nineteenth-century Romantic poets, much in the same relation as Gay stood to Pope, Swift, and Arbuthnot, in the Classic confederacy of the previous century. With a poetical genius far inferior to that of his companions, he possessed certain genial and popular qualities that endeared him to the society with which the others were at war. He resembled Gay in the facility with which he could adapt himself to the taste of the moment, and in the readiness with which he subordinated the art of poetry to fashionable demands. The son of an Irish grocer and wine-merchant, his sympathies were early enlisted in the cause of Irish nationality; but he kept free from the entanglements of the conspiracy in which his friend Emmet was involved. Like Gay, he understood the art of music; and the foundation of his success as a poet was laid in the skill with which he composed melodious and flowing lyrics for old Irish airs. These, being often inspired by the nationalist movement, excited enthusiasm and admiration in Ireland, and, falling in with the catchword of liberty employed by the English Whigs, were welcomed by the leaders of the Opposition, in whose houses Moore, a sweet singer of his own melodies, became a familiar and petted figure. When the Whigs were estranged from the Prince Regent, Moore placed at the disposal of the party his gift of easy, familiar verse; and his *Twopenny Post-bag* reflected successfully the humours of the not very interesting political intrigues in the period preceding the battle of Waterloo. In 1816 he turned the public taste for Oriental romance to account in the most ambitious of his poetical efforts, *Lalla Rookh*. He took great pains in accumulating details of Eastern manners for the colouring of this poem, and contrived to blend them very happily with a form of romance borrowed from

Beckford's *Vathek* and Mrs Radcliffe's *Mysteries of Udolpho*. The versification of the poem is a mixture of Byron's style in *Lara* and *The Giaour* with the easy mellifluousness of Moore's own *Irish Melodies*. Its saccharine sweetness gave it an immense popularity, which, owing to a want of nerves and sinews in the diction, has proved fleeting. But there is excellent ingenuity in the prose narrative employed as a framework for the series of poems; and the whole design, including the parody of the solemn criticism of the *Edinburgh* and *Quarterly Reviews* in the character of Fadladeen, entitles *Lalla Rookh* to a permanent place in the history of English poetry.

If, however, poetry be regarded in the sphere of creative invention, rather than in that of lyrical self-expression, no writer of the day can compare, in respect of largeness of achievement, with Walter Scott (1771–1832). A Tory in politics, a Conservative in literary taste, the amplitude of his humanity and his wide sympathies enabled him to conquer a new world of imagination, which lay beyond the range either of the Lake School philosophy or of revolutionary idealism. He was the descendant of Scottish borderers; and, though his father, a Writer to the Signet in Edinburgh, was a steady Hanoverian loyalist, of whose principles he himself entirely approved, his own fancy was coloured with all the Jacobite sympathies which had distinguished his remoter ancestors. From very early days his mind was steeped in the traditions of feudalism, and he delighted in the quaint medieval terms and customs of the Scotch law, of which he was for many years a student. In literature he was an ardent admirer of the classical principles of Dryden, Swift, Pope, and Johnson; at the same time his imagination was stirred by the movement of German supernaturalism; he naturally sympathised with the reaction in favour of the old ballad poetry peculiar to his own border-land; he felt the intellectual influence, though he dissented from the poetical practice, of the Lake School; and his ear was caught with the novelty of the rhythms embodied in Coleridge's *Christabel*. Hence he had all the imaginative qualities required to expand the taste of a nation resolved at once to abide by the dearly-won experience of the past, and to surmount the barriers of a mechanical tradition.

Scott's earliest exploration of the new world of romance was in verse. He joined Matthew Lewis in the latter's attempt to acclimatise the German "spectral" school, and contributed to *Tales of Wonder* (1801) a translation of Bürger's ballad *Lenore*. But he speedily diverged into the path to which he had been led by his study of the ballads of his native country. In 1803 he inserted in the third volume of his *Border Minstrelsy* the admirable ballad *Cadyow Castle*, in which he first showed how the swiftness and energy of the old ballad style might be combined with classical polish and selection in the use of metrical language. The form of his first long poem, *The Lay of the Last Minstrel* (1805), was to a great extent the result of chance. Springing

out of a promise to Lady Dalkeith to embody in verse a wild Border legend, the primal idea was gradually augmented with the conception of the last of the minstrels, the weird goblin atmosphere of the story being evidently imitated from the style of *Christabel*. When these elements were pieced together, it was seen that Scott had contrived to invent a new species of epic poem. While this lacked the loftiness of the old epic, it possessed the swiftness of the Homeric narrative; and every English reader was delighted to find himself in an ideal world, where a very slight knowledge of history enabled him to sympathise with the feelings and actions of fictitious personages. The octosyllabic verse of the poem, though below the dignity of epic, was well adapted to the character of the incidents related; and its over-facility was restrained by a judicious mixture of *rime couée*. This experiment was extended and improved in *Marmion* (1808) and *The Lady of the Lake* (1810), both of which abound in passages of animated incident and description, the battle-pieces in each being of especial excellence. *Rokeby* (1813) and *The Lord of the Isles* (1815) are products of a period of declining inspiration.

More lasting in its effects, because based on deeper and older foundations, was the revolution in romantic fiction accomplished by Scott in the great series of the Waverley Novels. The English novel, in the form under which we know it, sprang into popularity towards the middle of the eighteenth century with Richardson's *Pamela*. It was the product of a long and varied history. The novel and the romance had completely distinct origins, the former being the descendant of the ancient *fabliau*, the latter of the *roman*, or history written in the Romance tongue, as distinguished from history written in Latin. Hence from the earliest times the essence of the novel (*novella*) consisted in the imitation of real life and manners, while the romance was a record of wonderful events which were believed to have actually happened in the remote past. But both types underwent strange transformations. The fate of the *fabliau*, or short story of life and manners, orally told, was to lose itself in the gradual development of the drama, becoming, in its new form of existence, the groundwork of tragedy and comedy. On the other hand the romance by degrees dropped its original character of history, while retaining the accidental accompaniments of magic and marvel; the structure of the Spanish romances, which descend from *Amadis of Gaul*, is radically different from that of the old chivalrous romances of the *trouvères*, represented in Malory's *History of King Arthur*. Cervantes gave the first idea of the manner in which the story of real life might be combined with the wonders of romance, by his invention of the satiric narrative of *Don Quixote*. But for a long time the types of the novel and the romance were kept entirely distinct. The former, coloured with all the elements it had acquired from the drama, moved, under various shapes, along the path marked out for it by Le Sage in *Gil Blas*, as the exponent of everyday action and character; the latter,

aiming at the serious and heroic, after the tradition of the Spanish romance-writers, attained what imaginative results it could by an alliance with Pastoralism, as in the *Arcadia* of Sannazaro, or with Court allegory, as in the *Grand Cyrus* and *Clélie* of Mlle. de Scudéry.

In England during the eighteenth century the type of the novel prevailed decidedly over that of the romance. The novel insensibly took the place of the decayed poetic drama, presenting to the reader in a book the strongly-imagined actions and passions which, in the time of Shakespeare, had been exhibited on the stage. The situations almost always reflected the incidents of contemporary life; at the same time the distinctly ethical character of thought in the eighteenth century compelled the novelist to invest his stories with something of the gravity peculiar to the romance, and to disown the trivial purposes of the old *fabliau*. Richardson's intentions in his novels are always directly moral; Smollett, who in his novels of adventure follows the footsteps of Le Sage, professes that his object is "to subject folly to ridicule and vice to indignation"; while Fielding, a disciple of Cervantes, gives dignity to his descriptions of real life by philosophical discourses and invocations of the Muse.

Horace Walpole was the first to employ romance in fiction for the mere purpose of amusement. His aim in *The Castle of Otranto* (1764) was simply to beguile *ennui* by the discovery of novel sensations, and for this purpose he sought to revive the magic of the old Spanish romances in a modern form. His experiment opened the door to German spectralism; and this again inspired a host of English imitators. Mrs Radcliffe in *The Mysteries of Udolpho* (1794) and many other stories, Matthew Lewis in *The Monk* (1795), and Charles Maturin in *The Fatal Revenge* (1807) and *Melmoth the Wanderer* (1820), all based their romantic style on the tragic horror aroused by the presence of the supernatural.

There was an obvious limitation in the imaginative capacity both of the novel and the romance, as they were each treated up to the close of the eighteenth century. Both were lacking in the element of the universal, the ideal quality, from whatever source derived, which makes a fictitious creation interesting at all times, in all places, and to all persons. In so far as the novel treated of human character and passion, it possessed this element, which was, however, liable to be neutralised by an excessive minuteness in the description of manners, since these, being in their essence accidental and transitory, tended when obsolete to destroy the illusive life of the ideal creation. The supernatural romance, on the contrary, depended for its interest entirely on mystery: it aroused a feeling of wonder or terror by its description of dreadful effects of which the cause was unexplained; its authors also sought to trace the feeling of supernatural awe to psychological sources. Hence the creations of the romance writers soon lost their vitality; the narrator might divine accurately the means by which the readers of his own day could be

astonished or frightened, but in his inventions he made no allowance for the advance of science, nor ever conceived of the coming of a sceptical generation in which children would turn with prosaic indifference from horrors which made the men and women of his own time afraid to go to bed.

By the exertion of sound judgment and a prodigious creative genius, Scott, blending the two types, extended the horizons both of the novel and the romance in such a manner as to suit the adventurous spirit of his age. He saw that in history, the source out of which the romance originally sprang, he possessed the empire of a region which enabled him at once to dispense with supernatural machinery and to avail himself of all the interest arising out of the description of life and manners. When they believe that something *has* happened, men, as Aristotle says, are ready to believe in an imaginative account of *how* it happened; and, by throwing back the time of his tales beyond ordinary memory, Scott transported the fancy of his readers into what was for them almost a supernatural world. At the same time his knowledge of living men, and his vast acquaintance with details of manners and customs in earlier times, enabled him to give the *dramatis personae* of his ideal action all the vivid colour of reality. Consequently Carlyle's attempt to lower the greatness of his genius fails; and his well-known criticism of Scott—"we might say in a short word, which covers a long matter, that your Shakespeare fashions his characters from the heart outwards; your Scott fashions them from the skin inwards, never getting near the heart of them: the one set become living men and women; the other amount to little more than mechanical cases, deceptively-painted automatons"—is radically unsound. It is true of course that Scott's heroes and heroines, because they are, as a rule, of another age, move in the midst of an atmosphere and a "light that never was on sea and land"; it is equally true that, in their dialogue, many of them do not use the ordinary idioms of men, but speak an ideal tongue invented by their creator out of his study of the old English dramatists. But that leaves untouched the truth and consistency of the whole creation. Setting aside trifling historical inaccuracies, which do not mar the reality of the general conception, and grammatical negligences, such as, with Scott's swift and vigorous habits of composition, are almost inevitable, the total effect of the Waverley Novels is to leave on the imagination of the reader, while he is under the spell of the magician, a complete illusion of nature and probability. If the "heroes" of Scott's stories—the Henry Mortons and the Frank Osbaldistones—are perhaps of the nature of "automatons," that is because they are only required for the action of the *romance*; their very unreality helps to set off the beings by whom they are surrounded—the Cuddie Headriggs, the Bailie Nicol Jarvies, the Dandie Dinmonts, and the Edie Ochiltrees—whose life and humour is the essence of the novel. So complete a fusion of the ideal and the real is not to be found outside the plays of Shakespeare.

Opposed at all points to the poetical practice of Scott, was that of Keats (1795–1821), who, in respect of his principle of poetical diction, stood apart from all the leaders of the literary revolution; but whose work also shows the influence of the various motives by which the others were inspired. He felt, like Wordsworth, the movement in the unseen life of nature; like Southey and Landor, he chose for his subjects themes of purely abstract interest, remote from the active forces of living society; he sympathised with Shelley, in the efforts of the latter for the emancipation of thought; and, with Coleridge, he devoted the whole strength of a powerful fancy to vitalise isolated images raised in his mind by what he found in books. In the case, however, of all these poets a mixed literary and colloquial usage was, in one sense or another, the groundwork of metrical style. If Wordsworth, in theory, recommended the idioms of the peasantry as the true models of poetical diction, what he aimed at was still the “real language of men”; however remote were the subjects chosen by Southey and Landor, however Utopian the lyrical flights of Shelley, the diction in which each of them couched his thoughts was direct, simple, and conformable to established models of English verse. Coleridge, no doubt, had given a certain air of antiquity to *The Ancient Mariner* and *Christabel*; but that was because of the dream-like, supernatural character of the story. Keats, on the other hand, while making frequent mention of himself in his poems, and therefore to that extent keeping the reader in a modern atmosphere, deliberately revived in his stories the metrical style of the Elizabethan poets. His manner is particularly emphatic in the use of decasyllabic iambic verse. Instead of following the tendency, developed in this metre through many generations, of marking the period of the sentence or clause by the second rhyme of the couplet, Keats reverted to the looser method of Drayton and William Browne, in which the limitation of the couplet itself counts for little or nothing in the rhetoric of the verse.

In following this course he obeyed partly an artistic theory, but, to a greater extent, his own temperament. When he first began to write he was under the influence of Leigh Hunt (1784–1859), who, in his *Story of Rimini*, had initiated what he regarded as an emancipating movement in the use of the couplet, by making the narrative style “familiar”; in other words, by embodying in serious verse the flippant conversational idioms of the metropolitan literary coteries in which he was a presiding spirit. In *Endymion* there is a mixture of Hunt’s vulgarity with the poetical naïveté of the Elizabethan or Jacobean poets, whom Keats took as his models. But, as his genius strengthened, he got rid of Hunt’s unfortunate manner; and in *Lamia*, in many respects the finest of his narrative poems, there is little in the diction discordant with the general effect of the ideal atmosphere.

The consequences of this experiment were remarkable, both in respect of what was avoided and of what was aimed at. In the first place it

tended to remove poetry from the action of contemporary life and society, the stimulus of which was so strongly felt by poets like Scott and Byron. Keats repudiated in poetry all connexion with history:

Hence, pageant history ! hence, gilded cheat !  
 Swart planet in the wilderness of deeds ;  
 Wide sea that one continuous murmur breeds  
 Along the pebbled shore of memory !

.....Juliet, leaning  
 Amid her window flowers—sighing—weaning  
 Tenderly her fancy from its maiden snow,  
 Doth more avail than these : the silver flow  
 Of Hero's tears, the swoon of Imogen,  
 Fair Pastorella in the bandits' den,  
 Are things to brood on with more ardency  
 Than the death-day of Empires.

What he aimed at in the production of poetry was the invention of permanent ideal forms, such as are proper to the arts of sculpture and painting. His friendship with the painter Haydon, and the growing aesthetic tendency in the public taste, encouraged this inclination of his genius. His imagination dwelt more and more on the unseen spiritual life revealed in the phenomena of external nature, as suggested by the philosophy of Wordsworth ; and, out of the images he derived from these and from the stories of Greek mythology, he created for himself an ideal world, the forms of which appeared to remain stable amidst the general flux of things. To each separate image, as it rose in his fancy, he sought to give life and colour by embodying it in appropriate words and rhythms. His success was proportioned to the fitness of the metrical vehicles which he chose for the presentation of his thoughts ; and—as in the parallel case of Wordsworth—his finest effects are produced in measures where some kind of definite limitation, such as that of the sonnet, the ode, the Spenserian stanza, or *ottava rima*, enables him to give to abstract images all the distinctness of vivid pictures. His Odes *To a Nightingale*, *On a Grecian Urn*, and *To Autumn*, are unrivalled for the richness of their word-painting: the same excellence reappears in the sonnet *On first looking into Chapman's Homer*, and in the stanzas in *St Agnes' Eve* describing a winter night and a painted window. On the other hand, in narrative poems of any length, which depend for their interest on the swiftness of ideal action and the representation of character and passion, the pictorial processes of poetic imagination appear insufficient for epic purposes. *Endymion* is an invertebrate structure, being made up of a number of episodes—many of them full of beauties in detail—the versification of which is correspondingly wanting in nerves and sinews. *Hyperion*, which is masterly in rhythm and diction, but is evidently incapable of being organised into an epic whole, was deliberately left as a fragment by the poet, professedly because it seemed too openly to challenge comparison with *Paradise Lost*. If we look to the conditions justly postulated by

Tasso for the construction of a modern epic, it is plain that the subject of Keats' poem does not contain the degree of human interest which the reader is entitled to expect in a large composition.

Any historic and comprehensive survey of the Romantic movement in English literature must necessarily take into account its weakness as well as its strength, its social no less than its artistic significance, its relation to the past equally with its bearing on the future. Romanticism was, in its essence, a struggle for the emancipation of individual liberty from all traditional restrictions, and it acquired its power from the doctrines of the French Revolution. Alone among the great literary group of that era in England, Scott was content to accept the existing order, civil and religious, as the basis of his artistic creations. Wordsworth, Coleridge, and Southey, no less than Byron and Shelley, sympathised at the outset with the aims of the French Revolution ; it was only when they realised its destructive consequences, from the first foreseen by Burke, that the Lake poets became as reactionary as the most unbending Tories. In the same way the movement, begun by Wordsworth, for a reform of poetic diction ended with Keats in a poetic reaction.

The strength of the Romantic revolution lay in this, that the forms, whether political or literary, which had grown out of the English Revolution of 1688, had exhausted their vitality, and, becoming purely conventional, were no longer fitting vehicles for the desires and feelings which, at the close of the eighteenth century, were agitating the imagination of society. The restrictions of the Test Acts, the narrow basis of parliamentary representation, and the low standard of moral and religious life in the ruling classes of society, combined to stimulate the passion for liberty in the reflective part of the English nation. So also in poetry, the suppression, after the Revolution of 1688, of the medieval elements that had provided so much food for the imagination in earlier times, and the tendency, in the latter days of the Classical Renaissance, to restrict poetic invention within ethical and didactic limits, had reduced the art to a state of barren formalism, which naturally provoked a rebellion on the part of individual genius. It was perhaps equally natural that, in opposition to the impotent sticklers for traditional practice, the leaders of the Romantic movement should have declared that poetry required a completely "new departure," insisting on their right to carry forward each his own standard, whither inspiration prompted, without reference to the teaching of history.

Herein the movement showed weakness ; its pioneers saw the past in a wrong perspective. To cite the opinions of the most extreme representative of their school, they could see in the style of the eighteenth century only, as Keats says,

a schism  
Nurtured by foppery and barbarism.

They thought of poets like Pope, and novelists like Fielding, as an

ill-fated, impious race,  
That blasphemed the bright lyrist to his face,  
And did not know it.

Bred in the exciting atmosphere of the French Revolutionary era, they turned with sympathy to the writings of the great group of poets who flourished under Elizabeth and her successor. But they made insufficient allowance for the interval of historic change that had been transforming the manners and language of the nation since the sixteenth century. The Elizabethans enjoyed the advantage of great freedom of imagination, because in their time the modes of thought and expression were still vague and unsettled; but they wrote consciously under the influence of recognised social requirements, and their experiments in poetic diction and versification produced certain definite results, which were made emphatic by the practice of their successors.

The colder writers of the age of Queen Anne and the first two Georges, appearing when the course of events had brought the life and movement of the nation within constitutional limits, had to take account of the social order evolved out of a long period of conflict and civil war; and they no doubt restricted excessively the liberties enjoyed by the imagination in more primitive times. But, like their predecessors, they were inspired by common ideals, and to describe them with Keats as

Holding a poor decrepit standard out,  
Marked with most flimsy mottoes, and in large  
The name of one Boileau—

is to display an entire ignorance of the historic development of the art of poetry in England.

The great poets of the Revolutionary era differed from the representative poets of both the earlier epochs in the multiplicity of their artistic aims. Each of them, under the influence of unquestionable inspiration, and of an original genius affected by the atmosphere of the times, formed an individual conception of the function of poetry, and pursued it along his own road. To Wordsworth poetry was the channel for "the spontaneous overflow of powerful emotion," roused in his mind by the contemplation of nature in his Cumbrian lakes and hills; in poetry Byron, stimulated by romantic supernaturalism, the study of Rousseau, and his own passions, found a weapon of war against society, and Shelley a vehicle for his Utopian ideas; while in the hands of Keats poetry became an art for painting in words the abstract images with which his mind was peopled. In the case of each the imaginative result achieved was characteristic and splendid, and the artistic monuments such as will endure as long as the language itself. But, in so far as their work was purely individual, and conceived apart from the onward life and movement of the nation, it left no provision for the future expansion

of the art. Wordsworth, Byron, Shelley and Keats, cannot, being one of them, be said to have prepared a way for the development of representative metrical language, as Marlowe gave a lead to Shakespeare in the poetical drama, Milton to John Philips, and through him to Thomson and Cowper, in blank verse composition, or Drummond and Sir John Beaumont to Waller, and Waller to Dryden, Pope, and Goldsmith, in the use of the heroic couplet.

In fiction the case was different. As society advances in civil refinement, the difficulty of overcoming the scepticism and captiousness of men, so far as to create an illusion in the imagination, is felt to be ever on the increase ; so that there is an inevitable tendency to choose prose rather than verse as the vehicle for fictitious narrative. Hence, in the eighteenth century, the more poetic forms of epic fiction, and even the poetic drama, gave place, by what seems to be a natural law, to the novel of manners or of modern adventure. On the other hand, as life becomes more prosaic, the imagination seeks, with an ever-growing inconsistency, the satisfaction of its desires for the marvellous and supernatural. In some form or another, therefore, there seems to be a need for a combination of the principles of the *fabliau* and the *roman* ; and this end was first achieved by Scott in the *Waverley Novels*. It is a remarkable and artistically instructive fact, that the one writer of the Romantic group who stood completely apart from all revolutionary theories in politics, and who was uncompromisingly conservative in his adherence to literary tradition, should have been the greatest ideal creator of his age. Through his enterprise English fiction has been enabled to explore a new world. No subsequent novelist has indeed approached him in amplitude of creative power. But in different ways, the best novels of Lord Lytton, Disraeli, Thackeray, Dickens, and George Eliot, show that the secret of success in modern romance lies in the principle observed by Scott—respect for historical continuity in the life of the nation.

There is another aspect in which the movement of English Romanticism, proper to the Revolutionary era, deserves consideration, namely, the influence it exercised on Continental literature. From the early days of Sannazaro's *Arcalia* onwards the curiously international progress of modern romance is noteworthy. The fashion passed westward from Italy to Spain, and from Spain northwards to France and England ; but, with reference to the present subject, the main point for observation is the tidal interchange of romantic ideas between England and France from about the middle of the seventeenth century. What France contributed to romance was the element of the heroic and sentimental, such as it is conceived to be in the *Grand Cyrus* and *Clélie* of Mlle. de Scudéry. Passing into England, through the novels of the Earl of Orrery, the heroic fantasy gradually reduced itself to modern form in the *Sir Charles Grandison* of Richardson, and furnished a starting-point for the

sentimental and supernatural heroes who commended themselves to the English imagination from the last quarter of the eighteenth century down to the time of Byron. But the idea of primitive liberty, as opposed to the conventions of society, appears to have originated in England. The earliest glimpse of it is perhaps caught in the "noble savage" of Dryden's *Conquest of Granada*, who becomes incarnate in Mrs Behn's *Oroonoko*, and is then dissolved into sentiment and philosophy by Rousseau. Collected again in the vaporous form of sentimental philosophy, romantic ideas recrossed the Channel into England, to constitute the intellectual atmosphere in which the poets of the Lake School began to reconstruct the general conception of their art.

Wordsworth's philosophical poetry was of far too abstract and local a character to arrest the imagination of men who were strangers to his language; Coleridge's most characteristic poems, such as *The Ancient Mariner* and *Christabel*, were too essentially dependent on subtleties of rhythm and diction to produce an effect abroad. The same may be said of the poems of Keats; nor does it seem that, during the age of revolution, the works of any one of the poets just named were translated into foreign languages. It might have been expected that verse so directly inspired as Shelley's by the dreams of the pioneers of the French Revolution would have been eagerly read on the Continent. But this was not the case; and perhaps the generation that followed Condorcet was too thoroughly disenchanted to be any longer charmed with the visions of his disciples. Whatever the cause may be, there was no attempt to reproduce Shelley's works in French, German, or Italian, during the generation after the battle of Waterloo.

In that age, however, France, Germany, and Italy, were all interested in a Romantic movement of their own; and the character of this was largely determined by the poetry of Byron and the novels of Sir Walter Scott. The vast influence of Byron on the Continental imagination is readily intelligible. In his *Laras*, his *Conrads*, and his *Childe Harolds*, men found ideal creations in which the sentimentalism of Rousseau and other writers of the Continent was combined with the supernaturalism of Horace Walpole's and Mrs Radcliffe's English fictions. The whole atmosphere in which these heroes moved was lyrical, and stimulated emotions which were shared by all who were discontented with an order of society dominated by the absolutist ideas of the Holy Alliance. Hence, when the literary revolt against Legitimism of every kind began in France after the restoration of the Bourbons, Byron was the model to which the Romanticists naturally turned. His influence is equally visible in the types of character created for the Romantic drama by the elder Dumas and Alfred de Vigny, and in the introspective lyrics of Lamartine. In Italy the type of Byronic Romanticism, though disparaged by Leopardi, was propagated by Ugo Foscolo and others; while in Germany Byron's cynical turn of thought was characteristically appropriated and transmuted

by Heine. The universality of his influence is seen in the polyglot translations of his works: *Childe Harold* and even *Don Juan* have been reproduced in French, German, Spanish, Portuguese, Polish, Hungarian, Bohemian, Swedish, and Danish.

The influence of Scott, on the contrary, was that of an ideal creator; it was his function to enlarge on the Continent, as in England, the domain of imagination. Through the eighteenth century the area of romance had been confined within the limits of sentimentalism; but, when society settled into a new order after the downfall of Napoleon, it became necessary to satisfy the general craving for an ampler range of thought and action. Scott's introduction of history into the sphere of fiction gave the first signal for the exploration of a new world of ideas; and in every nation in which historic tradition was vivid men began to revive the memories of the past. In France, particularly, the example given by the Waverley Novels stimulated the efforts of the rising Romantic School: Alfred de Vigny's *Cinq Mars* and Victor Hugo's *Notre-Dame de Paris* clearly derive their origin from tales like *Quentin Durward* and *Peveril of the Peak*; and the elder Dumas is indebted to Scott for the suggestion of those famous cycles of historical fiction with which he has illustrated French history.

It is noticeable however that, in all these instances, what the French historical novelists borrow from Scott is not his method of uniting the romance and the novel, but simply his extended framework of romance. There is nothing in the tales of Dumas, for example, at all resembling those characteristic representations of peasant or bourgeois life and character with which Scott brings into relief the romantic course of his main action. The ethical element contributed by the novel is absent from Dumas' representations; the whole strength of his invention is thrown into his romance. It is his aim, not so much to carry back the imagination into a past age, still intimately connected with the life and conduct of the present, as to procure a stage with a picturesque background which, in combination with the reader's want of knowledge, may enable the author to create a momentary illusion of reality. The flow of the narrative never pauses over episodes and characters, like those of Jeanie Deans and the Laird of Dumbiedikes, Nanty Ewart, the Baron of Bradwardine, or the Mucklebackits; the force, the wit, the brilliancy of the story-teller, filling his romantic personages with his own vitality, hurry the reader along without giving him time to apply to the imaginary action the tests of probability. Compared with the Waverley Novels, the French historic romance gains on the side of amusement; it loses on the side of ideal truth. The difference in the treatment of historic fiction doubtless reflects the difference in the character and history of the two nations. Feudalism, in the French historic novel, is the reflexion of a shadow, the substance of which has vanished from society; in the tales of Sir Walter Scott it is the image of a still living spirit.

## CHAPTER XXIII.

### ECONOMIC CHANGE.

DURING the generation that followed the great wars no region of Europe remained altogether unaffected by that long series of economic developments which has changed the face and profoundly affected the structure of modern society. It was no mere industrial revolution; its story is not a list of inventions or a biography of inventors. Nor is it simply the story of capital and capitalistic production; nor yet that of the freeing of commerce, industry, and agriculture from customary or legal restrictions. Side by side with mechanical invention, the rising power of capital, the extension of economic freedom, and the expansion of international trade, went an astonishing growth of population and—more important still—a partial introduction of the methods and results of exact science into economic affairs. The distinctive mark of European economic history in the latter part of the eighteenth and the earlier part of the nineteenth century is to be found, not in any single change or group of changes, but rather in the coincidence of many types of change and the rapidity with which some of these types developed. Everywhere there was movement; but the causes of movement were infinitely varied. At one point, some carefully considered scheme of constructive economic reform was carried through by the State. At another, the State merely removed old barriers or sanctioned the enterprises of private citizens. Here a series of changes might be traced to the application of the discoveries of the chemist to manufactures or agriculture. There change was due simply to a forward step of rather unusual significance in the long, slow evolution of the mechanic arts. Other sets of forces were brought into play by decisive discoveries of the class that attract almost disproportionate attention—machinery for spinning or an effective steam-engine. The rise of new nations and the political reform of old ones carried with them readjustments in the balance of economic power; while war and conquest temporarily deprived many an old seat of trade or industry of its ability to further or share in a movement which, under other circumstances, it might have led. The narrative of these things cannot be fitted into the mould of any generalisation. It must above all things be varied, if it is even to indicate the truth.

The whole eighteenth century, down to the outbreak of the French Revolution, had been an age of steady industrial development and of great commercial activity throughout western Europe. In spite of dynastic and colonial wars, intercourse among the nations became more frequent and more free than ever before. The more or less scientific and comparative study of national resources, that in England had taken the form of political arithmetic, was now no uncommon thing. Imitation of superior foreign methods in agriculture, commerce, and the arts, was zealously advocated and keenly pursued. Where spontaneous economic development failed, enlightened princes and reforming ministers sought to generate it with a zeal not always according to knowledge. There was an accelerating accumulation of capital in most western countries. Investment had assumed in England, and to some extent in France and in the German North Sea ports, the modern forms already familiar in Holland in the seventeenth century and in Italy still earlier. Banking, the necessary prerequisite to investment and the organ of highly developed commerce, had made conspicuous progress, mainly, however, in Great Britain. That British banking alone had been increasingly successful is significant. Towards the close of the eighteenth century London had definitely superseded Amsterdam as the chief seat of finance—and of commerce—in the West.

Trade was cutting its own channels, wherever Governments would permit. In the more advanced countries it had refused, long before the middle of the eighteenth century, to confine itself to fairs and markets, after the medieval fashion. It had become an everyday matter, had ceased to be a thing of times and seasons. Yet in France the decline of the fairs only became marked in the two generations which the year 1700 divided; while in inland Germany they were still growing in importance long after 1789. Over-sea trade, though still jealously guarded and directed, needed and received less supervision than had once been held essential. Even in Spain many of the old restrictions connected with the colonial trade—the fixed times and places for traffic, the Cadiz monopoly, the prohibition of intercolonial commerce—had been abandoned by 1774 with very satisfactory results; while the American rebellion shook the colonial system of England. The great privileged trading companies, formed for the most part during the seventeenth century, were no longer the pioneers and directors of distant enterprise. Some had fallen, others—like the English East India Company—maintained a vigorous though limited and menaced authority.

A widespread care for the improvement of internal means of communication, combined with an ever-growing international trade, had quickened the pulse of economic life. This care was not everywhere a new thing. The Dutch had been canal-makers from the beginning. Their made roads were of old standing. In parts of northern Italy also the art of civil engineering had never died out; and its progress had

been a matter of concern to most intelligent statesmen in Europe since the days of Louis XIV, or even of Henry IV. In spite of bankruptcy and misrule, France, when Louis XVI came to the throne, possessed some ten or twelve well-situated inland canals and a few incomparable highways. In Great Britain the task of improving river navigation, reconstructing roads, and cutting navigable canals, fell for the most part into the hands of associated landowners and traders. This work was in full swing in the seventies and eighties ; but most of the long water-routes were unfinished, and many districts—especially in the north—were still provided only with pack-horse tracks or wretched highways in 1789. Government enterprise in the United Kingdom was confined to the strategic roads of the Highlands and to the assistance of Scotch and Irish canal-building.

In Austria under Maria Teresa and Joseph, in Spain under Charles III, in Tuscany under the Grand Duke Leopold, road-making found a place in the general work of reform. Nor was it neglected in Prussia and the other States of the modern German Empire. But central and northern Germany had no Roman foundations to build on and often lacked satisfactory material to work with, especially in the plains of the north-east, where the roads resembled the impracticable tracks of Poland and Russia. The first scientifically constructed *chaussée* on Prussian territory dates from 1788, the first within the bounds of modern Germany from 1753. In canal-building Prussia had made satisfactory progress, for her rulers had interested themselves in it ever since the Thirty Years' War. Yet, taken as a whole, the German-speaking lands, together with all eastern Europe, were still cut up into small self-sufficing areas, save in so far as natural waterways supplied the lack of artificial means of communication.

Throughout Europe the use of both natural and artificial routes was hampered by an excess of tolls and taxes. The free Rhenish towns laid heavy burdens on the river trade ; the navigation of the Seine was very far from free ; and these things were not exceptional. Each little State in Germany and Italy, almost every province in Austria and France and Spain, had its custom-houses, possibly its prohibited exports and imports. Turgot's efforts had not freed the internal traffic of France by 1789 ; and elsewhere such efforts had hardly become possible. Britain alone of the greater nations was in a position to make full use of the work of the road and canal builders. Tolls levied by the State were well-nigh extinct; there remained only the commercial tolls levied by canal companies and turnpike trustees. National unity was bearing its economic fruit.

England in the eighteenth century exemplified the close connexion which must always exist between improvement in the means of travel and transport, the concentration of population, and a progressive agriculture. Where the cultivator works only to supply his own needs, those of his lord—if he has a lord—or those of his immediate neighbourhood, he rarely escapes from the crushing compulsion of traditional

methods. The demand of the town and the roads which make it possible to meet that demand are essential if there is to be rapid movement on the land. In England the growth of London furnished a main driving force, although the influence of other towns became considerable as the century drew to a close. Most of the new roads led to London; and the most successful agricultural development was usually to be found in the counties that helped to feed London. So also in France the influence of Paris was felt over a wide area and directly stimulated agricultural reform. And those regions of Europe which for generations, even for centuries, had been famous for high farming, for the variety and ingenious rotation of their crops, the scientific feeding and care of their cattle, the skilful use of manure and the absence of wasteful fallows, were all old seats of town life well provided with routes and highways. Such were Flanders—both Austrian and French—Provence, parts of Holland and of northern Italy, lands which had long served as models for the rest of Europe.

These model lands had for the most part long enjoyed tolerably free systems of land tenure and of agriculture which gave scope for enterprise and improvement, whereas progress was hindered throughout a great part of Europe by the survival of systems which did not. In England, in the Teutonic lands generally, in northern and eastern France, and in parts at least of northern Italy, the prevalent system had once been that of the village with its open, common, arable fields, in which the land of the cultivators—on whatever tenure it was held—lay scattered in detached strips and was worked after a traditional routine binding upon all. The outstanding features of the routine were the prominence of corn crops, the practice of letting all land lie fallow one year in two or three, and the right of occupiers to feed their beasts on the stubble fields, as well as on the common village pastures that lay beyond them. Kindred systems characterised the Slavonic lands. Servile and semi-servile tenures had almost everywhere associated themselves with the common field agriculture. Where both survived intact in 1789, change was excluded. Things stood thus, for instance, in Russia and in most of eastern Germany. In western Germany tenures were freer; but the common field agriculture, in one or other of its forms, was still prevalent. In France true servile tenures were rare; compact farms had long existed in many districts; and there had been no small amount of enclosure both of common fields and—more frequently—of waste land, between 1766 and 1789. In England servile tenures were extinct, and the English common fields had been disappearing for centuries. Rapid enclosure had set in towards the middle of the eighteenth century; but it is probable that at least a third of the arable land remained unenclosed in 1789.

Decline in common field husbandry was associated in Great Britain, as it had always been, with imitation of the free and rational methods of the model lands or with spontaneous agricultural progress. By 1789

root crops and green crops were at least known to the ordinary farmer or yeoman, though by no means always used by him, in most parts of the country. Their introduction allowed of a more scientific rotation and had transformed many a barren district, especially in the eastern counties. The roots and the fodder crops also assisted the revolution in cattle-breeding and cattle-tending, which is associated with the names of Bakewell and his imitators. Much of the land recently enclosed—in Leicester and Derby for instance—had been laid down in permanent pasture to feed the new flocks and herds, which themselves fed London and the towns. In France, since the middle of the century, better rotations, reduction in the quantity of fallow, and the use of clover and sainfoin, had been spreading in various provinces hitherto subject to tradition; the potato had been introduced, and the breeds of cattle and sheep had been improved. But the frequently injudicious control of agriculture by Government, the prevalence of absenteeism and subletting, and the poverty and ignorance of the mass of the peasantry, were not favourable to progress. Outside France there is even less change to register. Clearing of wood and waste, together with better rotations of crops, was beginning in Hainault, Brabant, and the other backward provinces of the Netherlands. Experiments with the new field-crops were being made in western Germany, mainly, however, in Westphalia, where the common tillage was rare; while in the east the large land-owners, the natural leaders of agricultural reform, could do little so long as their domain lands lay—as they still very generally did—in scattered fragments among those of their peasants in the great open fields.

The mere absence of common field husbandry was in itself no guarantee of progress. Great parts of south-western France and of Spain, regions where the true common field seems never to have existed, were being tilled on the eve of the French Revolution as they had been tilled in Roman times, only with less skill and success—corn following fallow and fallow corn, year in year out. There, as in many parts of Italy, freedom or economic stimulus, or both, failed; and the peasant remained standing in the old ways. Even in England enclosure did not necessarily bring with it better rotations and methods, though it generally increased the productivity and rentable value of the land. On the other hand, in Germany, throughout the thickly-peopled districts of the south and west, and elsewhere near the towns, the continued existence of common field corn-growing had not prevented the early establishment and steady progress of that type of small-scale cultivation which is more akin to gardening than to husbandry; for the towns required it.

The familiar series of revolutionary inventions, which towards the end of the eighteenth century so greatly extended the use of capital in industry, fell on prepared soil. In all the western nations there existed some mining and manufacturing on a large scale, and many trades in

which the hand-workers, though not grouped into great establishments, were to a considerable extent dependent on the capitalist employer or merchant, for whom they usually worked and from whom they received their materials. These things were most common in England, Belgium, and Holland; but even in England the amount of capital invested and the number of hands employed under one management, in those industries which could show the largest individual business undertakings, were as a rule insignificant, if judged by nineteenth-century standards; while in most parts of Europe there was something abnormal and exceptional about both the economic and the legal status of factory trades. They were still the nurslings of the State; they had often to face the steady opposition of master-craftsmen's guilds or to submit to the excessive supervision of the Governments, their creators. In France, for instance, where since the early seventeenth century the Crown had encouraged them and had checked the restrictive tendencies of the guilds, few large factories or works came into being which did not receive some special privilege, exemption from taxes, local monopoly, or actual financial support from Government, and therewith the supervision which such favours implied. A royal charter was essential to their existence; and, although in the later days of Louis XV and under his successor privileges were granted less freely than had once been customary, the old system of Crown support and patronage survived. When a foundry and glass-works were set up at Creusot in 1782, the chief shareholder in the former was Louis XVI, and in the latter Marie-Antoinette.

Similar methods for encouraging both large and small industrial enterprises were universally employed on the Continent; but in very few cases had they led to the establishment of large single businesses, outside France and the Low Countries. In Prussia, Saxony, Austria—as well as in more backward countries like Russia and Spain—Government had set up some considerable works, such as Frederick the Great's foundry at Berlin; but most of the industries which the enlightened princes fostered and regulated were carried on by small master-craftsmen with very modest capitals. The linen manufacture of Silesia, the woollen manufacture of Berlin, the silk manufacture of Crefeld, were of this type. In Prussia, as in England, the raw material for such manufactures was sometimes supplied by capitalist merchants to the domestic workers; but this dependence on the owners of capital was an exceptional feature of trades which were themselves exceptionally situated and abnormally progressive, when judged by German standards. What progress in organisation they had made before the last quarter of the eighteenth century was due in part to royal encouragement, but mainly to the fact that they worked for export and so were brought under the influence of a commercial system already, and of necessity, organised on capitalistic lines. As a whole, the industrial activity of Germany and of all inner Europe was both insignificant in quantity and primitive in character.

A right instinct has selected the invention of spinning-machinery and the perfection of the steam-engine in England as the chief industrial events of the later eighteenth century. The first led to the reorganisation of what had long been the greatest group of industries ; the second furnished motive power for both new and old mechanical processes. But they were only the most important links in a long chain of improvements which freer industry, increasing skill and capital, expanding commerce, and a more scientific handling of technical problems, introduced into various branches of manufacture, not only in England but throughout Europe. During the earlier decades of the century England was still a borrower in matters of industry. She had learnt many things from the Huguenot craftsmen who left France after the revocation of the Edict of Nantes. Shortly after 1700 the swivel-loom, a complex piece of mechanism for weaving many narrow ribbons at once, seems to have come from Holland into the Manchester small-ware trade. Rather earlier the art of tinning iron plates had been introduced from Saxony, though it was apparently perfected in South Wales. Lombe's water-driven silk-throwing mill, which has been claimed as the first English factory, was built in 1719 from Italian models. Until about 1730 there was, in all probability, hardly a single branch of manufacture in this country that had not still something to learn in technique from the Continent ; although, unaided, England had applied the primitive steam-engine to the work of freeing her mines from water. But from that time onwards she began to take the lead, until, on the eve of the French Revolution, although her skill in some of the more artistic crafts was inferior to that of France and perhaps to that of the Netherlands, her supremacy as a manufacturing power was beyond question. For in almost all the main branches of industry she had already evolved and applied fresh methods of production.

The need for fresh methods had been most keenly felt in the metal trades, for the decline in England's stock of timber threatened the smelting industry. About 1740 smelting with coal or coke instead of charcoal, a process that had been tried experimentally almost a century earlier, was finally started. For thirty years it made small progress ; then it was adopted almost universally within a generation. This delay followed by rapid movement was no accident. The movement coincided with the perfection of the steam-engine by Watt. Steam was applied to the blast-furnaces ; and the building of steam-engines in its turn created a new demand for iron and steel. In the eighties came Cort's improved method of producing wrought iron in the puddling furnace and iron bars and sheets by means of rollers—the latter a device known in England half a century earlier, but little practised until the age of steam. Since the work of Huntsman, about the middle of the century, the making of cast steel had progressed rapidly in Sheffield. So the demand was met. Cast iron began to be used for structural purposes as

soon as the increased output was secure; and already in 1815 the growth of that output might have served as a gauge of economic progress. Thirteen years later (1828) the application of the hot-air blast to smelting concluded the first cycle of great inventions that dealt with the production of the raw iron. In 1740 the annual output of iron in Great Britain had been some 17,000 to 18,000 tons. It was 150,000 in 1800, and nearly 1,400,000 in 1840.

Of greater significance for the general progress of manufacture and commerce than the mere increased production of raw iron was the establishment in England, during the first forty years of the nineteenth century, of mechanical engineering as the organised capitalistic industry, upon which all other industries were beginning to depend. From one point of view that industry may be said to have been born between 1770 and 1785 at Boulton and Watt's Soho works, when some of the skilled workmen in what was already probably the greatest manufacturing establishment in the country turned from the making of buttons and buckles and watch-chains to the building of steam-engines. Even before Watt joined him, Boulton had employed water-power to drive his simple metal lathes. Power, numbers, and capital, were thus brought together in Soho ; but something more had to be added before modern engineering could come into existence. That want—the automatic principle by which machines make one another—was gradually satisfied during the nineteenth century ; and great businesses grew up, though slowly, to apply the principle on a large scale. Patents for wood-working lathes in which the cutting tool was held by a slide-block instead of by hand were taken out between 1790 and 1800. Henry Maudslay made his first screw-cutting lathe about 1800 ; and, during the thirty years that followed, his firm successfully applied the automatic principle to other branches of metal-working. The planing-machine is attributed to Bramah, Maudslay's master. Both planing-machine and screw-lathe, together with the slide-lathe for general engineering work, were utilised and improved by Richard Roberts at Manchester between 1816 and 1830. In 1833 Joseph Whitworth, "tool-maker from London," and in 1834 James Nasmyth—who had at the time a capital of £63—set up their modest businesses, also in Manchester. They had both worked under Maudslay, and they both worked on, building up great businesses and perfecting machine tools. Yet the change in industrial organisation, whereby the engineering firm, employing a crowd of men and working entirely in metal with the aid of steam, has supplanted both the millwright, who with his few journeymen constructed the simple and for the most part wood-built machinery of the days of water-power, and his successor, the small engineer and tool-maker, was far from complete in the early forties of the nineteenth century.

It was the making of textile machinery and of the engines which drove it that attracted the engineers to Manchester. The changes in

the cotton trade had coincided almost exactly in point of time with those in iron-working and machine-building ; and the two series of changes had become very intimately associated with each other. From 1730 onwards, experiments in spinning-machinery had been almost continuous. The principle that was to make Arkwright's fortune—the drawing out of the fibre to be spun by two pairs of rollers revolving at different speeds—was in operation twenty years before he secured his patent in 1769. By that time the stimulus to spinning invention had become irresistible. Cotton yarn of the finer sorts was largely imported. The difficulty of spinning suitable warp threads on the old wheels was so great that most English cottons were really half linen. The improvements in the common loom, due to John Kay and his son Robert, began to tell on the output of cotton cloth after 1760. New methods for producing yarn were essential, and they were found. In 1767 Hargreaves, the weaver, built his jenny, a simple hand-driven appliance by which he or his wife could spin upwards of eight threads at once. Arkwright coordinated the various processes preliminary to spinning, adopted water as a motive power, and created the mill. By 1788 there were over a hundred and forty such mills in Great Britain. Two years later, at Lanark, water-power was applied to Crompton's mule, invented in 1779, a machine fitted to spin finer and softer yarns than Arkwright's frame could furnish. The spinners had already seized on Watt's engines, especially in those districts where water-power was scarce, such as Manchester itself. Between 1801 and 1804 the use of steam in the cotton trade became general. Spinning-machinery was still rough and imperfect. But with the progress of engineering it slowly gained the precision necessary for the finest work. Richard Roberts built the first complete self-acting mule in 1825. Gradually the self-actor won its way ; and gradually the defects of the early "mill-yarn" were remedied.

The cotton trade was young ; in the eighteenth century its various parts had been but imperfectly organised ; and it was consequently adaptable. The wool-working trades on the contrary were old, highly organised, and in certain districts most conservative. It is in no way surprising therefore that machinery and steam were more slowly introduced in them than in the cotton trade. One old seat of these industries, East Anglia, lacked both water-power and coal ; another, Devon, had at least no coal—facts which help to explain the delay. But sea-borne coal can never have been exorbitantly dear at Norwich ; so that the fact that spinning by power was not even attempted in that neighbourhood until after 1830 must be credited to the conservatism of those who directed the industry rather than to any geographical necessity. Even in Yorkshire the new method did not appear in either the woollen or the worsted trade until after 1790. It made steady progress—especially in the worsted trade—during the wars ; yet, two generations after Waterloo, the hand-worked jenny was still to be found in many woollen-weavers'

cottages. Steam-mills began with the new century, almost as early as the water-mills, and slowly absorbed first the carding processes, preparatory to spinning, then the spinning itself. In the case of flax—which proved specially intractable to the machine—the introduction of power-spinning was later, its progress even slower.

Wool and flax and cotton spinning on the wheel died as the machine gained ground. Cotton, an exotic, had never been spun extensively outside the actual manufacturing districts. As a result of this, the work passed swiftly into the hands of the weavers' families and into the mills. In wool and flax spinning the change was far slower. Yet by 1820 wool spinning as a by-employment was only to be found in out-of-the-way corners of Britain. Those slow-moving districts which retained their weaving trade soon learnt to import yarn from the factory towns, as East Anglia began to do from Bradford very shortly after 1800. There was soon no place for the non-professional spinner.

The story of factory-weaving presents a sharp contrast to that of factory-spinning. The power-loom had only been used for the plainest cotton-weaving before 1815, and that not on an extensive scale. It did not appear in the worsted trade until after 1820; it had made no great progress in the woollen trade, even in Yorkshire, in 1840. The desperate plight of the hand-loom cotton and worsted weavers in the early years of Queen Victoria's reign was not shared by the woollen-weavers. They and the small master-clothiers for whom, and with whom, they often worked were threatened by the mills but not destroyed; and, although the clothiers were, to a certain extent, dependent on the capitalist merchants, as indeed they had always been, it was still possible, in 1845, for a French visitor to describe the woollen manufacture of the West Riding as an "altogether democratic exception to the devouring progress of the factory system."

Few trades in England remained untouched by the general advance in technique and the movement towards a more capitalistic organisation during the years between 1789 and 1840. To the steady improvement of manufacturing processes, which had marked the eighteenth century, were added the new and expensive motive power, better and more complex machines, and the new knowledge of the natural sciences, in the nineteenth. The production of chemicals in extensive works employing many hands and much capital began. Another new industry was called into existence by the general adoption of gas-lighting between 1815 and 1840, an industry that was of necessity organised on a large scale from the first. Trades ancillary to those of spinning and weaving, such as calico-printing, bleaching, and dyeing, were refashioned. Machinery and chemistry began to influence the ancient and conservative crafts of tanning and leather-working. Pottery-making, refounded in the eighteenth century by Wedgwood, was concentrated. In printing, in milling, in brewing, in glass-making, and in a score of other industries,

methods were revised and the scale of operations for the individual firm extended. The power-driven machine took hold even of simple crafts like carpentry and shoemaking. In coal-mining the combined effects of the new power, the new needs, and the new knowledge, were conspicuous. It was in the mines that steam had first been used for pumping; its use was extended to winding and other operations. Geology came to the aid of the mining engineer; chemistry supplied the analysis of coals and of pit gases. The annual output of coal in Great Britain was more than tripled between 1800 and 1845; while the size of the average mining undertaking greatly increased.

Yet all these things were but beginnings, even small beginnings as compared with the developments of the later nineteenth century. England in the early forties had still numerous and extensive domestic industries, although in almost all of them an employer or merchant—not to mention retail-dealers—came between the workman and the consumer. Silk-weaving, ribbon-weaving, and hosiery-knitting, were in the hands of domestic workers or of very small masters. So, though to a less extent, were linen and woollen, and, to a still less extent, worsted and cotton weaving. A few of the old "customer" weavers, who worked up the farmer's homespun, were to be found in certain agricultural counties of England; while in Scotland they were by no means rare. Wool-combing had not as yet become a machine trade, though the inventions that have transformed it were on foot. The Birmingham metal trades seem at this particular time to have been tending away from production on a large scale rather than towards it. It was said that the town contained in 1843 four thousand small masters, who each employed a handful of journeymen and hired power when they wanted it, besides the garret men who worked with two or three apprentices. Lock and key and chain making and the other innumerable branches of the hardware trade in the Black Country were in a still more primitive condition. In all these trades capital was generally to be found in the hands of middlemen rather than of the manufacturers. These are but samples, taken from leading industries. Even where large scale production had made most progress, much that was small and rude survived, as the condition of coal-mining shows. Deep workings were uncommon. A great part of the coal used was still raised near the outcrop from many small pits. One of these is figured in the appendix to the Report on children's work in the mines, issued in 1842. It represents a type; and the picture shows an old woman who is hoisting two children from the shaft by turning a winch.

When the Revolutionary wars began, the system of internal communications that preceded the railways was very far from complete. Turnpike-roads were numerous, but they were often ill-laid and ill-graded. The new canals in many districts were unfinished. Quick road-traffic

was a thing of recent growth, even near London. In the remoter parts of England and in most parts of Scotland and Wales it was unknown. But the wars hardly checked the work of improvement. The rapidity and success with which it was carried through by a nation burdened with taxes and debt is perhaps the most striking witness to the economic vitality of Great Britain. Year by year the road-makers gained experience, and the methods of construction were improved. The revolution in the iron industry allowed of the partial substitution of iron for stone in bridge-building—a change which may be said to have come with the new century, although a few iron bridges were built before 1800. Canal engineering became bolder, and waterways were completed across the backbone of England. The lamentable years of political unrest and economic distress from 1815 to 1825 saw the completion of Telford's Highland roads and of his great Holyhead highway, the construction of the Waterloo and Menai Bridges, and the adoption on many main routes of the method of road-building which is named, perhaps wrongly, after Macadam. No great country could equal England, so far as the quantity and average quality of her roads and canals were concerned; though it is probable that the best of the French highways were still superior to anything that the English engineers had built.

Work on harbours and estuaries and docks was undertaken concurrently with that on the roads and the canals. Here war acted as a direct stimulus, so that this development of the accessories of sea-power is far less remarkable than the inland works. For the trade of all the world was being shepherded into British ports; and they must needs be fitted to receive it. There were but few docks in the country when England went to war in 1793. During the next thirteen years, on the Thames alone, the East India Docks, the West India Docks, and the London Docks, were begun and finished. The Mersey, the Humber, and the Clyde, kept pace with the Thames; and the work begun during the war was carried on, though intermittently, during the peace.

The wars witnessed the beginnings, the peace the utilisation, of steam transport both on sea and land. It was in the year of Waterloo that a steamer first made the passage from London to Glasgow. Six years later steam was tried on the Calais packets. Shortly after 1830 the building of steamers and of marine engines became distinct trades. By that time iron was being used, though not yet freely, as a structural material both for steam vessels and sailing ships. Before 1840 the Atlantic had been crossed by steamers of a few hundred horse-power, and the screw was coming into use. Yet in that year, out of a total British tonnage of two and three-quarter millions, the steamers claimed less than ninety thousand tons; and the steam tonnage had not risen to a hundred and fifty thousand in 1850. In short, the second quarter of the century was not really an age of steam navigation. The steamers

that existed were essentially packet-boats. They carried only passengers and the most valuable and least bulky cargoes; for in the then existing state of marine engineering they had trouble enough to find room for their own bunker-coal.

On land a more real and rapid revolution had occurred; but it remained incomplete in the early forties. The railways found the reform of the old means of transport still unfinished. Telford was at work on the Birmingham and Liverpool Junction Canal, and was just completing his plans for a new and better Great North Road; the English mail-coach—the wonder and envy of foreign travellers—had barely reached perfection, when the railway age began. Telford's plans were laid aside; and only retrospective and literary persons admired the mail-coach. Together with Telford's schemes, the series of experiments with locomotive steam-driven road-carriages, that had lasted for almost two generations, was suspended. The Stockton and Darlington Railway was completed in 1825, the year after the surveys for the new North Road began; and in that same year twenty bubble railway companies were set afloat. The success of the Manchester and Liverpool line in 1830 gave the call to serious work. Short lengths of railway were rapidly constructed. By 1837 work was in progress on the London and Birmingham, the North Midland, the Manchester and Leeds, and the Great Western. Endless schemes and surveys were on foot elsewhere; and the sketch plan of the modern railway system was being filled in. There was a slackening of projection and construction in the early forties; but by 1843 the country possessed over eighteen hundred miles of finished line; and unbroken travel from London to Lancaster in the north-west, to Darlington in the north-east, and almost to Exeter in the west, was already possible. The full economic significance of the new system was, however, not as yet apparent. Goods traffic was to a great extent subordinated to passenger traffic at the outset. The electric telegraph, which has joined with the railway to create the modern market, had hardly passed its experimental stage; and the short-sighted critics who could treat the railway as a mere nuisance or a novel luxury had but recently been silenced.

In spite of the success with which agricultural reform had been pursued in England throughout the eighteenth century, very much remained to be done when the new century began. New-modelled waggons and ploughs, novel implements, and fresh crops, had been introduced; they had yet to be generally adopted. So late as 1811 turnips were almost unknown in Wiltshire. Not many years earlier, crops were still regularly led in Devon on horses' backs; a three-horse team was reckoned necessary to draw a wretched shallow waggon, seven feet long and three and a half broad, in parts of Yorkshire; and in Scotland there was not uncommonly found the ancient cart “of a size not larger than a good

wheelbarrow," with its solid, wooden, unshod wheels. The enclosure of the open arable fields was very far from complete; while the amount of waste land—even in the near neighbourhood of London—was an offence to the rural reformer. In the remoter shires it was even more abundant. Scores of thousands of acres in the fens were undrained or ill-drained. Lincoln Heath was still a vast sandy waste, many miles in extent. In all the northern counties immense tracts of moorland and not a little of the lower country were most imperfectly used. There was almost everywhere a superfluity of heath and boggy lowland. In Wales agricultural reform had made little way; while in Scotland as in England there was still work enough to do, although the Scots had made astonishingly rapid and much-needed progress between 1760 and 1800.

Every external circumstance, in the years round about the turn of the century, contributed to accelerate change. England had recently ceased to have a surplus of corn after her own needs had been met; her population was growing abnormally fast; and she was engaged in the wars. The Board of Agriculture and the Smithfield Club had just been founded; the country was covered with landowners' and farmers' societies; and agricultural surveys of all the counties were being carried out. The progress of enclosure gauges the acceleration. From 1790 to 1800 Parliament passed on an average fifty private enclosure Bills a year; between 1800 and 1810 the average was over eighty, and over eighty it remained until 1820. For the most part the enclosed land was required for corn-growing, not for the creation of new permanent pasture. Indeed old pasture land, including some of the finest natural pasture of the northern counties, was not uncommonly broken up for wheat. Corn-growing ruled; and the number of enclosure Bills varied roughly with the price of wheat. The land enclosed was often old open field, more often still old common pasture or waste, sandy heath, moorland, or fen reclaimed with the aid of the engineer and the steam-pump. Enclosure was usually accompanied or followed by a decline in the number of yeomen, small farmers, and more or less independent cottagers, together with an increase in the size of farms, and in the numbers and importance of the class of large farmers, who could secure the control of considerable capital and of bodies of landless labourers.

The history of British agriculture in the earlier half of the nineteenth century was chequered by the extraordinary fluctuations in prices, profits, and rents, that war, peace, changing corn-laws, currency troubles, and the cycles of the seasons, brought with them. After the eager search for corn lands during the wars, and the extensive cultivation that went with it, came some twenty years during which, on the heavier soils at any rate, there was little progress and some retrogression in the methods of agriculture. Landlords had sunk much capital in the new

farm-buildings which the extension of arable land necessitated ; estates were crippled by mortgages and charges piled on them during the days of the war rentals ; the vicissitudes in prices had ruined many farmers. These things, together with social unrest, riotings, heavy poor-rates, heavy taxes, were not favourable to progress. But movement did not cease, though it was slow, intermittent, and unequal. The work of the eighteenth century had not been wasted. Scientific rotations were no longer confined to specially progressive estates and districts, but became matters of general knowledge ; and the medieval rotation with its bare fallows gradually died out. Marling and claying of light soils to fit them for wheat became commoner. A more intelligent use was made of natural manures ; and the value of artificial manures, such as bone dust, nitrate of soda, and guano, began to be appreciated. The new and improved breeds of cattle and sheep were established ; and their feeding and fattening were better understood. English farmers could, it is true, no longer supply manufacturers with the finer wools that they required ; but that was in part because breeding had improved the size of the fine-woollen South Downs and kindred stocks at the expense of the fleece. The use of the new-modelled ploughs and other implements known in the previous century became general ; and their construction benefited greatly from the progress of metal-working and machine-building. The threshing-machine, in its early form, that had been reinvented by Andrew Meikle shortly before the year 1800, came rapidly into use, the flail disappearing before it and therewith much valuable winter work for the labourer. Even during the disastrous years from 1815 to 1833, when parliamentary committees on agricultural depression sat again and again, the agriculture of whole counties—such as Lincoln and Northumberland—was being remodelled. During the thirties also a new aid was given to farming on those heavy clay lands that had felt the worst of the depression, through the improvements made by Smith of Deanston in the methods of field drainage.

There was little of novelty in the work done on the land before the forties. It consisted for the most part in the application of principles already established. But greater things were in preparation. Agricultural chemistry came into existence with the nineteenth century, and made public its first claims and promises in England when Davy delivered a famous series of lectures before the Board of Agriculture in 1812. Seven years later the Board came to an end ; and during the difficult years that followed the wars the chemist's voice was a *vox clamantis in deserto*. Nor was his work ripe. The earlier discoveries needed to be supplemented by those of Liebig and his successors ; and Liebig's results were not accessible until 1840. Two years earlier the Royal Agricultural Society had been founded ; two years later the Agricultural Chemistry Association followed. A scientific knowledge of agriculture and organisations for spreading it were being built up.

But agriculture had not become scientific—that is a development which takes time.

It has been said that before 1789 London was already the commercial and financial capital of the West. The industrial changes and the wars raised her higher still. London alone of the great European cities had never seen a hostile army. Instead of the invader came the foreign capitalists and merchants—of whom Nathan Rothschild was chief—who found London the most secure and convenient headquarters. London was now not only the centre of European finance and banking, but also, and naturally, the centre of marine insurance. Lloyd's had taken an organised form between 1770 and 1780, and had subsequently become essential for the commerce of England and the world; for its work was not confined to British shipping. Foreign vessels were freely and profitably insured against capture by English cruisers; and intelligence was collected for all. Everything favoured the accumulation in London of that wealth over which, it is said, Blücher smacked eager lips when the signs of it lay spread before him around the dome of St Paul's. It was the greatest city of Europe in 1801, and its population doubled in the next forty years, crowding both into the new western quarters and the undrained, crowded, and pestilential districts to the east and south. There were other things than wealth visible from the dome of St Paul's.

To Cobbett's mind, in 1821, the "swelling out of London" seemed due to the growth of the funded national debt, and the inhabitants of its comfortable quarters were for the most part "tax-eaters." He was pointing towards two economic facts that he only vaguely understood—the greatly increased opportunities for investing free capital (not in the English funds only) which political, industrial, and commercial changes had brought with them, and the position that London had secured as a market for investment. The field for investment had long been widening and the organisation for dealing in securities becoming more perfect. By 1773 the more reputable stockbrokers were grouping themselves into a society distinct from the crowd of lottery jobbers, gamblers in insurance, and miscellaneous sharpers who had given Change Alley its evil name. Dealings in Government stock, the shares of the East India and other trading companies, those of the older insurance and water companies, and the like, were the staple business of the eighteenth century stock exchange. When it established itself in Capel Court, in 1802, the great increase in the public debt and the creation of the canals had added considerably to its work. After the wars investment on a large scale in foreign loans began. Such investment had been known since first Marlborough raised a loan for the Emperor; but constant wars and an Act of 1730 had checked its development. The nations now borrowed mainly in England, as they had once borrowed mainly in Holland. Amsterdam still took a share in the lending, as did

Frankfort; but the trade and finance of Amsterdam never recovered from the shock of the French occupation and the temporary loss of the Dutch colonial empire.

The subsidies paid by England to the Allies during the wars had prepared the way for the later loans; and the great financial houses, notably the Rothschilds, controlled an international organisation fitted for handling them. Every nation came to borrow in London during the years of Europe's convalescence—France, Prussia, Austria, Russia, and the rest. The Americans borrowed too—the mushroom republics of the South very freely after 1820. Over ten millions were lent, and lost, in South America alone between 1822 and 1826. The loans were negotiated with the financiers, who passed them on to the English public, which was attracted by the guarantee of a fixed rate of interest in pounds sterling, a device invented by Nathan Rothschild and forced upon the needy borrowing nations. The process was profitable to the great firms, at times remarkably so. In 1817, for instance, the Barings and the Hopes of Amsterdam took up a French 5 per cent. loan at 57. Next year it stood at 85, and before the revolution of 1830 it had risen to upwards of 109. When that loan was issued, there was no single Parisian banking firm strong enough to share in it. Four years later, two or three French houses began to take a subordinate part in the work; but, down to and after 1848, the London financiers and the great international Jewish houses that were half domiciled in London ruled the loan market.

Meanwhile in England the growth of joint-stock companies further widened the field of investment. With each period of trade expansion attempts were made to bring some new type of economic activity within the scope of the principle of associated capital. Early in the century there was a great increase in canal and water companies. Gas manufacture became a company business from the start. Mining companies first appeared in considerable numbers in connexion with the wild schemes for the development of South America in 1825. Industry was as yet rarely carried on under the joint-stock principle; for the shameless fraud connected with many of the ventures of this period made the business world reluctant to employ the company form except in the greatest undertakings. Banking, the branch of commerce that most needed to employ that form and was best suited for it, was long kept from adopting it in this country owing to the jealously guarded monopoly of the Bank of England. During the fifty years from 1775 to 1825 the history of English banking is full of the rise and fall of innumerable private banks, that were born as trade expanded and died wholesale as it contracted. Free joint-stock banking was not sanctioned by Parliament until, in 1825, for the fourth or fifth time, some scores of these flimsy note-issuing private banks stopped payment in a single year. Even then a circle with a sixty-five mile radius was drawn about London, within

which joint-stock banking remained unknown until 1833. The Scottish banks have, however, an entirely different history. An uncommonly strong and flexible system of joint-stock banking had been created in Scotland in the eighteenth century, to which not a little of the swift progress of the country in commerce, industry, and agriculture during the first generation after 1800 may be attributed.

Thus merit and circumstance had united to make Great Britain the leader in economic change. She was praised, envied, and imitated; her ideas, her implements, and her men were borrowed as well as her accumulated wealth; though the British Government for years did its utmost to keep the skilled men and the machines at home. The early history of change on the Continent is full of English names—Richards, who began to build simple pumping-engines in Saxony before the great wars; Douglas, a maker of textile machines, whom Count Chaptal established in Paris on the Isle of Swans during the Consulate; Cockerill, of Seraing, who helped to found the machine industry of Belgium; Cockerill's sons, who in 1815 were invited by the Prussian Government to Berlin; a nameless Irish prisoner of war, who, having worked at muslin-weaving in Glasgow, greatly improved the looms of Tarare; the men from Nottingham, who shortly after Waterloo introduced the bobbin lace machine at Douai and St Pierre les Calais; Manby, Wilson, and Company, who started English methods at Creusot between 1826 and 1834; and so forth. The modern period in German agriculture is dated from the publication of Thaer's account of English farming in 1798. Telford was the adviser of the Austrian and Russian Governments; and his pupil, Tierney Clark, began the great suspension bridge at Budapest in 1839. English capital was responsible for the first serious railway-building by private enterprise in Belgium in the forties; and a few years later English contractors and English navvies went all over Europe.

The wars had both helped and hindered on the Continent that development of the means of communication without which there can be no swift economic progress. From this point of view the Napoleonic age was a time of restoration and advance for all countries that at any time formed part of the Empire, of arrested development for those that did not. In road and bridge and canal building, France, Belgium, and northern Italy had nothing, or almost nothing, to learn from England, except the use of iron bridges; even that, in the first instance, seems to have been a French invention. A sound economic instinct, as well as the desire to transport cannon across the Simplon, impelled Napoleon to the work of improving communications. It suited his genius to a marvel; and the *ancien régime* had set up a good tradition in civil engineering. New canals were planned and started; rivers were improved and canalised; and thousands of miles of main road were cut or reconstructed. The Bourbons carried on the task with creditable determination. Nearly a

thousand kilometres of canal were opened for traffic between 1815 and 1830; and the King's highways—many of which had fallen out of repair during the disastrous years after Moscow—were again taken in hand, repaired, and extended. The July monarchy was equally zealous. The total length of royal roads in good repair was nearly doubled between 1830 and 1848; and, though the local roads, both departmental and communal, were not all that they might have been, though the canal system at the beginning of the railway age was far less complete than that of England, France had no cause to be ashamed of her achievement. It was entirely the work of the public authorities, for there was no tradition of private enterprise in such matters, and private capital was lacking.

Belgium and Holland resumed work on their already well-developed road and canal systems as soon as the peace permitted. The great sea-canal from Amsterdam to the Helder, undertaken to revive if possible the trade of the Dutch capital, was opened in 1825; while in Belgium fresh road-making was undertaken by Government, canal-building by private capitalists. But over all the German-speaking lands progress was slow. The Prussian Government had begun to build solid main roads in 1788. By 1816 it was maintaining about nineteen hundred English miles of highway; but the greater part of these roads were in Westphalia and the Rhine Province. There was no appreciable quickening in the rate of construction down to 1844. The eastern provinces remained ill-furnished with satisfactory means of communication, Prussia proper containing only six hundred and fifty miles of *chaussée* in 1841. The rest of the highways were of the old eighteenth century type, full of ruts and pits and morasses. Yet Prussia was counted a well-administered State. Austria was by this time stirring again; and even Russia had joined in the work. The Polish road from Warsaw to the frontier, built from Telford's plans in the twenties, was the first satisfactory long highway in the Russian Empire. Austria had inherited a number of good routes from her eighteenth century monarchs, and her Italian provinces had formed part of the French Empire, so that she suffered less than some of her neighbours from the slow movement of the years that followed the fall of Napoleon. In southern Italy and in Spain much change was not to be expected.

Belgium is the single continental country where the railway age can be said to have begun before the later forties. A new economic life was rising on the foundation of her old industrial and commercial aptitudes; and, after the separation from Holland in 1830, her Government had the wit to appreciate the advantage which a policy of railway-building, combined with the development of the trade of the now opened Scheldt, would bring to a country so favourably situated between England and the ocean on the one hand and the mass of Europe on the other. Work on the State system of railways began in 1834. With Malines as centre, the lines struck north to Antwerp, south through Brussels towards

France, west to Ghent and Bruges, and east through Liége and Verviers towards Rhenish Prussia. By 1838 about a hundred and sixty miles of rail were opened—a considerable quantity for so small a country as Belgium; and by 1844 the main lines of the scheme were completed, though at a cost far greater than had at first been anticipated. France dealt deliberately with the railway problem. Her first lines, like those of most countries, were short and scattered, built by private enterprise to meet local needs. From three to four hundred miles of such lines had been constructed by 1842, the year in which the railway policy of Louis-Philippe's Parliament took form; but they by no means constituted a railway system, nor did they all make use of steam locomotion. In the German States the bureaucracy remained suspicious and hostile. The earlier lines were mainly of an experimental and suburban sort—Nürnberg to Fürth, Brunswick to Wolfenbüttel, Berlin to Potsdam—and the only long continuous stretch of railway in existence in 1842 began and ended in the heart of Germany. It ran from Magdeburg through Leipzig to Dresden. The distrust of the Governments was overcome during the forties; but, while it lasted, progress was necessarily slow, for no great public works could be quickly completed on the Continent in these early years without assistance from the exchequer.

That this was so is in part to be explained by the defects of the European banking system, defects both of immaturity and of decay. Already in the eighteenth century the old-fashioned deposit banks of the great commercial cities, banks that gave no credit and issued no notes, were declining. The Bank of Amsterdam collapsed ignominiously in 1791, although the Bank of Hamburg—an institution of a similar type—prolonged its life until it was merged in the Imperial Bank of the new German Empire. Note-issuing banks of a half-public character, modelled on the Bank of England, had been created during the eighteenth century in almost every State of Europe. But they fell into bad ways, became issuers of convertible paper-money at the order of Government, and succumbed or lost prestige and efficiency during the years of revolution and war. The reorganisation of these decayed official banks was slow and difficult. The Royal Bank of Prussia, for example—which was rather a department of the Prussian Treasury than a true bank—entangled itself in extensive and unfortunate mortgage operations during the wars, was carried on for years with a secret deficit, and was finally remodelled in 1846. The Bank of Vienna had an equally inglorious history. Much more successful was the Dutch Bank, established in 1814 to replace the defunct Bank of Amsterdam; but, effective and successful as it was, it needed time to grow. More successful still, and by far the most distinguished continental public bank of the early nineteenth century, was the Bank of France, built by Napoleon upon older foundations. In many small States, such as Bavaria, Saxony, and Switzerland, public chartered banks were first created between 1830

and 1840. That decade also saw the establishment of independent public banks or branches of the national bank in the chief commercial centres of France, a system which had been started at an earlier date.

Private banking also was at once decadent and immature. The shifting of political and commercial landmarks had taken from some cities much of their old importance as banking centres. Such were Geneva and Basel. Everywhere old-established firms had to recover from the shocks of the wars. How slow that recovery was is shown by the prominence of the English and Anglo-Jewish houses in the work of negotiating public loans. And even when recovery was complete, the greater part of the Continent remained far behind England in the extent and in the utilisation of banking facilities. The cheque and the bankers' clearing-house were unknown outside Great Britain. The regular use of banking accounts was rare, save in the greater commercial towns of Europe. In some parts of Germany the chief business of the banks was to exchange the bewildering currencies of the various sovereign States. In other parts there was no room as yet for true banking. Their condition resembled that of eastern Europe, where the simplest forms of credit were often unknown, where the rare buyings and sellings took place at markets and fairs and were invariably settled in cash.

Parallel to the relatively slow growth of banking was the slow advance in the use of the joint-stock company, either in commerce or industry, especially in the inner parts of Europe. In France, although the provisions of the code of commerce were not favourable to the free foundation of true joint-stock companies (*sociétés anonymes*), the joint-stock form spread with some rapidity between 1820 and 1830, as the need for associated capital showed itself with the progress of transport and the new industries; and under Louis-Philippe there was an outburst of company promotion. Seeing that the law subjected the *société anonyme* to a troublesome supervision, an ingenious modification of the old sleeping partnership (*société en commandite*) was adopted, the capital of the sleeping partners being cut up into small shares which could pass from hand to hand among the public. The device led to much fraud; but it also served a need. In Belgium, as in France, companies were freely created in the later thirties, whereas before the separation from Holland the country had contained barely a dozen true joint-stock undertakings. Speculative enterprise was encouraged by the new national Government; and, although collapse often followed hard on creation, the joint-stock system began to take a firm hold of mining, the metallurgical industries, and railway construction. Holland, the mother of companies in the West, had for the time being lost her vitality. The Hanse Towns followed slowly in the wake of France, whose legal forms they had adopted. On Prussian territory a beginning had hardly been made in 1825. Even insurance against fire, in all countries one of the first branches of commerce to rely on associated

capital, was not represented by a single company at Berlin in 1812; and it was not until nearly 1840 that the establishment of a few railway companies and of steam navigation companies on the Rhine familiarised Prussian subjects with the new method for the organisation of great undertakings. By that time free capital was beginning to accumulate and the investment habit to grow.

The history of the Paris Stock Exchange affords a fair indication of the character and progress of investment on the Continent. Beaten down by the Revolution—the declared foe of stock-jobbing—the Bourse painfully struggled back into life. Under the Restoration France did not even hold her own debt; therefore it is in no way surprising that only three classes of foreign funds were quoted on the official list in 1830. Only three others had been added by 1848, though it is true that the official lists do not adequately reflect the actual dealings. Domestic investment was no doubt growing with the growth of companies; but, just as industry still often retained a local character, so investment was barely emerging from the national stage, even in France. Foreign funds were sparingly purchased, foreign commercial and industrial securities seldom, if ever. It was only in England that "my Dutch stock and my Spanish stock," as well as "my five and three per cents," formed a normal investment for the savings of a private person, only in England that share capital for foreign railways and other commercial undertakings was likely to be subscribed.

Most instructed statesmen, in the later eighteenth century, had been conscious of the economic defects of the existing traditional methods of land tenure and cultivation, and had worked for their reform. The Revolution swept away the old tenures in and about France and prepared the way for a freer use of the land. It also transferred much additional land into the hands of the commercial and industrial middle class, a class that regarded it more habitually as a form of capital which must yield an adequate return than had some of the older land-owning families. The representatives of the old owners, who under the Restoration so frequently recovered their family estates in whole or in part, seem to have been awakened to the duty and the profit of developing them. In Prussia, and in some other German States outside the sphere of direct French influence, the reform of old tenures and of old methods of dividing up and using the land was taken in hand with new vigour during or shortly after the Napoleonic age. Some of the lesser German Governments, however, together with those of Austria and Russia, undertook no general plan of reform until after the forties. Everywhere the purely economic effects of changed tenures and partially rearranged fields were slow to appear; partly because the changes themselves were very slowly carried out—except in the case of the tenures destroyed by the Revolution—partly because the mere

right to make free use of his land could not readily change the ways of the peasant until new incentives to revise old methods of cultivation, or new chances of gain from sale and migration, were forthcoming. In many a French Department, five years of the railway produced more tangible, though it may be not more important, results than fifty years of emancipation from feudal dues. In eastern Germany, the rising English demand for wheat and fine wool in the early years of the new century influenced agriculture more swiftly and for a time more powerfully than did the edicts of emancipation.

Not that the changes made of set purpose were without economic effects. There were definite results in every case; but those results followed the reforms gradually and unequally, and in many cases not till after the first five-and-forty years of the nineteenth century. They were more pronounced in Prussia, where the abolition of serfdom in all its various grades and of the half-free tenures corresponding roughly to English copyhold was definitely linked, so far as might be, with a rearrangement of the great common fields and a partial division of the common pasture and waste, than in France and Belgium, where the Revolution dealt with tenures rather than with the use of land. There was not in France any systematic attempt to rearrange the village fields in those districts where the system of scattered strips prevailed, although a process of consolidating the peasant properties by purchase and private arrangement had been in progress for many generations. In both France and Belgium the common pastures, woodlands, and wastes—which were more general than the open arable fields—were handed over absolutely to the communes at the Revolution. The Belgian commons remained for the most part undivided and unimproved until a law of 1847 authorised and encouraged division or sale. Great stretches of similar land in north-eastern Holland have only been brought into use since the middle of the nineteenth century. Many commons in northern France, and some in other parts of the country, were voluntarily cut up or sold by the villagers; but all through the period of the July monarchy immense tracts of improvable and unimproved common remained in almost all the Departments, over and above the woodlands and the high mountain pastures of the east, centre, and south. Even in Prussia, where the curtailment and reclaiming of the extensive commons had begun in the eighteenth century, the work, like that of enclosing the open fields, went on most slowly. The three great, open plough-fields of Berlin itself, the Pankow field, the Lichtenberg field, and the Mid-field, were first rearranged, and their separate sections first cultivated independently by their owners, between 1819 and 1827. The town meadows were used in common until 1855.

The reform of the French land law and village economy had undoubtedly increased the comfort of the whole peasantry, widened its outlook, and prepared it to profit by further economic change. In

eastern Germany the reorganisation of rural life on the great *Junker* estates was building up, or, it might almost be said, was creating, the class of free, landless labourers. Still, there was no revolution in agricultural method, although the work of the eighteenth century continued and was accompanied by some exceptional innovations. The traditional triple course of husbandry remained unaltered, or but slightly altered, in many parts of Germany. In Hainault and Brabant modifications in the triple course were equally rare and slight; in the Ardennes country it is doubtful whether any change had occurred. Root crops were little used in Normandy, and hardly at all in Champagne, in the forties. In south-western France corn followed fallow and fallow corn as before, and agricultural implements retained their primitive simplicity. It was still a matter for congratulation in the year 1861 that the flail was nearly extinct in a progressive French province. Deep ploughing was unknown in the greater part of Germany before 1800; and for many years the old-fashioned furrow, three or four inches in depth, survived. In 1827 the Prussian Government is found solemnly ordering that no waggons in the future shall have axles less than four feet four inches in length. At the same time it is clear that, in the west, agricultural improvement was continuous, if slow. Dead fallow was becoming less and less common, especially in northern France and western Germany. The use of clover, root crops, and artificial grasses, was spreading. The potato was everywhere known and used. The steady growth of cities was telling on the agriculture of the surrounding country-side. France was breeding cattle with increased success, experimenting with English stock, and exporting dairy produce, fruit, and eggs to England; for her northern provinces were now within the sphere of attraction of the London market. Holland also was building up her pastoral industry; while Flanders and the other old seats of high farming further perfected their methods.

The exceptional innovations in continental agriculture in these years were all connected with the new industrial activity. Of these innovations the most remarkable was the introduction of improved breeds of sheep. Spanish merinos had been imported into France, Prussia, and Saxony as well as into England before 1789. The royal herd at Rambouillet was created in 1785; and Napoleon strengthened it by fresh importations. Shortly after 1800 the Prussian Government again turned its attention to the flocks; and during the next generation the spread of the fine-woollen sheep—merinos and half-merinos—in France, Prussia, and Saxony was astonishingly rapid. Royal houses and great landowners were the natural pioneers—among others La Fayette during his retirement at La Grange—but, in Saxony and Silesia at least, the improved breeds were to be found on peasants' land before 1840. The steadily growing demand for the finer wools offered a prospect of great profits from the flocks. For nearly thirty years “electoral” wool, nominally from Saxony, was used by all the English fine-cloth manufacturers. But its decline as a

staple German export was almost as swift as its rise; and that decline had begun already in 1840. The quality of the German wool was deteriorating, owing to careless breeding, while an effective substitute came in yearly increasing quantities from Australia.

The spread of the cultivation of the sugar-beet was as remarkable as the revolution in sheep-breeding. Beet-growing was first undertaken on a large scale during the wars. When war was over, great and small, Prussian squires and Flemish peasants, joined in the work. The cultivation of the new root led directly to the introduction of deep ploughing, drilling, and better implements generally, in central and eastern Germany. Between 1835 and 1837 there was an eruption of sugar factories in Saxony and Silesia. The movement was swift, for it was due to two of the great driving forces of the new age, industrial chemistry and large scale manufacture. Similar in character to the beet-sugar industry, though less extensive, was the new trade of distillation from the potato. Together with the extended growth of corn and oil seeds for export, these new branches of agriculture were beginning to exercise a powerful influence on the rural life of Germany. The Prussian squire, freed from some of the cumbrous routine of the old agrarian system, enabled to replace the inefficient customary service of his peasants by hired labour, came to regard his estate commercially and to watch home and foreign markets in a new fashion. He founded agricultural societies, exhibited at cattle-shows, and imitated the English landowners of an earlier generation.

The resistance offered to agricultural innovations on the Continent in the eighteenth century by antiquated land laws and a half-medieval village economy has something in common with the obstacles which guilds and ubiquitous Government control placed in the way of industrial change. But the importance of these obstacles may easily be exaggerated. In most, if not all, western countries the guild had long ceased to be a really independent, self-governing association of master-craftsmen. It was rather a police instrument in the hands of the State; and the State looked with favour on new industries, new processes, and large scale production, even when it subjected them to somewhat excessive inspection. With the Revolution and the French conquests guilds vanished from a large part of Europe. Industrial freedom was established in Prussia during the period of reconstruction after Jena. In many German States, however, the full guild-system with its regular hierarchy, its "*Wanderjahre*" and "masterpiece," and the accompanying State interference with the exercise of skilled crafts in rural districts, survived 1848. Here and there, as for instance in Bavaria, it certainly tended to delay change. But the industries most susceptible of change in the early days of the industrial revolution on the Continent were seldom organised after the complete guild pattern; and, when the time came for revolution in the

handicrafts, guilds were no longer alive. Again, the paternal supervision exercised throughout the German-speaking lands by a conservative bureaucratic Government delayed, among other things, the construction of railways and the reform of mining methods. On the other hand such supervision often accelerated economic movements. The royal *Gewerbe-institut* founded at Berlin in 1821 stimulated industries—such, for instance, as engineering—whose “natural” rate of growth would undoubtedly have been slow, as also did the attention which Napoleon, his councillors, and his prefects, gave to industrial affairs. Delay in the adoption of new processes and of the new power in Europe is to be traced far oftener to the absence of economic stimulus, and the consequent survival of simple methods of manufacture, than to the deliberate acts of Governments.

It is probable, moreover, that the high customs-tariffs, which most countries retained or adopted as a means of commercial defence against England during the peace, did in some cases hasten the transition from the old order to the new. When the natural protection created by a state of war ceased, threatened groups of producers made successful appeals to Governments, which in but few cases had abandoned the traditions of the eighteenth century. Mercantile communities that lay across the world's trade-routes, such as the Dutch and the seaboard city States of Germany, were naturally in favour of greater freedom; but such cases were exceptional. France quickly constructed a powerful protective system, with heavy duties both on manufactures and agricultural produce, and abundant prohibitions. Inadequate duties on manufactures formed one of the grievances of Belgium during the fifteen years of forced partnership with Holland. The separation of 1830 was followed by a tariff more satisfactory to the manufacturing interest and also by an outburst of industrial activity. The scientific and liberal Prussian tariff of 1818, although it was on the whole an important step towards freer trade, yet recognised the claims of the industrial classes; and, after the *Zollverein* came into being, the duties on manufactures were gradually raised, with results that seem to have been beneficial to the growth of the infant industries of Germany. In the most backward countries, in Russia, for instance, it is not possible to trace any such benefits; for, where new processes had not gained a footing, such exaggerations of prohibition and tariff as Russia practised were likely to perpetuate outworn methods of production. Nor was there any demonstrable gain to England, the leader of Europe, from the continuance of protection in its most extreme and irrational forms until after 1820, and in a form less irrational but still pronounced and ill-regulated until the forties. That continuance merely intensified the evils attendant on economic change, encouraged similar policies among England's neighbours, and hindered the expansion of her trade.

In almost every European country the industry that first felt the

infection from England was that of cotton. On the Continent, as in Great Britain, it was relatively young and adaptable; and, although in many districts it was both older and less adaptable than in Great Britain, yet its practice—unlike that of the linen and woollen industries—had never become associated with the tenacious routine of peasant life. Everywhere a professional trade, not a by-employment, those who followed it did so for gain. Very early indeed, in some cases several years before 1789, the hand-worked spinning-jenny and other English machines began to appear in France, the Low Countries, Switzerland, and Germany. By 1801 the jenny had driven out the wheel in the French Department of the North. During the Continental Blockade little spinning-mills began to spring up everywhere—near Lille, in Alsace, on the Rhine and on the Ruhr, in Bavaria and Saxony and Flanders. The machinery for preparing and spinning cotton could now be successfully made outside England. But steam was hardly known in the textile mills of Europe during the Napoleonic period. The first engine in Alsace—it was of 10 horse-power—was set up in 1812. The next year Cockerill, of Seraing, built the first in Belgium. After Waterloo there was rapid motion, the districts of Lille and Mülhausen taking the lead. In weaving, the flying-shuttle was well established, thanks largely to the influence of Napoleon; and so early as 1823 the power-loom was tried experimentally in Alsace. Twenty years later there were as many power-looms as hand-looms in the Alsatian trade. This is perhaps the most rapid conquest made by weaving-machinery in any section of the cotton industry. At Lille also the factory system was fully established in the forties, with all its ugly social accompaniments. True, progress was not uniform throughout France; Normandy, for example, lagged far behind Alsace and the North. Yet the trade as a whole was fast becoming a real factory industry in the later years of Louis-Philippe.

Belgium kept pace with France. Belgian manufacturers had been among the first in Europe to import English machinery; the progress of Belgian mining and iron-working encouraged further effort. Steam came rapidly into use between 1820 and 1840, and the close commercial relations with England, together with the economic activity of the new national Government after 1830, assisted large-scale production and the factory system. In the German States the cotton industry, owing to its exotic character, had always adopted a more or less capitalistic organisation and so was ready for change. Yet mechanical progress was slow. Before 1840 steam was hardly used at all in this or any other industry on Prussian soil. The total horse-power recorded in Prussia was rather over 9000 in 1837, and less than 22,000 in 1846. At this latter date in Saxony, counted a most progressive land, less than 2500 horse-power in all was available. Of these small quantities only a small portion fell to the cotton trade, for steam was used chiefly in mining and metallurgy. The spinning-mills that were again springing

up rapidly during the thirties in Prussia, Bavaria, and Saxony were invariably water-driven and generally small. Weaving by power was unknown. Even in 1846 not four per cent. of the cotton-looms in Prussia were automatic; and there was no such thing as a power-loom in Saxony.

The older and more rigid textile trades—wool, linen, and silk—were not easily bent by the new forces. In France none of them had adopted the power-loom in 1840; and, even in advanced cloth-manufacturing centres like Sedan and Reims, spinning-mills were rare. Decline in the spinning of wool by hand had, however, begun years before, whereas in the case of flax and hemp a decline was hardly yet perceptible. Cloth-shearing, which had long been taken over by machinery in England, was still carried on with the gigantic old hand-shears in the thirties. Hand-combing was of course universal; and the only branches of the trade—other than spinning—upon which the new methods had fastened were dyeing and finishing. In remote districts, such as the cloth-working valleys of the Cevennes, no change of importance occurred for almost another generation. Nowhere was there a true factory system, though the trade contained many considerable capitalists and fair-sized single establishments. In the silk industry, one notable invention was made at Lyons in 1804—the Jacquard-loom for weaving complex patterns without the intricate “harness” and endless labour of the old looms. As an invention it ranks with the greatest of those made in England, but it brought no change in the industrial organisation of the Lyons trade. The capitalist *maître fabricant*, more a merchant than a manufacturer, directed the course of business as in the eighteenth century, giving out designs and material to the subordinate *maître ouvrier* and his journeymen.

In Belgium the woollen trade at least had been considerably modified before 1840; but in Germany most primitive conditions prevailed. There were a few large spinning-mills about Aachen and in Silesia; but, as the Prussian “spinners” contained on an average only 107 spindles each in 1840, the bulk of them could hardly be termed factories. Every peasant family still spun its wool and its flax; most owned and worked a linen-loom; some wove their own wool. So late as 1843, not a third of the looms in Prussia were owned by professional weavers. Such weavers as there were almost all worked at home. There were three linen-weaving businesses in Berlin in 1846. They employed fourteen hands, all told. Its four cloth factories and its numerous silk factories each employed some five-and-twenty men; its three establishments for spinning wool by machinery each between five-and-twenty and thirty. In England the hardest social problem of the textile trades was that of the hand-weavers; in Germany it was that of the hand-spinners of flax. Flax-spinning was not a by-employment only; it was also a separate industry, an industry that had come into existence to meet

the needs of the great domestic linen manufacture in Silesia and elsewhere and to supply the export trade in linen and linen-yarn during the eighteenth century. Princes had set their soldiers and the occupants of their prisons spinning; spinning colonies had been created; distressed peasants had often turned spinners; and the easy trade was overcrowded with low-grade labour. Flax-spinning machinery had hardly appeared in Germany; but the competition of English mill yarns and fabrics, together with the deterioration in the quality of most of the German yarn, crippled the export trade and produced long-drawn misery in the thirties and forties. While Germany was thus experiencing some of the first effects of widespread industrial change, and while the remodelling of the textile industries was in progress also in Switzerland, southern and eastern Europe remained almost untouched.

Not all the industrial changes of the peace were the result of English initiative, as the case of Jacquard's loom shows. Most of the early and decisive mechanical inventions came from England, though flax-spinning machinery is claimed for the Frenchman Girard and the tubular boiler for Séguin. From England also came the modern factory system and industrial organisation. But there remained arts and crafts in which she was still backward. In the textile industries her vast superiority of mere producing power was accompanied by a grade of beauty and design that was often woefully low. Here France was her mistress, and parts of Germany at least her equals. In scientific methods of metallurgy she was in some ways inferior to Germany; and in many branches of applied science she could not claim supremacy. The foundations of industrial chemistry were largely laid by Frenchmen, from Lavoisier and Leblanc onwards; and the French Governments, Napoleon's Government above all, encouraged the work with zeal. So also in smaller matters of a scientific sort. The first tolerable oil-lamps are connected with two French names, while later came Daguerre and his sun-pictures. It is not possible to trace the long series of the scientific inventions. Many of them had produced no great effects on industry in the forties; but the leading continental nations were taking their full share in the work of discovery and dissemination. Already their activity was a matter of concern to England; and John Bowring wrote anxiously of the German Customs' Union in 1840, that "chemical knowledge, in all its various branches, is further advanced than with us."

That this advance in scientific knowledge did not as yet carry with it a corresponding advance in practice is shown by the position of the fundamental industries of mining and metallurgy on the Continent. The nearest approach to English conditions had been made in Belgium, thanks partly to the new railway system. The coal and iron industries were of old standing in the Low Countries. The pits of southern Hainault had been worked to a depth of over five hundred feet in the eighteenth century. Liège practised to perfection all known branches

of iron and steel working. War gave employment to her foundries and her forges; but the new processes only came with the peace—coke-smelting, the puddling-furnace, and the rolling-mill, crossing from England between 1820 and 1830. Even during the wars iron tramways and steam winding-engines were being introduced in the Hainault collieries. With the thirties came a great extension of mining and a rapid transformation of the iron industry. Between 1830 and 1835 some thirty thousand men were employed in the Belgian coal-mines, which at that time had a greater output than those of either France or Prussia. Steam was rapidly adopted and new industries sprang up fast on the coal-fields of the south.

French coal-mining developed slowly; and the small, old, charcoal-smelting furnaces, each giving work for a mere handful of men, that were scattered over the wooded highlands of the east and south were only gradually displaced by large coke-furnaces employing the steam-blast. One of Watt's engines came to Creusot in 1782. Experiments with coke were made there a few years later and again in the early years of the Empire; but at the time of the July Revolution there were still less than thirty coke-furnaces at work in France, as compared with nearly four hundred of the old type. The number of charcoal-furnaces grew for another nine years; and in 1846 more than half the French pig-iron was still charcoal-made. When the railway age began, the French industry was not in a position to supply the needs of the companies, which at times were forced to import from England, in spite of heavy tariffs, at times to make advances to equip furnaces out of their own funds. Until after 1840 the consumption of coal in France grew slowly, though persistently. The full extent of the northern coal-field was as yet unknown; and the greater part of the output came from the comparatively inaccessible fields of the upper Loire.

Outside Belgium and France there was little rapid movement before 1850. The ancient Swedish iron industry went forward steadily. It fed Sheffield and felt the effects of English industrial activity. The Styrian mines on the contrary, which in the third quarter of the eighteenth century had yielded almost as much iron as all England, were now utterly distanced. The new processes were not really established in Germany. In 1846 barely fourteen per cent. of the furnaces in Prussia had adopted coke as fuel; and six years later it was estimated that the output of iron from an average English furnace compared with that from an average German furnace was as ten to one. There were a few great smelting and iron-working establishments in Westphalia and Silesia in the forties; but they were all young. As a whole the German iron industry was still a half-rural, a woodland, trade. The old water-driven tilt-hammers, nail-mills, and wire-mills were thickly strewn over the iron district of Siegerland. Smelting in that country was commonly in the hands of small groups of peasants who “managed to divide their

time between the mine, the forest, the furnace, and their land," and wore the furnace-man's leather apron when haymaking, as an English traveller reported in 1846. Nine years earlier the average Prussian iron-mine gave employment to less than ten men ; and the working force even in the copper, lead, and silver mines was usually but thirty or forty. Belgium alone produced more iron than the whole Zollverein in the early forties, just as she produced more coal than Prussia. Coal-mining on a large scale had begun in Westphalia, on the Roer, and in Silesia ; but its growth waited on that of the iron industry and the railway.

Where the manufacture of pig-iron was still undeveloped, the engineering trades—and with them the fibres of the new industrial economy—were of necessity weak. This was the situation in Germany in 1840. The stimulus given to most branches of manufacture by the creation of the Zollverein was only just beginning to make itself felt. The use of steam-engines had hardly begun. Though various classes of machines were being successfully built in Saxony, at Berlin, and in Westphalia, and though joint-stock engineering businesses had recently been founded, all was experimental and somewhat raw. In France and Belgium this was not the case. There the new metal-working appliances—rollers, lathes, planing-machines, slotting-machines—were known and used in the thirties. But England's superiority remained indisputable. Cockerill, of Seraing, was probably the best of continental machine-builders. Yet his textile machinery was conspicuously inferior to that of English makers in 1837 ; almost all his models, in every branch of the industry, were English ; and from England came all his best machine tools. The next decade no doubt saw great advances in Germany, as well as in Belgium and France ; but England also was in motion, and the relative positions of the industrial nations were little affected.

The social and political effects of industrial change had touched almost every part of Great Britain in the early forties. Town growth was in headlong and unwholesome progress. That capitalism would triumph in all fields seemed certain. Economists could assume with no very glaring inaccuracy that both capital and labour were mobile between trade and trade. The manufacturers were a power in Parliament. Reform of the evils characteristic of life in mill and mine had begun. The multitudes of wage-workers in the new and new-modelled trades were struggling for freedom to organise, and feeling after those forms of organisation for self-defence and self-advancement which already existed in some of the older crafts. Collectivist thought was taking forms consonant with the principles of the new industrial systems. Friedrich Engels was following earlier English thinkers in examination and criticism of the tendencies of the new age, as manifested in Great Britain. Before 1850 Karl Marx settled in England. There was a fresh bitterness of class strife, threatening industrial as well as political

revolution. In France and Belgium the outward signs and the social effects of the new age were less marked and less general. They were concentrated, it might be in Alsace, or about Lille, at St Étienne, or at Roubaix. It could be plausibly maintained in 1849 that *la grande industrie* was an unnatural, as well as an unwholesome, growth in France—a growth due to slavish imitation of England joined to a protective tariff, and that small-scale, and not capitalistic, industry was and must remain the true French system. The *bourgeois* following of the *bourgeois* King was not a class of great manufacturers, though it contained such. Collectivist thought was not completely dominated by the new movements; it retained something of the classical flavour of eighteenth century social speculation. This was but natural; for the economic conditions under which the majority of Frenchmen lived, above all in the villages and country towns, had changed surprisingly little since Louis XVI met the States General at Versailles.

Germany furnishes a most complete picture of primitive social and economic conditions as yet untouched. Mills and furnaces might be rising, agricultural methods changing, the flax-spinners suffering; still, in innumerable trades and towns apprentice and journeyman lived with the master after the old fashion. The peasant was often enough his own miller; and, where the miller existed, he usually took his pay in kind. The village smith, in many districts, was an official paid by the commune and bound to work for small customary fees. Even in such industries as tanning and dyeing the small craftsman, working at home, generally held his own. During three generations—from 1754 to 1847—the number of master-craftsmen as compared with the population of Berlin hardly varied. The capitalist manufacturing class—the employers of modern economic theory—existed only as isolated individuals, not as a distinguishable grade of society. Industry had been freed over a great part of Germany; but it retained most of its old habits and moved slowly along the new ways; while in more than one State access to those ways was still hindered by the law.

In trading as in industry, inland Germany, and with it all eastern Europe, retained methods which in England and other parts of the west had long been disappearing. Trade was medieval in its simplicity. Peasant and townsman everywhere dealt directly with each other in the weekly markets. No intermediary came, as a rule, between the working craftsman and the consumer. The man who wanted a new town-house himself bought the materials and directed the workmen. In the country the peasant often built for himself with the aid of his neighbours. Local supplies of food for the most part satisfied all local needs. Even in Berlin the bulk of the flour consumed was ground at the neighbouring mills. Outside the greatest towns the pure shopkeeping class hardly existed. Pedlars and travelling dealers took its place, from whom both small townsman and peasant bought any implements, utensils,

articles of clothing, or luxuries, that could not be made on the spot. Fairs, such as those of Leipzig and Frankfort on the Oder, were the centres of a more wholesale commerce and attracted to themselves the greater merchants and the staples of international trade. The Frankfort fair was still growing in importance in 1850; for economic conditions in eastern Germany somewhat resembled those of Russia, where the decline of the fairs only began with the last quarter of the nineteenth century.

Not even in the west had that revolution been accomplished which has brought into some branches of retail trade organisation on the largest scale and, latterly, the joint-stock company form. In Paris itself, in the forties, almost all the retail business firms remained small and peddling, short of capital and of organisation. The position of the London tradesman was little better. It was noticed as a new thing, in 1825, that the prosperous shopkeeper was leaving the house over his shop for the suburbs; and such evidence of growing wealth evoked comment. As an institution the shop would seem to have been generally established some time before 1800, even in remote English villages; but in 1840 it was still an institution economically akin rather to the domestic system of manufacture than to the complex factory organism.

Meanwhile there had developed in the ports of the west wholesale dealings of uncommon magnitude. Forms and methods had not greatly changed since the eighteenth century; there had been no appreciable quickening in the rate of ocean transport or in the dissemination of market news; but the scope of commerce had been extended to meet new needs and make use of new opportunities. The long distance trades in food-stuffs and raw materials took a fresh aspect, as population thickened in the industrial lands, as manufactures using tropical or subtropical materials developed, and as the produce of the southern temperate zone for the first time crossed to the northern. England was the centre of the new activity. The slave-grown cotton of America, that had been sparingly used before 1800, came to Liverpool in greater quantity year by year during the generation that followed the wars. Cotton was also shipped to Havre, to Hamburg, to Antwerp, and elsewhere; but Liverpool remained the central European market where Frenchmen, Belgians, and others, did much of their buying. Gradually there was constructed at Liverpool a commercial mechanism adapted to the work in hand and modelled, to some extent, on that of the London Stock Exchange. The foundation of the Cotton Brokers' Association in 1841 may be taken to mark the beginning of this new type of highly organised and regulated wholesale dealings, a type which was to develop in other markets and affect other commodities. In the wool trade it had not developed, though there also great changes were in progress. Between 1820 and 1840 considerable supplies of wool began to reach Europe from Australia, Cape Colony, and the river Plate. With the arrival of the colonial wools a new international market was created in

London, a market through which for almost half a century well-nigh every bale of Australian or South African wool passed.

On all hands tariffs checked the free development of the international trade in grain; but it also was growing and changing notably. England was as yet the only country that depended on import for any appreciable quantity of her corn in ordinary years. Even in years of scarcity, however, her imports had probably never exceeded one-fifteenth or one-sixteenth of her total consumption of wheat before 1840. There was a rapid growth in the next decade; yet it was possible in 1851 to treat the notion that she might ever draw the greater part of her bread from abroad as a grotesque absurdity. Nevertheless this limitation of independence was a new and significant thing. Supplies of grain from fresh and remote sources were waiting admission at the doors of the industrial nations. Until the close of the wars the occasional needs of western Europe were met by the surplus produce shipped from the southern Baltic ports, from Sicily, and from the North African coast. The United States and Canada had contributed, but on no great scale, though American corn had often found its way to French ports and had been welcomed by the agents of the Revolutionary Government during the Terror. Before the eighteenth century ended, the colonisation of the Black Sea steppes by Russia and the opening of the Dardanelles to commerce prepared a new field of supply and a way to it. Odessa, a mere cluster of houses in 1790, was a town of fifty thousand inhabitants in 1825, whence grain was being shipped to the Mediterranean and the west. The cheap Russian wheat had reached France and England immediately after the Peace of Vienna. Its advent had encouraged both countries in their new policy of rigid exclusion. However, it speedily drove the Baltic wheat from such markets—they were mainly in the south of Europe—as it was permitted to enter. The wheat-growing capacity of America was still comparatively small; but there was a steady increase in the surplus available for export both in British North America and in the United States.

Other long distance trades of old standing had recovered from the disturbance of war; and their swift growth provoked incessant change in British and continental ports. England of set purpose discouraged the easy timber trade with the Baltic, and, by a substantial tariff preference, stimulated that with New Brunswick and the other North American provinces. British dealings with India and the Far East grew with the abolition of the Company's monopoly in 1813 and the transference of all trading powers from the Company to the private merchants in 1833. But the seas east of Singapore were still little frequented by English shipping; and direct trade with China was of no great importance until after 1840. Between 1820 and 1840 only twenty-three British ships cleared for China yearly; and only forty-four ships of all nationalities entered British ports directly from that country.

Meanwhile the old Dutch commerce with the Malay islands had revived. The spice trade of the Moluccas dwindled into insignificance; but its place was more than filled by the rapid growth of the new trade in coffee and other tropical produce from Java. Capable governors organised there a curiously artificial system of forced labour and strict monopoly, which, whatever its merits as a method of government, clearly gave new economic strength to the Dutch colonial empire, and to Amsterdam and Rotterdam something of their ancient activity.

Comparable to the development of Java, and of greater importance for international commerce as a whole, was the new phase in the history of the West Indies that began with the freeing of Cuban trade by Spain in 1809. After the ruin of San Domingo, Jamaica for a time held the first place among the sugar-colonies. But the stopping of the slave-trade in 1812, followed by the abolition of slavery itself twenty years later, helped to throw back the English islands and free the way for the rise of Cuba and Porto Rico. The land of Cuba was still virgin; English capital was offered abundantly to bring it into use; the population of the island nearly trebled in a generation; the tobacco industry was created; and by 1830 Cuba alone was supplying almost a fifth of the sugar consumed in Europe. The story of Brazil is not unlike that of Cuba. There, owing to English influence, trade was thrown open when the Portuguese royal family crossed the Atlantic in 1807. The tutelage which Great Britain had exercised over Portugal was extended to the new dominion, and carried with it the advantages of commercial connexion with the world's greatest market and a supply of British capital for the extension of coffee-planting, cotton-growing, and other less certain undertakings. In both Brazil and Cuba, as in the United States, the demand of Europe for tropical produce directly encouraged the consolidation and extension of a society based on slavery, with its evil economic and social consequences.

Towards the end of the first quarter of the nineteenth century the insurgent Spanish colonies of the North and South American mainland were also opened to European trade. Here too was England's opportunity and for a time she had few competitors. By gradually easing the bonds of the old colonial system and relaxing the Navigation Acts she also encouraged, though grudgingly, the natural intercourse between the new nations of America and her own American dependencies. As the New World took shape and gained strength, political and economic, it began to exercise trade influence on Europe greater than had been known since its precious metals deranged prices and perplexed statesmen in the sixteenth century. The young republics borrowed as freely as they sold and bought. Already in 1825 speculative trading with America had thrown the commerce of England out of gear; while before 1840 all the markets of Europe had felt, and for the first time, the effects of American manipulation of the cotton

supplies and the discomforts of that world-wide division of labour whereby one continent grows what another works.

Among the immediate results of the whole course of economic, legal, and political change in Europe and out of Europe, none was of greater significance or more intricately connected with all the complex forces that ruled the new age than the great flow of men outward from Europe that set in as the great wars ceased. It was an emigration such as the modern world had not before known. Population, held down in many countries by war, showed astonishing recuperative and expansive power. In the United Kingdom even war had done little to check its growth. The ties of law or custom that held the peasantry of Europe to the soil were falling away. Restrictions on emigration failed or were swept aside. The barriers round the old Spanish dominions fell. Even Africa began to open. Travel became easier year by year; and the unoccupied lands and the young trades of four continents gave room for industry and skill.

For the first fifteen years of the peace the movement of the population was, in the main, a movement from Great Britain to North America. In Britain employment was insufficient and wages low, both in the cities and on the land; trades and towns and classes were in the grip of the great changes; and political discontent came to aid the economic forces that were driving the people from home. According to the official figures, which however are undoubtedly too low, the average annual emigration from the United Kingdom for the five years 1820-4 was just over twelve thousand; for the years 1830-4 it was sixty-five thousand. The continental emigration was also mainly directed towards America; but it began late and gradually, and it is hard to measure. It is known that some fifteen thousand Germans landed yearly at United States' ports between 1830 and 1840; but in the earlier years of that decade the numbers were small. Of the Germans who went to other countries—and they were many—there are no adequate records. From the United Kingdom the movement was accelerating in the thirties. Schemes for systematic colonisation were on foot; but their numerical results were inconsiderable. North America retained its vast attractive power; it was not until 1838 that more than five thousand British emigrants turned elsewhere in any one year. From France and Belgium, Holland and Scandinavia, Spain, Italy, and eastern Europe, emigration was slow before 1840. It gathered speed from Switzerland and Scandinavia in the forties; and in the early fifties even lands with but a small natural increase of population contributed to the stream. From the United Kingdom it was reaching full flood, for the Irish exodus had begun and the new gold of the west and south was drawing men away over seas.

## CHAPTER XXIV.

### THE BRITISH ECONOMISTS.

THE *Wealth of Nations* was published in 1776. The work was based on lectures which formed part of Adam Smith's course of Moral Philosophy when Professor in the University of Glasgow (1752-63). After resigning his Chair, Smith travelled on the Continent for three years as tutor of the Duke of Buccleuch. A considerable part of the time was spent in Paris, where he made the acquaintance of Quesnay, the founder of the Physiocratic system, which Smith described as "with all its imperfections perhaps the nearest approximation to the truth that has yet been published upon the subject of political economy." On returning to Scotland, Smith settled at Kirkcaldy, and for the next ten years devoted himself entirely to the composition of his great work. It ran through several editions during his lifetime; but, although he made many small alterations, he introduced no substantial changes and only added one new chapter.

The social conditions and institutions of his time (1723-90) which chiefly affected, or modified the proportions of, "the wealth of nations," were, first and foremost, the survivals of medieval regulations and ideas in the governmental management of home industries and the predominance of the Mercantile System in foreign trade and colonial policy. In consequence, a large part of the work of Adam Smith was critical and destructive. "Laws frequently continue in force long after the circumstances which first gave occasion to them, and which could alone render them reasonable, are no more." Large estates, supported by primogeniture and entails, might have been necessary under the insecurity of the feudal system; but in the actual state of Europe the proprietor of a single acre was as secure as the proprietor of 100,000. The survivals of feudal institutions checked the improvement of agriculture. "After small proprietors, rich and great farmers are in every country the great improvers." Feudal survivals checked the subdivision of land and the establishment of peasant proprietors and yeomen, and checked also the investment by large tenant farmers of capital in land. Smith allowed that the land system in England was less hurtful than that prevailing in most parts of

Europe; but he is hardly just to the "spirited landowners" of the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries. The reform of the land laws has, however, proceeded in England on the lines laid down by Adam Smith; freedom of transfer has been promoted, settlements have been restricted, and the security of the tenant's capital has been increased. Cobden declared that in the reform of the English land laws he would rely entirely on the teaching of Adam Smith. Labour, like land, in Adam Smith's opinion, remained in fetters or in leading-strings no longer required. The Statute of Apprenticeship (or Artificers), 5 Eliz. cap. 4, and the customs which enforced the same ideas, imposed restrictions on the advancement of labour; and the "ill-contrived" laws of settlement limited its mobility. Combinations of masters were tacitly if not openly permitted, while those of labour were suppressed. Adam Smith advocated free trade in labour as in land.

With regard to capital, although he held strongly that, from the national stand-point, there were differences in the relative advantages of employing capital in different ways, he still considered that the direction of private people as to the employment of their capital could be "safely trusted not only to no single person but to no council or senate whatever." His view that the State should not attempt to direct the employment of capital is the more remarkable because he did not think profit, by which individuals are guided, was the measure of national advantage. On the contrary he maintained that, with equal or nearly equal profits, there might be great differences in national advantages. The most remarkable illustration of this doctrine is the argument that the monopoly of the colonial trade had, by raising the general rate of profit, affected adversely the national interests, and even the separate interests of the three great classes which make up the nation—labourers, capitalists, and landlords. Of all employments of capital, that in agriculture was by him considered the most advantageous to a nation; but "those systems which, preferring agriculture to all other employments, in order to promote it impose restraints on manufactures and foreign trade, act contrary to the very end which they propose and indirectly discourage that very species of industry which they mean to promote." Adam Smith condemned equally the laws intended to prevent speculation and those designed to regulate the inland trade in corn; he condemned alike the bounties intended to encourage the export of corn and the extension of the area under cultivation, and the restraints on the importation of foreign corn.

The main part, however, of Adam Smith's criticism was directed against the regulations framed for the management and direction of foreign and colonial trade, which are generally summarised under the title of the Mercantile System. In his Fourth Book he examined the foundations of this system, especially from the point of view of the encouragement alleged to be given to home labour and the promotion of native industries. He attacked the general theory of the balance of

trade, and then examined in detail, with an abundance of historical and statistical illustrations, the various expedients by which it was sought to attain a favourable balance: restraints on imports, encouragements to exports, commercial treaties, and the exploitation of colonies. It has been well said by Adolf Held that anyone who reads the Book carefully will find in it a wonderful picture of the whole social relations and of the state of the economic and financial legislation of England about the middle of the eighteenth century—and he might have said, not only of England, but of the whole world. On surveying mankind from China to Peru, Adam Smith discovered an enormous mass of what he considered useless or harmful regulations, not merely, as is so often supposed, from what List calls the *cosmo-political* point of view, but from that of the various nations concerned. He set himself to cut away these growths and give free play to the natural economic forces. And the conclusion of the Fourth Book is that, “all systems either of restraint or preference being thus completely taken away, the obvious and simple system of natural liberty establishes itself of its own accord.”

This passage, divorced from its context, has often been quoted to show that Adam Smith was the founder and supporter of the most extreme form of *laissez faire*. But, before examining this popular error, it is desirable to recall briefly other historical conditions and events by which his work was naturally influenced. While he was living the life of a recluse at Kirkcaldy, on one side of the world the British Colonies were being driven to rebellion, and on the other the races of India were being brought under British dominion. Naturally some of the longest and best chapters in the *Wealth of Nations* deal with British policy as regards the Colonies and India. No part of his work is better calculated to show that Adam Smith did not consider it the duty of British statesmen simply to let India and the Colonies look to themselves. On the contrary, as a basis of colonial policy, he expounded a most elaborate and far-reaching scheme of imperial federation involving imperial taxation with imperial representation; and, as regards India, he maintained strongly that a company of merchants was unfitted to exercise the functions of government. With respect to European policy, the most noticeable feature of Adam Smith’s position is his advocacy of better trade relations with France. Until his time the commercial relations of the two countries had been marked by animosity and distrust, evidenced by heavy duties and prohibitions. The treaty negotiated by Eden (1786) was the direct outcome of Pitt’s approval of Adam Smith’s teaching, though the wars which ensued from political causes did not permit the fruits to be seen. Adam Smith also strongly approved of a union with Ireland on the lines of the union with Scotland. “By a union with Great Britain, Ireland would gain, besides the freedom of trade, other advantages much more important, and which would much more than compensate any increase of taxes that might accompany that union.”

Attention has been directed in the first place to the critical or negative side of Adam Smith's work, because by that he is best known popularly, and because this side of his teaching has possibly had the greatest influence on practical policy. But on the positive or constructive side the *Wealth of Nations* has had very great influence in the development of economic science and in the enunciation of ideas of far-reaching effect.

In the positive as in the negative part of his work Adam Smith made equal use of the two methods or rather kinds of methods on the relative merits of which a great controversy was raging a century later. Adam Smith's treatment was on the one side abstract, deductive, hypothetical, *a priori*, and on the other it was positive, inductive, historical, comparative; but in his mind there was no opposition between the two methods, and they are always complementary. We find abstract theories on land and labour so strongly expressed that they have been taken as the basis of the most extreme forms of socialism; but, with Adam Smith himself, the constant reference to history and experience makes them the "promoters" not of sudden and violent revolutions but of gradual and peaceful reforms. Two illustrations may be offered: one general, the other particular. After bestowing on Quesnay the eulogy already quoted he goes on to say in effect: Quesnay, who was himself a physician, and a very speculative physician, seems to have imagined that the political body (like the human body) would only thrive under a certain precise *regimen*, the exact *regimen* of perfect liberty and perfect justice. But if, Adam Smith objects, a nation could not prosper without the enjoyment of perfect liberty and perfect justice, there is not in the world a nation which could ever have prospered. Adam Smith maintains that in the body political as in the body natural a considerable margin of variation from standards of perfection is compatible with health. In particular he considered that to expect the perfect establishment of free trade in Britain was utopian; and of the system of the Corn Law of his day he remarked that with all its imperfections we might say of it what was said of the laws of Solon, namely, that, though not the best in itself, it is the best which the interest, prejudices, and temper of the times would admit.

Adam Smith's contributions to abstract theory were in fact so great that a leading representative of the mathematical method has asserted that his chief work was the application of the idea of measurement to economic motives, and that he used history and experience simply for illustrations of his theories. It may be shown, however, that alike in its general plan and in the treatment of particular topics, the *Wealth of Nations* is dominated by the historical method. No merely abstract treatment could reveal the meaning and the importance of the change from a natural to a money economy, which may be said to be the economic counterpart of the formula of "progress from status to

contract." No mere theory of capital would have sufficed to show the increasing predominance of capital as compared with land in the distribution of economic power. Paradoxical as it may seem, the constant reference to history widened rather than restricted the application of economic theory. Adam Smith applies his theories to churches, to Courts of justice, to navies and armies, to education in the most extended sense of the term, and to the development of all kinds of social institutions in which economic or money considerations are of importance. His account of the fall of the medieval Church is in remarkable conformity with the latest historical judgment. The main cause was that the Church had ceased to give value for the money received. Rome had made a monopoly of religion and applied the principles of monopoly to the distribution of her services.

Adam Smith often speaks of labour, and of the price of labour, as if labour were a commodity like other commodities; but, taking his treatment as a whole, owing to historical influences he is more humane than any of his immediate successors. In opposition to the prevalent ideas of the time, he insisted on the "economy of high wages," and warned masters and men of the dangers of over-pressure. In his survey of political economy considered as a practical science, he places first the provision of a plentiful revenue for the masses of the people. He was the author, except in name, of the theory of the unearned increment, and argued that, wherever they could be got at, the gains of monopolists should be subject to differential taxation. The most decisive test of the prosperity of a nation is the advance in the numbers of the people; and the reason is not any admiration for mere numbers, but because, to use the modern phrase, with increasing population the law of increasing return comes into play, and with an increase of numbers there is an increase of general prosperity. There are indeed constant references to the dictates of common humanity. Education should be universal and compulsory, not because it would add to the economic efficiency of labour, but because it would add to the dignity and worth of mankind. It is the duty of the Government to encourage the military virtues of the people, not simply for defence, but also on account of the improvement in their manhood; "cowardice is as loathsome a disease as leprosy," and should be as effectively guarded against.

This broad humanity of Adam Smith might, perhaps, be suggested by philosophy; but it was made a living thing by history. In the same way his treatment of capital was dominated by the historical method. He realised the growing importance of capital in economic progress; but he realised also the growing danger of its abuse. His attitude of distrust towards the capitalist as the adviser of the legislator is in marked contrast to that of his immediate successors. "The interest of the dealers in any particular branch of trade or manufactures is always in some respects different from and even opposite to that of the public....The

proposal of any new law or regulation of commerce which comes from this order of men ought always to be listened to with the greatest precaution, and ought never to be adopted till after having been long and carefully examined, not only with the most scrupulous but with the most suspicious attention." He is much more favourable to the landowners and capitalist farmers: "they are, to their honour, of all people the least subject to the wretched spirit of monopoly." And yet in his analysis of rent he says it is naturally at a monopoly price. It is not proportioned to what the landlord may have laid out on the land, but to what the farmer can afford to give. The landlord exacts rent from land that is incapable of improvement; he exacts it even from the sea. With regard to property in land we have the often-quoted expression on entails, that they are founded on the most absurd of all suppositions, the supposition that successive generations of men have not an equal right to the earth and to all that it possesses.

In accounting for the prosperity of colonies we are told that in the old countries rent and profit eat up wages, and the expenses or the extortions of governments are heavy, while in new countries wages are high. Here we have the application of the more general proposition that forms the introduction to the treatment of wages. "The produce of labour constitutes the natural recompense or wages of labour." In the original state of things, which precedes both the appropriation of land and the accumulation of capital, "the whole produce of labour belongs to the labourer; he has neither landlord nor master to share it with him." Then, again, Adam Smith adopts with emphasis the labour foundation of property. "The property which every man has in his own labour, as it is the original foundation of all other property, so it is the most sacred and inviolable." He avoided, however, the extravagances to which later socialistic writers pushed these doctrines, partly because his analysis though less formal is more thorough, and partly because he always tested his philosophy by history. "The original state of things was at an end long before the most considerable improvements were made in the productive powers of labour; and it would be to no purpose to trace further what might have been its effects upon the recompense or wages of labour." Rent and profit very soon began to eat up wages. With Adam Smith, moreover, it must be remembered, in connexion with the development of socialistic doctrines, that he always used the term "labour" in the widest sense. It was applied to the highest offices and professions; and perhaps the only notable exception is that in the analysis of profits the element of wages of management is reduced to much less importance than is the case with other economists. In fact, we are told that wages and profits are altogether different; and, conversely, that the reward of the capitalist or employer is not due mainly to his labour.

The Fifth Book of the *Wealth of Nations* is entitled: "Of the revenue

of the sovereign or commonwealth"; but in reality it treats of the economic functions of the State and forms the necessary complement to the obvious and simple system of natural liberty which is erroneously interpreted to mean unqualified *laissez faire*. In this Book, it is true, we also find a destructive criticism of many existing financial and legislative expedients; but in it the foundations are laid of a reformed system which certainly cannot be described as the "individualistic minimum." In forming an accurate idea of Adam Smith's attitude towards the general doctrine of *laissez faire* it must also be borne in mind that the *Wealth of Nations* forms only a part of his whole system. He had published previously the *Theory of Moral Sentiments*, the foundation of which is sympathy; and he tells us in the preface to the latest edition that he had drawn up the plan of a separate work on the philosophy of law and government. It is usual to regard Adam Smith as the founder of political economy in the modern sense of the term, because he was the first to make a definite study of the wealth of nations apart from other objects of social or political union. It does not follow that in his view wealth is to be considered as of fundamental importance, to the exclusion of these other objects; and the contrary may be easily shown from many noticeable *obiter dicta* in the *Wealth of Nations* itself. "Defence is of more importance than opulence"; and the recommendation of the simple and obvious system of natural liberty is conditioned by the reservation that every man should be left perfectly free to pursue his own interest in his own way, both as regards industry and capital, only so long as "he does not violate the laws of justice." The ideas of justice and humanity are, with Adam Smith, always of greater cogency than the ideas of opulence or property.

The *Wealth of Nations* has given rise to a voluminous literature both critical and expository. Probably no work of importance in economics has since been written which has not been directly or indirectly influenced by it. And yet the freshness of the original has survived like that of a work of nature; it is, in short, one of the rare great creative works of genius. It still stands unrivalled as the foundation of economic science; though improvements have been made in every part taken in isolation, it still holds the field as the best general survey, especially for the student of history. Much labour has been devoted to showing that Adam Smith was not original, that all his doctrines are to be found in earlier writers. Even in the narrow literal sense this charge of want of originality can hardly be maintained. The discovery and publication of the notes of his lectures in the University of Glasgow show that he had already given to his students the ideas he was supposed to have taken from Quesnay and the Physiocrats during his stay in France some years later. It is no doubt true that many of his criticisms of the mercantilist position had been anticipated so early as the seventeenth century; and that even the benefits of free trade and

the advantages of division of labour had been observed and described. Nicolas Barbon in his work *A Discourse of Trade* (1690) had insisted that imports must of necessity be paid for by exports; and Sir Dudley North in his *Discourses upon Trade* (1691) had argued that money was distributed amongst the nations according to their economic needs for it through the adjustment of prices, and had maintained that the classes in any nation, and also the different nations constituting the commercial world, were bound together by a solidarity of interests, and that absolute free trade was the best means to the acquisition of wealth. The general argument for free trade was still more emphatically stated by the French economist, Marquis d'Argenson, in an essay published in the *Journal Oeconomique* (1751). To him is ascribed the first statement of the rule "*ne pas trop gouverner*" and of the still more famous "*laisser faire*." The movement of trade should be as free as that of the air; all Europe should be organised as one market; public security should be maintained; and then "*laissez faire, morbleu, laisscz faire*."

In the same way, before Adam Smith there was a vast literature—largely, it is true, in pamphlets and fugitive writings—on every important topic treated in the *Wealth of Nations*: e.g. the nature of usury and interest in the modern sense, the canons of taxation, the foundations of banking and credit, public debts, population, etc. And although Adam Smith is very sparing in quotations of the names of authors, he had read everything bearing on his subject and worked up all that he considered of value into his own argument. Apart from these special studies of economic problems, there had been before Adam Smith expositions of political economy as a science, notably by Richard Cantillon, whose work written 1730-4 (*Essay on the Nature of Commerce at large*), and first published in 1755, is pronounced by Jevons to be the first systematic treatise of political economy. Cantillon's work had been handed about in manuscript, and had largely influenced Mirabeau and the Physiocrats; and he is one of the few writers whom Adam Smith quotes by name. Turgot separated economics from jurisprudence in his *Reflections* (published 1769) on the formation and distribution of wealth, a work of which a too partial biographer has said that it contains in a short compass all that is of value in the *Wealth of Nations* "without its tedious prolixity." Quesnay had died two years before the publication of Adam Smith's work, which it is recorded it was the intention of the Scotchman to dedicate to the Frenchman; and Quesnay's first article had appeared in 1755. David Hume, whose *Political Discourses* were published in 1752, was Adam Smith's most intimate friend. He treated of some of the most general problems of economics; and his writings are to a great extent in accord with those of Adam Smith, though they differ in details. Sir James Steuart's *Inquiry into the Principles of Political Economy* (1767) attained a considerable reputation in England at the time; and in recent years attempts have been made to reestablish

his reputation. He is generally described as a moderate mercantilist, though in many points he emphasises as clearly as Adam Smith the benefits of individualism.

Enough has been said to illustrate the position now accepted that neither in its general scope nor in the details of the work was the *Wealth of Nations* entirely due to the inventive genius of one man. Even the breadth of view by which Adam Smith compares so favourably with his successors must be ascribed largely to the training he had received in philosophy and jurisprudence. And yet, when all allowances have been made for the materials and the influences of other sources, the *Wealth of Nations* must be considered one of the greatest of original works, epoch-making and path-breaking in the fullest sense of the terms. If Adam Smith knew how to absorb and assimilate, he knew also, what is infinitely harder, how to reject and cast aside. He accepted nothing on authority ; whatever its origin or suggestion, every opinion became part of his own living thought. This is no doubt one reason why he makes so few references to other writers by name. His reading had been absorbed in his thinking. If any of Adam Smith's predecessors have had any influence either on the practical economic policy or on the economic theory of the nineteenth century, it is chiefly in so far as their work became part and parcel of the *Wealth of Nations*. Adam Smith is quoted more than all previous authorities put together.

The success of the *Wealth of Nations* was immediate, and, considering the nature of the work, unprecedented. Smith, it must be remembered, had already made a European reputation by his *Theory of Moral Sentiments* ; and besides he was in touch with the greatest men of the time in letters, thought, and politics. The story is well known of the dinner of celebrities to which Adam Smith came late, and was received by the whole company rising and with the greeting by Pitt, "We will stand till you are seated, for we are all your scholars." Had it not been for the continued and exhausting wars into which the country was plunged, there is no doubt that Pitt would have inaugurated the era of free trade. The popular idea that free trade is to be ascribed entirely to the influence of Cobden and the Anti-Corn Law League is quite erroneous. The ideas of Adam Smith were beginning to dominate political thought on economic affairs in the early years of the nineteenth century. Two documents are of special interest in this connexion. There is, first, the protest against the Corn Law of 1815 drawn up by Lord Granville and subscribed by ten peers and entered in the *Journals* of the House of Lords. Here is one phrase : "Because we think that the great practical rule of leaving all commerce unfettered applies more peculiarly and on still stronger grounds of justice as well as of policy to the corn trade than to any other." There is, secondly, the petition of the London merchants drawn up by Thomas Tooke, the celebrated author of the *History of Prices*. This document, *inter alia*, "showeth, that freedom

from restraint is calculated to give the utmost extension to foreign trade and the best direction to the capital and industry of the country." The petition was presented to the House of Commons in May, 1820.

In the early part of the nineteenth century, however, it was mainly through his influence on Ricardo that Adam Smith affected the commercial and economic policy of England. It has so long been the custom to look upon Ricardo as the originator of the abstract deductive method in political economy and the propounder of certain unpopular theories which have been pushed to an extreme by other writers, that his influence on the practical politics of England and thus on English history has been underrated and almost forgotten. His theories were popularised by John Stuart Mill, who in any conflict of opinion between Adam Smith and Ricardo always preferred the latter. Mill, however, unfortunately had neither the historical knowledge of Adam Smith nor the practical acquaintance with business of Ricardo, so that he was inclined to pay too little attention to the modifications expressed by Adam Smith and implied by Ricardo. To understand the historical influence of Ricardo, it is necessary to pass over the popular adaptation by Mill of his doctrines and to take account of the personality and conduct of the man. David Ricardo was the son of a Jew who early in life had migrated from Holland and settled in this country. He was educated partly in England and partly in Holland; and, as his friend and biographer McCulloch states, classical learning formed no part of his early instruction. In fact he was trained solely for business, and began to be confidentially employed by his father in the business of the Stock Exchange when he was only fourteen years old. From his youth up Ricardo was a fearless and independent thinker. In spite of his personal affection for his father, much against his father's will he abandoned the Jewish faith, and about the age of twenty-one married and began business on the Stock Exchange on his own account. In a few years he had made a fortune. His success at the time was unequalled; and, long before he was known to the public, he was regarded as one of the ablest men of business of his time. He first read Adam Smith in 1799, when he was twenty-seven years of age. Ten years later he wrote the letters on currency which were afterwards republished in pamphlet form with the title, *The High Price of Bullion a Proof of the Depreciation of Bank Notes*. It was this tract which was the principal cause of the appointment of the Bullion Committee; and the celebrated report of that body is based almost entirely on the opinions of Ricardo. His reputation was much raised by his controversy with Charles Bosanquet on the theory of currency and of the exchanges (1810-1); and about this time he became intimate with James Mill and Malthus.

James Mill began the process of over-emphasising the abstract character of Ricardo's principles in the lessons he gave to his much-enduring son, so that Ricardo was impressed on the younger Mill from

the beginning of his economic training. For the present, however, we are concerned with the practical influence of the real Ricardo. In 1816 he published his *Proposals for an Economical and Secure Currency, with Observations on the Profits of the Bank of England*. The idea was to issue notes not against sovereigns, but bars of standard gold bullion. The plan was approved by Robert Peel and was actually carried out. It broke down on the allegation that the one-pound notes were extensively forged. In the meantime Ricardo had begun to write on the price of corn and the Corn Laws. During the discussions on the Corn Law Bill of 1815, he argued in favour of giving greater freedom to the corn trade, as against Malthus, who advocated greater restrictions. Ricardo's views on the Corn Laws found their final expression in the tract entitled *Protection to Agriculture*. He proposed that the duty should be gradually reduced until it reached ten shillings a quarter, which he thought was justifiable by way of compensation to the English landed interest for the public burdens imposed on land. The *Principles of Political Economy and Taxation* was published in 1817; and in 1819 he entered the House of Commons. His first speech, made in response to loud calls from all parts of the House, was on Peel's resolutions on the resumption of cash payments. From this time till his death (1823) his opinion on economic or financial questions was considered of the greatest weight; and he exercised on these questions great political influence.

McCulloch has recorded that Ricardo was much more effective in conversation than in writing, and that his speeches were greatly superior to his publications. "His style of speaking was easy, fluent, and agreeable." "Nothing could exceed the ease and felicity with which [in speaking] he illustrated and explained the most difficult questions in political economy." This evidence is important because there is little doubt that, just as Adam Smith had influenced Pitt, so Ricardo influenced Peel. The practical difference was that, owing to the circumstances of the time, Peel was better able to carry into effect the ideas of his master in economics. To Ricardo, then, may be ascribed directly or indirectly the principles which were adopted by Peel as the foundation of his reforms in currency and banking as well as in financial policy, though the Bank Charter Act was only passed in 1844, and the Corn Laws were repealed in 1846. The harsh and crabbed style of Ricardo's writings, his excessive condensation, his habit of purely abstract reasoning, his avoidance of illustrations except those of hypothetical arithmetic, his frequent transitions without notice from one set of assumptions to another—these characteristics, with his want of literary education, make his writings extremely difficult even to a trained economist. His clearness of thought is unsurpassed, but so also is the infelicity of his mode of expression.

Although Ricardo was the greatest exponent of Adam Smith's theories, and was the connecting link between Adam Smith and Peel,

his name is now more often associated with the dogmas which, by a natural reaction, gave rise to Socialism. His abstract principles being taken without the qualifications always expressed or implied, he was credited with the "iron law of wages" on the one side and the theories of the continuous growth of rent and the unearned increment on the other. If in the natural progress of society wages were to tend constantly towards the bare minimum of subsistence, the cost of labour to increase by the increase in the cost of food, and profits were thereby to fall, while the resort to inferior soils only benefited the landlord, the case for a revolution in a society so constituted seemed not only plausible but reasonable. Even in pure economic theory, in which the disturbing element of social sentiment was not present, the difficulty of Ricardo's style led to misunderstanding, as was long afterwards evidenced by the onslaught of Jevons; and the rehabilitation of Ricardo has hardly yet been effected to the extent demanded by his real contributions to economic science. His analyses of cost of production, of the incidence of various taxes, of the determination of international values, all suffered from the style in which they were presented; and in McCulloch and Mill, his principal translators into common thought, he found admirers too indiscriminate in their judgment. Fortunately it was Peel who translated into practice his ideas on currency, taxation, and free trade; and it is through Peel that Ricardo's political economy became dominant in these departments of the national policy.

The influence of Ricardo may be traced in the stress laid by the so-called Manchester School on the importance of capital, and in the neglect of the wider humanitarian ideas of Adam Smith on labour; though personally Ricardo was the most charitable of men. Much of the original thought of Ricardo is of interest mainly in connexion with the development of economic theory, and not as bearing on the history of the nation. He was, for example, the originator of the quantity theory of money; and, if he did not originate the theory of economic rent, he placed it in such a new light that it is generally known by his name. His explanation of the distribution of the precious metals throughout the commercial world, and his theory of international values, are among the best examples of the classical political economy. His works will always be read by the serious student of economic theory, not only for their place in the history of thought, but for their energising and stimulating qualities. Of all economists, Ricardo is the most notable "*agitator mentis.*"

The Ricardian theory of rent, resting as it does on the law of diminishing return to land, is closely connected with the Malthusian theory of population. The father of Malthus was a correspondent of Rousseau, and a great believer with Condorcet in infinite progress, and with Godwin in the perfectibility of mankind. At an early age young Malthus took up the opposite side; and in 1798 he published anonymously

*An Essay on the Principle of Population as it affects the Future Improvement of Society.* The leading idea was that all schemes for the promotion of equality break down through neglect of the tendency of population to outstrip the means of subsistence. In the essay in this first form the argument was mainly theoretical and was pushed to the extreme of pessimism. But, under the influence of personal observations in several of the countries of Europe and a more extensive reading on the subject, he entirely recast the essay ; and the new edition appeared with his name in 1803, under the title, *An Essay on the Principle of Population or a View of its Past and Present Effects on Human Happiness.* The change in the title, with the substitution of *past* and *present* for *future*, is significant of the change from the deductive and abstract to the inductive and historical method. The sixth edition, revised by the author, appeared in 1826, three years after the death of Ricardo.

Malthus has, perhaps, suffered more than any great writer from popular misunderstanding. His wide inductions have been forgotten ; and his principles have been perverted beyond recognition. Malthus had been influenced from the first, not only by the ideas of his time, but by the actual conditions that prevailed in England. The old Poor Law was accumulating its evils from year to year ; and, owing to a variety of causes—war, bad seasons, Corn Laws, expansion of manufactures, and the increase of the towns—a large part of the population was always on the verge of famine. The pressure of population on the means of subsistence seemed a natural deduction from the law of diminishing returns. And it was this easy deduction that under the conditions of the time seized the popular imagination. The theory of Malthus had much the same reception as later the theory of Darwin, of which, indeed, it suggested the leading idea. But, although Malthus was reviled, his work made a durable impression on the understandings of those most interested, namely the economists and the philanthropists. The effect is best seen in that extraordinary combination of the two, Thomas Chalmers. His treatise on *Political Economy in connexion with the Moral State and Moral Prospects of Society*, published in 1832, is dominated by the Malthusian theory. In an Appendix dealing with the Corn Laws, Chalmers approves of their abolition, but argues in effect that the cheapness of food would be of no benefit to the working classes unless, under the influence of moral restraint, they adopted prudential habits regarding the increase of population. Chalmers, like Malthus, relied on education and religion ; and, again like Malthus, he relied for the relief of the poor on voluntary effort, and in his parish in Glasgow applied his principles in one of the most remarkable and successful social experiments of the century.

On the whole, however, the doctrines of Malthus had more influence on speculative thought than on practical politics. It is true that he set himself to prove that the Poor Law had done more harm than good ;

and the essay directly controverted the old idea that people who had enriched their country with a number of children should receive relief as a matter of right and honour. But the evils of the indiscriminate relief of the old Poor Law were not confined to the grant of bounties on the production of children, even if illegitimate; and the general argument of the essay in its final form was of far wider range. It cannot be said that the Report of the Commission which led to the Poor Law Amendment Act was governed by the influence and ideas of Malthus as the Bullion Report had been governed by Ricardo. Malthus proposed the gradual abolition of the Poor Law; but the Act simply cut away the abuses that had grown up under lax administration and what may be termed accidental legislation, and really made the application of the old Elizabethan principles more effective. The speculative influence of the essay, however, was enormous. John Stuart Mill, who, without making any original contribution to economic science, coordinated and restated the old theories in such a way as to make them seem almost new, made the theory of Malthus a principal part of his system, and carried the practical applications far beyond the widest interpretation of his master's teaching. Mill, indeed, set himself to prove, that in general it was immoral to have a large family, and that the example of the clergy was specially to be condemned.

In this way the application of the abstract method to the principles of Ricardo and Malthus, without regard to the circumstances in which they were propounded, and the qualifications with which they were openly or implicitly guarded, converted political economy, according to the popular interpretation, into a truly "dismal" science. The humanity of the real Adam Smith was forgotten or neglected; and his name was attached to the purblind dogmas and narrow maxims which passed for economic principles. In this way the authority of political economy was used to oppose the factory legislation, under the idea that it was contrary to the system of natural liberty; it was supposed to be proved by the same authority that Trade Unions could have no beneficial effects on wages, or rather, by checking the accumulation of capital, tended to lower them; almost every kind of industrial or commercial reform was opposed by some interest or other as contrary to the laws of political economy. McCulloch, who in most matters out-Ricardo'd Ricardo, proved on economic principles that absenteeism from Ireland did no harm to that country, and that it was a matter of indifference where the Irish rents were expended.

And yet, in one department, the orthodox political economy in its most extreme form had achieved a triumph so great that the reflected glory, for the time being, made the authority of the science respected by the masses. The battle of Free Trade was won by the insistence on certain broad principles, and by the exposure of certain crude fallacies regarding the nature and advantages of foreign trade: the

arguments in both cases being derived from the economists. It was of course necessary, in order to give the economic ideas sufficient driving force, to free them from the clogging effects of hypotheses and exceptions. And, as it happened, the circumstances of the times in England were such that what was required for practical purposes was insistence on the general rule, and not the ingenious application of suitable exceptions. England, it was urged, had nothing to fear and everything to gain from the freest importation. Distance, it was supposed, gave a sufficient natural protection to agriculture; and the competition of foreign manufactures in the home market was negligible. The manufacturers hoped that the free importation of food would lower the cost of labour; and on the Ricardian theory this meant a rise in profits. The labourers were told, and in time began to believe, that wages would rise by the expansion of trade and the greater accumulation of capital, while food would fall in price, or at any rate be kept below the level which it would otherwise have reached.

This popular interpretation of Ricardian principles was most effective. It was proved that the only class who could benefit by the import duties on corn were the landlords; and the landlords already were gaining a continuous rise in rents, while they slept, from the general progress of society. The interests of the country were set against the interests of the towns; the country was identified with the landlord, and the towns with the masses of the people. A line was drawn from Inverness to London; and the agricultural east was pitted against the manufacturing west. During the Great War, the tariff had become so intricate and complex, so all-embracing and burdensome, that almost any kind of reduction was sure to do immediate good; and the movement for reduction and simplification began five-and-twenty years before the repeal of the Corn Laws. As a matter of fact, in nearly every case, every reduction of the tariff was followed by an expansion of trade; and Peel had intended to repeal or largely reduce the corn duties as part of his general policy of tariff reform. It is beyond the range of the present chapter to consider the political forces which led to the adoption in its extreme and simple form of the doctrine of Free Trade, or to judge the part played by the statesmen of opposing parties. The point of present importance is that in popular estimation the battle of Free Trade was won with the weapons taken from the economists. Cobden was never tired of appealing to Adam Smith; and probably the influence of Ricardo had been unconsciously working in Peel long before his actual reforms. Peel, as was well said, had emphatically the politico-economic mind; and his first great instructor had been Ricardo.

Ricardo did not devote much attention to those parts of political economy which lie on the borders of moral and political philosophy, although he wrote in favour of an extension of the suffrage and of election by ballot. In these more purely political questions he was

content to follow Bentham, who had been the intimate friend of James Mill, and is said to have called himself the spiritual father of Mill, and Mill the spiritual father of Ricardo. Ricardo emphasised with Bentham the importance of security and of private property, and took for granted his analysis of society into a mass of individuals actuated by self-interest. Accordingly, the corner-stone of the orthodox or Ricardian political economy came to be extreme *laissez faire*, and the ideal, the minimum of governmental interference. Freedom of competition and the pursuit of self-interest began to be regarded not only as the necessary postulates of the deductive political economy, but as the necessary conditions of national well-being. And, although Ricardo is generally spoken of as if he were dealing professedly with abstractions and hypotheses, there is no doubt that he considered the economic forces, of which he examined the actions and interactions, to be the great forces by which the wheels of society were actually driven. He considered that the main problem of political economy was to discover the laws which determine the division of the produce of industry amongst the classes which concur in its formation; and these laws he deduced from the economic bases of individualism, competition, self-interest, and private property. At the beginning of the nineteenth century, as a consequence of the industrial revolution, the old social organisations were broken up; and the assumptions of individualism were nearly realised in the world with which Ricardo was familiar. In this world money-power and capitalism were supreme.

The so-called orthodox political economy was so generally adopted by the educated classes after the repeal of the Corn Laws that John Mill's favourable attitude (in theory) towards socialism came to many as a revelation of some quite new thing in social philosophy. Godwin's *Political Justice* (1793) was indeed known by repute, and Robert Owen had been celebrated both for his ideas and his social experiments; but it has been only recently recognised, largely owing to the researches of Foxwell and Menger, that from the first there had been in England a reaction against the anarchy of individualism and a movement towards constructive socialism. Karl Marx indeed is shown to have derived the leading ideas of *Das Kapital* from the early English socialists who had been forgotten. Of this school Godwin may be considered the father; and it is worthy of note that the youthful Malthus had directed his first *Essay* against the reasonings of *Political Justice*. Godwin considered the established system of property as the root of all social evil; he desired to substitute some system of equality, and to make the distribution of wealth depend upon the wants or capacities of individuals. Godwin, however, was an idealist who imagined that people could be educated to realise that their true interest, after their animal wants were satisfied, was to be found in the knowledge of truth and the practice of virtue. He had extraordinary notions of the perfectibility

of the human race even as regards the prolongation of life; his intellectual optimism made his anarchical communism quite harmless; but his ideas stimulated thought, and he has been described by Foxwell as the Adam Smith of socialistic speculation. But Godwin's socialism was the exact opposite of the modern state socialism. He was, in truth, an anarchist, and looked to the dissolution of government and constituted authority as the goal of all efforts at political reform.

Robert Owen (1771-1858) is perhaps the best example both of the strength and the weakness of modern socialism. The son of a shopkeeper, he began life in the retail trade; but, before he was twenty years of age (1790), he became manager of a cotton-mill in Manchester, and in this capacity was the first to introduce an important change in cotton spinning. Four years later he started a cotton-twist factory on his own account, and in 1797 acquired for himself and partners the manufacturing business of D. Dale at New Lanark at a cost of £60,000. He entered on the government of this business on January 1, 1800, and at once began to put his ideas of social reform into practice. During the whole period of his management of New Lanark he conducted the business so as to obtain large profits; and he must be considered as a successful capitalist employer. He showed, however, by his own practice that it was possible to earn large profits, and yet at the same time to introduce great improvements in the conditions of the employment of labour. For more than a quarter of a century public attention was directed to Owen's work at New Lanark; and in this way he contributed greatly to the initiation and development of factory legislation and generally to the better education and upbringing of children. His ruling idea was that "circumstances formed character," and accordingly that the education of children and healthy conditions of employment were the first requisites of the efficiency of labour, as of moral well-being. He established infant-schools, in the literal sense: providing for children of two years and later even for infants of one year at their mothers' request. These infant-schools were the first of their kind in the United Kingdom; and the example was largely followed. Owen endeavoured to make the instruction mutual and recreative; the pupils were to make one another happy; drill was provided for the boys, domestic economy for the girls, and dancing and singing for both. As regards the adult workers, he imposed checks on drunkenness, uncleanliness, and immorality; the fines imposed were paid into the "support" fund, which was used for the benefit of the sick and aged and those injured by accidents, and was also contributed to by the workers out of their wages. He established a common store, for which the goods were bought at wholesale prices and, though of much better quality, were sold at 25 per cent. less than the usual rates and still yielded a profit. The effects of these arrangements were seen in the absence of convictions for crime, the

disappearance of dram-shops, and the encouragement of thrift. As regards religion, Owen, considering his own speculative views, showed a large toleration ; he maintained a clergyman on the establishment at his own expense, and allowed Bible-reading and Sunday-schools.

The project of a new institute for the formation of character led to the break-up of the old partnership ; and eventually, in 1814, he bought New Lanark for himself and another set of partners for the sum of £114,000. Of these partners the most noteworthy was Bentham ; but several were Quakers, and it was the opposition of his Quaker partners that, in 1828, led to his retirement from the firm. The ideas applied by Robert Owen at New Lanark were all shown by subsequent experience to be of great practical value ; and he must be always ranked as one of the greatest pioneers in the industrial reformation of the nineteenth century. His later schemes proved impracticable, and he spent large sums on projects of what may be called “domestic” socialism, as contrasted with modern ideas of state socialism—the most famous being the community at New Harmony in Pennsylvania. These more extreme ideas and projects, in spite of their failure, had considerable influence on the growth of socialistic opinion, and in this way served as the basis of the attack on the Ricardian economics.

Charles Hall, in his profession as physician, was impressed by the misery of the masses and the inequality in the distribution of wealth. He published in 1805 a work *On the Effects of Civilisation on the People in European States*. The leading idea is that in the course of progress the rich become richer and the poor poorer, which is also the leading idea in modern so-called evolutionary socialism. Hall's remedy was what would now be termed nationalisation of the land ; and the method which he proposed, in its essential features, resembled the Russian village community. Hall's work had considerable influence on the leaders of the Owenite societies, though it never attained any widespread popularity. In the development of socialistic ideas, William Thompson, though long overlooked, is now considered to be the most eminent founder of scientific socialism ; and St Simon, Proudhon, Rodbertus, and Marx, are all indebted to his works for their leading economic opinions. Thompson was a pupil of Bentham, who regarded himself as the spiritual begetter of Ricardo ; and his argument rests on the basis of utility and is presented with formal enumerations and elaborate classifications in the style of his master. But, while Bentham never advanced beyond the stage of philosophical radicalism and was specially opposed to systems of equality, Thompson was a supporter of Robert Owen's communistic schemes.

In Thompson the socialistic reaction against the Ricardian political economy is strongly marked. He accepted the Ricardian analysis of actual social conditions ; and, even as regards the distribution of wealth, he insisted on the freedom of labour and the freedom of the exchange of the products of labour as natural laws, as fully as the most extreme

supporter of *laissez faire*. In fact, like Godwin, he showed a strong preference for voluntary methods of reform and relied much on the possibilities of education. But, instead of taking it for granted, as Ricardo does, that the present system of private property and competition must continue, he makes the deduction that it ought to be ended. Under the present system all wealth is the creation of labour; things are valuable in proportion to the quantity of labour required for their production; and therefore labour has a natural right to the whole product of labour. But, owing to the iniquity of present social arrangements and institutions, labour obtains a decreasing share; and more and more of the increasing wealth of society is taken by the owners of land and other privileged classes. On this view capital ought to obtain only what may be termed a bare subsistence minimum, instead of labour obtaining only a bare subsistence wage. The voluntary exchange of the whole products of labour by their producers was vitiated by capitalism and competition. In this analysis we have all the ideas of modern socialism; but Thompson looked to much simpler remedies. He had no conception of state socialism, even in the municipal form, but relied on cooperation and communism on the Owenite models. His most important work is entitled *An Inquiry into the Principles of the Distribution of Wealth most conducive to Human Happiness; applied to the newly proposed System of Voluntary Equality of Wealth*. It appeared in 1824, when the reputation of Ricardo's principles was firmly established. The title indicates the influence of Bentham and Owen.

John Gray was the author of a *Lecture on Human Happiness* (1825), which was ostensibly a defence of Owen's schemes. Later in life he abandoned his socialistic ideas and sought for social salvation in the avoidance of dislocations in industry and the better adjustment of supply to demand; and his practical remedy was to be found in a peculiar scheme of paper currency. Thomas Hodgskin wrote *Labour defended against the Claims of Capital; or the Unproductiveness of Capital proved with reference to the Present Combinations amongst Journeymen* (1825). The occasion of this book was the attempt to reenact the Laws against Combination repealed in 1824. In one notable sentence we have the germ of List's main argument: "All the effects usually attributed to the accumulation and storing up of circulating capital are derived from the accumulation and storing up of skilled labour." In another we have the root-idea of the modern produce theory of wages directed against the popular idea of the time that wages are paid out of preaccumulated capital. "As far as food, drink, and clothing are concerned, it is quite plain that no species of labourer depends on any previously prepared stock, for in fact no such stock exists; but every species of labourer does constantly and at all times depend for his supplies on the coexisting labour of some other labourers." Hodgskin was an ardent admirer of Adam Smith, and pointed out that in many ways his successors had

narrowed his fundamental ideas. John Francis Bray was the author of *Labour's Wrongs and Labour's Remedies* (1839), a work in which the analysis of profits given by Marx in *Das Kapital* is clearly anticipated. His social remedy was a system of labour exchanges based on a number of Joint-Stock Companies: such companies consisting of 100 to 1000 men and confined to one trade.

This brief survey of the early English socialists shows clearly that, while Ricardo and his followers were developing, in an extreme form, some of the doctrines of the *Wealth of Nations*, another school of thinkers in England were pushing to an extreme the ideas of Adam Smith which were overlooked by the Ricardians. There can be little doubt that these humanitarian ideas had considerable effect in promoting social legislation, and in leading to the abandonment of *laissez faire* as regards the conditions of employment. For the time, no doubt, in economic literature and in journalism the Ricardian political economy was predominant; but the history of labour legislation and of Trade Unions shows that in practice there was from the beginning a reaction against the capitalistic abuses consequent on the Industrial Revolution; and the *raison d'être* of this reaction was disclosed in the writings of the socialists.

The criticism most generally directed against the Ricardian school of economists is that they have overlooked altogether or at any rate failed to appreciate the value of the historical method; and it is generally supposed that the Germans of a later generation discovered this weakness of the Ricardians and also supplied the remedy. It is no doubt true that neither Ricardo, nor any of the systematic writers who developed his system, had the appreciation of history shown by Adam Smith; but, just as there were English socialists in the early nineteenth century, so also there were English historical economists. And in fact, from Adam Smith onwards, we have the historical side of economics represented by works of the first rank. Sir Frederick Morton Eden (1766–1809) published in 1797 his celebrated work, *The State of the Poor*, rightly described by McCulloch as the grand storehouse of information respecting the labouring classes of England. In this work, and the large appendix, a mass of facts bearing on the history of labour from the Conquest to the time of writing is brought together; and in the preface the author insists on the importance of historical facts as a foundation of theory. He attacked the "ingenious but unsolid speculations of merely theoretic reasoners," and declared that he never wasted time in polishing a sentence which he thought he could better employ in ascertaining a fact. No writer has illustrated more forcibly the value of induction, and especially of induction based on history.

Arthur Young (1741–1820) began to write in 1767 (*The Farmer's Letters*); and for nearly forty years he devoted himself to publications on the economics of agriculture. His best works are based on his

travels in France and his tours in England and Ireland. Although he was attracted by the natural theories of Rousseau, he condemned natural right as unhistorical, and he traced many economic evils to political causes. He considered the misery of the French to be due almost entirely to their government, and often expressed and illustrated the doctrines of *laissez faire*, e.g. by showing that the Irish measures, meant to encourage the silk and woollen trades, had the contrary effect, and that the French measures, meant to avert, actually created, famine. At the same time, however, he resisted with Malthus the movement towards free trade in corn advocated by Ricardo. Young's chief merit is as an observer and recorder of economic facts, though some of his general *obiter dicta* have become classical, e.g., "the magie of property turns sands into gold."

David Macpherson (1746–1816) published in 1805 his large work in four quarto volumes, *The Annals of Commerce, Fisheries, and Navigation*, partly based on the earlier work of Anderson. The method adopted, of recording year by year the events, treaties, regulations, etc., of commercial interest all the world over, does not lend itself to the discovery of principles by the historical method; but the work is still largely used as the basis of English economic history. Thomas Tooke (1774–1858) was born in St Petersburg, and at an early age had the management of a large Russian house in London. He was also actively engaged in the promotion of various industrial schemes in connexion with docks, railways, insurance companies, and, like Ricardo, was regarded as a leading practical authority in all questions connected with commerce and banking. As already stated, he drew up in 1820 the celebrated petition of the London merchants in favour of free trade. He wrote several monographs on the corn trade and on the connexion between currency and prices, and used the materials collected as the basis of his principal work, *A History of Prices and of the State of the Circulation during the years 1793–1856*, which was completed by William Newmarch, his collaborator. This work is still the standard history of its subject. On the main point of theory Tooke was opposed to the principle of the Bank Act of 1844, chiefly on the ground of the want of elasticity in the note issues from the banking point of view.

Richard Jones (1790–1855) definitely attacked the hypothetical character of Ricardo's work, and insisted on the importance of the appeal to experience and the danger of hasty generalisation. He projected a great work, based on the application of the historical method, on the *Distribution of Wealth and on the Sources of Taxation* and in 1831 published the First Book, on *Rent*; but the undertaking was never carried further. He has been termed "the founder of the English historical school."

George Richardson Porter (1792–1855) married a sister of Ricardo. On the formation of a statistical department of the Board of Trade, Porter

was placed at the head, and became one of the founders of the Statistical Society. His principal work is *The Progress of the Nation in its Social and Commercial Relations from the beginning of the Nineteenth Century to the Present Day*. The first two parts appeared in 1836, and it was completed in 1843; new editions, bringing the figures down to date, appeared in 1846 and 1851. Porter was one of the strongest advocates of Free Trade, and published a translation of Bastiat's *Popular Fallacies*. His own work, however, is written in the most impartial style, and is a classic in economic history.

There is probably no branch of economic enquiry in which English writers did not follow the example of Adam Smith in testing theory by the appeal to history. Even McCulloch, who is generally quoted as an extreme Ricardian, devoted his best energies to economic history, and especially to economic literature. And apart from the works of individual writers, in any survey of the influence of English economists account must be taken of the invaluable series of governmental reports—as for example the celebrated documents, often republished, which led to the Poor Law Amendment Act of 1834. William Nassau Senior (1790–1864) was one of the most active of the Commissioners who drew up this Report. He is often regarded as an extreme representative of the hypothetical or abstract school. It appears, however, that Senior based his opposition to Trade Unions, not on any abstract theory of wages, but on the abuses which had been associated with their early history; and in the same way his statement, in the *Letters on the Factory Act*, that “the whole net profit in cotton-factories was derived from the last hour,” was founded on the analysis of actual returns and was not a deduction from pure theory. And, generally, it may be said that Senior's support of *laissez faire* was based on the evils which had resulted from the interference of the State, especially in the management of the poor, and in the attempts to encourage agriculture by protective duties.

The appeal to the actual literature of Political Economy during this period proves not only that the British economists, from the time of Adam Smith, made popular certain fundamental ideas on the benefits of freedom of competition, or more generally of the system of natural liberty, but also that they showed the necessity of testing ideas by experience. Hence their influence on practical legislation and policy was always real and considerable: the so-called abstract ideas were themselves modified by circumstances of the times in which they were propounded.

## CHRONOLOGICAL TABLE

OF

### LEADING EVENTS MENTIONED IN THIS VOLUME.

- 1542 Publication of the New Laws for the Spanish Indies.  
1569 Francisco Toledo Viceroy of Peru.  
1570 The Inquisition established in Mexico and Lima.  
1609 Beginning of the Jesuit missions in Guaira (Paraguay)  
1655 English capture of Jamaica.  
1752 Hume's *Political Discourses*.  
1755 Cantillon's *Essay on the Nature of Commerce at large*.  
1763 Febronius' [Houtheim's] *De statu ecclesiae et de legitima potestate Romani pontificis*.  
1767 Expulsion of the Jesuits from the Spanish dominions in America.  
1768 Priestley's *Essay on Government*.  
1769 Turgot's *Reflections on the Formation and Distribution of Wealth*.  
1773 Goethe's *Götz von Berlichingen*.  
1774 Quebec Act. Treaty of Kutchuk Kainardji between Russia and Turkey.  
Abortive rising in the Morea.  
1776 Adam Smith's *Wealth of Nations* and Bentham's *Fragment on Government*.  
1778 The Savile Act passed.  
1781 Schiller's *Die Räuber*.  
1790 Goethe's *Faust* (Part 1).  
1791 The Constitutional Act for Canada. Mitford's Act passed.  
The Society of United Irishmen established.  
1793 Hobart's Act in Ireland.  
1794 Goethe's *Wilhelm Meister*.  
1797 Publication of Eden's *State of the Poor*.  
1798 Wordsworth and Coleridge's *Lyrical Ballads*, and Malthus' *Essay on the Principle of Population*.  
1799 Schiller's *Wallenstein*.  
1801 Georgia united to Russia.  
1806 Beresford's capture of Buenos Aires.  
1807 The Portuguese Regent Dom John leaves Portugal for Brazil.  
Bialystok united to Russia.  
Wordsworth's *Ode on Intimations of Immortality*.  
1808 Mexico declares war against Napoleon.  
1809 Grand Duchy of Finland formally annexed by Russia.  
Revolutionary movements in Upper Peru and in Quito.  
1809-24 Revolution in Spanish America.  
1810 Revolution in Buenos Aires.  
Imeretia conquered by Russia.

- 1810-17** Mexican revolt.
- 1811** Proclamation of independence by the Congress of Caracas.
- 1812** Treaty of Bucharest between Russia and Turkey.  
Fall of the first Venezuelan Republic.  
Byron's *Childe Harold*, Cantos i and ii, published.
- 1812-14** The Anglo-American War.
- 1813** Treaty of Valençay between Napoleon and Ferdinand VII.
- 1814** Return of Pius VII to Rome.  
Reconstitution of the Society of Jesus.  
Organisation of the Society of True Poles.  
Foundation of the Hetairia Philike.  
*Waverley*.
- 1815** March. William VI of Orange becomes William I, King of the Netherlands.  
June. Germanic Confederation constituted.  
July-August. The "White Terror" in France.  
September. Promulgation of the Holy Alliance.  
,, Resignation of the Talleyrand Ministry. Richelieu Prime Minister.  
November. Second Peace of Paris.  
,, Alexander I grants a Constitution to Poland.  
,, The Treaties of Paris.  
English Corn Law passed.
- 1816** January-March. Brazil erected into a kingdom under John VI.  
July. *Motuproprio* of Pius VII.  
November. Opening of the Diet of the Germanic Confederation.  
Proclamation of the independence of the Argentine Provinces.  
Haller's *Restoration of Political Science*.
- 1816-17** Economic distress and Luddite riots in England.
- 1817** March. Establishment of the Prussian Council of State.  
May. Conventions between Great Britain and Turkey. Parga handed over to Ali of Janina.  
July. Bolívar's capture of Angostura.  
September. Anglo-Spanish treaty.  
October. The Wartburg *Burschenschaft* Festival.  
Grant of autonomous government to Servia.  
Bentham's *Catechism of Parliamentary Reform* and Ricardo's *Principles of Political Economy and Taxation*.
- 1818** April. San Martín's victory at Maipú.  
October. Meeting of the Conference of Aix-la-Chapelle.  
October-November. Evacuation of France by the troops of the Allies.  
November. Renewal of the Quadruple Alliance.  
Papal Concordats with Bavaria and Russia.  
Keats' *Endymion*.
- 1819** March. Assassination of Kotzebue.  
July. Conference between Frederick William of Prussia and Metternich at Teplitz.  
August. Settlement between Pius VII and the French Church.  
,, The "Manchester Massacre," and the "Six Acts."  
September. "The Carlsbad Decrees."  
October. Tariff-treaty between Prussia and Schwarzburg-Sondershausen.  
November. Conference at Vienna.  
Bolívar's victory of Boyacá. Liberation of New Granada and proclamation of the Republic of Colombia.  
Count Joseph de Maistre's *Du Pape*.

- 1820 January. Accession of George IV.  
 January–March. Revolution in Spain.  
 February. Murder of the Duke of Berry.  
 May. Supplementary Act of Vienna.  
 July. Outbreak of revolt in Naples.  
 October. Meeting of Conference of Troppau.  
 „ The Floridas ceded to the United States.  
 James Mill's *Essay on Government*; Shelley's *Prometheus Unbound*; Keats' *Lamia and other Poems*.
- 1820–22 War between the Porte and Ali of Janina.
- 1821 January. Meeting of the Conference of Laibach.  
 March. End of the Neapolitan Revolution.  
 „ Insurrection in Piedmont. Abdication of Victor Emanuel.  
 „ Ypsilanti's rising in the Danubian Principalities.  
 April. King John VI returns to Portugal. Dom Pedro Regent in Brazil.  
 „ Revolt in the Morea. Outbreak of the War of Greek Independence.  
 Execution of the Patriarch Gregorios.  
 May. Foundation of the Polish Patriotic Society.  
 June. Greek defeat at Dragashan. Collapse of Ypsilanti's rising.  
 December. Resignation of the Richelieu Ministry. Villèle and Corbière take office.  
 „ Arrest of Count Federico Confalonieri.  
 Guatemala proclaims its independence.
- 1821–2 Mexican Revolution.
- 1822 April. Massacre of Scio.  
 August. Death of Castlereagh.  
 September. Proclamation of the independence of Brazil. Dom Pedro of Portugal Constitutional Emperor.  
 October. Opening of the Congress of Verona.  
 The United States recognise the independence of Colombia, Chile, Buenos Aires, and Mexico.  
 Famine in Ireland.
- 1823 March. Recognition of the Greeks as belligerents by Great Britain.  
 April. French invasion of Spain. Absolutist reaction in Madrid. Great Britain abandons the Concert of Powers.  
 August. Death of Pius VII and (September) accession of Leo XII.  
 October. Meeting of the Emperors Alexander and Francis at Czernovitz.  
 December. President Monroe's message to the American Congress.
- 1823–5 Formation of Catholic Associations in Ireland.
- 1824 April. Miguelist rising in Portugal.  
 September. Death of Louis XVIII. Accession of Charles X.  
 November. Battle of Ayacucho secures the independence of Peru and of other South American States.  
 December. Great Britain recognises the independence of Buenos Aires, Colombia, and Mexico.  
 Intervention of Mehemet Ali in the Greek war.
- 1824–5 Legislation in connexion with the English Combination Laws.
- 1825 February. Goulburn's Irish Act passed.  
 August. Portugal recognises the independence of Brazil.  
 December. Death of Tsar Alexander I. Accession of Nicholas I.  
 Risings in Russia.  
 Congress of Panama.
- 1825–6 May–April. Defence of Missolonghi.
- 1825–8 War between the Argentine Provinces and Brazil.

- 1826 March. Death of John VI of Portugal.  
 April. Protocol of St Petersburg.  
 May. Abdication of Pedro IV of Portugal in favour of Maria II.  
 August. Return of the Jesuits to France.  
 October. Treaty of Akkerman between Russia and Turkey.  
 Russia declares war on Persia.  
 Railway from Stockton to Darlington opened.
- 1827 April. Canning Prime Minister.  
 July. Treaty of London between Great Britain, Russia, and France.  
 August. Death of Canning.  
 October. Battle of Navarino.  
 December. Resignation of Villèle.  
 Manzoni's *Promessi Sposi* and Heine's *Buch der Lieder*.
- 1828 January. Ministries of Wellington and Martignac formed.  
 " South-German Customs-treaty between Bavaria and Württemberg.  
 February. Treaty of Turkmanchay between Russia and Persia.  
 March. Capodistrias President in Greece.  
 May. War between Russia and the Porte.  
 June. Dom Miguel proclaimed King of Portugal.  
 July. Protocol of London.  
 August. Ibrahim agrees to evacuate the Morea.  
 September. Saxony negotiates a Mid-German commercial union.  
 Revolt in Catalonia.  
 Repeal of Test and Corporation Acts.
- 1828-9 November-March. Conference of London places a large part of Greece under the guarantee of the Powers.
- 1829 April. Catholic Relief Bill passed.  
 May. Customs' treaty between North and South German Customs' Unions.  
 August. Polignac's Ministry formed.  
 September. Treaty of Adrianople between Russia and Turkey.
- 1830 June. Death of George IV and accession of William IV.  
 July-August. Revolution in Paris. Louis-Philippe called to power. Establishment of the Orleans monarchy.  
 August-September. Revolt of the Belgians against King of Holland.  
 November. Outbreak of the Polish Revolution.  
 " Resignation of Wellington. Lord Grey's Ministry formed.  
 December. Death of Bolívar.  
 Revolutions in Germany.  
 Risings in Central Italy.  
 Victor Hugo's *Hernani*.
- 1830-3 Beginnings of French colonisation in Algeria.
- 1830-44 Completion of the German Zollverein.
- 1831 January. Protocols of London recognising the independence of Belgium.  
 February. Battle of Grochow near Warsaw.  
 " Election of Pope Gregory XVI.  
 February-March. Rising in the Papal States.  
 March. The ministry of Casimir Périer takes office.  
 April. Abdication of Pedro I, Emperor of Brazil, and accession of Pedro II.  
 " Accession of Carlo Alberto in the Sardinian Kingdom.  
 May. Polish defeat at Ostrolenka.  
 July. Prince Leopold of Saxe-Coburg becomes King of the Belgians.  
 August. Dutch invasion of Belgium. French intervention.  
 September. Entry of Russian troops into Warsaw. End of the Polish Revolution, and of the constitutional kingdom of Poland.

- 1831 October. Treaty of the Twenty-four Articles.  
 November. Revolt of Mehemet Ali and invasion of Syria by his son Ibrahim.  
 Mazzini founds the society of "Young Italy."
- 1832 May. European recognition of the new Greek State.  
 " Death of Casimir Périer.  
 June. The English Reform Bill passed.  
 July. Dom Pedro's expedition lands in Portugal.  
 November. French expedition to Antwerp.  
 Publication of Ranke's *Historisch-politische Zeitschrift* begun.  
 Rosmini's *Cinque Piaghe della Santa Chiesa* and Silvio Pellico's *Mie Prigioni*.
- 1832-3 Siege of Oporto.
- 1832-8 French troops in Ancona.
- 1833 January. Otto, King of the Hellenes, lands in Nauplia.  
 April-May. Convention of Kiutayeh between the Sultan and Mehemet Ali.  
 May. Convention of London between Holland and Belgium.  
 July. Treaty of Unkiar Skelessi between Russia and the Porte.  
 " Napier destroys the fleet of Dom Miguel off Cape St Vincent.  
 Miguelist defeat at Piedade. Dom Pedro enters Lisbon.  
 September. Convention of Münchengrätz betw. Russia, Prussia, and Austria.  
 " Death of Ferdinand VII of Spain.  
 October. Convention of Berlin between Russia, Prussia, and Austria.  
 Chile establishes a presidential system of government.  
 First English Factory Act, and Act for the Abolition of Slavery, passed.
- 1834 April. Quadruple Alliance between Great Britain, France, Spain, and Queen Maria II of Portugal.  
 May. Dom Miguel leaves Portugal.  
 July. Carlist war begins in Spain.  
 November. Dismissal of Melbourne, and formation of Peel's Ministry.  
 English *Poor Law Amendment Act* passed.
- 1835 March. Death of Francis I of Austria and accession of Ferdinand I.  
 April. Melbourne's return to office.  
 June. French defeat on the Macta.  
 December. French victory at Mascara.  
 English Municipal Reform Act.  
 Strauss' *Leben Jesu*.
- 1836 September. Revolution in Lisbon.  
 December. French victory at Tlemcen.  
 Tithe Commutation. Establishment of the Ecclesiastical Commission.
- 1836-7 Risings in Canada.
- 1837 June. Death of William IV and accession of Queen Victoria. Separation of Great Britain and Hanover.  
 " Treaty of the Tafna.  
 October. French capture of Constantine.  
 November. Religious struggle in Germany. Arrest of Archbishop of Cologne.
- 1838 Publication of the *Charter*. Irish Poor Law passed.  
 Lord Durham Governor-General of Canada.
- 1839 April. Final recognition of the independence of Belgium.  
 " Turkish invasion of Syria.  
 May. Peel resigns on the Bedchamber Question.  
 June. War between the Sultan and Mehemet Ali.  
 July. Death of the Sultan Mahmud.  
 Completion of the French conquest of Algeria.

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- 1839 Beginnings of State-control of Education in England.
- 1840 June. Death of Frederick William III of Prussia.  
" End of the Carlist War in Spain.  
July-Aug. Convention of London and intervention of the Powers against Mehemet Ali.  
October. Abdication of the Spanish Regency by Queen Cristina.  
Marriage of Queen Victoria and Prince Albert of Saxe-Coburg-Gotha.  
Act for the Government of Canada passed.
- 1841 May-June. Regency of Espartero in Spain.  
June. Peace between the Porte and Mehemet Ali.  
July. *Protocole de Clôture* and *Protocole des Détroits*.  
August. Peel Prime Minister.
- 1842 January. Revolution in the Portuguese government.  
November. Treaty of the Hague between Holland and Belgium.
- 1843 Gioberti's *Primato morale e civile degli Italiani* and Balbo's *Speranze d'Italia*.
- 1845 The Protest of Rimini.  
Gioberti's *Prolegomeni al Primato*.
- 1846 May. Revolution in Portugal.  
June. Accession of Pope Pius IX.
- 1847 July. Convention of Gramido ends the civil war in Portugal.

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